The Rising Costs of Turkey's Syrian Quagmire Crisis Group Europe Report N°230, 30 April 2014 Page 45

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The Rising Costs of Turkey's Syrian Quagmire Crisis Group Europe Report N°230, 30 April 2014 Page 45 The Rising Costs of Turkey’s Syrian Quagmire Europe Report N°230 | 30 April 2014 International Crisis Group Headquarters Avenue Louise 149 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i Recommendations..................................................................................................................... iii I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. Turkey Adapts its Humanitarian Response ..................................................................... 2 A. Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Safety without Status..................................................... 2 1. As the world’s best shelters reach their limit ....................................................... 4 2. Syrians spread through Turkey’s urban spaces ................................................... 6 3. Syrian children miss out on schooling ................................................................. 9 4. Turkey’s many Aleppos ........................................................................................ 10 5. A new Syrian working class .................................................................................. 10 B. Turkey’s Lifeline to Northern Syria ........................................................................... 12 1. “Zero point” deliveries .......................................................................................... 12 2. A de facto humanitarian haven ............................................................................ 14 C. Limited International Solidarity Disappoints Turkey ............................................... 15 1. Learning to live with INGOs ................................................................................ 16 2. Why Turkey needs more help ............................................................................... 17 III. Strains Build inside Turkey .............................................................................................. 20 A. Hospitality Turns to Hostility .................................................................................... 20 B. A Health-care System Under Siege ............................................................................ 22 C. The Resilience of Gaziantep ....................................................................................... 23 D. Unresolved Alevi Grievances ..................................................................................... 25 E. A Domestic Kurdish Complication ............................................................................ 26 IV. Turkey’s Limited Course Correction ................................................................................ 28 A. Support for the Syrian Opposition Continues ........................................................... 29 B. Security Strategies Recalibrated ................................................................................ 34 C. Two Steps Forward, One Step Back with the PYD .................................................... 37 D. Coming to Terms with the Jihadi Threat: Too Little Too Late? ................................ 38 V. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 41 APPENDICES A. Map of Turkey .................................................................................................................. 42 B. Maps of Turkey-Syria Border ........................................................................................... 43 C. Glossary ............................................................................................................................ 44 D. About the International Crisis Group .............................................................................. 45 E. Crisis Group Reports and Briefings on Europe since 2011 .............................................. 46 F. Crisis Group Board of Trustees ........................................................................................ 47 International Crisis Group Europe Report N°230 30 April 2014 Executive Summary The Syrian crisis crashed onto neighbouring Turkey’s doorstep three years ago and the humanitarian, policy and security costs continue to rise. After at least 720,000 Syrian refugees, over 75 Turkish fatalities and nearly $3 billion in spending, frustra- tion and fatigue are kicking in. Turkey’s humanitarian outreach, while morally right and in line with international principles, remains an emergency response. Ankara needs to find a sustainable, long-term arrangement with the international community to care for the Syrians who arrive daily. While spared the worst of the sectarian and military spillover, Turks are reminded of the security risks by deadly car bombs and armed incidents on their territory, especially as northern Syria remains an unpre- dictable no-man’s-land. The conflict was not of its making, but Ankara has in effect become a party. Unable to make a real difference by itself, it should focus on protecting its border and citizens, invigorate recent efforts to move back from the ruling party’s Sunni Muslim-oriented foreign policy to one of sectarian neutrality and publicly promote a compromise political solution in Syria. Turkey needs to ensure that refugees fleeing Syria are able to access safe territory and receive international protection within a legal framework, but it should not have to pay for this alone. Turks have accepted the Syrians on behalf of the wider inter- national community, which has a responsibility to share more of the growing burden. The high costs of building and maintaining shelters mean most newcomers end up outside the camps: the official number of such urban Syrians is around 500,000, but in reality it could be twice that. The influx puts pressure on local infrastructures and creates social tensions. As resources and patience stretch thin and security incidents proliferate, Turkey’s open door policy has its limits. Even with stricter border con- trols, however, Syrians continue to arrive, often illegally. Ankara needs a comprehensive accommodation strategy, including giving refu- gees the option to integrate into Turkish society through jobs, access to social care, language training and education. This requires, first, a more comprehensive legal framework that expands the April 2013 law on foreigners and immigration. Donors can help logistically and financially by sharing expertise on and providing funding for mutually-agreed housing schemes for Syrians inside Turkey. Turkey has been the main lifeline to northern Syria since 2012, with many countries and international and local organisations providing critical aid to at least 100,000 Syrians via a de facto humanitarian safe zone. It should continue cooperating to the full extent with international organisations to deliver humanitarian assistance. From Turkey’s perspective, taking care of the displaced inside Syria limits any new influx. But plans to address needs at makeshift camps for the foreseeable future overlook the dangers to both Syrians and aid workers as the environment becomes increas- ingly volatile. As Crisis Group argued in April 2013, the best option is to provide a way out of Syria for all civilians who want to leave their war-torn country. Turkey may be bigger, stronger and richer than Syria’s other neighbours, but it still needs to feel supported so that it will continue to keep its borders open to refu- gees. In the past year and a half, Ankara has opened up to international assistance and registered more international humanitarian NGOs to work on the crisis. Never- theless, residual fear of outsiders and bureaucratic obstacles still block Turkey from The Rising Costs of Turkey’s Syrian Quagmire Crisis Group Europe Report N°230, 30 April 2014 Page ii fully benefiting from available international resources. Third parties have contributed less than one tenth of what it has spent on the crisis so far. Donors should no longer hide behind Ankara’s initial rejection of foreign aid, or the fact that it handles the situation more effectively than Jordan or Lebanon. While Turkey has successfully contained internal sectarian unrest, its Syria policy is highly unpopular domestically, not least with its large Alevi and Kurdish popu- lations. Feeling betrayed by Western failure to live up to promises of intervention or more support, Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has re- calibrated its foreign policy in the past year. Its narrative has changed to include jihadi elements of the militant opposition in the growing list of security threats from Syria, along with the regime and its agents. In 2013, it reversed its all-out objection to engaging the Syrian Kurds’ Democratic Union Party (PYD), linked to Turkey’s insurgent Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and in March 2014, it let UN aid convoys cross into PYD-controlled areas when Syria finally opened one border crossing for UN humanitarian aid. In the bigger picture, Turkey wants to avoid prolonged military entanglement, but violent border clashes and occasional aerial confrontations with the regime increase risks of an escalation. Even so, extensive Turkish military inter- vention is unlikely without at least an international mandate and backing. The AKP
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