Indian Navy, Or the Government of India

m m m National Maritime aritime aritime aritime Foundation P P P maritime ER ER ER SP SP SP PERSPECTIVES EC EC EC TIVES TIVES TIVES 2018 Edited by

2018 VICE ADMIRAL PRADEEP CHAUHAN CAPTAIN (DR.) GURPREET S KHURANA Edited by C V I A C P E T

A A D I N M ( I D R R A .) L

G P R U A R D P E R E E P E

T C S H A Rs. 600.00 K U H H U A ISBN 978-81-932998-6-9 R N A

National N Maritime A Foundation Varuna Complex, Airport Road, NH-48, New Delhi-110 010 9 788193 299869

Edited by Vice Admiral Pradeep Chauhan Captain (Dr.) Gurpreet S Khurana MARITIME PERSPECTIVES 2018

Edited by Vice Admiral Pradeep Chauhan and Captain (Dr.) Gurpreet S Khurana

First Published in 2019

Fully referenced versions of the essays are available at NMF website www.maritimeindia.org

ISBN: 978-81-932998-6-9

Rs. 600.00

The editors acknowledge the contributions of Ms. Richa Klair, Research Support Associate NMF for compiling the essays and of NMF Research Interns Ms. Arushi Painuly, Mr. Mohit Kumar and Mr. Abhijeet Nagpal for copy editing the volume.

The views expressed in this volume are of the individual contributors and do not represent the official policy or position of the National Maritime Foundation, the Indian Navy, or the Government of India.

Published by: National Maritime Foundation Varuna Complex, Airport Road, NH-8, New Delhi-110 010

Printed by: Alpha Graphics 6A/1, Ganga Chambers, W.E.A., Karol Bagh, New Delhi-110005 Mobile : 9312430311 Email : [email protected] Foreword

A review of geo-political trends in recent years clearly indicates that the year 2018 has been an especially momentous one, particularly in respect of India’s pursuit of her maritime interests within the ‘Indo-Pacific’. Notably, the first formal articulation, at India’s apex-political level, of the country’s concept of the ‘Indo-Pacific’, was unequivocally made by the Hon’ble Prime Minister Narendra Modi, at the 2018-edition of the Shangri La Dialogue, held in Singapore in June of this year, when he explained that it extended “…from the shores of Africa to that of the Americas”, in the process, defining India’s strategic geography in this part of the world. The year that has only just gone by also witnessed substantive strides — by a variety of ministries, departments and agencies of the Government of India and a number of private, non-governmental structures as well — towards providing form and substance to both, the Government’s ‘Act East’ Policy and the Prime Minister’s vision of SAGAR (Security And Growth for All in the Region). As a consequence, substantial progress has been made in realising India’s enormous potential as a major maritime power, as also in progressing India’s transition to a Blue Economy. Against this busy maritime backdrop, I am delighted to note that the National Maritime Foundation (NMF) continues to persevere with its excellent practice — initiated four years ago — of collating and compiling its annual web-publications into an edited-book that can be perused and savoured at each reader’s personal convenience. This year’s compilation of ‘Issue Briefs’ and ‘Commentaries’ on topical strategic, and operational issues that bear upon the maritime domain provides an attractive albeit kaleidoscopic sprinkling of contemporary developments within the Indo- Pacific. The essays amply indicate that India’s economic, security and geopolitical environment remains in a state of dynamic flux, posing multifarious challenges for national policymaking, but simultaneously providing numerous opportunities for India to further advance its cooperative and collaborative maritime endeavours with its immediate, extended and strategic maritime- neighbourhood. I am confident that this compilation would help lay-readers and serious scholars alike, in discerning the emerging trends of this region, thereby catalysing and promoting further thoughtful deliberations and policy-relevant analyses. All this would, of course, admirably serve to further the Foundation’s overarching objective to promote maritime awareness among the broader strategic community and public at large. I congratulate the authors of the essays contained in this issue of ‘Maritime Perspectives’ and wish all its readers a happy and healthy 2019 and beyond. Jai Hind!

Admiral RK Dhowan PVSM, AVSM, YSM, IN (Retd) Chairman National Maritime Foundation Contents

Foreword 5

Maritime Concepts

Revisiting ‘SAGAR’ – India’s Template for Cooperation in the 13 Indian Ocean Region G. Padmaja

Remoulding Maritime Culture in the Indian Mind 20 Asma Masood

The Focus is on the Indo-Pacific 24 Captain (Dr) Gurpreet S Khurana

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation — The Maritime Potential 30 of a Continental Construct Adarsh Vijay

Vizhinjam Port: A Maritime-Strategic Capital? 33 Adarsh Vijay

Maritime Security

Community-Engaged Maritime Secuirty: Beyond ‘Eyes and Ears’ 43 Commander Himadri Das

Lakshadweep Islands: From Fragility to Stability 48 Adarsh Vijay

7 BIMSTEC and Maritime Security: Issues, Imperatives and the Way Ahead 52 Captain (Dr) Gurpreet S Khurana

Ten Years after ‘26/11’: A Paradigm Shift in Maritime Security 60 Governance in India? Commander Himadri Das

Cyber-Warriors for Cyber-Space: What we can learn from the US Navy 68 Rear Admiral Sudarshan Shrikhande (Retd)

Naval Power

Indian Navy’s ‘Camping’ Expeditions in the Indian Ocean Region 73 Commodore RS Vasan, IN (Retd.)

COMCASA – Wind-Vane of Indian Foreign Policy?! 77 Rajesh Soami

Japanese Naval Diplomacy in the Indian Ocean: Prospects and Possibilities 81 Seetha Lakshmi Dinesh Iyer

Relevance of Aircraft Carriers for India: An Assessment 85 Captain (Dr) Gurpreet S Khurana

“Aircraft Carriers: Glug Glug Glug…..”: Really? Significance of Carrier Borne 97 Airpower for India Commander Dinesh Yadav

Indian Navy: A Force for Good and a Partner in Peace 102 Rana Divyank Chaudhary

8 China/ East Asia

“Comfort” Women and the “Uncomfortable” East Asian Geopolitics 109 Shahana Thankachan

China’s Growing Influence in Africa: Lessons for India 116 Jyotishman Bhagawati

Five Years of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) : Revisiting BRI 124 in tandem with the Malacca Dilemma Noor Bhatnagar

Another Chinese Takeover in the Indian Ocean Region? 133 Rajesh Soami

Political Crisis in Sri Lanka: China and the Maritime Dimension 137 Dr. Jabin T. Jacob

Maritime Law

China’s approach to the Freedom of Navigation: No-Sail Zones 147 Jayesh Mathur

India and the Protection of its Overseas Nationals 153 Himanil Raina

Legal Aspects of the 25th November, 2018 Kerch Strait Incident 161 Himanil Raina

Employment of Unmanned Maritime Systems in the Indo-Pacific: 170 Legal Implications and the Way Ahead Suriya Narayanan

China and the South China Sea Arbitration: Analyses in the 174 Indo-Pacific Context Hamsa Devineni and Captain (Dr) Gurpreet S Khurana

9 South East Asia

India and Indonesia: Converging Maritime Interests in the 185 Confluence of the Oceans Surbhi Moudgil India and Myanmar: Prospects of Maritime Reciprocity 193 Adarsh Vijay 25 Years of India - ASEAN Economic Cooperation 198 Anjelina Patrick

India-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation Prospects 202 Surbhi Moudgil Maritime Cooperation as a Thrust Area between India and Indonesia 207 Premesha Saha India and Indonesia: Strengthening Maritime Relations 211 Sahima Gupta

Geopolitics

Trump’s Trade War: A New Threat to the ‘Quad’ 217 Rajesh Soami

An Opening for India in the Maldives 221 Rajesh Soami

Should India Bail Out Debt-Ridden Maldives? 224 Rajesh Soami

The Karachi Attack: Looking Beneath the Surface 228 Maitreyee Shilpa Kishor

India again fails in the UN to Condemn Terrorism: 231 A Relapse into an Old Disease Rajesh Soami

10 Maritime Concepts

Revisiting ‘SAGAR’ – India’s Template for Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region

G. Padmaja *

The month of March 2018 marks three Assembly of Mauritius to commemorate years since the Indian Prime Minister the island nation’s Independence Day Narendra Modi first enunciated India’s Interestingly, Modi spoke about SAGAR vision for the Indian Ocean Region that very day, but not in the Mauritius (IOR) commonly known by its acronym National Assembly. He did so on the - SAGAR (Security and Growth for All occasion of the commissioning of the in the Region). In a well thought out Indian built Offshore Patrol Vessel strategic move, Modi first spoke about (OPV) Barracuda in the service of the SAGAR, not in India but in Mauritius. National Coast Guard of Mauritius. Since then, every discourse on India’s This OPV would be used by Mauritius foreign policy, including maritime to police its vast Exclusive Economic policy, necessarily finds a mention of Zone (EEZ) against piracy, smuggling, SAGAR. illegal fishing, drug trafficking and to provide logistical support for search and This issue brief revisits SAGAR and rescue operations. examines its main policy statements. In doing so the essay seeks to understand The OPV MCGS Barracuda was the manner in which these proposals the first ever warship built in India for were breaking new ground. export, based on the specific design requirements of the buyer country, SAGAR – India’s Vision for the Indian which in this case was Mauritius. It was Ocean Region built by India’s defence PSU (Public On 12 March 2015, the Indian Prime Sector Undertaking) Garden Reach Minister Modi addressed the National Ship Builders and Engineers Limited

13 (GRSE) in Kolkata. It symbolised a new of Indian shipping, fishing, seaborne beginning for India’s defence industry trade, energy supply, assets and resources sales; and the ships final destination in the maritime domain and Indian being Mauritius, indicated the island citizens who are working overseas. nation’s geo-strategic importance in the Given the seamless connectivity in Indian Ocean. the maritime domain, instabilities anywhere would impact India’s The Indian Ocean has over forty maritime security too. As per SAGAR, littoral states bearing over 40 per cent of India seeks to deepen economic and the world’s population. It is through the security cooperation with its maritime IOR that two-thirds of the world’s oil neighbours and assist in building shipments; one-third of the world’s bulk their maritime security capabilities. cargo; and half of the world’s container For this, India would cooperate on traffic transit. Also 90 per cent of India’s the exchange of information, coastal trade by volume and 90 per cent of its surveillance, building of infrastructure energy imports transit through these and strengthening its capabilities. Next, waters. Peace and security in the Indian India believes that it is only through Ocean is thus critical for both economic collective, collaborative and cooperative prosperity and social stability of most approaches that peace can be advanced nations in the world, including India. in the region. In this context, an Modi christened India’s vision for association like IONS (Indian Ocean the Indian Ocean Region as SAGAR Naval Symposium), an Indian initiative which in the Indian language of Hindi established in 2008 and which brings means the ‘sea’ and when expanded, together 35 navies in the region; and stands for – Security And Growth for the India-Sri Lanka-Maldives Trilateral All in the Region. According to this established in 2013 is important. vision, India would do everything to Such mechanisms strengthen efforts safeguard its mainland and islands and to counter non-State actors engaged defend its interests. Further, India will in piracy, terrorism, other crimes and also work to ensure a safe, secure and natural disasters. Further, India seeks stable IOR. Though the Prime Minister an integrated approach and cooperative did not elaborate, it is implied that these future, which will result in sustainable interests include the safety and security development for all, in the region. India

14 opines that the Indian Ocean Rim First, by choosing to speak from Association (IORA) has an important Mauritius and not India, Modi was role to play in this context. Bringing addressing all the littoral countries of out the importance and centrality the IOR. The policy proposals spelt out of the ‘Blue Economy’ to India, the in SAGAR were not entirely a break Indian Prime Minister said that the from the past. However, they were blue chakra or wheel in India’s national presented as a cohesive organic whole flag represents the potential of the for the first time. SAGAR effectively Blue Revolution or Ocean Economy. demonstrated the linkage between Lastly, Modi stated that those who are maritime cooperation, maritime security resident in the region, i.e., in the littoral and economic development. The result countries have the primary responsibility was an Indian vision and initiative for for peace, stability and prosperity in the Indian Ocean Region which was the Indian Ocean. With other nations inclusive, collaborative and respected who have strong stakes in the region, international law. India engages through dialogues, visits, Second, while defense and security naval exercises, capacity building, relations had been important pillars of capability enhancement, and economic bilateral cooperation with some of the partnerships. Prime Minister Modi IOR countries like Seychelles, Mauritius categorically stated that India stands and Maldives; India now intended to for respect for international maritime expand strategic partnerships with other rules and norms by all countries and the IOR littorals in Asia and Africa too and peaceful resolution of maritime issues. SAGAR provided the mechanism to do SAGAR, therefore was an inclusive so. vision with politico-economic-security Third, through SAGAR, India also cooperation and respect for international wanted to stress upon the relevance of maritime laws. regional mechanisms. In this context SAGAR stressed the critical role of SAGAR - Breaking new ground IONS, an Indian initiative which has This section analyses the manner in 35 navies as its members; and IORA, which SAGAR was an important established in 1997 to facilitate and landmark in India’s maritime diplomacy. promote economic cooperation. It is

15 important to note that at the IORA’s manner through its capacity building Council of Ministers meeting held and capability enhancement programs. in November 2011 in India, the Following SAGAR, many bilateral visits association decided to focus on six were undertaken by the apex Indian specific areas. These were maritime leadership including the President, Vice- safety and security, trade and investment President and Prime Minister to the facilitation, fisheries management, Indian Ocean littoral countries wherein disaster risk management, science & maritime cooperation was stressed. In technology cooperation, and lastly fact, the Indian President Ram Nath tourism and cultural exchanges. These Kovind was on a bilateral official visit six areas indicated a holistic and to Mauritius and Madagascar from 11 integrated approach to development in to 15 March 2018. Significantly, his the IOR. first bilateral official visit abroad, upon taking over as the 14th President of Fourth, it was during Modi’s three India was to the Indian Ocean littoral- nation bilateral visits to Seychelles, Djibouti. This visit was undertaken in Mauritius and Sri Lanka in March 2015, October 2017. that the SAGAR vision was first shared with the world. These official visits were Fifth, to understand the manner in important because an Indian Prime which SAGAR breaks new ground, it Minister was making a bilateral visit to needs to be examined not in isolation, Seychelles after 34 years, to Mauritius but as part of a larger set of events, all after 10 years and to Sri Lanka after of which point to India’s maritime 28 years. By undertaking these visits, resurgence. Some of the important Modi emphasized India’s commitment events which preceded SAGAR, at the highest political level to peace, included India’s Look East Policy stability and development in the IOR. being upgraded to Act East Policy in Modi’s visits underlined that maritime November 2014; India accepting the co-operation is a by-product of strong award of the International Tribunal on bilateral relations. SAGAR indicated, the Maritime Boundary Arbitration the leadership role and responsibilities, between India and Bangladesh in July India was ready to take in the region 2014 and thereby demonstrating that it is on a long-term basis in a transparent a law-abiding country; Project Mausam

16 which focused on maritime heritage and For example, on 16 August 2017 the maritime routes being announced in Indian-built Water Jet Fast Patrol Vessel June 2014. Some of the events which CGS Valiant was commissioned into followed SAGAR included Modi’s June Mauritius National Coast Guard; in 2015 bilateral visit to Bangladesh with March 2016, ten fast interceptor boats maritime cooperation as an area of focus had been inducted; and in December wherein blue economy, coastal shipping 2016 CGS Victory was commissioned and maritime security were discussed; and two Chetak helicopters were India’s initiative to invigorate new inducted. In September 2017, India life into BIMSTEC; the first edition handed over Indian Coast Guard of the maritime exercise between the Ship Varuna to Sri Lanka. The ship Indian and Australian navies called was re-christened as Suraksha and AUSINDEX being held off the coast of commissioned into the Sri Lankan Coast Visakhapatnam in the Bay of Bengal in Guard in October 2017. In Seychelles, September 2015; an International Fleet the Coastal Surveillance Radar System Review (IFR) conducted by the Indian was operationalised in March 2016. Navy at Visakhapatnam in February Here too the patrol vessels gifted by 2016 wherein 50 countries participated; India help safeguard their vast EEZ. release of the SAGARMALA Perspective India also concluded agreements on Plan in April 2016, which seeks to defence cooperation with the Indian accelerate economic development in the country by harnessing the potential Ocean littorals in Africa. of India’s coastline and river network; Lastly and most significantly, the USA-Japan-India trilateral Malabar SAGAR brought to focus the increasingly naval exercises took place off the coast critical role that the Coast Guard agencies of India in July 2017; further at all of the Indian Ocean littorals will play in forums India focused on the potential of ensuring security of their respective vast Blue Economy ; and also that India is a EEZs for facilitating economic activities ‘net maritime security provider’ in the based on blue economy. The Abu Dhabi Indian Ocean Region. declaration of January 2014 on Blue Sixthly, post-SAGAR, India actively Economy highlighted the contribution continued to pursue its program of of fisheries in providing food security capacity building initiatives in the IOR. and sustainable livelihoods; marine

17 based tourism as a source of decent SAGAR, however, could have been employment and contribution to enunciated only by a country having poverty alleviation; ocean as a source a strong navy. Thus, while SAGAR of hydrocarbon and mineral resources resonates a benign vision, it is also and; oceans as the primary medium of in the same breath a policy of naval global trade through shipping and port power projection. Ironically, it is also facilities. SAGAR too has prioritised Blue an admission of the fact that given the Economy. A multiplication of activities nature of the maritime medium, it is only related to Blue economy will call for a through cooperation and collaboration more vigilant and efficient role of the with other littorals that any strong navy coast guard agencies of the IOR littorals. can effectively discharge its duties. For, only when maritime security is The critical relevance of SAGAR assured, will the blue economy, which is emerges when seen in conjunction with both capital and skill intensive, be able India’s other policies impacting the to attract the required investments. maritime domain like Act East Policy, SAGARMALA, Project Mausam, SAGAR was a response to the harsh India as a ‘net security provider’, reality that instability in the maritime focus on Blue Economy, etc. which environment anywhere would not symbolise India’s maritime resurgence. enhance India’s own maritime security SAGAR, contributes to the effective and its national interests. SAGAR implementation of all these policies by therefore sought to create and shape acting as an enabler to create a positive a positive and favourable maritime environment in the IOR. environment. The paper proposes two initiatives Conclusion which can make SAGAR more effective. First, with the focus on blue economy in SAGAR propelled maritime issues to the all the Indian Ocean littorals, maritime centre of India’s foreign policy. It filled a security in the EEZ is a concern for all. In serious policy vacuum and highlighted this context the role of the Coast Guard the critical interdependent link between Agencies in all the Indian Ocean littorals maritime security, maritime cooperation becomes critical and will continue to and blue economy. expand. In this context, it is important

18 to note that since 1991, the coast guard to share its hydrological capability agencies of India and Maldives have been with the member states to enable conducting bi-annual exercises called better navigation and understanding DOSTI. In 2012, this was expanded to of marine topography. India has been include Sri Lanka and is referred to as assisting some of the IOR countries Trilateral Joint Coast Guard Exercises bilaterally in this field and preparing (Tri-DOSTI). Following SAGAR, this hydrological charts. The same should should now be expanded to include now be institutionalized, so that India’s the coast guard agencies of the IOR expertise in this field can reach all the littorals from Asia and Africa which IOR littorals in a structured manner number over 40. Coast Guard agencies irrespective of the nature of bilateral do not come with the baggage of power relations. Both the above initiatives will projection like it happens with the navy. result in a win-win scenario. The interactions among the coast guard However, SAGAR is most effective agencies of these countries will help in a scenario of positive bilateralism. in augmenting the operational level Presently India-Maldives relations are interaction and capacity building in areas going through a difficult phase. A few of search and rescue, pollution response, hiccups have also arisen regarding India’s maritime law enforcement, maritime infrastructural developmental activities safety and security at sea, sharing of best in the strategically located island management practises, and training of nation of Seychelles which need to be personnel through exchange programs. addressed. Sustaining positive bilateral It is important to note here that IORA relations on a long-term basis with the has only 22 members and many geo- Indian Ocean littorals will be a major strategically located IOR countries are challenge in implementing SAGAR. It not its members. Expanding Tri-DOSTI is in such a scenario that the role of the will overcome this limitation too. political leadership in India becomes Secondly, at the 1st IORA Leaders’ crucial to keep up the momentum of Summit in Jakarta held in March 2017, cooperation. India had said that it would be happy 25 April 2018

19 Remoulding Maritime Culture in the Indian Mind

Asma Masood*

A series of recent high-level visits to India by Indian schools indicates that these by foreign dignitaries have been making books have certain lacunae that need to news headlines. Significantly, several be addressed. There is a need among bilateral maritime agreements have been educational institutions in the country signed with France and Vietnam. These to project an oceanic view in addition to developmental events are reinforcing a standard geographic knowledge. This India’s maritime endeavours. However, can be done by studying the works of there is a scope for wider dissemination scholars who have dwelt on maritime of these developments in the public issues. Similarly, there is scope for the domain. An overview of the Central country’s history books to showcase Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) India’s past maritime adventures, and National Council of Educational notably those which occurred in South Research and Training (NCERT) syllabi Asia and Southeast Asia. A case in point reveals that there lies much potential is highlighting the naval pursuits of the and the need to incorporate India’s rich Cholas which took place during the 14th maritime culture in the country’s school century. textbooks. This commentary seeks to Fortunately, there is no dearth examine the imperatives and avenues of data resources when it comes to for sensitizing the Indian citizens to addition of information on India’s India’s rich maritime culture, and the maritime dynamics. Essays on India’s resurgence of its maritime power, with Maritime History, a publication by specific focus on the country’s youth. National Maritime Foundation (NMF), A study of the syllabi of geography enlightens readers on India’s vast textbooks currently being prescribed maritime trade networks which have

20 flourished during the past. According to contrast, India looks upon the Indian the book, these maritime linkages thrived Ocean as a region where all stakeholders amidst citizens across the globe, be it must coordinate towards common with the Romans, Arabs or East Asians. objectives. For instance, Delhi realizes The book also highlights other ancient that the success of SAGAR (Security and Indian maritime contours, including Growth for All in the Region) does not Maratha military naval power, the lie with India alone. All littoral countries spread of Buddhism and the exchange in IOR have a role to play in carrying of cultures. Given this context, NCERT out this initiative. (India would also and other educational bodies in India benefit if it describes its magnanimous can seek assistance from the country’s maritime moves in the country’s history think tanks, including NMF, which and geography textbooks.) For example, specialize in maritime research. This the books can narrate the move by move will add to the maritime outlook Delhi to accept the international verdict of textbook syllabi. favouring Bangladesh in a maritime boundary dispute case. This would One recalls the approach of China’s display a hallmark of India’s diplomatic educational curriculum. Across the goodwill, sound foreign policy and eastern nation, school children study principle of ‘Neighbourhood First’. from textbooks which declare the entire South China Sea as China’s territory. Besides, traditional economic This is clearly a long-term strategy principles in Indian textbooks can be worked out by Beijing. It would enable supplemented with maritime concepts. a strong sense of nationalism among the This is not merely an idealistic Chinese at an impressionable age, while recommendation. China is following encouraging China’s citizens to support the concept of Blue Economy with their country’s stand on the South China full steam. However, Beijing’s aim is Sea dispute. to achieve the number one status on the international stage, via the Belt and Chinese persons are hence accepting Road Initiative. their country’s claim over the entire South China Sea, and are thereby On the other hand, India has a supporting China’s disregard for nobler path to follow, albeit a longer international maritime obligations. In one. Namely, a genuine Blue Economy

21 which involves sustainable oceanic Secondly, greater participatory development. Environmental studies approach is required. Maritime are already a compulsory subject in consciousness emanates from the Indian school and college curricula. grassroots, especially among the coastal These textbooks may do well to add the areas. The fishing community’s youth are importance of sustainable development equal stakeholders. Their grievances need across borders, including the maritime to be addressed and discussed with youth domain. In addition, a credit system can from other educational or occupational be offered to college students for engaging streams. A top-down approach is likely in maritime-friendly practices where ever to see impediments, as seen in the case of feasible. Experiments can be conducted certain regional maritime initiatives such to build on policies and technologies as Mausam, SAGAR and Indian Ocean related to sustainable maritime space Rim Association (IORA). These fora, practices. These include fishing, can reach optimum levels of maritime deep-sea mining, energy exploration, regionalism if they are all-inclusive in maritime infrastructure, trade, logistics, their approach. engineering, software, mapping, satellite The onus of moulding maritime systems and healthcare. Another option culture lies not with the senior would be, the conducting of legal generations alone, but also among the summits by, for and of the youth on youth. This is a relatively hassle-free issues related to maritime boundaries or task today, given the advent of ICT arrest of fishermen in contested waters. and social media. Documentaries on While these avenues seem promising, maritime history, modern sea tales and certain obstacles must be overcome. the Indian Navy’s achievements can Firstly, a careful and moreover a factual be broadcast on television and online approach through the proper channels media/social media. NMF and other is required. This will ensure positive similar organizations may collaborate for receptivity from society while adding producing such programmes. College the topic of ‘maritime culture’ to India’s students can sail on brief sea excursions educational syllabi. Hence, negative to add variety to their experiences. accusations of hyper nationalism would The members of Young Minds of be eschewed. C3S, a youth forum, can also take up

22 the subject of maritime culture in their move will add value to India’s maritime research and seminar activities. Coastal might and enhance the IOR’s maritime regions’ governments may launch regionalism. schemes for exhibiting their states’ The ocean is a source of wealth, be maritime achievements. They may also it living and non-living resources. The involve youth in landlocked regions doors to harness these resources have in order to share maritime benefits been opened, thanks to the Indian with India’s inland states. New Delhi’s government’s Blue Economy initiative. measures such as the Africa-Asia Growth There is a need to collectively harness Corridor (AAGC) and the North-South the resources, while protecting the Transport Corridor (NSTC) should environmental harmony of the maritime be participatory. Awareness campaigns world. Indians can achieve this by may be conducted across the nation, in continuing to acknowledge, appreciate various educational and other youth fora, and build on their own maritime for enabling feedback and dissemination strengths, while the country sets out of knowledge. This will ensure that into the ‘Maritime Century’. China’s Maritime Silk Road (MSR) is effectively countered. Besides, the 02 May 2018

* Asma Masood is Research Officer, Chennai Centre for China Studies (C3S). The views expressed are her own and do not reflect the official policy or position of NMF or C3S.She can be reached atasma. [email protected]

23 The Focus is on the Indo-Pacific

Captain (Dr) Gurpreet S Khurana*

In the taxonomy of ‘Geopolitics’ and economic progress achieved by East and ‘Geo-strategy’, the prefix ‘geo’ refers South-East Asia in the past half century, to a country’s strategic geography, the ‘maritime underbelly’ of Asia - the which is the core underpinning of its ‘Indo-Pacific’ will surely surpass this ‘50 national-strategy. Geopolitics involves per cent’ ratio. the satiation of the country’s geo- The Genesis of ‘Indo-Pacific’ economic and other objectives, which are sought to be met through coherent The ‘Indo-Pacific’ idea is thus premised geo-strategies in various domains. The on the need for enhanced geo-economic military domain merely represents connectivity between the Indian and an ‘assurance’ and ‘insurance’ for Pacific oceans, shared prosperity, and effectiveness of the other ‘operative’ the attendant need for good order strategies. Notwithstanding the talk and strategic stability. It also involves about the ‘Rise of Asia’, the ‘Rise of the exerting restraining pressures upon Indo-Pacific’ may be a more accurate disruptive tendencies, of either state or conceptualization. Some centuries ago, non-state players. This idea germinated for much of the time, India and China about a decade ago, and involved a together contributed to more than half series of notable events. Amongst these of the global Gross Domestic Product. was the January 2007 Annual Dialogue The proportion fell sharply beginning between the Institute for Defence Studies the 18th Century due to the combined and Analysis (IDSA) and the Japan effects of the industrialization of the Institute for International Affairs (JIIA). Europe and the colonization of Asia, During the discussions, it was noted that but it is on the rise again. Given the the ‘geo-economic connect’ between

24 the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and discussed China’s strategic vulnerability the Western Pacific (Pacific-Asia) in - its energy lifelines transiting the Indian terms of the increasing dependence Ocean. The ‘Indo-Pacific’ idea was an of the East and South-East Asian on opportunity to showcase the Indian the natural resources of the IOR. Such Navy’s ability choke China’s jugular, dependence had begun some decades and thereby, dissuade its growing ago with the growing industrialisation assertiveness. This led to the publication of the economies in Pacific-Asia. of paper, titled ‘Security of Sea Lines: However, the ‘security connect’ was Prospects for India-Japan Cooperation’ a new development. For instance, in IDSA’s Strategic Analyses journal. since 2004, the Proliferation Security The paper introduced and explained Initiative (PSI) was launched by the US the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept, elaborating to counter the proliferation of Weapons on the vulnerability of Japan’s Sea of Mass Destruction (WMD), which Lines of Communication (SLOC). The operated across the entire maritime aim was ‘strategic communication’; to swath stretching from West Asia (Iran send a subtle message to China that and Syria) to North-East Asia (North its own SLOCs could be targeted if it Korea). During the Dialogue, China’s continued its behaviour of politico- increasing geopolitical assertiveness and military assertiveness. A few months growing influence in the IOR was also later in August 2007, the Japanese discussed. A couple of years earlier in Prime Minister Shinzo Abe addressed 2005, a US think-tank had reported the the Indian Parliament, speaking of ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean. the ‘Confluence of the Pacific and the Indian Oceans dynamic coupling as seas The Japanese were becoming wary of freedom and of prosperity’. In August of the increasing risks to their geo- 2016, Shinzo Abe expanded this vision economics interests in the IOR. The further to ‘free and open Indo-Pacific ‘. Indians were worried over the possibility of a permanent Chinese naval presence in How countries perceive the IOR. Both were equally anxious over ‘Indo-Pacific’ the fluidity of Balance of Power (BoP) in India maritime Asia, and how the new balance would affect their respective strategic India reoriented its geostrategic interests. The participants, therefore, orientation to the East nearly three

25 decades ago through its ‘Look East’ Policy footprint in the IOR; and consequently, of 1991. This is dictated inter alia by the the need for India to play a more active need for economic connectivity with Pan-Asian maritime security role, which India’s extended eastern neighbourhood, led to its call for India to be a regional ‘net good order at sea, and a credible strategic security provider’. The US thus expanded deterrence against China. However, the ‘Asia-Pacific’ nomenclature to ‘Indo- the effort was not effective enough. Asia Pacific’ (as an effort to maintainU S The Indo-Pacific concept of 2007 was, relevance as a resident power in Asia). therefore, also a subconscious effort to During his Asia tour in November 2017, support India’s vision. The idea did not the President articulated ‘Indo-Pacific’ gain traction until 2014, when India’s repeatedly. Whether or not being a PM provided policy ballast to it through reincarnation of the ‘rebalance to Asia’, his reinvigorated ‘Act East’ policy. his tone and tenor indicated a desire for an anti-China partnership, thereby Australia polarising the ‘Indo-Pacific’, which was not constructive. The recent move Australia perceives itself as key to the by the US Congressional Committee Indo-Pacific concept, long before the to rename the US PACOM to ‘Indo- concept gained traction. Its Defence Pacific Command’ is indeed a welcome White Paper of 2013 is the first-ever development, assuming that it would ‘official’ articulation of the concept in interface the Indian Navy with the the contemporary times. Interestingly, US Naval Forces, Central Command like the Japanese, the Australians have (NAVCENT). However, it reiterates envisioned a ‘free and open Pacific’, the rather narrow American world-view but their pictorial depictions do not on security and military power, which encompass Japan, reflecting the scope of needs to be reconsidered by Washington Australia’s geostrategic frontiers. DC.

United States ASEAN and EU Since 2010, the US realised that the Consequent to the US President’s ‘Asia-Pacific’ construct was inadequate articulation, the ASEAN and the to meet its geopolitical objectives; owing European Union (EU) have become to China’s increasing military strategic averse to the ‘Indo-Pacific’ idea. From

26 their shared perspective, President which is being expressed by the Chinese Trump’s articulation will force smaller analysts as the ‘Indo-Pacific gateway’. countries to take sides and involves a Indirectly, the Indo-Pacific concept has quasi-military alignment. However, also enhanced the legitimacy of Chinese driven by their national interests some military presence in the Indian Ocean. key ASEAN and EU countries like Vietnam, Indonesia, France and the The Geographical Scope UK are ‘on board’ the Indo-Pacific construct. During the IDSA-JIIA Dialogue of January 2007, the geographical scope of China the ‘Indo-Pacific’ was conceived as the IOR and the Western Pacific. However, China has been circumspect about ‘Indo- three notable variations have since Pacific’ since November 2012, when the emerged. The Japanese PM’s speech US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton of August 2007 covered the entire lauded India as an important player in Pacific Ocean right up to the Americas. the Indo-Pacific region. China has not The US may prefer to have the Indo- expressed any official reaction, but its Pacific coincide with the existing Area academia (that reflects and supports of Responsibility (AOR) of its Pacific official policy-making) has expressed Command (The changed “INDO- an enhanced concern, especially after PACOM” nomenclature is unlikely to President Trump’s articulation of the redefine the OA R). Australia may prefer “Indo-Pacific…”. Meanwhile, Beijing to have ‘Indo-Pacific’ merely straddle has capitalised upon the Indo-Pacific Oceania, ranging from the IOR to concept by reinforcing its geo-economic Southeast Asia. Notwithstanding these connects with the IOR countries. differences, two aspects are salient: Chinese academic literature refers to China’s Maritime Silk Road (MSR) • Even though the IOR is vastly initiative as “Indo-Pacific with Chinese dissimilar to Pacific-Asia in characteristics”. The MSR has been terms of geopolitics and security augmented lately by the government issues, the countries in one part approval for ‘Hainan Free Trade Zone are being impacted by events in and Port’ (to be completed by 2025- 35), the other part.

27 • The Indo-Pacific region is been to achieve freedom and essentially a maritime-littoral prosperity. region, wherein issues necessitate • Towards this, moderating the maritime solutions. That stated, behaviour of China is only a none can ignore the differences way-point, not the ultimate in geographic scope of the ‘Indo- end-state. Pacific’. This represents differing and dynamic national interests, • While the core objective is which is crucial. common, each Quad member is driven by differing interests. Prognosis • China’s reaction is likely to be Trends indicate the likelihood that the carefully calibrated to exploit ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept will progressively the ‘fault-lines’ among the quad gain acceptance, notwithstanding the members. differences in its geographical scope. The Way Forward Its future contours will depend upon political-level partnerships among Towards making the ‘Indo-Pacific’ the key players in the region vis-à-vis concept and the Quad effective China. in achieving its objectives, the nomenclature of the Quad needs to The functional parameters at the be reviewed, and the word ‘security’ Executive Level are yet to be fleshed out. removed from ‘Quadrilateral Security China will react to it based upon how Dialogue’. The Quad could then these parameters are decided. Shared focus on geo-economics, including values are important instruments of connectivity models as alternatives to statecraft, but cannot alone form the the Chinese MSR. It could help the basis of policy-formulation, which needs regional countries to build capacity to incorporate ‘shared interests’ as well. for sustainable development of marine So, the executive level could be best resources and ocean economy in general, worked out by acknowledging that: under the concept of ‘Blue Economy’. • The foremost aim of the Indo- To facilitate geo-economics, the Quad Pacific concept has always could also work towards strengthening

28 maritime safety mechanisms in the like the Western Pacific Naval Symposium region. Concurrently, the Quad could (WPNS) and the Indian Ocean Naval work towards politico-diplomatic Symposium (IONS), linking up the two. persuasion and dissuasion of China, Towards ‘insurance’, the Quad would such as by supporting regional countries need preparedness to respond to both to subject China to international state and non-state security challenges legal arbitration, capacity-building in key areas, inter alia, situational and capability enhancement of the awareness, operational compatibility regional maritime forces for maintain a (inter-operability) through combined favourable balance of power and sharing naval exercises, and enhancing maritime- strategic assessments. The security military sustenance through a web of (military) dimension would need to be logistic agreements among the Quad used as an ‘assurance’ and ‘insurance’ members. mechanism. Towards ‘assurance’, subtle pressures need to be exerted upon China through multi-lateral naval mechanisms 03 July 2018

*Captain (Dr) Gurpreet S Khurana, Indian Navy, is a PhD in Defence Studies and the Executive Director, National Maritime Foundation (NMF), New Delhi. He may be contacted at gurpreet. [email protected]. This Article was first published in the Aviation and Defence Review (June 2018 Issue).

29 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation — The Maritime Potential of a Continental Construct

Adarsh Vijay*

With its vast geographic spread to fashion a continental alliance within accounting for 22 per cent of the the Eurasian landmass. However, the world’s landmass and 40 per cent of its inclusion of India and Pakistan as full population, the Shanghai Cooperation members into the mechanism in 2017, Organisation (SCO), established in has added to its maritime character. 2001, is the world’s largest regional With this new overture, half of the eight- organisation and is often construed as an member body, along with Russia and Asian response to the West’s domination China, possess approximately 60,176 km of international fora. As the successor to of coastline. However, has it enhanced the erstwhile “Shanghai Five”, founded the scope of the SCO’s activities or does in 1996, the platform’s geopolitical it challenge the organisation’s original agenda has remained predominantly vision? The answer hinges on the degree focused upon the land-locked Central of consensus and mutual confidence Asian region. Has that made the SCO that the member States have been able essentially a continental construct and to build thus far. negated its potential in the maritime The genesis of the SCO is domain? This article is an attempt primarily attributed to existing regional to examine the avenues of maritime insecurities, with China and Russia cooperation in the SCO and the hurdles coming into an uneasy coexistence in the way of capitalising upon these based largely upon their shared concerns opportunities. regarding border management and Since its inception, the general domestic ethno-national insurgencies trend in and around the SCO has been such as the Uyghur uprising in China. A

30 meeting of the top security officials of the region”. The provision of an “indirect” member States, in May 2018, identified use of sea, as provided in the definition, the need for cooperation in the area of offers the possibility of instituting a ‘blue counter-insurgency operations, drug economy’ template under the SCO’s trafficking, and transnational crimes. ambit, with its landlocked members All this notwithstanding, the presence remaining important stakeholders. Even of maritime-configured States within though Central Asian member States do the grouping will, in all probability, not have access to the open oceans, they lead to an eventual reorientation of nevertheless have a significant market their security concerns, forcing them potential relevant to their maritime to transcend their present ‘continental counterparts, all of which underlines the mindset’. For instance, the inclusion of scope of ‘blue’ growth. India and Pakistan has brought security ‘Connectivity’ continues to be threats emanating from- or within- an integral requisite for realising the the Indian Ocean Region into the internal cohesion and economic interests SCO’s area of interest. In this regard, of the member States. China’s ‘Belt and the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure Road Initiative’ (BRI) is sought to be (RATS), a subset of SCO, would need aligned with the SCO’s connectivity- to redesign its framework in order to template, and a consensus appears respond collectively to this expanded set to have been reached in this regard. of asymmetric threats. The deep-sea port at Gwadar, in the The economic mandate of the SCO Baloch province of Pakistan, provides can also not forever exclude the maritime the maritime component of the China- interests of ts constituent member-States. Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), According to a 2014 report of the United which connects China’s Xinjiang Nations Conference on Trade and province with the Indian Ocean. Development (UNCTAD), “the ocean Moreover, since 2016, India is part of economy can be defined as the economic a trilateral agreement with Afghanistan activity which directly or indirectly uses and Iran that is working towards the the sea as an input whereas the coastal development of Chabahar Port, which economy represents all economic activity is located in south-eastern Iran, in the which takes place in a specific coastal immediate proximity of Gwadar.

