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Key Generation and Storage in Hardware Compact Ease of Deployment Upgradeable and Extensible Secure Storage Benefits Specificati

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Key Generation and Storage in Hardware Compact Ease of Deployment Upgradeable and Extensible Secure Storage Benefits Specificati SOLIDid™ PRODUCT RANGE Benefits The SOLIDid™ tokens forms part of the Key Generation and Storage in Hardware SOLIDguard range of cyber security products. The SOLIDid™ tokens are • Offers the ability to perform on-board key generation, encryption and other cryptographic processing portable USB based PKI cryptographic • Ensures that cryptographic keys and functions cannot be compromised or altered by malware or devices that offer industry leading other attacks features and functionality covering a wide range of information and cyber Compact security applications. • Small and rugged, with a tamper-resistant construction for extra security As a USB based extension of smart card technology, the SOLIDid™ makes Ease of Deployment use of advanced cryptography to provide security for certificate-based • Units are easily carried around on a lanyard or as key-fob authentication, verification, signing and encryption. Upgradeable and Extensible • Offer the ability to securely upgrade and extend the supported feature sets as required No other token solution currently on • Ensure that tokens can be upgraded to address any future security vulnerabilities or attacks the market provides the wide range of • Provide the ability to add new algorithms and features as they become available cryptographic algorithms, curves and key sizes provided by the SOLIDid™. Secure Storage Typical uses of the SOLIDid™ includes • The SOLIDid 5000 has a built-in 1Gbyte storage area. Data saved to the disk is encrypted and only accessible after a PIN code is entered. The SOLIDid 6000 makes provision for a user provided micro secure multi-factor authentication; SD card encryption and digital signing of emails and documents; digital certificate, key and password storage; and on-board key generation. Specifications The two models offer support for a wide Product Information variety of customer applications for the SOLIDid 5000 SOLIDid 6000 most demanding portable cryptography applications. The devices interface with a PC or laptop USB port and in the case of the SOLIDid™ 6000, using either Product Image Bluetooth or Near Field Communication. As a FIPS 140-2 Level 3 validated solution, Product Code SID5000 SID6000 the SOLIDid™ 5000 provides additional physical security protecting against unauthorized tampering. Encrypted Storage SOLIDid 5000 SOLIDid 6000 Both products offer a hardware based • SD card slot providing encrypted • 1 GB of on-board encrypted storage true random number generator for Storage Size storage up to 32 GB for files and other data improved security of on-board key • SD Card not included generation. • Encryption activated by Fingerprint Activation • Encryption activated by PIN code match and/or PIN code • Read @ 32 M bits/s, Write @ 4.5 M • Read @ 4.5 Mbit/s, Write @ 2.8 M bits/s Performance Unlike many other cryptographic tokens, bit/s (typical) (typical) the SOLIDid™ 6000 can be securely upgraded by the user, giving users the Interfaces flexibility to change in step with the ever-changing demands of the modern SOLIDid 5000 SOLIDid 6000 • USB A type connector information security world. • USB C Type connector USB Connection • Supports USB 2.0 Interface (High • Supports USB 2.0 interface (Full Speed) The SOLIDid™ is designed for use Speed) with all Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) • 8 x 8 mm Fingerprint capacitive sensor Fingerprint Sensor --- • On device matching of up to 3 environments and as such supports a fingerprint profiles wide array of cryptographic algorithms Bluetooth --- • Bluetooth BLE 5.0 and APIs along with a host of different operating systems. NFC --- • Reserved for future use Cryptographic Functions SOLIDid 5000 SOLIDid 6000 • Encrypt/decrypt • Encrypt/decrypt • Sign/verify • Sign/verify • Digest • Key generation • Key generation • Wrap/unwrap • Derive Supported Cryptographic APIs SOLIDid 5000 SOLIDid 6000 • PKCS#11 • PKCS#11 • PKCS#15 • PKCS#15 • Microsoft CSP (CAPIv1) & KSP (CAPIv2) • Microsoft CSP (CAPIv1) & KSP (CAPIv2) • Microsoft PC/SC • Microsoft PC/SC • Apple Native PC/SC • Apple CryptoTokenKit Random Number Generation (RNG) SOLIDid 5000 SOLIDid 6000 • Hardware True Random Number Generation (TRNG) • True random number generator (TRNG) compliant with NIST 800- • On-board RNG based on RBGs specified in SP 800-90 90B15, AIS-31, and FIPS 140-2/315 • (HASH, HMAC, CTR) and ANS X9.62-2005 (HMAC) Certificate and Key Storage SOLIDid 5000 SOLIDid 6000 • 100 objects, e.g. 50 keypairs or 100 certificates. • 10 x keypairs/certificates, • 5 x symmetric secret keys Digital Signing SOLIDid 5000 SOLIDid 6000 • RSA (PKCS#1) • RSA (PKCS#1) • DSA (FIPS-186) Hash Digest SOLIDid 5000 SOLIDid 6000 • SHA1 2 • SHA256 • SHA2 256, 384, 512 • MD5 2 Asymmetric Algorithms SOLIDid 5000 SOLIDid 6000 • RSA 2 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096 • RSA 1024, 2048 • DSA 2048/224, 2048/256, 3072/256 • Diffie-Hellman 2048, 3072, 4096 • ECC, ECDSA, ECDH (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) • Primary: 224, 256, 384, 521 • Kolbitz: 233, 283, 409, 571 • Binary: 233, 283, 409, 571 • Brainpool curves available as add-on Symmetric Algorithms SOLIDid 5000 SOLIDid 6000 • AES 128, 192, 256 - ECB, CBC, CFB, OFB, CTR, CCM, GCM, XTS • AES 128 - CBC • TDES-EKE (Triple DES) - ECB, CBC, CFB, OFB Supported Applications SOLIDid 5000 SOLIDid 6000 • Windows Smart Card Logon • Windows Smart Card Logon 1 • Microsoft Office: Word, Outlook, PPT and Excel • Microsoft Office: Word, Outlook, PPT and Excel • Microsoft Office and Outlook for Mac • Microsoft Office and Outlook for Mac1 • Adobe Acrobat Reader • Adobe Acrobat Reader • Mozilla Thunderbird, Firefox • Mozilla Thunderbird, Firefox 1 • Apple Mail • Apple Mail 1 • TrueCrypt / VeraCrypt • TrueCrypt / VeraCrypt 1 Should support any application which supports the above listed Should support any application which supports the above listed Cryptographic APIs Cryptographic APIs Certifications, Standards & Classifications SOLIDid 5000 SOLIDid 6000 • FIPS 140-2 Level 3 (HSID5000A) • RoHS • RoHS • IPX7 • IPX7 • CE • CE Power Supply and Batteries SOLIDid 5000 SOLIDid 6000 • USB powered; no battery required • 100 mAh LiPo battery included • Rated for one week operational and 1 month standby • Recharge via USB port Mechanical / Electrical / Environmental SOLIDid 5000 SOLIDid 6000 Size • 70mm x 20mm x 10mm • 60mm x 35mm x 13mm Weight • 22g • 18g Temperature • Operational 0°C to 50°C/Storage -20°C to 60°C • Operational 0°C to 50°C/Storage -20°C to 60°C Humidity • Operational 0% to 80% non-condensing • Operational 0% to 80% non-condensing 1 Planned TM: A Certification Mark of NIST, which does not imply product 2 Some algorithms not available in FIPS mode endorsement by NIST, the U.S. or Canadian Governments. Rev 01 76 Regency Drive | Route 21 Corporate Park | Irene x 72 | South Africa www.etion.co.za T: +27 12 678 9740 | F: +27 12 345 2561 | E: [email protected].
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