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Launch Services Overview to the Planetary Exploration Decadal Survey Committee

November 17, 2009

Bill Wrobel NASA / SOMD Agenda

• Overview • Manifest • Launch Vehicles • Issues

2 Overview

• NASA’s (LSP) was consolidated at KSC in 1998 – LSP provides acquisition, technical management, mission integration and launch management • NASA utilizes a mixed fleet of vehicles (small, medium & intermediate) with varying levels of performance used to support a mix of mission sizes – Mainly for Science Mission Directorate , but SOMD (TDRS) and other government agencies also use NASA launch services – Launches conducted from multiple ranges; CCAFS, VAFB, RTS, WFF, and Kodiak • Vehicles are selected from the NASA Launch Services Contract (NLS) – Through competition based on mass, , class of , and best value – Current NLS contract expires in 2010, RFP released to extend the contract • Most recent contract action purchased four intermediate class missions – TDRS – K & L, RBSP and MMS • Important issues – Loss of Medium Class , which has been 50% of NASA missions historically – Compressed manifest – Possibility that NASA incurs a portion of the intermediate class infrastructure costs post 2010

3 Launch Services Program Roles & Responsibilities

• Identify & Aggregate NASA Space Launch Requirements • Provide Launch Services for Other Agencies, Upon Request • Procure Commercially Available Expendable Launch Services to meet Spacecraft mission requirements • Overall Integration • Engineering • Launch Ops • Assure Compliance with Applicable Laws, Regulations & Policy • Collaborate with Other Government Launch Agencies (USAF & NRO) to Seek Areas of Synergy

4 Launch Services Program Relationships

NASANASA HQ HQ Bolden Note: Includes Reimbursable FTEs (15) Griffin

Exploration Science Space Ops ExplorationCooke WeilerScience GerstenmaierSpace Ops Horowitz Cleave Gerstenmaier

Assistant AA for Launch Services Wrobel HQ Safety & Mission HQAssurance Safety & Flight Kennedy Space AssuranceMission Planning Center Board KennedyCenter Director Space Center Center (AA)Director

Safety & Launch(VA) Services (GG) (OP) Engineering(NE) (SA) Spacecraft Chief Financial Procurement Engineering Mission LaunchProgram Services Office Programs & ChiefOfficer Financial Procurement Engineering SafetyAssurance & Mission ProgramFrancois Projects Officer Office Assurance Francois 155 12 15 39 25

Interfaces to other NASA Centers Support Contractor Interface

MSFC MSFC MSFC MSFC SSC Propulsion DiscoveryMSFC & ELVISDiscovery (Analex) & Discovery & Discovery & Support TechnicalNew Frontiers Support New Frontiers New Frontiers New Frontiers 3 Projects 5 ProjectsWYE 236 5 U.S. Space Transportation Policy

• 1988 and 1994 National space policies directed the U.S. Government to use commercially available goods and services to the fullest extent feasible. – Directed agencies to avoid actions that preclude or deter commercial space sector, except when necessary for national security or public safety – Goal was to stimulate private sector investment, ownership, and operation of space assets

• January 6, 2005 policy requires U.S. Government to “capitalize on the entrepreneurial of the U.S. private sector, which offers new approaches and technology innovation in U.S. space transportation, options for enhancing space exploration activities, and opportunities to open new commercial markets” – NASA shall maintain capability to develop, evolve, operate, and purchase services for those space transportation systems, infrastructure, and support activities necessary to meet civil requirements – U.S. Government agencies shall purchase commercially available U.S. space transportation products and services to the maximum extent possible, consistent with mission requirements and applicable law

• Commercial Space Act of 1998 requires purchase of space transportation services as a commercial item

6 NASA Launch Services Manifest

FPB Approved 7/1/09 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Release 10/22/09 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

Small Class (SC) A Pegasus (P) K A NuSTAR (P-XL) *OCO (T) (T) A Taurus (T) 8/15/11 2/24/09 NET 10/1/10 V (F1)

Medium Class (MC) NOAA-N' (D3) 2/6/09 A A A 732X Series (D3) AQUARIUS (D3) V V V NET 9/1/10 WISE (D3) Delta 742X Series (D4) 12/7/09 KEPLER (D) 3/6/09 A A Delta 792X Series (D) A STSS Demo (D) NPP (D) 9/25/09 V 1/16/11 A A Delta 792X H (DH) STSS ATRR (D) GRAIL (DH) V 5/5/09 9/8/11

Falcon 9 (F9)

