McNair Scholars Journal

Volume 9 | Issue 1 Article 10

2005 Resistance to U.S. Economic Hegemony in : Hugo Chávez and Rachel M. Jacques Grand Valley State University

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Recommended Citation Jacques, Rachel M. (2005) "Resistance to U.S. Economic Hegemony in Latin America: Hugo Chávez and Venezuela," McNair Scholars Journal: Vol. 9: Iss. 1, Article 10. Available at: http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/mcnair/vol9/iss1/10

Copyright © 2005 by the authors. McNair Scholars Journal is reproduced electronically by ScholarWorks@GVSU. http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/ mcnair?utm_source=scholarworks.gvsu.edu%2Fmcnair%2Fvol9%2Fiss1%2F10&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages Resistance to U.S. economic hegemony in Latin America: Hugo Chávez and Venezuela

Abstract Introduction Recent years have seen increasing opposition On April 11, 2002, a group of to U.S. political and economic influence in senior military officers stormed the Latin America. Venezuela is a key player in presidential palace in Caracas, the the South American economy. This project capital of Venezuela. They ousted the researches the country’s history from the leftist president, Hugo Chávez, and 1950s to the present and the role of the replaced him with the more conservative U.S. in its formation. Through political Pedro Carmona. The coup had the economy, this study asks if recent political support of the business community, changes are due to the effects of U.S. policies the upper classes, the mass media, and in Venezuela. The research examines tacit support from the U.S.; however, the relationship between the two nations the de-facto government was short and the development models proposed lived (Cooper, 2002; Hellinger, 2003; by the Chávez government. The paper García-Guadilla, 2003; Parenti, 2005). considers alternative models of economic Thousands of the nation’s poor filled development, independent from U.S. the streets demanding that Chávez be political hegemony. restored to office while, in a surprising move, branches of the Venezuelan military acted to support rather than Rachel M. Jacques suppress the movement. After two McNair Scholar days of massive protests, Carmona stepped down and Chávez returned to power. Scholars Steve Ellner and Daniel Hellinger (2003) claim that this scenario “has no equivalent in Latin American history” (p. ix). No equivalent in Latin American history? Such a strong assertion, as well as the media controversy over Chávez and his “,” are what spur research on this topic. What has happened in Venezuela to create such controversy, and what does it mean? The goals of this project are two-fold. The first is to investigate recent changes in Venezuelan society since the election of Hugo Chávez, putting them in a historical context that reveals their root causes. This enables one to see beyond the rhetoric and romanticism of street protests and coups, making sense of social and economic changes that may appear at a glance to be chaotic. The second goal is to develop a theoretical interpretation of these national changes George Lundskow, Ph.D. that is grounded in a global framework. Faculty Mentor Globalization has been changing the way people understand the concepts of community and economy; therefore focusing on the national level alone is

GVSU McNair Scholars Journal VOLUME 9, 2005 81 insufficient. Careful attention has been was founded in 1958 with the Pact of power with nature, rather than with paid here to the colonial history of Punto Fijo, an agreement that established the people: “the nation’s social body Latin American countries – this history an electoral democratic system after became more marked as the passive continues to shape development and years of dictatorship and coups. The beneficiary of its natural body, seen politics of power in the region, and it is new arrangement was designed to bring now as the main source of the nation’s my belief that present-day inequalities together democracy, oil nationalism, powers” (Coronil, 1997, p. 168). It is stem from its legacy. Upon looking at and economic development in a project in this context that one can understand the case of Venezuela, I argue that the that cast the state as distributor of oil Venezuela’s economic system of statism. revolutionary program proposed by rent money (Coronil, 2000; Hellinger, Such systems, internally-focused and Chávez is not so shocking given the 2003). In the electoral system, two less open to foreign investment, were history and structure of Venezuela’s dominant parties shared power – the common from the 1930s to 1960s in political-economic system. I also submit social democratic Acción Democratica Latin America and the United States. that, despite its shortcomings, the (AD) and Christian democratic Comité Statist philosophy maintains that the program offers policy changes that are de Organización Política Electoral state should create the conditions for necessary for the development of regional Independiente (COPEI). The two parties industrial development and strategic sovereignty for South America and for