Whitewater-Baldy Complex Fire Review

Gila National Forests USDA Forest Service June 2013

Purpose

On November 26, 2012, James Hubbard, Deputy Chief for State and Review Objectives: Private Forestry (SPF) issued a letter requiring several large fires of Fiscal Year 2012 be reviewed by the National Incident Management Identify Best Business Practices Used on Fires Organization (NIMO). The letter emphasized the responsibility of the This Past Season Forest Service to evaluate management actions and assure they were appropriate, risk based and effective. The fires were selected based Identify How Social and on complexity and national significance ensuring the selected fires Political Issues Factored Into Our Decision Making provide a cross section of our risk management performance in fires of various final costs, sizes and oversight complexity. Identify Which Current Procedures Can Be On January 28, 2013, Tom Harbour, Director of Fire and Aviation Enhanced or Expanded Management (FAM), issued a letter to Bob Houseman defining Identify Improvements expectations for the review of the Whitewater-Baldy Complex. The That Can Be Made In purpose of the review was to identify areas that need improvement Sharing and Clarifying and carry recommendations forward for best management practices Expectations in the future. The reviews looked at the use of the 2012 Risk Decision Framework which was included with the 2012 Wildfire Guidance Review Team Members from the US Forest Service National Incident letter signed by James Hubbard, dated May 25, 2012. Management Organization (NIMO), and Region 3 Staff: Background Bob Houseman Incident Commander, NIMO The team reviewed records contained in the Whitewater-Baldy Fire

John Truett Operations Section package located at the Forest Supervisor’s Office for the Gila National Chief, NIMO Forest (NF). Interviews were conducted between the weeks of Susan Lee, Finance Section Chief, February 19 and March 11, 2013. Those interviewed included the NIMO Agency Administrator (AA), AA representatives, Initial Attack Judy Palmer, Finance Section Chief, Incident Commander (IC), Type 2 (T2) and Type 1 (T1) Incident NIMO Commanders, T2 and T1 Operations Section Chiefs, Forest Fire Mike Baca, Planning Section Chief, Management Officer, State Forestry representative and NIMO and members of the Region 3 fire staff. The focus of the review was Emily Irwin, Program Specialist Fuels, Region 3 internal, concentrating on organizational effectiveness. In addition, the team agreed to a request from the Region to review past fire history on the and has provided their findings and observations within the context of this report.

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Whitewater-Baldy Complex Review Gila National Forest USDA Forest Service

The Baldy Fire was ignited by lightning at 0645 MT on May 9, 2012. The Whitewater Fire was detected on May 16, 2012 at 1025 MT. It was possibly started with the same lightning storm, but not detected until May 16, 2012. The Whitewater-Baldy fire was burning approximately 20,000 acres per day during mid to late May on 85 percent of the perimeter.

The strategy was to protect the communities and use a combination of direct and indirect suppression tactics along all flanks. This strategy led to the following suppression actions: a large burnout stopped the northward progression of the fire, direct line slowed the fire on the northeast side, the Miller Fire and natural barriers slowed the progression of the fire on the southeast flank, and the fire continued to move into the on the east and parts of the west flank, where it naturally went out, or went out as it reached burnouts, firelines or pinyon- fuel types. The majority of the fire on the west flank went out due to natural barriers and pinyon-juniper fuel type. On the southeast flank, the slowed the spread of the fire, along with limited suppression action and natural barriers on the very south end. The fires merged on May 23, 2012 and were declared 100 percent contained on July 31, 2012 after burning 297,845 acres on the Gila National Forest and 527 acres of private land.

