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Civilian Research of the Status of Worldwide Nuclear Forces

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www.fas.org Civilian Research of the Status of Worldwide Nuclear Forces Hans M. Kristensen Director, Nuclear Informaon Project Federaon of American Sciensts [email protected] | 202-454-4695 Briefing to Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolion (RECNA) Nagasaki University March 5, 2015 www.fas.org History and Status More than 125,000 warheads produced since 1945 Peak of 64,500 stockpiled warheads in 1986 (70,300 if including rered warheads) • US stockpile peaked early (1967) • Russian stockpile peaked late (1986) Enormous reducons since 1986 peak: • ~54,000 warhead stockpile reducon • ~47,000+ warheads dismantled ~10,000 warheads in stockpiles (~16,000 if counng rered warheads awaing dismantlement) US and Russia possess 90% of global inventory (94% if counng rered warheads); each has more than 4 mes more warheads than rest of world combined; 15 mes more than third-largest stockpile (France) Decreasing: US, Russia, Britain, France Increasing: China, Pakistan, India Israel relavely steady; North Korea trying Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 2 www.fas.org With more than 90% of world inventory, US and Russia have US-Russian Arsenals special responsibility to reduce Reducon of deployed strategic warheads from some 23,000 in 1989 to 3,500 in 2014 (New START counts 3,285) Readiness level of remaining strategic forces is high: about 1,800 warheads on prompt alert No official de-alerng, but significant reducon of overall alert numbers: heavy bombers de-alerted, US ICBMs and SLBMs downloaded, non-strategic forces de-alerted Trend: pace of reduc3on is slowing Note: rered, but sll intact, warheads awaing dismantlement are not shown US cut only 309 warheads in 2009-2013, compared with 3,287 warheads cut in 2004-2008 Russia cut an esmated 1,000 warheads in 2009-2013, compared with 2,500 in 2004-2008 Instead of connuing pace or increasing reducons, US and Russian stockpiles appear to be leveling out for the long haul; new emphasis on modernizaon New iniaves needed to prevent stalling of arms control Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 3 www.fas.org Esmated Worldwide Arsenals Esmated Worldwide Nuclear Warhead Inventories 2015 Country Deployed Stockpiled Re3red Inventory Russia 1,780 4,300 3,200 7,500 United States 2,080 4,760 2,340 7,100 France 240 300 300 China 260 low 260 Britain 120 215 low 215 Pakistan 120 120 India 110 110 Israel 80 80 North Korea ? ? Total 4,220 10,145 5,540 15,685 Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 4 www.fas.org US-Russian Non-Strategic Weapons • U.S. and Russian combined stockpiles of non-strategic nuclear warheads reduced by roughly 90 percent since 1991. Neither side has disclosed actual numbers • Russia: two public declaraons: 2005: Russian “non-strategic nuclear forces” have been reduced “by four @mes” since 1991. 2010: “the Russian arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons is reduced four mes [75%]* in comparison with the USSR arsenal.” All are in central storage * Note: PNI declaraons do not add up to 75% • United States: two public declaraons: 2010: "The number of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons • Some 2,500 warheads remain assigned to declined by approximately 90 percent from September 30, non-strategic forces (Russia ~2,000; United States ~500) 1991 to September 30, 2009.” • Several thousands addional rered, but sll relavely intact, 2014: "The number of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons warheads in storage are awaing dismantlement has declined by approximately 90 percent since September 30, 1991. • Stockpiles will likely connue to decline in next decade with or without arms control agreements ~180 US B61 bombs forward-deployed in Europe Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 5 www.fas.org Non-Strategic Weapons: Russia • Widely dispersed forces in four Services: taccal air force, navy, defense, and army (see map) • Warheads not on bases but in central storage • Yet some upgrades of nuclear-storage sites at bases (Shaykovka Tu-22 base, boom le; Kaliningrad boom right) May 2007 July 2007 October 2009 Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 6 www.fas.org Non-Strategic Weapons: NATO • 180 U.S. B61 bombs scaered in 87 underground vaults underneath 87 aircra shelters at six bases in five European countries: • Addional bombs in the United States for extended deterrence missions elsewhere • 50 French ASMPA cruise missiles at three bases for 3 squadrons (2 air and 1 naval) Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 7 www.fas.org Non-Strategic Weapons: Issues Because