31 The Ashgabat Agreement (2011), to India and China, arising from their which India acceded in February 2018, explicitly incongruent roadmaps for a would create a multi-modal transit and reformed international order, further transport corridor between Central Asia reduces the SCO’s value as an institution and the Persian Gulf. Amongst the four capable of producing a grand cohesive signatories, India and Uzbekistan are regional order. Most recently, India also full members of the SCO, while Iran refused to give support to the CPEC is an ‘observer’. On similar lines, the during the 18th SCO Summit held at International North-South Transport Qingdao in June 2018. Alhough India Corridor (INSTC) agreement between and China ventured into the second India, Iran and Russia, provides for edition of their bilateral ‘Maritime a 7,200 km multi-modal transport Security Dialogue’ on 13 July 2018, the corridor, through ship, rail and road future of a stable cooperation between networks, which could, in due course, these two Asian powerhouses remains be brought within the purview of the unclear. Therefore, under the present SCO. circumstances, the maritime domain Despite this evidently adequate remains a difficult one in which the rationale for the institutionalisation of a ‘Shanghai Eight’ could navigate. The maritime mandate, the achievement of bilateral concerns of the member States consensus among the member States on assume primacy over the organisation’s forging a maritime identity seems remote vision. The availability of a large coastal at present due to some crippling factors. geography would not, in and of itself, The long-standing unresolved political guarantee the maturating of the SCO’s problems and mutual acrimony between maritime character or potential. The India and Pakistan is one such factor, ‘Shanghai Spirit’ must tread a long and which severely constrains the likelihood challenging path towards the oceans. of maritime convergence amongst the SCO’s most prominent Indian Ocean constituents. The trust-deficit between 07 August 2018

* Adarsh Vijay is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the Madras Christian College, Chennai. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect the position of the NMF. He can be reached at [email protected]

32 Vizhinjam Port: A Maritime-Strategic Capital?

Adarsh Vijay*

Introduction Touted as the “gateway to South Asia”, the Vizhinjam project portends the Owing to its inadequate infrastructure possibilities of a strategic breakthrough and years of policy-deficit, India has that provides a series of navigable been encountering a transhipment maritime-economic options for tackling hub paucity vis-à-vis handling its India’s “ports-deficiency”. However, the commercial container cargo. As the reality unfolds an ambiguous posture of proposed green-field deep-water port the port given the emerging maritime at Vizhinjam, Thiruvananthapuram narrative in the Indian peninsula. district, in the south-western state of Kerala, is underway amidst a series A Maritime Lever in the making of delays, New Delhi is bracing itself The Vizhinjam port has been a historically for receiving an extra maritime leg. significant hub of trade since the Roman With this to-be-completed port by times. Much of the significant maritime the Government of Kerala (GoK), the forecasts predict that this ancient port country is attempting to build a nautical with a 72 feet draft, which is deepest case to partly decimate its container in the country, with a requirement of terminal quandary. Apart from the minimal dredging, is expected to be a economic payoffs that it can offer, the game-changer as a maritime forecast. Its port is assumed to be a strategic boost for revitalization in the form of Vizhinjam India’s maritime position in the world. International Seaport Limited (VISL), The port indeed bears overwhelming at an initial phase investment of Rs. geopolitical implications at a time when 7,525 crores, is being developed in the the country is exploring a myriad of landlord model with Public Private options in flexing its maritime muscles. Partnership (PPP). The four-phase

33 construction of this transhipment deep- Region (IOR). On the flip side, the water multipurpose project which is economic episode in its maritime variant based on a Design, Build, Finance, shows an unremarkable trail, especially Operate and Transfer (DBFOT) in the civilian maritime infrastructure. arrangement has been awarded to the Thanks to the hitherto-subscribed “sea- Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone blindness”, India’s domestic port sector Ltd (APSEZ). The construction of the has never been a thing of attention first phase began on 5 December 2015 among the strategic pundits. There are and is expected to be commissioned by 4 only a few container transhipment ports December 2019. The agreement allows in the country like Kochi, Mumbai, the concessionaire M/s Adani Vizhinjam Mundra, Visakhapatnam, etc. which Port Private Ltd to operate the port for have the adequate capacity of handling 40 years, which is extendable by another large motherships. The numerical 20 years. The state government shall mapping of such port facilities reveals begin receiving one per cent of the gross the domination of west coast ports revenue after 15 years from the date of over the ones on the east coast in the the operationalisation of the project, domestic container market. A report which would continue to maturate on on the fiscal year 2017-18 indicates an annual 1 per cent rate until it reaches that, of the 9.14 million Twenty-foot the benchmark of 40 per cent. Equivalent Units (TEUs) India-bound or originating cargo traffic, 35 per cent A Panacea for the “Economic” were being diverted to foreign container Sea-Blindness transhipment ports in Colombo, Jebel Indian Ocean’s crucial place in the Ali, Klang, Salalah and Singapore for maritime map with a quantum of more “bulk break” and further transported than 50 per cent of the world’s seaborne through small feeder vessels. Data show trade creates more space for India as a that the Colombo port stands atop in putative power in the regional totem pole. the transhipped containerised freight. India’s maritime prowess from a military sense has been long known through its The Vizhinjam project is assumed force projection and capabilities, and its to be a pack of strategic opportunities. dynamic role in contributing towards According to official sources, the peace-building in the Indian Ocean Vizhinjam port, as a transhipment

34 hub, shall be capable of handling the competition to the ports at Chennai and largest mainline vessels with a capacity Tuticorin in the state of Tamil Nadu and of 18000 TEUs. Moreover, the port the Vallarpadam International Container facilitates 2000 metres of berthing space Transhipment Terminal (ICTT) in for containers with a draught of 18.4 Kochi, Kerala over time. The proposed metres. The VISL would aid in saving Rs. 27,570 crore Enayam port project in costs and reduce the dependence on Tamil Nadu, which is just at 36 km south foreign ports for cargo transhipment. of Vizhinjam, also spurts the intensity Besides, with its geographic proximity to of this ongoing “ports-race”. And, it the Bay of Bengal, Coast of East Africa, is pertinent that the Colombo port is the Middle East, and Strait of Malacca, naturally brought under the competition the port promises an unparalleled geo- radar. Of the 4.8 million TEUs handled strategic edge. Another striking feature by the Colombo port in 2017, 45 per that the port offers is a relaxation of the cent was containers to and from India. cabotage law. Cabotage restrictions are It is conspicuous that the Colombo port directed towards a mandatory use of is undoubtedly depending on India for Indian-flagged ships for transporting its container cargo business. With the consignments between various ports in operationalisation of Vizhinjam port, the country as a check to prevent foreign the Indian maritime port sector would competition for the domestic shipping venture into a favourable shift from industry, and for matters concerning these trends vis-à-vis an independent national security. The possibility of cargo handling mechanism. In turn, the coastal shipping by foreign-flagged Colombo would experience a loss in its vessels postulates a good sign that helps share of cargo from India, which would reduce the freight cost, pooling of cargo, set in an economic setback for the island and a quantum leap in the tonnage on nation. coastal routes. Is it a Game-Changer? Experts are of the view that Despite the possibilities it theoretically Vizhinjam is anticipated to be a strong offers, on realistic grounds, likelihoods contender to a number of ports both are high that the speculations on its within India and abroad. For instance, could-be-game-changer tag might the VISL is going to throw a healthy remain a far-fetched “scenario-building”.

35 Firstly, the clouds of dubiety are gathered Ministry of Shipping. It would help over the puzzle whether the port can achieve the objectives as enshrined in substantially reduce the Indian container the Sagarmala Institutional Framework dependence on foreign terminals, which includes the development of particularly Colombo. Secondly, would mega port projects and improvising the project be able to override the delays maritime connectivity. Interlinking in its completion by adhering to the Vizhinjam with Sagarmala would make four-phase deadline? Finally, considering it act as a force multiplier in securing the newly proposed Enayam port, India’s economic ambitions in the which is akin to Vizhinjam’s structural, region by adding an extra constituent to functional and geopolitical profile, and its container terminal network. its geographical adjacency, could the Nevertheless, India’s credentials in latter be a geostrategic driver? policy-inertia are hardly new. Adding to The industrial backwardness in it, the completion of the first phase of the hinterland of the port arrests the the port itself is way behind schedule, likelihoods of having an edge of gateway which was guaranteed to be completed traffic over transhipment traffic, which within a “1000 days” deadline by the makes the survival of the project Adani Group. The Cyclone Ockhi that comparatively on the latter. At the ravaged the Kerala coast in 2017 and the same time, India’s bewildered state of consequent demand for further dredging, transhipment is further accentuated due lag in the procurement of granites owing to the higher port handling charges and to local resistance near quarries, and the port call costs for the cargo vessels. Low passivity in the progress of breakwater marine charges (vessel-related charges) facilities cause the delay of the project. and the need for least deviation from the Kerala’s political ecology carries East-West Sea Route in contrast to the its own weight in the success of the Indian ports, make Colombo the first Vizhinjam port. A 2017 Comptroller choice for the shipping liners. and Auditor General Report citing At the same time, being the country’s lacunae in the port agreement led to first mega transhipment port, Vizhinjam the appointment of a Commission of can provide an impetus to the Sagarmala Inquiry by the state government, which initiative, launched in 2015, by the finally gave a clean chit in December

36 2018, to the then United Democratic are deemed necessary in future provided Front government that inked the same. India’s expected ascendancy in the global The infamous and highly demonstrative maritime trade is achieved in the long- politically-affiliated labour unionism run. The rationale for the co-existence and its clout that continue to plague the of the duo has been supported by the state would determine the operational economic forecast that projects the dynamics of the project in the long- Indian container freight to reach 2.5 run. Incessant labour strikes and the billion tonnes by 2025, which requires resulting economic-paralyses are routine a larger array of container terminals. features of the state and the port Moreover, the presence of multiple precincts would never be an exception. ports in the southern Indian peninsula A better capitalization on the labour- makes sufficient room for developing management equations is a requisite for a “cluster” of transhipment hubs, the healthy survival of the venture. The fashioned on the Middle East and South local opprobrium, largely among the East Asian models, which complements nearby coastal-fishing hamlets, against the country’s maritime sway in the the project raising environmental region. concerns, in spite of a favourable report Contextualising India’s Neighbour- following the Environmental Impact hood First Policy in a nautical directive, Assessment (EIA) by the Ministry the Colombo port could be a diplomatic of Environment, Forest and Climate capital that allows India to make further Change (MoEF&CC), also throws more maritime inroads into Sri Lanka. The insights into the challenges arising from Lankan government’s negotiations the socio-demographic quarter. with its Indian counterparts are On the question of Enayam port already in place seeking the latter’s and its proximity, it is yet to be proven support in the development of the the actual utility and significance of the East Container Terminal at Colombo Vizhinjam project in the Indian port port. This new shift reveals Colombo’s realm. The economic viability in having desired extrication from China’s “debt- two ports at such a short distance from trap diplomacy” and the search for each other had raised concerns. Albeit strategic alternatives beyond Beijing in dubieties are in the fray, both projects the maritime-capacity building. It is

37 plausible that India’s engagement in the port at Vizhinjam also facilitates tactical expansion of the Colombo port would manoeuvring which helps strike a better mean a more advantageous position for score in its voyage to attain domestic the same in the maritime space, thereby maritime-infrastructure autonomy. pushing the Indian ports to avenues of The Military Undercurrents higher competition. Last but not least, the military implications Conceptually, repositioning of the port also require a closer look. Vizhinjam with the so-called geopolitical Usually, as a convention, a security- buzzword “Indo-Pacific” could reap a rhetoric by the national navy follows the range of benefits in the maritime arena. announcement of any strategic seaport The Indo-Pacific strategy, which is a across the globe. So was the case with revamp of the preceding “Asia-Pacific the Gwadar port in Pakistan and the Rebalancing Strategy”, is a concerted Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, when attempt led by the United States to their respective naval branches released ward-off challenges posed by the statements on the military potential of the projects. Apparently, Vizhinjam port Chinese foreign and security policy also followed suit when the former Vice behaviour in the region. Though India Chief of the Naval Staff Vice Admiral R is affirmative on its disdain of military P Suthan was vocal about the military tag for the concept, the economic significance of the same for the Indian interpretations related to the oceanic Navy (IN) as it provides an earshot to template have gained recognition. It guard against the increasing Chinese is worthy to take note of the fact that footprint in the IOR. The military signs China wanted to partner with an Indian at the port vicinity began in 2014 with firm to develop the Vizhinjam port. the docking of the Navy’s fast attack But the proposal was declined by the craft INS Kalpeni for a two-day public Indian Government citing national display. The Southern Naval Command security reasons. For India, any intent (SNC) had even approved a proposal to overpower Beijing’s munificence for acquiring a 500m long berth for the and sabre-rattling antics in the Indo- permanent presence of naval vessels at Pacific, given its emanating maritime the deep-sea port. The state government character, requisites an independent had gone to the extent of assuring, in maritime-economic configuration. The the legislative assembly, 500m and

38 200m long berths for the IN and Indian operations in the state has become an Coast Guard (ICG) respectively. Apart eye-opener again when the naval vessels from that, the allied facilitates were also had to be dispatched from the naval base ensured on a cost-sharing basis. Reports in Kochi. A quick response in future, in were affirmative of the prospects of any such scenario, calls for a permanent joint operations between IN and ICG, naval station in the southern tip of the involving the already stationed lone state, for which Vizhinjam remains amphibious brigade of the Indian Army the obvious choice bereft of a second (IA). However, the plans haven’t fallen in thought. place and provision for defence berthing facility only during emergency situations Conclusion was found consensus. The export-import (EXIM) container Clause 17.17.1 of the Vizhinjam cargo traffic entails the independence of concession agreement underscores the container freight management, in terms ‘use of port by Defence Forces’ as: “The of self-sufficiency in port infrastructure, concessionaire acknowledges and agrees as critical for a maritime power such as that the Defence Forces shall at all times India on economic and security premises. have the right to use the Port and all New Delhi is chalking out a plan to bring facilities thereof, without any restriction its less-competitive east coast ports as or constraint of any nature whatsoever, on well under the container transhipment payment of compensation in accordance architecture. Apart from addressing with Applicable Laws.” In addition, concerns of the domestic maritime clause 17.17.2 states that, “Without sector, the endeavours associated with prejudice to the provisions of Clause the Vizhinjam port might enable India to 17.7.1, the Concessionaire’s obligations draw a maritime trajectory by scripting to the Defence Forces in respect of usage a strong economic discourse in the IOR. of the Port during an Emergency shall be As a strategy which is driven towards determined by GOI from time to time and torpedoing the geopolitical quagmires to the extent thereof, the Concessionaire reflected in its commercial expressions, shall be relieved of its obligations to provide the port-led template can provide inputs services to civilian users of the Port.” in constructing an independent maritime The Ockhi-driven Humanitarian identity that embraces an assertive stand Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) on matters of seaborne trade.

39 The Indian dilemma of the theory metamorphosis in the country’s maritime of “sea-blindness”, which has existed policy from an economic-strategic for long, cannot be read just from a convergence prism. Nonetheless, the military perspective since an economic underlying challenges and the myopic dimension also finds a place behind its vision of the government blur the grand veil. Developing a progressive maritime- prospects of the project. It is inconclusive economic narrative through port-led whether the port could really stand as a industrial growth has been progressively token of a prospective maritime capital deteriorated by the reluctance of the which offers adequate geostrategic Indian policy elites. Vizhinjam project, dividends. after its completion, would shed light 16 January 2019 on the new vigour and the fundamental

40 Maritime Security

Community-Engaged Maritime Secuirty: Beyond ‘Eyes and Ears’

Commander Himadri Das*

In March 2018, as per media reports, based policing or community-oriented Neil Basu, the Scotland Yard’s newly policing — have several definitions. appointed Indian-origin Assistant India’s Bureau of Police Research and Commissioner of Police responsible Design (BPR&D), Ministry of Home for counter-terrorism, launched a new Affairs (MHA), has defined community- campaign to urge the public to fight policing as the “forging of a cost-effective terrorism. According to the report, of problem-solving partnership between the the nearly 31,000 reports made by the police and the community.” In ancient public in 2017, more than 6,600 (21.3 India, policing had a community percent) resulted in ‘useful’ intelligence. orientation, with the village chief Basu also highlighted that the statistics doubling as the police officer. However, substantiated the assertion that the need to enforce colonial rule by a ‘communities defeat terrorism’, and that formally constituted police force, led the Yard’s success in foiling 14 terror to the abandonment of this age-old plots would not have been possible practice. Following Independence, and without community-support. The media with ‘law and order’ being listed as a report also brought out that research state subject, several state-level initiatives indicated that 80 per cent of people are were launched to once again create and motivated to report suspicious activity, leverage the concept of community but they were unclear what exactly they policing. should be looking for. Subsequent to the Mumbai blasts in The concept of community- March 1993, a joint coastal surveillance policing, or its variants — community- operation, Operation SWAN, was

43 launched in April 1993. In July 1999, the • The conduct of Community Maharashtra police, with the support of Interaction Programmes (CIP) the Indian Navy, implemented a coastal- by the Indian Coast Guard community (policing) initiative—the to promote participation of Sagar Rakshak Dal (Sea Protection fishers/ coastal community in Group)—in 263 villages, with the aim of policing, by functioning as the enhancing coastal security surveillance ‘eyes and ears’ of the concerned along the Maharashtra coast. security agencies. The CIPs also contribute towards improving Subsequently, after ‘26/11’, similar maritime safety-awareness community groups, involving fishing- amongst fishers. Likewise, the and coastal communities, have been Indian Navy, too, conducts established in India’s coastal states and Coastal Security Awareness Union Territories (UTs), and integrated Programmes (CSAP). into the national coastal security construct. These groups include the • The setting-up of a Toll-Free Sagar Suraksha Dal / Gram Rakshak Number (1093), which Dal (Village Protection Group) in facilitates 24x7 free telephone Gujarat and Karnataka; Kadalora access to the concerned State Jagratha Samithi (Coastal Awareness Marine Police. The Indian Coast Committee) in Kerala; Village Vigilance Guard’s Search-and-Rescue Committees (VVC) in Tamil Nadu and (SAR) Assistance Toll-Free Andhra Pradesh; and, the Fishermen Number (1554) is also available Watch Group in the Andaman and as an alternative number. Nicobar Islands. These groups facilitate • Inducting fishers and coastal institutionalized mechanisms for citizens as Special Police Officers periodic community interaction with (SPOs) and as members of the the coastal police. Marine Home Guard (MHG).

In addition to establishment of The Police-Community Partnership community groups, other initiatives (PCP), a pan-India ‘over-arching to engage the coastal communities for community-policing model’, has been strengthening coastal security include: envisaged under the ‘community-

44 policing’ micro-mission of the National and coastal communities to complement Police Mission (NPM). The model, with the efforts of security agencies, as ‘beat policing’ at its foundation level, also their significant contribution encompasses an interface at the beat-level towards enhancing security. It further and police station-level with citizens; emphasised, as a focus area, the need to the enrolment of citizen volunteers as ‘involve, sensitise and incentivise’ the Police Mitra-s (Friends of the Police); the contribution of the coastal-community establishment of Community Liaison to coastal security. Groups (CLGs); and, the setting-up of a ‘Community-Policing Training and While efforts at engaging the coastal Documentation Centre’ in each state. community in coastal security are being pursued with increased vigour and Consequent upon the report of scope, a few issues that merit attention, the Group of Ministers (GoM) on include the following: Reforming National Security (2001), a State Marine Police has been established • Community-policing, driven in all coastal States/ UTs, and, dedicated by the state, often has a state- Coastal Police Stations (CPS) have been centric security predisposition set-up by coastal states and UTs, with (national/maritime/coastal financial assistance from the Centre, security), rather than a citizen- under the MHA’s Coastal Security centric safety focus (human Scheme (CSS). Further, State Marine security). Although the process Police Training Centres (SMPTCs) of engagement between the are also envisaged in coastal states for community and security coastal security. Extrapolating the land- personnel does facilitate better based PCP model for coastal security mutual understanding, such will entailan interface between coastal/ engagement, to be effective, fishing communities and the respective must also place equal focus upon CPS. issues related to human security, The Indian Navy’s Strategy such as safety, and, a rapid, Document, Ensuring Secure Sea: Indian comprehensive, and humane Maritime Security Strategy (2015), response to accidents, disasters underscored the potential of the fishing and coastal erosion.

45 • According to some estimates, is the State Marine Police, in CIPs have been able to reach out accordance with the overarching to only a small fraction of the model of PCP, which is best- community, and are unevenly positioned to steer such distributed across coastal engagements. villages, in terms of both time and space. A more formalised • The present communication mechanism has, therefore, been through toll-free numbers recommended, in the form of has, of course, been very a central scheme supported useful. However, considering by appropriate budgetary the penetration of mobile allocations. telephony (including data), the user-friendliness of mobile • Coastal communities themselves applications (apps), and the have suggested the need for better power of social media, the training. It is noteworthy that the development of suitable ‘app- Apada Mitra (Friends in Disaster) based’ services for security scheme for disaster management (and policing) could facilitate has been institutionalized even greater community with an earmarked financial engagement, albeit within allocation. This scheme entails limited ranges. The Royal the training of over 6,000 Malaysian Navy (RMN), for volunteers across disaster-prone example, has launched a mobile districts as first responders in the app ‘K3M’ to engage with the case of a disaster. Establishment maritime community. Likewise, of SMPTCs and Community Scotland Yard encourages online Policing Training Centres will communication (in addition also facilitate training. to telephonic reporting). • Language is a barrier in Encouragingly, the Government communication. The vernacular of India, too, has a tie-up is a prerequisite for effective with Facebook for disaster- communication, and therefore, response (this, of course, might rather than central agencies, it well end-up being one of the

46 inadvertent victims of the data- Indian Navy, the Indian Coast Guard, scandal involving Facebook and and the Maharashtra Police have, over Cambridge Analytica). the past two decades, been expanded to cover all coastal states and UTs and • Many women in coastal areas/ become far more institutionalised. fishing hamlets are reportedly Meanwhile, community policing, as a not aware of issues related to policing-concept, has also gained traction security (and do not know in India. As Scotland Yard contends, about the toll-free numbers that inputs from the community can provide they can use to establish contact ‘useful’ information — if not ‘actionable with the concerned agencies intelligence. While hard intelligence in case of an emergency). and niche technologies — such as space- Consequently, as in other based surveillance, cyber surveillance, social-welfare projects, women- technical and electronic surveillance focussed engagement, could — can and do fail, human beings (and generate greater community- communities) remain a reliable source support in cases involving safety of information. With increasing low- and security. cost sensors and technologies available In sum, the Scotland Yard statistics to the communities themselves, the ‘eyes have not only validated their own case, and ears’ concept perhaps goes beyond but have also substantially proved a merely ‘eyes and ears’ in the literal sense. concept. This strengthens the case Continued community-engagement for for community policing elsewhere, maritime security, therefore, remains an including for coastal policing and exigent imperative. maritime security. The community- engagement initiatives launched by the 28 May 2018

* Commander Himadri Das is a serving officer in the Indian Navy. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect the official policy or the Indian Navy, the NMF or the Government of India. He can be reached at [email protected]

47 Lakshadweep Islands: From Fragility to Stability

Adarsh Vijay*

With a total land area of just 32 km2, relative paucity of academic literature the Lakshadweep Islands, which lie off on this island chain. Against the the west coast of India, are the smallest background of this relative-paucity of of the Union Territories (UT) under the adequate information, a number of basic Government of the India (GoI). And yet, questions persist in the minds of the lay they contribute something like 20,000 public: What is the strategic importance sq. km to the area of India’s Territorial of the Lakshadweep Islands? How do Sea, and 400,000 km2 to the country’s they help in shaping India’s maritime Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). New strategy, given contemporary conflictual Delhi, which seeks to be a flag bearer patterns within the IOR? In what ways and the “net-security provider” within can the islands be leveraged for military the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), advantage..? And so on. perceives Lakshadweep Islands as a crucial maritime bastion from which to The Union Territory of Lakshadweep progress its naval imperatives, as also to (UTL) is an archipelago of 36 islands counter the escalating asymmetric threats that are located some 400 km to the west emanating from its western seaboard. of the Indian state of Kerala and offers This notwithstanding, most Indian 400,000 sq.km of Exclusive Economic scholars have tended to focus closer Zone (EEZ) to the country. Despite its attention to the geopolitical significance ecologically fragile character and the of the Andaman and Nicobar (A&N) degrading biodiversity, the primary factor Islands, on India’s eastern seaboard. The that provides the Lakshadweep military Lakshadweep group (which includes significance is its potential in terms of Minicoy Island) has been afforded far less safeguarding India’s western seaboard. attention. There is, as a consequence, a Its geographic proximity to IOR littoral

48 states such as the Maldives and Sri Lanka wide swathe of Naxal influence, is a further enhances its criticality. The UTL further cause of concern. Until recently, has attained even greater significance in inadequacies in terms of connectivity the wake of the November 2008 terror of the islands with the Indian mainland attacks in Mumbai, which revealed also contributed to the islanders’ feeling the easy accessibility and consequent of isolation from the Indian polity, and vulnerability of India’s west coast to their susceptibility to focussed influence terrorist organisations possessing even from other quarters. Fortunately, the a modicum of maritime capacity and provision of telecommunication facilities capability. There have been unconfirmed has reduced, if not eliminated, this reports that malevolent non-State State- ‘insulation’ of the islands. The downside sponsored actors such as the Lashkar-e- of this is that the likelihood of ‘online Toiba (LeT) planned to utilise one or radicalization’ has increased. more islands of the Lakshadweep group as a base from which attacks on mainland Somali piracy is another threat India could be launched. This could well that has, in the past, manifested itself have been based upon an appreciation in the vicinity of the islands. This by the LeT that Lakshadweep, with has necessitated an intensification its predominant Muslim demographic of the security of the Sea Lanes of composition (belonging to the Shafi Communication (SLOCs), which, school of thought) offered easy pickings. amongst other measures, includes the The increase of radical Islamic activities setting-up of a sophisticated system of in the Indian state of Kerala, which coastal security and surveillance focussed shares linguistic, cultural and religious upon the Eight Degree Channel. This affiliations with Indian citizens residing Channel, which separates Minicoy in the Lakshadweep group, has raised Island from the Maldives, witnesses the security-concerns over the possibility of daily passage of considerable seaborne this religious radicalisation proliferating traffic. In 2012, the IN operationalised to the islands. The apparent vulnerability a naval base — INS Dweeprakshak — of Maldives, as seen from the rise of on Kavaratti Island. In addition, three radical Islam in that country, coupled naval detachments (NAVDETs) are also with the inclusion of Kerala in the being functioning, one each in the islands revised “Red Corridor” that maps the of Minicoy, Kavaratti and Androth. In

49 addition, the Indian Coast Guard (ICG) options for the Indian Navy (IN) to maintains a District Headquarters enhance its cooperation with the US (CGHQ-12) in Kavaratti, the capital of Navy, the People’s Liberation Army the UTL. The Navy also recognizes the Navy (PLAN), European Union Naval need to elevate the region to a strategic Forces (EUNAVFOR), and the Japan outpost and a forward operating base, Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF), and infrastructure-development is all of whom share similar concerns in guided by the dynamics of the maritime terms of protecting the International template in and around the UTL. A Shipping Lanes off Somalia and the fourth NAVDET is likely to come up north-east coast of Africa. in Bitra Island. Of the 36 islands of the On another level, the rising presence UTL, only 11 are inhabited. However, of extra-regional powers, particularly the securitization of the uninhabited China, creates a need for greater islands, too, is becoming a priority due vigilance and maritime surveillance off to the emanating asymmetric threats the country’s western coast. Beijing’s from within the maritime space. galloping interests in the IOR, which are The Indian Navy currently has evident from its increasing naval presence, strong regional interfaces with counter- as also from the recent establishment of piracy structures and measures being China’s first overseas military base in undertaken by other organisational Djibouti, lends additional urgency to structures, such as the European Union’s the need for a reconfiguration in India’s Op ATLANTA and the Combined military approach to Kavaratti. The Maritime Forces organised by the USA. geographic position of this island offers The EU’s coordination structure for the the navy with a better outreach in terms dissemination of information related of naval patrolling and surveillance to national and multinational anti- across the Western Indian Ocean. As piracy efforts is the Shared Awareness such, it can be used to great advantage and Deconfliction (SHADE). The to enhance the IN’s power-projection Indian Navy, is a member of SHADE, capabilities. as are other individual navies (such The island territory, as a whole, as those of China), and, navies that periodically witnesses a variety of security constitute the Combined Maritime drills. Exemplifying this is the coastal Forces (CMF). Thus, SHADE offers security exercise, ‘SAGAR KAVACH’,

50 whose latest edition was conducted over Islands, as a defensive mechanism three-days off the coasts of Lakshadweep, based upon community-participation Kerala and Mahé, from 24 to 26 April in matters such as the reporting of 2018. It was focussed upon reviewing unidentified boats, maritime crimes, or and enhancing the operational readiness any other threat to coastal security. of the various stakeholders involved, so Finally, there is a good chance that as to better tackle seaborne threats. The the Lakshadweep Islands will be adversely UTL also hosts other coastal security impacted by the devastating effects exercises, such as like Exercise GEMINI of climate change and its geographic and the half-yearly NEPTUNE series, repercussions. Considering the rising which focus on the recalibration of seawater level, the island might even the entire coastal security mechanism. become history, in the long run. Hence, Furthermore, the Coastal Security when viewed over a larger timespan, it Scheme (CSS) launched in 2005 by might even be argued that the ongoing the GoI incorporates the Lakshadweep militarisation of the region is a vain Islands within its scope. The CSS seeks endeavour. This notwithstanding, as to enhance the prowess of the Marine long as the IOR as a whole remains Police force, through infrastructure- unaffected, the geopolitical changes development and capacity-building in this maritime space calls for more and capability-enhancement. The investment in terms of ‘military capital’ nature of the region also throws up the in the islands, so as to ensure that India possibility of community-involvement prospers within a stable security calculus. as being the best line of defence against There is no doubting the fact that in a maritime-security challenges. One such geopolitically unpredictable IOR, the option that seems feasible is to replicate Lakshadweep group of islands are a the model obtaining in the state of geostrategic asset for India. Kerala, by establishing “Kadalora Jagratha Samithis” (Coastal Awareness 31 May 2018 Committees) in the Lakshadweep

* Adarsh Vijay is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the Madras Christian College, Chennai. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect the official position of the NMF. He can be reached at [email protected].

51 BIMSTEC and Maritime Security: Issues, Imperatives and the Way Ahead

Captain (Dr) Gurpreet S Khurana*

Oddly, the Bay of Bengal Initiative for ‘sea-blindness’. It is high time now that Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic this disposition should change, and there Cooperation (BIMSTEC) is a sub- is need for the ‘blue’ in BIMSTEC, at regional grouping named after a sea least figuratively. body, but the graphics in its logo (Fig. This essay provides a broad overview 1) are devoid of blue colour. Of course, of the maritime and geopolitical the etymology of BIMSTEC originated imperatives of BIMSTEC member from the names of its members in States, as the littorals of the Bay of 1997, but the fact remains that all of Bengal and the Andaman Sea, with the its members have inherently had land- aim of proposing a preliminary Maritime centric perspectives, more aptly called Safety and Security (MSS) agenda for the BIMSTEC. Maritime-economics in the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea

The recent resolution of maritime boundary disputes amongst Bangladesh, India and Myanmar has enhanced mutual trust, leading to enhanced emphasis on harnessing the living and non-living marine resources and geo- economic connectivity among the sub- Figure 1 - BIMSTEC Logo regional littoral States. The outstanding

52 disputes never inhibited transactions via in both national and sub- the sea, but the delineation of maritime regional contexts. boundaries has certainly provided a • Amalgamate India’s North- symbolic heft to economic connectivity. Eastern States into the nation’s Notably, even the two land-locked socio-economic development. countries – Nepal and Bhutan – have This led to national emphasis stakes in the oceans, and have the legal on Project SAGARMALA (port- right to maritime access, as per the led development) and trans-national United Nations Convention on the Law of maritime connectivity, not only for the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982). EXIM trade, but also for movement From the Indian perspective, the of people and tourism. A specific increasing geo-economic connectedness manifestation of these is the India- among the Bay of Bengal littorals is a Bangladesh Protocol on Inland Water result of New Delhi’s broader external Transport and Trade (PIWTT). In policy reorientation in terms of the October 2018, the two countries concept of SAGAR (Security and signed a host of agreements, such as Growth for All in the Region), articulated the extension of ‘protocol routes’ and by India’s Prime Minister Mr. Narendra Standard Operating Procedures (SoP) Modi in 2015, and the emerging for movement of cruise vessels on inland national focus on maritime issues. waterway routes and coastal shipping. SAGAR — essentially meaning that “All All this will be accompanied by the boats (regional countries) rise with the need for enhanced maritime safety and rising tide (together)” — was stated in security. India’s Cabotage relaxation the broader context of the Indian Ocean policy, leading to the increased presence Region (IOR), but is very relevant to the of foreign-flagged vessels in Indian Bay of Bengal countries in context of Mr. ports, also has security implications Modi’s “Neighbourhood First Policy”. specifically for India. With regard to the Bay of Bengal, India’s Piracy and Trafficking of Drugs specific imperatives are to: and Weapons • Capitalise upon the cost- The International Hydrographic effectiveness of maritime routes, Organisation (IHO) publication giving

53 the Bangladesh authorities. The answer lies in enhanced information-sharing. There have been suggestions to enhance real-time information-sharing among BIMSTEC States via submarine cables. However, these cables are extremely vulnerable to terrorism; and there is no national or multilateral plan yet to Figure 2 - Geographical Limits of Bay of Bengal respond to such contingencies. and Andaman Sea Sustainable Fishing the limits of the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea. As shown on the maps A major issue in the Bay of Bengal is (Fig. 2), there is no major International how to sustain the fast depleting fish- Shipping Lanes (ISL) in these areas, stocks and the huge Dead Zone that except the one right in the south it has, and in accordance with the which crosses these sea areas over a principles of Blue Economy. Could the rather short stretch. As a result, there is Bay of Bengal littorals coordinate their hardly any piracy here at present, only domestic laws with regard to regulation armed robberies at sea within national of fishing activity? jurisdiction. However, the increasing The prevention of illegal fishing and trade flows — including Chinese poaching off the Andaman and Nicobar tankers coming to Kyuakphu— could Islands was the main task of the new Fast lead to pirate attacks, and this needs to Attack Craft (FAC) commissioned at Port be factored. Blair, soon after the integrated Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) was The trans-national maritime crimes formed in 2001. The same year, the like trafficking of drugs and weapons Indian Navy (IN) began Coordinated are quite rampant in the area. These Patrols (CORPAT) with the Indonesian have also been feeding into the militant Navy (TNI-AL), and after three years in movements in India’s North East. A 2005, with the Royal Thai Navy (RTN). large arms-haul destined for the United The aim was to have the IN in constant Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) was touch with TNI-AL and RTN, to hand unearthed off Chittagong in 2004 by over their fishermen apprehended in the

54 Indian EEZ in real-time, without going through the elaborate legal processes including confiscation of their fishing boats. Later in 2013 and 2018, the IN forged similar agreement with Myanmar and Bangladesh respectively. These CORPATs, in the multilateral format, have immense potential to contribute to the overall maritime security and safety, especially by expanding information- sharing under the bilateral CORPATs to the BIMSTEC level, involving info- sharing on as-required basis. Search and Rescue: Response to Figure 3 – Search and Rescue: Areas of Responsibility Maritime Accidents and Irregular Migration Bangladesh are parties to the Under customary international law, all International Convention on Maritime States bear an international commitment Search and Rescue, 1979. The reason to provide assistance to persons in distress why the others are not, is well known, at sea, be they victims of accidents at sea and such sensitivities are legitimate. or irregular migrants. (It is important This is the reason why we still have to note that the common usage of the provisional SAR areas of responsibility term “illegal migrants” is inappropriate. on the SAR chart (India-Bangladesh, These are not “illegal” migrants, since India-Myanmar and Sri Lanka-Indonesia customary international law permits boundaries demarcated in lighter colour these migrants to ‘seek’ asylum, though in Fig. 3). of course, it does devolve upon the This problem was effectively ‘destination State’ to grant ‘refugee addressed by the Council for Security status’ to these migrants). Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) Notably, among the BIMSTEC Study Group on Harmonisation littoral countries, only India and of Aeronautical and Maritime SAR

55 (HAMSAR), which was instituted after However, a coordinated approach the Malaysian MH-370 airline disaster, among the coastal countries BIMSTEC and wherein the author represented is necessary. CSCAP-India as the co-chair (with Capability Enhancement CSCAP-Malaysia). The Study Group (Hardware and Software) recommended that this void could be overcome by a web of bilateral Four of the five largest SriL ankan warship Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) are built in India. Of course, India’s is among the ASEAN Regional Forum making concerted endeavours to bolster (ARF) members. The same applies to hardware transfers to the IOR countries, BIMSTEC. The Indian Coast Guard and India’s capacity-building assistance has already signed such SAR MoUs with to its regional neighbours is likely to Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. One with grow after Mauritius commissioned the Myanmar is being discussed. However, Barracuda, the first warship that India discussions on a similar MoU with built specifically designed for a foreign Thailand have not yet commenced buyer. due the ongoing reorganisation of the However, India’s core strength lies Thailand’s coast guard agency. in beyond (hardware) capacity-building. Humanitarian Assistance and It lies in areas such as technical and Disaster Relief operational training and doctrines, hydrographic assistance, Maritime The entire north-eastern Indian Ocean Domain Awareness (MDA), and so on. is well known to be prone to natural The Indian Navy coordinates the fairly disasters. The 2004 Tsunami clearly well-developed National Command, indicated that this area is prone not only Control, Communications and Intelligence to tropical cyclones. The reason is the (NC3I) network instituted in 2014 after seismic fault-line stretching along the the Mumbai terrorist attacks (November subterranean ridge along the Andaman 2008), with its nerve centre called the and Nicobar groups. The Indian Navy Integrated Management and Analysis has instituted an internal mechanism. Centre (IMAC) at Gurugram (near For instance, all Indian warships now Delhi). In a couple of years, the IMAC carry palletised stores for Humanitarian will house the IOR Information Fusion Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR). Centre (IOR-IFC, with foreign ILOs)

56 similar to the IFC Singapore. Another successfully resisted China’s attempts to positive development is the forging of acquire naval bases in the Bay of Bengal, information-sharing of ‘White Shipping’ their purchase of Chinese submarines agreements. The Indian government has will lead to them providing the PLA approved the Indian Navy’s proposal for Navy ‘virtual’ bases. It is important to such agreements with 36 countries. The note that their submarines operating in Navy has signed such agreements with the Bay of Bengal will be compatible 18 countries so far (including Myanmar with the PLA Navy submarines in terms and Sri Lanka), of which 11 having been of equipment, machinery and even operationalised (including Myanmar). weapon stores. Those with Bangladesh and Thailand Support to IORA and IONS have been approved, but are yet to be signed. BIMSTEC needs to be contextualised with the pan-IOR Maritime Security Maritime-Military Issues and Safety (MSS) Structures. There is The submarine-operating countries in an exigent need to develop BIMSTEC’s are increasing. Bangladesh has recently MSS agenda to contribute to the Indian acquired (Chinese) submarines and Ocean Rim Association (IORA), whose Thailand will do so soon (also Chinese). own MSS structure is at a nascent India and Indonesia are adding new stage and needs to be supplemented. submarines. This leads to some critical It was only in 2014 that MSS was imperatives; notably, the de-confliction incorporated in IORA’s agenda, and it of unintended naval encounters, water- was only in September 2018 that the space management and submarine initial workshop was held in Colombo safety. With regard to submarine rescue, (Sri Lanka) to formulate the Terms of the IN has recently acquired an effective Reference (ToR) of the IORA MSS capability of submarine-rescue, and is Working Group. It was also decided that willing to share it with other submarine- the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium operating navies that do not have such a (IONS) be represented at the IORA capability. MSS Working Group.

Although sub-regional countries It is common fallacy that IORA’s like Bangladesh and Myanmar have “inclusive approach” only relates to

57 involvement of extra-regional stake- (Andaman and Nicobar Islands) launched holders, and not the role of sub-regional in 1995 with originally conceived as a arrangements within the IOR. Although ‘milan’ (Hindi word for ‘meeting’) of Maldives joined IORA in November the Bay of Bengal navies. This means 2018, Myanmar could not do so due to that Milan at Port Blair could effectively objection from South Africa. However, implement the BIMSTEC’s MSS there is a strong case for Myanmar’s agenda at the functional level. Similarly, IORA membership. The objection to the MSS cooperation in BIMSTEC also this is premised on the perception that needs to be synergised with the IONS. the Myanmar government is not doing All BIMSTEC countries are members enough to resolve the Rohingya migrant of IONS. Furthermore, Indonesia is a issue. However, on the other hand, key member of not only the IORA, but inclusion of Myanmar in IORA could also that of the ASEAN. Its inclusion lead to persuading Myanmar to deliver in BIMSTEC as a member could in this regard. It is important to recall enhance the BIMSTEC’s MSS agenda that Myanmar was incorporated into the substantively. Association of South East Asian Nations Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific (ASEAN) in 1997 mainly to avoid Region Myanmar’s isolation from international community, which worked well. The The geopolitical environment in same has been India’s approach with the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman regard to its Myanmar policy, and the Sea is closely linked to the geopolitics contribution of the Indian Navy towards of the entire Indo-Pacific region. As this aim has been notable. Following articulated by Mr Kanwal Sibal at the the Navy’s persistent efforts to develop BIMSTEC Think Tank Dialogue in an interface with the Myanmar Navy, a New Delhi, the sub-regional countries Myanmar corvette participated in the would need to balance their need for Milan-2006 at Port Blair. It was the geopolitical engagement with extra- first time in 4 decades that a Myanmar regional stakeholders like China, and warship ever visited a foreign port. its implications for the sub-regional neighbours. Such engagement — It is also important to recall that ranging from subscribing to China’s the Milan congregation at Port Blair Maritime Silk Road (MSR) Project to

58 the purchase of Chinese submarines China has challenged the maritime — would also bring with it a ‘strategic norms and established legal order based dependence’ upon China, and therefore, on the UNCLOS, 1982. Therefore, the sub-regional countries would, the issue now involves the entire Indo- therefore, need to take more deliberate, Pacific region, and its stakeholders. deft and prudent decisions. Even though China does not have any maritime claims in the Bay of Bengal, Furthermore, the South China Sea given its increasing geopolitical presence (SCS) is becoming increasingly volatile, in the IOR, any insecurity or discord in and the Bay of Bengal-Andaman Sea Bay of Bengal will involve China directly, combine could well become the next leading to a geopolitical contestation. In area of major-power contestation. this direction, the resolution of maritime Importantly, the SCS disputes are no disputes in Bay of Bengal is a positive longer an issue between China and the step, but more needs to be done. ASEAN countries. Given its historic claims and its refusal to accept the verdict of an International Tribunal, 16 November 2018

* The author, Captain (Dr) Gurpreet S Khurana, Indian Navy, is a PhD in Defence Studies and the Executive Director, National Maritime Foundation (NMF), New Delhi. This is a revised version of the presentation that he delivered at the BIMSTEC Think Tank Dialogue on Security, conducted at the Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF), New Delhi on 13-14 November 2018. He may be contacted at [email protected]

59 Ten Years after ‘26/11’: A Paradigm Shift in Maritime Security Governance in India?

Commander Himadri Das*

On 26 November 2008 (‘26/11’), of 2001 recognised that India’s long a group of terrorists from Pakistan coastline had remained “largely un- undertook attacks at several locations protected and unguarded.” The report in Mumbai. The siege ended three days recommended comprehensive measures later. By then, the terrorists had killed for border management, including for or injured more than 400 people. The maritime borders and island territories, terrorists had sailed from Pakistan and in addition to setting-up the Border landed at Mumbai using the sea route. Management Department in the En route they had also hijacked an Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), Indian fishing vessel Kuber. Earlier, the strengthening of the Indian Coast Guard sea route had also been used to traffic and the raising of the State Marine Police arms and ammunition for the Mumbai (SMP) were some of the other major blasts (1993). recommendations for management of coastal borders., State-specific initiatives for joint The unprecedented ‘26/11’ attacks patrolling of coastal areas by the navy, highlighted the pressing need to coast guard, and police were launched in holistically review the construct for Tamil Nadu in 1990 (Op Tasha), and in coastal security in India. By February Gujarat and Maharashtra in 1993 (Op 2009, a series of initiatives were set into Swan)., These measures were in response motion to strengthen coastal security. to the withdrawal of the Indian Peace This brief encapsulates some of the Keeping Force (IPKF) from Sri Lanka major initiatives and undertakes a and the Mumbai blasts respectively. succinct analysis of the ten years since The Group of Ministers (GoM) Report ‘26/11’.