Intermediate (IC) / Heavy RBSP (AV) MARS SCIENCE 5/31/2012 Class (HC) A A SDO (AV) LAB (AV) LDCM (AV) 2/3/10 NET 12/2012 10/2011 A V (AV) A A TDRS-L (AV) A (AV) A V A 2/23/2013 LRO/LCROSS (AV) 8/5/2011 TDRS-K (AV) MMS (AV) Delta IV (DIV) 6/18/09 4/13/2012 10/15/2014 Delta IV Heavy (IVH)

Falcon 9 (F9) OSC/CRS-1 GOES-P (DIV) (T2/C30) 10/2010 GOES-O (DIV) 10/2011 W LADEE (M) GPM Core LSP ADVISORY ROLE 6/27/09 5/2012 7/2013 SpaceX/CRS-1 OSC/CRS-2 JWST () 1/2012 (T2/C30) 5/2011 (F9) 6/2014 OSC (T2/H) 1/2013 OSC (T2/H) OSC (T2/H) SpaceX-1 (F9) OSC Demo-1 SpaceX (F9) 1/2014 1/2015 NASA COTS/CRS (Info only) 1/2010 3/2011 (TII) 8/2012 (Managed by JSC/C3PO and SpaceX-3 SpaceX (F9) OSC SpaceX (F9) OSC (T2/H) SpaceX (F9) 8/2010 (F9) 7/2014 3/2015 SpaceX-2 SpaceX (F9) 1/2013 7/2013 2/2014 OSC (T2/H) ISSP) SpaceX (T2/H) 6/2010 (F9) NET 8/2011 1/2012 (F9) 7/2015 SpaceX SpaceX (F9) SpaceX SpaceX (F9) SpaceX 5/2013 (F9) 10/2013 6/2014 (F9) 11/2014 7/2015 (F9) GOES-R CY 2015 IRIS V MAVEN GEMS Discovery 12 Vehicle Unassigned NET 12/2012 11/18/2013 NET 4/2014 5/2015 NOTE: SpaceX/COTS missions assigned to Falcon 9; OSC/COTS missions assigned to Taurus II 30 (C30) or HESSI (H).

For NASA Planning Purposes Only Not for Distribution Outside USG UR = UNDER REVIEW Red Fill = Unsuccessfully Launched = SCIENCE I V = VAFB LAUNCH W = WALLOPS LAUNCH A = ATP’d Green Fill = Successfully Launched = SPACE OPERATIONS Gold Fill = COTS/CRS missions approved/in-work = EXPLORATION SYSTEMS = DOD REIMBURSABLE K = KWAJALEIN

Commercially Available Vehicles

Pegasus XL

Delta IV

Launch Services Falcon 1 Available Under NLS

Atlas V Taurus XL

Falcon 9 Delta II H 9 Launch Vehicles

Current Vehicles Emerging Vehicles

Pegasus Taurus

Minotaur SLV-A SLV-B Taurus II

Delta II Delta IV Falcon 1 Falcon 9

11/17/09 10 7 Launch Site Locations & Utilization

Launch Site Locations Available

Virginia Marshall Islands

Air Force Station,

LSP Launch Site Utilization Percentage Breakdown

Air Force Base, California Alaska Kwajalein Kodiak 3% 2%

VAFB 40% CCAFS 55%

Actual Launched: CCAFS = 34 / VAFB = 24 / Kwajalein = 2 / Kodiak = 1 (Reflects mission data from 1998 - Sept 2009) 11/17/09 8 11 Issues Introduction

• NASA missions are launched using a mixed fleet of vehicles selected competitively under NASA’s Launch Services (NLS) contract • Ordering period expires June 2010

• Serious issues face NASA (USG) in all classes of service with costs rising, the end of Delta II and a large number of suppliers for few missions in the small class

• Problems were not created or will not be solved in a short period of time, but is an ongoing problem likely becoming more serious as time moves on without a solution(s)

• True commercial need for launch is nearly non-existent within the US – Mid-1990’s commercial “blip” long since over (see next page) – Most GEO launches (demand is intermediate class or larger) performed overseas – Some US commercial launch of imaging spacecraft due to ITAR, some quid pro quo from foreign entities and the occasional GEO-Comm – Market once owned by the US now performed by foreign services

• If USG does not provide the payloads, there is no need for US launch services – No current or planned significant R&D so “Breakthrough” technology leap to make launch inexpensive and less risky – More significant foreign government investment / sustainment and non-market economies • Ariane, , , Long March, PSLV, etc.

