www.fas.org

Worldwide Nuclear Weapon Modernizaon Programs

Hans M. Kristensen Director, Nuclear Informaon Project Federaon of American Sciensts Phone: 202-454-4695 Email: [email protected]

Presentaon to Side Event on Nuclear Weapon Modernizations Organized by Alliance for Nuclear Accountability

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference United Nations, New York, April 28, 2015 www.fas.org History and Status

More than 125,000 warheads produced since 1945 Peak of 64,500 stockpiled warheads in 1986 (70,300 if including rered warheads) • US stockpile peaked early (1967) • Russian stockpile peaked late (1986) Enormous reducons since 1986 peak: • ~54,000 warhead stockpile reducon • ~47,000+ warheads dismantled

~10,000 warheads in stockpiles (~16,000 if counng rered warheads awaing dismantlement) US and Russia possess 90% of global inventory (94% if counng rered warheads); each has more than 4 mes more warheads than rest of world combined; 15 mes more than third-largest stockpile (France) Decreasing: US, Russia, Britain, France Increasing: China, Pakistan, India Israel relavely steady; North Korea trying

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 2 www.fas.org

With more than 90% of world inventory, US and Russia have US-Russian Arsenals special responsibility to reduce

Reducon of deployed strategic warheads from some 23,000 in 1989 to 3,500 in 2014 (New START counts 3,285)

Readiness level of remaining strategic forces is high: about 1,800 warheads on prompt alert

No official de-alerng, but significant reducon of overall alert numbers: heavy bombers de-alerted, US ICBMs and SLBMs downloaded, non-strategic forces de-alerted

Trend: pace of reducon is slowing

Note: rered, but sll intact, warheads awaing dismantlement are not shown US cut only 500 warheads in 2009-2014, compared with 3,287 warheads cut in 2004-2008

Russia cut an esmated 1,500 warheads in 2009-2014, compared with 2,500 in 2004-2008

Instead of connuing pace or increasing reducons, US and Russian stockpiles appear to be leveling out for the long haul; new emphasis on modernizaon

New iniaves needed to prevent stalling of arms control

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 3 www.fas.org Esmated Worldwide Arsenals

Esmated Worldwide Nuclear Warhead Inventories 2015 Country Deployed* Stockpiled** Rered Inventory Russia 1,780 4,500 3,000 7,500 United States 1,900 4,700 2,500 7,200 France 290*** 300 300 China 260 low 260 Britain 150 215 low 215 Pakistan 100-120 120 India 90-110 110 Israel 80 80 North Korea ? ? Total ~4,100 ~10,200 ~5,500 ~15,700 * A deployed warhead is defined as either deployed on a launcher or at a base with operaonal launcher. ** Stockpiled warheads are those in the custody of the military and/or available for use by launchers. The number includes spares but not rered, but sll intact, warheads awaing dismantlement. *** The actual number may be lower because some French SLBMs have been downloaded to fewer warheads.

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 4 www.fas.org

Russia: Modernizaon Diverse Nuclear Forces

Gradual phase-out of soviet-era systems and paral Strategic replacement with “new” systems by early-mid 2020s Replacement began two decades ago ICBM: 3 types being replaced by 2 (in 6 versions SLBM: 2 types being placed by 1 Old New System MIRV First Deployed Bombers: 2 types being replaced by 1 System Non-Strategic SS-18 Sarmat (“heavy” ICBM) Yes (2018-2020?)

SS-19 SS-27 Mod 1 (Topol M) No 2097 Navy: SLCM, SAM, ASW missiles, SS-27 Mod 2 (RS-24) Yes 2014 torpedoes, depth bombs SS-25 SS-27 Mod 1 (Topol-M) No 2006 Air Force: cruise missile, bombs SS-27 Mod 2 (RS-24) Yes 2010 Army: short-range ballisc missiles, SS-27 Mod 3 (RS-26) Yes 2016? intermediate-range cruise missile SS-27 Mod 4 (Rail) Yes 2019? Defense: ballisc missile defense, air- SS-N-18 SS-N-32 (Bulava) Yes 2015-2017? defense, coastal defense SS-N-23 SS-N-32 (Bulava) Yes 2017-2025? Tu-95MS PAK-DA 2020-2030? Tu-160 PAK-DA 2020-2030?

