Inquiry Into the Boipatong Massacre Vereeniging Date

INQUIRY INTO THE BOIPATONG MASSACRE

VEREENIGING DATE; 1992-08-05

MEMBERS OF THE HIS LORDSHIP MR JUSTICE GOLDSTONE COMMISSION: ADV. D.J. ROSSOUW (SC) (Vice Chairman)

ADV M.N.S. SITHOLE (SC)

ASSESSOR; HIS LORDSHIP MR JUSTICE BAGWATHI, FORMER CHIEF JUSTICE OF INDIA

ON BEHALF OF:

ISCOR LTD ADV. FABRICIUS ADV HAYCOCK

KWAZULU GOVERNMENT: ADV W.J.L. VISSER (SC)

INKATHA FREEDOM MR M. MOSSELSON PARTY:

HOSTEL DWELLERS: ADV. V. BOTHA MS F.J. van der WESTHUIZEN ♦sr SOUTH AFRICAN ADV A.W. MOSTERT (SC) DEFENCE FORCE: ADV D. PRETORIUS

MINISTER FOR LAW AND ADV P.A. HATTINGH (SC) ORDER; THE SOUTH ADV W.L. WEPENER AFRICAN POLICE: ADV J.L.C.J. VAN VUUREN

PWV REGION OF THE ADV A. CHASKALSON (SC) AFRICAN NATIONAL ADV D. KUNY (SC) CONGRESS; ANC ADV K.S. TIP (VAAL) AND THE VAAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES:

THE COMMISSION: ADV J.J. DU TOIT

VOLUME 1

(Pages 1 - 30)

DATAVYF (PTY) LTD L030792

STATEMENT READ BY MR JUSTICE R J GOLDSTONE AT THE COMMISSION’S PRELIMINARY HEARING INTO THE ROIPATONG MASSACRE HELD AT PRETORIA ON MONDAY 6 JULY 1992

A. ENQUIRIES BY THE COMMISSION

The Commission consists of five members and a small staff. It is

obviously unable to enquire into every one of the many tragic

incidents of violence which regrettably have become a daily occur

rence in South Africa. In deciding which incidents to investigate

the Commission has regard to many factors and primarily its most

important task which is to find ways and means of curbing viol

ence. When it declines to investigate any particular situation or

incident of violence in no way does it lack a full appreciation of

the personal and public tragedy associated with needless and often

mindless loss of life or serious injury. The Commission holds

preliminary enquiries in order to assess whether the issues are

such that a full enquiry is necessary having regard to the Commis sion's resources and terms of reference.

B. THE BOIPATONG ENQUIRY

1. Some incidents cry out for full and exhaustive enquiry. The

Boipatong massacre is one. The number of people who were murdered and injured, the personal tragedy of the bereaved families and the justified anger of all decent people demand answers to the ques- 2

tions which so obviously arise in relation to the events of

17 June 1992.

2. The legal representatives of the parties have assisted the

Commission with regard to framing terms of reference relating to

the enquiry. They are the following:

(a) The identity of the persons directly responsible for the massacre;

(b) The cause of the massacre and the nature, time and place of

the planning of the massacre and the persons responsible

for the massacre and the planning thereof;

Force who were in the vicinity of the KwaMadala Hostel im

mediately after the massacre;

(d) Whether any steps could or should have been taken by the

South African Police to prevent or overt the massacre;

(e) The nature and efficiency of the investigation by the South

African Police after the massacre;

(f) Steps which should be taken to prevent or overt any recur H rence of such acts of public violence.

3. With the concurrence of the Minister of Justice, the Commis

sion has decided that a Committee of the Commission should be

established to conduct the full enquiry. It will consist of

myself as chairman. The members will be Adv D J Rossouw SC and •

Adv M N S Sithole. Justice P N Bhagwati, the former Chief Justice

of India, will assist the Committee as an assessor. 3

4- All of the legal representatives appearing before the Commis

sion are agreed that they are not yet in a position to begin the

enquiry. it has been agreed that it will commence on 4 August

1 992 at 10 am at a venue to t>e announced.