Incident Management Transitions:

WHITEWATER-BALDY COMPLEX Day Date Command Actions 1 May 9 Monitoring Baldy Fire Starts 2 - 5 May 10 – 13 Monitoring Baldy Fire 6 - 7 May 14 - 15 T3 IMT Baldy Fire 8 May 16 T4 IMT on Whitewater Fire is Whitewater Fire detected 9 - 10 May 17 – 18 T3 IMT Baldy Fire 11 - 14 May 19 - 22 T3 IMT on the Baldy T2 IMT assumes Fire, T2 IMT on command of the Whitewater Fire Whitewater Fire on May 19 15 May 23 * T3 IMT on the Baldy The Baldy and Fire, T2 IMT on Whitewater Fires Whitewater Fire merge 16 May 24 T2 IMT Whitewater- T2 IMT takes Baldy Complex command of both fires 17 May 25 T2 IMT T1 IMT Ordered 18 May 26 T1 IMT T1 IMT assumes

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command 0600 19 - 33 May 27 – June 10 T1 IMT 34 NIMO assumes June 11 NIMO command at 1800 35 - 41 June 12 – 18 NIMO 42 - 83 Whitewater-Baldy Complex turned back June 19 District to the District 84 July 31 District Fire declared out

Fire Environment

The complexity of the Baldy and Whitewater Fires increased due to rapid growth, large remote wilderness, and extremely difficult terrain. The Baldy Fire which was in monitor status grew from 226 acres on May 9, 2012 to 15,000 acres on May 23, 2012.

The Whitewater Fire was in full suppression status when the crews disengaged after initial attack failed on May 16, 2012. There was active fire behavior in the late afternoon, limited safety zones, steep inaccessible terrain, fuels roll out and short distance spotting. A T2 Incident Management Team (IMT) was assigned to the Whitewater Fire on May 19, 2012 at 1700 due to the complexity. State Road 159 to Mogollon was closed to the public, and a structural assessment plan of Creek summer homes was conducted. The fire had not crossed Whitewater Creek, but it was expected to, making significant runs towards the Willow Creek summer homes. On May 22, 2012 there was a precautionary evacuation of the Willow Creek summer homes due to fallout and spotting from plume dominated fire behavior.

On May 23, 2012 the Whitewater and Baldy Fires merged, having started approximately 8 air miles apart. Eleven homes and 8 outbuildings in the Willow Creek summer homes area were destroyed. On May 24, 2012 one additional home was burned, and the management of both fires was turned over to the T2 IMT as a Complex. The Whitewater-Baldy Complex was now 70,578 acres. On May 26, 2012 the management of the fire as a complex was turned over to a T1 IMT. The northwest corner of the fire was backing towards the community of Mogollon, and a mandatory evacuation was ordered. There was a red flag warning on May 26, 2012 due to low relative humidity and high winds. Between May 24 and May 28, 2012 the fire increased from 70,578 to 133,193 acres, and was 15 percent contained.

The fire continued to grow approximately 20,000 acres each day, from May 28 until approximately June 9, 2012 when it began to slow. By then it was 274,838 acres and 32 percent contained. The residents of Willow Creek were allowed back into their homes on June 9, 2012. On June 11, 2012 the T1 IMT turned over management of the fire to the 3 Whitewater-Baldy Complex Review Gila National Forest USDA Forest Service

Phoenix National Incident Management Organization (NIMO) team, which would continue to manage the now 278,708 acre fire that was 37 percent contained. Additional objectives, including providing emergency planning support to county officials, were added to the NIMO Delegation of Authority due to potential flooding in downstream communities. The NIMO team was requested to work with local, state and federal agencies to provide information to local communities on the potential for severe flooding and impacts to private lands. The NIMO team was asked to coordinate and assist the BAER Assessment Team with planning. On June 18, 2012 the fire was turned back to the Gila National Forest at 296,980 acres and 87 percent contained. On July 31, 2012 the fire was declared 100 percent contained, at 297,845 acres.

Critical Values at Risk

The VARs identified by the Forest Service and New Mexico State Forestry included the communities of Mogollon, Glenwood, Willow Creek and Indian Creek summer homes and cabins, Negrito Fire Base, N-Bar Ranch, Bearwallow Lookout and cabins, the White Creek administrative site, additional private inholdings, and threatened and endangered species. Twelve homes and eight outbuildings in the Willow Creek summer homes area were destroyed on May 23 and May 24, 2012.

Observation by Objective: The following are key observations and corresponding lessons learned organized by the four objectives of the review.