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 5 www.fas.org Russia: Modernizaon

Modernizaon, not “build-up” Yet trend is that Russian reducon appears to be coming to an end Strategic force is leveling off over next decade: Launchers just below 500 Warheads around 2,400 Future force will be more mobile and more MIRVed

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 6 www.fas.org Russia: Modernizaon ICBM • SS-27 Mod 2 (mobile): replacing SS-25s at Novosibirsk, Tagil, Yoshkar-Ola • SS-27 Mod 2 (silo): replacing SS-19s at Kozelsk • SS-27 Mod 2 (rail): planned • RS-26 (compact SS-27): to replace SS-25s at Irkutsk and Vypolzovo • Sarmat “heavy ICBM”: to replace SS-28s at Dombarovsky and Uzhur SSBN / SLBM • SS-N-23 SLBM life-extension (Sineva/Layner) in Delta IV SSBN • Borey SSBN: 8 planned (possibly 10-12) • SS-N-32 (Bulava): fielding Bombers • Upgrades of some Tu-160 (Blackjack) and Tu-95 (Bear) • New bomber (PAK PA) in development • ALCM (Kh-102) in development Taccal • Tu-22M (Backfire) upgrade underway • Su-34 (Fullback) fielding • Yasen (Sverodvinsk) SSGN development • SLCM (SS-N-30, Kaliber) development • GLCM test-launched; in producon? • SSM (SS-26, Iskander) deploying • SAM (S-400/SA-21) deploying (nuclear ?) • ABM (A-135) upgrade planned Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 7 www.fas.org Russia: ICBMs

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 8 www.fas.org Russia: Teykovo

First SS-27 unit (54 Guards Missile Division).

36 TELs for SS-27 Mod 1 (Topol-M) deployed in 4 regiments. Each ICBM single warhead.

Previously with SS-25.

Teykovo 1: SS-27 Mod 1 (Topol-M) Deployment phase:

2006: SS-27 Mod 1 (Topol-M) operaonal. 18 TELs deployed in 2 regiments.

2010: SS-27 Mod 2 (RS-24) operaonal 18 TELs deployed in 2 regiments.

Teykovo 4: SS-27 Mod 2 (RS-24)

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 9 www.fas.org Russia: Tashchevo

Second SS-27 unit (60 Missile Division).

60 SS-27 Mod 1 (Topol-M) deployed in 6 regiments. Each ICBM singled warhead.

Satellite images show upgrade of silos and launch control Upgrade of silo 61F and Launch Control Center centers. (images 21 Sep 2004 (top); 2 Aug 2005)

Previously with SS-19 (probably all gone).

Deployment phase:

1997: SS-27 Mod 1 (Topol-M) first operaonal.

2013: Last of 60 missiles deployed.

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 10 www.fas.org Russia: Novosibirsk

Third SS-27 unit (39 Guards Missile Division). SS-27 Mod 2 TEL under camouflage (top) and upgrade of first of several regiment bases. First regiment with 9 SS-27 Mod 2 (RS-24) placed on “experimental combat duty” in 2013. Second in 2014

Satellite images show upgrade of regiment base and media photos show SS-27 Mod 2 launchers.

Remaining SS-25s are being phased out.

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 11 www.fas.org Russia: Tagil

Fourth SS-27 unit (42 Missile Division).

Part of first regiment with 6 SS-27 Mod 2 (RS-24) placed on “experimental combat Construction of SS-27 Mod 2 base (bottom); camouflaged vehicles at supply duty” in 2013. Second regiment in 2014 base (top left); upgrade to warhead storage (top right). Image: 2 Jun 2014

Satellite images show complete reconstrucon of regiment base (boom) with 9 TEL garages for 3 SS-27 Mod 2 baalions, as well as upgrade of warhead storage and newly arrived camouflaged vehicles at supply base.

Remaining SS-25s being phased out.

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 12 www.fas.org Russia: Kozelsk

Fih SS-27 unit (28 Guards Missile Division).

Deployment of first regiment with 10 SS-27 Mod 2 (RS-24) underway. First 4 become operaonal by December 2014. Upgrade to SS-27 Mod 2 at Kozelsk missile News media photos show upgrade of silos. field in 2012 (bottom) and 2013 (top).

Planned numbers are unknown, but there were 60 SS-19s in 2006 and 60 SS-27s were deployed at Tashchevo.

Previously with SS-19 (possibly all gone).