alternated in power uninterrupted for strength (Kelly & Romero, 2002). This a sustainable system that is inclusive of nearly four decades. was the goal of the Pact of Punto Fijo, previously marginalized Venezuelans. The According to historian-anthropologist which organized the state to be the “revolution” that Chávez brought with Fernando Coronil (1997), Venezuelan manager of its natural resource wealth. his presidency may well be a middle- democracy was distinctive because The close relationship between the road model that defies both traditional of its fusion of resource wealth with state and industry in this model meant capitalist and state-socialist models. political power. With this combination, that the government derived most of he says, citizens could expect to both its revenue from the oil industry. Oil History participate in the political system and drilling had begun in 1914, expanded Traditional democracy: The Punto Fijo system benefit from the natural wealth of the quickly throughout the 1950s, and For decades, Venezuela was considered country’s resources. Furthermore, he when Venezuela nationalized its oil by many to be an “exceptional” nation, describes how the nation could be industry in 1976, it represented the both because of its prosperous economy thought of as having two parts: a “social culmination of the Punto Fijo project and because of its governmental system body” made of its people and political (Hellinger, 2003). After the oil embargo similar to that of the United States organization, and a “natural body” made by the Arab states of OPEC, global (Coronil, 2000; Ellner, 2003; Kelly & of its physical resources. This split was oil prices skyrocketed, making for Romero, 2002). The political structure significant because it aligned political windfall revenues to oil-exporting nations world-wide. (See Figure 1.) Indeed, Venezuela received more money Figure 1. International crude oil prices from 1978 to 2005 (Source: Oil Energy) during this boom than all of Europe did under the Marshall Plan (Coronil, 1997). The surge in income allowed the Venezuelan government to further its statist agenda. It increased spending on social programs and infrastructure projects, and from the oil industry grew a prosperous middle class. A sharp decline in oil prices after the 1970s began to erode the middle class and forced the government to borrow heavily to maintain its social spending. This caused Venezuela (and numerous other Latin American export-based economies) to accumulate massive debts, the effects of which are still felt today.

82 Resistance to U.S. economic hegemony in Latin America: Hugo Chávez and Venezuela It is critical to understand how the in Venezuela was to create a society If the Punto Fijo system is analyzed bond between governmental institutions in which the population expected in this light, the failure of Venezuela to and oil money shapes the economic the state to distribute the wealth create a sustainable economy did not and social progress of the country. of its export, despite the lack of result only from mismanagement by Statism and Import Substitution productivity and organization on the party leaders, but also from the structure Industrialization were common in other part of the population (Parenti, 2005; of the political-economic system itself. It Latin American countries as well, but Kelly & Romero). Ever since 1936, is well-documented that the system was the high revenues brought in by oil (as the government has touted its goal of marred by corruption, and the struggle opposed to other primary-good exports) “sowing the oil,” the phrase for using to be rid of it continues (Maya, 2003; were what had helped to bolster the nation’s oil wealth to establish Roberts, 2003; Gott 2001; Coronil, Venezuela’s exceptional image. productive enterprises in other sectors. 1997; Munckton, 2005; Parenti, 2005). The country’s failure to “sow the Corruption was visible when Carlos The demise of Punto Fijo and the statist oil” does not surprise Coronil (1997), Andres Pérez, president for the first model: Long-term causes however, who argues that Dutch Disease time during the late-seventies oil boom, The exceptionality was not an inherent is a misnomer. He says that it should suffered two separate coup attempts national characteristic, however, and in be renamed the “Third World” or “Neo- during his second term in 1992. The the last decade Venezuelans watched colonial Disease,” pointing out that coups failed, but Pérez was impeached as their system of 40 years came apart it is “an epidemic in the monocrop on counts of corruption the following at the seams. There are both long-term economies of the third world” that year. In the 1993 presidential elections, and immediate reasons for the decline, seldom afflicts nations of first-world the abstention rate was 39%, the both of which must be acknowledged status (Coronil, 1997, p. 7). He also highest in Venezuelan history (Buxton, to understand the current situation. argues that the Dutch Disease does 2003). These events, and others to The long-term economic and political not give a satisfactory explanation of follow, served to reinforce a