60 Key Initiatives for Strengthening maritime security (including coastal Coastal Security security) and the Indian Coast Guard for coastal security in territorial waters Policy Coordination (with the SMP). Furthermore, towards The establishment of coordinating exercising criminal jurisdiction, at least committees at multiple levels of one Coastal Police Station (CPS) in governance — National Committee every state now exercises jurisdiction in for Coastal and Maritime Security international waters, compared to only (NCSMCS) in 2009, Steering Committee two police stations earlier (one on each for Review of Coastal Security (SCRCS) coast). in 2013, and the State and District While there have been considerable level Coastal Security Committees efforts at strengthening the legislative in 2016 — have institutionalised framework for overall maritime security mechanisms for policy coordination and such as through the Anti-Maritime implementation.,, These committees, Piracy Bill, the Marine Fisheries with multi-stakeholder representation, (Regulation and Management) Bill, and reflect a shift towards a comprehensive the Merchant Shipping Bill, these bills whole-of-government approach to are pending enactment. maritime security. The present approach is not only broader in terms of agencies Capacity Building, Capability involved (going beyond traditional Enhancement, and Operational security agencies), but also deeper in Coordination terms of the levels at which activities Capacities and capabilities of maritime are being monitored. Notwithstanding, security agencies, particularly the Indian a long-standing recommendation for a Coast Guard have been significantly single-point apex level body, such as the augmented and enhanced. The Indian proposed National Maritime Authority Navy has augmented its capacity for (NMA) is yet to be realised. Low Intensity Maritime Operations Specific roles and responsibilities (LIMO) by the raising of a battalion- for security agencies for coastal security strength Sagar Prahari Bal (SPB) and the have been formulated, with the Indian induction of over 100 Fast Interceptor Navy being responsible for overall Craft (FICs) and Immediate Support

61 Vessels (ISVs). The Indian Coast Guard construct in India is crowded with has significantly grown since ‘26/11’ numerous stakeholders. and is amongst the largest in the world. Operational Coordination has The growth story encompasses raising received a significant fillip by the of additional Regional Headquarters; establishment of Joint Operations induction of ships, surface craft and Centres (JOCs) by the Indian Navy, aircraft; recruitment of additional duly supported by the Coastal Security manpower, and, infrastructure Operations Centres of the Indian development. According to media Coast Guard. Real-time linkages and reports, the Indian Coast Guard has a common operational plot amongst plans to become a 190-ship and 100- all the Operations Centres facilitates aircraft force in another five years. quick coordinated actions to emerging Coastal States, through the Coastal situations and threats. The ‘hub and Security Scheme (CSS) Phase II, have spoke’ model between the Indian been able to establish additional Coastal Coast Guard and CPS provides further Police Stations (CPS) and develop linkages at with CPS at the local level. infrastructure such as jetties. However, Formulation of Standard Operational as parliamentary reports indicate, the Procedures (SOPs) has further implementation of CSS has its fair share streamlined inter-agency coordination. of issues. For a relatively new force, some of these are perhaps teething issues. The conduct of biannual coastal security exercises in all coastal States There have been proposals for and Union Territories involving all setting-up a central force for coastal stakeholders—perhaps a one-of-a- policing and for shifting the Indian kind exercise in India, if not in the Coast Guard under the MHA., world—facilitates review of operational Reportedly, the Ministry of Defence readiness, including identification of (MoD) is not in favour of the latter. voids and mechanisms to address them. The raising of additional central force Progressively, the scale and complexity for coastal security also seems to be an of such exercises has been enhanced, and antithesis to the ‘one border–one force’ the largest of such exercise encompassing recommendation of the GoM Report all coastal States is planned in early of 2001. As such, the coastal security 2019.

62 A significant milestone has been unparalleled facility in the Indian Ocean the recent operationalisation of the Region (IOR). National Academy for Coastal Policing While Phase II of the CSN has (NACP) at Okha, Gujarat. This is likely been sanctioned, the Indian Navy is to address the training requirements of steering the National Maritime Domain the coastal police. Hitherto, the Indian Awareness Project (NMDAP) to Navy and the Indian Coast Guard integrate all stakeholders and maritime were undertaking maritime orientation information systems into one common training for Central Armed Police Forces grid., Considering oceanic seamlessness, (CAPFs) and SMP respectively. The the proposed Information Fusion Centre setting-up of dedicated training facilities for the Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) in all coastal states, akin to the NACP, will also provide vital information for will also contribute in developing the developing domain awareness. Despite human component of combat power. the veritable revolution in domain Maritime Domain Awareness awareness for coastal security, ensuring Enhanced awareness of the maritime gap-free electronic surveillance remains domain has been facilitated by the a daunting challenge. setting-up of a Coastal Surveillance Sectoral Initiatives Network (CSN), a chain of coastal radars, by the Indian Coast Guard) and Since ‘26/11’, the fisheries sector has the National Automatic Identification indeed been an area of increasing System (NAIS) by the Directorate focus. The colour-coding of boats, General of Lighthouses and Lightships. online registration of fishing vessels The Indian Navy has set-up a National and fishing licensing, and, issuance of Command Control Communication biometric cards have been some of the and Intelligence (NC3I) Network, notable initiatives. The development which facilitates interlinking naval and of a suitable tracking system for fishing coast guard stations and the development vessels has been progressed, but a final of a common operational plot. The solution is yet to emerge. Considering Information Management and Analysis the increasing vagaries of nature, this Centre (IMAC), is the nerve-centre of is critical not only from a security the NC3I network and is perhaps an perspective, but also from a safety and

63 human security perspective. The setting- government agencies has been launched up of the proposed Monitoring Control in Kerala as a pilot project. The inclusion and Surveillance (MCS) Centres for of coastal security as a topic in the coastal marine fisheries, coupled with the adult literacy programme of Kerala— envisaged tracking system would further Askhara Sagaram—is also a stronger strengthen fisheries management., indicator of the wider understanding of security matters in the government, and In the port sector, while the the need for wider sensitisation. These International Ship and Port Facility efforts need to be emulated elsewhere as (ISPS) code is applicable for all ports well. dealing with international trade, based on audit of non-major ports, guidelines Summary for security of non-major ports have been prepared. The induction of Immediate Having covered some of the major Support Vessels (ISVs) and enhanced initiatives, a succinct analysis of the electronic surveillance through the developments in the decade after ‘26/11’ Vessel and Air Traffic Management is as follows: System (VATMS) has also strengthened Firstly, the developments in the the security of the offshore sector. past decade are in consonance with Community Engagement established models and best practices for maritime security governance. The community is a key element of the The whole-of-government approach coastal security construct. The concept for policy coordination, and focus on of community policing, essentially a inter-agency coordination, are the key policing concept, has been extended elements in this regard. to the maritime domain. Community Interaction Programmes (CIPs) and Toll- Secondly, these initiatives have been Free Numbers in coastal States facilitate taken on a national-level basis involving interaction between coastal communities all coastal States and Union Territories, and security agencies, and serve the and unlike in earlier years, have not dual purposes of security and safety., A been localised to specific coastal States. mobile application, Sagara, to facilitate Consequently, the scope and scale of communication between fishers and these efforts are unprecedented.

64 Thirdly, significant capacity other contingencies and scenarios such as augmentation and capability Search and Rescue (SAR), Humanitarian development of maritime security Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), agencies has been undertaken, especially urban coastal flooding, etc. for the Indian Coast Guard and the SMP. Ninthly, the legislative framework for security remains largely unchanged. Fourthly, there has been an enhanced focus on technological solutions to Finally, as multiple reports of the domain awareness and inter-agency government suggest, there remains a lot coordination. These efforts have been needs to be done in multiple areas. While effectively leveraged to upscale to the projects such as CSN have transited national and international levels. into the next phase, some others, such Fifthly, considering the federal nature as the implementation of the CSS are of governance, and policing being a State well behind their initial timelines. subject, there are challenges to bringing Further, some recommendations, such in uniformity across all States. as that of a single-point apex level body, the NMDAP, and strengthening of Sixthly, several sectoral initiatives the legislative framework are yet to be have been taken to strengthen security. implemented. Considering multiple sectors involved, some sectors such as fisheries, need Moving forward, addressing greater focus than others. Similarly, outstanding recommendations of the within sectors, certain aspects merit numerous audits and examinations greater attention, such as non-major by Parliamentary Committees and ports within the port sector. the Comptroller and Auditor General Seventhly, an inclusive approach to (C&AG), and completion of ongoing security has been adopted by including projects should be a priority. Due the community as a key stakeholder consideration to unresolved issues, (community as ‘eyes and ears’ of the un-actioned recommendations, and security agencies). emerging questions, could also provide Eighthly, the inter-agency linkages vital inputs for the future. For the future, through the coastal security construct some of the more significant points of can be effectively leveraged to deal with reflection pertain to the following:

65 First, will the highly recommended Seventh, how could gap-free single-point apex body for maritime electronic surveillance of the Indian affairs give further impetus to the reform coastline and adjoining sea areas be process? ensured?

Second, is the legislative framework Eighth, what measures can be taken for maritime security appropriate for the to ensure that security considerations are envisaged threats, and are all agencies an intrinsic element in every maritime appropriately empowered? endeavour, irrespective of the sector? Furthermore, what are the specific areas Third, is there a scope to of concern within each sector, which institutionalise periodic independent need to be addressed on priority? audits of the maritime security sector through objective criterion, such as those Ninth, what could be done to ensure envisaged in documents such as the US that the construct remains responsive Maritime Security Sector Reform Guide? to emerging threats such as cyber Such systems could provide much threats, unmanned vessels/aircraft, needed periodic course corrections and and improvisations, such as Water- inputs for continuing reform. Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (WBIED). Fourth, with the long-term plan of the Indian Coast Guard to be a close to And finally, what measures could 200-ship and 100-aircraft Coast Guard be taken to institutionalise community by 2023, is there are case to recalibrate engagement for security? engagement of other agencies for coastal Concluding Remarks security? Overall, in the past decade, there Fifth, considering enduring issues have indeed been some significant with the implementation of the CSS, developments in the management of whether raising another CAPF under maritime security in India – more has MHA would be useful? been witnessed in the past decade, than Sixth, would placing the Indian in the previous six decades. Certainly, Coast Guard under the MHA serve the there has been an exponential progress larger objectives? since ‘26/11’, and it would only be

66 reasonable to assume that the concept especially coastal security. However, the of ‘coastal security’, which has witnessed gains need to be further consolidated increasing global attention, has a and strengthened. In short, the reforms strong Indian connect. Regrettably, of the maritime security sector need to these developments gained traction continue. India’s wider aspirations as a only after ‘26/11’, despite the earlier regional player can only be realised if recommendation of the GoM. its own maritime backyard remains safe and secure. Safety and security are also Like anywhere else in the world, inextricably linked to overall economic it would be wishful to assume that development, national prosperity, and the work has been done, or to assume the well-being of the citizens. impenetrability of the Indian coastline. However, there is reasonable assurance Despite the inherent advantage with that necessary systems are in place to the aggressor in asymmetric scenarios, deter and to respond to non-traditional there is every reason to believe that threats in the maritime domain. overall, the security of the Indian Considering the scope, scale and nature coastline has indeed been strengthened. of the reforms undertaken, it would only However, should it be tested, every link be fair to suggest that the past decade in the chain should be able bear the has witnessed a paradigm shift in the strain. governance of maritime security in India, 28 November 2018

* Himadri Das is a serving officer in the Indian Navy. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect the official policy, the Indian Navy, the NMF or the Government of India. He can be reached at [email protected]

67 Cyber-Warriors for Cyber-Space: What we can learn from the US Navy

Rear Admiral Sudarshan Shrikhande (Retd)*

On 04 Jun this year, the US Navy professional knowledge and experience (USN) took a rather unusual step in in pace with growing complexities of reintroducing the Warrant Officer-I equipment and hardware as well as in (W-I) rank and inviting applicants in training and maintenance. this rank for cyber warfare. The USN has had a complex history of warrant The USN’s step is certainly worth ranks as opposed to commissioned and considering. In relatively newer combat non-commissioned ranks. The details disciplines like cyber warfare there are of this history are not of direct interest problems with earlier methods that were to us. As such, the Royal Indian Navy more conservative and to use the catch- (RIN) followed the Royal Navy (RN) all phrase of not rocking the boat “time- in doing away with “Warrant Officer” tested” ways of recruiting and advancing ranks in 1949. (In comparison to the sailors. As pointed out in the US media, RN, the RIN had very few Indian the newer skills required for in the cyber WOs and not many Indian officers domain exist in just a few among the either.) For various reasons such as the available pool of younger sailors in the dissatisfaction that RN WOs had with USN. As reported by the “Navy Times” the social discrimination they faced from (by Mark D. Faram, 13 Dec 2018), this wardrooms and reduced promotional was because “cyber skills are in such avenues, the ranks were abolished and demand in the civilian marketplace that Branch Lists were introduced. In 1965, many sailors weren’t sticking around Branch List was renamed Special Duties long enough to make chief petty officer, List. In the IN this has been a useful the traditional springboard for warrant cadre of officers who have brought core ranks.” As warrant officers they will get

68 higher pay and benefits, greater status period and then incentivised for and more opportunities for promotions advancement to Chief Petty Officer, etc. including to commissioned ranks. Truly outstanding sailors could also be selected for early commissioning within Is there a need for the Indian Navy the Special Duties List for cyber/ space and indeed for the other two Services to and other niche warfare areas. adopt a similar approach? Can cyber- warfare or other niche skills required Does this sound undoable? Not at in space, intelligence and information all! In fact, there are precedents and the operations be developed, retained and closest model is, strangely, in a totally deployed with the existing arrangements non- warfare and non-core area. Most for recruiting, training, paying and naval readers would know of the rapid promoting? We regularly talk about the promotions that can be earned by increasing importance of understanding “sports quota” sailor-entries depending and deploying higher technologies in on their performance in national and most warfare areas and the criticality of international events. This analyst does skilling operators, grooming analysts and wish, as much as any other Indian, that producing leaders in the very same areas. our country of 1.3 billion people wins It is not surprising that the Army Chief, many more medals in all sports and General Bipin Rawat has highlighted necessary incentives be offered to sports the challenges that technology presents persons. However, not many nations, if during the 2018 MCETE Convocation any at all, have taken recourse to asking in Secunderabad on 15 Dec. Senior their armed forces to devote a fair bit of leadership in other services have also effort in recruiting such individuals and expressed similar concerns. then spending relatively large amounts on Therefore, the Navy could think of infrastructure, sports nodes, coaches and leading the way by swiftly encouraging exposure as have Indian armed forces. All and selecting the “right stuff” that could this is in a completely non- warfare area form the inaugural cadré of the joint by any stretch of imagination! Therefore, cyber command as well as at the single the analyst feels that the responsibility Service interfaces. Sailors so identified, for winning sports medals should be and rigorously security-vetted, could of the departments and the ministries then be skilled up and promoted to whose task is to do so, not of the armed Petty Officer rank for a probation forces. We all remember earlier decades

69 when a few officers and men got Secondly, the IN, in continuing the naturally selected for state and national inheritance from the RN, had a different level sports with some participating in set of intake standards, training pattern international events, something that and service conditions for artificer rarely happens now. Importantly, they entries. These entries have served the continued to do their primary duties. Navy very well. While there may have Here is an illustrative digression: It been the occasional hiccup, these were may be of interest to note that General far outweighed by the advantages their George S Patton — no “sports quota skills brought to core-area efficiencies. entry” — of the US Army was part of Services often talk about the American pentathlon team in the transformation. Technology of course 1912 Olympics. Had he been taken in as is an important part, but transforming a “sports quota entry”, he may have won the way in which we can recruit, train, more sporting medals but not battles and motivate, skill, deploy and lead our campaigns! However, if such modalities warriors is by far more important. for recruitment, skilling and fast- track No one could have said it better than promotions could be adopted by all Colonel John Boyd of the OODA Services (and there is currently very little loop fame: “People, Ideas, Things are jointness in this as well) then there is no what matter most and in that order.” reason for not doing so in core warfare Cyber-warfare requires jointness and areas where we already face problems. integration not only within Services but As far as this writer knows, the Navy can with quite a few civilian agencies who recruit potential sportsmen as senior are all partners in this new warfare area. sailors and the Army perhaps went a The Navy could perhaps take the lead step further with an entry rank of a Naib in creating new cyber warriors that will Subedar (JCO). If such precedents exist be the cutting edge in monitoring and in non-core areas, it should be certainly winning combat in cyber-space. worth considering to be more future- ready in warfare disciplines. 19 December 2018

* Rear Admiral Sudarshan Shrikhande (Retd)is a former Rear Admiral of the Indian Navy and the NMF’s Regional Director, Goa Chapter. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the NMF, the Indian Navy, or the Government of India. He can be reached at [email protected]

70 Naval Power

Indian Navy’s ‘Camping’ Expeditions in the Indian Ocean Region

Commodore RS Vasan, IN (Retd.)*

The year that has gone by is significant deployment pattern by surface units in many aspects for the Indian Navy’s which remain on patrol for up to three operational deployment which has been months before being relieved. There demonstrated far and wide in the Indian is a maritime surveillance architecture Ocean Region (IOR). The time-tested (MSA) led by the P8I Long-Range formula of the navies of the world, Maritime Reconnaissance and Anti namely, “Forward presence and Submarine Warfare aircraft operating posturing” can only be effective from INS Rajali in Arakkonam and the when it is applied continuously in a IL-38s operating from INS Hansa in sustained manner to maintain a credible Dabolim. These efforts are augmented ‘Command, Control and by satellites, medium range surveillance Communication’ architecture, which platforms such as Dornier aircraft as also is driven by an effective information by UAV squadrons operated by the Navy. management system. The Indian The requirement for such continuous Navy commissioned the Information deployment has been acutely felt with Management and Analysis Communic- the increased presence of the PLA ation (IMAC) system in November 2014, in Gurgaon, close to the capital. Navy (PLA-N) and also other maritime This has enabled information collation, developments in India’s neighbourhood. analysis and dissemination in real time. It is a matter of concern that there is a near continuous presence of PLA-N New Horizons, New Deployment surface and sub-surface units who are on Pattern. variety of missions in the Indian Ocean, Commencing early last year, the Indian including, anti-piracy off the Somali Navy has adopted a new form of extended Coast since 2008.

73 The Navy and the Coast Guard not participate in this year’s edition of together ensure that the entire Indian the biennial meet “Milan” which brings Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and together navies from different regions the extended areas in the IOR are to discuss the challenges in the region. monitored to spot any unusual activity. Maldives quoted the internal situation The presence of the naval or coast guard as a major factor that precluded its units is akin to ‘boots- on- the ground’ participation. in army parlance, as it is the physical ANDEP This patrol area is in presence of surface units and their the Andaman and Nicobar group of ability to contain unlawful activity that Islands (A&N) area, where patrolling is required at sea. between the North Andamans and Interestingly, the new deployment South Nicobar is undertaken. This area pattern interestingly can be explained by also has witnessed poaching and illegal the acronym CAMPING. The following traffic from the neighbouring countries are the areas which are being kept under thus requiring a greater degree of vigil. surveillance by regular deployment of MALDEP The Straits of Malacca ships in the IOR: and Singapore (SOMS) are crucial CENDEP This area covers the arteries of the global shipping traffic and central IOR, where patrolling in waters serve the two-way traffic between the south of India, off Maldives and Sri Pacific and the Indian Oceans. A naval Lanka, is undertaken. The developments ship on patrol, in this region, which in Maldives have been a cause of is prone to piracy and other illegal concern and hence there is a need for activities, provides the Indian Navy patrolling these areas. It may be noted with an opportunity and the ability to that India has a trilateral agreement coordinate and integrate its plans with the Tri-Service Andaman and Nicobar that includes both Maldives and Sri Command in timely and effective Lanka and conducts DOSTI a Coast manner. Guard exercise annually. However, the recent developments in Maldives POGDEP Anti-Piracy patrols will prevent any active engagement by commenced in 2008 and has continued the Maldivian forces till the internal unabated, to ensure that piracy off the situation is stabilised. Maldives also did east African coast, is contained. Indian

74 Naval units have been on patrol the last countries, most of which willing to decade and in carrying out operations contribute to the efforts of India to along with other navies of the world and provide security and stability in the IOR have been successful in contributing by augmenting capacity and capability. to enhanced safety and confidence of NORDEP The Bay of Bengal has seafarers. This has to be seen in the immense relevance to India’s Act East backdrop of PLA-N’s own deployment Policy and requires effective engagement to contain piracy. Surprisingly, the with the neighbouing States in the Bay PLA-N thought it fit to use piracy as an of Bengal. The NORDEP is aimed at excuse to deploy its submarines, which keeping the northern Bay of Bengal and clearly are unsuitable for such missions. the eco sensitive waters of the Andaman In the bargain, however, the PLA- Seas under effective surveillance by Navy obtained invaluable “hands-on” coordinating with the maritime security experience in operating its submarines, agencies of Bangladesh and Myanmar. far away from its shores, and also The mass migration of the Rohingyas gained local knowledge of the operating both by sea and over land requires conditions. The experience led to China close monitoring. Likewise, close co- building and commissioning a naval ordination with the neighbouring base in Djibouti which will provide countries is needed to monitor illegal the requisite logistic support for its movements, human trafficking and ambitions in the IOR. smuggling in these areas. Coordinated patrols with Myanmar, Thailand IODEP This deployment seeks and Indonesia would augment this to keep the South Indian Ocean, off deployment objective by keeping the Mauritius, Seychelles and Madagascar sensitive areas under surveillance. areas under surveillance. Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) programmes GULFDEP Just as a close eye is in this region enjoy the support of being kept over the SOMS, is being the Governments of Mauritius and kept under watch, there is a need to Seychelles. Following the visit of Prime pay a close attention to the goings on in Minister Modi, there has been a great the approaches to the Strait of Hormuz momentum to revitalise the historical and the Persian Gulf which are critical links and synergise with these island to the energy security of India, China

75 and other eastern economies. and there the areas of interest. The experience thus is an inescapable need to keep this area far also would have provided immense under constant surveillance. There is opportunities to obtain new data of also a power play of sorts going on in the environment, shipping patterns, this area, with the Chinese investments weather, bathymetry and oceanographic in Gwadar, a possible Chinese funding data. This also has provided an of a naval base at Jiwani, investments opportunity for the IN to review human in Chabahar as also the new Asia Africa and machinery limitations on such Growth Corridor (AAGC) a joint deployments and tweak operational initiative of India and Japan, which is and manning patterns. The Logistic seen as a counter to the Maritime Silk Exchange Memorandum of Agreement Road (part of the China’s Belt and Road (LEMOA) with USA, France and other Initiative (BRI). India, in the recent bilateral agreements would facilitate years, has practically engaged the navies cross-utlisation of facilities in the IOR in this region and has also been provided thereby, promoting the objective of recently with support facilities including being prepared for both armed conflicts dry docking, in Duqm in Oman. and also for Maritime Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) including In conclusion, it is clear that the HADR. ‘CAMPING’ deployment pattern in the IOR by the Indian Navy serves the objective of being present and relevant in 06 April 2018

* Commodore RS Vasan IN (Retd) is the NMF’s Regional Director of the Chennai Chapter and also the Director C3S. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the NMF, the Indian Navy or the Government of India. He can be reached at rsvasan2010@ gmail.com

76 COMCASA – Wind-Vane of Indian Foreign Policy?!

Rajesh Soami*

The United States has been prodding COMCASA, like LEMOA, has India to sign the Communications, divided the strategic community in Compatibility and Security Agreement, India once again. The sceptics point better known as COMCASA, for more to its intrusive nature. The Agreement than a decade. COMCASA is a version envisages the usage of American military of CISMOA (Communication and communication equipment onboard Information Security Memorandum various systems bought by India from of Agreement) tailored specifically for US. Since these equipment will almost India. CISMOA is considered to be one certainly use American encryption of the three foundational agreements standards for inter-operability with that the United States of America signs other US systems, India would need with its military allies. The other two to allow American experts to access agreements are LSA (Logistics Support such equipment periodically. One Agreement) and BECA (Basic Exchange may wonder, how comfortable Indian and Cooperation agreement). India strategic mandarins would be in signed LEMOA (Logistics Exchange allowing US technicians to inspect Memorandum of Agreement) in 2016 Indian arms in Indian military bases. when Manohar Parrikar was the Defence Moreover, bulk of defence armaments Minister. LEMOA is a version of LSA in India is of non-US origin. Since they specific to India. According to various would be non-compliant with American sources in the media, India and the US communication systems, signing of have also made progress in discussions COMCASA to acquire American on COMCASA and Indian government systems would make it difficult for may take a decision regarding the India to make its own different systems agreement in the near future. interoperable.

77 On the other hand, there is a general capabilities of the US and its allies, and admission in military circles that United the other countries. It also underlined States is a leader in some defence the fact that some advanced weapons technologies, if not all. Unmanned may only be acquired from US or its aerial vehicles, anti-submarine warfare allies. Although, India has previously and aircraft carrier technologies are bought drones of various types and uses some fields where US has set the pace from Israel, getting the more advanced for rest of the world to follow. India, versions directly from the US would whose own armament development give Indian forces an extra punch in programmes have seen mixed success in combat ability. This is but only one the last 70 years, has three choices if it example where India can gain by signing wants advanced warfare capabilities. It COMCASA, as US has insisted on the can wait for its own R&D programmes agreement to part with advanced weapon to mature, acquire the American systems. But COMCASA is more than systems, or try to get similar systems just a military agreement. Signing on from elsewhere. the dotted lines would also be a foreign Although Indian research and policy statement by India. development has had success in some In the last two decades, New Delhi advanced fields like rocket engines and has visibly gotten closer to the US. It missiles, it is finding the going tough in has also reaped benefits from this policy. many other areas. Indian armed forces Washington has helped Delhi become a cannot wait indefinitely for development de-facto nuclear power with the 1-2-3 of defence hardware, even as threats to nuclear agreement. It has also helped India the country evolve continuously. The join multilateral arms agreements like economics of reinventing the wheel also the Missile Technology Control Regime do not seem attractive for a relatively (MTCR), Wassenaar arrangement and poor country. the Australia group. In return, India has When Russia bought reconnaissance shown willingness to engage with the US drones from Israel in 2011, having on different geopolitical issues. These been impressed by their performance include strategic alignment in the Indo- during the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, it pacific and issues related to Iran and revealed the widening gap in advanced Afghanistan. India has also increasingly

78 bought weapons directly from the US. by CAATSA. The US administration is This was unthinkable barely 20 years working with the Indian government as ago. well as the legislature in Washington to find a solution to the issue. But debate Unfortunately for the two countries, in India regarding the unpredictability election of Donald Trump to the White of US actions has gained momentum. House has been a major disruption. The new President’s “America First” India has tried to maintain policy has countered much of the independent strategic autonomy and goodwill generated in India by foreign policy for much of the last 70 previous administrations. In pursuing years. This has been the bedrock of the mercantilist policy, Washington the Indian strategic thought for much has refused to differentiate between of its post-independence history. It allies and/or competitors. His pressure was this nature of Indian policy which on India on trade issues has deeply was reflected in the Indian initiative in disappointed the Americophiles in New founding of the Non-Aligned Movement Delhi. Recently, India has threatened (NAM) during the cold war. to impose tariffs on the US imports as Modi became the first Indian PM retaliation for Washington slapping steel to miss the NAM summit in 2016, the and aluminum tariffs on the country. same year India signed LEMOA with the At the same time, India and China US. But the changing of US positions on have come closer under the shadow of issues vital to Indian interests seems to Trump’s trade war. be prompting a rethink. Between April The CAATSA (Countering America’s and May 2018, PM Modi visited both Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) law China and Russia in quick succession. enacted by US Congress has also led to The visits were unplanned, informal increasing doubts in India about the and likely the result of Indian initiative. reliability of US as an ally. The law directs They have been followed by conciliatory the US administration to punish foreign and friendly statements by relevant countries doing business with Russian parties. Since the informal summits, defence and intelligence apparatus by the Defence Minister, Prime Minister applying sanctions against them. India is and President of India have repeatedly one of the countries likely to be affected reiterated their commitment to multi-

79 polarity and strategic autonomy. India fall through, one may conclude that has also stated publicly that its relations American ties with India have hit a with Russia are not negotiable. trough. The geopolitical implications of such a development cannot be overstated. Pragmatic geopolitics dictates that The two democracies could again rue India must not reject the extended arm missed chances and lost opportunities of friendship of the lone superpower in the future. on the globe. But last year and half of developments in Washington could be On the other hand, if New Delhi pushing India to relapse into the non- signs the COMCASA, we can deduce alignment mode. This time India may that the two countries have managed be seeking middle ground between US to tide over their differences, or at least on one side and China and Russia on agreed to disagree, in favour of better the other. geostrategic relations. This will need a lot of foresight and statesmanship from Whether or not New Delhi signs the the leaders in Delhi and Washington COMCASA could be indicative of where though. Indian foreign policy goes from here. If the negotiations on the agreement 28 June 2018

* Rajesh Soami is an Associate Fellow at the National Maritime Foundation. The views expressed here are his own, and do not reflect the official policy or position of the NMF. He can be reached at [email protected] or [email protected]

80 Japanese Naval Diplomacy in the Indian Ocean: Prospects and Possibilities

Seetha Lakshmi Dinesh Iyer*

Japan’s strategic advancement into As a part of a push to promote the the South Asian geopolitics comes at “Free and open Indo-Pacific strategy”, a time when the Abe administration Japan is presently looking at extending its is restructuring and expanding the reach to South Asia, primarily, through scope of their military architecture. their JMSDF assistance. Sri Lanka is South Asia holds enormous strategic expected to be the first in line to receive significance in the Indo-Pacific security special support from the JMSDF in the order. In addition, Japan’s extensive region. Tokyo’s maritime engagement relations with India, especially in the with Colombo includes a major port maritime domain, are making the facility in Galle. The upcoming port is region a potential destination for the only over a 100 kilometres away from island nation to manifest its aspirations the Chinese sponsored Hambantota as a regional power. How have Tokyo’s and could later serve as a vital check maritime security ties in the South Asian over Beijing. The Abe government littorals been so far? What could be had granted 1.8 billion Japanese Yen the prospective role and avenues of the in 2016 towards improving maritime Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force safety capabilities of the Sri Lankan (JMSDF) in the Indian Ocean? To what Coast Guard (SLCG). The deal seeks extent would the India-Japan proximity to provide regular training to SLCG be instrumental in making JMSDF personnel in addition to equipping a regional stakeholder? This article them with the means to carry out anti- aims to explore these very questions in piracy operations, countermeasures for detail. transnational crimes and to prevent the

81 over exploitation of marine resources. International Shipping Lanes (ISL) Since 2009, a number of port calls have of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). also been made from the JMSDF and Tokyo is part of various regional and the Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) to the international mechanisms to combat island. piracy and organized crime alongside other regional powers, like Beijing and Japan seeks to play a proactive role New Delhi, which share similar security- in contributing to peace and stability related apprehensions. These include through cooperation in Humanitarian the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery funding development projects and against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), the maritime capacity building. This comes at a point, when China is flexing its Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast military muscle in the Indo-Pacific. of Somalia (CGPCS), and the Shared Due to a pacifism-driven security Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) doctrine, the island nation has thus far mechanism. been largely dependent on its “coast The Japanese government plans guard diplomacy” to keep its leverage to facilitate the development of port over the maritime space going. Tokyo infrastructure in the Indian Ocean has also been using it as an effective nations for capacity building in order tool to propagate a peaceful maritime to connect Asia and Africa through order and secure sea trade. Japan the Middle East. Under this, the already has a standing partnership island nation has proposed to jointly with the Indian Coast Guard (ICS) in develop a deep-sea port at Matarbari in building maritime domain awareness Bangladesh. If the former acquires rights in the region. Extending support in over using the port as a military facility, strengthening the coast guard along the it might help Tokyo gain access to major rest of the South Asian littorals would choke points along the Bay of Bengal facilitate a safer movement of goods. (BoB) and the eastern Indian Ocean. It Such an engagement is already in place could also operate as a strategic response with Sri Lanka. to Beijing’s ongoing plans to establish Similarly, piracy has been an a naval base in the Sonadia islands of impinging issue all along the critical Bangladesh. The development of geo-

82 economic arrangements such as the The 1971, the United Nations Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) Declaration categorized the Indian Ocean would later add value and strength to as a Zone of Peace (ZOP). This called the proposed creation of a Quad-led for the elimination of foreign military investment mechanism. presence in the region. JMSDF’s possible advance into the South Asian maritime Interestingly, there was a courtesy theatre would violate the ZOP and thus, visit by the Bangladeshi Naval Chief to more engagement might even mean Hiroshima Yamamur, the Assistant Vice more power rivalry. Furthermore, Japan Chief Admiral of JMSDF during the faces the problem of tyranny of distance sixth Indian Ocean Naval Symposium to the Indian Ocean waters. If the island (IONS) held in 2018 at Tehran, nation intends to establish its permanent signaling an affirmative interest in naval presence in the region, it might associating with Japan’s naval diplomacy. have to work on force restructuring and Multilateral naval mechanisms like the move towards “forward deployment,” Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) which could require more military and and IONS works as a subtle signal to diplomatic capital. The revival of the Chinese assertive foreign policy. On Quadrilateral as a collective security the flip side, the inking of the Grant arrangement could provide a significant Agreement of 2017 with the Republic opportunity for Tokyo to diversify of Maldives allows the introduction of the scope of its self-defence forces and terrestrial digital broadcasting facilities look beyond assistance. In this regard, which would play a key role in making Japan’s combined exercises with India meteorological assessments and reducing and the US like the MALABAR helps disaster risks there. Japan’s association in building interoperability between with Pakistan on the maritime security maritime forces and shared Maritime front has been limited. However, the Domain Awareness (MDA). The recent three nation visit (Sri Lanka, former could also look at strengthening Maldives and Pakistan) from the island its maritime-military through enhanced nation called for emphasis on increased logistic agreements with Quad partners. cooperation in maritime security and stability, indicating the latter’s evolving Japan endorses India’s quest to act security architecture in the region. as a “Net Security Provider” (NSP) in

83 the IOR. The latter’s bid for NSP could part of a Chinese project. On the other offer a more favourable environment hand, the renaming of the US Navy’s in catering to JMSDF’s interests in the Central Command into the Indo- region. Besides, the island nation has Pacific Command could be seen as a already been able to use New Delhi’s positive signal in support of the Abe political clout in maintaining closer administration’s “Free and Open Indo- engagement with its regional maritime Pacific strategy” from a prime ally. This neighbourhood. For instance, both would further enhance previously well- nations have jointly proposed the established India-Japan relations and redevelopment of the existing port in increase the latter’s role in the IOR. Trincomalee, and converting it into a trading hub in a possible joint venture with Sri Lanka which was otherwise 09 July 2018

* Seetha Lakshmi Dinesh Iyer holds a Master’s degree in Political Science from the Madras Christian College, Chennai. The views expressed are her own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the NMF. She can be reached at [email protected]

84 Relevance of Aircraft Carriers for India: An Assessment

Captain (Dr) Gurpreet S Khurana*

Introduction Lively debates on the rationale for aircraft carriers have often surfaced in The epic sea battles between aircraft the past, in India and among other naval carriers never recurred after the Second powers; and each time, the naysayers have World War. In the post-war period, opted for a graceful withdrawal of their most carriers began to retire without arguments. As a result, notwithstanding even having participated in battle. the protracted discussions over the years, Many countries that possessed carriers the aircraft-carrier has still not followed or were aspiring to do so thus began to the battleship into oblivion. The issue re-assess the military-strategic utility of seems to be surfacing one again, in the such platforms in the radically altered Indian context, and ostensibly, as a result global geo-strategic environment. The of effective Strategic Communication operational concept incorporating campaigns by foreign analysts. Needless carriers also came under the scanner due to suggest, it may be more prudent for to the risk to these high-value assets by Indian policymakers to consider the the proliferation of sea-denial platforms views of Indian analysts. In this context, and weapons. For example, the this issue-brief aims to examine need acquisition of submarines by Indonesia for aircraft carriers for India, and assess and Pakistan in mid-1960s led to India’s the related operational-level and tactical employment of INS with much Vikrant aspects of carrier operations in the hesitation. Whether the enormous Indian context. financial investment to acquire and operate a carrier can be justified against Merely on the basis of reduced its need has been another contentious employment of aircraft-carriers in the issue. recent past, or by a casual reckoning

85 of the shifting offence-defence balance maintain neutrality during an armed against these platforms, it may be conflict involving India and a third perilous to infer that aircraft-carriers are country. Besides, by sheer virtue of the redundant in the contemporary times. prefixed adjective, these ‘fixed’ bases The current regional geo-political and will not provide the Indian Navy the security environment is marked by flexibility of ‘operational manoeuvre’, ambiguities and uncertainties. It is still which is so critical for a maritime unclear as to what kind of world order operation. Furthermore, these ‘fixed’ will emerge after the bipolar one ended bases will be highly vulnerable to the with the Cold War. The only certitude is adversary. that the process will involve substantial Although there are numerous geopolitical competition, wherein the possible scenarios wherein a carrier possibility of military conflicts cannot capability would be indispensable, some be discounted. Furthermore, given of the more conceivable ones are as the shifting global focus to the Indo- follows: - Pacific region (from the Pacific-Atlantic combine); the competition is more likely • In Support of Land Battle to manifest in this region. Coupled with India’s expanding vital interests, such a The concept of using a carrier to regional environment will necessarily support a continental war is not necessitate a multi-carrier capability for alien to India. During the 1971 its Navy. operations for liberation of Bangladesh, the aircraft onboard Strategic Imperatives INS Vikrant was employed very The Indo-Pacific is largely a maritime- successfully to strike strategic configured region. Therefore, there is targets deep inside the erstwhile much rationale for a regional power East Pakistan. It is important like India to possess a carrier capability. to note that as long as much of Even if India could obtain access to India’s land boundary (stretching extra-territorial bases, these may not be from north-west to north-east) available in the most critical occasion remains disputed, the potential due to geopolitical factors, or premised of a border conflict; and thereby on the imperatives of host country to the likelihood of such a need;

86 will persist. In such conceivable (“pearls”) in the Indian Ocean conflict scenarios, carrier- littoral dispersed along the based aviation will remain an arterial shipping routes bear a indispensable tool for affecting similar potential. Owing to the the outcome of the war, even ongoing diversification of energy if it is essentially continental in sources away from the Persian nature. The guns and missiles Gulf area, these distant SLOCs on board destroyers and frigates are also assuming strategic cannot possibly deliver sufficient significance for India. volume of firepower in the enemy littoral. • Maintaining Influence in the IOR • Security of Sea-Lines of Communication (SLOC) India’s security is directly linked and closely enmeshed with that In the event of a military of the Indian Ocean and the conflict, a carrier is the only adjoining littoral region (IOR) - naval asset that can provide the area of its primary strategic a comprehensive protection interest. The Chinese “pearls” to the merchant shipping in Indian Ocean, besides carrying strategic commodities catering for Beijing’s strategic to India. A decade ago in vulnerability in terms of its energy 2008, the Indian naval chief expressed apprehensions on the imports, is likely to be aimed at future vulnerability of energy ‘displacing’ India’s influence in imports through the Strait of the IOR. A possible Chinese Hormuz due to China’s strategic politico-military intervention in ‘foothold’ in Pakistan’s Gwadar the region will seriously impinge port, as part of its overall “String on India’s security. As hitherto, of Pearls” strategy, which was a carrier can best bestow India analysed by the author earlier a capability to maintain its that year. These apprehensions influence in these waters and seem to be coming alive today. achieve a strategic ‘dissuasion’ Like Gwadar – and more lately, and ‘deterrence’ against any Djibouti – many other locations inimical extra-regional power.