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 13 www.fas.org Russia: Submarines

Modernizaon from Delta to Borey:

6 Delta IV, each with 16 SS-N-23 (Sineva modificaon) Will likely be replaced by Borey SSBN in 2017-2025

3 Delta III, each with 16 SS-N-18 Will be replaced by Borey SSBN in 2015-? Russia’s SSBN fleet is based at Yagelnaya (Gadzhiyevo) on the 8 Borey (planned), each with 16 SS-N-32 (Bulava) Kola Peninsula in the Barents Sea (top) and Rybachiy on the Kamchatka Peninsula in the Pacific.

A Borey SSBN captured in the Kola Bay on 20 July 2014 with the aircra carrier Admiral Kuznetsov. Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 14 www.fas.org Russia: Submarine Missiles

Implicaons of modernizaon: Weapons System Missiles Warheads Missiles Warheads (2014) (2014) (2024) (2024) SSBN fleet will remain relavely SS-N-18 48* 144 0 0 stable around 8-9 SSBNs. SS-N-23 (Sineva) 96** 384 32 128 SS-N-32 (Bulava) - - 112*** 672 SLBMs stable at some 144 missiles. Total 144 528 144 800 * It is possible that only two Delta IIIs with 32 SS-N-18s are operaonal. Significant increase in warheads from ** Not all six Delta IVs are operaonal any given me; normally 1-2 boats are in overhaul. 528 to 800. *** Assume 7 of 8 planned Borey SSBNs have entered service.

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 15 www.fas.org Russia: Bombers A new subsonic, low-observable long-range bomber (PAK- DA) is under development. A Tupolev design apparently was selected in 2013. Expected deployment in the mid-2020s to replace: Tu-95MS (Bear): roughly 60 le of which perhaps 50 are operaonal. Carries AS-15B ALCM and bombs. Being upgraded to increase convenonal capability. Tu-160 (Blackjack): roughly 15 le of which perhaps 13 are operaonal. Carries AS-15A ALCM and bombs. Upgrade to increase convenonal capability. Su-22M3 (Backfire): Intermediate-range but somemes considered strategic. Carries AS-4 ALCM and bombs. Being upgraded to increase convenonal capability.

A new nuclear ALCM (Kh-102) has been under development for some me, possibly to replace the aging AS-15 on the PAK-DA bomber Tu-95MS and Tu-160 bombers. (subsonic, stealthy)

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 16 www.fas.org Russia: Non-Strategic Weapons

Weapons System Remarks Large leover warhead inventory of almost Air Force enrely Soviet-era weapons. AS-4 ALCM 1967: 47 years old. For Tu-22M3 Reduced by at least 75% since 1991. Bombs For Tu-22M3, Su-24M, Su-34 Most esmates vary from 1,800 to 2,000 Navy warheads. DOD menons unofficial esmates of SS-N-9 (Malakhit) 1969: 45 years old. For ships. 2,000-4,000 SS-N-12 (Bazalt) 1976: 38 years old. For subs.

SS-N-15 (Vyuga) 1969: 47 years old. For subs/ships. All warheads in central storage; not with/on

SS-N-16 (Vodopad) 1981: 33 years old. For subs. delivery vehicles. SS-N-19 (Granit) 1980: 34 years old. For ships. Of current force, only three types are being SS-N-21 (Granat) 1987: 27 years old. For subs. modernized. Future plans are unknown. SS-N-22 (Moskit) 1981: 22 years old. For ships.

SS-N-30 (Kalibr) ? (2015). For subs. Replacing SS-N-21?

Torpedoes (550/650 mm) For subs. “The general purpose forces – to include dual-use

Depth Bombs For ASW aircra and helicopters. nonstrategic nuclear forces – will continue to acquire new equipment for the near-term, but Army deliveries will be small and largely consist of SS-21 (Tochka) 1981: 33 years old. modernized Soviet-era weapons.” SS-26 (Iskander-K) 2005: Replacing SS-21. US Defense Intelligence Agency, 2013 Defense

S-300/A-135/coastal Nuclear status of newer systems uncertain. Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 17 www.fas.org United States

Stockpile peaked in 1967; deployed strategic warheads peaked in 1986 Stockpile and deployed strategic warheads have not changed much since 2009

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 18 www.fas.org United States: Modernizaon ICBM • Minuteman III life-extension compleng • Warhead fuzes/interoperable warhead planned • GBSD (ICBM replacement) in development SSBN / SLBM • Trident II D5 SLBM life-extension development • SSBN replacement development (12 planned) • W76-1 warhead life-extension deploying • W88-1 warhead life-extension development Bombers • Upgrade of B-2 and B-52 underway • LRS-B next-generaon bomber in development • B61-12 guided standoff bomb in development • LRSO (ALCM) replacement in development Taccal • F-35A nuclear capability in development • B61-12 guided standoff in development Infrastructure • Uranium Processing Facility (secondaries) construcon • Plutonium producon facilies (primaries) construcon • Warhead surveillance/simulaon facilies upgrade