1. Identify Best Business Practices Used on Fires This Past Season

The Whitewater-Baldy Complex covered a large geographical area. The fire exhibited extreme fire behavior at times in the dry and wet mixed conifer vegetation. Initial attack on the Whitewater Fire was a full suppression, direct attack strategy. The Baldy Fire continued in monitoring status, however, the fire environment and extreme fire behavior soon dictated a re-evaluation of these strategies. The IC and the AA discussed options based on incident objectives. The outcome of this discussion was to enlarge the planning area while maintaining a direct and indirect suppression strategy.

Indications were that the actual location of this large planning area was not adequately discussed between the IMT, Forest, AA and AA Representatives. Taking the fire to safer ground and reducing the exposure factors associated with this decision was an emphasis by the Incident Management Team (IMT), which led to burning out areas in the pinyon- juniper fuel type which was a concern for the Forest. While the decision to execute this strategy was risk-based, it became evident that an increased emphasis on exposure and risk vs. gain conversations between the IMT and the Forest would be appropriate in future risk assessment discussions. 4 Whitewater-Baldy Complex Review Gila National Forest USDA Forest Service

This large planning area and direct/indirect suppression strategy was deemed to have a high probability of success. Implementing this strategy allowed time to integrate anticipated fire environment changes, assess values at risk, identify appropriate mitigations measures, and provide time to make informed decisions on how to best utilize resources to accomplish achievable objectives while reducing firefighter exposure.

Using the Five Rights approach (Right Plan, Right Place, Right Time, Right Assets, and Right Duration), a range of responses from monitoring, point protection, and direct/indirect tactics was developed across the planning area to achieve the strategy and objectives. Burnout operations were continuously improved upon to effectively reduce damage to the natural resources by placing fire in key strategic locations, including burning out along roads outside of the wilderness areas, which then limited fire alignment with prevailing winds and topography, increasing operational effectiveness. Parts of the fire were never staffed due to fire history in and across the Forest and within the Gila Wilderness. Monitoring the fire growth on the east and south flanks allowed resources to be placed in other higher priority areas. Using vegetation changes, roads, hand lines, and natural barriers to slow or suppress the fire was a successful containment strategy. Past fire history scars, (2011 Miller Fire) and fuels treatments around the communities of Mogollon and Willow Creek were considered in the development of the suppression strategy, and instrumental in saving many structures in both communities.

To ensure firefighter safety in extremely remote areas of the complex, and to ensure extraction capability was available prior to engaging resources, a need for air-evacuation was addressed by utilizing the New Mexico Air National Guard Blackhawk helicopter for night time evacuation and hoist capabilities.

Unfolding within the context of the Whitewater-Baldy Complex was an apparent failure to understand at the onset just how significant the burning conditions were at the time and how quickly fire would grow and move across the landscape. The fire exceeded not only the modeling but also the historical mental model of fires on the Gila NF. Through interviews with local Forest Service personnel, stakeholders and Regional fire staff it was revealed that folks were working from a framework of past fire history, or mental models, on the Gila NF and not within the context of the very dry conditions influenced by high risk weather events resulting in underestimating the potential fire behavior in the mixed severity fire regime (mixed conifer). This underestimation caused responders to fall behind the curve in the decision making process, working from past mental models of fire history and the expectation that actions initiated on past fires would match current conditions. There will be a need in the future to recognize early on that under the current conditions, fires may move more quickly, and grow exponentially. This may require the development of a long term strategy around risk and values to be protected while managing the next few operational periods. 5 Whitewater-Baldy Complex Review Gila National Forest USDA Forest Service

2. Identify How Social and Political Issues Factored Into Our Decision Making

Social and political concerns played a significant role in the management of the Whitewater-Baldy Complex. The Region, Forest, IMT and local stakeholders worked together to ensure communication of the strategies and subsequent actions was shared across jurisdictional boundaries to ensure a good understanding of rationale was in place throughout the incident.

One observation was how well the Forest and the IMT worked to include the many stakeholders and the public early on, and throughout the fire, ensuring they understood how large the fire may get, the potential duration of the fire, and the potential for flooding events after the fire.

