Those Weren't the Days
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Those Weren't the Days Nixon has been looking better lately connpared to George W. Bush. But in fact he's as bad as we rennember. By Jacob Heilbrunn iberal historians have begun waxing nostalgic about past Republican presidents, Lextolling them as presenting a stark contrast to the current occupant of the White House. Consider Ronald Reagan. Deemed a heartless and dangerous conser vative in the 1980s, he is now being lionized by progressive scholars like John Pat rick Diggins, who depicts him as a worthy successor to Abraham Lincoln and Frank lin D. Roosevelt. Perhaps the most interesting rehabilitation has been that of Rich NIXON ard Nixon. His image has gotten periodic makeovers since his resignation from the presidency in 1974 until his death in 1994, when he was hailed as an eminence gris of zjiU American politics. Nixon was a wise realist in foreign affairs, we are often told, who K i S S . 4 A 4 1- %- reached out to the Soviet Union and China. At the same time he instituted envi ronmental reforms and pushed affirmative action on the domestic front. The moral Nixon and Kissinger: seems simple enough: Bush represents a dangerous deviation from the sensible Re Partners in Power publican presidents of yesteryear. But as Robert Dallek's marvelous new book, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power, by Robert Dallek demonstrates, the reality is much more complicated. Dallek, who has previously writ HarperCollins, 752 pp. ten critically acclaimed biographies of John R Kennedy and L3mdon Johnson, is a sea soned historian who follows the Plutarchian model of letting the evidence speak for itself. From the tens of thousands of pages of newly available documents—including Nixon tapes, Kissinger telephone transcripts, and national security files—Dallek of fers a potent reminder of the widespread and oft-deserved loathing that Nixon and Kissinger inspired. Many stories of Nixon's perfidiousness are fairly well known, but Dallek does a commendable job of amplifying previous judgments with new materi al he has unearthed. What emerges is a portrayal of Nixon that can hardly compare favorably to George W. Bush for the simple reason that Nixon comes off as so much like George W. Bush. Nixon in particular broke new ground as a polarizer. He wanted to turn his domes tic critics into the functional equivalent of traitors; the antiwar college kids, whom he loathed, were supposed to serve as a kind of domestic Fifth Column, like the commu nists of the early 1950s, that could shore up the Republican base and stigmatize the Democrats in the eyes of the Silent Majority he felt he represented. In 1970, for ex ample, Nixon's press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler read a statement of Nixon's after the shooting of students at Kent State which declared that it "should remind us all once again that when dissent turns to violence, it invites tragedy." It almost seemed that the president of the United States was blaming the students for their own deaths. Ac cording to Dallek, nothing shook Nixon's conviction that he needed to wage warfare on his opponents. Despite his landslide election victory in 1972, Nixon was, Dallek writes, "almost morbid," convinced that his adversaries in the Georgetown salons and elsewhere were already plotting to undo him. Indeed, "he saw the price of reelection 58 June 2007 LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED ON POLITICAL BOOKS as a fresh round of conflict with domes fault: "It's those dirty rotten Jews from Dallek is wise to emphasize the key tic enemies"—read liberal elites. New York who are behind it," he told his role that Nixon and Kissinger's outsize Like George W. Bush, Nixon worked aides. He also enjoyed deriding Jews personalities played in shaping their overtime to portray himself as a popu in front of Kissinger: "Isn't that right, policies. They weren't statesmen sim list battling effete elites intent on sub Henry? Don't you agree?" Kissinger's ply reacting rationally to world events. verting the American way. There are oth response was downright creepy: "Well, Rather, they were at once ruthless and er similarities: the White House's obses Mr. President, there are Jews and then insecure, consumed by their personal sion with secrecy was the precursor of there are Jews." hatreds and fears. the Bush administration's penchant for Kissinger was intent on maintaining According to Dallek, "harsh life ex running roughshod over the nation's Nixon's goodwill. Uneasy with his own periences had made both men cynical laws. The parallels between the Vietnam Jewish identity (his family had emigrat about people's motives and encouraged War and the Iraq War—the official lies, ed from Nazi Germany in 1938), which convictions that outdoing opponents re the pretense of victory, the misuse of he sought, as far as possible, to