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 19 www.fas.org United States: Modernizaon

Next 10 years: $350 billion for maintaining and modernizing nuclear forces and infrastructure Comprehensive modernizaon: • All three legs of strategic triad • Taccal dual-capable aircra • Warhead producon complex Consolidaon and modificaon of warhead types Some delays happening; more expected Extending nuclear deterrent through 2080

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 20 www.fas.org

United States: Modernizaon Alleged advantages: • Fewer warhead types permit reducon of hedge • Modified warheads with increased safety, use control, and performance margin • Fewer warheads will be cheaper to maintain and deploy Possible risks: • Modified warheads further from tested designs; reliability issues? • Reduced stockpile diversity • Complex and expensive programs prone to delays and cost overruns • Modified warheads “new”? • Costs highly uncertain and esmates probably underrated Fundamental quesons: 3+2 strategy: reducon from 12 warhead versions (8 basic designs) to 5 types: • Why is hedging necessary for missile 3 “Interoperable” or “adaptable” warheads on ICBM and SLBM warheads but not bomber weapons? • Why must US hedge when Britain and IW-1 (W78/W88-1), IW-2 (W87/W88-1), IW-3 (W76-1) France do not? 2 non-interoperable warheads on bombers and fighters • Why is “deployed” warheads the ALCM (LRSO) with W80-1 or W84 same in the future? B61-12 guided standoff bomb Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 21 www.fas.org China: Modernizaon

ICBM / MRBM • DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 2) deploying • New mobile ICBM test-launching • Development of new mobile ICBM • Development of mobile ICBM capable of carrying MIRVed warheads SSBN / SLBM • Jin (Type-094) SSBN fielding (4-8 expected) • JL-2 (CSS-N-14) SLBM in development • Type-096 SSBN possibly in development Cruise Missiles: • ALCM (CJ-20 on H-6 bomber) in development* • GLCM (DH-10/CJ-10) fielding**

Note: China is the only of the P-5 (NPT declared) nuclear- weapon states that is increasing its nuclear arsenal

* Listed in 2013 AFGSC briefing ** Listed by NASIC as “conventional or nuclear,” the same designation as the Russian nuclear-capable AS-4 Kitchen ALCM

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 22 www.fas.org China: ICBMs 50-60 deployed: 20 DF-5A (silo) 10 DF-31 (mobile) 20-30 DF-31A (mobile)

New ICBM being test-launched

New ICBM in development, possibly capable of MIRV

Dimensions of DF-31A TEL displayed at the 2009 parade (top) is very similar to DF-31 TEL displayed at the 1999 parade

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 23 www.fas.org China: ICBMs

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 24 www.fas.org China: ICBMs

US projecons of Chinese ICBMs tend to predict too many too soon

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 25 www.fas.org China: DF-21

Approximately 60 nuclear (DF-21 and DF-21A)

Almost completely replaced DF-3A

Vast training area in Delingha and Da Qaidam

DF-21C and DF-21D convenonal versions deploying

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 26 www.fas.org China: DF-21

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 27 www.fas.org China: DF-21

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 28 www.fas.org China: Submarines

Building class of 4-8 Jin SSBNs Each with 12 JL-2

First seen in 2007 on commercial satellite photos

3 in service, but JL-2 not yet operaonal

1 normally at North Sea Fleet

1 normally at South Sea Fleet

ONI now says 4 are based at Hainan

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 29 www.fas.org China: Submarines

Expansion of Hainan submarine base

First Jin SSBN presence in 2008

ONI now lists 4 SSBNs at Hainan

Base includes demagnetization facility, underground submarine pier, SLBM handling and transportation system

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 30 www.fas.org China: Submarines

Important new capability, but…

Jin SSBN noisy compared with Russian SSBNs

To target USA a Jin SSBN would have to sail far into Pacific or Sea of Japan

Command and control capability is limited

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 31 www.fas.org France: Modernizaon

SSBN / SLBM • TNO warhead on M51.2 SLBM • M51.3 SLBM development Bombers • Rafale K3 planned at Istres Air Base • Next-generaon ALCM in development Infrastructure • Megajoule at CESTA development • Airix/Epure hydrodynamic test center at Valduc development (partly Joint French-UK warhead surveillance tesng center)