13 Introduction

• As US LV costs rise NASA launches less, as NASA launches less costs rise – fixed budgets plus inflation – Downward spiral that directly affects SMD budget – Supporting more than one provider in any one class may not be feasible due to low flight rates

• US infrastructure and resources continue to decay as a result – ULA well supported but maybe not in the beneficial way, • Has had one reduction in personnel in 2009 already and another is planned • No incentive for ULA to attract commercial customers – Second and third tier suppliers worse off as a result of even lower production • Problems for remaining solid and liquid propulsion, ordnance, and component manufacturers – Aging infrastructure and lack of infrastructure

• Current US providers continue to stride towards lower costs through the use of foreign hardware – exception is SpaceX – Engines, electronic components, tanks, valves, fairings, misc structures, separation systems, – Not clear that SpaceX can remain the low cost provider when they really come on-line

• US does well when it comes to integration and operations – Unprecedented success rate in nearly all classes

14

Small Launch Vehicle Performance Range (Kg) Performance From Payload Planner’s Guides or Company Estimates

120 inch PLF

92 inch PLF 7 3

50 inch PLF 2 0

60 inch 92 inch N O

PLF PLF L O N G E R

O N

C O N T R A C T

Small Class Medium Vehicle Falcon 1 Pegasus I I SIGNIFICANT Taurus XL GAP Athena II Minotaur IV GAP Delta 7320 XL GAP Orbit

600 km 200 (a) 250 ~300 375 900 ~1150 ~1200 NA 1650 90 deg

675 km SS 225 325 750-800 1100 NA 1550

C3=0 NA NA NA NA ~280(kg) ~425(b) NA ~390 7425=750(b)

Perf risk Low-Med Low Med Low Low Med Low Low Low

Avail for Now Now - ~Late CY Now Now ~Late CY ~3rd qtr ~3rd qtr N/A - Science Msn 2014 2014 2011 2011 (c)

(a): Falcon 1e concept with higher performance (~400kg) exists, but is in early development stage (b): Requires additional LV provided stage for high energy missions (c): Significant schedule risk exists for first flight date of any new launch vehicle configuration, therefore actual availability is likely 6 to 18 months after dates noted above. 16 Medium, Intermediate and Heavy Launch Vehicle Performance Range (Kg) Performance From Payload Planner’s Guides or Company Estimates

5m PLF 4m PLF

5m PLF D e

l 4m PLF t a

10 ft PLF I I

7 3 / 7 4 2 5

N O T

O N

C O N T R A C T

Medium Class EELV Class Vehicle Delta II Taurus 2 Delta II 7920/5 Falcon 9 SIGNIFICANT Delta 4040 Atlas V 401 Atlas V 551 Delta IV Heavy (c) Orbit 7320/5 WFF H Block 1 (b) GAP

C3=0 750 (a) 1150 (a) 1400 (a) 2000 2750 3450 6300 9305 62.8 mT(to TLI)

C3=10 650 (a) 950 (a) 1200 (a) 1350 2100 2850 5300 7010

675 km sun sync 1550 Not achievable Not achievable ~6500 6800 7250 13600 20250 ~187.7 mT from WFF from CCAS (to 29 deg incl, 130 nm)

GTO N/A TBS 900 3495 3985 4765 8570 12980

Perf risk Low High Low Med Low Low Low Low Med

Available for N/A ~1st qtr 2014 Now 1st qtr 2013 Now Now Now Now 2nd half CY2019 (d) Science Msn (d) (d)

(a) Requires additional LV supplied upper stage for high energy missions (b) Falcon 9 Block 2 upgrade planned (higher performing) – available ~4th qtr 2013 (c) On hold until conclusion of 17 Augustine Commission (d) Significant schedule risk exists for first flight of any new LV configuration, therefore actual availability is likely 6 -18 mo after dates noted above.

Basic Launch Service Price History for Delta II 7925 from ETR

* 2.84% jump NLS to 19 Pack

2.35% increase 5.00% increase Per year Per year in Under NLS 2.10% increaseNTE Per year Note: MELVS contract had cost growth Under 19 Pack negotiated and tied to inflation

COMMERCIAL MARKET BOOM. COMMERCIAL MARKET GPS FLIES OUT. ANTICIPATION BY BOEING THAT EVAPORATES BUT NLS WAS BID MANIFEST DOWN TO 1-3 MARKET ENVIRONMENT MARKET WOULD CONTINUE TO BEFORE IMPACT WAS NOTICED. PER YEAR. BE GOOD. PRODUCTION OF ECONOMIES OF SCALE FOR 19 COMMERCIAL MARKET 10-12/YEAR PACK RECOVERING 19 US Commercial Missions

