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Refugee Review Tribunal

AUSTRALIA

RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE

Research Response Number: LKA17718 Country: Date: 16 December 2005

Keywords: Sri Lanka – JVP – Rajapakse Government – State protection – Police

This response was prepared by the Country Research Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum.

Questions

1. Please provide an update on the status of the JVP in Sri Lanka? 2. How close is it to the new government? 3. Does it still have a clandestine military wing? 4. Can the police be relied upon to give any protection to former JVP members? 5. Is the police force politicised?

RESPONSE

1. Please provide an update on the status of the JVP in Sri Lanka?

The JVP (also known as the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna or People’s Liberation Front) is a legal in Sri Lanka. The leader of the party is Somawansa Amarasinghe and the general secretary is Tilvin Silva. JVP’s website is at http://www.jvpsrilanka.com (Szajkowski, Bogdan (ed) 2004, Revolutionary and Dissident Movements of the World, John Harper Publishing, 4th ed, London, pp.459-460 – Attachment 1; Office of the Commissioner of Elections 2005, ‘Political Parties’, (Sri Lanka) Department of Elections website, 5 October http://www.slelections.gov.lk/genaral/2004_results/general.html - Accessed 7 December 2005 – Attachment 2; ‘Interview: Introduction’ 2004, People’s Liberation Front website http://www.jvpsrilanka.com/interview/interview_with_siri_wstanderd.htm - Accessed 7 December 2005 – Attachment 3).

The party has a continuing Marxist and pro-Chinese orientation. In respect of resolving the civil war the JVP supports administrative decentralisation for Tamil-dominated regions and nothing more (Szajkowski, Bogdan (ed) 2004, Revolutionary and Dissident Movements of the World, John Harper Publishing, 4th ed, London, p.460 – Attachment 1; Biswas, Soutik 2004, ‘Analysis: Peace process under shadow’, BBC News, 4 April http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3599037.stm – Accessed 7 December 2005 – Attachment 4). The JVP’s stronghold is in the Sinhalese-Buddhist dominated south (‘Politics: From prime minister to president’ 2005, Economist Intelligence Unit – Business Asia, 28 November – Attachment 5).

There have been recent reports of demonstrations and attacks involving the JVP:

• The JVP held a demonstration in August 2005 to protest killings by the Liberation Tigers of (LTTE); at the demonstration JVP activists attacked and robbed a photographer. The photographer was then turned over to the police as a suspected LTTE member (Committee to Protect Journalists 2005, ‘Watchdog condemns attacks on Tamil media’ 6 September www.bbcmonitoringonline.com – Accessed 8 September 2005 – Attachment 6).

• In August 2005 the LTTE attacked a JVP office in Kantale, near . Subsequently, there was a protest march against the attack (‘LTTE attacked JVP office to kill MP’ 2005, Asian Tribune, 10 August http://www.ds- osac.org/News/story.cfm?contentID=33923 - Accessed 11 August 2005 – Attachment 7).

• In June/July 2005 there were JVP protests against the government’s proposed joint mechanism with the LTTE on post-tsunami aid distribution (Ratnatunga, Sinha 2005, ‘Gulf News: Police break up demonstration in ’, Gulf News, 14 June – Attachment 8; ‘Sri Lanka: JVP launches campaign against CFA in south’, TamilNet, 25 July http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=15459 – Accessed 27 July 2005 – Attachment 9).

• In March 2005 the JVP held a demonstration over the World Bank Colombo representative’s comments on the LTTE (‘Demonstration held against World Bank office in Sri Lanka’ 2005, Xinhua News Agency, 10 March – Attachment 10).

See question 2 on the JVP’s relationship to the government.

2. How close is the JVP to the new government?

The JVP has signed an agreement supporting the new president, Mahinsa Rajapakse. However, although the party is considered to be close to government it currently does not form a part of it. Some sources anticipate an early legislative election to lessen Rajapakse’s support for parties such as the JVP (see below).

