Valentin Ćorić's Final Trial Brief
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IT-04-74-T 69741 D69741 - D69531 28 March 2011 SMS THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA Case No. IT-04-74-T TRIAL CHAMBER III Before: Judge Jean-Claude Antonetti, Presiding Judge Arpad Prandler Judge Stefan Trechsel Reserve Judge Antoine Kesia-Mbe Mindua Registrar: Mr. John Hocking Filed: 28 March 2011 THE PROSECUTOR v. JADRANKO PRLIĆ BRUNO STOJIĆ SLOBODAN PRALJAK MILIVOJ PETKOVIĆ VALENTIN ĆORIĆ BERISLAV PUŠIĆ - Public Redacted - _______________________________________________________ VALENTIN ĆORIĆ’S FINAL TRIAL BRIEF ________________________________________________________ The Office of the Prosecutor Counsel for Jadranko Prlić Counsel for Milivoj Petković Mr. Kenneth Scott Mr. Michael G. Karnavas Ms. Vesna Alaburić Mr. Douglas Stringer Ms. Suzana Tomanović Mr. Zoran Ivanišević Counsel for Bruno Stojić Counsel for Valentin Ćorić Ms. Senka Nožica Ms. Dijana Tomašegović Tomić Mr. Karim A. A. Khan Mr. Dražen Plavec Counsel for Slobodan Counsel for Berislav Pušić Praljak Mr. Fahrudin Ibrišimović Mr. Božidar Kovačić Mr. Roger Sahota Ms. Nika Pinter 69740 VALENTIN CORIC’S FINAL TRIAL BRIEF PUBLIC TABLE OF CONTENTS **** I. INTRODUCTION -1- A. STANDARDS OF PROOF -3- 1. Presumption of Innocence -3- 2. Reasonable Doubt -3- B. EVIDENTIARY MATTERS -4- 1. Hearsay Evidence must be Scrutinized with Due Care -4- 2. Circumstantial Evidence must be Scrutinized with Due -5- Care II. THE STRUCTURE AND DUTIES OF THE MPA– THE DE JURE AND DE -5- FACTO TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF CORIC AS MILITARY POLICE ADMINISTRATION CHIEF, AND FUNCTIONING OF THE MP BATTALIONS A. Overview -5- B. Coric’s Position in the Military Police Administration -6- C. Formation of the Military Police on the basis of HVO Municipal -6- Councils, and the Limited Role of the Military Police Administration 1. Changes in the Structure of the Military Police did not -8- Change the System of Command and Control, which was exercised at the level of the HVO military commanders in the Field. 2. The Changes in the Structure of the Military Police -11- only further degraded the already limited involvement of the Military Police Administration in the operation of the Military Police in the field. 3. Reporting System in place and functioning among -13- Military Police units in the Field and the Military Police Administration. IT-04-74-T pg. i 28 March 2011 69739 VALENTIN CORIC’S FINAL TRIAL BRIEF PUBLIC D. Position of the Military Police Administration within the HVO -15- III. THE OTP HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE RESPONSIBILITY OF -16- CORIC AS A COMMAND-SUPERIOR OF ANY ALLEGED PERPETRATORS UNDER ARTICLE 7(3) A. The Law of Command Responsibility -16- B. Coric cannot be considered a Command-Superior of any -19- principal perpetrators found to be HVO/Herceg-Bosna personnel who were NOT Military Police C. Coric cannot be considered a Command-Superior of any -20- perpetrators found to be HVO Brigade Military Police engaged in Combat Actions or otherwise engaged upon orders of the HVO Brigades. D. Coric cannot be considered a Command-Superior of any -23- perpetrators found to be members of the HVO Home Guard Units (“Domobranstvo”) engaged in Combat Actions or otherwise engaged upon orders of the HVO Brigades. E. Coric cannot be considered a Command-Superior of any -24- perpetrators found to be HVO Military Police engaged in Combat Actions or otherwise engaged in Daily Duties upon orders of the HVO Military Commanders. 1. HVO Military Police were subordinated to HVO Army -26- Commanders, including in the performance of Combat Operations in the Field 2. HVO Military Police were subordinated to the HVO -30- Army Commanders, including in the performance of Regular Policing Duties in the Field a. Confirmation from HVO military -30- commanders b. Confirmation from Military Police Witnesses -33- F. Command-Superior Liability is improper as Coric did not have -35- the requisite State of Mind due to a lack reporting that would have imparted actual knowledge of crimes committed by alleged subordinates IT-04-74-T pg. ii 28 March 2011 69738 VALENTIN CORIC’S FINAL TRIAL BRIEF PUBLIC IV. THE PROSECUTION HAS FAILED TO SHOW A JOINT CRIMINAL -37- ENTERPRISE A. Allegations of the Indictment -37- B. Relevant Legal Standards for JCE Liability -38- 1. OVERBROAD PLURALITY OF PERSONS -40- 2. NO COMMON PLAN OR PURPOSE -41- a. Witnesses Uniformly Denied Knowledge of a -42- Criminal Plan or Participation in a plan b. Documentary evidence runs counter to any Criminal -43- Plan or JCE on the part of the HVO c. Formation of the HVO was for defensive, not -47- offensive purposes. d. The Operation of the HZ-HB showed no -48- discriminatory intent against Bosnian Muslims 3. CORIC ISSUED NO ORDERS OR OTHERWISE -49- CONTRIBUTED TO FURTHERANCE OF ANY JCE 4. CORIC HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF ANY JCE ON THE PART -57- OF OTHERS. V. CORIC AND THE MPA DID NOT FAIL TO PREVENT OR PUNISH -58- CRIMES. A. Coric undertook reasonable efforts to provide proper training -58- of HVO MP in order that crimes could be prevented. B. Coric reasonably relied on domestic law structures in place in -60- order to determine his obligations such that cooperating with these structures would be sufficient so that crimes could be punished and prevented. 