Case Study: Syncrude Tar Sands Incident, Fort McMurray Canada
Denis Su-Feher & Lin Zhao CHEN PhD Students Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center Outline
• Syncrude Overview
• Sequence of Events
• Investigation Findings
• Analysis
• Recommendations
Syncrude Oil Sands Facility in northern Alberta1
2 Syncrude Oil Sands Overview2,3
• Built in 1964 • Location: Fort McMurray, Canada • Date: August 15, 1984 • Fluid Coker 8-2 • 82,000 barrels per day
Syncrude Coker Unit2
3 Sequence of Events
Operational Maintenance Incident Problems
4 Operational Problems: Up to 19793
High solid level ~2000 Plugging in in cyclone external multiple separators contractors pipelines hired to fix various issues Crash Inefficient shutdown in Operations cold weather External maintenance contractor hired to clean slurry recycle line 5 Maintenance Plan: January 19793
Carbon Steel was used instead!
Remove 18” length of Clean pipeline with Re-assembled slurry 6” diameter 5% • • high pressure hot line with chrome chrome steel recycle water/caustic wash steel pup line via cold cut
Weld chrome steel Test weld for Insulate pipe and pup to chrome steel hardness bring coker online pipeline
6 Incident: August 15-16,19843,4 • August 15 – 9:30 PM: Carbon steel pup piece ruptured – 86 barrels per minute of 374oC hot recycle slurry and bitumen released – Subsequent fire burned out of control for two hours • August 16 – 1:20 AM: Fire extinguished – 3:30AM: All clear sounded
7 Mitigation3,5
• Coker feed immediately isolated • Emergency response significantly minimized losses
8 Aftermath3
• Zero fatalities • One reported temporary hearing loss • 2760 barrels of liquid hydrocarbon released - Majority burned or cleaned up • $100 million in property damage • Facility shutdown for 121 days • Several hundred million dollars in lost revenue
9 Investigation Findings: Immediate Causes3
• 1979 - Chrome steel pup was improperly tagged and secured - Carbon steel installed instead of chrome steel • 1984 - Rupture occurred at the mid-point on the gravitational side where the wall thickness was 0.038” (originally 0.28”) - Wall thinning was a result of hot sulphidation corrosion
10 Investigation Findings: Basic Causes3
1. Lack of material control - Lack of material identification, storage, tracking
- Poor housekeeping during shutdown Chrome Steel6 - Inadequate lay down area 2. Lack of change/risk management - Failure to identify key hazards
Carbon Steel7
11 Investigation Findings: Basic Causes3
3. Lack of proper procedures - Safe work permit system - Critical work/welding - Double checking standards 4. Premature transition of maintenance responsibility - Limited on site experience and expertise - Reactionary attitude of original construction contractor
12 Investigation Findings: Basic Causes3
5. Limited investigation of maintenance contractor competence and compatibility - Site experience (Extreme temperature) - Familiarity with workforce - Scale
13 Investigation Findings: Basic Causes3
6. Miscommunication between contractors and Syncrude - Scale - Confusion due to unplanned shutdown - Lack of leadership and supervision - Scope of contract and alignment of objectives
14 Analysis • Bitumen and sulphidation corrosion
- Bitumen(Asphalt): Viscous liquid/semi-solid petroleum, residues of vacuum cracking
- Sulfidation corrosion: Prevalent phenomenon in refinery that occurs in oil containing sulfur species between 230 °C and 425 °C
- Corrosion progresses in the steels via a film on the surface8
Bitumen main composition9 Element Concentration(%) C 80.2 -84.3 • Naphthene aromatics H 9.8 – 10.8 • Polar aromatics/carboxylic acids S 0.9 – 6.6 • Saturated hydrocarbons N 0.2 -1.2 • Asphaltenes … …
pseudo-passive film 15 Analysis • Sulphidation corrosion - Cr, Si, Mo significantly inhibit sulfidation corrosion, carbon steel has Cr up to 1%
- The corrosion resistance of carbon steel is marginal at 316 °C (<374 °C )
Modified McConomy curves to predict sulfidation corrosion10
374 °C