In January 2004 the then President (of the (SLFP)) signed an alliance agreement to form the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) with the JVP. In the April 2004 general elections the UPFA won 105 seats, eight short of a simple majority. In these elections the JVP had won 39 seats, up from the 16 seats won in December 2001 (‘Sri Lanka’ 2005, SBS World Guide, Hardie Grant Books, 13th ed, Prahran, pp.682-683 – Attachment 11; Szajkowski, Bogdan (ed) 2004, Revolutionary and Dissident Movements of the World, John Harper Publishing, 4th ed, London, pp.459-460 – Attachment 1; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2004, LKA42646.E - Sri Lanka: Current information about the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) (People's Liberation Front - PLF); violence, arrests and/or disappearances associated with demonstrations organized by the JVP; treatment of members of the JVP by authorities in recent years (2002-2004), 28 June – Attachment 12). As a result of the April 2004 general election the newly elected UPFA coalition comprised the SLFP, JVP and a number of other small, left-wing and nationalist groups. A key partner was the JVP. This was the first time that the JVP had been in government. The JVP had gained a strong foothold in parliament and gained political power by being part of a ruling coalition (‘Media situation report, Sri Lanka. May 2003 to April 2004’ 2004, International Freedom of Expression eXchange http://ifex.org/en/content/view/full/59774/ - Accessed 6 December 2005 – Attachment 13; Biswas, Soutik 2004, ‘Analysis: Peace process under shadow’, BBC News, 4 April http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3599037.stm – Accessed 7 December 2005 – Attachment 4).

There were, however, differences in policies between the SLFP and JVP, for example, two positions on the peace process. One source noted that the JVP felt “choked with bureaucratic hurdles, corruption and lack of focus” (Biswas, Soutik 2004, ‘Analysis: Peace process under shadow’, BBC News, 4 April http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3599037.stm – Accessed 7 December 2005 – Attachment 4); Chandrasekharan, S. 2004, ‘Sri Lanka: Chandrika makes a tactical move: Update 67’, South Asia Analysis Group, 8 August http://www.saag.org/notes3/note235.html - Accessed 28 November 2005 – Attachment 14).

In June 2005 the JVP withdrew from the government in protest at government plans for a tsunami aid deal with the LTTE. This left Kumaratunga with a minority government. JVP’s leader reportedly stated that some problems needed to be sorted out before it would consider rejoining the government. Currently the JVP has not rejoined the government (‘Sri Lanka split ‘not a disaster’’ 2005, BBC News, 16 June http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4100974.stm - Accessed 7 December 2005 – Attachment 15; ‘JVP to stay out of Lanka govt’ 2005, Hindustan Times, 24 November – Attachment 16; ‘Tigers and a hawk’ 2005, The Economist, 26 November, p.32 – Attachment 17).

In September 2005, Mahinda Rajapakse of the SLFP, the then Prime Minister and presidential candidate, signed a memorandum of understanding with the JVP and the Buddhist (JHU, National Heritage Party) obtaining their support for his election bid. He won the presidential election held on 17 November 2005 with 50.3% of the votes cast. The JVP reportedly aims to become the largest party in parliament and its alliance with Rajapakse may give the party greater influence over his future policy (‘Sri Lankan PM gets JVP support’ 2005, BBC News, 8 September http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4225698.stm - Accessed 7 December 2005 – Attachment 18; ‘Politics: From prime minister to president’ 2005, Economist Intelligence Unit – Business Asia, 28 November – Attachment 5).