X X 12 13

14

16 10

7 18 13 18 N 13 A 10 14

20 Orbital Space Launch Activities 2009 Year To Date (Launch Date based on Universal Time) US ORBITAL SPACE LAUNCHES Rest Of World ORBITAL SPACE LAUNCHES (cont.) Date Launch Vehicle Payload Site Type 18-Jan Delta IV HLV NROL-26 CCAFS MIL Date Launch Vehicle Payload Site Type 6-Feb Delta II (7320) NOAA-N' VAFB CIV 30-Jan -3 Koronas-Foton PKC CIV 24-Feb *Taurus-XL OCO VAFB CIV 10-Feb Soyuz-U Progress-M66 (ISS-32P) BKC CIV 7-Mar Delta II (7925) Kepler CCAFS CIV 11-Feb Proton-M/Briz-M ExpressAM44/ExpressMD1 BKC COM 15-Mar STS-119 Discovery ITS-S6 KSC CIV 28-Feb Proton-K/DM2 Raduga-1 PKC MIL 24-Mar Delta II (7925) GPS IIR-20(M) CCAFS MIL 17-Mar Rockot GOCE PKC CIV 4-Apr Atlas V (421) WGS-2 CCAFS MIL 26-Mar Soyuz-FG TMA-14 (ISS-18S) BKC CIV 5-May Delta II (7920) STSS-ATRR VAFB MIL 3-Apr Proton-M/Briz-M -W2A BKC COM 11-May STS-125 Atlantis HST-SM04 KSC CIV 30-Apr Soyuz-U Kobalt-M (Cosmos 2450) PKC MIL 19-May Minotaur-1 Tacsat-3/Pharmasat-1 et al WFF MIL 7-May Soyuz-U Progress-M-02M (ISS-33P) BKC CIV 18-Jun Atlas V (401) LRO / LCROSS CCAFS CIV 18-May Proton-M/Briz-M Protostar-2 (Indostar-2) BKC COM 27-Jun Delta IV (4,2) GOES-O CCAFS CIV 21-May Soyuz-2-1a/ Meridian-2 PKC MIL 14-Jul Falcon-1 Razaksat RTS CIV 27-May Soyuz-FG TMA-15 (ISS-19S) BKC CIV 15-Jul STS-127 Endeavour ISS-2J/A KSC CIV 30-Jun Proton-M/Briz-M Sirius-FM5 BKC COM 17-Aug Delta II (7925) GPS IIR-21(M) CCAFS MIL 6-Jul Rockot/Briz-KM Rodnik (Cosmos 2451/52/53) PKC MIL 29-Aug STS-128 Discovery MPLM KSC CIV 21-Jul -3M Parus (Cosmos 2454)/ PKC MIL 8-Sep Atlas V (401) PAN CCAFS MIL 24-Jul Soyuz-U Progress-M67 (ISS-34P) BKC CIV 25-Sep Delta II (7920) STSS-Demo CCAFS MIL 29-Jul -1 Dubaisat-1/Deimos-1/et al BKC CIV 8-Oct Delta II (7925) Worldview-II VAFB COM 12-Aug Proton-M/Briz-M Asiasat-5 BKC COM 18-Oct Atlas V (401) DMSP-18 VAFB MIL 17-Sep Soyuz 2-1b M1, Sterkh-2, et al BKC CIV 17-Sep Proton-M/Briz-M -5 BKC COM Rest Of World ORBITAL SPACE LAUNCHES 30-Sep Soyuz-FG TMA-16 (ISS-20S) BKC CIV Europe 15-Oct Soyuz-U Progress-M-03M (ISS-35P) BKC CIV Date Launch Vehicle Payload Site Type 2-Nov Rockot/Briz-KM SMOS/Proba PKC CIV 12-Feb Ariane-5ECA HB-10/NSS-9/-1&-2 CSG COM 10-Nov Soyuz-U Progress-M-SO-2 (ISS-5R) BKC CIV 14-May Ariane-5ECA Herschel/ CSG CIV 1-Jul Ariane-5ECA Terrestar-1 CSG COM Sea / (Non-US carrier) 21-Aug Ariane-5ECA JCSat-12/Optus-D3 CSG COM Date Launch Vehicle Payload Site Type 1-Oct Ariane-5ECA Amazonas-2/SatcomBw-1 CSG COM 26-Feb -3SLB -11N BKC COM 29-Oct Ariane-5ECA NSS-12/-6 CSG COM 20-Apr Zenit-3SL Sicral-1B SLO MIL 21-Jun Zenit-3SLB Measat-3A BKC COM China Date Launch Vehicle Payload Site Type 14-Apr LM-3C Beidou-2B XSLC CIV Date Launch Vehicle Payload Site Type 22-Apr LM-2C -VI (?Jianbing-7) TSLC MIL 2-Feb SEM CIV 31-Aug *LM-3B Palapa-D1 XSLC COM 12-Nov LM-2C Shi Jian XI-01 JSLC CIV North Korea Date Launch Vehicle Payload Site Type Japan 5-Apr *-2 Kwangmyongsong-2 TSLG CIV Date Launch Vehicle Payload Site Type 23-Jan H2A (202) Gosat, SDS-1, KKS-1, et al TSC CIV South Korea 10-Sep H2B HTV-1 TSC CIV Date Launch Vehicle Payload Site Type 24-Aug *KSLV-1 STSAT-2 NSC CIV India Date Launch Vehicle Payload Site Type 20-Apr PSLV-CA Risat-2, Anusat SDSC CIV 23-Sep PSLV-CA (C14) Oceansat-2, Beesat, et al SDSC CIV

