Post-Reversion Okinawa and U.S.-Japan Relations
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ヌ U.S.-Japan Alliance Affairs Series No. 1 May 2004 Post-Reversion Okinawa and U.S.-Japan Relations A Preliminary Survey of Local Politics and the Bases,1972-2002 Robert D. Eldridge Post-Reversion Okinawa and U.S.-Japan Relations A Preliminary Survey of Local Politics and the Bases, 1972-2002 Robert D. Eldridge ________________________ U.S.-Japan Alliance Affairs Division Center for International Security Studies and Policy School of International Public Policy, Osaka University May 2004 我胴やちょんわどの Wada ya chon wadu nu 儘ならぬ世界に Mama naran shike ni 彼ようらめゆる Ari yu urami yu ru よしのあるい Yushi nu arui --本部按司、19世紀 In a world full of obstacles, One cannot steer his course at will. Why should I think ill of others, When they fail to suit me? --Prince MUTUBU Anji, 19th Century Table of Contents I. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………1 Purpose of Study Previous Research Materials Used Structure of Study Final Remarks and Acknowledgments II. Overview of Politics and Social Dynamics in Okinawa following Reversion………………7 A. The Reformist Years, 1972-1977 B. The Conservative Shift, 1977-1988 C. The Return of the Reformist Wave, 1988-1997 D. Accommodation, or the Return of the Conservatives, 1998-2002 E. Politics after 2002: Beyond the 30th Anniversary of the Return of Okinawa III. The Okinawa Base Problem and U.S.-Japan Relations after Reversion…………………. 58 A. U.S. Bases at the Time of Reversion B. Ensuring Land Usage—the Repeated Crises over Legislation for Compulsory Leasing C. The Arrival of the Self Defense Forces D. Base-related Frictions in the 1970s E. Base-related Frictions in the 1980s F. Base-related Frictions in the 1990s G. The 1995 Rape Incident and its Implications H. The SACO Agreement and Its Implementation I. The SOFA Dilemma IV. Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………….129 V. Appendices…………………………………………………………………………………133 Basic Documents Appendix 1 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (1/19/60) Appendix 2 U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement (1/19/60) Appendix 3 Okinawa Reversion Agreement (6/17/71) Appendix 4 List of Facilities at Time of Reversion (Memorandum of Understanding) Appendix 5 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (7/8/76) Appendix 6 East Asia Strategic Initiative (4/18/90) Appendix 7 East Asia Strategy Report (7/92) Appendix 8 East Asia Strategy Report (2/27/95) Appendix 9 Improvement of SOFA Implementation (10/2795) Appendix 10 U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security (4/17/96) Appendix 11 SACO Interim Report (4/15/96) Appendix 12 SACO Final Report (12/2/96) Appendix 12a SACO Final Report on Futenma Air Station (supplement) Appendix 13 Revised Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation(9/23/97) Appendix 14 East Asia Strategy Report (11/23/98) Appendix 15 Prefecture SOFA Revision Request (8/29/00) People in U.S.-Japan-Okinawa Relationship following Reversion i Appendix 16 Post-Reversion Japanese Prime Ministers Appendix 17 Post-Reversion Japanese Foreign Ministers Appendix 18 Post-Reversion Japanese Ambassadors to the United States Appendix 19 Post-Reversion Directors of North American Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Appendix 20 Post-Reversion Japanese Ambassadors for Okinawa Affairs Appendix 21 Post-Reversion Defense Agency Directors General Appendix 22 Post-Reversion Directors of Defense Facilities Administration Agency Appendix 23 Post-Reversion Japanese Defense Facilities Administration Bureau (Naha) Directors Appendix 24 Post-Reversion Commanders of 1st Combined Brigade, Naha, SDF Appendix 25 Post-Reversion Directors of Okinawa Development Agency Appendix 26 Post-Reversion Chairman of Okinawa Special Committee of Diet Appendix 27 Post-Reversion U.S. Presidents Appendix 28 Post-Reversion U.S. Secretaries of State Appendix 29 Post-Reversion U.S. Ambassadors to Japan Appendix 30 Post-Reversion U.S. Consuls General in Okinawa Appendix 31 Post-Reversion U.S. Secretaries of Defense Appendix 32 Post-Reversion III MEF Commanders Appendix 33 Post- Reversion Governors and Prefectural Leadership Appendix 34 Directors of Base Affairs Office, OPG Appendix 35 Post-Reversion Prefectural Assembly Speakers Appendix 36 Post-Reversion Prefectural Assembly Base Committee Chairpersons Appendix 37 Post-Reversion Chairmen of Prefectural LDP Appendix 38 Post-Reversion Chairmen of Prefectural JSP/SDP Appendix 39 Post-Reversion Chairmen of Prefectural JCP Appendix 40 Post-Reversion Chairmen of OSMP Appendix 41 Post-Reversion Chairmen of Komeito Consultation Committees Appendix 42 Meetings of the Tripartite Liaison Committee (1979- ) Appendix 43 Meetings of the Okinawa Policy Committee (1996- ) Appendix 44 Meetings of the Futenma Replacement Facility Committee (2000-2002) Other Data Appendix 45 Base-related Revenues in Okinawa Appendix 46 Summary of USMC Community Relations and Volunteer Activities Appendix 47 Base-related Crimes Committed by SOFA Personnel Appendix 48 Overviews of trends in voting participation Appendix 49 Changes in Okinawan Public Opinion on Bases Appendix 50 Population and Households in Okinawa Appendix 51 