Public Governance and Tunneling: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in China Guowei Xu PhD Candidate Department of Finance Renmin University of China Beijing, China and Department of Accountancy and Law Hong Kong Baptist University Hong Kong, China
[email protected] Wenming Wang Department of Accountancy and Law Hong Kong Baptist University Hong Kong, China
[email protected] Danhua Zhou MBA student Andersen School of Management University of California, Riverside California, U.S.A
[email protected] Gaoguang Zhou Department of Accountancy and Law Hong Kong Baptist University Hong Kong, China
[email protected] This version: 2016 Oct 1 Public Governance and Tunneling: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in China Abstract: In this study, we take advantage of the unprecedented anti-corruption campaign launched in December 2012 to examine the effect of improved public governance on tunneling in China. Using a sample of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange listed companies from 2010 to 2014, we find that the scale of tunneling decreases significantly after the campaign, supporting the notion that increased public governance effectively curbs tunneling. Cross-sectional results show that such effect is more pronounced in firms controlled by private entrepreneurs, in private firms having political connections, in firms audited by non-Big 8 auditors, in firms with large divergence between control right and ownership right, and in firms located in areas with low marketization. Our results highlight the importance of anti-corruption initiatives in improving public governance and in turn reducing expropriation. Our study provides implications for many emerging economies with similar institutional background. Keywords: Anti-corruption, Public governance, Tunneling, China.