* Indicates Launch Failure BKC – CCAFS - AFS, FL CSG - Guiana Space Center DOM - Dombarovsky (Yazny) JSLC – Juiquan SLC KSC - , FL KYC – Kapustin Yar Cosmodrome PKC – RTS – Reagan Test Site SDSC – Satish Space Ctr. SLO – Odyssey SYC – Svobodny TSC – Tanegashima SC TSLC – Taiyuan SLC VAFB – Vandenberg AFB, CA WFF - XSLC – Xichang SLC SEN - Semnan Small Class Strategy

• Continue to utilize an IDIQ methodology (in the near term) to allow the market to settle out over the next few years

• Oversupply exists in the small class with 5 existing launch vehicles, and possibility of 7 with addition of SLV-A/B (Athena) – Most utilized vehicle in small class will be Minotaur IV/V (5 missions in the next year) • Suggest the U S Government should ultimately adopt a strategy that levels the playing field between commercial and subsidized providers (ie consider DoD elimination because its existence may put a commercial provider out of business) • No cost effective commercial vehicle in the upper end of the small class or lower end of the medium class (ie Taurus XL is very expensive for the performance, SLV-B doesn’t exist yet) – At the upper end of the small-class, NASA may seek the use of Minotaur IV/V on a case-by-case basis until there is a cost-effective commercial alternative in this performance range • Uncertainty will exist for a few years – Projected costs of Pegasus XL and Taurus XL after NLS contract expiration and a launch gap of three to five years – Reliability of Falcon 1/1E, availability, performance and NASA cost for the Falcon 1-E – Price and the availability of the SLV-A and SLV-B – NASA’s ability to obtain Minotaur launch services, due to the eventual impact on the commercial market, or the desire of the U.S. Government to abandon Minotaur in favor of supporting a fully commercial small-class market • Will have to budget for resolving issues we will find on any new 22vehicles Medium Class Strategy

• Medium class is dependant on ICRS awards to provide a baseline set of missions to a commercial provider upon which science missions can be purchased – A science mission is likely to be the 3rd or 4th launch in a given year instead of the only mission • Medium class offerings have synergy with EELV class – Seek competition between CRS winners and EELV for science missions • Still need to assure science missions at current levels – Missions are irreplaceable, and substantially expensive > $300M resulting in a “can’t fail” culture – NPD 8610.7 requires demonstrated success and extensive technical evaluation • Task is to enable commercial development and initial success of the LV without government intervention – COTS, ICRS and/or LSP space act agreements do significantly less than full mission assurance – Impact is greatest, and is most efficient during development of the LV – Technical assessment will be beneficial even though starting late

• Will have to pay for capabilities not needed by ISSP – High inclination launch capability – Upper stages for escape missions – Mission unique items for science missions

• Will have to budget for resolving issues we know we will find – Consistent with early days of Pegasus and more recent Taurus XL certification findings – Already see Taurus 2 engine having significant test issues 23 Intermediate/Heavy Class

• EELV is stable due to DoD funding for both Atlas V and Delta IV – To date Atlas has been a better deal for NASA, though costs are rising and are expected to continue • Last missions hit the contract NTE • Delta IV is much more expensive – DoD costs (already considered very high) for either vehicle will rise for both parts of the EELV program – ELS and ELC – Some US Government users are not satisfied with the current situation – ELC re-look is expected by 2010 – initial numbers are up 1/3 – NSPD-40 – “Not later than 2010, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration shall evaluate the long-term requirements, funding, and management responsibilities for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle system(s) and infrastructure. That evaluation shall include recommending a proportionate shift of the existing funding responsibility of the Secretary of Defense to reflect any change to the balance between national security and civil missions employing an Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle.”