87 • Safeguarding Vital Interests by participating in a peace- Overseas enforcement operation under the aegis of the United Nations. Carrier aviation will enable India to safeguard its strategic • Security of Island Territories interests overseas, not only in Integral naval aviation is essential the IOR but also beyond. India’s for defence of India’s far-flung economic/ strategic stakes are island territories, particularly conspicuously increasing in of the Andaman and Nicobar Afro-Asian states, many of Islands (A&N) that lie more which are plagued by political, than 1,000 km from the Indian socio-economic and ethnic mainland. These islands are also instabilities. Besides, many extremely vulnerable due to Indian citizens are working in their geographical spread, and these countries, and past events the fact that most of these are have amply demonstrated how uninhabited. The possibility of their lives and property can be foreign military occupation or jeopardised. New Delhi will claim may be unlikely in the need to safeguard these interests foreseeable future, but cannot be in conjunction with the host ruled out altogether. The take- nations. When the operational over of the Falklands Islands by situation so warrants, it may Argentina was also considered preferable to carry out precision a remote possibility until it air-strikes to ‘soften’ the target actually occurred in 1982. By all before inserting ground forces, indicators, high-value naval/ air since to do otherwise may lead assets are unlikely to be based in to avoidable casualties. The the A&N Islands. This makes Gulf wars conducted by the the aircraft carrier indispensable, United States are instructive including as a deterrent. in this regard. Even if its own interests are not directly • Non-military Missions endangered, India may need to Although the concept of a meet its international obligation carrier is essentially centred on

88 its military role, such a platform (along with large sealift platforms and would substantially increase hospital ships) to meet its normative India’s operational options to international obligations by projecting respond to a natural disaster its ‘benign’ humanitarian role in the in the regional seas or littoral. Indo-Pacific region, and the same needs While it has begun inducting to be reflected in its national and military large sealift platforms with doctrines. integral helicopters like the A carrier is essential to fulfil the other INS Jalashwa Landing Platform politico-diplomatic roles of the navy. The Dock (LPD), a disaster of a large platform is an awesome symbol of large magnitude may necessitate national power. Its overseas presence the employment of a carrier. missions and port-calls, when used with Akin to a floating city, a carrier prudence and in a non-threatening poise can provide virtually unlimited can yield intangible, but substantial sealift, substantial airlift and all dividends to the country. conceivable essential services ranging from freshwater to an Air Power: Sea-based versus electric supply, and medical to Land-based engineering expertise. There is an effort to further enhance the The recent past is witness to a quantum usefulness of a carrier for such advancement in aviation technologies, roles, such as by incorporating a leading to the induction of ‘fourth- modular concept. It incorporates generation-plus’ aircraft by many modular spaces/ containers countries including India (SU-30 carrying specialised personnel, MKI). Their intrinsically enhanced engineering equipment, medical flight endurance is further augmented facilities, etc., which can be by in-flight refuelling capability. It may rapidly deployed for specific therefore seem that land-based air-power missions. can meet any of the aforesaid strategic objectives, which hitherto necessitated As India emerges as a major carrier-borne air operations. However, maritime power, it will need the the following considerations indicate capability inherent in an aircraft carrier otherwise: -

89 • Aerial refuelling has its own of surprise and uncertainty to operational constraints, such as the adversary. in terms of safety of the tanker- • For India to defend its widely aircraft. dispersed island territories, • The ‘time on task’ of a land- carrier-based aviation may be based aircraft in the conflict a more cost-effective option as zone would be significantly compared to land-based aircraft, lesser than that of its sea-borne which would need elaborate counterpart. supporting infrastructure. Besides the airfield, it will • Carrier-borne aircraft are need an air-surveillance radar better able to maintain combat chain, a fixed anti-submarine efficiency. In contrast, the sensor network, fuel stores, lengthy transit of land-based ammunition depots, and so on. aircraft would have degraded • In many cases, as compared to an crew efficiency, by the time airfield, a carrier is less vulnerable the aircraft reach the conflict to the enemy’s pre-emptive strike zone/‘task’ area. due to its mobility. • Positioning the carrier in close The Case against Carriers geographical proximity of conflict zone enables the commander to The arguments against a carrier better monitor the changing essentially revolve around the increasing operational scenario and execute operational vulnerability of such a high- timely measures. value platform, which is bound to be a focal target for an adversary’s military • In case of some scenarios like strategy during war. It is true that a carrier a military conflict across the is more prone to detection today due land border, the targets may lie to advent of spaced-based surveillance, well within the striking range unlike in the past when it could ‘hide’ of land-based strike aircraft. in the vast expanse of the ocean. It is However, employment of also stated that once detected, it is also carrier-based aircraft will be more assailable to sea-denial forces than necessary to present an element hitherto. This assertion may however be

90 too simplistic, and does not reckon the lethality in terms of their speed, inherent defences of a carrier task force. sea-skimming flight profile to evade The raison d’etre of a carrier is to establish the targets radar, sophistication sea-control (including air-dominance) in of is Electronic Counter-Counter a sizable area around it, with its precise Measures (ECCM) to evade size being contingent upon the mission, ship’s ‘soft-kill’ defences, and so threat perception and the forces at the on. However, the technological carrier’s disposal. This implies that effectiveness of ‘defence’ has also before a carrier is put to sea, it must be increased substantially, almost in capable of sanitising all possible threats tandem with the ‘offence’. (in all dimensions) in the sea-control Besides, considering that the area. The case against the carrier also adversary is likely to resort to pertains to some specific threats, which concentration of force to ‘saturate’ are examined and accounted for later. its defences, tactical doctrines have The hype on insecurity of a carrier been re-oriented accordingly to largely stems from a larger fear – if the bolster the defence. For example, carrier is lost to the enemy, it would not it has now become necessary to only severely and irreversibly degrade destroy the launch-platform before the nation’s military capability, but will it launches the missile. The platform also lead to a major symbolic dent to its could be a warship or a maritime morale and pride – after all, nowhere in patrol aircraft, like the P-3C Orion the annals of military history, the loss operated by Pakistan. It could also of a single asset to the enemy, including be a submarine, which is examined that of the ‘battleship’, has never been later in greater detail. The value of so damaging to national interest. The ‘organic’ aviation of a carrier here following accounts for the oft-stated lies in the availability, at virtually arguments against the carrier. immediate notice, of a means to search and positively identify distant 1. “Its vulnerability to anti-ship hostile platforms, and thereafter missiles has increased” ‘kill’ these, before missile launch. The new generation anti-missiles To cater for the possibility that the like Exocet, Harpoon and Moskit destruction of launch platform is not are characterised by increasing achieved, the many subsequent layers

91 of defence directed at destruction of 2. “Its vulnerability to submarines has the incoming missiles are facilitated increased” by the various sensors on the carrier In the increasing ‘transparency’ task force units, including those of of maritime battlefield brought the carrier-borne Ka-31 helicopters about by space and information that provide a continuous Air technologies, the intrinsic attributes Early Warning (AEW) ‘cover. of underwater medium have Theoretically, the task of Fleet undoubtedly provided an edge to the Air Defence could be achieved by submarine. It is however important OTH surveillance coupled with to note that an aircraft carrier can LR missiles, but as of now, and for bring to bear substantial anti- many years in future, use of organic submarine capabilities to prosecute air will be easier and cost-effective. the enemy submarine; much greater Therefore, carrier-borne air and than what any task force devoid of a anti-missile defences against the carrier can so do. According to one adversary’s air, ship and submarine- account of the 1971 Indo-Pak war, launched missiles is critically had INS Vikrant (with its Alize anti- essential, not only to protect the submarine aircraft) been deployed carrier and its escorts, but also other in the western maritime theatre units operating in the area. rather than in the Bay of Bengal, Furthermore, a carrier’s inherent the Pakistani submarines would battle-damage resistance is often not have been so successful in the under-estimated. History has shown Arabian Sea. (One of these sank INS that large ships are significantly less Khukri). vulnerable than small ships and can The induction of underwater- withstand high degrees of damage launched long-range missiles by without loss of the platform. Even the submarines of India’s potential if a carrier is hit by one or two adversaries has presented a more missiles, this is unlikely to affect serious threat. The Exocet (on even its fighting-efficiency, let alone Pakistan’s Agousta-class), Klub-S its ability to stay afloat return to (on Chinese Kilo-class) and YJ-8-2 harbour. (on Chinese Song-class) are capable

92 of striking a carrier at extended Besides, a full-fledged protective stand-off ranges. However, the ‘screen’ around a carrier is not employment of such capability always necessary. In accordance with must necessarily be preceded by the prevailing threat scenario, the precise location of the carrier force commander can exercise his through the submarine’s radar or discretion to detach forces for other electronic support measures (ESM). independent missions in the form of A submarine is severely constrained Surface Action Groups (SAG) based here, since this would necessitate it on the appreciation of the shore to come to surface/ periscope-depth, command. making it vulnerable to detection and prosecution. Even if it does so, It is pertinent to mention here due to the limited height of its radar/ that ‘Carrier-less’ SAGs do exist ESM mast, its ‘horizon’ for electronic (such as the US Navy’s SAGs search/ tracking is extremely limited centered upon the Aegis-class in relation to the maximum range of destroyers armed with Tomahawk its missile. long-range anti-ship missiles) with their own means of obtaining 3. “It ties down substantial forces in targeting information. However, escort role” their ‘non-reusable’ weapons are It is true that a carrier never sails too expensive to be fired without in a ‘hostile’ environment without confirmation of target, particularly numerous consorts in escort role when the adversary is observing a to cater for a multi-dimensional higher degree of electronic silence threat. However, the argument that in congested International Shipping this “ties down” these forces is based Lanes (ISL), where neutrals are on ignorance of the mutual support also present. Besides, there may be that carriers and the other ships serious international repercussions offer as part of an integrated force. of making a mistake. In contrast, On the contrary, as explained earlier, a carrier’s strike aircraft can always the carrier supports the consorts return without using its weapons as much as the consorts escort the if the target is not found or is carrier, if not more. considered ‘unworthy’.

93 Besides, the ‘overwhelming’ naval 4. “Its acquisition and operating costs forces being employed for the are prohibitive” protection of the carrier could be While a current-generation reduced significantly if the platform destroyer (5,000 tons displacement) possesses adequate weapon-systems. costs about Rs. 3,000 crore, an This route was not adopted by India aircraft carrier of about 35,000 tons in case of INS Vikramaditya (former Admiral Gorshkov) in order to keep displacement costs twice that figure. the cost low and have space for a This amounts to the procurement larger number of aircraft. Another cost of a carrier on ‘per-ton’ basis option is to increase the carrier being substantially lesser than that of tonnage (size). This will enable a destroyer. Furthermore, when seen the platform to carry more aircraft in the context of a carrier’s ability to (in anti-ship and anti-submarine perform varied roles, including that roles) for its own defence, without of a floating airfield, which no other commensurately increasing its type of naval asset can perform, the vulnerability in terms of radar high induction and operating cost signature or manoeuvrability. Both may be well justified. will remain alternative options for During the aircraft carrier debate in India’s future carriers. Australia in the 1970s, one of the It is pertinent to note the global proponents stated that “Virtually all technological achievements in weapon acquisitions are expensive; favour of the carrier. For example, but for a carrier to meet the the fixed-wing unmanned aerial requirements, its price-tag is no more vehicles (UAV) have already been than the cost of two destroyers… no operationalised in many countries. other equipment acquisition can The induction of unmanned rotary- match the essential capability of the wing craft and underwater vehicles aircraft carrier at equivalent cost.” is on the anvil. In the coming years, such force-multipliers will further Conclusion augment the defence of the carrier, As the eminent naval strategist, Bernard which may reduce the necessity for Brodie, noted in his book ‘Guide to a large number of escort vessels. Naval Strategy’ in 1965,

94 “There has always been a lay the imperative of including carriers in prejudice against bigness in naval its naval doctrine far outweighs its cost, vessels. That is why in the past, battleships were subject to such violent both financial and operational. verbal attacks while the much more vulnerable cruisers escaped any kind of Alike India, China is an emerging criticism. This attitude was indeed a naval power in the Indo-Pacific region. prejudice, because it characteristically China operationalised a training carrier ignored the fact that bigness makes for better protection…” Shilang (formerly the Soviet Varyag) in 2012, and its second indigenous It is important to remember that one will be commissioned soon. More many of the arguments against the carrier than a decade ago, the author was mentioned in this paper were used even naïve to state that “Aircraft carriers are before the World War Two. The statistics not the current priority (in China’s of the war pertaining to allied forces maritime strategy) since these would later disputed these - in comparison to cause apprehensions among Southeast 11 per cent carriers, the allies lost 18 per Asian states and besides, would be very cent battleships, 33 per cent cruisers, 36 vulnerable in the South China Sea per cent frigates, 21 per cent sloops and due to the many ‘unfriendly’ air bases 37 per cent submarines. The post-Cold dotting its periphery.” The penchant War global trends of carrier acquisitions of Chinese analysts for the theories of are instructive. Despite the fact that the American Admiral AT Mahan was only Indian and British carriers went ignored as merely an allure of China’s into action in the Cold War-era, France, symbolical completion with the United Italy, Spain and Thailand did not hesitate States. However, recent developments to acquire carriers. In the US, the debate amply indicate that the assessment was not about the need of carriers, but was incorrect, and carrier-based ‘Sea their optimum numbers to support its Control’ remains the core element of global interests. China’s maritime-military strategy. The Towards deciding the need for earlier assessment failed because China’s carrier aviation for India, an objective geo-strategic scope was incorrectly cost-benefit analysis will have to appreciated by the author. The scope is be carried out. However, given the not confined to the South China Sea, aforesaid considerations, prima facie, but extends to the Indian Ocean, and

95 possibly beyond, in the coming years. Likewise, India must deliberate on the It is of little surprise, therefore, that the number and size of its carriers, rather Chinese will be operating four carriers than on the platform per se. in 2025, and as many as ten by 2050. 12 July 2018

* Captain (Dr) Gurpreet S Khurana, Indian Navy, is a PhD in Defence Studies and the Executive Director of NMF. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the NMF, the Indian Navy, or the Government of India. He can be reached at gurpreet.bulbul@ gmail.com

96 “Aircraft Carriers: Glug Glug Glug…..”: Really? Significance of Carrier Borne Airpower for India

Commander Dinesh Yadav*

In his recent article published by the Navy). Whilst India’s first indigenous Lowy Institute, titled “Glug, Glug, Glug: aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant (IAC-I) is India’s interest in unsinkable Aircraft being built by Cochin Shipyard (CSL) Carriers”, David Brewster, probes India’s and is likely to be commissioned in end medium-term plan to develop into a 2020, India has already embarked on its three-carrier fleet. Brewster cites huge follow-on induction, likely to be named costs (acquisition, maintenance and as INS Vishal (IAC-II), and expected operational) and vulnerability issues to be much larger and more potent. attached with the Carrier Task Force A three-carrier force would allow the (CTFs) in support of his assertion and, Indian Navy to operate one CTF on as an alternative, advocates the use of each of its seaboard at all times, with ‘unsinkable’ island bases as cheaper the third carrier involved in refit or and more effective options. Dismissing maintenance. flat-tops as vulnerable status symbols Bang for Buck – Misplaced for India, the author recommends the Example of Great Britain deferment of INS Vishal and instead, use the freed-up capital in shoring up India’s The Royal Navy currently operates military capabilities in the Andaman only one Aircraft Carrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth (commissioned in December and Nicobar (A&N) and Lakshadweep 2017). Its second flat-top, of the same island chains. class, HMS Prince of Wales, is likely to India currently operates only one be inducted in 2020. The author argues carrier, INS Vikramaditya (erstwhile that the Great Britain scaled down on Admiral Gorshkov of the Soviet/ Russian its Carrier program as Carriers delivered

97 only a modest punch for their heavy of buck’ in first place, and hence, may price tag, and that greater bang for the not be an appropriate example to buck could be provided by island air quote. bases instead. Aircraft Carrier Program of the The Royal Navy, till date, has US Navy operated 39 Aircraft Carriers of 13 different classes, commencing 1917. Of John Lehman, who was one of the these, 11 aircraft carriers took active part fiercest critique of aircraft carriers in the Second World War, and another from outside the US administration, 10 were added towards the fag end of the changed tack when appointed as the War. Britain lost five aircraft carriers in Navy Secretary under President Ronald the War to offensive action by the Axis Reagan. He eventually authored the powers. Carriers again prove their worth ‘13 Carrier Navy’ policy of the US, for the Royal Navy during the Falkland which remains the guiding policy conflict with the Argentines in 1982. document for the force structure of the US Navy (USN). It was marginally Even as the British power waned revised when President Obama considerably, it continued to operate advocated 11 Carriers in his Asia-Pacific four carriers in 1980s, three post 1990s, Pivot policy. and currently plans to operate two carriers of the Elizabeth class. Sure, the There is one statement of President number of aircraft carriers operated by Bill Clinton that sums up the rationale the Royal Navy has witnessed a steady behind maintaining a CTF based Navy decline, but attributing this decline to for all countries whose economy would operational efficacy of aircraft carriers is allow that: - clearly misplaced. A careful examination “When word of crisis breaks would reveal a near perfect correlation out in Washington, it’s no accident that the first question that comes to of the British economy and the number everyone’s lips is: ‘Where’s the nearest of aircraft carriers that it operated. carrier’” Therefore, rather than the ‘Bang for – President Bill Clinton, Buck’, the guiding principle for the 12 March 1993 on board USS Royal Navy would be the ‘availability Theodore Roosevelt

98 Aircraft Carrier Program of the As has been aptly brought out in PLA Navy (PLAN) “In Defence of the Aircraft Carrier”, for the Indian Navy, the aircraft carrier is China, in a White Paper of 2015, has an ‘article of faith’, a ‘potent symbol’ of declared its intention for focusing on India’s pride and power, and a ‘projection ‘far sea maritime capability’, thereby of national will’. ramping up requisite capability to allow pre-positioning its warships, in Vulnerability Issues a manner similar to the USN. CBGs The statistics pertaining to the World would naturally form an integral part War II are quite revealing in respect of of such a strategy, and in consonance, survivability of aircraft carriers vis-à-vis it commissioned its first aircraft carrier, other naval combatants. In comparison Liaoning, in 2012. to 11 percent carriers, the Allies in the The construction of the second Second World War had lost 18 percent battleships, 33 percent cruisers, 36 Chinese aircraft carrier appears to be percent frigates, 21 percent sloops and well on track and it would be a matter of 37 percent submarines. time when China churns out a number of follow-ons. Possibility of the PLAN There’s no gainsaying that attack CBGs, operating out of Gwadar and capabilities against the CBG has since Djibouti, in the Indian Ocean, therefore, increased manifold, through better is almost certain in the coming decades. surveillance, detection, classification, Some sources reveal that the PLA (Navy) identification and even more lethal plans to operate four carriers by 2025 targeting. However, what naysayers and 10 carriers by 2050. miss out completely is the fact that the CBGs too have kept pace with time, and Aircraft Carriers as Status Symbols they are an equally more lethal pack, It would be naïve that a country, however operating as a synergized and mutually- prosperous, would be spending in excess supporting conglomerate, such that of 4 Billion USD (approximate cost the combat-capability of the group as of construction of INS Vikrant) for a a whole is greater than the sum of its mere ‘status symbol’. Nor does it reflect parts. prudence to operate and maintain such Unlike the aircraft carriers that cost intensive ‘status symbol’ platforms! operated in the Second World War,

99 today’s variants are self-sufficient in to its mobility. In addition, shore- defence as stand-alone. For instance, based aircraft have their own share of Vikramaditya is equipped with Barak issues pertaining to the safety of aerial anti-missile defence (AMD) system refuellers, time on task, and combat and the future Indian carriers are likely efficiency at extended ranges. to be equipped with extended-range Barak versions or even better AMD Extra Territorial Air-Bases systems. In addition, the escort warships In addition to the limitations that and integral aircraft of the CBG and constrain shore-based airpower in its escorts are even more effectual in maritime role, India does not seek to various combat roles such as Air Early invest overtly in overseas basing. Such Warning (AEW), Anti-Submarine foreign bases are expensive and may not Warfare (ASW), Combat Air Patrols be even available in critical times owing (CAP), and AMD. CTFs of today have, to adversarial geo-political factors. therefore, better survivability than their counterparts that operated during the Consequently, Carrier-based force Second World War. remains the only suitable alternative for India to conduct out of area Sea-based vs Land-based Air Power contingencies. Also, the CTF remains the History bears testimony that static fastest means of deployment of credible defence has seldom worked against force as a force projection measure, in mobile maritime forces. On the other support of own land operations, or for hand, each aircraft carrier provides for providing security assistance to friendly an extensively ‘mobile’ airbase, thereby countries. ‘virtualising’ a number of static ones. For India, carrier-based aviation would Shoring up Combat capabilities at rather be a much more cost-effective A&N and Lakshadweep Islands option as compared to the shore-based India’s emergence as a major power and airpower, in defence of its widely the consequent expansion of its area dispersed island territories and also in of interests would place concurrent dealing with mobile maritime threats. demands for substantive investments in CTFs are much lesser vulnerable various dimensions of national security. to enemy’s pre-emptive strikes owing And shoring-up of combat capabilities

100 at A&N and Lakshadweep islands the world’s second largest economy in is definitely one of these significant PPP terms in 2050, only behind China, dimensions. accounting for 15 percent of the world’s total GDP. However, it would be imprudent to offset one significant capability with On the other hand, the Indo-Pacific the other and it would remain the sole is likely to remain the strategic center of prerogative of the Government to balance gravity (COG) for all major powers of the competing budgetary requirements for world. Accordingly, India would need to myriad requirements in the capacity/ invest substantially to possess the ‘blue- capability matrix. water’ naval capability, centered upon the Carrier Task Force, thereby keeping Conclusion pace with its economic trajectory and India today is world’s sixth-largest expanding areas of interests. economy by nominal GDP and the The debate in India, therefore, third-largest by Purchasing Power should not be on the need of the Parity (PPP). Post the 1991 economic aircraft carriers, but on the optimum liberalisation, India has achieved a numbers, size and capability of these remarkable 6-7 per cent average GDP potent platforms needed to safeguard growth annually. In 2018, India’s and protect our expanding maritime economy became the world’s fastest interests. growing major economy, surpassing that of China. As per PwC estimates in ‘The World in 2050’, India is expected to be 23 July 2018

* Commander Dinesh Yadav is a Research Fellow at the NMF. As a Communication specialist of In- dian Navy, he holds a Masters degree in Defence and Strategic Studies from the Madras University. These are personal views of the author and do not reflect the official policy of the Govt of India or the Indian Navy. He can be reached at [email protected]

101 Indian Navy: A Force for Good and a Partner in Peace

Rana Divyank Chaudhary*

The Indian Navy (IN) dons many hats the states that form the littoral of the in the service of India’s national interests. Indo-Pacific region. Pursuant of this Over the decades since independence, goal, the IN has seamlessly transformed the Navy’s actions, both in times of peace into a benign diplomatic asset for and conflict, have firmly established the country and a provider of global its reputation as a self-assured and public goods in the region. Its sailors, professional arm of the country’s defence ships, and aircraft are now in regular forces. Even though India has fought and deliberately reassuring presence in its wars primarily on land and in the the ports and sea lanes of this oceanic air, it is the IN which has consistently space where they build and enhance the garnered wider recognition for the littorals’ capabilities; voluntarily sail in extremely varied range of responsibilities for humanitarian assistance and disaster it shoulders and the challenges it faces relief (HADR) missions; and pitch in to in securing India’s future. As the 2018 share the burdens of willing international Navy Day celebrates the 47th year of coalitions for tasks ranging from search the IN’s display of its combat potential and rescue (SAR) to anti-piracy. The and effectiveness in the western theater salience of the scale of these efforts grows of the 1971 conflict, it is the shape and even further when viewed in proportion outlook of this service’s future which to the limited capacity available to the should occupy our thoughts. IN, which is also the smallest, in terms As India’s dependence on the oceans of manpower, in comparison to its sister have grown, so has its acknowledgment branches, the Indian Army and the of the centrality of its relations with Indian Air Force.

102 This consciously cultivated self- and therefore least appealing to those at image notwithstanding, the Navy is the helm of deciding a nation’s strategy. also perceived in many quarters both It has learnt that India as a nation with at home and abroad, as an armed force a vast peninsular orientation, straddling that will ultimately secure for India the millennia-old busy international elusive status of a feared great power. The shipping lanes, is at once both blessed internet, of all platforms, remains awash and at permanent risk. It recognizes with speculations of the ‘versus’ kind that India’s northern geographic where the IN must either win or lose a configuration and the historic arc of its match of battlefield potential against its relations with the northern neighbours likely adversaries. While these click baits combined with its sea-based economic last for less than a few minutes, today’s lifelines make it an ‘island’ in classical keyboard warrior’s obsession with a geopolitical imagination. With India’s ‘clash of civilizations’ taking place at sea maritime territorial and economic zones during his lifetime is chronic. It is not likely to span an area as large as the necessarily unrealistic. However, it is an country’s landmass itself, the Navy has incessant noise which drowns out some the onerous task of ensuring that India’s particularly germane conversations lifelines remain alive. India’s power status currently taking place in India, especially in the world order is all but of secondary within the seafaring strategic fraternity interest to this critical consideration. that also comprises the Navy’s present It is from here on that the Navy’s and future leadership. chosen bearings take it toward These conversations bear out that the unconventional thinking whereby it Navy has been painstakingly studying the views itself not as the sole master of rise of great powers throughout history India’s maritime strategy, but as one of and the historic hinge factors which have the custodians of a maritime nation’s either led a state to global hegemony or freedom to chart its own course, a symbol down the road of violence and decline of its sovereign interests in the ‘global into oblivion. It has learnt humbling commons’, and an insurance against lessons that have been the staple of threats emanating from sea. To reiterate strategy for eons but that, ironically, this identity, the point of maximum have also been deemed least glorious thrust for the Navy when it comes to

103 national policy is to be employed first, trigger military force. Its growth in size and whenever preferable, as an and stature mollifies the insecurities in instrument of diplomacy. The character national perception, tempers domestic of the world’s oceans, the international popular pressures, and helps India legal regimes governing them, and negotiate with China from a position the customs of the global seafaring of confidence. If another ‘Doklam’ community render the Navy capable were indeed to happen, it is even more of unambiguously symbolizing India desirable for both states that many and communicating India’s posture more options of communicating intent, to both friend or foe, grey-hulled between the two extremes of friendly or merchantman, a state or a whole overtures and a border skirmish, and region, in open seas or even in deeply managing a conflict in its early days contested maritime zones. A rational become possible. understanding of this privilege of sailing Further, there is a more ‘innocently’, responding proactively, fundamental aspect which warrants and reacting flexibly is at the heart of the careful consideration when the IN and IN’s Indian Maritime Doctrine 2009 Chinese Navy are discussed in relation (updated in 2015). to each other. The Indian Ocean has In the light of these observations, historically been a space of unrestricted the complete picture of IN’s role vis- seafaring and has largely been free from a-vis the Chinese Navy in the Indo- hegemony of a single great power navy. Pacific region becomes more complex With the decline of Great Britain, this but also broader and open to greater geography has produced an environment possibilities. As far as the outstanding where the ocean has accommodated disputes between India and China are both geopolitical rivalry between the concerned, the IN’s accretion of capacity superpowers as well as allowed for a may ostensibly appear to be a measure growth in comity among the littoral to forearm in anticipation of a fortuitous states. India’s outreach to these littoral collapse of bilateral dialogue that could states has also been to consciously trigger a violent showdown. In fact, preserve the relative absence of zero- as explained above in depth, the IN’s sum competition in this ocean and to nature is anything but that of a hair- shape an ecosystem based on universally

104 accepted values of dialogue, cooperation, was apolitical and unmarred by global and consensus-building. China has not ideological schisms. In contrast, the enjoyed a similar favourable maritime Chinese Navy is foremost the Chinese geography and the mere mention of the Communist Party’s sword arm and its ‘island chains’ would serve as a reminder origins lie in a violent national revolution, of this reality. To make matters worse, a civil war, and a grand political ideology China’s rude awakening to the oceans was which has been directed against the brought upon by some of the heaviest values that have come to be epitomized costs imposed by the last World War and by the West. the ensuing military preponderance of Suffice it to conclude from these two the United States in extremely proximate broad considerations, that the core issue waters. The primary objective of Chinese is not whether the IN or the Chinese maritime strategy has thus been to dispel Navy represents the more righteous and the dominant naval power from its ‘near enlightened national interest. Instead, to seas’ and expand its defensive perimeter paraphrase Stephen Kotkin’s portrayal of far out by breaking through the natural US-Russia relations, there is an evident barriers. clash of values and interests between The two nations’ naval forces were India and China. As flag follows trade, also born under different historical the Chinese Navy might well be within its conditions and were subsequently logically justifiable rights to be present in shaped by dissimilar national and the Indian Ocean. However, its founding global outlooks. The IN finds it origins strategic imperatives being based on in the British colonial past but with the belief that China’s recent history the country gaining independence, was a “hundred years of humiliation” the force dedicated itself to national promises a hardline nationalistic drive service and weathered the challenges of to right the wrongs of the past. It dissonance that might have arisen out of risks awakening the destructive forces its changing identities. It may be singled which are the very antithesis of the out for trying to punch above its weight constructive and integrative trends in in the early decades but the national regional cooperation. If the recruitment vision, of non-alignment among other advertising of the People’s Liberation key tenets, ensured that the IN’s journey Army is taken as an indication, then

105 ‘peace is behind and war is in front’. This need to employ their navies to jointly mode of thought is an anachronism in develop a mutual understanding of the the century of the Indo-Pacific and does desirable norms and common goods, not sit well with China’s own vision of a towards keeping their competition ‘harmonious world’. free of hostility, and self-consciously prevent an exploitative impact on the A better understanding of China’s littorals of Asia and Africa. The IN has values and interests allow for a window demonstrated foresight in preparing of opportunity where it can be itself to become capable of managing persuaded to align its actions with its this relationship. In its benign role, expressed intentions. The way forward the Navy’s stature in the Indian Ocean is for both the IN and the Chinese Navy makes it an incredibly valuable partner to recognize the dangers of a clash and in forging peace and cooperation with its likely fallout for the Indo-Pacific, whoever shows commonality of interest which is in its early days of gaining and transparency of intent. traction as a confluence of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Both countries will 05 December 2018

* Rana Divyank Chaudhary is an Associate Fellow at the NMF. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the NMF. He can be reached at divyank.chaudhary@ gmail.com and [email protected]. An abridged version of this article was published in the Indian Military Review in its December 2018 issue.

106 China/ East Asia

“Comfort” Women and the “Uncomfortable” East Asian Geopolitics

Shahana Thankachan*

On 27 December 2017, South Korean South Korea relationship and its impact President Moon Jae-in, publicly criticized for the region and the world, in the light the 2015 Comfort Women Agreement of current events. reached between South Korea and Japan, and appointed a task force to review the Part of Benedict Anderson definition Agreement — which in turn concluded of a nation is an “imagined community” that the Agreement was flawed. This with a deep horizontal comradeship. created a diplomatic furore in Japan, One way of building this deep and the Japanese Foreign Minister horizontal comradeship is by fabricating warned of serious repercussions for an “other”. A nation needs an “other” to Japan-South Korea relations. Although give itself the sense of being one nation. this tension was resolved on 11 January Sometimes this “other” is found within 2018 when the South Korean Foreign the nation itself, however, in largely Minister agreed that South Korea will homogenous societies such as Japan, not seek renegotiation of the agreement, Korea and China, the “other” is found history tells us that this is no guarantee mostly outside the nation. A common of South Korea’s commitment. Japan way of keeping the “other” alive is and South Korea have had a very edgy through using history. Each state in the relationship and this is complicated by region plays its history cards to further the fact that Japan and South Korea its domestic and foreign policy and are very strong US allies, and their keeps the “other” alive. China plays the mutual rivalry has and can have major ‘victim card’, wronged by Japan and the ramifications for regional geopolitics. West. Rana Mitter argues that China This paper attempts to analyse Japan- used nationalism to articulate resistance

109 to the domination of the country by about the South Korean attitude towards other powers. She further argues that Japan. However, it stands out like a resistance to Japanese imperialism also sore thumb in the current geopolitical shaped Korean Nationalism. North circumstances. North Korea is an all- Korea sees both Japan and South Korea time looming threat to both Japan and as an enemy. Japan, on the other hand, South Korea, and both are threatened tries to absolve itself of its militarist by the rise of China in varying degrees. history by portraying itself as a victim While the hatred for Japan by North of the atomic bombings. However, the Korea and China is not something common factor in the region is hatred easily reconcilable, the hatred for Japan for Japan. Japan is the only Asian nation by South Korea is something within the to have had imperialist ambitions in that purview of reconciliation. it tried to create a Greater East Asia Co- Background Prosperity Sphere. The history of Japan-South Korea South Korea makes no effort hiding relations is a fascinating tale of two very its hatred for Japan. When travelling proud civilizations trying to mark their through South Korea a ubiquitous place in the world. Korea was Japan’s feature across all public places is the bridge to mainland Asia. Unsurprisingly, government’s propaganda videos against Japan also had a very strong direct trade Japan. These videos deal principally with Korea. Both Korea and Japan were with the issue of the disputed islands considered as tributary states by China. between Korea and Japan, and, with Korea, however, did not consider itself the ‘comfort women’ issue. What is as being subordinate to Japan. This was surprising is that the videos target only despite the fact that Korea faced a long Japan, and not China or North Korea. invasion by Japan in the late Sixteenth This is not the only example of South Century. A constant reminder of this Korea’s vehement anti-Japanese views. invasion is the mound of 10,000 Korean Most commoners, when asked to rate and Chinese ears and noses sent to the China, Japan and North Korea in a Japanese city of Kyoto as a war trophy. descending order of hatred, place Japan This monument still exists in Japan. right at the top of their ‘hatred rating’. Horrendous as it was, in the grand sweep There is nothing new or surprising of history this was a relatively minor glitch

110 in the largely peaceful relations between comfort women. Following this, a the two nations. Things, however, private fund, called the “Asia Women’s changed after the second invasion of Fund”, dedicated to resolve the issue Korea by Japan, in 1910. The situation of “comfort women” was created in was exacerbated by the atrocities of the Japan. Japan’s second apology came in Japanese military in Korea. One of the 1995, when Prime Minister Tomiichi most striking of these atrocities was the Murayama issued a statement. South forceful use of Korean women as sexual Korea rejected the fund, claiming that it slaves in the Japanese military. These had not been launched by the Japanese women were recruited under the false government. Further, it rejected both pretext of serving in “comfort stations” the statements, too, claiming that they and are therefore euphemistically called came in the personal capacity of the comfort women. This gross abuse of leaders, and were not official apologies. these Korean women persisted right through the Second World War. The issue seemed to be finally resolved on 28 December 2015, when Japan-South Korea diplomatic Japan and South Korea reached an relations were re-established only in agreement on resolving the ‘Comfort 1965, twenty years after Korea was Women’ issue. This Agreement, too, liberated from Japanese rule. Relations came after three and a half years of remained stable through most of the deteriorating relationships between Cold War period, however, towards the two countries. The Agreement the end of the Cold War period, South included three main components: an Korea began accusing Japan of teaching official apology by the Prime Minister a watered-down history of South Korea of Japan; Japan paying one billion Yen in its history textbooks, rather than to a foundation established by the South historically accurate descriptions of Korean government to work for the Japan’s atrocities. welfare of these ‘Comfort Women’; and, In 1993, Japan issued its first finally, South Korea giving the assurance apology in the form of a statement issued that it would work on the removal of by the then Cabinet Secretary, Yohei the emblematic statue of the ‘Comfort Kono, in which Japan acknowledged Woman’, from its provocative location responsibility for the conscription of just outside the Japanese embassy in

111 Seoul. This Agreement was a win-win issue and that Seoul was not actually for both South Korea and Japan. For interested in resolving the issue at all. Japan, it meant that it was consistent This time, South Korea claimed that the with the Japanese position that all issues Agreement was flawed as it did not deal pertaining to these ‘Comfort Women’ with the ‘Comfort Women’ directly. had been resolved by the Japan-South While this is true, the South Korean Korea Basic Treaty of 1965 and Japan, government is to be equally blamed for therefore, did not have to deal with keeping the women out of the talks. the ‘Comfort Women’ directly. For Factors Affecting Japan-South South Korea, it meant that Japan had Korea Relations rendered an official apology and also paid reparations towards this end. The Nationalism — in Japan, South Korea Agreement included an assurance from and China, used and fuelled by domestic South Korea that it would be “final and politics in each of these nations — is the irreversible”. prime cause of the bitterness affecting relationships between these nations. Of The success of the Agreement also course, this nationalism is derived and led to the conclusion of the General fed by history as has been explained Security of Military Information above. Hatred for Japan, or a manifestly Agreement (GSOMIA) between the anti-Japanese foreign policy, is invariably two nations in November 2016. This used as a major item within any election Agreement lets the United States share agenda and almost always ensures intelligence received from either of electoral success. A recent example of this its two allies with the other. This is was the intense pressure upon President deemed to be crucial in dealing with Park Geun-hye to maintain a virulently any security situation in the region. anti-Japan image, so as to allay public However, as mentioned earlier, South suspicion that she was sympathetic Korea reneged on the 2015 Agreement towards the Japanese because her father when Moon Jae-In publicly criticized it had been a member of the Imperial on 27 December 2017. This confirmed Japanese Army. In Japan, on the other the Japanese apprehension that South hand, since nationalism is generated by Korea would keep shifting the goal post a pervasive notion of the greatness of when it came to the ‘Comfort Women’ Japanese civilization, nationalist fervour

112 is generated through acts such as visits concerns of Japan, South Korea and by Prime Ministers of the country to the the United States are actually very Yasukuni Shrine, which memorialized different. The primary strategic concern fourteen A-Class war criminals of the for South Korea is North Korea, for Second World War. This, of course, Japan it is China, while the US gives invariably infuriates South Korea and equal importance to both China and China. North Korea amongst its own strategic concerns. This creates discord in strategic Another reason for discord between approaches that these countries take the two countries, apart from history towards the region and fuels disaffection and historical issues, are contemporary between Japan and South Korea. territorial disputes. Japan and South Korea have mutually contestable claims Geopolitical Impact of the Rivalry over several islands, islets and rocks. The biggest geopolitical impact of the These include the Liancourt Rocks, also Japan-South Korea troubled relationship known as Takeshima/Dokdo islands, is that it is detrimental to US interests which are claimed by both South Korea in the region. The discord between and Japan. The Tsushima islands are these two closest US allies manifests also disputed between the two nations, itself in several areas. For instance, the even though it is only a small minority GSOMIA was signed as late as 2016. of Koreans who articulate a Korean In 2012, when it was first negotiated claim to these islands, and not the — that too after much deliberation government as such. The nomenclature — South Korea abruptly pulled out of the Sea of Japan is also a source of of this agreement, hours before it was ill-feelings between the two countries. to be finalized. Even in 2016, in the South Korea argues that the name used immediate aftermath of the GSOMIA for the water body in historical maps was being signed, South Korea refused to the East Sea/ Eastern Sea, while Japan share information with Japan on any argues that it was historically referred to matter other than North Korean missile as the Sea of Japan. activities in the peninsula. Likewise, it Yet another factor that causes a refused to divulge any information on deterioration of the Japan-South Korea Chinese military activities in the South relationship is the fact that the strategic China Sea.

113 Another Agreement that could Korea. While it is widely believed that have been potentially strategic is the Japan will not withhold the use of these ‘Acquisition and Cross-Servicing bases should such as a scenario actually Agreement’ (ACSA). This would have unfold, Japanese claims to the contrary allowed for logistical cooperation in create immense insecurity in South the event of peacekeeping operations, Korea and unnecessary problems for and humanitarian and disaster relief. the United States in terms of reassuring However, all efforts to date to have South Korea. Japan, on the other hand, this be negotiated between Japan and can allay the fears of its people only if South Korea have been in vain. In its domestic populace is convinced that November 2017, an attempt by the South Korea is indeed friendly towards Trump administration to present a Japan. joint front against North Korea in the Japan’s military normalization Sea of Japan by conducting a trilateral is a fact necessitated by the current military exercise involving Japan, South geopolitical environment and the United Korea and the US met with resistance States is very keen on Japan expediting by South Korea. This was because South this process. However, South Korea Korea was hesitant of Japan Maritime is against any move by Japan in this Self Defence Forces (JMSDF) presence direction. This, of course, is a sentiment so close to the Korean peninsula. that stems from the historical distrust of The usage of US bases in Japan, too, Japan and its propensity for militarism. is contingent on Japan-South Korea South Korea has repeatedly iterated that relationship. The US military presence Japan is using the North Korean threat in the region is centred upon its bases as an excuse to further its militarization in Japan and it is contingent for the US agenda. South Korea cites this as a reason to use these bases in the eventuality of to not participate in US regional missile North Korean aggression against either defence systems. The ROK clarified South Korea or Japan. However, in order in November 2017 that it would not to allay domestic fears of Japan getting consider any further deployment of the engulfed in another’s war, Japan declared THAAD missile system, and further, that it would not allow the USA to use that it sees trilateral cooperation only Japanese bases against North Korea, through a peninsular lens and not as in case the latter were to attack South a trilateral military alliance extending

114 beyond the North Korean threat and the Japan-South Korea relationship, as the Korean Peninsula. penalty of such reticence might well The country that gains the most mean losing South Korea to China. This from the rivalry between Japan and is something that Japan, too, should South Korea is China. For China, a consider and Tokyo needs to walk the divided region is probably the most extra mile towards Seoul. suited for the advancement of its own The bitterness in Japan-South interests. This is a further cause for Korea relations comes at a great cost regional concern, considering the to the region and to the two nations increasing affinity that South Korea has as well. South Korea needs to reassure been showing towards China. Moon Jae- Japan that it is serious about irreversibly In has been following a tough balancing resolving past historical disputes. Japan, act in terms of his diplomatic approach on the other hand, needs to stop its dual between the United States and China. approach of showing the will to resolve Conclusion the ‘Comfort Women’ issue, even while continuing with provocative visits by There is no doubting that the historical its political leaders to the Yasukuni wounds inflicted by Japan on Korea and war memorial. The mere resolution other countries are not easily forgettable of the ‘Comfort Women’ issue will not or even forgivable. However, Japan must automatically make Japan and South be given due credit for the constancy Korea the best of friends, but this issue of its pacifist attitude since the end of is far more emotive and probably more the Second World War. Despite the easily resolvable than the territorial gradually increasing assertiveness in its disputes between the two countries. security policy, there is no denying the As such, it will surely go a long way in fact that Japan is a benign power which bettering the relationship between the has seen a peaceful rise. two neighbours. It is high time for the United States and India to shed their reluctance of getting more deeply involved in the 06 February 2018

* ShahanaThankachanwas a Research Associate at the NMF, New Delhi. The views expressed here are her own, and do not reflect the official policy or position of the NMF. She can be reached at [email protected]

115 China’s Growing Influence in Africa: Lessons for India

Jyotishman Bhagawati*

On December 04, 2015, while delivering Chinese aid and investments are of a speech at the opening ceremony of significant value since the continent the Johannesburg Summit of the Sixth happens to be one of the poorest and least Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, developed in the world. Despite these the Chinese President Xi Jinping complementarities, relations between asserted, “In conducting China’s relations the two giant geographical entities are with Africa, we adhere to the principles of not without their complications, and sincerity, practical results, affinity and good China’s activities in Africa have been the faith and uphold the values of friendship, subject of strong criticism, albeit mostly justice and shared interests, and we will from the West, for failing on good work with our African friends to embrace governance standards and human rights. a new era of win-win cooperation and These complications notwithstanding common development.” He went on to the nature and pace of Chinese recommend that “the new type of China- activities in Africa, clearly demonstrate Africa strategic partnership be upgraded to the coherence between Chinese geo- a comprehensive strategic and cooperative economic goals and the geostrategy that partnership.” Xi’s statement reflected Beijing has adopted in order to attain China’s quest to develop an enduring those goals. This geostrategy of China relationship with Africa, especially at a quite clearly involves the dextrous use time when obtaining long-term energy of all three major instruments available supplies has become vital for the Asian to Beijing in the execution of its foreign giant to sustain its industrialisation by policy, namely, vigorous diplomatic securing access to oil supplies and other and economic exchanges, strongly raw materials. Similarly, for Africa, supported, insured, and assured, by the

116 Chinese military machine operating to the east coast of Africa during at the strategic level. On the other the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) of hand, India, which is often perceived imperial China, as the starting point as a regional alternative to China, has for China-Africa relations. However, been unable to make much headway in available evidence points to a much Africa, either, despite sharing historical earlier commencement. The admiral commonalities with several countries undertook his maritime voyages in the of that continent, partly due to its own Fifteenth Century, while economic and capacity constraints, but largely thanks cultural exchanges between China and to its lackadaisical bureaucracy. It is Africa are believed to have been ongoing true that with the year-on-year increase since China’s Han Dynasty (206 BCE- in India’s economic and political heft, 220 CE), when trade through the “Silk its engagement in Africa is gradually Road” connected China with much of increasing. However, the pace of Chinese the rest of the world. inroads in the region far outweighs Following Zheng’s voyages, however, that of India’s. This situation needs two significant developments brought remedying based upon careful analysis, about a significant decline in the as Africa is not only strategically located exchanges between China and Africa. in the middle of important maritime The first was the discontinuation of trade corridors but also constitutes maritime expeditions by both the Ming a significant part of India’s extended and the Qing Dynasties, probably for maritime neighbourhood. fear of strategic overreach. The second This paper attempts to analyse was the launch, in the same century, China’s increasing presence in Africa, of the European ‘Age of Discovery’, with the aim of identifying the challenges, spearheaded by Portugal and typified by opportunities and imperatives for the arrival of the Portuguese adventurer, India. Vasco da Gama, on the coast of East Africa in 1498, which opened up Overview of China-Africa Relations the region to trade with the West, In dealing with Africa’s historical links and eventually, to over 450 years of with China, scholars frequently point colonial rule by European maritime to Admiral Zheng He’s expedition powers.

