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Worldwide Nuclear Weapon Modernization Programs

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Worldwide Nuclear Weapon Modernization Programs www.fas.org Worldwide Nuclear Weapon Modernizaon Programs Hans M. Kristensen Director, Nuclear Informaon Project Federaon of American Sciensts Phone: 202-454-4695 Email: [email protected] Presentaon to Side Event on Nuclear Weapon Modernizations Organized by Alliance for Nuclear Accountability Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference United Nations, New York, April 28, 2015 www.fas.org History and Status More than 125,000 warheads produced since 1945 Peak of 64,500 stockpiled warheads in 1986 (70,300 if including rered warheads) • US stockpile peaked early (1967) • Russian stockpile peaked late (1986) Enormous reducons since 1986 peak: • ~54,000 warhead stockpile reducon • ~47,000+ warheads dismantled ~10,000 warheads in stockpiles (~16,000 if counng rered warheads awaing dismantlement) US and Russia possess 90% of global inventory (94% if counng rered warheads); each has more than 4 mes more warheads than rest of world combined; 15 mes more than third-largest stockpile (France) Decreasing: US, Russia, Britain, France Increasing: China, Pakistan, India Israel relavely steady; North Korea trying Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 2 www.fas.org With more than 90% of world inventory, US and Russia have US-Russian Arsenals special responsibility to reduce Reducon of deployed strategic warheads from some 23,000 in 1989 to 3,500 in 2014 (New START counts 3,285) Readiness level of remaining strategic forces is high: about 1,800 warheads on prompt alert No official de-alerng, but significant reducon of overall alert numbers: heavy bombers de-alerted, US ICBMs and SLBMs downloaded, non-strategic forces de-alerted Trend: pace of reduc2on is slowing Note: rered, but sll intact, warheads awaing dismantlement are not shown US cut only 500 warheads in 2009-2014, compared with 3,287 warheads cut in 2004-2008 Russia cut an esmated 1,500 warheads in 2009-2014, compared with 2,500 in 2004-2008 Instead of connuing pace or increasing reducons, US and Russian stockpiles appear to be leveling out for the long haul; new emphasis on modernizaon New iniaves needed to prevent stalling of arms control Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 3 www.fas.org Esmated Worldwide Arsenals Esmated Worldwide Nuclear Warhead Inventories 2015 Country Deployed* Stockpiled** Re2red Inventory Russia 1,780 4,500 3,000 7,500 United States 1,900 4,700 2,500 7,200 France 290*** 300 300 China 260 low 260 Britain 150 215 low 215 Pakistan 100-120 120 India 90-110 110 Israel 80 80 North Korea ? ? Total ~4,100 ~10,200 ~5,500 ~15,700 * A deployed warhead is defined as either deployed on a launcher or at a base with operaonal launcher. ** Stockpiled warheads are those in the custody of the military and/or available for use by launchers. The number includes spares but not rered, but sll intact, warheads awaing dismantlement. *** The actual number may be lower because some French SLBMs have been downloaded to fewer warheads. Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 4 www.fas.org Russia: Modernizaon Diverse Nuclear Forces Gradual phase-out of soviet-era systems and paral Strategic replacement with “new” systems by early-mid 2020s Replacement began two decades ago ICBM: 3 types being replaced by 2 (in 6 versions SLBM: 2 types being placed by 1 Old New System MIRV First Deployed Bombers: 2 types being replaced by 1 System Non-Strategic SS-18 Sarmat (“heavy” ICBM) Yes (2018-2020?) SS-19 SS-27 Mod 1 (Topol M) No 2097 Navy: SLCM, SAM, ASW missiles, SS-27 Mod 2 (RS-24) Yes 2014 torpedoes, depth bombs SS-25 SS-27 Mod 1 (Topol-M) No 2006 Air Force: cruise missile, bombs SS-27 Mod 2 (RS-24) Yes 2010 Army: short-range ballisc missiles, SS-27 Mod 3 (RS-26) Yes 2016? intermediate-range cruise missile SS-27 Mod 4 (Rail) Yes 2019? Defense: ballisc missile defense, air- SS-N-18 SS-N-32 (Bulava) Yes 2015-2017? defense, coastal defense SS-N-23 SS-N-32 (Bulava) Yes 2017-2025? Tu-95MS PAK-DA 2020-2030? Tu-160 PAK-DA 2020-2030? Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 5 www.fas.org Russia: Modernizaon Modernizaon, not “build-up” Yet trend is that Russian reducon appears to be coming to an end Strategic force is leveling off over next decade: Launchers just below 500 Warheads around 2,400 Future force will be more mobile and more MIRVed Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 6 www.fas.org Russia: Modernizaon ICBM • SS-27 Mod 2 (mobile): replacing SS-25s at Novosibirsk, Tagil, Yoshkar-Ola • SS-27 Mod 2 (silo): replacing SS-19s at Kozelsk • SS-27 Mod 2 (rail): planned • RS-26 (compact SS-27): to replace SS-25s at Irkutsk and Vypolzovo • Sarmat “heavy ICBM”: to replace SS-28s at Dombarovsky and Uzhur SSBN / SLBM • SS-N-23 SLBM life-extension (Sineva/Layner) in Delta IV SSBN • Borey SSBN: 8 planned (possibly 10-12) • SS-N-32 (Bulava): fielding Bombers • Upgrades of some Tu-160 (Blackjack) and Tu-95 (Bear) • New bomber (PAK PA) in development • ALCM (Kh-102) in development Taccal • Tu-22M (Backfire) upgrade underway • Su-34 (Fullback) fielding • Yasen (Sverodvinsk) SSGN development • SLCM (SS-N-30, Kaliber) development • GLCM test-launched; in producon? • SSM (SS-26, Iskander) deploying • SAM (S-400/SA-21) deploying (nuclear ?) • ABM (A-135) upgrade planned Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 7 www.fas.org Russia: ICBMs Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 8 www.fas.org Russia: Teykovo First SS-27 unit (54 Guards Missile Division). 36 TELs for SS-27 Mod 1 (Topol-M) deployed in 4 regiments. Each ICBM single warhead. Previously with SS-25. Teykovo 1: SS-27 Mod 1 (Topol-M) Deployment phase: 2006: SS-27 Mod 1 (Topol-M) operaonal. 18 TELs deployed in 2 regiments. 2010: SS-27 Mod 2 (RS-24) operaonal 18 TELs deployed in 2 regiments. Teykovo 4: SS-27 Mod 2 (RS-24) Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 9 www.fas.org Russia: Tashchevo Second SS-27 unit (60 Missile Division). 60 SS-27 Mod 1 (Topol-M) deployed in 6 regiments. Each ICBM singled warhead. Satellite images show upgrade of silos and launch control Upgrade of silo 61F and Launch Control Center centers. (images 21 Sep 2004 (top); 2 Aug 2005) Previously with SS-19 (probably all gone). Deployment phase: 1997: SS-27 Mod 1 (Topol-M) first operaonal. 2013: Last of 60 missiles deployed. Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 10 www.fas.org Russia: Novosibirsk Third SS-27 unit (39 Guards Missile Division). SS-27 Mod 2 TEL under camouflage (top) and upgrade of first of several regiment bases. First regiment with 9 SS-27 Mod 2 (RS-24) placed on “experimental combat duty” in 2013. Second in 2014 Satellite images show upgrade of regiment base and media photos show SS-27 Mod 2 launchers. Remaining SS-25s are being phased out. Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 11 www.fas.org Russia: Tagil Fourth SS-27 unit (42 Missile Division). Part of first regiment with 6 SS-27 Mod 2 (RS-24) placed on “experimental combat Construction of SS-27 Mod 2 base (bottom); camouflaged vehicles at supply duty” in 2013. Second regiment in 2014 base (top left); upgrade to warhead storage (top right). Image: 2 Jun 2014 Satellite images show complete reconstrucon of regiment base (boom) with 9 TEL garages for 3 SS-27 Mod 2 baalions, as well as upgrade of warhead storage and newly arrived camouflaged vehicles at supply base. Remaining SS-25s being phased out. Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 12 www.fas.org Russia: Kozelsk Fih SS-27 unit (28 Guards Missile Division). Deployment of first regiment with 10 SS-27 Mod 2 (RS-24) underway. First 4 become operaonal by December 2014. Upgrade to SS-27 Mod 2 at Kozelsk missile News media photos show upgrade of silos. field in 2012 (bottom) and 2013 (top). Planned numbers are unknown, but there were 60 SS-19s in 2006 and 60 SS-27s were deployed at Tashchevo. Previously with SS-19 (possibly all gone). Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 13 www.fas.org Russia: Submarines Modernizaon from Delta to Borey: 6 Delta IV, each with 16 SS-N-23 (Sineva modificaon) Will likely be replaced by Borey SSBN in 2017-2025 3 Delta III, each with 16 SS-N-18 Will be replaced by Borey SSBN in 2015-? Russia’s SSBN fleet is based at Yagelnaya (Gadzhiyevo) on the 8 Borey (planned), each with 16 SS-N-32 (Bulava) Kola Peninsula in the Barents Sea (top) and Rybachiy on the Kamchatka Peninsula in the Pacific. A Borey SSBN captured in the Kola Bay on 20 July 2014 with the aircra carrier Admiral Kuznetsov. Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 14 www.fas.org Russia: Submarine Missiles Implicaons of modernizaon: Weapons System Missiles Warheads Missiles Warheads (2014) (2014) (2024) (2024) SSBN fleet will remain relavely SS-N-18 48* 144 0 0 stable around 8-9 SSBNs. SS-N-23 (Sineva) 96** 384 32 128 SS-N-32 (Bulava) - - 112*** 672 SLBMs stable at some 144 missiles. Total 144 528 144 800 * It is possible that only two Delta IIIs with 32 SS-N-18s are operaonal. Significant increase in warheads from ** Not all six Delta IVs are operaonal any given me; normally 1-2 boats are in overhaul. 528 to 800.
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