UC Berkeley UC Berkeley Previously Published Works
Title A model of direct and intermediated sales
Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8s74d0pf
Journal Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 15(2)
ISSN 1058-6407
Authors Hendershott, T Zhang, J
Publication Date 2006
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California A Model of Direct and Intermediated Sales
TERRENCE HENDERSHOTT Haas School of Business University of California, Berkeley Berkeley, CA 94720-1900 [email protected]
JIE ZHANG College of Business Administration University of Toledo Toledo, OH 43606 [email protected]
We examine a model in which an upstream firm can sell directly online and through heterogeneous intermediaries to heterogeneous consumers engaging in time-consuming search. Direct online sales may be more or less convenient and involve costly returns if the good fits consumers poorly. Direct selling appeals to higher-value consumers and increases the upstream firm’s profits by allowing price discrimination. Competition and segmentation due to direct sales results in lower intermediary prices, making all consumers better off. Thus, entry by an upstream firm increases consumer surplus at the expense of intermediaries with the net result being an increase in social welfare.
Traditionally, services provided by intermediaries, such as managing inventory, breaking bulk shipments, supplying information, market- ing, and coordinating transactions, have been sufficiently difficult for producers that a substantial part of the economy has utilized intermedi- aries.1 Advances in technology now allow producers to cost-effectively perform many tasks that previously required intermediaries. This trend is evident in 68% of consumer goods manufacturers planning on selling online (Forrester, 2000) and manufacturers’ Web sales taking in 15% of the total retail e-commerce revenue (Boston Consulting Group, 2000).
We thank the editor, two anonymous referees, seminar participants at the University of California at Berkeley,the University of Rochester, the 2001 Econometric Society meetings, the 2001 Workshop on Information Systems and Economics, the 2002 Stanford Institute on Theoretical Economics, the 2003 International Industrial Organization Conference, Greg Shaffer, and Miguel Villas-Boas for their helpful comments and suggestions. Hendershott gratefully acknowledges financial support from the National Science Foundation. 1. See Spulber (1996b) for a discussion of intermediation in the economy and Spulber (1999) for models of intermediation and the theory of the firm in a number of settings.