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Kurdistan's Secession from Iraq Is Not a Done Deal

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Kurdistan's Secession from Iraq Is Not a Done Deal October 15, 2017 11 Debate Iraq Kurdistan’s secession from Iraq is not a done deal raq’s Kurds have voted obstacle to Kurdish independence. overwhelmingly to become in- Other countries were content to dependent. More than 90% of work in tandem with the national James Snell those who voted backed seces- Iraqi government to make full inde- is a British journalist. sion. This confident margin of pendence less likely. Knights said: victory does not translate into “Turkey is following Baghdad’s lead international confidence. The at present and there is a desire in IUnited States repeatedly attempted Ankara to teach the Kurds a lesson to dissuade the leaders of the Kurd- and show Baghdad that Turkey is a ish Regional Government (KRG) partner in restraining a move to full from having the referendum at all. independence.” The government of Iraq did not Punitive measures such as this look kindly on talk of independence dampen the tone in the KRG, which and attempted, mainly by issuing faces financial and governmental threats, to prevent the referendum crises. from taking place. Once the vote Abdulla Hawez, a researcher at was completed, Iraq’s leaders hard- King’s College London who looks ened their position. at Kurdish politics and society, said Other regional powers also lined that, despite the massive elec- up to condemn the possibility of toral victory for the independence secession. In this, Iran and Turkey campaign: “I think the majority are looking not only outward, but of Kurds are actually pessimistic. inward, assessing that their own There were already a large number Kurdish minorities may be embold- of Kurds who were not happy with ened by the Iraqi vote. the timing of the independence Despite the rhetoric of KRG [vote] and thought it is a politically President Masoud Barzani and driven decision by Barzani to stay in others, Iraqi Kurdish politicians are power.” cautious. Independence is not a He said there are threats from done deal. Baghdad and other countries that Michael Knights, a fellow at the have “imposed sanctions on KRG Washington Institute for Near East without Barzani being able to do Policy, said: “De jure independ- much; increasingly a number of ence — meaning Iraqi Kurdistan as people are questioning whether the a UN-recognised state — is not inevi- timing of the referendum was right table.” Instead, Knights suggested, and whether Barzani has an actual locked, “the region needs to have forces are not only partisan but other options remain. Iraqi Kurdis- plan to go further with his inde- the approval of at least one of the loyal to the Barzani and Talabani tan could end up “a stronger federal pendence project.” neighbouring countries (e.g. Tur- ruling families.” autonomous region inside Iraq” or Hawez noted that “there are key) to be able to export its natural For Iraqi Kurdistan to succeed as the Iraqi state could embrace “co- many complexities.” resources thus to economically an independent state, the guaran- federalism.” The practical business of seces- survive.” With Ankara aping Iraq’s tors of state security cannot be These outcomes are not popu- sion is made more difficult by the national government in denouncing beholden to two political families. lar. They are options that require problems that need to be resolved the referendum and the prospect An independent Kurdistan would dialogue and conciliation after a if Iraqi Kurdistan is to become of independence, this result seems face many challenges. Even to campaign that strained relations be- independent. These include the unlikely. secede, its leaders would need to tween the Kurds and Iraq’s Baghdad continuing fight against the Islamic Independence is also hampered find, with Iraq and other neighbour- government. State (ISIS); the status of Kurdish- by political dysfunction within ing countries, solutions to almost The Iraqi state has taken a hard occupied areas, such as Kirkuk Iraqi Kurdistan. As Hawez noted: intractable problems. None of this line on the possibility of Kurdish province, which have Arab majori- “Kurdistan doesn’t have any actual looks likely. The atmosphere inter- independence and has done so in ties but are not officially incorpo- functioning institutions.” nationally is hardly positive. This is For Iraqi Kurdistan concert with neighbouring coun- rated into the KRG; and economic “For instance, the KDP [Barzani’s beginning to sour the mood within tries. It has closed Kurdish airspace issues. Kurdistan Democratic Party] was the KRG. to succeed as an to outside travel, shutting down The status of Kurdistan’s natural easily able to unilaterally close Successfully carrying out and independent state, flights linking Erbil to the wider resources is vital. If an independent the parliament in 2014 when the winning the referendum was the the guarantors