According to the Economist Intelligence Unit:

In the pacts with the JVP and JHU, Mr Rajapakse agreed to insist that the ceasefire agreement with the LTTE be rewritten before starting peace talks, and that a federal solution to Tamil grievances would not be considered. (In his election manifesto, Mr Rajapakse also rejected the concept of a “traditional homeland” based on ethnic lines.) The pacts also in effect commit Mr Rajapakse to abolish and replace the post- tsunami operations management structure (P-TOMS). This mechanism was devised to enable the distribution in rebel-held areas of international aid pledged in the aftermath of the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. He has also raised the possibility of the resumption of a brokering role in the conflict for , following criticism of the Scandinavian monitoring team for purportedly ignoring repeated violations of the ceasefire by the LTTE.

Mr Rajapakse will now face the dilemma of whether to fulfil his pledges to his Sinhalese nationalist allies. If he reneges on his undertakings to his electoral allies in order to appease the Tigers, he risks courting civic unrest and instability in the Sinhalese Buddhist-dominated south, the stronghold of these hardline parties. Alternatively, he could attempt to alter the approach to negotiation that has been followed for the past five years, which would satisfy his allies but would risk precipitating a return to war with the LTTE (‘Politics: From prime minister to president’ 2005, Economist Intelligence Unit – Business Asia, 28 November – Attachment 5).

Rajapakse’s electoral alliances have alienated people in the SLFP and the UPFA (‘Politics: From prime minister to president’ 2005, Economist Intelligence Unit – Business Asia, 28 November – Attachment 5).

Although the JVP is described as a strong ally of Rajapakse, there were no JVP appointments in the recently appointed 25-member cabinet. It was said that the JVP was offered five portfolios but disagreements led the party to decline them (‘Politics: From prime minister to president’ 2005, Economist Intelligence Unit – Business Asia, 28 November – Attachment 5; ‘New Sri Lanka cabinet appointed’ 2005, BBC News, 23 November http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4462538.stm - Accessed 7 December 2005 – Attachment 19).

Sources mention that Rajapakse’s appointment of the new cabinet may lead to an early parliamentary election to strengthen the representation of the SLFP and to lessen his dependence on his extremist allies (‘New Sri Lanka cabinet appointed’ 2005, BBC News, 23 November http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4462538.stm - Accessed 7 December 2005 – Attachment 19; ‘Tigers and a hawk’ 2005, The Economist, 26 November, p.32 – Attachment 17).

3. Does the JVP still have a clandestine military wing?

No information was found in the sources consulted on whether the JVP still has a clandestine military wing. There have been some reports over the past 18 months of JVP members involved in violent activities.

• In August 2005 a photographer was set upon and robbed at a JVP rally protesting killings by the LTTE. “JVP activists” gave the photographer to the police on suspicion of being an LTTE member. The photographer was released the next day (Committee to Protect Journalists 2005, ‘Watchdog condemns attacks on Tamil media’ 6 September www.bbcmonitoringonline.com – Accessed 8 September 2005 – Attachment 6).

• Following a number of attacks in Buddhist temples in April 1004, one monk feared that the JVP was going back to its earlier tactics (‘Sri Lankan monks seek police protection from Marxist attacks’ 2004, Agence France Presse, 26 April – Attachment 20).

• In March 2004 the JVP’s propaganda secretary made a threatening phone call to the chief editor of a Sri Lankan newspaper. The threat was on the basis that a political advertisement detrimental to the propaganda secretary was to appear in the newspaper (‘Media situation report, Sri Lanka. May 2003 to April 2004’ 2004, International Freedom of Expression eXchange http://ifex.org/en/content/view/full/59774/ - Accessed 6 December 2005 – Attachment 13).

4. Can the police be relied upon to give any protection to former JVP members?

No information was found in the sources consulted on whether the police could be relied upon to give any protection to former JVP members. The following information is useful.

In one recent incident it was reported that police provided protection to the JVP. Police, guarding a JVP office in the town Kantalai, shot and arrested a suspected LTTE for throwing a grenade at the office (‘Three hurt as suspected rebel hurls grenade at Marxist office in Sri Lanka’ 2005, Agence France Presse, 7 August – Attachment 21; ‘LTTE attacked JVP office to kill MP’ 2005, Asian Tribune, 10 August http://www.ds- osac.org/News/story.cfm?contentID=33923 - Accessed 11 August 2005 – Attachment 7).