5. In its Second Interim Report the commission recommended that

the Government empower it to offer adequate witness protection to

persons testifying before the Commission. the Minister of Justice

has informed the Commission that this recommendation has been

accepted and discussions are presently being conducted by the

Commission with officials of the Department of Justice with regard

to appropriate regulations. It is hoped that the regulations will be in force by 4 August 1992.

6. Justice Bhagwati has generously agreed to return to South

Africa in order to sit with the Committee. I would like to ex

press my sincere appreciation to him for agreeing to do so. The

Commission is indebted to him more especially as his wise counsel

and wide experience have already been of much value to the Commis sion .

C. GENERAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

1 • In view of the present climate of violence and political volatility in the country, the Commission has unanimously decided to make public its views on a number of issues. 4

Allegations of responsibiIjtv for vinlpnrp

2. With regard to the involvement in current violence of Govern

ment and the Security Forces different kinds of allegations have

ade by some political leaders and by some newspapers. They include:

Direct complicity in or planning of current violence by the

State President, members of the Cabinet and senior members of

the South African Police and Defence Force;

(b) Direct complicity in or planning of current violence by

members of the middle or lower ranks of the South African Police and Defence Force;

of the Cabinet to take adequate steps to prevent current violence;

(d) Unwillingness or inability by the gf Security Forces to prevent current violence.

3. No evidence has been submitted to the Commission which in any

way justifies allegations of any direct complicity in or planning

of current violence by the State President, any member of the

Cabinet or any highly placed officer in the South African Police or Defence Force. But if such evidence is submitted to the Com- mission it will be thoroughly investigated.

4. In the absence of such evidence the Commission considers that allegations to the effect that Government and Security Force 5

leaders are themselves directly responsible for the commission of

violence are unwise, unfair and dangerous. They are dangerous

particularly because they are likely to exacerbate the climate of

Violence and frustrate and retard attempts to curb violence.

5. Evidence in support of the other kinds of allegations con

cerning Government and Security Force involvement in the violence

has been received by the Commission. The serious acts of violence

committed by 32 Battalion in Phola Park has been reported by the

^ Commission to the State President, other evidence of misconduct

by members of the Police or Army are currently being heard and

considered by Committees of the Commission.

6. The Commission will continue to investigate allegations of

violence alleged to have been instigated by supporters of the

African National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party.

7- So, too, the Commission will continue to investigate any

allegations concerning the unwillingness or inability of the

# Security Forces to prevent violence and those relating to the

adequacy or sufficiency of steps taken by them to do so.

8. The Commission is of the view that in order for a Government

to gain the respect and support of its citizens whom they serve,

it must be able to demonstrate that it has full control of its

security forces. In turn the security forces must be able to

secure the lives and homes of the people. Such a state of affairs

cannot be brought about without active co-operation between the 0 6

security forces and the vast majority of the citizens and their

political representatives. How to bring about such a state of

affairs is the most urgent and daunting task of the Commission.

9. The Commission appeals to all the political leaders in South

Africa to actively assist it in this task.

Non-co-operation with the nnl-i^

^ 10. In its Second Interim Report the Commission set out a number

of reasons for the distrust and mistrust of the South African

Police by so many South Africans. The Commission remains deeply

aware and concerned at this state of affairs.

11. If acts of violence were to be committed by or with the

complicity or with the active support or connivance of members of

the South African Police, it could not be expected of the victims

violence to co-operate with the Police in subsequent enquiries

into the violence by the Police. The Government and the Security

Forces should therefore understand and appreciate the anger and

frustration of so many South Africans. It will take more than the

abolition of racial legislation and statements of good intention

to achieve racial and ethnic harmony in South Africa. Whether or

not groups of former Koevoet members employed by the South African

Police is involved in incidents of violence, the infamous reputa

tion of Koevoet is such that the very existence of such a group in

South Africa in 1992 is calculated to cause yet further distrust and suspicion of the security forces. The wisdom of employing

such a group or groups must be open to serious question.