117 In the contemporary era, China got China’s remarkable ability to capitalise off to a slow start in Africa, with Egypt upon opportunities that presented being the first African country to establish themselves was in stark evidence when, diplomatic ties with China, in May 1956. in 1995, following the imposition of Beijing’s approach to Africa was initially sanctions by the USA on Sudan, the guided by two key drivers. The first China National Petroleum Corporation was to enhance its own legitimacy and (CNPC) took an immediate decision to establish global recognition as the only invest in that country’s oil sector. China true representative of China, along with is now the largest investor in Sudan, the concomitant discrediting of Taiwan’s controlling 75 per cent of Sudan’s oil claim to represent China in the United industry, and this near-monopoly has Nations. The second was to counter been aided greatly by the absence of the influence of the West and the Soviet any competition from the USA. This Union in the African continent. From was followed by the establishment the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s Beijing of the ‘Forum on China-Africa pumped in about US$ 2.5 billion in aid Cooperation’ (FOCAC) in Beijing, in to 36 African countries and provided the October 2000, with its stated objective assistance of thousands of its engineers, being to strengthen multidimensional doctors and technicians for a variety of cooperation between China and Africa. development and infrastructure projects in these countries. The 1860-kilometre There has been little let up since Tazara Railway Project (1970-75) then. The year 2006 was a particularly between Tanzania and Zambia, which defining one for Sino-African relations. had been jointly requested by the then Beginning with the release of the first President of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda, White Paper on China’s Africa Policy and his Tanzanian counterpart, Julius on January 12, on the occasion of the Nyerere, remains one of China’s most 50th anniversary of China’s formal celebrated assistance projects in Africa. diplomatic ties with Africa, the year China’s Forays in Africa also witnessed visits to Africa by China’s top three leaders, namely, President Hu With the collapse of the Soviet Union Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao and Foreign in the early 1990-s, Beijing began to Minister Li Zhaoxing. The first Heads accelerate its engagement of Africa. of State Summit of FOCAC was also

118 hosted by Beijing in November 2006, welcomed by African states. Beijing the closing statement of which declared is also eager to utilise the enormous a “new strategic partnership” between numerically-driven diplomatic heft China and Africa. that Africa has, to bring about its desired changes in the thus-far Western- Moreover, as part of the ‘Belt and dominated world order. China had Road Initiative’ (BRI), China seeks to already had a foretaste of success in this link several African countries such as regard, when it secured a permanent seat Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Uganda, on the UN Security Council, replacing Rwanda, South Sudan, Burundi, Congo, Taiwan, with the support of 26 Africa Angola, Tanzania, etc., through railway states (34% of the General Assembly lines, to ports such as Alexandria (Egypt) votes). In short, China is heavily reliant on and Mombasa (Kenya), which are nodes Africa for trade, natural resources, great of the Maritime Silk Road. Beijing is power ambitions as well as for legitimacy also creating an industrial economic belt purposes, especially over Taiwan and for alongside these connectivity corridors, support at multinational institutions. underscoring the significance of Africa in And yet, as has already been mentioned, what is usually referred to as a Eurasian despite the rising cooperation, Chinese infrastructure network initiative. activities in Africa have been subject China’s rising profile in Africa reflects to criticism by the West and by some the growing importance of the region to segments of African civil society, too, China’s growth and development. The for issues relating to poor quality of continent has become the second largest products, the disregard or abuse of source of China’s crude imports after human rights, ‘white elephant’ projects, the Persian Gulf. In addition, China environment degradation, etc. Reports is Africa’s largest trade partner and the suggest that there are roughly a million destination as well as the source of most Chinese workers in Africa, which is of Africa’s exports and imports. While disproportionately high compared to the Chinese state-owned enterprises are amount of financing provided by China involved in the extraction of natural and also in comparison with migrants resources in Africa, private Chinese from other continents. There are also investments are mostly in the services allegations that infrastructure programs and manufacturing sectors, and are funded by China overwhelmingly

119 benefit Chinese corporations. Several China is unwarranted since “many uncomfortable questions have also been African countries are worse off than China raised on the quality of the infrastructure as they attach low priority to environment built by China. A case in point is the protection, have understaffed environment Luanda General Hospital in Angola, bureaucracies and even worse records for which had to be shut down, a mere four countering corruption”. Recent reports years after its opening in 2006, due to also suggest that China is becoming serious structural problems. Likewise, more sensitive to such criticism and is several infrastructure projects are poorly working on addressing these concerns. maintained and underutilised, and have Wang Yi, China’s Foreign Minister, turned out to be ‘white elephants’. The while on a 2015 tour of Kenya, asserted Kilamba City project, once again in that “[China] absolutely will not take Angola, which had been undertaken the old path of Western colonists, and by the ‘China International Trust and we absolutely will not sacrifice Africa’s Investment Corporation’ at a cost of ecological environment and long term US$ 3.5 billion, is one such example. interests.” State-owned Chinese Chinese firms also stand accused of corporations are also required to publish unfair labour practices (which, for annual Corporate Social Responsibility example, led to violent protests in (CSR) reports. For instance, after having Zambia), a lack of resource transparency, been flayed for poor environmental and very superficial efforts to ensure standards, CNPC is now working with animal and environment protection. the Gabonese government to ensure However, despite the high level of environmentally sensitive practices in Western scrutiny, China’s engagement future. All in all, it may be reasonably of Africa has also had positive effects, concluded that especially by way of job creation, economic growth, the availability of China is executing a fairly successful critically required infrastructure and and multi-pronged geostrategy to attain developing assistance, investments in its geo-economic goals and objectives. services and manufacturing, as well Implications for India as in saving mines from catastrophic deterioration. Moreover, some scholars What does all this mean for India? opine that much of the criticism of India’s engagement with Africa is small

120 when compared to that of China, Mozambique etc. India often perceives but it nevertheless holds a position of these naval activities as being part of significance for almost all African States. a larger strategy of China that is — This is partly attributable to the shared whether consciously or inadvertently colonial history of India and Africa, as — is encircling India. This is what is well as to millennia-old historical ties known as China’s “string of pearls” that India and Africa share with one strategy in the IOR. other. However, India, too, is playing While the recent financial crisis in the game, competing vigorously with the West and growing interest in South- China, and, gradually making inroads South cooperation has led to declining in the region. This is particularly trade and investments between Africa by way of its strong pharmaceutical and its traditional partners, namely, companies, software firms and back- Europe and the USA, several African office outsourcing businesses. India’s countries are keen to build trade and contemporary engagement of Africa took economic partnerships with emerging a new turn when, like China, the South powers like China and India. Although Asian giant also established cooperation- China is involved in manufacturing, forum mechanisms with Africa, in construction and infrastructure projects 2008, under the framework of ‘India- in more than 50 African countries, Africa Forum Summits’. Since that of particularly concern to India is the year, there is much evidence of increased military-strategic moves that increasingly cooperation, in multi-dimensional fields underpin China’s involvement in Africa. and disciplines, between India and In 2016, Beijing established its first Africa. In fact, India and China are also overseas naval base at Djibouti, which encouraging their respective enterprises is situated at the mouth of the strategic to collaborate in Africa. A prominent Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, in the Horn of early example of such collaboration is Africa. There are unconfirmed reports the joint venture that was established as that China plans to construct as many early as 2004, between China National as 18-19 overseas strategic supply- Petroleum Corporation and Oil and bases in (amongst others) Seychelles, Natural Gas Corporation, to explore oil Maldives, Madagascar, Kenya, Tunisia, reserves in Sudan.

121 Comparative Analysis approaches to developmental deals and investments, which has always been Fortunately, for the most part, China guided by instrumental motivations, and India engage with Africa in unlike the West which make their ties complementary sectors. As a result, conditional upon certain parameters there is relatively little competition and like human rights, democracy etc. This no real economic conflict between the “no strings-attached” policy makes two Asian giants, at least at present. it convenient for Beijing to invest in However, as both the rising powers countries with significant political and get further involved with Africa, security risks. China’s recent foray in competition and occasional disputes are Africa is also guided by its “Great Power” bound to occur. The challenge will lie ambitions — to be globally recognised as in managing such occurrences. a ‘great power’ is something that Beijing Africa has emerged as a vital has always longed for. Towards this geostrategic arena in the evolving new end, China has been quite successful great game for power, competition and in wooing back almost all-important influence in the Indo-Pacific region. African countries from Taiwan’s fold, The resource-rich continent’s strategic thus giving it greater recognition and location gives it numerous tactical legitimacy in the international arena. advantages in terms of maritime trade In view of this emerging ‘Great and connectivity within the IOR. As Game’ in Africa, India needs to step up a consequence, Africa is witnessing its efforts and promote greater private renewed interest from a host of maritime sector participation and investments in powers such as Japan, India, China, the region. New Delhi needs to be far France, and the USA, all jostling for more proactive in its efforts to cultivate influence in the region. and maintain better relations with In analysing China’s engagement African countries, so that New Delhi’s of the region, a clear shift is noticeable interests are not adversely affected by today from Beijing’s traditional (and China’s own geopolitical game moves in much touted) policy of non-interference the continent. While India and China in the various countries in the region. have both shown political maturity by This follows from Beijing’s old-style cooperating and jointly bidding for oil

122 blocks in the continent, New Delhi must Growth Corridor’ (AAGC) to provide take a more realistic approach towards a viable regional alternative to Beijing’s such joint projects, since China has not ‘Belt and Road Initiative’. However, been willing to demonstrate the same reports indicate mounting Japanese level of cooperation in areas where it frustration with the inability of the finds itself in an advantageous position, Indian bureaucracy to respond to Prime such as in Central Asia. Nevertheless, Ministerial initiatives such as the AAGC, as a country with limited resources, reducing the visionary statements of it is imperative for India to work with both Prime Ministers (Modi and Abe) like-minded states such as the USA, to rhetoric that can easily be derided. Taiwan, etc., to safeguard its interests Indeed, in dealing with Africa, India in Africa. Towards that goal, India and Japan might do well to take a cue is already working with Japan to give from China! form and substance to the ‘Asia-Africa 01 March 2018

* Jyotishman Bhagawati was a Research Associate at the NMF, New Delhi. The views expressed here are his own, and do not reflect the official policy or position of the NMF. He can be reached at [email protected]

123 Five Years of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) : Revisiting BRI in tandem with the Malacca Dilemma

Noor Bhatnagar*

Five years ago, in September and October of the year 2013, the ‘Chinese Marshall Plan’ or the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was unveiled in Kazakhstan and Indonesia by Premier Xi Jinping. Done to ‘enhance regional connectivity’, the delayering of the ‘belts’ and ‘roads’ mechanism mapped expansively through Asia, Europe, and Africa will tell one that it is primarily a Figure 1: The Six economic corridors under BRI shot to global dominance ensuring its Source: GIS Reports sustained security and stability. It is a vision based on humungous investments and on stimulation of the Chinese economy.

Although the recent US-China trade war may have adversely affected the initiative, its fifth-year anniversary makes it imperative for it to be a subject of discussion and scrutiny of whether it has been efficient in accomplishing its Figure 2: Overview of the BRI Source: Mercator Institute of Chinese Studies objectives. (MERICS)

124 The Initiative and its Objectives in its energy needs, specifically crude oil, and its consequent dependence on Strait With an estimated investment of more of Malacca which is responsible for bulk than $1 trillion, this ambitious initiative of its energy imports. The vulnerability has been routinely compared to the also arises from the geography of Strait Marshal Plan of the United States of of Malacca which is an 890 km wide America. The amount facilitates the narrow lane with an average depth of 25 creation of six economic corridors. metres, located between Malaysia and These economic corridors the Indonesian island of Sumatra, which essentially enable bilateral trade and makes it a significant chokepoint. energy infrastructure development in With respect to crude oil, China the partner countries. For example, the grabbed the position of the World’s China-Pakistan Economic Corridor largest oil importer from the United (CPEC) aims to connect Gwadar Port States of America (USA) in 2017 with in the Balochistan region with Kashgar around 18.6% share in total import of in China fostering “energy projects, crude oil. The Strait of Malacca is solely transportation, infrastructures and responsible for majority of oil (roughly economic zones.” a quarter of all oil transported by sea) With infrastructure partnerships and other raw material supply, from with numerous countries, BRI West Asia and Africa to China (over fundamentally aims to diversify China’s energy imports, and make already existing sources easily and securely accessible. Thus, at the heart of BRI lies the sheer motive of energy cooperation to ensure China’s energy security. The Economics of the Strait of Malacca Figure 3: Maritime Chokepoints: Malacca, One of the major reasons safeguarding Lombok and Sunda energy security is of grave importance to Source: US Energy Information Administration China, is due to the exponential increase (EIA)

125 80% of China’s oil imports by sea go The maximum size of a vessel that through strait of Malacca), so much so can pass through the strait is called that in case of any conflict where the Malaccamax, having a draft (or draught) Strait of Malacca is blocked and the of 20 metres, which carries oil from ships are interdicted, it might lead to an the Persian Gulf to China. The Sunda acute energy insecurity in the country, Strait is much shallower and narrower derailing the economy altogether. for VLCCs like Malaccamax, presenting many navigational hazards. It would The problem or the ‘dilemma’ with imply a minimum of 1.5 days delay if the Strait of Malacca is that there are no the Sunda strait is used. Alternatively, alternatives to the trade route. China the Lombok Strait, is deeper and wider is at the risk of great adversity if this than the Malacca Strait making it strait succumbs to blockages owing navigationally safer than the Malacca to international political play, a fear Strait, but the problem emerges with it nurtured by China due to an increasing being inconvenient leading it in delaying presence of USA in the region. The the shipment by approximately 3.5 days. Lombok strait (Between the Indonesian The additional shipping costing would Islands of Bali and Lombok) and the then further affect the energy prices in Sunda Strait (Between the Indonesian totality. This is the primary reason the Islands of Java and Sumatra) are the Strait of Malacca, being the shortest nearest routes that connect the two route to China, is of crucial importance. oceans. With no viable pre-existing alternatives to the Strait, it becomes imperative that the alternatives are created or the dependence on the Strait is reduced.

Ever since in 2003, when Hu Jintao coined this problem as the ‘Malacca Dilemma’ declaring a fight to claim the control of the strait by ‘certain major powers’, every strategic action taken by Figure 4: China’s trade routes China can be assumed to address this Source: Brookings (2011) Malacca dilemma. Therefore, while

126 reviewing BRI one needs to explore the effectiveness of its mechanisms in mitigating the energy insecurity stemming from Malacca Dilemma. Mechanism to mitigate energy insecurity

The Belt and Road initiative is a key landmark towards this endeavour which can help in reducing China’s dependency on the Strait by two means: providing alternative routes for the transportation of resources and providing alternative Figure 5: Proposed Thai Canal sources of energy. Source: The Medium

China’s energy mix, though progressively changing, still depends on connecting the Pacific Ocean to the oil and natural gas. With a predicted Indian Ocean, simultaneously reducing 28% increase in Oil from 2016 to 2040, the transit time by two to three days and Natural gas is expected to increase by thus decreasing the cost of shipping. 194% in the same time period. This is The project though much sought after, precisely why it becomes important to might not be actualized due to domestic examine BRI’s mechanism in tandem political play. with these two energy resources. The Kyaukpyu project linking BRI involves various projects that Bay of Bengal to Chinese province allow supply of the eastern oil to the of Yunnan via Myanmar is another Chinese mainland without it being example in this context. With routed via the Strait of Malacca. One Myanmar’s inclination towards of the projects that was considered China, the China-Myanmar Oil to be the solution to the dilemma pipeline completed in 2014 has given was the Thai Kra Canal, linking the a gateway access to crude oil from South-China Sea to the Andaman Sea, West Asia which allows China to

127 Figure 6: The Sino-Myanmar Pipeline Source: China.org.cn skip the Strait of Malacca. In Yunnan also translate in its efforts to diversify itself, Petro China has already built its import countries, with a special an oil refinery with the capacity to focus on countries in Central Asia. process 13 million tonnes a year of crude. The Russian Federation is a crucial illustration of this fact. In The China-Pakistan Economic 2013, with respect to crude oil it was Corridor (CPEC) also facilitates the fourth largest supplier with a 9% connection between the Gwadar Port in share in China’s crude oil imports. the Balochistan region with Kashgar in Within a time period of four years, China through the disputed Karakoram in 2017, according to Trade Statistics area in Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir by the International Trade Centre, (PoK). For strategic purposes, it will not it claimed the first position with only potentially give the Chinese access 14.6% share in China’s crude oil to the Arabian Sea but will also allow import being the largest supplier and them to bypass the Malacca Strait. leaving behind West Asian countries China’ efforts to reduce its including Saudi Arabia, Oman, and dependency on the Strait of Malacca, the African Nation of Angola.

128 Besides Oil, Russia is also a major gas imports, Australia has jumped up to partner of China in the Ice Silk Road the position of top second supplier with initiative of the BRI. The Yamal a share of a close 19.3% of the total LNG Project, even though situated share and a growth of 53% in imported in Russia, involves 20% and 9.9% quantity since 2013 as it heavily relies stake by China National Petroleum on the Lombok Strait. In comparison Corp. and Chinese Silk Road Fund to this, the West Asian countries of respectively, is considered to be Qatar and UAE stand at the third and crucial in diversifying China’s maritime fourth position respectively which routes, benefiting from the short clearly indicate China’s efforts towards geographical distance between the diversification of its energy imports. two countries. China in all its might is not only Even for natural gas where the trying to reduce its dependence on the Central Asian country, Turkmenistan Strait of Malacca but is also increasingly has been the top supplier since 2013 focussing on strengthening its security with a share of 19.8% in total Natural by engaging in multilateral efforts with

129 Table 1: List of Top 10 supplying markets (quantity-wise) for Chinese product imports (2017) (Product: 2709 Petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals, crude)

Exporting Country Value Share in Quantity Quantity Growth in imported in China’s imported in unit imported 2017 imports 2017 quantity between (USD (%) 2013-2017 thousand) (%, p.a.) Total 163,820,667 100 419,462,076 Tons 11 1 Russian Federation 23,884,155 14.6 59,538,196 Tons 25 2 Saudi Arabia 20,514,965 12.5 52,179,521 Tons 0 3 Angola 20,122,698 12.3 50,416,004 Tons 6 4 Iraq 13,812,852 8.4 36,815,228 Tons 12 5 Islamic Republic of Iran 11,928,933 7.3 31,151,914 Tons 9 6 Oman 12,374,604 7.6 31,006,894 Tons 6 7 Brazil 9,176,625 5.6 23,090,321 Tons 49 8 Venezuela, Bolivarian 6,565,538 4 21,761,404 Tons 11 Republic of 9 Kuwait 7,083,003 4.3 18,243,452 Tons 19 10 United Arab Emirates 4,156,682 2.5 10,157,654 Tons 0

Source: ITC Trade Statistics the littoral states and other members of It would be rational to think that the Association of the South-East Asian BRI might not be able to save the day Nations (ASEAN). in this context. Where the efforts to diversify its imports of energy resources Analysis of the Initiative are unambiguously evident, be it oil or While the BRI continues to expand natural gas, the West Asian countries and engulf more countries in its together are still the largest supplier to comprehensive mechanisms, the China. Specifically, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, question still persists that whether the Oman, Iran, Kuwait, United Arab Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is helping Emirates, Qatar, Egypt, and Yemen hold in resolving the ‘Malacca Dilemma’. a share of 43.8% in China’s oil imports,

130 Table 2: List of Top 10 supplying markets (quantity-wise) for Chinese product imports (2017) (Product: 2711 Petroleum gas and other gaseous hydrocarbons)

Exporting Country Value Share in Quantity Quantity Growth in imported in China’s imported in unit imported 2017 imports 2017 quantity between (USD (%) 2013-2017 thousand) (%, p.a.) Total 33,007,536 100 87,960,631 Tons 20 1 Turkmenistan 6,526,056 19.8 24,511,500 Tons 8 2 Australia 6,379,463 19.3 17,612,860 Tons 53 3 Qatar 4,777,543 14.5 10,355,030 Tons 5 4 United Arab Emirates 3,238,518 9.8 6,575,121 Tons 51 5 United States of America 2,498,672 7.6 5,288,992 Tons 152 6 Malaysia 1,523,052 4.6 4,341,691 Tons 9 7 Indonesia 1,231,519 3.7 3,118,845 Tons 6 8 Uzbekistan 649,636 2 2,593,250 Tons 10 9 Myanmar 1,172,113 3.6 2,516,850 Tons 79 10 Papua New Guinea 902,798 2.7 2,098,880 Tons 87

Source: ITC Trade Statistics which is thrice of that of China’s is reliable and sustainable. Where China top supplier Russia’s 14.6% share. has found a ready source of raw materials Countries like Saudi Arabia, Angola, in its neighbour there still exists a lack of Iraq, Oman, Iran, Brazil, Kuwait, mutual trust in both the countries for Venezuela, and UAE, together account each other, and an imbalance in power for approximately 77.4% of China’s oil in favour of China with respect to oil, imports, all of which use the Strait of which might hinder the formation of a Malacca. long-term cooperative alliance as both Additionally, it is not clear whether countries aspire to be the dominant China and Russia’s strategic partnership power.

131 There are numerous projects that beyond 4,000km [2,500 miles] the cost are being heavily scrutinized due of using it to transport energy is higher to countries spiralling into what is than doing so by sea, so the [economic] called ‘debt-trap’ induced by China’s benefit of Gwadar Port doesn’t exist.” exploitative practices. Myanmar’s port Where it is unstated that BRI is project is one among many to be scaled highly effective in extending China’s soft down due to the fears of excessive debt. power footprint in numerous countries, Moreover, projects like CPEC which we can be sure that this mechanism, at were conceived with an aim to bypass least for now won’t be able to resolve the Malacca strait, are considered to be China’s Malacca Dilemma. costlier where according to many, “Based on experience [of similar projects around the world], once a pipeline extends 31 December 2018

* Noor Bhatnagar is a Junior Research Associate at the NMF, New Delhi. The views expressed are her own and do not reflect the official policy or the position of the NMF. She can be reached at [email protected]

132 Another Chinese Takeover in the Indian Ocean Region?

Rajesh Soami*

The spectre of the takeover of another is located at the western end of the Gulf strategically located port by China in the of Aden, just south of the strategically Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is looming vital Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb. However, large these days. In Kenya, a leaked report there are another five countries which from the Auditor-General’s office states have military assets in Djibouti and that the terms of a loan taken by Nairobi all of them tend to keep a weather eye from China’s EXIM Bank make the port on Chinese goings-on. A takeover of a collateral in case of a Kenyan default. Mombasa port by the Chinese will, on First published in the Florida-based the other hand, give them access to the website, “The Maritime-Executive”, the western Indian Ocean without their report states that the waiver of Kenya’s activities being monitored by other sovereign immunity, together with other powers. clauses in the contract, make the assets For its part, India has close historic of the Mombasa port vulnerable to a and economic ties with Kenya. Apa Chinese takeover. Saheb Pant, who was India’s first Kenya lies on the east coast of Commissioner for East Africa (Kenya, Africa. Mombasa, which is the country’s Uganda, Tanganyika and Zanzibar), primary port, is strategically located had called the two countries “next-shore between the Mozambique Channel and neighbours”. A sizeable portion of the the Strait of Bab el Mandeb. Kenya is Indian diaspora in Africa lives in Kenya. also a neighbour of Somalia and lies New Delhi has been trying to expand uncomfortably close to the piracy-prone its political footprint in the East African waters of the latter. The Chinese already region and a visit to Kenya is practically have a military base in Djibouti, which de-rigueur for Indian officialdom. Prime

133 Minister Modi, too, visited the country (KRC) is unable to generate sufficient in 2016, while President Kenyatta traffic on the rail route, the assets of the had come to India in 2015 and again port of Mombasa would be treated as in 2017. A steady stream of visits by collateral. The government of Kenya Indian ministers has taken place in the is, of course, putting up a brave face. last couple of years. The Auditor-General’s office has stated that the leaked reports were not the Of course, the Chinese, too, have final word on the issue. Other officials been upping their game in Africa. Under also sounded confident of returning the the ambit of the Belt and Road Initiative loan. However, they also said that the (BRI), Beijing has been investing heavily government might need to take another in the continent in general and in Kenya loan to pay this amount. This is the classic in particular. A $3.2 billion investment manifestation of a debt-trap, something by China has financed the construction that India and western countries have of a rail-link from the capital of the been warning the recipient countries of country, Nairobi, to Mombasa. This BRI against. rail-link is eventually to be expanded to connect Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, the In 2013, the erstwhile Prime Minister Democratic Republic of Congo, South of India, Dr Manmohan Singh, had Sudan, and Ethiopia, to Mombasa. The stated that India was well positioned to idea is to connect these countries to become a provider of net security in the Mombasa, so that all of them can trade Indian Ocean region (IOR). This was through the Indian Ocean. This is the after the US Defence Secretary, Robert largest investment to have occurred in Gates, had said the same in 2009. Kenya in the 50 years that have elapsed Since then, China has posed numerous since the country’s Independence. challenges to the Indian pre-eminence Ironically, it is this very investment in the region. In 2014, the Chinese sent by China that is now threatening to a nuclear submarine into the Indian become an albatross around the Kenyan Ocean on the slightly ludicrous pretext government’s neck. of undertaking anti-piracy mission. The submarine had berthed at Colombo and The contract with China stipulates this sent alarm bells a-ringing in New that if the Kenya Railways Corporation Delhi.

134 The Chinese have already taken over Policy Options for India the port of Hambantota in Sri Lanka on a 99-year lease after the country fell Broadly speaking, India has three into a debt-trap not very different from options: that facing Kenya. Likewise, Beijing is It could choose to challenge Chinese developing Kyaukpyu port in Myanmar, debt-trap investments penny-for-penny. and already controls the port of Gwadar This would be difficult considering that in Pakistan. There is a gradual but Beijing possesses far deeper pockets than significant increase of Chinese naval as New Delhi. However, India has shown well as financial activity in the IOR. the will and ability to do precisely this in Consequently, India is seeing itself Maldives. It could also call upon friendly being hemmed-in by Chinese outposts States such as Japan, which are equally in the IOR, which effectively constricts wary of China, to help out. her in her efforts to attain her own goals. Recently, India gave a $1.4 billion Secondly, India could opt to let lifeline to Maldives to financially rescue the countries, which have made the the latter after the country had borrowed wrong choice of borrowing heavily from heavily from China. China, fend for themselves. Adoption of this option is likely to accelerate the However, there is little clarity on acquisition by China of strategic assets whether and how India should, or in the IOR and could be deleterious to would, deal with similar situations in India’s own security therein. However, the future, including the one in Kenya. India could conceivably adopt this The confusion and initial shock that option if New Delhi feels confident emanated from the Hambantota fiasco enough about the preponderance of ought to have sufficiently influenced its comprehensive national power decision-makers in Delhi. However, in the IOR, the Chinese incursions that hardly seems to have been the case. notwithstanding. New Delhi appears to be handling the Chinese debt-trap issue on a case-by-case Thirdly, it could subtly encourage basis, rather than developing a robust debtor-States to default on the loans and well-considered policy for it. This they have taken from China, or to keeps the stakeholders, both within the simple nationalise these assets once country and outside of it, guessing. they lapse to Chinese control. While

135 western countries have a system in place Indian government would do well to to punish such behaviour, the Chinese create a policy for such contingencies. apparently do not. Nevertheless, this The issue of neighbours, maritime or could have unpredictable consequences otherwise, facing a financial crunch and set problematic precedents. The owing to the large amounts they have international financial system is not used borrowed from China, will continue to States failing to meet their financial to haunt India. Delhi should clear the obligations. air as to how it wishes to deal with it. Knee-jerk reactions to every new case Need for a Coherent Policy are unlikely to help the country’s cause. The Kenyan financial predicament vis-à-vis the Chinese, may or may not snowball into a larger problem, but the 31 December 2018

*Rajesh Soami is an Associate Fellow at the NMF. The views expressed here are his own, and do not reflect the official policy or position of the NMF. He can be reached at [email protected] or [email protected]

136 Political Crisis in Sri Lanka: China and the Maritime Dimension

Dr. Jabin T. Jacob*

In late October 2018, Sri Lankan of restoring democratic order and President Maithripala Sirisena set off a functioning to the country. Sirisena had, constitutional crisis by sacking Prime of course, broken ranks with Rajapaksa Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe and within their own political party, the Sri replacing him by Sirisena’s predecessor Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and joined Mahinda Rajapaksa. With Sirisena later hands with Wickremsinghe’s United dissolving Parliament, even members of National Party to oust the strongman the Sri Lankan Election Commission in 2015. Following the dissolution of declared the President’s action illegal1 parliament Rajapaksa carried with him before the country’s Supreme Court dozens of members of the SLFP to finally overturned the President’s formally join the Sri Lanka Podujana decision. Subsequent attempts to have Peramuna (SLPP, Sri Lanka People’s a vote of confidence settle matters in Front) created by his supporters– his Parliament failed amidst acrimony and brother Basil had joined the party as violence, before the political crisis was early as November 2016. The SLPP finally resolved with Wickremesinghe had done best among all parties in the being reinstated as Prime Minister in local elections in February with nearly mid-December. 45 per cent of the vote, which suggests that Rajapaksa must fancy his chances Sirisena’s actions were particularly whenever general elections are held. galling for ordinary Sri Lankans who voted for him in the 2015 presidential China, the ‘friendly neighbor’? elections based on his promise of reducing presidential powers that The internal dynamics in Sri Lanka Rajapaksa had accumulated and is considerably more familiar to New

137 Delhi, which has a long history of recover some lost ground as Sri Lanka’s involvement in the internal affairs of politicians slug it out. Across the board, that country. During Rajapaksa’s time no matter what their personal views on at the helm, however, the Chinese also China, Sri Lanka’s politicians have learnt began to gradually involve themselves to do business with Beijing. Sirisena has in Sri Lankan politics, if mostly on called China’s support ‘indispensable’ the side of the ruling dispensation as for his country’s development, while is their wont. Besides supplying arms Wickremesinghe himself has been quick to the Sri Lankan armed forces in the to deny Hambantota would be used as civil war against the LTTE, the Chinese a Chinese military base and supported were involved in financial transactions the various Chinese Belt and Road directly to Rajapaksa’s family and Initiative (BRI) projects in Sri Lanka. It cronies in exchange for swinging is, therefore, no surprise that the Chinese major infrastructure deals China’s way. ambassador was quick to meet with Therefore, when Rajapaksa lost power, both Wickremesinghe and Rajapaksa it was widely perceived as China also following the onset of the crisis. having lost their man in power. Nevertheless, the degree of Chinese However, it is also a sign of the involvement in Sri Lanka was such times and of China’s increasing presence that despite concerns raised during the that allegations quickly surfaced of elections about the Colombo Port City China funding certain parliamentarians project helmed by the Chinese – the amidst the political crisis. Xinhua, largest foreign investment in the country China’s state news agency, reported the – it continued on track even under Chinese embassy in Colombo as saying Sirisena. Therefore, the current shake- that the allegations were ‘groundless and up in the Sri Lankan system is unlikely irresponsible’. The embassy reiterated to ruffle the Chinese too much. If that China was ‘a friendly neighbor’ anything, it possibly helps take attention of Sri Lanka’s and also its principle of away from such pressure points for non-interference declaring, ‘We believe China in Sri Lanka as its controversial that the Sri Lankan government, parties 99-year lease on Hambantota port. and people have the wits [sic] and In the short term, there can be no ways needed to deal with the current doubt that the Chinese will be able to situation’.

138 The interesting part is not the delegation to Sri Lanka that there is patronising note about the Sri Lankans ‘a huge export opportunity for the Sri being able to manage their own affairs Lankan agriculture and fresh produce but the declaration that China was sector’ is significant. ‘a friendly neighbor’. One, of course, To take another example, India China is geographically nowhere near remains the top source of tourists to Sri Sri Lanka to be calling itself a ‘neighbor’ Lanka but the growth of Chinese arrivals but it gives a sense of the thinking in has been faster and could eventually Beijing that sees South Asia as part of change the situation. Notably, Sri China’s near neighbourhood and an area Lanka’s first private airline, with funding of interest and important activity. Two, from American and Chinese investors, is to say that it was a ‘friendly’ neighbour expected to start operations in February is to imply that Sri Lanka has unfriendly 2019 with five daily direct flights to neighbours, which, of course, can only destinations in China. This can be be a reference to India. In this, Beijing expected to increase the flow of Chinese might be reflecting an important point tourists to Sri Lanka. of view on the island nation but also adds fuel to the fire. A Maritime Research Centre However, in other ways, the Chinese of Note Embassy’s statement also reflects the While Sino-Sri Lankan economic reality of an increasingly close economic engagement in these cases do not come and military relationship between Sri at the expense of India, its growth will Lanka and China. Trade between the eventually change the incentive structure two countries according to China’s for Colombo in its dealings with New Department of Commerce, increased Delhi. However, there are other issues by three percent from US$ 4.47 billion that should concern India in China’s in 2016 to US$ 4.6 billion in 2017. outreach to Sri Lanka. Given that Sri Lanka is still a developing country with a large agricultural sector, Among the growing number of the visit and declaration in early October Chinese projects in Sri Lanka, one by the China National Agriculture research initiative with a somewhat Wholesale Market Association greater strategic import than most is the

139 rather innocuously named China-Sri famed National Basic Research Program Lanka Joint Centre for Education and of China also known as the ‘973’ Research (CSL-CER) at the University Programme and the National High- of Ruhuna in southern Sri Lanka in Tech Development Program of China collaboration with the South China Sea or the ‘863’ Programme. Institute of Oceanology of the Chinese While all of this looks ostensibly Academy of Sciences (CAS). Late above board, there are several interesting September 2018 saw the inauguration aspects about the SCSIO, which are of a new building for the Centre. This highlighted only in the Chinese version of is the first overseas research center on the introduction to the Institute and not marine sciences of the CAS and the in the English version. For instance, the result of a 2014 MoU signed during Chinese version also highlights its focus Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to on ‘national defense safety construction Sri Lanka in September that year. projects’. The introduction also notes The full gamut of activities under that the environmental protection of additional MoUs between the Sri island and reef engineering projects are Lankan university and the Chinese entity among the SCSIO’s strategic focus areas, includes academic staff and student (zhanlüezhuti 战略主题) a reference exchange, the establishment of a fully- obviously to the massive Chinese automated weather station, and a reclamation projects on disputed features joint observatory for wave and tidal in the South China Sea. Indeed, the measurements. Prof. Wang Dongxiao Institute maintains what it calls Deep Sea (王东晓) of the South China Sea Marine Environment Observation and Institute of Oceanology (SCSIO, 中国 Research Stations (shenhaihaiyanghua 科学院南海海洋研究所) under CAS njingguanceyanjiuzhan深海海洋环 was appointed as an Adjunct Professor 境观测研究站) in both the Paracels of the Department of Oceanography (Xisha in Chinese 西沙) and Spratlys and Marine Geology of the Faculty (Nansha南沙). of Fisheries and Marine Sciences and Technology. The SCIO is one of China’s The presence of the extension of top institutions in the field drawing such a Chinese research institute and its on funds and projects under China’s personnel in India’s near neighbourhood

140 must raise questions about their overall as Fu referred to the issue as one ‘about objectives. While there are a number of business’, he also pointed out India subjects that the Institute covers that would ‘have to get used to [Chinese should interest India’s naval planners, presence in the Indian Ocean], as it will it might also be worth noting that the become normal with more and more Maldives had in July 2015, under the Chinese enterprises going abroad’. tenure of then President Abdulla Yameen, Maldives had passed a constitutional In this context, another reason why amendment making it legal for foreigners the University of Ruhuna’s Chinese to buy land. Among the stipulations collaboration should be of interest under the new amendment was that is because the SCSIO’s introduction those who wished to purchase land had in Chinese also talks about ‘national to invest over US$ 1 billion and that 70 defense safety construction projects’ per cent of the land should be reclaimed (guofanganquanjianshegongcheng 国防 from the sea. 安全建设工程) as being among its aims as also the fact that its international While the Maldives was well within scientific collaborations are aimed at its rights to pass such a law in the interests developing China’s marine economy of its national development, what was and ‘safeguarding its maritime rights interesting was how this development and interests’ (weihuhaiyangquanyi 维 fit very well with capabilities that China 护海洋权益). It should be no surprise was at the time showcasing, in its illegal then that the SCSIO has won the reclamation activities in the South China commendation of not just the PRC State Sea and over which much of the world Council and the Central Committee of was crying foul. Indeed, Fu Xiaoqiang ( the Communist Party of China but also 傅小强), an expert on South Asia and the Central Military Commission in terrorism at the China Institutes of 2018. Contemporary International Relations in Beijing was quoted specifically as noting All of this suggests how closely that Chinese investors and construction linked China’s research institutions companies could benefit from the are to national security and military Maldivian law, ‘given China’s advanced objectives and institutions. Indeed, a technology in land reclamation’. Even late 2018 Financial Times (London)

141 report that Chinese PLA researchers Chinese (广东省侨联)2 is noteworthy. are accessing Western universities and The UFWD is practically a foreign research facilities in civilian garb to work ministry of sorts within the Party on potential dual-use projects, should responsible among other things for the put this particular development in Sri CPC’s interactions with influential elites Lanka in context. and interest groups outside China and Cheng’s appointment suggests a degree Taken together with the Chinese of serious attention and importance construction and/or takeover of ports now being accorded to Sri Lanka by the and terminals, visits by its submarines, Chinese. increased military exchanges including the gifting of a naval frigate, not just Much of this interest will be in in the case of Sri Lanka but other solidifying Sri Lanka’s position as part countries in the region, China’s desire to of China’s 21st Century Maritime Silk play ‘a bigger role in the international Road under the BRI. In his opening cooperation on marine sciences and speech as Ambassador to Sri Lanka, education in the Indian Ocean region’ Cheng talked about ‘jointly constructing through the Centre in the University through mutual consultations, the of Ruhuna as the Xinhua reported has ‘one belt, one road’ in order to achieve wider implications for India. tangible benefits for the two countries and the two peoples’ (tongguogongshang, BRI and China’s Increasing gongjian “yidaiyilu” geiliangguo he Political Attention liangguorenmindailaiqieshiliyi 通过共商、共建 “一带一路” 给两国和两国 The fact that the current Chinese 人民带来切实利益)� while the SCSIO’s ambassador in Sri Lanka, Cheng Chinese introduction also talks about Xueyuan (程学源), appointed in strengthening exchanges with countries January 2018 is not a career diplomat along the BRI and specifically mentions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the CSL-CER at the University of but a Party apparatchik whose previous Ruhuna in this context. stint was as head of a United Front Work Department (UFWD 中共中央 Another development of note in the 统一战线工作部) outfit, the Province context of the emphasis on the BRI in Federation of Returned Overseas China-Sri Lanka ties is the archaeological

142 excavations being carried out in ‘logistics support base’ in Djibouti in Allaippidy and Kayts Fort in the Jaffna 2016, despite Chinese interlocutors peninsula by the Shanghai Museum. The previously having consistently declared Chinese media reports the archaelogists that China would not set up military as having carried out a ‘comprehensive bases abroad and the militarization of survey of the harbor city of Jaffna and its Chinese-occupied features in the South surroundings’ and of having discovered China Sea, after Xi had specifically ancient ceramic pieces at the Allaippidy promised then US President Barack site, the majority of which appear to be Obama that China would not militarize of Chinese origin and to have traveled them. It stands to reason, therefore, along the ‘ancient maritime Silk Road’. that Chinese activities in Sri Lanka In other words, history and archaeology are designed with multiple intentions are being used to strengthen China’s and that New Delhi must watch more presence and access to India’s maritime closely developments in Sri Lanka and neighbourhood. the wider neighbourhood beyond just the high-profile military sales or PLA Conclusion Navy port calls.