24 Conclusion

• In light of the current launch vehicle market, progress has been made to get NASA the best value possible for the launch services it requires • While a strategy exists for future launch services without new providers, this path continues the trend of increasing costs that will ultimately result in fewer science missions being conducted • COTS/CRS could work only if the extra steps are taken to make these new vehicles useable for NASA science missions as well – Dependencies exist on timely and successful launches of new systems – Initial launch failures should be expected based on LV history – Cost of existing vehicles is increasing except where there is competition (at least in the short term) or in cases where companies buy in due to worsening market conditions – Fewer missions (NASA, and commercial) make it hard for a supplier to exist in the face of competition – Full cost accounting of first launch on a new system makes it very difficult for spacecraft projects to take the risk of planning on a new launch vehicle • As this remains a U S Government problem, the various groups must work together and determine the best path forward in all classes • For long term health, NASA / US Government should take the lead in R&D (funding) because industry cannot due to the significant risk with the current poor market conditions • If the US Government decides other issues are more important, perhaps a policy change to allow the use of foreign vehicles should be considered 25 Back-up LSP Summary

• LSP has acquired and managed launch services for NASA robotic missions since 1998, aligned with the National Space Policy – Since consolidating the program at KSC in 1998, NASA’s launch success rate is 98.3%

• A mixed fleet of vehicles is utilized to meet NASA mission requirements

• The NLS contract provides the capability to effectively procure and manage launch services – Flexibility to support mission unique requirements, including vehicle upgrades and advanced planning via studies/task orders – Ability to conduct requisite technical oversight and technical penetration as new vehicles become available

• Technical management is repeatedly cited for its strengths

• Alliance with DoD Agencies provide synergy across EELV fleet

• LSP continues efforts to ensure that launch services are available in all classes of missions for the future

27 NASA Launch Services Contracts

• The objective of the NASA Launch Services (NLS) contract is to provide the agency with domestic launch services that are safe, successful, reliable and affordable.

• Contracts provide launch services for NASA-owned and NASA-sponsored payloads for up to ten years through multiple Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) Task Order Contracts.

• The launch services are provided on a Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) basis.

• Missions are acquired using a competitive Launch Service Task Order (LSTO) acquisition process which is utilized to promote competition.

28 NASA Launch Services (NLS) Contract Current and Follow On Status

• Three service providers currently under contract: • (ULA) • Orbital Sciences Corporation (OSC) • Space Explorations Technologies Corporation (SpaceX) • Awarded: 16 June 2000 • Ordering Period: Through 16 June 2010 • RFP has been released for extension of the contract through 2020 • SMD participates directly in the process as team members • New missions must be competed among all NLS contractors using Launch Services Task Order (LSTO) process • Spacecraft customer is active participant in requirements development and proposal evaluation • On-Ramp Provision currently occurs every February and August • Technology infusion or improvements • New offerors may seek a NASA launch service contract • NLS extension contract will have only an August on-ramp provision • Heritage contract – SELVS-KSC (Orbital Sciences Corp) (ongoing)

29 NLS Requirements

• Standard launch services: – Launch vehicle and operations – Readiness reviews, documentation – Program management – Base support services – Launch site range support – Mission integration – Make all arrangements with responsible authorities to perform all launch site activities • Non-Standard Services, as ordered: – Alternate Vehicle Configurations (solid motors, fairings, adapters, upper stage hardware, access doors), payload processing facilities, advanced mission analysis and support, launch service, public affairs support, support for developing data books for radioactive components • Special studies in support of NASA payload mission planning • Mission unique modifications as required by the payload

30 Agency Requirements

POLICY

NPD 8610.7 NPD 8610.23 NPD 8610.24 CATEGORIES OF RISK CONSISTENT SCOPE OF PRE-LAUNCH REVIEW TECHNICAL OVERSIGHT PROCESS

1. No Flight History Statement Of Technical Oversight LSP Program Manager LVRR • Approvals LSP FRR • Insight LSP LRR 2. At Least One • NASA Non-concur Via Final Poll For Launch Successful Flight “Changes” Clause Applicable To All Missions Tailoring Authorized 3. String of Successful Flights At FPB

4. Applicable To All Missions Tailoring Authorized At FPB

LSP PROGRAM PLAN LINKAGE OF ALL ELEMENTS

31 LSP Governance Model

NASA Chief Engineer NASA Administrator Office of Safety and Mission Assurance Chief

Mission Directorate Director, KSC Associate Administrator

Engineering Director

Safety and Mission Assurance Director Launch Services Ops Sys Eng & Des/Dev Program Manager Engineering Directors

Prog/Proj and Des/Dev Chief Safety and Mission Assurance Engineers Launch Services Division

Divisions/Branches Lead Disciplin/Discipline Engineers

Direct Report Matrix Report Engineering Technical Program/Project Authority Technical Authority Flow Report Safety & Mission Assurance Technical Authority