One article states that a JVP member of parliament was attacked by a (UNP) parliamentary member. The incident was reported to the police; no information was provided on action taken (‘UNP MP accused of attacking JVP MP in Matara’ 2005, Colombo Page, 17 November http://www.colombopage.com/archive/November17135627RA.html - Accessed 12 December 2005 – Attachment 22).

The JVP website offers details about alleged violence against JVP members reported to the police. One of the reports states that no action was taken by the police. No information was given in the other two reports on what action was taken by police (‘Mahinda Wijesekera’s type of polling’, ‘UNP Goons attacked to JVP Members’ and “UNP Goons attacked Relief Workers’ (undated), JVP website http://www.jvpsrilanka.com/activities.htm - Accessed 14 December 2005 – Attachment 23).

More generally, in August 2001 DFAT advised that protection by law enforcement authorities is available to all citizens. However, the efficacy and reliability of the authorities responding to or investigating complaints is mixed (DIMIA Country Information Service 2001, Country Information Report No. 243/01 – Sinha Kodi Vyaparaya (sourced from DFAT advice of 20 August 2001), 24 August – Attachment 24).

The Asian Human Rights Commission also reported in November 2004 (researcher’s emphasis in bold type):

The country has also too long neglected the overwhelming crisis in its policing system. The misuse of police institutions for political purposes, including the causing of disappearances and other acts of violence, has deprived the country of a reliable means for public protection. It is openly acknowledged that the criminal investigation system is totally defective and lacking in virtually everything: qualified investigators, fingerprint analysis and forensic science equipment, even basic facilities for communication like mobile phones and fax machines (Asian Human Rights Commission 2004, Judge’s murder is the price for neglect of the Sri Lankan judiciary, 20 November – Attachment 25).

5. Is the police force politicised?

Country information indicates that, although attempts have been made to depoliticise the police force, there remains a degree of politicisation. Recent news articles in the Sri Lankan press note that the police force is politicised. One article notes that politicians “interfere severely with police activities” (‘Highlights: Sri Lankan Press’ 2005, AOL CountryWatch, 4 August http://aol.countrywatch.com/aol_wire.asp?vCOUNTRY=161&UID=1630707 – Accessed 6 December 2005 – Attachment 26; ‘Elections: Anxieties and hopes’ 2005, Sunday Observer, 4 September http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2005/09/04/editorial.html - Accessed 13 December 2005 – Attachment 27).

In 2004, the Chairman of the National Police Commission (NPC) reportedly stated that “often politicians manipulated the police for their own personal ends”. The NPC was formed with the aim to create “an independent and efficient police service”. The NPC was established by the 17th Amendment of the Sri Lankan Constitution enacted in September 2001. It was passed with the intention to depoliticise the country’s main institutions. According to the Asian Human Rights Commission, the NPC has a long way to go to fulfil its constitutional mandate (Asian Human Rights Commission and Law & Society Trust 2005, Prevalence of Torture in Sri Lanka; Persisting Problems and Outstanding Issues, 7 October http://www.alrc.net/MSWord/AHRC-LST_CAT_SriLanka_2005.doc - Accessed 13 December 2005, para. 6.2, footnote 55 – Attachment 28; ‘Editorial, The Island: Loopholes in the 17th Amendment’ 2001, website, 26 September http://www.priu.gov.lk/news_update/EditorialReviews/erev200109/20010926editorialreview. html - Accessed 13 December 2005 – Attachment 29; Asian Human Rights Commission 2004, Political attacks on the NPC and election violence in Sri Lanka, 2 September http://www.ahrchk.net/statements/mainfil e.php/2004statement/200/ - Accessed 3 September 2004 – Attachment 30).