they are dual-capable, non-strategic nuclear forces are quickly drawn into conflicts: Russian deployment of S-300 air-defense and Su-24 bombers in Crimea (above); German personnel loading U.S. B61 on German Tornado (top right); U.S. F-16 from Aviano Air Base on rotaonal deployment to Lask Air Base in Poland (top right); Russian Tu-22 bomber intercepted over Balc Sea by French Mirage fighter (boom right) Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 8 www.fas.org Russia Diverse Nuclear Forces Gradual phase-out of soviet-era systems and paral Strategic replacement with “new” systems by early-mid 2020s Replacement began two decades ago ICBM: 3 types being replaced by 2 (in 6 versions SLBM: 2 types being placed by 1 Old New System MIRV First Deployed Bombers: 2 types being replaced by 1 System Non-Strategic SS-18 Sarmat (“heavy” ICBM) Yes (2018-2020?) SS-19 SS-27 Mod 1 (Topol M) No 2097 Navy: SLCM, SAM, ASW missiles, SS-27 Mod 2 (RS-24) Yes 2014 torpedoes, depth bombs SS-25 SS-27 Mod 1 (Topol-M) No 2006 Air Force: cruise missile, bombs SS-27 Mod 2 (RS-24) Yes 2010 Army: short-range ballisc missiles, SS-27 Mod 3 (RS-26) Yes 2016? intermediate-range cruise missile SS-27 Mod 4 (Rail) Yes 2019? Defense: ballisc missile defense, air- SS-N-18 SS-N-32 (Bulava) Yes 2015-2017? defense, coastal defense SS-N-23 SS-N-32 (Bulava) Yes 2017-2025? Tu-95MS PAK-DA 2020-2030? Tu-160 PAK-DA 2020-2030? Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 9 www.fas.org Russia: Modernizaon ICBM • SS-27 Mod 2 (mobile): replacing SS-25s at Novosibirsk, Tagil, Yoshkar-Ola • SS-27 Mod 2 (silo): replacing SS-19s at Kozelsk • SS-27 Mod 2 (rail): planned • RS-26 (compact SS-27): to replace SS-25s at Irkutsk and Vypolzovo • Sarmat “heavy ICBM”: to replace SS-28s at Dombarovsky and Uzhur SSBN / SLBM • SS-N-23 SLBM life-extension (Sineva/Layner) in Delta IV SSBN • Borey SSBN: 8 planned (possibly 10-12) • SS-N-32 (Bulava): fielding Bombers • Upgrades of some Tu-160 (Blackjack) and Tu-95 (Bear) • New bomber (PAK PA) in development • ALCM (Kh-102) in development Taccal • Tu-22M (Backfire) upgrade underway • Su-34 (Fullback) fielding • Yasen (Sverodvinsk) SSGN development • SLCM (SS-N-30, Kaliber) development • GLCM test-launched; in producon? • SSM (SS-26, Iskander) deploying • SAM (S-400/SA-21) deploying (nuclear ?) • ABM (A-135) upgrade planned Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide10 www.fas.org Russia: ICBMs Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide11 www.fas.org Russia: Teykovo First SS-27 unit (54 Guards Missile Division). 36 TELs for SS-27 Mod 1 (Topol-M) deployed in 4 regiments. Each ICBM single warhead. Previously with SS-25. Teykovo 1: SS-27 Mod 1 (Topol-M) Deployment phase: 2006: SS-27 Mod 1 (Topol-M) operaonal. 18 TELs deployed in 2 regiments. 2010: SS-27 Mod 2 (RS-24) operaonal 18 TELs deployed in 2 regiments. Teykovo 4: SS-27 Mod 2 (RS-24) Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide12 www.fas.org Russia: Tashchevo Second SS-27 unit (60 Missile Division). 60 SS-27 Mod 1 (Topol-M) deployed in 6 regiments. Each ICBM singled warhead. Satellite images show upgrade of silos and launch control Upgrade of silo 61F and Launch Control Center centers. (images 21 Sep 2004 (top); 2 Aug 2005) Previously with SS-19 (probably all gone). Deployment phase: 1997: SS-27 Mod 1 (Topol-M) first operaonal. 2013: Last of 60 missiles deployed. Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide13 www.fas.org Russia: Novosibirsk Third SS-27 unit (39 Guards Missile Division). SS-27 Mod 2 TEL under camouflage (top) and upgrade of first of several regiment bases. First regiment with 9 SS-27 Mod 2 (RS-24) placed on “experimental combat duty” in 2013. Second in 2014 Satellite images show upgrade of regiment base and media photos show SS-27 Mod 2 launchers. Remaining SS-25s are being phased out. Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide14 www.fas.org Russia: Tagil Fourth SS-27 unit (42 Missile Division). Part of first regiment with 6 SS-27 Mod 2 (RS-24) placed on “experimental combat Construction of SS-27 Mod 2 base (bottom); camouflaged vehicles at supply duty” in 2013. Second regiment in 2014 base (top left); upgrade to warhead storage (top right). Image: 2 Jun 2014 Satellite images show complete reconstrucon of regiment base (boom) with 9 TEL garages for 3 SS-27 Mod 2 baalions, as well as upgrade of warhead storage and newly arrived camouflaged vehicles at supply base. Remaining SS-25s being phased out. Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide15 www.fas.org Russia: Kozelsk Fih SS-27 unit (28 Guards Missile Division). Deployment of first regiment with 10 SS-27 Mod 2 (RS-24) underway. First 4 become operaonal by December 2014.
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