1. Relationship of the MPA to the Military Judicial -60- System C. The MPA promoted compliance on the part of the MP for -62- performance of their law enforcement duties. IT-04-74-T pg. iii 28 March 2011 69737 VALENTIN CORIC’S FINAL TRIAL BRIEF PUBLIC 1. The lack of personnel and Delegation of Crime -65- Prevention Authority to the Operative Zones limited what role Coric and the MPA had in preventing and punishing crimes 2. HVO MP in the field were subject to discipline and -66- punishment from the HVO army commanders they were subordinated to 3. Duty of Military Commanders in Field to take steps to -68- initiate criminal investigations and criminal reports for crimes occurring within their Area of Responsibility. a. Brigade Military Police -71- b. Military Police In Operative Zones -72- 4. Objective obstacles existed, outside of the control of -73- Coric, hindering proper investigations from being undertaken 5. Obstacles due to the significant interference of -77- Municipal Authorities. VI. CORIC’S KNOWLEDGE WAS THAT CHECKPOINTS WERE OPERATED -78- FOR LEGITIMATE PURPOSES AND WERE NOT INTENDED FOR ANY CRIMINAL PURPOSE A. THE OPERATION OF CHECKPOINTS WAS THE TYPE OF DAILY -80- POLICING DUTIES PERFORMED UNDER THE AUTHORTY AND COMMAND OF HVO COMMANDERS, OR OTHERWISE WAS BEYOND THE COMPETENCY OF CORIC B. CHECKPOINTS WERE OPERATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH -84- LEGITIMATE LAW ENFORCEMENT PURPOSES C. HUMANITARIAN CONVOYS WERE LEGITIMATELY -86- CONTROLLED IT-04-74-T pg. iv 28 March 2011 69736 VALENTIN CORIC’S FINAL TRIAL BRIEF PUBLIC VII. CORIC IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR CRIMINAL ACTS ALLEGEDLY -87- COMMITTED IN DETENTION FACILITIES A. FORMATION OF THE PRISONS -87- B. THE SITUATION IN 1993 -88- C. DETENTION OF MUSLIM HVOS IS OUTSIDE OF THE -90- JURISDICTION OF THIS CHAMBER 1. MHVOS Were Incorporated Into And Owed Allegiance -90- To The HVO. 2. MHVOS Not Eligible For Protection For Grave -92- Breaches Or War Crimes 3. MHVOS Not Eligible For Protection For Crimes -93- Against Humanity 4. The HVO were entitled to detain MHVOS -93- 5. There were legitimate reasons to detain MHVOS -94- 6. The acts do not amount to an ‘attack’ as to qualify as -95- a crime against humanity D. ROLE OF THE MILITARY POLICE ADMINISTRATION AS TO -96- PRISONS IT-04-74-T pg. v 28 March 2011 69735 VALENTIN CORIC’S FINAL TRIAL BRIEF PUBLIC E. THE MILITARY POLICE ADMINISTRATION DID NOT HAVE ANY -98- AUTHORITY OVER PROZOR DETENTION FACILITY 1. Prozor Detention facilities were under the Authority -98- of the HVO Brigade Commanders Who issued the orders to arrest persons detained at Prozor based on the orders of the Main Staff 2. The MPA did not have a Role in Appointment of -99- Wardens at Prozor Prison 3. The MPA had no role in Maintenance of the Prozor -100- Detention Facilities 4. Security was provided at Prozor detention facilities -101- upon order of the HVO Military Commanders 5. The MPA did not have authority over the Release or -102- Transfer of Detainees at Prozor 6. The MPA was not informed about the conditions of -103- detention in the Prozor detention facilities and therefore, the actual conditions of detention were unknown to Coric 7. Coric was not aware of the criminal acts allegedly -105- committed in Crni Vrh and he bears no responsibility for those acts 8. Conclusions concerning detention facilities at Prozor -106- IT-04-74-T pg. vi 28 March 2011 69734 VALENTIN CORIC’S FINAL TRIAL BRIEF PUBLIC F. THE MPA DID NOT HAVE ANY AUTHORITY OVER THE -106- HELIODROM CENTRAL MILITARY REMAND PRISON, AND CORIC DOES NOT BEAR ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE INCIDENTS AT HELIODROM 1. The MPA and Coric did Not Have a Role in the -106- Establishment of Heliodrom Central Military Prison or in the Appointment of the Warden of the Prison 2. No plan existed for the establishment of the detention -108- centre at Heliodrom 3. Temporary Evacuation of Civilians cannot be -109- Qualified as Unlawful 4. The Military Police and the MPA did not have any -111- direct authority over Heliodrom 5. The MPA had no role in the Overall Maintenance of -114- the Heliodrom Prison 6. The Military Police had a solely Administrative -115- Function concerning the Release of Prisoners 7. The MPA is Not Responsible for Taking Prisoners out -117- for Labour a. The Law -117- b. The Facts -117- 8. Coric did not know and did not have reason to know -124- about incidents that allegedly occurred at the Heliodrom Prison 9. Conclusions concerning the Heliodrom Central -126- Military Prison G.