12. But at the same time, in the current climate of distrust and

suspicion community leaders should be particularly careful not to

make allegations of police misconduct or complicity which are not

materially substantiated by facts.

Ignoring recommendations of the Commissinn

13. The Commission is distressed that some of the considered and

urgent recommendations made by it have been ignored. In particular it would refer to the following:

14. In its Second Interim Report the Commission that:

"Hostels are common to most of the worst areas of violence.

All hostels should immediately be adequately and securely

fenced. A strong and efficient police presence should ensure

that no arms are taken in or out of hostels. It should also

be in a position to protect all hostel dwellers from external attack."

The only response to date has been a statement on behalf of Gov ernment that R294 million has been allocated for the upgrading of hostels. As far as the Commission is aware no action has been taken to date. 15. The Commission's recommendations, made in January 1992,

concerning policing in Mooi River have been ignored. No reasons

have been furnished for so doing.

16. The Commission's recommendations concerning the deployment of

32 Battalion in peace keeping operations were met with what can

generously be described as an unhelpful response from a senior

member of the South African Defence Force. No reasons have been

furnished for ignoring the Commission's recommendations.

17. In December 1991, the Commission referred to the Attorney-Ge

neral of the Transvaal a prima facie case of involvement by

policemen in Schweizer-Reneke in an unsuccessful conspiracy to

murder an ANC leader in the town. Notwithstanding constant en

quiries by the Commission the police investigation has taken an

unacceptably long time. Eventually the Commission felt obliged to

call the investigating officer to testify in public and explain the delays.

18. The Commission by no means expects that recommendations made

by it should necessarily be accepted or implemented. It does

expect, however, that they will not be ignored, if they are not

accepted or not implemented the Commission believes that it and the public are entitled to be informed of that fact and of the reasons therefor.

19. If the Commission is to continue to serve any purpose it must retain such national and international credibility as it may have earned. To ignore its recommendations can only be calculated to

diminish if not destroy the credibility and effectiveness not only

of the Commission but also of the Government.

20. The Commission's recommendations concerning the bearing of

weapons in public has w t been particularly ^inadequately been implemented.

Mass art-inn

21. Public demonstration is a fundamental democratic right though

m times of political tension it may have the potential for viol

ence. For that reason, some months ago the Commission set up an

international panel of experts to assist it in making recommenda

tions to the State President on the rules and procedures which

should apply to public demonstrations, marches and picketing.

That panel will report in public in Cape Town on Thursday. It is

the hope of the Commission that at the end of the public debate

Which will follow the Report, an accord will be reached on such rules and procedures.

22. In the view of the Commission the right to public demonstra

tion is especially important at a time when the disenfranchised

majority of South Africans have no alternative peaceful means of

political action. But at the same time this right should not be

exercised in such a way that it is calculated to lead to violence. Appeal to leaders

23. The Commission appeal to all of our country's leaders to

spare no effort m re-establishing appropriate ways to continue

the search for a peaceful transition to a democratic form of

government. without it the efforts of people of peace will come

to nought and the activities of the instruments of the Peace

Accord will become irrelevant.

Anticipation findings of the Commission

24. The Commission has previously welcomed vigorous public debate

on matters referred to it for enquiry and on its reports. How

ever, it views with concern recent press comment which anticipates

findings which have to be made by the Commission. In particular

there has been comment on the credibility of witnesses who,have

testified before the Commission and findings have been stated in

mattershave yet to be decided by the Commission. This

practise is regrettable and it is hoped that it will not be re peated. “ 1 “ OPENING ADDRESS

CHAIRMAN; This inquiry regarding public violence and in

timidation was established to enquire into various aspects

of the Boipatong massacre which occurred on 17 June 1992.