Population Density in Okinawa Appendix 52 Population Growth in Okinawa Appendix 53 Ration of Unemployed in Okinawa Appendix 54 Layoffs of Military Base Workers Appendix 55 Number of Tourists and Tourism-related Income in Okinawa Appendix 56 Gross Prefectural Domestic Product by Industry Appendix 57 Economic Growth Rates in Okinawa Appendix 58 Comparison in Reductions of U.S./SDF Bases in Japan and Okinawa About the Author About the Center for International Security Studies and Policy ii I. Introduction revision of the 1960 Status of Forces Agreement, which symbolizes for Okinawans the“victimization”of Okinawa by the United Purpose of the Study States and the“weak-kneed diplomacy”of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs for not The so-called“Okinawa problem”historically “standing up”to the United States, grow in has been, currently is, and will likely continue intensity, literally, by the day. to be an issue that challenges policy-makers, Meanwhile, the U.S. Department of politicians, and civic leaders well into the Defense is in the final stages of completing a future. major review of its global posture, including The Okinawa problem, not to mention forces in Japan and the Asia-Pacific, which will Okinawa itself, is full of contradictions and have implications for Okinawa for years to certainly not one-dimensional in nature. The come (to what degree remains unclear). As part fundamental issues (bases, economic of this review, Secretary of Defense Donald H. development, social and administrative Rumsfeld visited Japan in mid-November 2003, integration with Japan, relations with the and went to Okinawa on November 16, being central government) inherent in the problem the first Defense Secretary to go there in more can be seen across years and decades, forming than 13 years. Governor Inamine Keiichi met seemingly endless cycles and patterns. At the Rumsfeld with a list of demands for resolving same time, frustratingly, no one solution seems the different base issues that he proceeded to to exist because the issues are so intertwined. read off during their meeting at the Prefectural Indeed, the“Okinawa Problem”is a like a knot. Government office.1 In late April 2004, during If you pull one string too hard, the knot only a meeting in Washington with leaders of the gets tighter. Untying the knot that the Okinawa ruling parties in Japan, Rumsfeld reportedly problem has become during the post-reversion stated that“ the concerns of the people of years (1972~ ) continues to require patience Okinawa Prefecture would also be taken into and skill (assuming the actors wish to move consideration”in the realignment planning.2 beyond simply the status quo), especially in an How policy-makers formulate answers to emotionally and politically charged these issues over the coming months will set the atmosphere. tone—hopefully one that is more positive and In 2004, for example, the return of Marine forward-looking—for the decades ahead. The Corps Futenma Air Station, agreed to in 1996 answers will reflect and be developed in light remains unrealized due to, among other things, of the many dimensions of the Okinawa local opposition to its relocation within the problem-- intra-community dynamics, prefecture. In April this year, residents in Nago, intra-prefectural politics, prefecture-central the site of the planned relocation, and government affairs, and Okinawa-Japan-U.S. representatives of citizens’ groups, clashed with relations, and a constantly changing officials who were about to start a drilling international environment. In light of these survey from the Defense Facilities complex issues, efforts to further the Administration Bureau in Naha, an organization that represents to Okinawans both a source of personal prosperity and a symbol of 1“Promoting Resolution of Issues Concerning U.S. Okinawa’s “victimization” by the central Military Bases on Okinawa,” government. Similarly, strong opposition of http://www3.pref.okinawa.jp/site/contents/attach/4587/ local residents has been seen to the planned Petition20031116.pdf . construction of an Army urban conflict training 2“Beigun Saihen: Bei Kokubochokan‘Kenmin Hairyo facility in Camp Hansen, set to be completed Mo’(U.S. Military Realignment: U.S. Secretary of within a year’s time. Defense [says]‘Concerns of People of Prefecture [Also On the other hand, demands by the to be Taken into Consideration]’,”Ryukyu Shimpo, May Okinawan Prefectural Government for the 30, 2004. 1 understanding of the historical and assembly, mayoral, and national Diet), contemporary aspects of the so-called“Okinawa base-related matters, and complicated dynamics problem”are vital.3 between Okinawa and the central government The following study was undertaken (as well as vis-à-vis U.S. representatives). precisely as an attempt both to begin to fill the Likewise, the study does not attempt to propose gap that exists in the literature regarding the extensive policy recommendations—again, the post-reversion history of Okinawa and more author has done this elsewhere—but rather to importantly to understand this history and what provide a better grasp of the events of it means for the contemporary importance in Okinawa following its Okinawa-Japan-U.S.