While it would be incorrect to paint a At the same time, India would do picture of the Chinese government or well to not dismiss the ability of its the CPC as always working according neighbours to upset Beijing’s calculations to a grand plan or to assume that their and drum out pro-China rulers in agencies work in coordination or well defence of their own national interests together, it is nevertheless, a good rule as evident in general election results this of thumb to expect that there is no year in Pakistan and the Maldives. Even Chinese foreign policy, economic or as it raises concerns over its security cultural initiative or project whether in and commercial interests, New Delhi South Asia or elsewhere that will not must learn to deal with its neighbours have more than the publicly declared with a gentler hand and combine talk objectives. The Chinese record since of providing alternatives to China the ascension of Xi Jinping to power with actual action and results on the is particularly stark in this regard. This ground, consistently and in a sustained includes the opening of the so-called manner. While it might not be possible

143 to keep China out of South Asia or extent and success of Chinese activities India’s maritime neighbourhood, it will in the region. be the nature of India’s relations with its neighbours that will determine the 01 February 2019

* Dr. Jabin T. Jacob is Adjunct Research Fellow at the NMF and Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations and Governance Studies, Shiv Nadar University. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of the NMF. He may be reached atadjunctrfellow.nmf@ gmail.com and [email protected]

144 Maritime Law

China’s approach to the Freedom of Navigation: No-Sail Zones

Jayesh Mathur*

Introduction the ambit of ‘Freedom of Navigation’. This is especially so in the context of Torturous negotiations, involving much ‘Military Freedoms’. China has been at bargaining and several compromises, loggerheads with the United States of characterised the multiple sessions of America, and other countries, too, over the Third United Nations Conference this very issue, with Beijing alleging on the Law of the Sea. Although the that some activities of the USA are Conference eventually succeeded in inconsistent with the spirit of UNCLOS formulating what is now known as (which was ratified by China in 1996). the United Nations Convention on Ostensibly to curb US activities that it the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), the consequences of these compromises considers as being greatly in excess of continue to be felt. In contemporary those permissible under the ‘Freedom times, a great deal of controversy has been of Navigation’ clause (as defined under concentrated upon the exact meaning UNCLOS), China has, in the recent of the term ‘Freedom of Navigation’. past and particularly during its conduct The UNCLOS has, indeed, laid down of military exercises, promulgated and the extent of the freedoms available to a established ‘No-Sail Zones’ beyond its given State that is operating within the territorial waters, barring ships other maritime zones of a different Coastal than its own from sailing in such zones. State. However, this notwithstanding, This action by China has attracted there remain significant differences considerable opprobrium, especially in the manner in which States have from the USA (but from other countries interpreted permissible ‘activities’ under as well), who hold that such curbs upon

147 the right of Freedom of Navigation ‘Right of Innocent Passage’ within the of other States is grossly violative of territorial sea of a coastal State. As long international law. as the passage is innocent (i.e., it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order and This Article will analyse the degree security of the coastal State), the coastal to which such ‘No-Sail Zones’ conform state is not supposed to interfere with to international law, as also the degree to a ship undertaking such ‘innocent- which China’s position is legally justified, passage’. In addition, Article 25 (3) of using one such zone, which was created the UNCLOS authorises a coastal State by China in the South China Sea, in to temporarily suspend the right of 2016, as a case-in-point. innocent passage in specified areas of In July of 2016, China cordoned its ‘territorial sea’ for purposes relating off an area off Hainan, covering the to its own security and the safety of Paracel Islands (which are also claimed shipping, such as during the conduct by Vietnam), within which it conducted weapon-firing exercises. In such cases, military (predominantly ‘naval’) drills movement of foreign ships is restricted, over a period of a week. Beijing issued even if their passage is otherwise not an official statement declaring that no prejudicial to the peace, good order or other ships would be allowed in the area. security of the coastal State. However, This statement evoked a sharp response the convention does not confer upon from a variety of quarters, including the coastal State any right to suspend from Vietnam, which strenuously movement of ships of other states protested against the drills in waters within the Exclusive Economic Zone. which, in the opinion of Ha Noi, Article 58 of the Convention states that belonged to Vietnam. Other critics of all states enjoy the right of ‘Freedom of the Chinese action argued that barring Navigation’ in the Exclusive Economic ships from entering the area was against Zone (EEZ) of the coastal State. The the principles of international law. coastal State is under an obligation to demonstrate due regard for the rights Legality of ‘No-Sail Zones’ of other States within its own EEZ. The United Nations Convention Thus, the imposition of restrictions on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) by a coastal State on the entry-into or states that all ships are entitled to the passage-through its EEZ of foreign ships

148 Figure 1 unlawfully impedes the movement of other words, China created a temporary ships of other States. ‘No-Sail Zone’ in the waters off the coast of its island province of Hainan, which China’s Actions also covered portions of the Paracel China’s Maritime Safety Administration, Islands. on the 3rd of July, 2016, issued a Notice Declaration of Straight Baselines to Mariners, directing all vessels not to operate in an area roughly spanning Although China did not make reference 39,000 square miles, enclosed by to its regime of baselines while dismissing geographical coordinates published international criticism of its ‘No-Sail on its website. The Notice stated that Zone’, it is pertinent to take note of military exercises would be conducted in the basis upon which China has drawn the area from the 5th to the 11th of July, its baselines, since these baselines form 2016, during which period the ‘entry’ of the reference for the delineation of its vessels into the area was ‘prohibited’. In maritime zones.

149 Figure 2

In 1996, China declared two sets of whose coastlines are deeply indented, ‘straight baselines’. The first baseline was which is not true of China There is no drawn along the coast of its mainland, “fringe of islands” in the immediate traversing southwards from the eastern vicinity of the Chinese mainland either, tip of the Shandong peninsula to which might have necessitated the use of encompass the island of Hainan. This straight baselines. effectively converted waters lying to the Legitimacy of the Zone based on west of Hainan into ‘internal waters’ ‘Chinese’ Baselines (See Figure 1). Even if one were to accept China’s The second baseline was created position on the issue (which is based off the Paracel Islands, wherein the on a highly flawed interpretation of the outermost points of the islands were conditions laid down in UNCLOS, connected (See Fig 2), and the waters which must be met for straight baselines that were now enclosed within such to be drawn), parts of the ‘No-Sail Zone’ zone were, once again, claimed to be declared in July 2016, lie beyond the 12 ‘Internal Waters’. nautical mile breadth of the Territorial Article 7 of the UNCLOS states that Sea that the straight baselines in the Straight Baselines may be drawn by States Paracel Islands would generate. Similarly,

150 large swathes of the zone appear to lie zone during military exercises, China’s well beyond territorial waters to the Notice constituted an encroachment south-east of Hainan (generated by upon the ‘freedom of navigation’ all the first baseline). Large parts of the States enjoy in the Exclusive Economic cordoned-off area are actually within Zone of the coastal state. The official China’s claimed Exclusive Economic position of States such as the USA (which Zone (EEZ). As stated earlier, all States, has not yet ratified the UNCLOS) vis- whether landlocked or coastal, enjoy à-vis military exercises in international the right of freedom of navigation in waters is indicative of its awareness of the Exclusive Economic Zone of every the rights of other States. Thus, the zone coastal State. created in 2016 is devoid of legitimacy, even by China’s own baseline-measuring A number of States conduct military standards. exercises on a routine basis, both in their territorial waters as well as international China’s unilateral imposition of waters. The US “Commander’s restrictions on the freedom of navigation Handbook on the Law of Naval has no place under UNCLOS or Operations” states, “Notices may be issued other rules of international law. This to airmen and other mariners, alerting conclusion is independent of the gross ships and aircraft of the heightened hazards violation of the regime of Straight and recommending but not requiring that baselines, which China has illegally foreign ships and aircraft steer clear.” drawn around Hainan Island and the Ships and aircraft of ‘other nations’ are Paracel Islands (the latter are themselves not required to remain outside, but subject to overlapping claims by Vietnam are ‘obliged’ to refrain from interfering and Taiwan). with activities therein. The instructions Conclusion enumerated in the handbook intend to convey, to foreign ships which plan China’s actions in the given case, to enter the area, the dangers that are i.e. prohibiting entry of vessels in attendant upon the conduct of such international waters represent a breach exercises. Unlike the USA, which does of its commitments under the United not require ships and aircraft of other Nations Convention on the Law of nations to remain outside the specified the Sea. The fact that such ‘No Sail

151 Zones’ are temporary creations notwith- China to trample upon the navigational standing, if these are not challenged, it freedom of other States. could encourage erring states such as 07 May 2018

* Jayesh Mathur has interned with the NMF, New Delhi. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of the NMF. Jayesh may be reached at [email protected]

152 India and the Protection of its Overseas Nationals

Himanil Raina*

India’s overseas population contributes nationals and whether or not citizens more to the nation financially every would stand on a different footing vis-à- year by way of remittances, than vis nationals when it comes to demanding foreign direct investment (FDI) and or receiving State protection. foreign aid put together. In 2017, the Disaggregating India’s Overseas FDI and foreign aid received by India Population amounted to roughly $43 billion. In the same year, remittances amounted At 31.2 million, India possesses the to $69 billion. India has come a long world’s largest overseas population. way from the Nehruvian era policy This figure does not include short-term of ‘active disassociation’ between the travelers or temporary expatriates. This Indian State and overseas Indians. Prime figure does include 13.3 million NRIs Minister Narendra Modi has stated that and 17.9 million OCIs and PIOs. The the Indian government does not look at term NRI is indicative merely of taxation the “colour of the passport but only the and not political status. The term OCI blood relationship.” The need to protect is indicative of political status. The term Indians residing abroad may arise due PIO is a term of colloquial usage and to any number of scenarios ranging indicates neither taxation or political from natural disasters to civil disorder status. Of these three categories of to terrorist action to full scale combat. individuals, NRIs alone are citizens of This article examines whether or not India. OCIs and PIOs are not citizens of India. overseas Indians can demand State aid or protection as a matter of right. This For purposes of international law, it article also examines the issue of dual is quite irrelevant that a State’s internal

153 laws distinguish between different Consequently, NRIs and OCIs are kinds of nationals- those who enjoy full nationals of India, while PIOs may or political rights (citizens), and those who may not be Indian nationals depending do not enjoy full political rights (some on the particular facts and circumstances. category other than citizens, like OCIs Amongst the major reasons for the or PIOs). Nationality is the only term of failure to distinguish between the any consequence. Legally, an individual concept of a citizen and a national is may be the national of a State without the Parliament’s failure to enact a law having its citizenship. governing the recognition, acquisition and termination of nationality. The The Supreme Court of India has framers of the Constitution never addressed this distinction saying that, intended to enact a code of nationality “…the words ‘national’ and law into the Constitution itself. Rather, ‘citizen’ are not interchangeable as has this was a task left to the Parliament. been sometimes supposed.” “Citizen and ‘national’…are not synonymous… Indeed, Part II (Citizenship) of the Every citizen is a national, but every Constitution does not even provide national is not always a citizen.” for a comprehensive law governing “…citizens are those persons who have citizenship. It simply identifies the full political rights as distinguished from nationals, who may not enjoy full people who became citizens of India at political rights.” the commencement of the Constitution.

154 Article 11 empowered the parliament to the relevant international laws governing enact a law to provide for the acquisition the grant of nationality. There are 3 and termination of citizenship. ways by which nationality is acquired/ conferred by States: “descent/parentage The Citizenship Act, 1955 in its (jus sanguinis – law of the blood), birth original form recognized only one on the territory (jus soli – law of the soil) category of Indians – citizens. The or by way of naturalization (including jus category of individuals recognized as domicili or long residence).” The grant PIOs and OCIs was only introduced of an OCI status largely veers towards many decades later. Following a citizenship by jus sanguinis (descent/ government decision in 2015, there is parentage). A State’s “own determination no longer a distinction between PIOs that an individual possesses its nationality (Persons of Indian Origin) and OCIs is not lightly to be questioned. It creates (Overseas Citizens of India). All Persons a very strong presumption both that the of Indian origin cardholders became individual possesses the state’s nationality Overseas Citizens of India from January as a matter of its internal law and that 9, 2015 onwards. The term ‘Overseas that nationality is to be acknowledged for Citizen’ however, is misleading in international purposes.” Given how even the extreme as India does not have a the foundational laws governing Indian dual citizenship regime. Article 9 of citizenship itself have been shifting from the Constitution expressly prohibits a jus soli conception to a jus sanguinis an Indian citizen from acquiring the conception, the Indian determination of citizenship of another State. Further, OCIs as Indian nationals is indeed not Section 7B of the Citizenship Act, to be lightly questioned. 1955 specifically deniesO CIs a number of fundamental, constitutional and The Spectrum of State Support statutory rights that are available only to citizens and not OCIs. A government has three available choices to extend support to a distressed OCIs therefore, are clearly not national abroad: Consular Assistance, Indian citizens. They are, however, Diplomatic Protection and the Use of Indian nationals. A perusal of Section Force. 7A of the Citizenship Act, 1955 shows that the provisions governing the grant Consular Assistance is exercised of OCI status are in consonance with by the State in a preventive manner

155 (to prevent a national from being the territorial sovereign to protect them. subjected to internationally wrongful Three, the intervening State’s actions acts). Consular action is concerned with must be strictly confined to protecting visiting persons, finding lawyers and its nationals against injury. Prior to the contacting the local authorities. entry into force of the U.N Charter in 1945, the use of force to protect its Consular action does not encompass nationals was an accepted part of a State’s intervention in the host state’s internal right to exercise diplomatic protection affairs or judicial processes, nor does it under customary international law. entail the grant of legal advice or the Subsequently, it has been settled that investigation of a crime. the use of force prohibited by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter in exercise of Diplomatic Protection is essentially the right of diplomatic protection is no remedial (to remedy an internationally longer permissible. However, whether or wrongful act that has already been not a State’s right to use force to protect committed). It has nothing to do with its nationals still exists outside the field the protection of diplomats. Rather, it of diplomatic protection is not clear. is mainly concerned with protecting This is so as International Law neither nationals who are not engaged in official authorizes nor definitively rules out international business on behalf of the protection of nationals. State. Diplomatic Protection comprises diplomatic action and other means If a State consents to another State of peaceful settlement. Diplomatic extricating individuals from within Action includes protest, request for an its territory, then this constitutes an inquiry or negotiations. Other means of intervention by invitation. This is a peaceful settlement includes negotiation, completely uncontroversial action that mediation and conciliation and arbitral requires no further comment. However, and judicial settlement. a situation where the host nation does not provide its consent or where the The use of force for the protection of presence of consent is unclear, there nationals requires the existence of three exists a legal grey area. As noted by a cumulative conditions. One, there must scholar, “the question of the legality of exist an imminent threat of injury to the forcible rescue operations remain disputed nationals. Two, the failure/inability of today, while the possibility of evacuation

156 of nationals without active combat accede to every request of the national. engagement remains unchallenged.” On The Ministry of External Affairs does this issue, a State may subscribe either acknowledge that consular assistance to the restrictionist or to the counter- can be provided to Indian nationals and restrictionist position. Restrictionists to Overseas Citizens of India (OCI). do not believe that the use of force However, it qualifies this by stating to protect its nationals is a right that that this assistance will not be provided accrues to nations in the post-Charter regardless of the circumstances. era. Counter-restrictionists believe that it does. On the issue of using force As opposed to consular assistance, to rescue hostages abroad, India has which can be claimed as a matter expressed its disapproval (at least in so of individual right, diplomatic far as such a right is traced from Article protection is a State prerogative and 51 of the U.N Charter). However, on the not an individual right. The exercise issue of using force to rescue its nationals of diplomatic protection by a State is a due to internal unrest/armed conflict, purely discretionary power. Should an India can be located in the grouping of individual feel that his rights are not nations who have refrained from taking adequately protected (by the host State a side/expressing their opinion on the exercising diplomatic protection), he issue. will have no remedy in international law. There exists no obligation for a A Right or a Request State to extend diplomatic protection In Consular Assistance, consular officers to its nationals abroad. As stated by the act as per the Vienna Convention on International Court of Justice, “The Consular Relations as per which it is the State must be viewed as the sole judge individual and not the State who is the to decide whether its protection will be titulaire of the right. The right to seek granted, to what extent it is granted, and consular assistance is not synonymous when it will cease. It retains in this respect with the right to obtain that assistance. a discretionary power the exercise of which This means that the national cannot may be determined by considerations of a be denied access to his government political or other nature, unrelated to the officials by the host country, even as particular case.” The most that a national the host country is not obligated to could possibly demand of his protecting

157 State is that the government consider his which does not result in the renunciation request rationally. Municipal law may of a prior nationality.” oblige a State to protect its nationals Can a State protect its nationals, abroad. The Ministry of External Affairs if these nationals simultaneously also however, clearly stipulates that it cannot hold the nationality of the State against guarantee the safety and security of whom the right to protect nationals is Overseas Indians outside the scope of being exercised? The International Law local laws. As stated by India in the Commission has held that, “A State of U.N.G.A Sixth Committee (Legal): nationality may not exercise diplomatic “Concern for the rights of the individual protection in respect of a person against a should not, however, be stretched to the State of which that person is also a national point where it was obligatory for the State of unless the nationality of the former State nationality to espouse the claim in question is predominant…” This principle of despite political or other sensitivities.” ‘predominant nationality’ defines the circumstances in which a State may In the current legal disposition, an extend diplomatic protection to its individual can only request for and not nationals when they also possess the claim as a matter of right diplomatic nationality of the state against whom the protection. Given this fact, an enquiry right of diplomatic protection is being into whether an individual can as a invoked. Clarity is certainly required matter of right, call upon the State of his as to what exactly constitutes these nationality to use force to protect him is a circumstances. Clarity is also needed on redundant line of enquiry. In the absence whether or not the rule of predominant of any municipal law obligations, the nationality will also apply to the law answer shall be a negative. governing the use of force. This is so Dual Nationals the use of force entails executive action as opposed to the law of diplomatic Dual nationality is not prohibited protection which only entails a claim. by international law. It may arise “as Rights of Citizens versus a result of the parallel operation of the Rights of Nationals principles of jus soli and jus sanguinis or of the conferment of nationality by Should a State conduct Non-combatant naturalization or any other manner… Evacuation Operations as part of the

158 protection of nationals, would a citizen or plantation properties. OCIs also have stand on a different footing from a rights at par with Indian citizens with national? This is an important question, respect to pursuing certain professions, as given the limited space onboard adoptions, domestic air fares, entry to ships and aircrafts, there may be a need national monuments, historical sites, to prioritize in between the two in the museums, national parks, wildlife course of evacuation operations. sanctuaries etc. Government policy, as it stands today, treats OCIs differently The Delhi High Court has held that: from Indian citizens based upon an “the gaining of the status of an OCI…does intelligible differentia. Indian courts not guarantee parity of treatment with have clearly ruled that “it is not enough Indian passport holders.” The provisions to show that the person is an Indian governing OCIs have received a statutory ‘national’. Absent an explicit recognition status and this provision itself can be of such status in law, a ‘national’ may not traced to Article 11 of the Constitution. per se be entitled to the same treatment as However, the rights that are conferred a ‘citizen’.” on OCIs depend entirely upon the policy of the Government of India. In a case before the Delhi High Section 7B of the Citizenship Act, 1955 Court this year itself (2018), Justice states clearly that an overseas citizen is Vibhu Bakhru held: “In terms of Section entitled to only such rights as the central 7B (1) of the Citizenship Act, 1955, all government may specify {other than the rights other than those specified in sub- section (2) of the said Section are available rights specifically not made available to to an OCI card holder. Although Article them by Section 7B(2)}. A perusal of the 16 of the Constitution of India is specified relevant central laws by the Ministry of in Section 7B(2) of the Act, Articles 14 and Home Affairs and the (then) Ministry of 19 are not included. Thus, prima facie, Overseas Indian Affairs (now subsumed the rights under Articles 14 and 19 of the under the Ministry of External Affairs) Constitution of India which is guaranteed makes clear that OCIs have parity with to the Citizen of India also appear to be NRIs in respect of all facilities available extended to an OCI card holder.” to them in the economic, financial and educational fields except in matters What must not be forgotten relating to the acquisition of agricultural however, is that given the absence of any

159 obligations placed on the Indian State population, there is little doubt that the by domestic law to use force to protect/ need to protect Indian nationals will evacuate even its citizens, the question arise in the future. of prioritizing between its citizens and There is a pressing need for legal nationals is presently a moot question. clarity in relation to the acquisition, Nonetheless, this question does require determination and termination of clarity, as an answer to the same is still Indian nationality, particularly in cases germane for purposes of public policy, of dual nationality. The use of a variety perception management, morality and of terms (citizens, nationals, OCI, PIO, possibly in the future, the law itself. NRI, passport holders) has generated Conclusions immense confusion about who exactly is entitled to the protection of the Indian The contemporary international State. There is a lack of uniformity across environment has been increasingly different ministries of the Government characterized by a tendency to accept or of India with respect to the usage of at least tolerate the forcible protection these terms. This requires correction. of nationals. Given the sheer number and dispersion of the overseas Indian 03 December 2018

* Himanil Raina is a B.A., LL.B. (Hons.) graduate of the NALSAR University of Law and a Research Associate at the NMF, New Delhi. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect the official policy or the position of the NMF. He can be reached at [email protected] and researchas- [email protected]

160 Legal Aspects of the 25th November, 2018 Kerch Strait Incident

Himanil Raina*

What Happened on 25th November Su-25SM’s started patrolling the strait. In the evening, Russian ships opened On November 23, 2018, three fire on the Ukrainian Gyurza M class Ukrainian Navy ships set sail from the artillery gunboats (the Berdyansk and the port of Odessa to the port of Mariupol. Nikopol). Six Ukrainian servicemen were This voyage required them to pass from wounded, all 3 Ukrainian navy vessels the Black Sea via the Kerch Strait into were seized and the crew of 23, including the Sea of Azov. On November 24, the 2 intelligence officers of Ukraine’s SBU commander of the Ukrainian naval group security service were taken captive.3 was notified by the Russian authorities Russia temporarily closed navigation to about the closure of navigation in non-Russian traffic, before reopening the Kerch Strait area. On November it on November 26th (Monday). On 25, the Ukrainian naval contingent 27thNovember, the Verkhovna Rada requested the Russian maritime control (Ukrainian Parliament) backed a services for passage through the Kerch presidential plan to declare martial law Strait. On the same morning, a Russian for 30 days in the 10 regions bordering coastguard vessel rammed the Ukrainian Russia, Crimea and the Sea of Azov. tugboat YanuKapu, damaging it. As the Ukrainian ships continued their voyage, Russia stated that the Ukrainian Russia blocked the entrance to the Sea ships were in violation of the rules of of Azov by positioning a freighter length peaceful passage in the territorial waters wise in front of the entrance under the 12 of Russia. According to Russia, the mile bridge across the Kerch Strait and Ukrainian ships attempted to carry out Russian Ka-52 attack helicopters and illegal manoeuvres in Russia’s territorial

161 waters. Owing to the failure of the in advance as required by the Russian Ukrainian ships to stop immediately authorities. The Russian perspective is and end their maneouvres, Russian that the Ukrainians did not go through vessels used force to stop and detain the proper channels to receive a place the ships in Russia’s territorial waters. in line to cross the strait despite being Ukraine states that Russian ships have aware of the procedure for innocent unlawfully used force in violation of the passage. The Ukrainian position is that United Nations Charter and the United their notification of intent to transit the Nations Convention on the Law of the Strait of Kerch was sufficient and that Sea (UNCLOS). Ukraine says that in it any case there was no international doing so, Russia has committed an act notice regarding the closure of the of aggression as defined in Article 3, strait to maritime traffic. Second, were paragraph 3 (blockade) and 4 (attack on Russia’s actions in attacking, boarding the sea forces of a state) of the United and seizing the Ukrainian naval ships Nations General Assembly resolution justified? 29/3314. The legal consequences will differ The Legal Implications depending on the applicable legal The incident has given rise to a number regime. If Russia and Ukraine are not in of legal questions. The commission a state of war/armed conflict, then the of an armed attack, Ukraine’s right to UNCLOS will be applicable. If, however, respond as per Article 51 of the U.N Russia and Ukraine are in a state of war/ Charter, Russia having purportedly International Armed Conflict, then the engaged in an act of aggression and law of naval warfare will largely displace the status of the detained Ukrainian the UNCLOS and act as the governing sailors are some of them. However, law. only two specific issues are addressed The Law of War herein. First, relates to passage rights as enshrined in a 2003 Russian-Ukrainian The Office of the United Nations High treaty. Ukraine provided the Russian Commissioner for Human Rights authorities an advance notice of their (OHCHR) has held that there exists an intention to traverse the strait, but this international armed conflict in between notice was not provided sufficiently Russia and Ukraine. Apropos the first

162 issue, the relevant question is whether Self defence as recognized by Article 51 a Russia-Ukraine bilateral treaty of of the United Nations Charter however, 2003 which recognizes Ukraine’s treaty- is not one of them. based passage rights, can be suspended Apropos issue 2, if it is presumed owing to the existence of an armed that there exists a state of armed conflict conflict. There exists no presumption between Russia and Ukraine, then the law in international law that hostilities will of naval warfare (a restatement of which necessarily have the effect of terminating or suspending the operation of treaties is found in the San Remo Manual on between the parties to the conflict. International Law Applicable to Armed Article 7 of the Draft articles on the Conflicts at Sea) will be applicable (while effects of armed conflicts on treaties not binding on states, the Manual is a refers to an indicative list of treaties, codification of customary international the subject matter of which involves law). Rule 10(a) recognizes that hostile an implication that they continue in action by naval forces may be conducted operation during an armed conflict. in the territorial seas, internal waters The Russia-Ukrainian bilateral treaty and the exclusive economic zones of of 2003 could certainly be read into the belligerent states. The Ukrainian clause b (Treaties declaring, creating or artillery gunboats qualify as military regulating a permanent regime or status objectives as defined in Rules 40 and or related permanent rights, including 41 and, therefore, constitute belligerent treaties establishing or modifying land forces. The Ukrainian tugboat is an and maritime boundaries) or clause auxiliary vessel as defined in Rule 13(h) h (Treaties relating to international and therefore cannot claim to belong to watercourses and related installations the class of vessels exempt from attack and facilities of the indicative list) of the as defined in Rule 47. Russia, would indicative list referred to in Article 7. then be well within its rights to attack The application of treaties concerning the Ukrainian naval contingent and its the status of certain waterways may decision to use force would not, be illegal. indeed be subject to the exercise of However, Russia’s actions would still the inherent right of self defence. The have to comply with the requirements of Russian intervention in Ukraine has been International Humanitarian Law as they justified under various legal doctrines. relate to proportionality, distinction,

163 necessity and preventing unnecessary the Kerch Strait by Russia in 2015 is suffering. It is to be noted however, that probably not in consonance with its the OHCHR document characterizing bilateral treaties of 2003 and 2012 with the Russian-Ukrainian conflict as Ukraine. an international armed conflict was Prior to commenting on the second supported by only 70 States. 77 States issue, a preliminary inquiry needs to be abstained and 26 chose to vote against it made. This enquiry relates to whether or (including India and China). not the incident in question happened The Law of Peace in Russian territorial waters. This is a question of both fact and law. As Apropos the first issue, by virtue of for the factual question, coordinates a 2003 bilateral treaty, Ukraine does offered by both sides suggest that the indeed have treaty-based passage rights vessel was in Crimean waters. The legal through the Kerch Strait. As per Article question pertains to the territorial status 3 of the same treaty, Russia and Ukraine, of Crimea. This is important as the both undertook to cooperate and jointly fundamental principle governing the law regulate shipping and navigation. of the sea is that ‘the land dominates the Further, in 2012, both nations entered sea’. The implication of this proposition into an Agreement on measures to ensure is that the territorial situation on land the safety of navigation in the Sea of Azov constitutes the starting point for the and the Kerch Strait. By virtue of Article determination of the maritime rights 8 of the 2012 agreement, amendments of a coastal State. Figure 3 represents may be made to the agreement with Russian and Ukrainian maritime zones the consent of both parties. Whether, in the Black Sea prior to the annexation Russia, in drawing up and implementing of Crimea by Russia in 2014. such laws and regulations has been in violation of its international law The prevailing international obligations is not explored herein, as consensus as embodied in the United that is concerned with the violation of Nations General Assembly resolution bilateral legal obligations as opposed to 68/262 is that the referendum held in maritime law. It is sufficient to note that the Autonomous Republic of Crimea the unilateral adoption of rules on the in March 2014 has no validity. This advance notification of passage through would have adverse consequences for

164 Figure 2: Russian and Ukrainian claims in Black Sea and Sea of Azov before March 2014 Source: Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory of Columbia University Russia’s extended claims, as the exercise seizure of the Ukrainian vessels occurred of coastal state rights by Russia would in territorial waters that belonged to be an usurpation of Ukraine’s rights. Russia even prior to the assimilation Regardless, Russia has asserted that the of Crimea with Russia. It has been

Figure 3: Russian maritime claims after annexation of Crimea Source: intellinews.com

165 independently verified that Ukrainian be required to leave the territorial sea ships did indeed enter Russian waters immediately by the coastal State. The (of both Crimea and mainland Russia). second set of exceptions are found in Articles 17-26 of the UNCLOS. Article At this early stage, it would be 17 recognizes that all ships have the right fruitless to seek to determine whether of innocent passage through territorial or not Russia’s actions were actually in seas. Article 19 defines innocent passage consonance with the law, given that as passage that is not prejudicial to the the facts are still unclear or contested. peace, good order or security of the However, were it to be assumed that the coastal State and provides a detailed list waters in question were indeed a part of of activities that would be considered its territorial seas, it is worth examining prejudicial to the peace, good order or whether international law even permits security of the coastal State. Article 21 Russia to engage in the actions that it requires that all foreign ships exercising resorted to. This is important so as to be innocent passage through the territorial able to counter narratives which suggest sea are required to conform with the that one party’s (Russia’s) actions are coastal State’s laws in respect of the illegal irrespective of which version of safety of navigation and the regulation events is true. of maritime traffic. Article 22 further Article 95 of the UNCLOS states allows the coastal State to require foreign that a warship operating on the high seas ships exercising the right of innocent enjoys immunity from the jurisdiction passage through its territorial sea, to of any State other than the flag State. use such sea lanes and traffic separation This immunity is absolute. Article 32 of schemes as it may designate or prescribe. the UNCLOS provides that a warship Article 25(1) gives the coastal State operating in the territorial sea also enjoys the right to take the necessary steps to immunity, but this immunity is not prevent passage which is not innocent. absolute. It is subject to two exceptions. Specifically, Article 25(3) states that in The first exception is found in Article the case of ships proceeding to internal 30 of the UNCLOS, which states that waters (which is the legal status of the Sea a warship which does not comply with of Azov), the coastal state has the right the coastal State’s regulations concerning to take the necessary steps to prevent passage through the territorial sea may any breach of the conditions to which

166 admission of those ships to internal economic zone (EEZ) and another part waters or such a call is subject. of the high seas or an EEZ. The Sea of Azov however, contains no high seas nor What though will be the legal any exclusive economic zones. It is an position should a warship fail to comply enclosed or semi-enclosed seaas defined with the coastal State’s demand that that in in Part IX of the UNCLOS. As per the warship leave its territorial sea? The Article 123 of the UNCLOS, States UNCLOS does not elaborate as to what bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed are the ‘necessary steps’ that may be taken seas are to cooperate in the exercise of to prevent passage which is not innocent. their rights and the performance of their The right to employ force is, however, a duties. Prior to the USSR’s dissolution logical and reasonable derivation of state in 1991, the Sea of Azov and the Kerch sovereignty over the territorial sea. Such Strait were the USSR’s internal waters. a use of force would however, have to be While, Ukraine and Russia have not tempered by the customary international finished delimiting the area, they have law requirements of necessity and recognized the Sea of Azov and the proportionality. Russia has relied upon Strait of Kerch as the inland waters these provisions to defend its actions. of Russia and Ukraine through two 2 Some of the arguments advanced by bilateral treaties in 2003 (January and Ukraine are, however, quite inconsistent December). Hence, no question arises or not founded in fact at all. For instance, of there existing any high seas or an EEZ Ukraine’s assertions that Russia’s actions within the Sea of Azov, which is why the constituted a violation of Articles 38 Strait of Kerch cannot constitute a strait and 44of the UNCLOS are not founded used for international navigation as in fact at all. These articles talk about envisaged in Part III of the UNCLOS. the right of transit passage and the In July 2015, certain members of the duty of States that border a strait to Ukrainian parliament had submitted a ensure that they do not hamper transit Draft Law on the Denunciation of the passage. Article 37 of the UNCLOS Treaty between Ukraine and the Russian however, specifies that these articles are Federation on Cooperation in the Use applicable only to a strait that is used of the Azov Sea and the Kerch Strait. for international navigation between This draft law was not adopted. For one part of the high seas or an exclusive Ukraine to argue that the Kerch Strait is

167 an international strait is quite puzzling importantly, Ukraine also recognized as Ukraine relies upon its 2003 bilateral the Sea of Azov as internal waters. treaty with Russia for both its opposition Following the Orange Revolution of to the construction of the Kerch Strait 2004 in Ukraine however, Kiev has been bridge by Russia and its passage rights. insisting on a revision of the agreement. As per the 2003 agreement Ukraine Similarly, Ukraine’s assertion that legally controlled 62 percent of the Sea Article 95 of the UNCLOS (which of Azov’s area and Russia controlled grants immunity to warships on the high 38 percent. Following the Crimean seas) is relevant in the matter at hand is annexation of 2014 however, Russia quite puzzling. This is so, as while it is controls 75 percent of the Sea of Azov. contested whether or not the Ukrainian navy ships were in the territorial seas The present incident is indeed a when attacked by Russia, it is not ‘dramatic’ escalation as it marks the first contested that they were in Crimean time that the Russian armed forces have territorial waters. Consequently, Article openly attacked the Ukrainian armed 95 is completely inapplicable to the case forces and claimed responsibility for the same. Despite the ongoing violence on at hand. land since Russia’s military intervention The Wider Geopolitical Context in Ukraine in 2014, the Sea of Azov had thus far been free of clashes. Tensions Negotiations between Russia and escalated in March 2018 when Ukraine Ukraine on the status of the Sea of Azov seized a Russian-flagged fishing vessel and the Kerch Strait have been ongoing in the Sea of Azov. While the crew since 1995. Following the Tuzla island was released, the vessel still remains crisis of September 2003, a bilateral in Ukrainian custody. Following this agreement was signed in December incident, Russia began stepping up 2003. Many benefits accrued to Russia the inspection of Ukrainian vessels. from this treaty. For instance, Russian In May 2018, Russia also completed vessels no longer had to pay Ukraine the construction of the Kerch Strait for passage as they could now use the bridge (construction on which began Kerch-Enikale canal freely. Further, in 2015 without taking the Ukrainians foreign warships could no longer enter on board first). This 19km bridge the sea without its permission. Most linking the Krasnodar region of Russia

168 with Crimea, is the sole land route to maximum draft of 14 m. With the Kerch mainland Russia. Citing the need for bridge now in place, the dimensions of enhanced security, Russia scaled up ships that may pass through are restricted the deployment of armed ships in the to 160m (length), 31m (width), 33m region. Cargo ships headed to Ukrainian (height) and maximum draft of 8m. ports now found themselves subject Trade to Ukrainian ports has fallen to increasingly frequent inspections by 30 percent since Russia has started and lengthy delays (at times as a long interfering with its shipping. Ukraine as a week). Additionally, the Kerch has already initiated legal proceedings Strait bridge has imposed physical against Russia under Annex VII of restraints on navigation. Ukrainian port the UNCLOS for the infringements administration authorities stated that of its rights as a coastal State by these the average measurements of vessels developments. That the recent incident visiting the Ukrainian ports were 175 followed Ukraine’s first ever attempt to m (length) and 27 m (width), with a bring naval ships through the Kerch maximum draft of 9.6 m. Panamax type Strait following the completion of the vessels that visited the Mariupol port bridge may well be no coincidence. had dimensions of 225 m (length), 32.5 m (width) and 37.5 m (height), with a 12 December 2018

* Himanil Raina is a B.A., LL.B. (Hons.) graudate of the NALSAR University of Law and a Research Associate at the NMF, New Delhi. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect the official policy or the position of the NMF. He can be reached at [email protected] and researchas- [email protected]

169 Employment of Unmanned Maritime Systems in the Indo-Pacific: Legal Implications and the Way Ahead

Suriya Narayanan*

On December 16 2016, the People’s (UMS) consist of vehicles that are either Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) seized autonomous or remotely operated in air, an Unmanned Underwater Vehicle surface or subsurface (underwater). (UUV) in the EEZ of the Philippines, approximately 50 nautical miles North- Autonomous and remotely operated West of the Subic Bay. The UUV weapon systems are being increasingly belonged to the United States (US) used in modern day warfare. A classic Navy. The US government condemned example of the modern-day usage of the Chinese action. It claimed that the an autonomous weapon system would People’s Republic of China had violated be an armed aerial drone. The US uses international maritime law, specifically it regularly for kinetic strikes against articles 32, 58 and 96 of United targets in Somalia, Yemen and in the Nations Convention on Law of the AfPak region. Having realised the Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS). While Articles dangers of unregulated drone usage in 32 and 96 of the UNCLOS provide the country, the government of India for the immunity of warships and the has instituted regulations to control immunity of ships on government non- their usage. Unfortunately, UMS have commercial service, respectively, Article not received the same attention although 58 addresses the obligations of a State their unregulated use in the waters of in Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Coastal States in Indian Ocean Region towards security of the Coastal State. (IOR) poses a complex challenge. However, the UNCLOS does not address these issues with respect to unmanned Unmanned systems can be used systems. Unmanned Maritime Systems for activities ranging from surveillance

170 missions to full-fledged kinetic strikes. from “interference by the authorities Currently, UMS are used by navies for of nations other than the flag nation”. non-lethal assignments, inter alia the The status of UMS though, cannot be following, clearly determined by the international legal framework as it stands today. • Intelligence, Surveillance and UMS certainly do not fall under the Reconnaissance (ISR) definition of a warship. The UNCLOS • Intelligence Preparation of definition states that a warship should the Operational Environment be “manned by a crew which is under (IPOE) regular armed forces discipline.” As the names indicate, UUVs and most AUVs • Mine Counter measures are unmanned. Whether UMS should (MCM) be considered as warships or auxiliaries; or, do we require a new category to • Inspection / Identification classify UMS is a question of law that • Oceanography requires deliberation.

• Communications To complicate the matter further, the UNCLOS does not define a ship • Payload Delivery / Time Critical or a vessel. Reference for the purpose Strike (TCS) of guidance though, can be made to the Regulatory mechanisms are not “San Remo Manual on International developing as rapidly as technology is. Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Existing international laws, including Sea, 1994”, for categorization of UMS. the UNCLOS, do not provide sufficient The text of 13(h) Section V of the clarity to address the issues regarding the Manual allows the classification ofU MS as Auxiliary Vessels. However, this poses legal status of UMS and the regulation another hurdle in regulation of UMS as of their employment. the UNCLOS does not define the term International law treats naval vessels ‘Auxiliary Vessels’ either. The status and as extensions of the respective State nomenclature of UMS in the high seas whose flag they fly. This is an established and territorial waters of coastal states principle of international law which is something that legal heads need to grants sovereign immunity to these vessels ponder over.

171 Recently, the Indo-Pacific has The nations in the Indo-Pacific emerged as a region of geopolitical region have been actively procuring or competition. With the presence of all developing UMS that are envisaged major powers in the IOR, which are also for military, non-military and dual-use sufficiently technologically advanced purposes. However, the legal regime to deploy UMS, it is imperative for governing UMS ranges from being India to assess the challenge from both non-existent to highly inadequate. This operational as well as legal perspectives. legal ambiguity is dangerous. This is so as another nation could deliberately Among other powers, China has exploit this gray area of the law or become increasingly active in the IOR. It even accidentally cross another nation’s has regularly deployed warships and even threshold and trigger a kinetic response. nuclear submarines. With its growing Nations would like to avoid situations naval and technological might, there is involving UMS of other major powers a large likelihood that China will deploy which could lead to ratcheting up of UMS in the oceans around India. China tensions. The benefit of promulgating has built or is in the process of building legal mechanisms is that, they are ports in Myanmar, Pakistan and Sri prospective. In furtherance of leaving no Lanka. It already has an active military lacunae, nations should not wait for a base in Djibouti. With its ‘String of trigger event to promulgate laws. Before Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean Region, such issues become a matter of grave Beijing will be able to deploy, control concern, member nations of the Indo- and service its UMS in the IOR. Pacific must initiate promulgation of China has also been aspiring to their respective municipal laws as well as augment its nuclear submarines with contribute, not only to the development a system that is powered by AI. As AI of appropriate international legal is coupled with UUVs, more complex mechanisms but also to secure one’s issues are bound to arise that will own territory by addressing the lacunae require active consideration by the in governing and regulating UMS. They regional nations. The 2016 incident in should rather be equipped to address the South China Sea amply highlights issues that are visible as a product of the complexities of the employment of reasonable foreseeability. Consequently, UMS in the IOR there is a pressing need to clarify or

172 create (if required) the legal architecture and expanding maritime interests in the governing UMS. India, particularly, IOR. should take the lead in this as it is likely to be most affected due to its long coastline 17 December 2018

* Suriya Narayanan is a research associate at the NMF. The views expressed here are his own, and do not reflect the official policy or position of the NMF. He can be reached atresearchassociate3.nmf@ gmail.com

173 China and the South China Sea Arbitration: Analyses in the Indo-Pacific Context

Hamsa Devineni and Captain (Dr) Gurpreet S Khurana*

In January 2013, the Philippines to the established legal maritime order, initiated an international arbitration case regional countries would eventually against China under Part XV, Section 2 cherish their hard-fought and well- on “Compulsory Procedures Entailing deserved objectives of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ Binding Decisions” and Annex VII idea that seeks regional prosperity and (“Arbitration”) to the United Nations development. Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 Such academic enquiry — as also its (UNCLOS). The case concerned the prevailing maritime disputes in the functional solution — lie in ascertaining South China Sea (SCS), and broadly the answers to two key questions: First, concerned the role of historic rights, in rejecting the jurisdiction of PCA maritime entitlements, the status of — and later, its decision — under maritime features and the lawfulness of the compulsory dispute resolution certain actions by China, upon which, mechanism of UNCLOS, is China’s the Philippines alleged that China had position legally valid? If so, is the violated the Convention. China adopted relevant international law (UNCLOS) a position of non-acceptance and non- inadequate to address the emergent participation in the proceedings, and geopolitical issues in the Indo-Pacific eventually, rejected its verdict declared region? in July 2016. This issue-brief aims to address these The case is very relevant to the questions, ascertain the implications of ‘rise’ of the Indo-Pacific region; and the same on stable and lawful maritime more specifically, to the imponderable order in ‘Indo-Pacific’ region, and offer whether amidst the emerging challenges recommendations in this regard.