Findings and observations surrounding the engagement of both local Forest and impacted stakeholders on the many social and political issues indicated there was a mixture of pre and during incident interaction. The Gila NF and its many stakeholders including New Mexico State Forestry, several community fire departments, and Catron County Sheriff and public officials share a history of strong relationships and understanding of jurisdictional concerns. This was mentioned during several interviews and displayed in the actions taken prior to and during the Whitewater-Baldy Complex.

Initially, the strategy was to work within a small planning area to contain the Whitewater Fire while monitoring the Baldy Fire. When the fires merged and complexity increased a new strategy was developed which encompassed a larger planning area. This prompted local citizens and public officials to express concern and question Forest Service decision making. To address these concerns the Forest and the IMT provided a forum of community meetings and utilized Liaison Officers (LOFRs) to work closely with local jurisdictions. This proved highly successful in securing both public and stakeholder understanding and buy-in. When faced with complex public and stakeholder issues, consider using LOFRs to assist the IMT.

Cooperation to achieve common goals among partners will remain a key objective as we deal with increased fire complexity. We need to meet people where they are through the creation and fostering of relationships on a year round basis. To an extent, this principle was in play prior to and during the Whitewater-Baldy Complex. Ensure all communities that become affected by the incident are provided public information to offer reassurance and up-to-date information as the incident unfolds.

The impacts of a fire and the Burned Area Emergency Response (BAER) work that will be needed should be anticipated by the Forest and District. With long term incidents, the Line Officers need to be mindful of overworking the staff, and request outside assistance early on, as soon as the incident appears to be large and long duration. 6 Whitewater-Baldy Complex Review Gila National Forest USDA Forest Service

3. Identify Which Current Procedures Can Be Enhanced or Expanded

There were several common themes identified in looking at current procedures on the Whitewater-Baldy Complex. The Wildland Fire Decision Support Systems (WFDSS) decision making, documentation processes and the models, (such as FSPro) were found to be useful to the Forest, but time consuming to produce the products. There was difficulty in deciphering the decision document by Forest personnel and cooperators. Questions were raised concerning the value of supporting the decision vs. WFDSS being a “black box” that documents the decision after the fact. Two separate decisions were published one for the Baldy Fire and one for the Whitewater Fire on two districts with two separate assessments. The combining of two fires in WFDSS is challenging at best and needs to be well thought out.

Concern was shared between the AA, AA Representatives, Forest and District Staff and the IMT in understanding the WFDSS and FSPro probabilities and capability model runs. The 80th percentile has frequently been interpreted as the worst case scenario, and is based on normal weather patterns. With the current Southwest drought conditions, it may be more likely that the 80th percentile probability will be reached. The fire can reach the edges of the probability in one day or 14. There is a lack of understanding that FSPro is a probability model, not a progression model like Farsite or Near Term Fire Behavior. Without this understanding, decision makers and IMTs may make poor decisions, even though they have good information. It would be useful to have training for Line Officers (possibly at a Regional Line Officer meeting) on the capabilities and changes to WFDSS, FSPro and other models each year.

As the incidents transitioned from the T5 and T4 to T3 and T2 there was not enough time to capture decisions in WFDSS and document Management Action Points (MAPS). These decisions were documented later with a result being that some MAPS were burned over prior to being documented in WFDSS. Designating an individual on a District with good WFDSS skills who can document and track the decision content in the WFDSS decisions and MAPs while the Initial Attack Incident Commanders are managing the fire could be beneficial.

Initial FSPro runs were viewed as inaccurate and there was disbelief as to the large size of the predicted fire. When the fire continued to grow exponentially, there was continued disbelief and lack of acceptance of the potential size of the fire that was indicated by the models, which would lead to assumptions of a long duration event. As the fire progressed, a Geospatial Analysts (GSAN) with Long Term Analysts (LTAN) oversight included additional data such as updated drought conditions, weather patterns, and local fuel information to adjust and calibrate the FSPro model to better reflect fire potential. When the confidence in the models increased, there was buy-in to the potential size and 7 Whitewater-Baldy Complex Review Gila National Forest USDA Forest Service

duration of the Whitewater-Baldy Complex. This buy-in with the FSPro models became useful in discussion of values at risk (VARs) and the probability of the fire reaching the identified values. FSPro also validated thought processes and decisions as the fire progressed towards the VARs. Skilled fire program application specialists who can calibrate the model inputs are instrumental when running, interpreting, and communicating model outputs.