The Asian Human Rights Commission also stated that there was “decades-old manipulation of the police by political interests” (Asian Human Rights Commission 2004, Global alert on rapidly degenerating security situation in Sri Lanka, 22 November http://www.ahrchk.net/statements/mainfile.php/2004state ment/220 - Accessed 23 November 2004 – Attachment 31).

In 2003 DFAT stated that the operation of the police force is often politicised. Earlier, in 2001, DFAT gave the example that, during elections, police were known to be used by the ruling party for political purposes and to turn a blind eye to acts of violence against opponents. It also mentioned that, anecdotally, people associated with opposition parties have occasionally found it difficult to obtain police protection or to access justice (DIMIA Country Information Service 2003, Country Information Report No. 97/03 – Persecution because of political affiliations (sourced from DFAT advice of 23 July 2003), 25 July – Attachment 32; DIMIA Country Information Service 2001, Country Information Report No. 243/01 – Sinha Kodi Vyaparaya (sourced from DFAT advice of 20 August 2001), 24 August – Attachment 24).

List of Sources Consulted

Internet Sources: Government Information & Reports Non-Government Organisations Region Specific Links Search Engines Google search engine http://www.google.com.au/

Databases: Public FACTIVA Reuters Business Briefing DIMIA BACIS Country Information REFINFO IRBDC Research Responses (Canada) RRT ISYS RRT Country Research database, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, US Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. RRT Library FIRST RRT Library Catalogue

List of Attachments

1. Szajkowski, Bogdan (ed) 2004, Revolutionary and Dissident Movements of the World, John Harper Publishing, 4th ed, London, pp.459-460. (RRT Library)

2. Office of the Commissioner of Elections 2005, ‘Political Parties’, (Sri Lanka) Department of Elections website, 5 October. (http://www.slelections.gov.lk/genaral/2004_results/general.html - Accessed 7 December 2005)

3. ‘Interview: Introduction’ 2004, People’s Liberation Front website. (http://www.jvpsrilanka.com/interview/interview_with_siri_wstanderd.htm - Accessed 7 December 2005)

4. Biswas, Soutik 2004, ‘Analysis: Peace process under shadow’, BBC News, 4 April. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3599037.stm – Accessed 7 December 2005)

5. ‘Politics: From prime minister to president’ 2005, Economist Intelligence Unit – Business Asia, 28 November. (FACTIVA)

6. Committee to Protect Journalists 2005, ‘Watchdog condemns attacks on Tamil media’ 6 September. (www.bbcmonitoringonline.com – Accessed 8 September 2005) (CISNET Sri Lanka CX133859)

7. ‘LTTE attacked JVP office to kill MP’ 2005, Asian Tribune, 10 August. (http://www.ds-osac.org/News/story.cfm?contentID=33923 - Accessed 11 August 2005) (CISNET Sri Lank CX131180)

8. Ratnatunga, Sinha 2005, ‘Gulf News: Police break up demonstration in Colombo’, Gulf News, 14 June. (FACTIVA)

9. ‘Sri Lanka: JVP launches campaign against CFA in south’, TamilNet, 25 July. (http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=15459 – Accessed 27 July 2005) (CISNET Sri Lanka CX128711)

10. ‘Demonstration held against World Bank office in Sri Lanka’ 2005, Xinhua News Agency, 10 March. (FACTIVA)

11. ‘Sri Lanka’ 2005, SBS World Guide, Hardie Grant Books, 13th ed, Prahran, pp.682- 683. (RRT Library) 12. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2004, LKA42646.E - Sri Lanka: Current information about the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) (People's Liberation Front - PLF); violence, arrests and/or disappearances associated with demonstrations organized by the JVP; treatment of members of the JVP by authorities in recent years (2002-2004), 28 June. (REFINFO)

13. ‘Media situation report, Sri Lanka. May 2003 to April 2004’ 2004, International Freedom of Expression eXchange. (http://ifex.org/en/content/view/full/59774/ - Accessed 6 December 2005)