174 The Legal Dimension proceedings before the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), in accordance The UNCLOS, in the first instance, with Annexure VII of the Convention. mandates all its State parties to settle their disputes amicably, mutually and by The Philippines requested the peaceful means (Article 279). However, PCA to decide on 15 issues. Manila’s when the parties are unable to settle a contentions may be distilled into three dispute, it also provides a procedure to key issues, as follows: - resolve the contention under Part XV of • China’s claim to sovereign UNCLOS on ‘Settlement of Disputes’. jurisdiction within the nine- It permits any State to institute a case dash line on the basis of ‘historic against another State in one of the forums rights’ are unlawful. chosen by the latter in its declaration under Article 287(1) (Section 2 of • The features that China Part XV on ‘Compulsory Procedures claims in SCS do not generate Entailing Binding Decisions’). As per this maritime zone entitlements as provision, every State is free to choose per UNCLOS. one or more of the four enumerated • China has violated its obligations forums namely, the International under UNCLOS, including Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in terms of interfering with or the International Court of Justice the Philippines’ exercise of the (ICJ) or an arbitral Tribunal constituted sovereign rights. under Annexure VII or a special arbitral tribunal constituted under Annexure China refused to participate in the VIII. Given that China has not made arbitration proceedings formally as a a declaration choosing the forum, it is party. It, nonetheless, expressed its view deemed to have accepted arbitration to the Tribunal through a ‘position under Annexure VII [Art 287(3)]. paper’. Broadly, the paper said that the Accordingly, given that the Philippines PCA had no jurisdiction on the issue failed in its attempts to resolve its long- between the two countries, and that pending maritime dispute with China in China has filed a declaration under the SCS through bilateral negotiation, it Article 298(1), which exempt it from took recourse to instituting arbitration compulsory arbitration [Article 287(3)].

175 The declaration made by China on 26 to decide the dispute between the August 2006 had stated that: Philippines and China. “The Government of the People’s The Tribunal proceedings, thereafter, Republic of China does not accept any continued as per Article 9 of Annexure of the procedures provided for in Section 2 of Part XV of the convention with VII, which inter alia, states that the respect to all the categories of disputes absence of a party or the failure of a party referred to in paragraphs 1(a), (b) and to defend its case shall not constitute (c) of Article 298 of the Convention.” a bar to the proceedings. China was Essentially, the three paragraphs provided with daily transcripts and of UNCLOS Article 298 refer to the documents of the Tribunal proceedings, disputes… along with the opportunity to comment thereon. However, China continued to • 1(a) “…relating to historic exempt itself from participating based bays or titles…and… sovereignty on declaration it had made by it in or other rights over continental 2006 under UNCLOS, Article 298(1) or insular land territory”. [sub-paras (a), (b) and (c], as mentioned • 1(b) “…concerning military above) that exempts it from compulsory activities and disputes concerning dispute settlement. law enforcement activities”. Clearly, the claims raised by • 1(c) “…in respect of which the Philippines did not fall under the Security Council of the (a) ‘sovereignty or other rights over United Nations (UN) is continental or insular land territory’, or exercising the functions assigned (b) or (c) above, for which China sought to it by the (UN) Charter….” exemption. As regards the exception on (a) ‘historic bays or titles’, the Tribunal On the jurisdiction issue, the PCA declared that, Tribunal conducted a separate hearing “as between the Philippines and under UNCLOS Article 288(4), which China, China’s claim to historic rights, empowers it to decide on its own or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, jurisdiction. Accordingly, on 29 October with respect to the maritime areas of the South China Sea encompassed by the 2015, the Tribunal passed a preliminary relevant part of the ‘Nine-dash line’ are order affirming its lawful jurisdiction contrary to the convention and without

176 lawful effect, to the extent that they However, despite this, China refused to exceed the geographic and substantive comply with the Tribunal’s verdict. On limits of China’s maritime entitlements under the Convention”. the other hand, the Philippines has not been able to compel enforcement of the The Tribunal further declared arbitral award due to lack of effective that, “the Convention superseded any enforcement provisions under the historic rights, or other sovereign rights UNCLOS. or jurisdiction, in excess of the limits imposed therein.” Thus, the ‘historic Although Article 12(1) of Annexure bay or titles’ exception enumerated VII says that a dispute regarding in Article 298(1)(a) is subject to the implementation of an arbitral award limits imposed by the UNCLOS and may be submitted to the same arbitral this exception cannot be taken to tribunal, the UNCLOS is silent on mean an exception to the geographic its power to execute the award. Only and substantive limits of the maritime a decision adjudicated upon by the entitlements enumerated under the ICJ is enforceable by recourse to the Convention. Thus, China’s claim to UN Security Council, which can take sovereign jurisdiction on the basis of measures to give effect to the judgment historic rights was declared illegal by the (Article 94 of the UN Charter). As PCA through its final order issued on 12 things stand today, the execution of July 2016. awards passed by ITLOS and the arbitral tribunals are left solely to the The order of the PCA being “final” good faith obligations undertaken by means there is no further chance of appeal the concerned State. The State that is or revision and both the Philippines adversely affected, therefore, may only and China are legally bound by it, secure compliance through persuasion alike the orders passed by the ITLOS, and diplomatic goodwill. Given the the ICJ, or arbitral tribunals under increasing geopolitical rivalry in the Annexure VII or VIII. Additionally, Indo-Pacific region, this translates into a Article 33 of Annexure VI and Article potential for a paralysis of the UNCLOS 11 of Annexure VII also reiterate that mechanisms. the order of ITLOS and the arbitral Tribunal constituted under Annexure Amending the UNCLOS to VII are final and binding on the parties. incorporate an enforcement mechanism

177 may be solution. The Convention either through convening a conference permits such amendments through a (Regular Procedure), or through formal procedure enumerated in Articles 312- written communication (Simplified 316 of Part XVII (Final Provisions). Procedure), as indicated in flow-chart Such an amendment could be adopted below (Fig. 1).

Figure 2 - Flow Chart: Procedure to adopt an amendment (UNCLOS Articles 312 and 313)

178 The Geopolitical Dimension It seems as if the Chinese are saying “don’t impose Western-based laws upon Despite being an active participant in the China… as ancient Asian civilizations, UNCLOS III (Third United Nations China (and also India) did have Conference on the Law of the Sea, flourishing maritime economic and 1973-82) negotiations and a State party cultural linkages within the Indo-Pacific to the UNCLOS, 1982, China declined region, which would not have been to conform to its compulsory dispute possible without existence of a robust resolution mechanism (UNCLOS, maritime law… the ancient mariners Part XV), citing the declaration that of Asia were neither killing each other it made to the effect in August 2006. at sea, nor were their merchant ships While allowing for such declarations, colliding”. A dispassionate view holds UNCLOS provides its State-parties the such an argument to be substantially latitude to choose what is best suited to robust. their respective conditions and interests. However, such leeway ought not be Nonetheless, this argument — used by a State party to absolve itself and China’s assertion of geopolitical of its treaty obligations in entirety. For power to further it — is indeed a risky instance, by asserting its ‘historic claim’ proposition for the Indo-Pacific, and also within the “nine-dash line” without an for the wider international community. established State practice as provided for It is unhelpful to meet the objectives of in UNCLOS, Beijing is clearly reneging the contemporary concept of ‘Free and on its treaty obligations. China’s legal Open Indo-Pacific’ — as an essential position is being supported by its prerequisite for regional prosperity — geopolitical (including geo-economic) that which was originally conceived in power, which is diluting the objectivity 2006 in India, and articulated by the of international law. Japanese Prime Minister in the Indian Parliament in August 2007. Ostensibly, like its oft-articulated ‘dissatisfaction’ with the Western-based During his address at the Shangri global order, China seeks to shun the La Dialogue held at Singapore in June UNCLOS that is based on ancient 2018, the Indian Prime Minister Sh. Roman and Nordic maritime laws. Narendra Modi said,

179 “India’s vision for the Indo-Pacific on “Compulsory Procedures Entailing Region is…a positive one. And, it Binding Decisions”) to institute has many elements… We believe that our common prosperity and security international arbitration against India at require us to evolve, through dialogue, the PCA, India willingly involved itself a common rules-based order for the in the arbitral proceedings. Later, in July region…. These rules and norms 2014, notwithstanding a PCA judgement should be based on the consent of all, not on the power of the few. This must that was adverse to India, New Delhi be based on faith in dialogue, and not gracefully accepted the Tribunal’s award. dependence on force. It also means Such national policy approach is also in that when nations make international commitments, they must uphold them. consonance with Prime Minister Modi’s This is the foundation of India’s faith vision of Security and Growth for All in multilateralism and regionalism; in the Region (abbreviated as SAGAR, and, of our principled commitment to meaning ‘Ocean’ in Hindi language), rule of law. which was enunciated in Mauritius This implies that the divergences in March 2015. The vision stands for in the interpretation of international collective economic development and law in the maritime domain, if any, security of the regional countries. It is would need to be reconciled through premised on the realization that India a consensual approach, and solutions can achieve prosperity only if its regional found within the existing overarching neighbours also prosper, which is best legal framework, as represented by the represented by the aphorism “a rising UNCLOS. tide lifts all boats”.

This goes beyond a mere ‘sermon’ A couple of years before the and is a case of ‘practicing what you resolution of the India-Bangladesh preach’. No matter which political party maritime dispute, in 2012, Myanmar forms the central government in New also settled its maritime boundary with Delhi, as a satiated and status quo power, Bangladesh through referral to the India has stood by the established ITLOS. The other countries of the Indo- international legal order almost as a Pacific are also increasingly resorting to fundamental tenet of its foreign policy. international arbitration to resolve their In October 2009, when Bangladesh outstanding maritime disputes amicably, invoked UNCLOS (Part XV, Section 2 and in accordance with the UNCLOS.

180 For instance, in August 2014, Kenya though the Japanese Prime Minister referred its maritime boundary dispute articulated it in August 2007 in the with Somalia to the ICJ. More recently Indian Parliament. in 2017, pursuant to a UN General On the other extreme, the “Indo- Assembly resolution, the ICJ was Pacific…Indo-Pacific… Indo-Pacific…” approached to resolve the dispute articulation of the US President Donald between Mauritius and the UK over Trump during his Asia Tour in November the status of the Chagos Archipelago. In 2017, and its temporal coincidence none of these cases has any involved party with the launching of the Quadrilateral rejected the jurisdiction of the concerned Security Dialogue (QSD) has led to court. China’s non-participation in the polarizing the Indo-Pacific region, with Philippines-China PCA case, therefore, the region presently facing the adverse stands out starkly as an aberration in the consequences in terms of being forced emerging geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific to choose sides. region. This deleterious consequence needs The Way Ahead to be neutralized though exerting Ever since the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept was persuasive and dissuasive pressures renewed in 2006-07 to respond to the upon China in a graduated manner. contemporary reality of emerging the In this regard, among other measures, security linkage between the two oceans, international legal regimes like UNCLOS China has been the centre-piece of the could be very helpful. Even though ‘Indo-Pacific’ idea. Accordingly, the Beijing has been dismissive of the PCA most appropriate regional geopolitical arbitration instituted by the Philippines, response to China should have been the arbitral proceedings and its verdict one of asserting nuanced and graduated have constructively served to exert persuasive and dissuasive pressures upon substantial geopolitical pressures upon China. However, the governments of China. If the other ASEAN countries the Indo-Pacific countries could not that have maritime disputes with China comprehend this, much less implement in the SCS were also to seek recourse to it. India’s own apex leadership never international arbitration against China, fathomed the import of the Indo- the weight of such pressures could be Pacific’ concept until June 2018, even increased substantially.

181 The ‘power’ that China is using as Procedures Entailing Binding Decisions” its ‘primary weapon’ to challenge the are made enforceable through the UN established tenets of international law Security Council, alike those taken by is also a source of its vulnerability. The the ICJ. more powerful a nation is, the more is its Concurrently, the countries of need to preserve its image and standing in the Indo-Pacific region may need to the international community. For China undertake deliberations at multilateral specifically — which places much value fora, so as to evolve a common upon ‘face’ owing to historic and cultural interpretation of UNCLOS with factors — going against the collective regard to freedom of navigation, such will of the international community as in terms of the innocent passage of is accompanied by substantially high foreign warships in the Territorial Sea, costs in terms of its regional and global and foreign military activities in the influence. China is thus likely to Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This realise, sooner or later, that the current will prevent a scenario wherein China transaction is not ‘cost-effective’. begins exploiting the ‘fault-lines’ among Meanwhile, efforts need to be the Indo-Pacific countries in terms made at the global level to amend the of the existing divergences in their UNCLOS under its inherent proviso interpretations of international law. (UNCLOS Articles 312 and 313), such that the decisions awarded under the

UNCLOS provision of “Compulsory 28 December 2018

182 South East Asia

India and Indonesia: Converging Maritime Interests in the Confluence of the Oceans

Surbhi Moudgil*

As the ‘rise’ of Asia gathers momentum, maritime resurgence for his country the geopolitical interplay amongst the through his ‘Global Maritime Fulcrum’ regional powers is likely to become (GMF) vision, which finds resonance more vigorous. India and Indonesia are with India’s AEP. Towards this end, amongst these powers whose interface is the collaborative efforts of the two likely to be guided by strong convergent countries—being major powers and interests due to a variety of reasons. First, stakeholders in the region—can be with the concept of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ mutually reinforcing. gaining traction leading to a changing Third, given that India and Indonesia geopolitical landscape in Asia, both are immediate maritime neighbours with countries are now required to formulate contiguous maritime zones, they can appropriate geo-strategies so as cut out a collaborate to forge a strong partnership major role for themselves in the region. in the domain of maritime safety and security. This can translate into major Second, since coming to power opportunities for the two countries to in their respective countries in 2014, meet their respective national objectives the apex political leaders of India through a collaborative approach. and Indonesia have enunciated their visions. While Prime Minister Modi This issue brief examines the has enunciated his revitalized Act East opportunities and challenges for India Policy (AEP) to give thrust to India’s and Indonesia to optimize the potential geopolitical approach towards Southeast of maritime cooperation between the Asia and beyond, President Jokiwi has two countries. Such cooperation is articulated Indonesia’s desire to achieve considered necessary for the fulfilment

185 of the geopolitical objectives of the two per cent of India’s seaborne merchandise countries in the Indo-Pacific region, trade transited the Malacca Strait and specifically in terms of their respective the South China Sea (SCS) (Figure 1). interests pertaining to geo-economics, This makes the key waterways like the maritime security, and a favourable Malacca Strait highly strategic trade regional order. routes, not only for India, but also for the countries of Southeast Asia and East Geo-economics Asia. Consequently, India’s major geo- India has trade relations with various economic interests lie in the safety of East Asian and South East Asian shipping, and the security of the ISLs economies, and also has established leading to SCS and beyond. comprehensive economic cooperation agreements (CEPA) with Japan, South With its increasing sea trade Korea, and ASEAN. In 2016, about 30.6 dependence on the Malacca Strait,

Figure 1 : India and Indonesia: Converging Sea-born Trade Flows

186 Figure 2.Entry of International Shipping Lanes (ISL) into the South China Sea Source: CSIS China Power Project

India’s maritime security interests are India seeks to accord high priority to its expanding in the region. However, relations with Indonesia. However, there maritime threats like collisions, are other reasons as well. For instance, the groundings, and piracy/armed robberies SCS is considered Indonesia’s backyard, at sea can disrupt trade in the Malacca wherein a benign maritime environment Strait, the Sunda, the Lombok, and is becoming increasingly important the Ombai-Wetar straits, as shown in for India’s growing sea-trade with its Figure 2. With the growing reliance on extended eastern neighbourhood. the Malacca Strait for the flow of goods, Conversely, Indonesia also has major geo-economics is increasingly gaining economic interests in the Indian Ocean prominence in India’s geostrategic Region (IOR), which plays a vital role calculus in the Indo-Pacific region. This in Indonesia’s comprehensive national is the primary reason why India has been development. Notably, about 40 per looking to contribute to security in the cent (approximately US$ 11.67 billion) Malacca Strait, including in partnership of Indonesia’s total foreign investment is with Indonesia which has a crucial role sourced from IOR countries. In 2016, in the security of the Strait. Accordingly, the trade between Indonesia and the

187 other IOR countries was about US$ 89.8 Maritime Security billion. Indonesia’s increasing interest in The Indo-Pacific region is confronted the IOR is evident from the country’s with both traditional and non- proactive role as the chair of the Indian traditional maritime security challenges. Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and The traditional challenges include conducting the seminal IORA Concord sovereignty issues, maritime disputes, and during the Jakarta Summit on 7 March contradicting positions on international 2017. norms, to name a few. These challenges Further, Indonesia’s growing are significant, considering that they interest in the Indian Ocean can also be can threaten Indonesia’s interests in the substantiated from the statement made region, and any unnecessary escalation by President Joko Widodo, which stated due to muscle flexing by countries that the future of the world economy involved in SCS disputes can cause lies in the Indian Ocean, and Indonesia major insecurities for the country. wants to integrate its “global maritime In this regard, India and Indonesia’s axis” program with shipping lines. apprehensions over China’s disregard for This is best exemplified by the IORA international law and established norms Business Summit held in Jakarta on 6 of conduct lead to converging security March 2017, which sought to boost concerns. These concerns are enhanced economic cooperation between IORA by the fact that both India and Indonesia members. The increasing importance have disputes with China with regard of Indian Ocean in Indonesia’s foreign to territory and maritime sovereignty, policy would increasingly prompt respectively. Jakarta to look towards New Delhi, Both India and Indonesia may since Indonesia’s Indian Ocean outlook have reasons to be circumspect of cannot be complete without its China’s increasing naval presence in the engagement with India. Hence, it is not IOR. Under the pretext of anti-piracy surprising that Indonesian scholars have operations, the Chinese deployment of been writing about developing a ‘Look submarines in the IOR has raised the West’ policy in consonance with India’s possibility of China’s increasing military ‘Act East’ policy. assertiveness in the Indian Ocean in

188 the coming years, akin to that in the countries have also enhanced their SCS. In the recent past, both countries defence and security cooperation in the have stood firm against Chinese region by implementing initiatives, like pressure: for example, India refusing the India and Indonesia Coordinated to back off in the Doklam standoff, Patrol (CORPAT). The latest was the and Indonesia renaming a part of its 29th CORPAT conducted in May Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) lying 2017. India and Indonesia will also need within the Chinese-claimed ‘Nine Dash to synergise their approaches at regional line’ to “North Natuna Sea”, as shown fora like the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ below in Figure 3. India and Indonesia Meeting (ADMM-Plus) that addresses have taken a rather bold stance which shared security challenges. deserves credit, and sets an example for Favourable Regional Order other regional countries who seek to moderate China’s assertiveness in order India and Indonesia share a history of to maintain peace and stability in the bilateral cooperation due to similitude Indo-Pacific region. Additionally, both in their ethnicities and cultures.

Figure 3: Location of the North Natuna Sea Source: Straits Times Graphics

189 However, today, the challenge for both While the two countries aim to maintain countries is to rediscover and reshape peace, progress, and prosperity in the their partnership in the post-Cold War region, they also strive to develop a multi- globalized world order. The most urgent polar Asia to augment relations with diplomatic foreign policy task before regional countries. Consequently, both the two countries is to identify their India and Indonesia needs to enhance converging geopolitical concerns arising their geostrategic interfaces with other from the evolving balance of power in key countries the Indo-Pacific region, the Indo-Pacific region—specifically, the including under the ambit of regional behaviour of China as a rising power in multilateral forums such as the ASEAN the region. One of the most prominent Regional Forum, the Indian Ocean Rim converging geopolitical interests are Association (IORA), and the Indian the freedom of navigation and over- Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), to flight based on established international name a few. These avenues increase the laws and norms of conduct. This was capabilities of the two countries to play a clearly indicated in the December 2016 positive role towards shaping a regional Joint Statement made during President balance of power which is favourable to Jokowi’s visit to India, wherein he and them. Prime Minister Modi reiterated their Further, to convert the converging commitment to respecting the freedom geopolitical interests of India and of navigation and over-flight, and Indonesia into substantive cooperation, unimpeded lawful commerce based on it is necessary to engage with each other the principles of international law, as at all levels. The level of interaction reflected notably in the UNCLOS. between the two countries ought to The two countries have stated their increase by facilitating growing people- interests in augmenting closer relations to-people interaction through tourism during past ministerial visits. However, which is flourishing between the two they need to substantiate them by countries. Nonetheless, even as more implementation. Thus, for a realization than 183,558 Indians have visited of converging visions, the two countries Indonesia in the period between January need to achieve more substantive and May 2017, all flights make it cooperation that goes beyond symbolism. necessary to transit through Singapore,

190 Bangkok, or Kuala Lumpur. In such Sumatra Island. Furthermore, while the a case, even if there is a facility of visa current Indonesian President has visited on arrival, it has hitherto not served India, his Indian counterpart is yet to the purpose completely. Therefore, the make a visit. exchange of ideas and culture between the two countries is restricted due to However, it is undeniable that constraints of time. India and Indonesia recognise the importance of each other in their The two countries also have limited respective neighbourhoods. The issue bilateral articulation. Under its AEP, of concern is the slow pace of them India has laid more emphasis on relations developing their converging geopolitical with its land neighbours rather than complementarities. India and Indonesia maritime neighbours. Likewise, under are projected to be the leading economies its Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF), of Asia in the future, and there are Indonesia is yet to identify India as a hardly any reservations regarding major strategic partner in the region. their collaborative ability to shape the It has been three years since President geopolitical landscape of the Indo- Jokowi announced Indonesia’s grand Pacific. The two countries geographically maritime vision GMF. Indonesia is yet lie at the heart of Indo-Pacific region, to undertake more proactive initiatives with strong historical linkages across the to strengthen its strategic relations with maritime medium. However, giving due India, which could begin by its support diligence to advancing the momentum to Indian initiatives of Security and of the cooperation is required. When Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR), all is said and done, the two countries the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor have interests in each other’s backyard. (AAGC), and Project Mausam. While assisting each other in the region and by trusting their partnership, both Moreover, Indonesia’s efforts to reach countries can achieve a more substantial out to India to promote culture, trade, and investment ties has been limited to engagement. New Delhi, rather than also to other parts Conclusion of India, especially to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, which are only about Amidst the promise that the Indo- 90 nautical miles away from Indonesia’s Pacific concept ushers in prosperity

191 and well-being, India, and Indonesia multilateral institutions. The increasing are attempting to meet their similar politico-military assertiveness of China overarching national objectives by in the entire Indo-Pacific swath will sharing close geo-economic dependence possibly be the most defining common in each other’s backyards. This needs to factor in the India-Indonesia equation be given due cognisance by the policy in the coming years and decades. establishments of the two immediate While the re-invigoration of the maritime neighbours which share relations between India and Indonesia contiguous maritime zones, and have is still tentative, its immense potential common economic stakes in the region. is clearly visible. It, therefore, becomes To fructify the immense economic rather exigent for the two countries opportunities that have come to the fore, to synergize their respective maritime both India and Indonesia need a stable visions to achieve their shared visions and conducive maritime environment, of maritime resurgence in the Indo- which flows,inter alia, from a favourable Pacific region in the 21st century. It is balance of power in the Indo-Pacific not difficult to conceive the moment in region. Towards this end, notable strides the future when the two countries will have been taken by the two countries. regard each other as ‘strategic partners’. However, defence and security Given the dynamics displayed by the cooperation needs to be strengthened new apex national leaderships, it would further. Also, India and Indonesia would be unfortunate if the Indo-Pacific region need to synergise their outreach to other is made to ‘wait and watch’. regional countries, including through 17 July 2017

* Surbhi Moudgil was a Research Associate at the National Maritime Foundation (NMF), New Delhi. The views expressed here are her own, and do not reflect the official policy or position of the NMF. She can be reached at [email protected]

192 India and Myanmar: Prospects of Maritime Reciprocity

Adarsh Vijay*

Myanmar occupies a critical position as India and Myanmar, which adjoins far as India’s geopolitical intentions in the strategically significant Andaman the Bay of Bengal (BoB) are concerned. and Nicobar Islands in the Bay of On 06 September 2017, the two Bengal, necessitates intensive maritime countries inked agreements on maritime cooperation, including military to security and cooperation, including one military relations, among the two on information-sharing with regard to nations. Nevertheless, the rising trends white shipping. New Delhi expects to in this direction make more sense when enhance its geopolitical leverage in the they are viewed in consonance with BoB, particularly in view of the manner New Delhi’s flagship “Act East Policy”, in which the regional maritime template its “Neighbourhood First Policy”, and, of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is the Chinese presence in the region. being redefined through the ubiquitous China’s interests in the IOR, especially in presence of extra-regional maritime Myanmar, are being viewed as challenges players. What does India seek to to Indian ambitions. achieve through this emerging maritime The prevailing bilateral cooperation narrative? Are New Delhi’s ambitions zeroes in on maritime issues ranging purely security-centric? If not, is India from regular port calls by the Indian triggering geopolitical rivalry in the Navy to ports in Myanmar to the region? supply of naval hardware. Since 2013, India’s maritime cooperation with the Indian Navy and Myanmar Navy Myanmar has been a significant one in have been engaged in coordinated the IOR. The International Maritime patrols along the IMBL. This series Boundary Line (IMBL) between of bilateral naval patrols has the slightly

193 clunky appellation, “Indo-Myanmar with the Association of South East Coordinated Patrol” (IMCOP). Asian Nations (ASEAN). Proximity to Bilateral maritime cooperation is in ASEAN states, particularly Myanmar, evidence even outside of the patrol- which is the only Southeast Asian state series. For instance, Naypyidaw sent a which shares both land and maritime ship to participate in the Indian Navy’s boundaries with India, is crucial for International Fleet Review, 2016. A sustaining the strategic edge enjoyed Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), by New Delhi. too, has been signed (in February 2016) between the two navies. In the past, The nature of maritime cooperation, New Delhi has provided sonars and however, goes beyond a security- sonar domes, ‘BN-2 Defender’ (a.k.a. oriented dimension. India’s maritime ‘Islander’) medium-range maritime engagement of Myanmar also reflects surveillance aircraft, directing gear, an economy-driven approach. In deck-based air-defence systems, and, the past, India’s image as a regional naval-gun boats, to Naypyidaw. In hegemon has invited scepticism from its March 2017, Indian Navy had agreed neighbourhood. New Delhi’s immediate to establish meteorological facilities and neighbours were almost invariably wary provide training for the Myanmar Navy. of the former’s intentions. India’s role The two countries had also cleared as a net security provider in the region, a deal, worth US $37.9 million, for therefore, remains a challenged one. the supply of lightweight torpedoes to Extra-regional players such as the USA Myanmar earlier this year. The two most (with its stated “Rebalance to Asia” recent Memoranda of Understanding policy), and China, which ideates on (MoUs) — signed in September, 2017 an Asian security mechanism, seek to — primarily focus on intensifying impose a security architecture that is maritime security cooperation, and, the likely to undermine New Delhi’s role sharing of ‘white shipping’ information. in the Indian Ocean. Considering the Adding to this, a technical agreement apprehensions of her neighbourhood, on a coastal surveillance system was India appears to be moving on the right also signed. The cooperation is also, track by capitalising upon economic according to some sources, said to help and diplomatic options as the foremost complement the defence cooperation priority.

194 The proposed ‘Bangladesh, (IWT) constituent, which extends up China, India and Myanmar Economic to 158 km along the Kaladan River Corridor’ (BCIM-EC) and the ‘Bay from Sittwe to Paletwa. The proposed of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral navigational channel is expected to Technical and Economic Cooperation’ enhance the connectivity and bilateral (BIMSTEC), which are the two major trade between the two countries. The sub-regional organisations in the region, transhipment terminal at Paletwa is offer a platform for both, the Indian and connected to Zorinpui, on the Indo- the Myanmar establishments, to redefine Myanmar border, by a 110 km highway, and prioritise their areas of cooperation, which is further complemented by a and create a trans-regional market 100-km long road-network that joins comprising South Asia and Southeast up with the National Highway-54 at Asia. BCIM’s expected capitalisation Lawngtlai, in Mizoram. This project upon the ‘three Ts’ (Trade, Transport also includes the option of a 539 km and Tourism) has an inescapable and shipping-lane between the ports of important maritime facet. A shared Kolkata and Sittwe. The initiative, vision, incorporating the creation of which was conceptualised through a maritime infrastructure, and harnessing ‘Framework Agreement’ in 2008, and the benefits of a ‘Blue’ economy, also covers a ‘Special Economic Zone’ underscores the potential value of (SEZ) is progressing well. Hence, these ‘three Ts’. These initiatives would the goals of regional connectivity and definitely help minimise the potential engagement, which are important facets of politico-economic instability in the of New Delhi’s “Neighbourhood First” BCIM sub-region. policy, are steadily being realised. The present pace of Indian endeavours India is keen on the early completion promises to keep its neighbourhood of a US $484 million Kaladan Multi- intact. Nonetheless, the project also Modal Transit Transport System on the brings a number of dilemmas in its western coast of Myanmar, which acts wake. Most importantly, the location of as a trade and logistics-link between the the project is largely in the conflict-torn state of Mizoram in India’s Northeast Rakhine state, within the Arakan region and Myanmar. The project focuses on of Myanmar. The insurgency resulting an integrated Inland Water Transport from the ongoing ethnic-cleansing and

195 the exodus of Rohingya Muslims means of security-cooperation, by unearthing that the security outlay for the project the alternatives in counter-strategies, will be much higher than might have particularly, on the maritime front. otherwise been the case. The port-related IUU fishing, too, is a major nature of the programme provides room cause of degradation of the maritime for the naval forces of the both countries environment and the deterioration of the in decision-making, in order to balance economies of the BoB littorals. Drawing the security equations. a requisite contour at the bilateral level The containment of maritime in order to strengthen the maritime law crime is another area where India and enforcement is a need of the hour. A Myanmar find convergence. The IOR joint strategy would be an add-on to the continues to be a hub of drug trafficking, greater schema in stopping unhealthy Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported ocean practices and in reviving the (IUU) fishing, and arms smuggling. ocean to a point of stability. The serious The North-East (NE) of India has depletion of fish in the BoB contributes descended into a volatile and vulnerable to a significant imbalance in livelihood continuum of Low-Intensity Conflicts. and hence degrades the security of all of Myanmar has invariably been a point the Bay’s constituent littoral States. The of transit for these drug traffickers and continuing menace of illegal fishing, arms smugglers, who then feed into the especially by foreign trawlers from insurgency-intensive economy of the NE, Taiwan, calls for better coordination from the ‘Golden Triangle’. Political and among BoB littorals. economic destabilisation within India’s It would be unwise for India to NE is directly proportional to instability underestimate the galloping interests in Myanmar. Therefore, given the of China in Myanmar even within desired regional security architecture, a structures such as the BCIM, which are stable Myanmar, as also its borderlands, designed to promote shared interests. is imperative for both New Delhi and Apparently, New Delhi is constantly Naypyidaw. Both neighbours can jointly exploring options to deter the Chinese address these common threats and work in what New Delhi considers to be its towards greater coordination in terms of own backwater. The Act East Policy information-sharing and higher degrees helps in the generation of investment

196 in non-military and diplomatic capital own naval bases on its East coast as also with which New Delhi seeks to outweigh in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, China in terms of strategic balance in where India’s only tri-service command SE Asia. On the other hand, Chinese is headquartered. If India wishes to investments, particularly in the deep-sea counter this, it needs to tilt Naypyidaw’s port at Kyaukpyu, in Myanmar, are of disposition in favour of New Delhi. great geopolitical significance, in that it The China factor also drives Indian is an important component of the much- endeavours that seek to broadening vaunted Maritime Silk Road (MSR). cooperation with countries such as China’s decision to invest in Kyaukpyu Japan, which shares New Delhi’s interests is viewed as a part of a larger picture in in a stable Myanmar fee from undue terms of Beijing’s effort to resolve the Chinese influence. Averting Chinese ‘Malacca Dilemma’. threats in the IOR requires the adoption and sustenance of a neighbour-friendly Finally, Beijing’s port-led approach by the Indian establishment, development initiatives in Myanmar on both, the military and economic may also result in enhanced Chinese fronts. The fact that the maritime naval presence in that country, especially domain offers the greatest potential in over the long run. Such an event would this regard bears little elaboration. bring the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) much closer to India’s 13 February 2018

* Adarsh Vijay is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the Madras Christian College, Chennai. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the NMF. He can be reached at [email protected]

197 25 Years of India - ASEAN Economic Cooperation

Anjelina Patrick*

In 2017, ASEAN and India War. Yet, India in the 1970s was seen celebrated their silver jubilee. ASEAN tilted towards the Soviet Union. The and India have evolved enormously period also saw the slow drift of ASEAN since early 1992 when India joined the countries. regional organization and launched its Nonetheless, the 1990s saw the “Look East Policy”. The policy was later growing friendship between ASEAN and named as “Act East Policy” showcasing India with bilateral ties in the economic the importance of the ASEAN arena. Later in 1992, India became the countries to the new Modi government. sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN. In The change came when the Indian 1995, India was invited to become its policymaker witnessed the economic full dialogue partner in the fifth ASEAN potential and strategic significance the summit in Bangkok. India also became region possessed. Therefore, the Act Eat the member of the ASEAN Regional Policy was the apt push of the Indian Forum (ARF) in 1996 and since 2002 government to strengthen the existing has been engaged in holding summit- relation. level meetings on an annual basis. India Historical Evolution also joined the East Asian Summit (EAS) in 2005. Soon after India’s independence in 1947, India supported the Non-Aligned ASEAN is currently India’s fourth Movement, an organisation of the states largest trading partner, accounting for that did not seek to formally align 10.2 percent of India’s total trade. India, themselves with either the United States on the other hand, is ASEAN’s seventh or the Soviet Union during the Cold largest trading partner.

198 Building India-ASEAN Relation the ASEAN region. The Bilateral trade has increased from USD 4.3 billion in Thailand at present is the second largest 2005- 20016 to USD 15.9 billion in economy and the fourth largest trading 2015- 16. partner to India in the ASEAN region. The commercial linkage between India The visit of President Joko Widodo and Thailand consolidating relationships to India in December 2016, with a are visible from their policy perspective, 25-member high-powered business India’s ‘Act East’ and Thailand’s ‘Act delegation is suggestive of the enhancing West”. Trade between both the nations economic relations, especially in in 2016 accounted up to USD 7.72 the sectors of pharmaceuticals and billion, with USD 5.15 billion in Thai information & technology. Similar exports to India and USD 2.57 billion gestures were seen when a group of in Indian exports to Thailand. twenty CEOs met President Jokowi in December 2016 to encourage Indian The fast-growing Indian economy investments in Indonesia. India’s remains an attractive option for the investment in Indonesia amounts to ASEAN countries and vice-versa, USD 343.2 million between 2010 and especially in the sectors of tourism, 2016, while Indonesian investments in infrastructure, and retail industries. India was about USD 20.50 million Since January 201o (signed in August between 2010 and 2016 (September). 2009) the Thai business has benefited At present both the countries seek to tremendously from the tax reduction increase direct trade, creating a win-win under the ASEAN-India FTA in situation. The recent visit by Indian goods. The recent visit of the Indian EAM has boosted the negotiations on External Affair Minister (EAM), Smt. exclusive economic zones and intensified Sushma Swaraj showcases the great cooperation to promote trade facilitation importance Thailand holds with respect and to explore other trade potentials to further enhancing India’s engagement through greater market access. with ASEAN countries. Thailand will assume the role of coordinator country Malaysia and India established for India-ASEAN relations in the its diplomatic relations in 1957, then middle of 2018. Indonesia at present is known as the Federation of Malaya. On the largest trading partner of India in 1st July 2010, India and Malaysia signed

199 comprehensive Economic Cooperation 494 million from India. The potential Agreement (CECA), which came to of both the countries seems to be force in from 1 July 2011. Later in hidden, but with the growing economic September 2014 India also signed the and shared values, it seems to be an Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in services achievable task. and investments with the 10-member India was among the first ASEAN. Malaysia is India’s largest countries to setup diplomatic ties after trading partner in ASEAN and India is the independence of Singapore in the largest trading partner for Malaysia 1965. Both countries have common from among the countries of the South, political and economic interests, with excluding China. Bilateral trade between a significant presence in each other both in 2015 amounted USD 12.02 economies since 1990’s. In 2015 the billion, subsequently USD 13.84 billion CECA with Singapore was the first such in 2014 and USD 13.38 billion in agreement to be signed by India with 2013. Apart from trade, infrastructural any country. It integrates agreements on investment in an area of cooperation, trade in goods and services, investment as India seeks Smart cities which match protection, and economic cooperation with the Malaysian capacities. in fields like education, intellectual The Philippines and India establish- property, and science & technology. ed its diplomatic relations in 1949, It also provides Mutual Recognition soon after both attained independence. Agreements (MRAs) that eliminates The trade agreement between the two duplicative testing and certification was signed in 1979. Until late 1990’s of products in sectors where there are the bilateral trade was slow, but saw a mandatory technical requirements. positive growth after India-ASEAN Singapore is India’s 10th largest trade ties were strengthened. In August 2009 partner globally and 2nd largest in agreement on trade in goods between ASEAN accounting for 25.9 percent of India-ASEAN helped in the increase of India’s overall trade with ASEAN (2013- bilateral trade. At present, the bilateral 14). India was Singapore’s 12th largest trade amounts to USD 1.98 billion, trade partner globally (2014). Bilateral where the exports are approximately trade expanded after the conclusion of USD 1.48 billion and imports USD CECA from USD 6.65 billion in 2004-

200 05 to USD 25.2 billion in 2011-12 but both India and ASEAN will define the declined to USD 19.27 billion in 2013- geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region. In 14. conclusion, the forthcoming ASEAN- India Commemorative Summit which The Common Denominator marks 25 years since the establishment The equations in the global geopolitics of Dialogue Partnership between have changed since the inception of Indian and ASEAN will enhance the regional organisations. The growing economic ties between both. The Chinese presence in the region has 69th Republic Day of India will also compelled India to have stronger ties witness 10 distinguished guests instead with all 10 ASEAN countries. As far as of the customary one, indicating the the ASEAN countries are considered, seriousness of Indian policymakers to it seeks India as a balancing agent enhance the ties. against China. The relation between 06 March 2018

* Anjelina Patrick was a Research Associate at the National Maritime Foundation (NMF), New Delhi. The views expressed here are her own, and do not reflect the official policy or position of the NMF. She can be reached at [email protected]

201 India-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation Prospects

Surbhi Moudgil*

As India looks towards its extended nascent stage, there is potential for them neighbourhood - South East Asia and the to converge in the realm of economic, geopolitical prospects of the Indo-Pacific maritime security, and geopolitics in concept, the Association for South East the region. Further, this can become Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a natural the cornerstone of a free and inclusive partner for engagement. This is so, as Indo-Pacific regional architecture. the India and ASEAN countries share The partnership is seeking to develop land border and contiguous maritime a leadership role to preserve maritime zones. India-ASEAN partnership security in the Indo-Pacific region, has traversed a long distinct path by especially considering the uncertainties appreciating similitudes of ethnicity, of United States’ policy for the region. culture, history, and economy. The However, in the existing scenario, the celebrations of 25 years of partnership challenge for India-ASEAN partnership in 2017, only exemplify the magnitude is to identify their converging of their achievements. India’s Look geostrategic concerns arising from the East Policy (LEP) enunciated by the evolving balance of power in the Indo- then Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in 1992 and now rechristened Act East Pacific region specifically under the Policy (AEP) propounded by Prime cloud of Chinese assertiveness. Minister Narendra Modi in 2014, only Geo-economics displays India’s continuous endeavours to strengthen geopolitical relation with Discourse on India-ASEAN geo- ASEAN countries. economic furtherance requires no Though the relations between India special emphasis in light of the evolving and ASEAN is considered to be at a narrative of the shift to the “Asian

202 Century”. India has trade relations with and beyond. Thus, India-ASEAN needs South East Asian economies, and also has to accord high priority and uphold each Comprehensive Economic Cooperation other’s geo-economic interests within Agreements (CEPA) with ASEAN the evolving geostrategic calculus of the countries, enunciated as the ASEAN Indo-Pacific region. –India Free Trade Area (AIFTA). Since Maritime Connectivity 2005-06 to 2015-16 India’s sea-born merchandise trade with ASEAN has a Connectivity is the new “Great Game” positive trajectory. According to The and the promotion of maritime Associated Chambers of Commerce connectivity between India and ASEAN and Industry of India (ASSOCHAM), is one of the priority areas envisaged by the exports to ASEAN have increased the multilateral partnership. BothIndia since 2005-06 to 2015-16 from US $ and ASEAN are littoral states with rich 10.41 billion to US $ 25.20 billion and history of maritime trade. It is important imports over the same period quadrupled to revive and reinvegorate those ancient from US $ 10.81 billion to US $ 39.84 links in a contemporary set-up. The billion. Additionally, the ASSOCHAM revival and reinvigorated ancient links report states that India’s total imports is argued to be the driving force of from ASEAN went up from 7.3 percent Asia’s maritime resurgence. Improving in 2005-2006 to 10.5 percent in 2015- connectivity is therefore essential for 16. the region’s prosperity, continued growth, and reliability. India-ASEAN In the India-ASEAN geo-economic connectivity has the potential to become paradigm, Malacca Strait is considered the main driver for lower trade costs, a key maritime chokepoint. In other increased industrial transport, enhanced words, the Straits of Malacca and trade and investments, developed Singapore are considered to be a production technology, and platform strategic trade route for India and for for vast opportunities deepening the the countries of Southeast Asia. As a regional integration process. result, India and ASEAN geo-economic interests lie in the safety and security of Some of the important features of the International Shipping Lanes (ISLs) India-ASEAN maritime connectivity traversing the South China Sea (SCS) architecture include –first, India has