widespread factors leading to the demise of the decline of the economy because discontent with the party system, which puntofijismo have to do with the efficacy the real causes are beyond mere had caused them in the first place and legitimacy of the system. Scholars mismanagement. The economic and (Coronil, 2000). disagree over which factors were most social downturn that took place after Partly as a result of the corruption, important, though there is a general the boom of the 70s had to do with the benefits of oil money were not consensus that the system was in decay. over-reliance on oil, but the overall enjoyed equally by all Venezuelans. Some believe that the main cause was decline was the result of structural and Political power in the democracy was a matter of economic mismanagement. cultural deficiencies in the country. The strictly centralized in the two parties Terry Karl (as cited in Hellinger, Punto Fijo government was not really and was distributed on the basis of 2001; as cited in Ellner, 2003) blames a democratic revolution that eliminated patron-client relationships. Unlike the Venezuela’s economic failure on the the oligarchs of the past, as the national ideology that cast each citizen as part reliance on oil to sustain the economy. mythology led people to believe. Rather, land-owner (Coronil, 2000), not all of She argues that oil-exporting nations Coronil (1997, 2000) claims, it was a the population shared in the prosperity suffer a phenomenon known as the compromise on the part of the elite to of oil sales. The biggest beneficiaries of “Dutch Disease,” a problem that occurs transfer political power to the electorate national wealth were those who were when booms overvalue currency and while maintaining the privileges of best positioned to take advantage of weaken other sectors in a domestic wealth and influence. political institutions in the patronage market. A single-export based economy system – these tend to be urban is also vulnerable to fluctuations in Just as oil wealth had allowed the dwellers of upper-class status and market prices, which can be disastrous concentration of political power in White/European ethnic origins. Political when they fall. the figure of the president during access has been especially difficult for As Kelly and Romero (2002) point [previous military dictatorships], Indigenous and Black Venezuelans, out, high prices can also be disastrous. it made it possible for the ruling minorities who were not protected by High revenues can lead to over- democratic parties to monopolize the constitution prior to 1999 (Becker, confidence (“an atmosphere of easy political and economic power and 2004). Even in 2000, the top 10 percent money”) and corruption (Kelly & to exert extraordinary influence of the population received half of the Romero, p. 149). The boom’s impact over society. (Coronil, 2000, p. 35) national income (Gott, 2001).

GVSU McNair Scholars Journal VOLUME 9, 2005 83 Acknowledging the sources of had been elected for another term by a continuing commitment to the anti- the economic decline, it must be Venezuelans who opposed free-market party cause, and his apology left an emphasized that the erosion of living or neoliberal reforms (Buxton, 2003; impression in the minds of the public, standards began far in advance of the Márquez, 2003). Contrary to his social who were not accustomed to hearing tumultuous events of the 1990s. After democratic platform, Pérez shocked political figures accept blame for their international oil prices plummeted in the nation by embracing the policies he failures (Parenti, 2005; Gott, 2001). the 1980s, Venezuela had borrowed had decried in the 1970s. In what has While the military coup tactics failed, heavily to maintain its funding for been dubbed “The Great U-Turn,” he Chávez returned after his release from social programs and services. Loans did announced on February 16 that he had prison to organize a coalition that not secure social spending, however. already made an agreement with the could oust the dominant parties in a During the neoliberal economic International Monetary Fund (IMF) to presidential electoral bid. As the Punto adjustments of the late 1980s, countries implement liberalization measures. Fijo regime faded, various smaller aimed to decentralize the government Shortly after his announcement the parties came on board to form the Polo and economy through financial Bolivar was deregulated and the price Patriótico (Patriotic Pole), a coalition deregulation and privatization of state of petroleum shot up by 100%. This for what had become the Movimiento enterprises. However, these measures placed an immediate burden on bus Quinta República or Movement for the only exacerbated poor conditions. In drivers living in the crowded shanty Fifth Republic (MVR). In 1998, Chávez Venezuela, social spending decreased towns around Caracas. To cover costs, ran on the platform of writing a new from 8 percent of GDP to 4.3 percent they doubled bus fares, and on February constitution and leading the nations of (Roberts, 2003), and with the decreased 27, commuters rioted in response, South America in an original direction national