Its members, apart from myself, are Adv D J Rossouw on my

right, the vice-chairman of the commission; and Adv. M N

S Sithole on my extreme left, a member of the commission.

We are privileged to have sitting with us as an assessor

Justice P M Bagwathi, the former Chief Justice of India.

I would like to thank Justice Bagwathi for again, at great

inconvenience, travelling to South Africa from his home (10) in Nu-Delhi in order to sit with us. It is deeply appre ciated. At this stage I would like to have formally on record the legal representation of the various parties.

Perhaps we can start on my left.

APPEARANCES ARE PLACED ON RECORD

CHAIRMAN: Very well. The terms of reference which were agreed upon are the following. They have been made public but 1 will read them out: To enquire into the following issues:

(a) the identity of the persons directly responsible (20)

for the massacre;

(b) the cause of the massacre and the nature, time and

place of planning of the massacre and the persons

responsible for the massacre and the planning there

of;

Defence Force who were in the vicinity of the Kwa-

Madala hostel immediately after the massacre;

(d) whether any steps could or should have been taken

by the South African Police to prevent or avert (30) 1,0136 . - 2 - OPENING ADDRESS

the massacre;

(e) the nature and efficiency of the investigation by the

South African Police after the massacre; and

(f) steps which would be taken to prevent or avert any

recurrence of such acts of public violence.

We have been informed informally in discussion with the

legal representatives that there are literally hundreds

of witnesses who could give evidence on one or more of the

terms of reference to which I have just referred. If we

were to hear all of those witnesses and evidence, we would(10)

require to sit here for many months. An inquiry of that

length would not, we believe, be in the interest of any

of the parties and would not assist the commission in re

lation to its primary task of finding ways and means of

curbing the violence. We have eight days available to us

in the present session of the committee, that is from

today until next Friday. We have held informal discussions with the legal representatives in order to decide how best to use this time. It has been decided that we will ini tially address two matters. The first relates to the (20) report of Dr P.A.J. Waddington on the evaluation of the investigation of the South African Police after the mas sacre. You will recall that he was assisted by two offi cers of the Metropolitan Police of London. That report was made public by the commission on 22 July 1992. The legal representatives of the South African Police had informed us that they will make available within the next few days the response of the South African Police to the Waddington report. That will be written document. The report has already become a public document and as soon as we (30)

receive/.. “ 3 - OPENING ADDRESS

receive the response from the South African Police that

too will become a public document.

What further enquiries will flow from the Waddington

report will obviously have to be determined in the light

of the response from the South African Police and that

is something on which the committee would like to hear

submissions during the course of the next few days at some

convenient time and we can then take a decision in that

regard.

The issue on which it has been decided to hear evi- (10)*

dence immediately is the alleged active involvement in the

massacre by members of the South African security forces,

the police and the army. In that regard a number of alle

gations are contained in a further document which has been

handed to the committee on behalf of the African National

Congress and the Vaal Council of Churches. Copies of that document are available. The response to it by the South

African police will similarly be made available. Both may be regarded as public documents.

In a short while I will be inviting the legal teams, (20) in particular those representing the African National Con gress, the South African Police, the South African Defence

Force and the hostel dwellers if they are in a position to assist us at this stage, to outline for the committee and for people present their case with regard to this first issue relating to the involvement of the security forces.

The decision to hear evidence immediately on this issue has been taken for a number of reasons and I refer to three.

Firstly, the importance of the issue from a public point of view is obvious. It is relevant to the national and (30)

international/.. 1•05 - 4 - OPENING REMARKS

international reputation of the South African Police and

the South African Defence Force. Allegations in various

forms concerning their involvement in the massacre have

received wide publication in both South African and fo reign media. Secondly, it would not be possible for this committee to address the question of the prevention of future incidents of this nature if the role played by the security forces is not ascertained and remains a matter of doubt. And thirdly, the allegations having been made, it is only fair and just to allow them to be tested and res- (10) ponded to by the legal representatives of the police and the defence force.