11/17/09 32 Roles and Responsibilities

Basic

Launch --Standard Launch Services (Vehicle, NLS Contractor Service Range Coord, Fairing, separation system, etc) LSP & Mission --Non-Standard Services approval --Special Studies NLS Contractor Unique --Mission Uniques

Requirem’t --Others (COLA, Pedigree, Orbital Debris) LSP

--Payload Processing Facility (Astrotech, SSI, Gov’t) Integrated --Eng Support Contractor (Analex) --Hazardous Support (NASA, USAF, Range Contractor) LSP Services --USAF Range Costs for SC Processing (USAF, Range Contractor) --Logistics & Escort Support (Analex, Range Contractor)

Telemetry --Fixed & Deployable Ground Assets & LSP procures Ship (OTTR) NLS Contractor schedules --Instrumented Aircraft (P3, Big Crow) & coordinates 33 NASA Risk Mitigation Policy (NPD 8610.7)

• NASA launch vehicle assignment and acquisition strategy seeks to balance launch risk for individual missions with launch vehicle demonstrated flight history, maturity and NASA technical penetration consistent with overall mission risk – Vehicle certification strategy enables NASA to offset limited flight history of evolved launch systems with targeted technical penetration within context of overall mission risk – The appropriate certification strategy for the mission is determined at a Flight Planning Board prior to authorization of a mission launch service task order – Certification effort provides a strong foundation for KSC Insight and Approval as required by NPD 8610.23

• Vehicle Assignment Policy Includes Assessment Of Vehicle Flight History And Mission Criticality / Complexity / Value – Cat 1: Low Cost, Non-Mission Critical Payloads – Cat 2: Medium-Cost, Mission Critical Payloads – Cat 3: High Value, Mission Critical Payloads

34 Technical Oversight of Launch Services (NPD 8610.23)

• NASA’s technical oversight approach seeks to ensure the highest practicable probability of launch success by involvement in, and control of, the launch through technical oversight – Technical Oversight: Combination of focused approvals and technical insight of contractor launch activities – Insight: Acquiring knowledge and understanding of contractor’s actions by monitoring of selected metrics and/or milestones through watchful observation, documentation review, meeting attendance, reviews, tests, and compliance evaluations – Approval: Providing the contractor authority to proceed and/or formal acceptance of requirements, plans, tests, or success criteria in specified areas – Approval is required for mission unique requirements, implementation, and launch • LSP maintains robust review processes to address all flightworthiness concerns – LSP independently evaluates resolution of “core vehicle” or fleet issues – Engineering Review Process establishes criteria for documenting and evaluating certain technical issues, exclusively for technical adequacy, that require engineering disposition – Includes insight into certain major subcontractor tasks and milestones • Final launch go/no-go authority rests with the LSP • NASA retains the right to non-concur with the contractor’s proposed actions based on knowledge obtained through insight • Policy applies to all NASA managed launches. Launches identified at the Flight Planning Board (FPB) as to tolerate higher risk may utilize a modified technical oversight approach. • Specific areas requiring government approval are focused on the interface with the spacecraft • Specific areas open to government insight are widespread

35 MISSION PHASES

Formulation Implementation

Pre- Phase A Phase B Phase C Phase D Spacecraft Phase A Phase E

Baseline Pre- L/V & S/C Mission Mission & Launch Launch Post Mission Engineering Planning Procure Site Ops Launch Planning Manufacturing Launch Services

Launch – 10-4yrs L – 4-3 yrs L – 3 or L-2 yrs L – 27 mo to L-3 mo L – 3 mo-10 days L – 10 days-Launch Launch + 3 mo Launch Services

MCR SRR Assign MDR Mission PDR/ FPB ATP CDR SIR MIWGs HARsGOR PSR LSRR LVRR ORR SMSR FRR LRR LAUNCH PLAR Mission MT Plan NAR (LSP) /GOWGs Success Determination CLARREO Maven LDCM NUSTAR GLORY WISE NOAA N’ DESDYNI GOES R IRIS MMS NPP SDO LRO Discovery 12 ILN (I) GEMS AQUARIUS LCROSS Jason-3 GPM LIO LADEE (A) GRAIL MSL OCO JDEM ICESAT-2 JUNO Kepler New Frontiers 3 JWST (A) (I) GOES P (A) STSS ATRR SMAP GPM CORE TDRS-K GOES O (A) Solar Probes (PA) (I) RBSP STSS DEMO TDRS-L Supporting Programs/AO’s