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 32 www.fas.org Britain: Modernizaon

SSBN / SLBM • SSBN (Vanguard replacement) in development (3-4 planned) • SLBM (Trident II D5LE) in development (USA) • Mk4A/W76-1 type warhead fielding Infrastructure • Joint UK-French warhead surveillance tesng technology center development

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 33 www.fas.org Pakistan: Modernizaon MRBM / SRBM • Shaheen III MRBM test launched • Shaheen II MRBM (Ha-6) fielding • NASR SRBM (Ha-9) in development • Abdali SRBM (Ha-2) in development* Cruise Missiles • GLCM (Babur/Ha-7) in development • ALCM (Ra’ad/Ha-8 on Mirage) in development • SLCM (naval version of Babur) in development? Infrastructure • Khushab-IV reactor #4 construcon • Uranium enrichment facility upgrade

* Listed by Pakistani ISPR but not by 2013 NASIC report

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 34 www.fas.org Pakistan: Modernizaon

Shaheen-II mobile launcher. Detected TELs fing out at Naonal Defense Complex. Not yet deployed in 2009, but probably now part of 90-110 warhead esmate. Improved Shaheen-I tesng underway

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 35 www.fas.org India: Modernizaon

ICBM / IRBM / MRBM • Agni VI ICBM development (MIRV?) • Agni V ICBM in development; canister test launch 2015 • Agni IV IRBM in development • Agni III IRBM fielding SSBN / SLBM • Arihant SSBN development (3+ expected) • K-15/K-4 SLBM development • Dhanush SLBM development Cruise Missiles • GLCM (Nirbhay) development* Infrastructure • Two plutonium producon reactors developing

* Reported by news media but not listed in 2013 NASIC report.

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 36 www.fas.org Israel: Modernizaon

IRBM • Jericho III IRBM development? SSG / SLBM • Dolphin SSG fielding • SLCM (Popeye Turbo/Harpoon) rumored* Bomber • F-35A acquision

* Reported by news media but denied by officials. US public intelligence reports omit references to Israeli nuclear forces

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 37 www.fas.org North Korea: Modernizaon*

ICBM / IRBM / MRBM • No Dong MRBM fielding • Musudan IRBM in development • Hwasong-13 (KN-08) ICBM in development (fielding?) • Taepo Dong 2 SLV/ICBM in development

SSBN/SLBM

Cruise Missiles • KN-09 coastal defense cruise missile in development ?** Infrastructure • Yongbyon plutonium producon reactor re-start • Uranium enrichment producon construcon

* Despite three underground nuclear tests, there is no known public evidence that North Korea has miniaturized its test devices sufficiently for delivery by ballisc missiles ** Listed by 2013 AFGSC briefing but not in 2013 NASIC report. 2014 update of AFGSC does not list KN-09

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 38 www.fas.org NATO: Modernizaon

• Modificaon of B61 bomb from “dumb” bomb to guided, standoff B61-12 with guided tail kit assembly that increases targeng accuracy and efficiency: one type can cover all bomb missions (taccal as well as strategic)

! Integraon on F-15E in 2013-2018

! Integraon on F-16 in 2015-2018

! Integraon on PA-200 in 2015-2017

• B61-12 First Producon Unit in 2020

• Addion of nuclear-capability to F-35A II Lightning fighter-bomber

! Integraon of B61-12 in 2015-2021

! Delivery to Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey (and Israel?)

• B61-12 will also be integrated onto strategic bombers (B-2 and new LRS-B)

• Upgrade of storage sites and handling

• B61-12 cost: more than a decade worth of European Reassurance Iniaves

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 39 www.fas.org Conclusions and Recommendaons

• Global nuclear arsenals have declined significantly but huge inventories remain

• The pace of reducons is slowing down; no negoaons about addional cuts

• Despite talk of reducons and disarmament, no nuclear-armed country has presented plan to do so • All nuclear-armed states (and many of their allies) connue to aribute importance to nuclear weapons

• All nuclear-armed states have extensive and expensive modernizaon programs underway

• Modernizaons drive suspicion, worst-case planning, and nuclear compeon

• Modernizaons slow or hinder nuclear disarmament efforts

• Connued modernizaons and intensions to retain nuclear weapons indefinitely contradict NPT Arcle VI • Arms control has been focused on numerical, but constraints on modernizaons are needed to avoid undercung arms control process

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2015 | Slide 40