Sri Lanka – JVP – Rajapakse Government – State Protection – Police
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Refugee Review Tribunal AUSTRALIA RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE Research Response Number: LKA17718 Country: Sri Lanka Date: 16 December 2005 Keywords: Sri Lanka – JVP – Rajapakse Government – State protection – Police This response was prepared by the Country Research Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Questions 1. Please provide an update on the status of the JVP in Sri Lanka? 2. How close is it to the new government? 3. Does it still have a clandestine military wing? 4. Can the police be relied upon to give any protection to former JVP members? 5. Is the police force politicised? RESPONSE 1. Please provide an update on the status of the JVP in Sri Lanka? The JVP (also known as the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna or People’s Liberation Front) is a legal political party in Sri Lanka. The leader of the party is Somawansa Amarasinghe and the general secretary is Tilvin Silva. JVP’s website is at http://www.jvpsrilanka.com (Szajkowski, Bogdan (ed) 2004, Revolutionary and Dissident Movements of the World, John Harper Publishing, 4th ed, London, pp.459-460 – Attachment 1; Office of the Commissioner of Elections 2005, ‘Political Parties’, (Sri Lanka) Department of Elections website, 5 October http://www.slelections.gov.lk/genaral/2004_results/general.html - Accessed 7 December 2005 – Attachment 2; ‘Interview: Introduction’ 2004, People’s Liberation Front website http://www.jvpsrilanka.com/interview/interview_with_siri_wstanderd.htm - Accessed 7 December 2005 – Attachment 3). The party has a continuing Marxist and pro-Chinese orientation. In respect of resolving the civil war the JVP supports administrative decentralisation for Tamil-dominated regions and nothing more (Szajkowski, Bogdan (ed) 2004, Revolutionary and Dissident Movements of the World, John Harper Publishing, 4th ed, London, p.460 – Attachment 1; Biswas, Soutik 2004, ‘Analysis: Peace process under shadow’, BBC News, 4 April http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3599037.stm – Accessed 7 December 2005 – Attachment 4). The JVP’s stronghold is in the Sinhalese-Buddhist dominated south (‘Politics: From prime minister to president’ 2005, Economist Intelligence Unit – Business Asia, 28 November – Attachment 5). There have been recent reports of demonstrations and attacks involving the JVP: • The JVP held a demonstration in August 2005 to protest killings by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE); at the demonstration JVP activists attacked and robbed a photographer. The photographer was then turned over to the police as a suspected LTTE member (Committee to Protect Journalists 2005, ‘Watchdog condemns attacks on Tamil media’ 6 September www.bbcmonitoringonline.com – Accessed 8 September 2005 – Attachment 6). • In August 2005 the LTTE attacked a JVP office in Kantale, near Trincomalee. Subsequently, there was a protest march against the attack (‘LTTE attacked JVP office to kill MP’ 2005, Asian Tribune, 10 August http://www.ds- osac.org/News/story.cfm?contentID=33923 - Accessed 11 August 2005 – Attachment 7). • In June/July 2005 there were JVP protests against the government’s proposed joint mechanism with the LTTE on post-tsunami aid distribution (Ratnatunga, Sinha 2005, ‘Gulf News: Police break up demonstration in Colombo’, Gulf News, 14 June – Attachment 8; ‘Sri Lanka: JVP launches campaign against CFA in south’, TamilNet, 25 July http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=15459 – Accessed 27 July 2005 – Attachment 9). • In March 2005 the JVP held a demonstration over the World Bank Colombo representative’s comments on the LTTE (‘Demonstration held against World Bank office in Sri Lanka’ 2005, Xinhua News Agency, 10 March – Attachment 10). See question 2 on the JVP’s relationship to the government. 2. How close is the JVP to the new government? The JVP has signed an agreement supporting the new president, Mahinsa Rajapakse. However, although the party is considered to be close to government it currently does not form a part of it. Some sources anticipate an early legislative election to lessen Rajapakse’s support for parties such as the JVP (see below). In January 2004 the then President Chandrika Kumaratunga (of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP)) signed an alliance agreement to form the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) with the JVP. In the April 2004 general elections the UPFA won 105 seats, eight short of a simple majority. In these elections the JVP had won 39 seats, up from the 16 seats won in December 2001 (‘Sri Lanka’ 2005, SBS World Guide, Hardie Grant Books, 13th ed, Prahran, pp.682-683 – Attachment 11; Szajkowski, Bogdan (ed) 2004, Revolutionary and Dissident Movements