Explorers  ARC • MIDEX o DOD • SMEX LSP Activity Discovery  GSFC ADVISORY (A) New Frontiers POTENTIAL ADVISORY (PA) • JPL New Millennium INTERNATIONAL (I) LPRP _ JSC S/C Activity ESSP ICRS/COTS (A) º LaRC » MSFC Update as of 08-05-2009 ELV Issues

• True commercial need for launch is nearly non-existent within the US - mid-1990’s commercial “blip” long since over – “Killer application” not yet found – “Breakthrough” technology leap making launch inexpensive and less risky not yet found – Does not mean give up

• If USG does not provide the payloads, there is no need for service – Some imaging spacecraft use due to ITAR, some quid pro quo from foreign entities and the occasional GEO Comm – Most GEO launches performed overseas • Market once owned by the US now performed by foreign services – More significant foreign government investment / sustainment and non-market economies » Ariane, Proton, Soyuz, Long March, PSLV, etc.

• As US costs rise NASA launches less, as NASA launches less costs rise – fixed budgets plus inflation – Downward spiral that directly affects SMD budget • Aging infrastructure adds to problem – Supporting more than one provider in any one class may not be feasible due to low flight rates

• Current US providers continue to work to lower costs through the use of foreign hardware – exception is SpaceX – Electronic components, tanks, valves, fairings, misc structures, separation systems, engines – Not clear that SpaceX can remain the low cost provider when they really come on-line

37 Summary

• Small end appears to have too many providers for the number of available missions (NASA use ~ one annually) – DoD uses Minotaur almost exclusively with significant demand – ATK also continuing with development of SLV A & B vehicles – Five vehicles available today and could be seven vehicles early next decade

• Allow small class to settle out and decide what to do about Minotaur

• Medium class has historically been NASA’s favored class, ~60% (now just 1 or 2 per year) – Delta II has been the workhorse in this class for many years- cost has increased significantly • Major component production ceased in 2006 • DoD will end its use in 2009, NASA will carry all costs • NASA use continues through 2011 – NASA continues effort to find a replacement, COTS/CRS supported LVs are our only real opportunities

• Medium class strategy is dependant on ISS Commercial Resupply Services awards, which provide a business base – But if the mission has to pay for full cost (infrastructure, escape capability, certification, fixes) than there is no incentive for a project to pursue new vehicles

• Looking forward, intermediate class cost is a concern (NASA use ~two annually) – National Space Transportation Strategy (NSPD-40) calls for a review before 2010 regarding sharing of EELV cost among NASA, DOD and Intelligence Community – Manifest is overcrowded, money was added for manpower to decrease the time between launches

38 Summary of ELV Studies

• Studies of Delta II availability, Alternative Launch Provider capabilities and Medium Class Options were conducted in 2006 and 2007 – Discussion conducted at progressively higher levels within the Agency – Retirement of medium class launch capability is a significant loss for NASA – March 2007 Agency PMC agreed that Medium Class missions in the FY ’09 budget would be priced using small EELV’s in an attempt to bound cost risk • Delta II full mission costs now include all infrastructure (Pads and post production) • Delta II still can compete, but prices need to be below EELV – November 2007 SMC Decided to proceed with a Minotaur letter of intent to Sec Def • No mission identified originally but now pursuing LADEE on Minotaur V – Biggest identified risk of relying on EELV while waiting on new medium class vehicles was (and remains) a potential NASA share of DoD EELV sustaining costs

• AA level ELV Summit in 2008 provided direction to the NLS Procurement Development Team resulting in current efforts to extend NLS contract for 10 years – Launch services for 4 EELV class missions were authorized as a mini block buy – Studied Dual Mission concepts (in house, industry, partnership); did not rule them out, but decided not to baseline Dual missions on EELV as part of the medium class strategy

39 Orbital Space Launch Market Analysis 2009 Year To Date

Totals include ALL launch attempts for market analysis purposes By Country By Orbit (Commercial only) # of launches Percent of Market GEO # of launches Percent of Market US 20 31.3% US 0 0.0% Russia 24 37.5% Russia 6 42.9% Europe 6 9.4% Europe 5 35.7% China 4 6.3% China 1 7.1% Japan 2 3.1% Japan 0 0.0% India 2 3.1% Sea/Land Launch 2 14.3% Iran 1 1.6% 14 North Korea 1 1.6% South Korea 1 1.6% LEO # of launches Percent of Market Sea/Land Launch 3 4.7% US 1 100.0% 64 64 ### Russia 0 0.0% Europe 0 #DIV/0! By Mission China 0 #DIV/0! # of launches Percent of Market Japan 0 US Military 9 14.1% 1 US Civil 10 15.6% US Commercial 1 1.6% World Military 7 10.9% World Civil 23 35.9% World Commercial 14 21.9% 64 100.0%