203 committed to put into action the re-calibrating their relationship in Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity the complexity of contemporary (MPAC) promulgated by the ASEAN international politics remains the main Connectivity Coordinating Committee challenge in realising the full potential of (ACCC) in October 2010. Second, India’s the otherwise promising convergence. To vision of Security and Growth for All in address this challenge and pave the way the Region (SAGAR) aims at connecting for a greater transformative cooperation, Indian ports (SAGARMALA) to India and ASEAN has to jointly work transnational docks for greater benefits on strengthening diplomatic relations to all in the region. For instance, the to become a significant actor in the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) evolving balance of power dynamics in and Project Mausam can collectively the Indo-Pacific region. facilitate cruise tourism between India India-ASEAN geopolitical con- and ASEAN. vergence assumes great significance Enhanced ASEAN–India connecti- in the context of China’s ability to vity will not only help realise the develop strong geostrategic assertion in potentials of the multilateral cooperation the Indo-Pacific region. While China but also will eliminate constrictions is aggressively asserting itself in SCS, and bottlenecks to development. the United States, besides considering Though shipping is considered to be India and ASEAN countries as “allies the mainstay of ASEAN-India trade, and partners” believes that a strong without a strong maritime connectivity India-ASEAN convergence can act as devoid of constrictions and bottlenecks; the linchpin in the evolving dynamics optimum utilisation of regional free of Indo-Pacific. US’s beliefs of India trade and cooperation agreements will being an important actor in the politics be rendered useless. of Indo-Pacific can be substantiated from the December 2017 US - National Geopolitics Security Strategy (NSS), which states In the constantly shifting dynamics the US’s realisation of India’s emergence of Indo-Pacific, the reinvigoration of as a global power and an important India-ASEAN relationship has a direct strategic and defence partner. The NSS implication on the region. However, has also significance in understanding

204 US’s views on the importance of tandem with the idea of ushering major players in the context of Indo- progress and prosperity in the region. Pacific, considering it seeks to increase Accordingly, endorsing maritime quadrilateral cooperation with Japan, cooperation prospects in their Australia, and India. Seriousness of the contiguous maritime zones needs to US in striving for balance of power in be given due cognizance by the Indo-Pacific can be highlighted from the policy makers. first senior officials’ level quadrilateral As India-ASEAN relations are meeting in Manila on November 2017 reinvigorating, its immense potential in the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit. to advance their geopolitical power in However, to convert the converging the region is clearly visible. India’s apex geopolitical interests of India-ASEAN level leaderships interface with ASEAN into substantive cooperation, it is member states has noticeably augmented necessary to engage with each other in the last three years and it is to be seen at all levels. Thus, for a realisation of if it fructifies at India’s 69th Republic converging visions, the partnership needs Day where all 10 ASEAN leaders to achieve more substantive cooperation are invited as the chief guests. India- that goes beyond symbolism. While ASEAN partnership has convergences India and ASEAN aim to maintain that can become the basis for a more peace, progress, and prosperity in the reliable cooperation. The Silver Jubilee region, they also have to strive to develop celebration of India-ASEAN relations a multipolar Asia to augment relations will closely align their quest for with regional countries. Consequently, prosperity, stability and security in the both India and ASEAN countries need Indo-Pacific region. to enhance their geopolitical interface However, to utilise the prospects with other key countries in the Indo- of strengthening partnership, ASEAN Pacific region to achieve the desired countries need to believe that India can objectives. be a reliable partner. For this to happen, India needs to project that it has the Conclusion potential to strengthen economic It goes without saying that India- prospects, advancing capabilities, and ASEAN relationship has grown in can be a net security provider to its

205 member states in the Indo-Pacific. It achieve their shared visions of maritime is therefore, rather exigent for the resurgence in the Indo-Pacific region in multilateral partnership to synergize the 21st century. their respective maritime visions to 05 April 2018

* Surbhi Moudgil was a Research Associate at the National Maritime Foundation (NMF), New Del- hi. The views expressed here are her own, and do not reflect the official policy or position of the NMF. She can be reached at [email protected] article was first publishedin Diplomacy & beyond Plus Magazine: Special Report on ASEAN-India: 25 years of Dialogue Partnership, January 2018 at www.diplomacybeyond.com

206 Maritime Cooperation as a Thrust Area between India and Indonesia

Premesha Saha*

The upcoming visit of Indian Prime ship tourism, and, coastal shipping Minister, Mr Narendra Modi, to between the Andaman &Nicobar Indonesia (later this month), is reflective Islands and Aceh. This was highlighted of the strong desire of both the countries during the recent visit to New Delhi by to work more closely together, in the the Indonesian Coordinating Minister face of the ‘rapidly evolving strategic for Maritime Affairs, Luhut Pandjaitan, realities’ in the Indo-Pacific region, after when he proposed granting India access years of mutual neglect. During this to the island of Sabang, located at the visit, the Prime Minister is expected northern tip of Sumatra and close to the to focus on concluding agreements Strait of Malacca. and boosting cooperation in the fields of defence, security, space, science- This Prime Ministerial visit presents and-technology, connectivity, and the an opportunity for India to showcase promotion of inter-faith dialogues. its full support for Indonesia’s vision There is a good chance that the Defence of being the Global Maritime Fulcrum Cooperation Agreement, which was (GMF). This vision of President Joko signed in 2001, would be renewed. Widodo (Jokowi), seeks to go beyond However, the primary focus and goal of economic development internal to this visit would be the strengthening of Indonesia and the mere enhancing of the maritime cooperation between these connectivity between the islands of the two important Indo-Pacific players. Indonesian archipelago. At a wider India and Indonesia are expected to plane, it seeks to “bring the Indian expand their maritime connectivity, Ocean back into Indonesia’s regional including direct shipping links, cruise- canvas and project Indonesia as a power

207 straddling thousands of islands between Indonesian government is also opening two continents (Asia and Australia) and its doors to foreign investment in the two Oceans (the Indian and Pacific)”. field of shipbuilding. This, too, provides The Indonesian Ocean policy released rich pickings for India, and can easily in 2017 to implement the vision of the be utilised to further meaningful GMF also mentions the need to take into cooperation with its maritime account various other regional initiatives, neighbour. ‘Connectivity’ is yet another such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative significant area of cooperation between (BRI), India’s Act East policy, and the India and the ASEAN that holds out USA’s Rebalance Policy. Indonesia’s very substantial promise. As part of its Ocean Policy articulates the Presidential own ‘Act East’ policy, India is seeking vision of synergising the GMF and opportunities to be a meaningful regional initiatives that are consistent partner in the Masterplan for ASEAN with Indonesia’s national interests, so Connectivity (MPAC). Investing and as to make a positive contribution to cooperating with the ‘Sea Toll Highway’ peace. The question of how India might project of Indonesia will help India to best react to the GMF is a seminal share ‘best practices’ on the one hand, one. The seven pillars of the GMF can and, on the other, to attain greater resonate well with New Delhi’s own connectivity with the ASEAN region as a articulations of India’s maritime vision whole. The linking of the SAGARMALA and, consequently, these pillars of the project, Project MAUSAM, the Spice GMF could and should be used by India Route, SAGAR (Security and Growth to cooperate and show its ‘active support’ for all in the Region) with the GMF for Indonesian maritime endeavour. would make India’s own position in Prime Minister Modi’s impressive and the Indian Ocean Region far stronger visionary formulations, such as SAGAR, than it presently is, and, in addition, SAGARMALA, Project MAUSAM, would provide a much-needed balance revival of the Spice Route and the Cotton against China’s BRI. Apart from this, Route, etc., can be readily linked to the India could also cooperate in the Indonesian pillars concerning the revival GMF’s pillars of maritime diplomacy of maritime culture, the development and the strengthening the Indonesian of maritime infrastructure, and the defence forces, especially the Navy. connectivity sought by the GMF. The The forthcoming Prime Ministerial

208 visit should be leveraged to catalyse in two hydropower projects, one power discussions on information-sharing in plant and a steel smelter (these contracts the maritime domain, so as to counter were signed during the recent visit of both non-traditional and traditional Chinese Premier Le Keqiang to Jakarta). security-threats, and, to increase navy- However, Indonesia seems reluctant to-navy cooperation. to accept Chinese proposals for the development of strategic ports under Indonesia’s earlier ‘inward-looking’ the ‘Sea Toll Highway’ plan of President defence orientation and thinking are Jokowi. Offering India access and now undergoing a change, wherein it is opportunity to invest in the development keeping a close eye on developments in of the port of Sabang shows Indonesia’s the Indian Ocean as well as in the Western ‘trust’ in India. India can and should Pacific, specifically the South China Sea. use this ‘trust card’ to its advantage and This may be seen in Indonesia’s altered should actively plan to invest in the stand against China’s assertions whereby development of other Indonesian ports Jakarta is actively voicing its concern as well, such as Malahayati in Aceh,a over China’s growing encroachment in major source of Indonesian exports to and around Indonesia’s Natuna islands. India, Teluk Bayur, Padang in Western Importantly for India, Indonesia is one Sumatra; Belawan, Dumai, Perawang of the few countries in Southeast Asia and Kuala Tanjung in North Sumatra, that has wholeheartedly embraced the and, ports in southern Java. These are concept of the Indo-Pacific. To balance islands that border the Indian Ocean China’s rise, Indonesia is likely to turn and are located astride four of the to India, especially given the strong chokepoints of the Indian Ocean. historical and cultural ties that bind the two nations together. Of course, it is Greater engagement with a country also true that Indonesia did participate such as Indonesia, which is acknowledged in the Chinese flagship BRI Summit as having played a ‘leadership role’ and proposed projects worth $28 within the ASEAN for the past several billion. Thus far, China has, through the years, and which actively seeks a greater BRI, made investments in the Jakarta- presence of ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific, Bandung High Speed Railway project, will greatly help India improve its own and has signed contracts for investing position and standing in ASEAN. This

209 will, in turn, help in the promotion and through New Delhi’s Act East policy. further strengthening of India’s Act East Indonesia and India both enjoy strategic policy. Beijing has long been using the locations that make them players that tools of ‘diplomacy and investment’ ‘one cannot ignore’ in the Indo-Pacific in South Asia to great advantage. It is region. now time for India to diplomatically and economically engage much more 26 May 2018 intensively with countries like Indonesia,

* Premesha Sahawas Associate Fellow at the NMF, New Delhi. The views expressed here are her own, and do not reflect the official policy or position of the NMF. She can be reached atpremesha@gmail. com

210 India and Indonesia: Strengthening Maritime Relations

Sahima Gupta*

India and Indonesia are maritime jointly by both nations the strengthening neighbours with a symbiotic relationship of their relationship is considered which can be utilised towards developing important for regional peace, stability, maritime cooperation in the region. economic growth, and prosperity. The distance between India’s Andaman Islands and Indonesia’s Aceh is not more This understanding and the than 80 nautical miles. Additionally, realization of the requirement for the fact that the Indian naval ships have strengthening the relations between the 1 been making visits to Indonesian ports two countries led to the adoption of the and have coordinated sea patrols for ‘Shared Vision on Maritime Cooperation many years, just shows that the existing in the Indo-Pacific Region’ on 30th May relations are already stable. 2018, during the visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Jakarta.1 As a maritime nation, India with a coastline of 7,516 km is in a pivotal The main highlight of the visit was position in the Indian Ocean Region the agreement to develop the Port of (IOR) overlooking the Sea Lines of Sabang in the Aceh Province, 104 nm Communication (SLOCs) that connect from Indira Point (the southernmost Asia to Africa, Europe, and in some point of India), and 376 nm from cases the east coast of the Americas. In Port Blair. The prospects of future comparison, Indonesia with a coastline constructive engagement were further of 108,000 km overlooks the Straits of highlighted when President Joko Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda, which Widodo stated that, “India is a strategic connect the Indian and Pacific Oceans. defense partner...and we will continue to Given the geographic advantage accrued advance our cooperation in developing

211 infrastructure, including at Sabang vision for the Indo-Pacific document, Island and the Andaman Islands.”2 specifically both nations believe in “free, open, transparent, rules-based, peaceful, For India, the strengthening of the prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific relation with its maritime neighbour is region, where sovereignty and territorial beneficial in several ways. Firstly, it would integrity, international law, in particular, result in port infrastructure development; UNCLOS, freedom of navigation and Secondly, aid the concept of Freedom of overflight, sustainable development Navigation (FoN); Thirdly, strengthen and an open, free, fair and mutually interoperability while ensuring regional beneficial trade and investment system security and; Fourthly, greatly aid are respected.”2 The document also talks economic development in the Bay of about the importance of Blue Economy Bengal. for both the countries as it can help In order to have a healthy and in their sustainable development and productive engagement between growth. both the nations it is necessary to There have also been talks find convergence area. In the case of about enhancing the existing naval India and Indonesia the convergence cooperation, which presently comprises factor can be provided by two policies; of Coordinated Patrols and the SAGAR (Security and Growth for All institutionalized bilateral naval exercises. in the Region) under India’s Act East However, there is one existent grey area Policy and Indonesia’s Global Maritime relating to the delimitation of maritime Fulcrum (GMF). While GMF serves to boundaries in the EEZ, the resolution improve the inter-island connectivity of which would further cement the and also ensure greater participation of relationship. Indonesia in the strategic environment of the Indo-Pacific, Prime Minister In 1947, there was an agreement Modi’s flagship project SAGAR works between both the nations demarcating towards enhancing India’s engagement the continental shelf between Great with her maritime neighbours. Nicobar Island and Sumatra (see map 1).3 Thirty years later in 1977, the revised Another convergence aspect that treaty decided to extend the continental merits attention is found in the shared shelf to the Andaman Sea and the Indian

212 Ocean. In terms of economic rights, on the continental shelf, a State has the right just over the non-living resources and activities such as installing structures and drilling.4

Until this juncture the agreements were clear without any issue. However, things changed after the introduction of the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) by the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which gave states special rights regarding the exploration and use of marine resources. As per UNCLOS Article 56 in the EEZ the coastal state has, “sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural Map 1: Continental shelf boundary between resources, whether living or non-living, India and Indonesia based on 1974 and 1977 of the waters superjacent to the seabed agreements. Source: Google Maps and of the seabed and its subsoil, and over the rights, and secondly to keep with regard to other activities for the in the spirit of UNCLOS and thus economic exploitation and exploration maintain respect for a rules-based order of the zone, such as the production of in the region. energy from the water, currents and winds (United Nations Convention on The two countries are yet to settle the Law of the Sea, 1982). Even after the EEZ boundary demarcation. Given the introduction of EEZ, the agreement that this issue is still not resolved, the between India and Indonesia remained fish resources in the extension (from unchanged, which provided rights only the Continental Shelf line) belong to over non-living resources and not living Indonesia, while oil and gas resources resources. This issue needs to be resolved and the sedentary species such as to firstly avoid any future differences sea cucumber (which constitute the

213 Continental Shelf resources) belong to the Continental Shelf (CLCS). Also, if India. the distance between two countries is less than 400 nm, then the boundary Recently Jakarta showed interest (for the continental shelf and EEZ) is in signing an agreement which would decided by bilateral negotiations. delimit the EEZ. In an interview with The Wire on 30 May 2018 the For India and Indonesia, the Indira Director General for Legal Affairs and Point in Andaman and Nicobar Island International Treaties, Indonesia, Damos and Banda Aceh in Indonesia have a D. Agusman said that “We agreed to an distance of just 80 nm. agreement on the continental shelf in 1974. At that time, EEZ did not yet The issue of delimitation needs exist. After UNCLOS, EEZ was born, to be well debated and discussed; and and we need to delimit it.”5 In order to will therefore take time. A cogent and resolve this issue, both the nations have pragmatic approach in the spirit of commenced bilateral talks and have also UNCLOS will not only help set an held meetings. example of respect for and adherence to international law, but also strengthen The inclusion of living resources was relations between these two maritime not the only issue that was raised after neighbours. This strengthening of the introduction of EEZ. UNCLOS relations could also aid stability and limits the distance between the balance of power in the maritime Continental shelf and EEZ to 200 nm. expanse of the Indo-Pacific region. However, the continental shelf can be extended (to 350 nm) after submission to the Commission on the Limits of 28 June 2018

* Sahima Gupta is an undergraduate student at the OP Jindal global University. The views expressed are her own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the India Navy, the NMF or the Government of India. She can be reached at [email protected]

214 Geopolitics

Trump’s Trade War: A New Threat to the ‘Quad’

Rajesh Soami*

The spillover of India’s determination to After the victory of Donald Trump counter US trade threats could endanger in the US elections last year, India has nascent security dialogues in the Indo- also become wary of new direction in Pacific. US policy on Asia. Trump’s overtures to China and his outwardly show of The idea of the Quadrilateral friendship with its president Xi-Jinping Security Dialogue or Quad, as it is often on social media has not gone unnoticed called, was mooted by Japanese premier in New Delhi. China has militarized the Shinzo Abe in 2007. The officials of South China Sea under the watchful eyes the four countries in Abe’s proposal - of the US Navy. Xi Jinping himself has India, US, Australia and Japan, met in changed the constitution to become the Manila the same year. However the lifetime leader of the communist state. Australian government withdrew from Neither of these actions has significantly the arrangement in 2008. Indians were affected Trump`s policy towards China. particularly miffed by this decision and have not forgotten it even after a decade. In contrast, Trump publicly mocked Consequently, they have repeatedly Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi blocked Australian requests to join naval twice in February. In his first speech exercises with the other three countries. to the Congress after taking office last Indian experts argue that internal debate year, President Trump had criticized the in Australia regarding its relations 100 percent import duty India levied on with China do not inspire sufficient American motorcycles. To placate him, confidence in Canberra`s commitment Indian government reduced the import to the Quad. duty on motorcycles twice. This did not

217 have any effect as Trump continued to After liberalization in 1991, Indian criticise Indian trade “practices”. economy has been growing at a fast pace. The elite in Delhi hope that The US administration has also continued rapid economic growth put pressure on India on other issues. will deliver Indian population from For instance, the curtailing of US visas centuries of misery. Trump`s trade war to Indian professionals threatens the rhetoric and economic pressure on India $150 billion IT sector business in India. is a hindrance to this policy. Initially, Washington has already imposed tariff the Indian government believed that US on steel and aluminum imports. In the measures were aimed at China. After- strategic field,U S government’s CAATSA all, apart from being a geopolitical act seeks to punish India for its defense competitor, China also has a very large ties with Russia. To the bewilderment trade surplus with the US. To get some of Delhi, the US administration has relief from Washington’s pressure, the been more accommodating of Chinese Indian government asked the US, not to interests. President Trump is personally equate India with China but to no avail. monitoring the issue of Chinese Recently, India seems to have given company ZTE which had been put out up on Trump-led America. It has of business due to US sanctions. He threatened to impose retaliatory tariffs has acted to help the company get back on twenty American imports into the in business in US. China is also free to country. Even more importantly, Indian arm itself with its humongous defence prime minister Modi has met both the spending. Chinese and the Russian presidents in To be fair to the US administration, quick succession. The summits were India is not the only ally suffering under unplanned and initiated by India. Trump`s America-first policy. South Although, Moscow and Delhi maintain Korea, Europe and Japan are also under that Putin invited the Indian PM to pressure. But unlike other economies, Sochi, the meeting itself was preceded India is a relatively poor country. Among by two visits by Indian NSA (National the four participants of the Quad, India Security Advisor) and other ministers has the lowest per capita income. Up of the cabinet. It is more practical to to 22% of population continues to live think that the idea of informal summit under the poverty line in the country. was proposed by the Indian side. With

218 respect to China, it was clear from the lead to larger Indian disenchantment start that Indian government had asked with USA. If Trump wins another term, for the meeting. the differences could gain permanence. The India-proposed informal summits Like the US, India also has a large suggest that Delhi may already be trade deficit with China. India wants hedging its bets in this regard. to reduce this deficit and had repeatedly requested the Chinese government to India is a major constituent of the remove trade barriers hindering Indian Quad. Australia and Japan were already imports into the country, without much tied into security arrangements with success. Barely days after the summit in USA. It was the Indian entry into the Wuhan, China removed its restrictions US-led security structure which led to on import of Indian pharmaceutical hopes of a larger democratic security products into the country. Almost in arrangement in the region. Moreover, it similar fashion, it has been announced is also the only country in the Quad to days after the summit in Sochi that have a land border with China. India and Russia will hold their first Relations between India and the ever strategic economic dialogue in July US have improved tremendously in in St Petersburg. While Russia and the last two decades. Both sides also India have shared good relations since regularly state their commitment to the cold war, it was the “long-term and maintaining this upward trajectory. strategic dialogue” with China, as put by However, Trump`s policies are clearly the government of India, that surprised affecting these ties. India still has many everyone. reasons to remain engaged with the US. The simultaneous downturn in However, Delhi’s outreach to Russia Delhi`s relations with Washington and China suggests that it may freeze its and improvement in relations with march into the US camp. This would other powers could prove ominous negatively affect the Quad. When for the Quad. Although, the new Australia withdrew in 2008, it took a developments have largely been confined decade to restart the process. Any new to the economic sphere till now, it is Indian reticence now could prove to be anybody`s guess how and when it could an even bigger challenge.

219 Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely arc of stability and prosperity” along that India, a poor country, would the outer rim of the Eurasian region. want to shoulder the Quad when The prosperity aspect of the security under pressure from the US on trade arrangement is now under threat from issues and amid continued Australian Trump`s trade war. It makes the “Quad” wavering. When president Abe initially less attractive in New Delhi. discussed the grouping of India, Japan, 11 July 2018 US and Australia, he mentioned “an

220 An Opening for India in the Maldives

Rajesh Soami*

The results of the Maldivian elections, well with New Delhi. Somewhat to held on 23rd September, have surprised India’s bewilderment, Yameen went a many, particularly in India. The step further and even invited senior authoritarian tendencies of President Pakistani military officials to Male. Yameen and news emanating from India barely tolerated his regime when Male thus far had suggested that the he jailed members of the parliament Maldivian strongman may not be and judges of the Supreme Court, last willing to step down, the results of the year. In fact, hawks in the Indian elections notwithstanding. It was the security establishment demanded general perception that Yameen would that the Indian government militarily attempt to manipulate the elections intervene in the country to effect a to ensure his victory. The manner in regime-change. Former Prime Minister which he has since conceded defeat to Mohamed Nasheed, too, had requested the joint opposition candidate, Ibrahim India to intervene. Mohamed Solih, has, of course, come as Fortunately, cooler heads prevailed in a big relief to New Delhi. Nevertheless, New Delhi and India successfully waited it is important for India to ensure that out the Yameen regime rather than its palpable feeling of satisfaction at the going in for a unilateral intervention, results of these elections do not lead to which would certainly have attracted complacency. internationally controversy. All this For the larger part of President notwithstanding, work for the Indian Abdulla Yameen’s rule, Maldives foreign office has just begun. The new maintained an uneasy relationship government in Malé does not owe with India. Yameen’s actions in anything to India and would probably courting China did not go down gravitate toward whichever power gives

221 it the ‘best bang for its buck’. In fact, Bridge (popularly known as the China- it is fair to state that it was not Yameen Maldives Friendship Bridge) that who initiated his country’s cosying links the islands of Malé and Hulhulé. up to China, but erstwhile President Chinese tourists constitute the single Mohamed Nasheed. Nasheed, who was largest number of foreign visitors to the the first democratically elected president country. Tourism is the largest industry in of the country, actively encouraged the Maldives and provides the country with opening of the Chinese embassy in Malé 60% of its foreign exchange earnings. in 2011 itself. With such heavy investment and close economic linkages, it is difficult to see One could reasonably conclude that any easy options for Malé should it seek Maldives, as a nation, will now commence to extricate itself from China’s grasp. afresh, the process of choosing a partner. Although, Yameen may well have made Yameen’s opponents have accused it far too obvious that he preferred him of selling out the country to Beijing. China to India, the game is once again This may not be entirely incorrect. The on, now that there is a new dispensation Chinese have loaned heavy sums to many in power. China may hold an economic countries with no or little clarity on how advantage, but India is geographically the money is to be returned. This has closer to this Indian Ocean archipelagic frequently been done under the ambit State. New Delhi will need to play its of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), cards dexterously, if it is to recover the which was unveiled in 2013. Often, the influence it enjoyed for many decades recipient States have been those ruled in Malé, but which it lost during the by authoritarian strongmen in desperate years of the Yameen incumbency. This need of easy funds to showcase their is easier said than done. development credentials. The Chinese have invested heavily In many respects, Maldives offers in large projects in Maldives. They an example that is eerily similar to that are currently expanding the Velana of another neighbour of India in the International Airport on the island Indian Ocean, which, too, had invited of Hulhulé, and building a 25-story Chinese investment and sought to build apartment complex and a hospital. closer ties with Beijing. In Colombo, Earlier this year, the government President Mahinda Rajapaksa had inaugurated the $300 million Sinamalé turned Sri Lankan government’s policies

222 towards China. He gave large projects statements whereby Beijing has advised to Chinese companies, only to saddle smaller countries of South Asia to work his country with a debt burden that it together with India. However, India could not bear. The present Sirisena cannot count merely on the goodwill government, although considered close of the Chinese establishment. It also to India, has found it increasingly difficult needs to work on its neighbourhood to extricate itself from the policies of the at the bilateral level to ensure it is not previous government. Consequentially, left out in the cold at a later date. it has been forced to cede control over The transition of power in Malé has a portion of its territory (Hambantota presented India with an opportunity to port) to the Chinese. re-energise ties with Maldives. Many The insidious encroachment of analysts contend that the election itself China into what New Delhi considers was fought on pro-India and pro-China to be its backyard has been worrying planks, with Solih representing the pro- India for quite some time now. Chinese India faction. That may not be entirely influence has been visibly increasing accurate and Indian delight may yet in Nepal, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and be premature. Solih has stated in the Pakistan. More importantly, the past that Maldives, under his rule, will acquisition of strategic ports, roads and continue to maintain friendly ties with territory around India has caused some China. More importantly, the tiny degree of alarm in South Block. At nation is in debt to Beijing to the tune of the macro level, Indian Prime Minister $1.3 billion, which the new government Modi has engaged with President Xi will have to pay. In all probability, Jinping to ensure that the two Asian therefore, China will continue to giants do not compete to each other’s maintain a strong influence over Malé. detriment. The Wuhan summit has However, that should not dissuade enabled India and China to come to India from proactively, meaningfully what the MEA has termed a ’long-term and substantively engaging the new and strategic understanding‘. This is also government. borne out by Chinese foreign policy 27 September 2018

223 Should India Bail Out Debt-Ridden Maldives?

Rajesh Soami*

Maldives has borrowed heavily from attend the inauguration ceremony of China in the last five years putting it at the incoming President. serious risk of debt distress. Now Male The new government in Male is has sought support from India to tide considered to be friendly to India. It has over its financial problems. The Foreign been making the right noises regarding the Minister of Maldives Abdulla Shahid relationship between the two countries. along with the Finance Minister Ibrahim In a symbolic gesture for instance, the Ameer and the Minister for Economic new government stated that it will retain Development Fayyaz Ismail visited the two helicopters gifted by India in New Delhi for a two-day trip on 26th 2013 which the previous government November 2018 and met officials of the had wanted to return. The Ibrahim Indian government to seek assistance. Solih government has also criticised This came in the backdrop of the China for what it claims is the execution recent transition of power in Maldives. of infrastructure projects in Maldives The government of Abdulla Yameen, at inflated prices. Notwithstanding the which had an undulating relationship recent developments, the larger question with India, has given way to the new for India is whether it should support dispensation led by President Ibrahim the new government in Male financially Solih. Solih is related to the former and if yes, to what extent? President Mohamed Nasheed through family ties and is also a close friend of Ever since the democratic transition the latter. The Prime Minister of India, in 2008, India has been anxious over Narendra Modi, made it a point to developments in Maldives and for a good

224 reason. For almost half a century, India gives Beijing a clout that India is had uncontested political influence in finding difficult to match. The Chinese the small atolls that constitute Maldives. government is investing massively in In the last decade though, the political infrastructure development projects leaders in the country have been looking under the ambit of the Belt and Road to diversify their relationship to other Initiative (BRI), which is the flagship powers. This was not a problem for project of Chinese President Xi Jinping. India so long as New Delhi ranked first The cash-strapped countries of South in priority in Male. However, the inroads Asia and IOR are happy to board the that China has made into Maldives in ‘gravy train’ offered by Beijing. There is the last couple of years started to ring no way that India can match the largesse alarm bells in the corridors of power in being offered by China. Besides, the Delhi. larger buying capacity of the Chinese Maldives is strategically located as it citizenry is also beginning to wield its straddles major international shipping own influence. This is true particularly in lanes. Any loss of Indian influence in the tourism sector which is the mainstay the country could cause long-term of the Maldivian economy. deterioration of its security situation China sends the largest number in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). A of tourists to Maldives. Depending on section in the Indian strategic community the season, tourists from China now sees the country as having already been constitute up to 16 to 30 percent of surrounded by the Pakistan-China quasi- the international tourist arrivals in the alliance on its northern and western country. This helps Male earn vital foreign land borders. Giving up influence in currency, needed for importing other the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and essential items. The massive jump in the allowing China to gain a foothold would number of Chinese tourists has taken complete the encirclement of India. place largely due to the commencement This is a strict red line for Delhi and it is of flights between China and Male. If therefore pushing back now. Beijing were to discourage these flights However, this is easier said than and/or their tourists from visiting the done. The size of the Chinese economy island state, it would cause immense is almost six times that of India. It damage to the country’s economy. There

225 is a precedent to this. When Turkey shot These factors must be accounted down a Russian plane in 2015, Moscow for when India decides whether or not retaliated by stopping chartered flights it wants to bail out the debt-ridden between the two countries. The impact Maldives. If Delhi decides to lend a on the Turkish tourism industry forced helping hand, it needs to analyse the the government to reconcile with extent to which it may be willing to get Russia. drawn into the Maldivian quagmire. If the aim is to pushback China and Among other issues, the situation in Maldives remains volatile. Politically, reduce its influence in Male, this might the country is divided. Abdullah Yameen be a difficult goal to achieve. Beijing and his pro-China policies continue to has more arrows in its quiver, based receive support from a large section of on its larger economic profile. We the Maldivian population. Therefore, need to remember that China is now any assumption that the political wind the largest trading partner of more in Male will continue to favour India in than 120 countries in the world today. the future may be premature. The recent India cannot simply buy away Chinese ominous developments in Sri Lanka, influence everywhere. Moreover, a whose economic situation Maldives pay cheque to retain influence in one now mirrors, are a lesson. Besides, neighbouring country could open Maldives has moved in a conservative the floodgates with other countries direction with religion playing a major expecting similar handouts. This simply role in politics. As a matter of fact, cannot be a viable or sustainable policy Maldives has contributed the largest for a developing country with its own number of fighters to ISIS (Islamic State needs. of Iraq and Syria) on a per capita basis, Moreover, the political situation with anywhere between 200 to 400 Maldivians joining the dreaded terrorist in Maldives has not stabilised as yet. organization. The narrative of a small While it may be true that India now Islamic island country being pushed has a relatively friendlier dispensation in around by big India has been used on Male, it would be premature to assume social media and in hushed tones in that this will continue to remain so. A the political circles by those opposed to change in government could see another New Delhi. U-turn in Male’s foreign policy. The

226 historically close ties between the two alleviate the problems being faced by nations must be thought of as a thing of Maldives. The security of the shipping past. All new democratic governments lanes in IOR is as important for other in the country are likely to weigh their members of the Quad as it is for India. options internally before choosing one. Besides, the financial aid to Maldives must be provided in accordance with India must make itself indispensable the principles of the International to Male if it wants to retain its influence Monetary Fund (IMF). A review of the in the country. This must be done by economic situation of the country by Investing in infrastructure development an expert panel must be carried out and in the country the way China is doing. recommendations given. A path must But that is not all. The investments must also be decided by which Maldives would be screened by different stakeholders pay back the support it receives. A blank of the country to ensure that political cheque is the sure-shot way to ensure changes do not have an impact on these continued bad practices and return for projects. The lesson from the GMR more aid in future. India must think of a fiasco of 2012 must be learnt. long-term solution to the issues at hand As far as the immediate needs of rather than act in an insecure manner the Maldivian economy are concerned, just because the Chinese are knocking India must call upon all international on the doors in IOR. stakeholders to help Male. India must seek the support of Quad states 29 November 2018 (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) to

227 The Karachi Attack: Looking Beneath the Surface

Maitreyee Shilpa Kishor*

The attack on the Chinese consulate in strength and capabilities. It took place Karachi on 23rd November 2018 that left in one of the upscale localities of Karachi seven dead and several injured. It was an – the heart of financial and commercial incident that sent shockwaves through activity in Pakistan. The BLA has always out the South Asian region. Perpetrated been vocal in its critique of the CPEC, by the Balochistan Republican Army since it sees the project as an excuse (BLA), a militant separatist group to marginalise the Baloch people on demanding a separate Baloch state, this their own land, while plundering their was by far one of the most audacious resources. The earlier attacks by this attacks in recent times and was intended group have also been aimed at derailing to increase the visibility of the Baloch the progress of CPEC including the cause on the global stage. However, it also attack on Chinese workers in Balochistan exposes a contradiction in the narrative in August 2018. Attacking the Chinese of the China-Pakistan Economic embassy further reinforces this stance, Corridor (CPEC) being a secure and and can be seen as an attempt to weaken sustainable joint endeavour of the two Pakistan’s relations with its close ally, states. It demonstrates the failure of China. Pakistan’s military approach towards Statements by Chinese officials the Balochistan problem. This attack calling the bilateral relationship “higher has a significance that goes beyond such than (the) mountains and deeper than manifestation of the problem. (the) sea,” and transcending mere talks, The target was chosen to be of high have been aimed at demonstrating that symbolic value, and the attack amply the China-Pakistan alliance remains showcased the militant organisation’s strong. But these can be seen as attempts

228 to paper over deep cracks that both A large part of the problems facing China and Pakistan are refusing to CPEC stem from the grievances of the acknowledge. This approach has only Baloch. Their feelings of alienation led to a worsening of the problem as it from the Punjabi-dominated federal festers under the veneer of normalcy. government have led them to oppose the development projects in Balochistan CPEC, a large part of which passes for the fear of being marginalised. through Balochistan, and the Gwadar Some of these groups have chosen to port is of immense geo-strategic adopt violent tactics, and the attack on importance for China. CPEC will the Chinese Consulate indicates that a provide it direct access to the Indian strategy involving military repression Ocean, and connect its western provinces is unlikely to succeed. Past attempts to Gwadar Port. However, this plan may at military suppression of movements not be as successful and sustainable between 1973 and 1978, and the as the two states claim it to be. The increased presence of military and constant security threats posed by Baloch paramilitary units since 2004 have failed militant groups is slowing down the pace to end the violence. Violent separatist of the work significantly. In addition, groups have managed to successfully Pakistan’s external debt of over US$ 91 regroup each time by temporarily fleeing billion and an estimated government Pakistan using cross-border networks debt to GDP ratio of 72.8 per cent adds that spill into Iran’s Sistan-Baluchestan to the crisis. Funds for various projects province and southern Afghanistan. under CPEC have been slashed, while Some militant groups, with connections others have been delayed until funds to Baloch groups in Iran, remain active become available. Furthermore, the today and continue to bog down Pakistani Railways police has stated the Pakistani forces in Balochistan. that “completion of CPEC projects is Meanwhile, the issues of economic contingent upon recruitment of 5,000 disparity, under-representation in the policemen”, which underlines the extent federal structure, sharing of revenues of insecurities involving the CPEC. This from natural resources and dismal approach of relying heavily upon the human development indicators persist. military, paramilitary and police forces to guard infrastructure projects is not This attack calls for a re-evaluation only costly, but also impractical. of Pakistan’s Balochistan-Policy and

229 the Chinese role. Instead of trying to statements on the matter, as a suppress the symptoms that manifest as stakeholder in the region, India too armed attacks on civilians and on CPEC benefits from a lasting peace there. It has infrastructure, the Pakistani state should committed to invest nearly $8 billion focus on addressing the legitimate in the port and industries at Chabahar grievances of the Baloch. Adopting an located in Iran’s Sistan and Baluchestan inclusive development strategy that province. Since the interconnections does not rely on denying resources to between Baloch groups in Iran and Balochistan for the benefit of Punjab and Pakistan are increasing, a conflagration Sind would go a long way in restoring the in Pakistan would spill-over into Iran confidence of the Baloch people in the and Afghanistan, threatening India’s Pakistani state. China is ideally placed investments. to help, though its approach is unclear. Being Pakistan’s major economic partner Given the complicated relations and having a high stake in ensuring the between China, India, Pakistan and timely completion of CPEC, it stands Iran, the Balochistan issue – that has the to gain substantially from a lasting potential to impact all these players – peace in Balochistan. The temporary is of high import. As investment pours suspension of funding by China for into this region, the stakes are rising, road projects which are a part of CPEC and ignoring the root causes of Baloch shows its dissatisfaction with the state of dissatisfaction will not be constructive. affairs. Despite the attempts by China Betting on the military solution to to ensure positive press for the projects, the Baloch unrest and hoping for a the frequent attacks on Chinese citizens reconciliation may be an invitation to the have become a clear cause for concern. failures of the past to repeat themselves. Although India has generally chosen to stay away from the conflict in Balochistan, with very few official 30 Nov 2018

* Maitreyee Shilpa Kishor is a Junior Research Fellow at the National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi. The views expressed are her own, and do not reflect the official policy or the NMF. She can be reached at [email protected]

230 India again fails in the UN to Condemn Terrorism: A Relapse into an Old Disease

Rajesh Soami*

In an imprudent move, India abstained joint statements with other countries from a United Nations resolution as far as possible. Moreover, Delhi’s brought to the General Assembly by relations with both Israel and the United United States of America on 6 December States have improved markedly in recent 2017. The harmless resolution years. This makes the Indian abstention condemned Hamas for firing rockets even more bizarre. into Israel which endangered the lives Israel’s ambassador to the United of civilians. It called for the cessation of Nations was forthright on why countries provocative and violent activities by all ought to support the resolution. He militant groups including Islamic Jihad. stated “You can’t sit on the fence. It also demanded “full respect by all Tomorrow there will be a terrorist parties for international human rights attack and you will come to the UN law and international humanitarian law, to seek a condemnation. No country is including in regard to the protection of immune.” For some unknown reason, the civilian population”. the powers that be in the South Block The entire text of the resolution failed to comprehend this simple logic. did not have a single word which India An unprecedented number of countries could possibly have disagreed with. It including the entire EU supported the was clearly directed at violent terrorist resolution but India was conspicuous by activities targeting civilians. New Delhi its absence. itself has been expending significant Resolutions condemning Israel, diplomatic energy on convincing other in contrast, are regularly passed at the countries to the dangers of terrorism. General Assembly. The Islamic bloc It ensures that terrorism is criticized in votes en masse to ensure this. New

231 Delhi has also often supported these has moved its embassy to Jerusalem and resolutions in the past. India, which did terminated the nuclear deal with Iran. At not even recognize the state of Israel till the same time, it has also made efforts to 1992, has since moved to balance its cater to India’s sensitivities. When India hitherto pro-Arab policies. Currently, bought the S-400 missile systems from New Delhi enjoys a healthy relationship Russia, the US made its displeasure with the Jewish state. However, this is known but refused to slap sanctions. It not reflected in its diplomatic moves. has also granted time-bound waiver to In its zeal to maintain some imagined India after the recent re-imposition of neutrality in Israel-Palestine relations, sanctions on Iran. More importantly, India continues to either vote against the Trump administration has shown Tel-Aviv or abstains from voting at all in extra sensitivity to India’s energy the UN General Assembly. requirements. In July 2017, Prime Minister Modi It is common knowledge that had visited Israel, becoming the first Indian economic growth is inversely Indian PM to do so. He along with the proportional to the cost of oil on the Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu had international market. Recently, when then condemned all forms of terrorism. the Iran sanctions started to bite and oil The Indian foreign secretary had said crossed $80 a barrel, economic experts “the Israeli position is really very in New Delhi began to sweat. United similar to ours, which is that there are States stated that it didn’t want “friend” no justifications for act softer on any India’s economy to be negatively affected grounds whatsoever.” The failure of India by these sanctions and was therefore to support unequivocal condemnation exploring alternative sources of supply of terrorist activities against Israel is to it. The United States has since leaned in stark contrast to this policy. On heavily on Saudi Arabia as well as the floor of the General Assembly, the increased its own production of oil to government of India seemed unaware bring down the price to $60. of either of the countries’ positions on In contrast, Indian government’s terror. actions have been anything but friendly. Not only this, the Trump Last December, it had voted against administration in Washington DC has the US move to shift its embassy from made extra efforts to support Israel. It Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. While one could

232 understand India opposing the change Last year, India and Israel had in status quo in West Asia, the current agreed that “the fight against terrorism abstention is bewildering. The main won’t work if it is very segmented and argument against the resolution was translated into narrow agendas”. Now that it would move the focus away from the Modi government has done just unilateral Israeli actions in West Asia. that. It has shot itself in the foot by This is similar to the argument given failing to condemn terrorism against by Pakistan when it opposes the Indian Israel. By doing so, it may have partially focus on cross-border terrorism instead legitimized terrorism against India of the so called “territorial dispute” of itself. A more foolish act could not be Kashmir. Moreover, why should the imagined, if one tried. US support Delhi against the terrorist Neither pragmatic geopolitics nor organizations in Pakistan, like Lashkar- any ethical reason makes sense of the e-Toiba, which specifically target India, Indian decision to abstain. The Ministry if India cannot do the same in West of External Affairs and Prime Minister’s Asia? Office need to pay more attention to taking the right diplomatic step on the India has been sitting on the fence floor of the General Assembly. Although for way too long and on way too many the UN resolutions are not binding, they issues. The timidity shown in this have sufficient political value not to be particular instance reminds one of the taken lightly. India should know better days when Delhi kept seeking security as it has been trying to deflect attention in the imaginary benefits of non- from the UN resolutions on Kashmir alignment, ever mindful of its weak since 1950s. Moreover, India may end economy, difficult security situation up alienating well-wishers and friends and poor populace. Modi’s pitch for a if it continues to let historical inertia strong India sounds rather hollow if the negate recent foreign policy activism government cannot even bring itself up and advantages the country has accrued to condemn terrorism against civilians from it. in unequivocal terms. 10 December 2018

**Rajesh Soami is an Associate Fellow at the National Maritime Foundation. The views expressed here are his own, and do not reflect the official policy or position of the NMF. He can be reached at [email protected] or [email protected]

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