of the World, John Harper Publishing, 4th ed, London, pp.459-460 – Attachment 1; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2004, LKA42646.E - Sri Lanka: Current information about the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) (People's Liberation Front - PLF); violence, arrests and/or disappearances associated with demonstrations organized by the JVP; treatment of members of the JVP by authorities in recent years (2002-2004), 28 June – Attachment 12). As a result of the April 2004 general election the newly elected UPFA coalition comprised the SLFP, JVP and a number of other small, left-wing and nationalist groups. A key partner was the JVP. This was the first time that the JVP had been in government. The JVP had gained a strong foothold in parliament and gained political power by being part of a ruling coalition (‘Media situation report, Sri Lanka. May 2003 to April 2004’ 2004, International Freedom of Expression eXchange http://ifex.org/en/content/view/full/59774/ - Accessed 6 December 2005 – Attachment 13; Biswas, Soutik 2004, ‘Analysis: Peace process under shadow’, BBC News, 4 April http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3599037.stm – Accessed 7 December 2005 – Attachment 4). There were, however, differences in policies between the SLFP and JVP, for example, two positions on the peace process. One source noted that the JVP felt “choked with bureaucratic hurdles, corruption and lack of focus” (Biswas, Soutik 2004, ‘Analysis: Peace process under shadow’, BBC News, 4 April http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3599037.stm – Accessed 7 December 2005 – Attachment 4); Chandrasekharan, S. 2004, ‘Sri Lanka: Chandrika makes a tactical move: Update 67’, South Asia Analysis Group, 8 August http://www.saag.org/notes3/note235.html - Accessed 28 November 2005 – Attachment 14). In June 2005 the JVP withdrew from the government in protest at government plans for a tsunami aid deal with the LTTE. This left Kumaratunga with a minority government. JVP’s leader reportedly stated that some problems needed to be sorted out before it would consider rejoining the government. Currently the JVP has not rejoined the government (‘Sri Lanka split ‘not a disaster’’ 2005, BBC News, 16 June http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4100974.stm - Accessed 7 December 2005 – Attachment 15; ‘JVP to stay out of Lanka govt’ 2005, Hindustan Times, 24 November – Attachment 16; ‘Tigers and a hawk’ 2005, The Economist, 26 November, p.32 – Attachment 17). In September 2005, Mahinda Rajapakse of the SLFP, the then Prime Minister and presidential candidate, signed a memorandum of understanding with the JVP and the Buddhist Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU, National Heritage Party) obtaining their support for his election bid. He won the presidential election held on 17 November 2005 with 50.3% of the votes cast. The JVP reportedly aims to become the largest party in parliament and its alliance with Rajapakse may give the party greater influence over his future policy (‘Sri Lankan PM gets JVP support’ 2005, BBC News, 8 September http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4225698.stm - Accessed 7 December 2005 – Attachment 18; ‘Politics: From prime minister to president’ 2005, Economist Intelligence Unit – Business Asia, 28 November – Attachment 5). According to the Economist Intelligence Unit: In the pacts with the JVP and JHU, Mr Rajapakse agreed to insist that the ceasefire agreement with the LTTE be rewritten before starting peace talks, and that a federal solution to Tamil grievances would not be considered. (In his election manifesto, Mr Rajapakse also rejected the concept of a “traditional homeland” based on ethnic lines.) The pacts also in effect commit Mr Rajapakse to abolish and replace the post- tsunami operations management structure (P-TOMS). This mechanism was devised to enable the distribution in rebel-held areas of international aid pledged in the aftermath of the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. He has also raised the possibility of the resumption of a brokering role in the conflict for India, following criticism of the Scandinavian monitoring team for purportedly ignoring repeated violations of the ceasefire by the LTTE. Mr Rajapakse will now face the dilemma of whether to fulfil his pledges to his Sinhalese nationalist allies. If he reneges on his undertakings to his electoral allies in order to appease the Tigers, he risks courting civic unrest and instability in the Sinhalese Buddhist-dominated south, the stronghold of these hardline parties. Alternatively, he could attempt to alter the approach to negotiation that has been followed for the past five years, which would satisfy his allies but would risk precipitating a return to war with the LTTE (‘Politics: From prime minister to president’ 2005,