14. Chandrasekharan, S. 2004, ‘Sri Lanka: Chandrika makes a tactical move: Update 67’, South Asia Analysis Group, 8 August. (http://www.saag.org/notes3/note235.html - Accessed 28 November 2005)

15. ‘Sri Lanka split ‘not a disaster’’ 2005, BBC News, 16 June. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4100974.stm - Accessed 7 December 2005)

16. ‘JVP to stay out of Lanka govt’ 2005, Hindustan Times, 24 November. (FACTIVA)

17. ‘Tigers and a hawk’ 2005, The Economist, 26 November, p.32. (RRT Library)

18. ‘Sri Lankan PM gets JVP support’ 2005, BBC News, 8 September. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4225698.stm - Accessed 7 December 2005)

19. ‘New Sri Lanka cabinet appointed’ 2005, BBC News, 23 November. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4462538.stm - Accessed 7 December 2005)

20. ‘Sri Lankan monks seek police protection from Marxist attacks’ 2004, Agence France Presse, 26 April. (FACTIVA)

21. ‘Three hurt as suspected rebel hurls grenade at Marxist office in Sri Lanka’ 2005, Agence France Presse, 7 August. (FACTIVA)

22. ‘UNP MP accused of attacking JVP MP in Matara’ 2005, Colombo Page, 17 November. (http://www.colombopage.com/archive/November17135627RA.html - Accessed 12 December 2005)

23. ‘Mahinda Wijesekera’s type of polling’, ‘UNP Goons attacked to JVP Members’ and “UNP Goons attacked Relief Workers’ (undated), JVP website. (http://www.jvpsrilanka.com/activities.htm - Accessed 14 December 2005)

24. DIMIA Country Information Service 2001, Country Information Report No. 243/01 – Sinha Kodi Vyaparaya (sourced from DFAT advice of 20 August 2001), 24 August. (CISNET Sri Lanka CX56581)

25. Asian Human Rights Commission 2004, Judge’s murder is the price for neglect of the Sri Lankan judiciary, 20 November. (CISNET Sri Lanka CX108024)

26. ‘Highlights: Sri Lankan Press’ 2005, AOL CountryWatch, 4 August. (http://aol.countrywatch.com/aol_wire.asp?vCOUNTRY=161&UID=1630707 – Accessed 6 December 2005) 27. ‘Elections: Anxieties and hopes’ 2005, Sunday Observer, 4 September. (http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2005/09/04/editorial.html - Accessed 13 December 2005)

28. Asian Human Rights Commission and Law & Society Trust 2005, Prevalence of Torture in Sri Lanka; Persisting Problems and Outstanding Issues, 7 October. (http://www.alrc.net/MSWord/AHRC-LST_CAT_SriLanka_2005.doc - Accessed 13 December 2005, para. 6.2, footnote 55)

29. ‘Editorial, The Island: Loopholes in the 17th Amendment’ 2001, Government of Sri Lanka website, 26 September. (http://www.priu.gov.lk/news_update/EditorialReviews/erev200109/20010926editoria lreview.html - Accessed 13 December 2005)

30. Asian Human Rights Commission 2004, Political attacks on the NPC and election violence in Sri Lanka, 2 September. (http://www.ahrchk.net/statements/mainfil e.php/2004statement/200/ - Accessed 3 September 2004) (CISNET Sri Lanka CX101900)

31. Asian Human Rights Commission 2004, Global alert on rapidly degenerating security situation in Sri Lanka, 22 November. (http://www.ahrchk.net/statements/mainfile.php/2004statement/220 - Accessed 23 November 2004) (CISNET Sri Lanka CX108206)

32. DIMIA Country Information Service 2003, Country Information Report No. 97/03 – Persecution because of political affiliations (sourced from DFAT advice of 23 July 2003), 25 July. (CISNET Sri Lanka CX82788)