Calculated Sulphidation corrosion (5 yr) = 7 mm (carbon steel), 1.9 mm (5% chrome steel) Measured wall thickness reduction= 0.24 inch = 6.15 mm (carbon steel) 16 Analysis
• If PSM had been installed
Process Safety • Corrosivity data Information • Material of construction
Contractors • Operation limits • Emergency shutdowns Training Employee Participation Procedure • Initial Training • Information access • Refresher Training • Consultation • Employer’s evaluation • PHA development • Other PSM elements • HAZOP • FMEA • Inspection and testing • Engineering controls • Spare parts Mechanical Integrity PHA 17 Analysis
• Why and how PSM and employee participation (EP) can help - Workers run process and equipment everyday - Valuable, specified first-hand knowledge - Notice trends and problems PSM Elements Employee Participation Syncrude Case
Corrosivity of pipe materials Identify missing safety information Information Pipe construction materials and specification
Operators and maintenance personnel Proper procedure and controls under cold weather Procedure initiate the safe work practices Emergency shutdown avoided
Help identify hazards present Potential corrosion identified and risk assessed PHA Develop scenarios
Give advice on Contractor Maintenance team proper trained per regulation frequency/content/adequacy of Right type of piece installed Training operational training
… … …
Do current regulations give clear instruction on EP implementation? 18 Analysis
• United States process safety management system (PSM) - 29 CFR 1910.119 - Process safety management of highly hazardous chemicals
• Canada health and safety management system (HSMS)
- ILO Guidelines on OSH-MS (International Labour Organization) - OHSAS 18001:2007 (Occupational Health and Safety Assessment Series) - CSA: Z1000-14 (Canadian Standards Association )
• Key elements in common - Employee/worker participation - Hazard identification - Training - Management of change - Emergency preparedness and response - Investigation 19 Analysis
• Employee participation in various management systems (US and CA) • OSHA 1910.11911: - Written plan of action to implement the employee participation - Consult with employees on the conduct and development of PHA and other elements - Access to PHA and to all other information required to be developed by the standard
• ILO-OSH12: Section 3.2 - Ensure workers are consulted, informed and trained on all aspects of OSH - Establishment and efficient functioning of health and safety committee - Arrange for worker to have the time and resources to participate
• OHSAS 1800113: Section 4.4.3 - Establish a procedure for communication, participation and consultation - Involve in hazard identification, risk assessment, incident investigation, review policies
• CSA Z1000-1414: Section 4.2.3 - Ensure active participation of workers at all levels - Involve in planning, implementation, evaluation, corrective action, and preventive action - Provide workers with timely access to information for ensuring participation in the OHSMS - Encourage worker participation by identifying and removing barriers, engaging existing 20 committees Analysis
• Effective employee participation
• Definition of employee(worker):
- "Employee" means an employee of an employer who is employed in a business of his employer which affects commerce(e-CFR 1910.2.). - Direct impact on the process - Supervisors, managers, team leaders, contractors, service providers
• Plan
- Clarification of actions - Procedure for effective communication, participation and consultation - How each PSM element is accomplished
21 Analysis
• Effective employee participation
• Access to information (PSI): - Education and awareness of PSM - Levels of access - Timeliness notification of updates/changes
• Consultant on PSM elements:
- Awareness of process information - PHA team(safety expertise and process knowledge) - Developing procedure Accountability - MI - Contractors - Training
22 Recommendations • Syncrude case
- Effective PSM - Employee participation - Material control - Quality assurance - Maintenance procedure - Contractor selection