Finally, I would like to draw attention to the fact that any person who has relevant evidence on any matter, any relevant matter relating to the Boipatong massacre is entitled himself or herself to approach this committee and if if any such person wishes to do so, they should approach either Adv. Du Toit, our counsel; or Mr Glen

Cuthbertson who is the secretary of the commission. I would emphasise that any persons are not obliged only to (20) give evidence, only to approach the commission through one of the legal teams. The committee is accessible to any member of the public at any time. In addition, I would like to make it clear that such a person may, if they have good reason to do so, approach the committee on a basis of confidentiality and secrecy. If they require protection because they fear reprisals or intimidation, suitable steps can be taken in terms of powers which have recently been given to this commission, for the protection of witnesses.

In particular the commission is now enabled to arrange at (30)

no /. . A*u/ - 5 - OPENING ADDRESS

no cost to a witness, housing at a secret venue for an

appropriate period before the person gives evidence and for

an agreed appropriate period after the person has given

evidence. I would appreciate it if this aspect of the

proceedings is brought to the attention of the people of

Boipatong and to the residents of KwaMadala hostel.

I will then without further ado ask Mr Chaskalson

if he would outline the case of his clients with regard to

the issue which we are going to hear evidence about.

MR CHASKALSON: Thank you, Mr Chairman. We have sub- (10;

mitted detailed memoranda to the committee and the picture

which emerges as a result of evidence which we have gathered

and which will be made available to the commission, as well

as from a survey of a limited, a limited selection of re

cords which we have as yet been able to examine and in

this context I think I should tell you we have not yet

been able to examine any records from the South African

Defence Force but we have been told that those will be made available to us today, so I obviously cannot say any

thing about those records now. But the picture from the (20) limited records which we have seen and from the statements which have already been submitted to counsel for the com mission, or a selection of statements which have already been submitted to counsel is as follows:

First, there was an attack which was ruthless and which was carried out by assailants using panga's, spears, knives, kieries and firearms. The attack was random in the sense that its victims included elderly and young people, women, men, children and even infants. It involved murder, assault, abuse, looting and mindless damage to the (30)

property/.. ■4

1,09 ~ ~ OPENING ADDRESS

property and possession of the residents whose homes were

in the paths of the attackers.

Now Mr Chairman, it may be helpful if you could turn

to the very detailed memorandum which we put up. There is

map - that memorandum is 163 pages. At page 135 of that

memorandum there is a map. That map shows numbers. Al

though I must apologise for the fact that the numbers do

not appear well in the copies, they will help us to identify

places when witnesses refer to particular numbers as being

the places at which they were present. (10

CHAIRMAN: Yes, I think there is a similar and perhaps

clearer map - have you received the (intervenes)

MR CHASKALSON; I have seen it. It is unfortunately less

clear because it does not give any numbers.

CHAIRMAN: Oh, has it not got numbers?

MR CHASKALSON: So there is no way in which, if a witness

comes in to court and says I was no.X, you will not be able

to find it on that map.

CHAIRMAN: Oh, I see. Right.

MR CHASKALSON: So we will have to look at the map at (20)

page 135 of our bundle.

CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR CHASKALSON: You will also see the main focus of the

attack marked out with arrows on that map. You will see at

the bottom of the page the location, the direction of Slovo

Park; the map itself is of Boipatong. The arrows show the approximate route which must have been followed by the at tackers. That is the section of the most extensive damage though there will be evidence that there was damage else where. The damage was not confined to this area, but it (30)

shows /.. 1-10 . - 7 - OPENING ADDRESS

Jjhows a clear pattern and the evidence is that almost every

window of houses in this area marked with arrows were broken.

So we can see the attackers moved down these streets and

around that area which was marked with arrows on the map.

On that map also you will see black squares. Those black

squares are homes at which people were killed. One is in

correctly marked. Looking at the page on the left-hand

side of the page you will see Lekoa Street and you will

see Moshoeshoe Street. That is where the arrows begin go

ing in two directions. If you go down Moshoeshoe Street (10)

there is a black mark at 86. That is wrong, it should be

at 83. Otherwise I think we have correctly (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: So you say that should be?