of world. Kurdistan could not control them, it legislators tried to discuss a new bill easy part for Barzani and other Under a Notice to Airmen, a tool would be unable to function. Hawez to change Kurdistan’s [presidential] Kurdish politicians. Independence state security used by governments to restrict said “the economy is almost all law and eventually topple Barzani,” may prove unworkably difficult, cannot be beholden flights, Kurdish airspace could dependent on oil and gas.” he said. involving economic hardship, po- remain closed until December 29. Making use of these resources is This is exacerbated by institution- litical isolation and internal crisis if to two political This could prove an effective pun- essential. Hawez noted that given al problems within the military and Iraqi Kurdistan achieves independ- families. ishment from Baghdad and a real the fact that Kurdistan is land- police. Hawez said: “The security ence at all. The Iraqi Confederation Project: A story of greed and betrayal n 1994, opposition lead- cession of the Kurdish region. • Anbar District. insisted on having an independent ers in Iraq, those backed by This was because it was de facto • Holy Sites District (Karbala and Kurdistan. Consequently, the con- America as well as those independent and had no need for Najaf Al Ashraf). federation pact was dead and the Ibrahim al-Zobeidi backed by Iran or Syria, be- anyone’s blessing unless of course • Hillah and Qadisiyyah District. region was thrown in turmoil. gan selling the Iraqi Confed- it had been the intention of Kurd- • Wasit and Maysan District. Barzani’s move opened a Pan- is an Iraqi writer. eration project. The Kurds ish politicians all along to bleed • Dhi Qar and Muthanna District. dora’s box and pitted the Kurds and their Islamist allies plus the Iraqi state in stages and take • Basra District. and the Iraqis against each other. IAhmed Chalabi and his compan- advantage of its military and civil- Of course, all the sermonisers The former partners are on the ions envisioned a confederation ian means to lay the foundations in the two Kurdish parties, Dawa verge of starting a war against each between two territories — one Arab for a Kurdish state that would be Party, the Islamic Supreme Council other. The Kurds insist on their and one Kurdish — on the basis of exclusively under the heel of their of Al Hakim and the Chalabi gang right to self-rule and the Islamists one country. parties. immediately tore our proposal are invoking national unity and the Independent Iraqi intellectuals • It could be told from the project apart. They accused us of doubting constitution. The truth, however, looked at the project and turned proponents’ behaviour, speeches, the Iraqi opposition’s “patriotism” is that neither of the belligerents it down. They said they found it writings and reactions to the inde- and of belittling the confederation is sincere. The Barzani camp has dubious, misleading and doomed pendent Iraqi opposition that they project, so vital for Iraq, and of never been loyal to the Kurdish to fail. They warned that if it came had no intention of sharing power, deforming its essence. people, and Iranian Major-General to pass, the Iraqi people would except among themselves. They Since the end of the dictator- Qassem Soleimani’s fans never have to pay a painful and bloody planned to impose their author- ship in 2003 and up to September cared for Iraq’s national dignity price for it. ity on the Iraqi people through 25, 2017, all Iraqis, regardless of and integrity. In August 1994, I published in money, military force and foreign their sect, religion or ethnicity The overwhelming “yes” vote the Lebanese daily Al-Hayat an ar- backing. Their evil entente with Is- had endured the worst days of in the Kurdish referendum was to ticle in which I reiterated the broad lamists was clear. The latter would their lives under the “democratic show the world that the Kurds be- lines of the arguments against the close their eyes on the evil inten- federal” regime put in place by the lieve no less strongly in their right confederation project, highlighted tions and doings of both Kurdish seven main leaders of the ex-Iraqi to independence than Barzani the weak and dubious points in parties and the Kurds would keep opposition. That form of regime does but most of them voted for it and proposed an alternative quiet about the Islamists’ spolia- had been sold to the Iraqi people the dream of an independent state project. I was certain that the pro- tion of the Iraqi people and would as the best way to ensure the end and not for secession, at least not The Barzani camp confederation minions, along with not oppose placing Iraq under the of dictatorship, racism, sectarian in the foreseeable future. has never been loyal their US and Iranian backers, were power umbrella of the supreme tension, cronyism and corruption They understand that imposing going to loathe the alternative and leader in Iran.
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