income came impoverishment sending a wave of protests through the that would unite and strengthen the and a widening income gap. Julia countryside in a matter of days. It took region (Gott, 2001). After the MVR Buxton (2003) reports that poverty grew five days to quell the revolt, known as did well in local elections, COPEI and from 36% to 66% from the mid 80s to the Caracazo, and this single event has AD desperately moved to endorse the mid 90s, shooting from 43.9% to 66.5% had a lasting impact on Venezuelan independent Salas Römer one week in the year between 1988 and 1989. At society. Pérez later explained that his before the election. It was not enough the height of political crisis in the mid decision was due to the desperate need to sway the election, and Chávez 1990s, the general poverty rate was at for foreign investment. Acknowledging won the presidency by a 56 to 39.9 86% (Buxton). The middle class had that the decision was unpopular, he said percent margin (Hellinger, 2003). The shrunk and civil society increasingly that Venezuelans “…must understand new constitution was drafted by a lacked organization. This was especially that these are unavoidable. There was constituent assembly and approved by a true of organized labor; as the economy no other way out” (Gott, 2001, p. 51). referendum vote in 1999. grew less formal, the traditional, more The riots were the country’s first mass productive enterprises of industry and expression of class-based unrest since Politics and policy in the era of agriculture waned while service jobs, the 1930s and marked the end of Using legitimate means to take power short-term and informal employment passivity on the part of the public. has not guaranteed an easy time for had become prominent. These trends Like the Caracazo, the failed coups Chávez and his administration. The show that the economic decline came in of 1992 were also turning points. The opposition has been fierce since his first a number of ways and occurred over an first attempt was led by Hugo Chávez election, marching en masse afterward to extended period of time. Frías, a young officer who had been demand both his ouster and a recall vote involved in revolutionary organizing on the basis that the election had been The demise of Punto Fijo and the statist within the military academy. When he rigged. Supporters have also turned out model: Immediate causes and the coup supporters were arrested to fill the streets, marching in defense of Immediate factors signaled the fall of the for treason, he made a one-minute Chávez’s legitimacy and celebrating the traditional system as well. The coups televised statement in which he told his anniversary of his inauguration. Both of 1992 and impeachment of Carlos comrades to put down their arms and opponents and supporters continue to Andres Pérez were not the only visible took responsibility for the failure. He protest, voicing opinions about chavista evidence of the decline; other events declared to the public that por ahora policies and programs. The stark split illustrated the increasing social unrest (for the time being), their objectives had between those who revere the president and disillusionment. In 1989, Pérez not been reached. This phrase signaled and those who despise him makes for a

84 Resistance to U.S. economic hegemony in Latin America: Hugo Chávez and Venezuela polarized and volatile political climate 2002; Hellinger, 2003). Pedro Carmona, a practical attempt to provide jobs and (Ellner & Hellinger, 2003; García- the man chosen as interim president services and a political attempt to show Guadilla, 2003; Roberts, 2003). during the coup, had been the head the MVR party as a joint civil-military Increased polarization can be seen of Fedecámaras, the nation’s leading organization (Buxton, 2003; Hellinger, in political parties, labor groups and business association. Even during the 2003; Roberts, 2003). A series of other civil organizations, but class divisions anti-government oil strike/lockout of projects, or missions as they are called, are what most clearly distinguish 2001, the majority of worker organizing have been initiated more recently, pro- from anti-governmental factions. was done by unionized labor, which addressing the foundations for social Chávez’s support comes predominantly is imbedded in the clientelist political welfare and a sustainable economy. from the peasant and working classes. system; workers in the informal sectors Two of the most successful missions According to a Datanalysis poll, in the continued working (Hellinger, 2003). have been for health care and education. 