• PSM and employee participation - Access to information - Accountability of involvement - Updates and continuous improvement
23 References
1. J. McIntosh, "Explosion, fire at Syncrude oilsands facility in northern Alberta," CTV News, 5 August 2005. [Online]. Available: https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/explosion-fire-at-syncrude-oilsands-facility-in-northern-alberta-1.3324966. [Accessed 15 February 2018]. 2. New Energy and Fuel, "Making Syncrude," New Energy and Fuel, 12 August 2009. [Online]. Available: http://newenergyandfuel.com/http:/newenergyandfuel/com/2009/08/12/making-syncrude/. [Accessed 15 February 2018]. 3. L. Wilson, D. McCutcheon and M. Buchanan, Industrial Safety and Risk Management, Alberta: University of Alberta, 2003. 4. CBC California, "Fire, explosion at Syncrude plant north of Fort McMurray," CBC California, 14 March 2017. [Online]. Available: http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/syncrude-explosion-fire-mildred-fort-mcmurray-1.4025069. [Accessed 2018 March 2018]. 5. D4H Technologies, "Private Emergency Response. Who’s Qualified?," D4H Technologies Limited, 2018. [Online]. Available: https://www.d4htechnologies.com/blog/post/20140808-private-emergency-response-whos-qualified. [Accessed 1 March 2018]. 6. AliExpress, "[CM626ZZ]Free Shipping 10pcs chrome steel Gcr15 160026ZZ 626zz 626-2z 626-zz ball bearing automotive bearing 6*19*6mm," KOKAL, 2018. [Online]. Available: https://www.aliexpress.com/item/CM626ZZ-Free-Shipping-10pcs-chrome-steel-Gcr15- 160026ZZ-626zz-626-2z-626-zz-ball - bearing/32817142453.html?ws_ab_test=searchweb0_0,searchweb201602_1_10152_10151_10065_10344_10130_10068_10324_10342 _10547_10325_10343_10546_103. [Accessed 1 May 2018]. 7. Ebay, "20x Deep V Groove 3x12x4mm Guide Wire Line Pulley Rail Track Ball Bearing," ilooke, 2018. [Online]. Available: https://www.ebay.com/p/20x-Deep-V-Groove-3x12x4mm-Guide-Wire-Line-Pulley-Rail-Track-Ball-Bearing/1262977713. [Accessed 1 May 2018]. 8. Rebak, R. B. (2011). Sulfidic corrosion in refineries–a review. Corrosion Reviews, 29(3-4), 123-133. 9. Goodrich, J. L., Goodrich, J. E., & Kari, W. J. (1986). Asphalt composition tests: their application and relation to field performance. Transportation Research Record, (1096). 10. McConomy, H. F. (1963, May). High-temperature sulfidic corrosion in hydrogen-free environment. In API Proceedings (Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 78-96). Washington, DC: API. 11. 1910.119 - Process safety management of highly hazardous chemicals. 12. ILO, I. (2001). Guidelines on occupational safety and health management systems. ILO-OSH. 13. BS OHSAS 18001 Occupational Health and Safety 14. CAN/CSA-Z1000-14 - Occupational health and safety management
24 Thank you! Questions and Comments? Backup Slides
26 Similar Incidents
• 2009 Silver Eagle Refinery Explosion, Woods Cross, UT - 10-inch pipeline failure due to sulphidation corrosion - Grade T12 alloy steel (1%-1.5% Cr) - Wall thickness never inspected between 1993-2009
• 2012 Chevron Refinery Pipe Rupture and Fire, Richmond, CA - A catastrophic failure occurs at an 8” side-cut pipe on distillation tower at 640F - Sulphidation corrosion identified in 2002, Upgrade and 100% inspection denied in 2006 and 2011, Pipeline ruptured in 2012 - 6 injured
• 2017 Syncrude Pipeline Rupture, Fort McMurray, Canada - Pipeline failure in upgrader unit - Release of naphtha, fire and explosion - One injured • http://www.csb.gov/silver-eagle-refinery-flash-fire-and-explosion-and-catastrophic-pipe-explosion/ 27 • http://www.csb.gov/chevron-refinery-fire/ • https://globalnews.ca/news/3309676/fire-reported-at-syncrude-facility-north-of-fort-mcmurray/ API Standards
• API RP 2200 - Repairing Hazardous Liquid Pipelines
• API RP1106 - Managing System Integrity for Hazardous Liquid Pipelines
• API SPEC 6D - Specification for Pipeline and Piping Valves
• API RP 939-C - Guidelines for Avoiding Sulfidation (Sulfidic) Corrosion Failures in Oil Refineries
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