MR CHASKALSON: At 83, two houses down. Now as I have

mentioned Mr Chairman, almost all the houses along that

route were attacked, some only by having their windows

broken but many by being entered, and there were also

attacks at other parts of the township. In some instan

ces houses were entered and it was there that the murder,

the assaults, the plunder and verbal abuse occurred. Slovo(20)

Park which does not appear on the map but was also subject ed to a similar attack, and you will see its location on

the map. There will also be witnesses from Slovo Park as well as Boipatong to talk about their experiences. But

in all over 300 homes were attacked that night. Not all of them as I have said were entered but in 300 homes damage was done by the smashing of windows and in some instances by, many instances by entering the homes and doing great damage inside.

Now more or less to the west of Boipatong, the (30)

township/.. -1-11 •* - 8 - OPENING ADDRESS ' township of Boipatong there is an Iscor hostel known as

the KwaMadala hostel. It was according to the evidence,

in fact an abandoned hostel in the sense that Iscor had

abandoned it but that it subsequently was occupied by sup

porters of the Inkatha Freedom Party. Major Davidson of

the police described it as having been privatised, whatever

that may mean. But the evidence shows that it was, or will

show that it was an Inkatha stronghold and that it had

been the focus of conflict for a long time prior to 17

June. That is relevant to both the issues which we are (10)

going to consider today. It was well-known that KwaMadala

hostel was the focus of conflict and there had been many

complaints concerning the hostel and many requests for it

to be addressed by the police and we will come to that

later, Mr Chairman.

Now the evidence given on behalf of the police at the

first hearing of the inquiry was that their investigations

proved unembiguously that the attack was by the residents

of the KwaMadala hostel on the residents of Boipatong and

Slovo Park; and the evidence made available by our (20)

clients to the commission supports that conclusion, but it

will go further than that. A number of witnesses will be made available to the commission to say that the attackers

included amongst their ranks some whites; that armoured vehicles of the type used by the South African security

forces were present in Boipatong at the time of the attack, but that no attempt was made by those personnel to prevent the attack.

There will also be evidence that a number of people who were clearly part of the attacking group, were seen t o (30) 1,12 ~ 9 ~ OPENING ADDRESS

«tr «V. be dropped off in Boipatong by an armoured vehicle. All ’> those matters will be dealt with by witnesses who have

already been made available to the commission and who have

been interviewed by counsel for the commission. It is clear

however, Mr Chairman, that most of the attackers were on

foot. A large group was seen crossing the - I think I

should say immediately that the document which has been

tendered to us by the Iscor representative will show that

^ group of approximately 800 people were seen in the vici

nity of the KwaMadala hostel just before 21:00. There is (10)

also evidence that, and here the time is a little uncer

tain but it seems to be between 21:30 and 22:00 that a

large group was seen crossing the Frikkie Meyer Boulevard

which is a main highway which lies between Boipatong and

KwaMadala. In other words, to get from KwaMadala to Boi

patong one has to cross the Frikkie Meyer Boulevard. They were seen crossing the Frikkie Meyer Boulevard from the Kwa

Madala side and proceeding towards Boipatong. As I say the exact time is difficult to fix but it seems that it was probably between 21:30 and 22:00. (20)

According to records which we have seen this incident was reported to the police; the actual crossing of the road by this large group of men was reported to the police at

Vanderbijlpark at 21:55, and the report indicates that it was reported by a motorist who, because of the presence of this large group crossing the road, decided that it was not safe for him to go to work, he went back to his house and immediately phoned the police. That is what the report records. At about 22:00 the record shows that reports of the attack started to come in to the police at the (30)

Vanderbijlpark/.. Collection Number: AK2672

Goldstone Commission BOIPATONG ENQUIRY Records 1990-1999

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