1998 presidential campaign Chávez A New York Times editorial affirms the Misión Barrio Adentro (Inner-City received the strongest support from source of opposition, saying that Chávez’ Mission, roughly) has been providing youth, men and lower classes (as cited opponents do not speak for the majority health care with the help of over 20,000 in Hellinger, 2003). In a subsequent of the population. Referencing his Cuban medics; it is reported to have race against Francisco Arias Cárdenas, victory in the 2004 recall referendum, done over 185 million consultations the class distinction was again very clear, the editorial attributes Chávez’ victory and saved over 25,000 lives (Munckton, with Arias receiving support from 2/3 to the fact that his programs address 2005). The program has been criticized of the wealthy and middle-class sectors, the concerns of the poor, who have by Venezuelans who fear the influence Chávez from a majority of the poorest “felt like the neglected stepchildren of of Cuban communism; others regard it social sectors (Hellinger, 2003). And as the country’s oil boom” (“Hugo Chávez as nothing more than social work (“Oil, noted, the reversal of the 2002 coup wins,” 2004). The referendum had been missions,” 2005). Social work in the was due in large part to the immediate called for by opponents on the basis realm of education is being provided response of crowds from the poor of fraud, but after auditing the results by Misión Ribas (), a barrios (Hellinger, 2003). Chávez’s win was endorsed by both the program that offers free adult education. As Chávez continues to pay particular Organization of American States and the It serves Venezuelans who haven’t attention to the poor and to the U.S.-based Carter Center (Forero, 2004). been able to attend high school due to Indigenous and Black communities, his economic hardship; it offers stipends approval ratings have grown immensely. Domestic agenda in the new order: to poor students and flexible hours for The 1999 constitution brought changes The Missiónes those who are working. The program by offering protection of land and Despite the fierce opposition, the graduated over 20,000 people in June, resources for Indigenous communities, administration has won seven national and 210,000 people are expected to have official status for Indigenous languages, referendums, succeeding in passing been graduated by the end of this year. and the reservation of three deputy seats a new constitution and initiating a Most have already enrolled in Misión in the National Assembly for Indigenous number of social programs. With the Sucre, which provides people with free representatives (Becker, 2004). In two stated goal of forming its own model university education (Munckton). polls, Chávez’s support has grown to a of “21st century socialism” or a “social, Other missions address issues of range of 53% to 70% and support for humanist, egalitarian economy” (“Oil, food, land reform and housing. Food the opposition has shrunk to a range of Missions,” 2005), the government’s sovereignty is the goal of Misión Mercal, 10% to 27% (“And now your,” 2005). purpose with the projects is to give a project of state-run supermarkets. Conversely, it is in the ranks of the more Venezuelans access to land, Twenty five thousand Mercal stores middle and upper classes that the most education, health care and a means hold 60% of the food market and opposition is found. The opposition of livelihood (Parenti, 2005; “Oil, source food from government-owned rallies and marches during the brief Missions,” 2005). cooperatives. This is a strategic move 2002 coup were organized in the more One of the first major projects was toward food sovereignty for a country affluent areas of eastern Caracas. The “Plan Bolívar 2000,” a civil-military that imports the vast majority of its coup itself showed where opposition public works project in which military food (Munckton, 2005). lay: it was supported by a faction of personnel worked to improve sanitation, Likewise, land reform is a crucial military officers, business elites and the health, transportation, housing, and component of food sovereignty. privately-owned mass media (Cooper, other public infrastructures. It was both Government projects have been started

GVSU McNair Scholars Journal VOLUME 9, 2005 85 to address rural land access issues, contest the government’s decision. As part of the broader Project which is urgent in a land where the According to Bruce (Apr 29, 2005), PAIS (Poblaciones Agro-Industrialies population is concentrated in urban officials in charge of the reform say that Sustentables, or Sustainable Agro- centers. The situation is precarious; the goal is “effective but peaceful land Industrial Populations), Chávez is according to The Economist, 75% of reform” (para. 23), which involves only combining the missions with job farmland is owned by less than 5% of partial expropriation; the government training and the formation of worker landowners (“And now your,” 2005). says that it would like for the ranchers cooperatives. The goal is to encourage The government claims that the country to continue using part of the land for re-settlement of the countryside by cannot grow enough food to feed its cattle ranching. creating centers of development that citizens, and its newly-created National The Chávez administration is also contain clinics, schools, and workshops Lands Institute has begun a review of trying to address urban land issues. for the production of goods (“Oil, latifundio, or large estates, for possible The Housing Mission is giving titles to missions,” 2005; Gott, 2001; Munckton, redistribution (Bruce, Apr 29, 2005). poor Venezuelans who have been living 2005; Parenti, 2005). The