suppress, quired a relaxed view of scruples. Iron the military, the disdain for democracy, partly by identifying himself with the ically, their cynicism would also make the bogus patriotism, and the contempt WASP establishment, for civil liberties—are inescapable. And Kissinger never dared the longer the war continued, the more remonstrate with Nix Nixon had the worldview of the it corroded America's domestic liberties. on about his crudity. Public opposition to the war led Nixon And Nixon never let an classic anti-Semite: he saw Jews and Kissinger to approve gross abuses opportunity slip to ad as having innate (and unpleasant) of civil liberties, including wiretapping minister a verbal slap their own subordinates, in the name of to his aide. Once, after group characteristics rather than national security. They were contemptu Kissinger expressed viewing them as individuals. ous of public debate, congressional in a view on the Mid put, and professional diplomats. Instead, dle East at a Nation they wanted to operate on a loftier plane al Security Council meeting, Nixon said, them rivals who could not satisfy their free of the constraints of a democratic "Now can we get an American point of aspirations without each other." Both government. Sound familiar? view?" And after aides informed Nixon men, for example, were infuriated by Nixon's paranoia about liberals that Vice President Spiro Agnew's rhet Daniel EUsberg's release of the Pentagon showed most unpleasantly through his oric was prompting an increase in news Papers, not because they thought there dislike of Jews. Though Nixon had Jew paper articles suggesting Agnew was re was anything devastating in the papers ish advisers—including, of course, Hen sponsible for an increase in anti-Semitic themselves, but because they viewed in ry Kissinger—he clearly saw Jews as hate mail, Nixon wrote, "Keep it up." tellectuals with contempt. A "weirdo," as a group as a leading enemy of his. Nix What, then, prompted Nixon to hand senior Nixon aide H. R. Haldeman put on's antipathy toward Jews is hardly a se Kissinger the job of national security ad it, shouldn't be challenging the presi cret, but Dallek suggests that it reached viser in the first place? One reason was dent. As Nixon once said to Kissinger, "I pathological proportions. No doubt Nix that they were both realists in foreign don't give a goddamn about repression, on's hatred of the press corps, particular policy. They viewed talk about human do you?" "No," Kissinger answered. It ly the New York Times, was largely rooted rights as sentimental claptrap. Another might be tempting to view this as locker- in his sense of aggrievement and loath was that they saw eye to eye about the room braggadocio, but their readiness to ing of Jews. The truth was that anti-Sem liberal establishment. Nixon may have countenance the rise of an authoritarian itism played well on the right for many resented the establishment because he regime in Chile suggests that it was not. decades; historian David Greenberg has could never penetrate it; Kissinger, by Nixon and Kissinger launched an noted that "in Nixon's early campaigns, contrast, saw it up close and believed enormously ambitious overhaul of anti-Semitism was a latent theme." that it was soft. It had turned tail once American foreign policy. They not only In essence, Nixon had the world- the going got rough in Vietnam. This, expanded the Vietnam War into Cam view of the classic anti-Semite: he saw Kissinger thought, was disgraceful. A su bodia and Laos, but also launched de Jews as having innate (and unpleas perpower had to flex its muscles, not ca tente with the Soviet Union in the face ant) group characteristics rather than pitulate to a backward. Third World in of enormous opposition from the right. viewing them as individuals. Again and surgency. The eastern establishment, he They established diplomatic relations again, he blamed Jews for his difficulties. believed, had become as timorous as the with China, meddled endlessly in Cen When the My Lai massacre was revealed, liberals who had capitulated to Nazism tral and South America, and worked tire for example, Nixon knew who was at during Weimar Germany. lessly to establish Middle East peace. The Washington Monthly 59 LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED Nixon was elected on the presump on genuinely wanted to be thought of CAMBRIDGE tion that he had a plan for ending the as a peacemaker and had a stubborn Vietnam War. This, as we now know, was streak of idealism. (The author notes wrong. As Dallek notes, Nixon proved no that Nixon used Woodrow Wilson's desk more flexible than Lyndon B. Johnson. in the Oval Office.) Nixon's peacemak In part, Nixon and Kissinger were fix ing instincts were at their best in his THEGLOBAL ated with appearing tough—legitimate approaches to China and, to a lesser ex ly fearful, like Johnson, of a right-wing tent, the Soviet Union.