projects are The government has asked hundreds on plots for years, often in homes they reported to have benefited 70% of the of firms to provide proof of title back built themselves (“Venezuela to offer,” population thus far (“Venezuela politics,” to 1848; failure to do so may result 2005; Munckton, 2005). Additionally, 2005; Munckton, 2005). However, all in distribution of plots of land to the government is building low-cost of Chávez’s projects have been made campesinos for small-scale agriculture housing and providing subsidies and possible by unusually high international and farming cooperatives. At the time credits to help pay for the homes. oil prices, over $65US per barrel at the of this publication only two estates have Chávez has promised to build half a time of this paper. (See Figure 2.) Time had land expropriated, one of which million homes by next year, with hopes will tell if the projects have succeeded in is a cattle ranch owned by the British of completely solving the housing crisis “sowing” the oil money, or if they have Vestey Group. Parts of the ranch have in 17 years. He has admitted, however, merely spent it. The future of Chávez’s been occupied by peasants for several that so far they have fallen short of the agenda remains uncertain. years. In March of this year, however, mark, saying that housing “is one of the Chávez’s programs may also appear the government declared failure of the most serious [problems] that Venezuela inadequate because poverty rates have firm to provide adequate proof of title. faces. Our revolution has provided some not decreased since reforms began. This clears the way for the government answers but they’re really not enough” The statistic from the Miami Herald to provide permanent titles to dozens of (“Venezuela to offer,” 2005). In the last (as cited in Weisbrot, 2005) is often families already living on the land under five years, only 91,000 homes have quoted by opponents that the poverty provisional titles. The move is opposed been built, not enough to house the 26 rate grew from 49% in 1998 to 53% by ranchers, who have 60 days to legally million who have inadequate housing. in 2004. The figures are correct, but they do not necessarily depict what Figure 2. Global crude oil prices over 2-year span (Source: U.S. Department of Energy) is taking place in society as a whole. Others counter that the poverty rate had begun to decline in 2003, and living standards for the lowest 84% of the population have increased by one third after accounting for inflation (Datos Information Resources, as cited in Munckton, 2005). According to Weisbrot (2005), statistics on household poverty do not include non-cash income of the poor such as subsidized food, health care and housing. Furthermore, he says that these kinds of subsidies have dramatically improved quality of life for the majority Note: WTI (West Texas Intermediate) and Brent are particular types of crude oil of Venezuelans. Because of this, he that are used as references for quality (Elf, 2005). argues, one must take into account the

86 Resistance to U.S. economic hegemony in Latin America: Hugo Chávez and Venezuela different kinds of changes in resource 2005, para. 16). Chávez has also used class issues to the forefront of political distribution that are happening in the Organization of American States dialogue in Venezuela. Because the Venezuela in order to compare the and the United Nations as sounding traditional balance of power has been effectiveness of Chávez’s policies. boards for building regional unity and for unequal, the creation of a more inclusive defense of political actions. In an hopeful system will necessarily require the International agenda statement in a March meeting between political elite to sacrifice some privilege. The missións are attempting to improve Chávez and heads of state from Brazil, Land reform, proportional representation quality of life for Venezuelans on the Colombia, and Spain, Chávez said that “a and government-subsidized social domestic front. As a direct result of new geopolitical map is forming on the services are just a few examples of how a the missións, millions of Venezuelans horizon,” one “without confrontations” better balance of power may be created. are receiving food and land, forming (“Presidente Chávez,” 2005, para. 8). If productive enterprises such as worker worker cooperatives for production of cooperatives can be sustained, they goods for the domestic market, and Discussion may also be the key to the country’s have more access to a high school and Class relations within Venezuelan society sustainable non-oil economy. college-level education. But international It seems quite possible that a new Most Venezuelans were prosperous relations also play an important role in geopolitical map is on the horizon for during the oil boom of the 20th Chávez’s Bolivarian vision. When he ran Latin America, though it is not likely to century. The problem was that it was for president, Chávez promised changes be free of confrontations. As illustrated, not a sustainable prosperity nor was that would protect the country from the a fierce debate rages between supporters it, as many had believed, the reward negative effects of globalization (Kelly and opponents of Chávez. Both sides for their exceptional self-governance. & Romero, 2002). A key part of his have claims that are legitimate; thus in With citizens content to rely on the plan to revive the nation is encouraging order to understand the situation it is government for distribution of resources, cooperation among countries in South not enough to take a side, one must they were not required to be active America and the Caribbean, outside understand what is at stake for those beyond participating in elections. This of the influence of the United States. on different sides of the debate. Also, poses a problem today as the country Venezuela’s increasing involvement the struggle is taking place in both the tries to wean itself off of its reliance in the Andean Community, OPEC, national and international arenas. on oil and spur productivity in other and neighboring countries shows his As discussed above, most of Chávez’s areas. As the planning and development commitment to regional integration opponents are of privileged social status minister, Jorge Giordani, told The Nation: and international trade, though moves and class. As a result, their privilege is such as oil contracts with Cuba have at risk with the success of the MVR’s We’ve been fighting political battles not been well-received by the U.S. Even policies. The Punto Fijo government, for most of our time in office. Many yet, Venezuela has remained a reliable while far more democratic than the people have learned to read in the supplier of oil to the United States and is dictators and military regimes that last few years, but how long will still a major importer of U.S. goods. preceded it, was a system that remained it take for them to work in high Economic integration is just one part of by and for the wealthy. The reason that technology, or medicine, or services? the plan to strengthen the region; cultural Chávez was able to gain power and Three years? A generation? We are and political coordination form the other. that his revolutionary programs have fighting a very individualistic, rentier This summer the government (along been relatively well-received is that the culture. Everything has been ‘Mama with Argentina, Uruguay, and Cuba) majority of the population was and state, Papa state, give me oil money.’ launched a new Latin American television is seeking radical change (Hellinger, To organize people is extremely network, Telesur, which is meant to 2003). Coronil’s observation (1997, hard. (as cited in Parenti, 2005, p. 5) provide a venue for media from a Latin 2000) that the system appeared, but American perspective. Andres Izarra, was not fully inclusive is important. This problem is not easily placed on Telesur’s president, describes the project Political power has consistently been any one individual or institution, but as “an initiative to integrate through reserved for the upper class status and on a confluence of factors in Venezuela’s communication the different countries of people of European descent – never history. The root causes of economic the region [and] an essential pre-requisite for Indigenous or mixed ethnicity, until decline were many, and as a result for closer political and economic links Chávez (Becker, 2004). What Chávez solutions will necessarily take time. across Latin America” (Bruce, Jun 28, did with his electoral bid was bring Chávez seems to be trying to address

GVSU McNair Scholars Journal VOLUME 9, 2005 87 this by requiring that communities and Mercosur as an “alternative to accusing his government of using oil organize in order to receive aid from globalization” (p. 39). This is only money to “destabilize its democratic the government. One attempt at this accurate if globalization is defined neighbors” while “financing extremist organization is the proliferation of narrowly, as what has been dubbed and antidemocratic groups” in the “,” which are small, the “Washington Consensus” or the region (“EEUU envió informes,” 2005). civilian-led local groups formed to model of U.S.-led neoliberal capitalism. Chávez was quick to rebuke the United broaden participation in and support Globalization should not be limited States, defending his commitment to for the Bolivarian cause (Maya, 2003; to the design of first-world schools democracy. Citing the history of U.S. García-Guadilla, 2003; Parenti). In of thought, however. Chávez has said intervention in the region, he called order for there to be true and long- that his project is “neither statist nor the memorandum “a slap in the face” lasting transformation, however, local neo-liberal,” that they are “exploring (“EEUU envió informes”). community organizing must continue the middle ground, where the invisible Despite this tension, Chávez has by Venezuelans of all political bents. hand of the market joins up with the not completely rejected nor attacked Education as well will play a key role, if visible hand of the state: as much state the historical ally of his country. He the educational missiónes are carried out as necessary, and as much market as is critical of U.S. intervention, as he in a way that cultivates active and non- possible” (Gott, 2001, p. 172). It is is seeking ways for nations in the partisan citizenship. clear both by the government’s efforts region to resolve their own conflicts to strengthen ties with neighboring and determine their own style of Changes in global dynamics of power nations and its enthusiastic involvement involvement in global affairs. Given Because no nation exists in complete with international trade that it is not that there is a well-documented history isolation in today’s world, power opposed to globalization. It cannot be of U.S. involvement in Latin American relationships must be transformed on anti-capitalist either, as evidenced by affairs, including the coup attempt on the global level as well. The relationship the way that Chávez has maintained Chávez in 2002, his wariness is perhaps between nations of first- and third- constitutional protection for capitalist justified. Relations were not helped by world status has historically been one elements such as private property rights the recent television broadcast of U.S. of inequality, and for all its wealth as and foreign collaboration with the state Reverend Pat Robertson, who called for an oil-exporting nation, Venezuela oil industry. the assassination of Chávez on the basis has not managed to escape this. What seems more likely is that that he had “destroyed the Venezuelan Extraction of resources by colonial Chávez is seeking a model of economy” and will make the continent powers was followed by extraction involvement in the global economy “a launching pad for communist of resources by first-world consumer that puts Venezuela first – a model that infiltration and Muslim extremism” markets, and finally loans that required will raise the standard of living for the (Borger & Campbell, 2005, p. 1). But radical structural adjustments ravaged poor and empower the country and the condemnations of these statements the fragile society. For economic region, rather than continue the failed already voiced by citizens of the United development to benefit everyone in neoliberal model that was destructive States will hopefully serve to ameliorate South American nations, serious strides in its implementation. It should come the situation. must be made to give the poor access as no surprise that most Venezuelans Certainly problems exist with to institutions of power and democratic have rejected the orthodox economic Chávez’s authoritarian tendencies; decision-making. How Venezuela is model championed by the United States, for the sake of limiting the scope of represented in international forums, because it did not benefit them. this paper, I have not attempted to institutions, and in mass media will Once this distinction is made, elaborate on his reported disrespect for do much to determine the role the it becomes easier to understand the civil rights of his opponents and country will have in determining its Chávez’s harsh treatment of the U.S. members of the private media. What development agenda. in his rhetoric. His inflammatory anti- I do assert is that we must be careful Though it is often portrayed as such, Americanism is often the focus of media not to think that the scenario is simply chavismo cannot be easily dismissed attention, as with his denunciation one of democracy versus dictatorship, as anti-globalization, anti-capitalist or of a U.S. memo to the nations of because this is misleading; it obscures even anti-American. Kelly and Romero CARICOM in June. The memo asked the problem of poverty and political (2002) cite regional integration in CARICOM nations to encourage Chávez exclusion that was the impetus for the the form of the Andean Community to respect democratic institutions, changes Chávez promises.

88 Resistance to U.S. economic hegemony in Latin America: Hugo Chávez and Venezuela The extent of the “Revolution” models, people who have been held The pressure that South American in third-world status will need to have countries face to modernize by the same more leadership roles in development. model as the United States and Western Venezuela today is pioneering a model Europe has created a clash of cultures of economic development that breaks that has yet to be reconciled because with the past orthodox models of as of yet no one side has prevailed. statism and capitalism. Those who This seems to be the question posed live in the “first-world” would do by Venezuela’s “revolution.” Chávez’s well to glean fresh insights from the policies for economics, international experiments of communities to the relations, and development have serious South. Not only are they sure to impact implications both for Venezuelans the future of global economic relations, and for how the world conceives but their experiments may provide of development. They have similar helpful models for even the most implications for how the U.S. conceives successful nations, as all countries will of its role in the hemisphere as a face rapid change and uncertainty in the leader and mediator. In the interest globalizing world. of sustainability and more egalitarian

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