Preparedness plans (Community Wildfire Protection Plans or CWPPs) and thinned timber stands around the community of Willow Creek and Mogollon had been conducted well in advance of the fire. The project around Mogollon provided responders with a good anchor in which to engage the fire and prevent it from threatening structural values. There is a need to review the CWPP fuel treatments and assess the need for additional treatments and fuel breaks.

4. Identify Improvements That Can Be Made In Sharing and Clarifying Expectations Region 3 was already into fire season and managing the Whitewater-Baldy Complex when the 2012 Leader’s Intent letter came out from the Washington Office (WO). It presented a shift in thinking but did not result in a change in direction for managing this fire. The Regional Forester was very engaged and communicated the WO direction even before it came out in writing due to his insight on what that Leader’s Intent would be. The direction for the Whitewater-Baldy Complex was based on past understanding of how fire is managed on the Gila NF. The ultimate strategy was not altered as a result of the letter so there was no confusion over what was being done and why.

Continuous and open dialogue between the IMT and AA was paramount particularly as complexity and duration increased. Not everyone agreed on the strategy, but the open dialogue allowed input and eventually led to common understanding. There is a need for AAs and Line Officers to develop a good understanding and comfort with managing fires and the associated risks. This may require additional assignments and quality coaches working with the AA, AA Representatives and Line Officers on Forest and District fires. IMTs need to integrate input from the Forest in development of strategies and tactics for the fire. If the IMT is unable to integrate the Forest’s input, it is prudent of the team to discuss these specific issues with the Forest, leading to open communication, and positive relationships when the team leaves the fire.

There was discussion over burning out around the community of Willow Creek early on or to wait for the fire to come to the community. There were ample resources to initially burnout around the Willow Creek community long before the fire reached it. But then what if the burnout and the main fire never burn together? Was that ok? There needs to

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be a clear understanding ahead of time between the IMT and the Forest on what are acceptable outcomes for putting fire on the ground around a community.

The IMTs worked closely with local Law Enforcement and Volunteer Fire Departments on evacuation plans and evacuations of the local communities. This was done with the cooperators and included numerous community meetings which proved invaluable in the development of relationships for the teams and the Forest. In part this is a direct result of the County having been routinely involved on a Forest with a national reputation for managing fires particularly in Wilderness.

There may be times when everyone wants to jump in and help. The challenge is to deal with all of the assistance offered which may come from state, or other federal government agencies. There is a need to anticipate these offers, and then determine how to best use or not use the assistance, based on looking at future relationships, when there may be a need for the assistance from these agencies.

Lessons Learned Observations and Recommendations

National Priority 1. To achieve common goals will remain the key objective as we deal with increased fire complexity. We need to meet people where they are through the creation and fostering of relationships on a year round basis. As part of this, it is imperative that public information be provided to all communities that are affected, reassuring them, and providing up-to-date information as the incident unfolds. 2. Conducting pre-season discussions between the public, partners and stakeholders over values to be protected, evacuation plans and the associated risks and appropriate resource commitment, or exposure, will improve coordination and collaboration to make critical risk based decisions, bridge differences in perception during an emerging incident, and reduce resistance regarding decisions made by the Forest and IMT on how to manage fires. 3. It would be useful to have training for Line Officers (possibly at Regional Line Officer meetings) on the capabilities and changes to WFDSS, FSPro and other models each year. 4. IMTs need to integrate input from Forests in development of strategies and tactics for the fire. If the team is unable to integrate the Forest’s input, it is prudent of them to discuss these specific issues with the Forest, leading to open communication, and positive relationships when the team leaves the fire. 5. When burning adjacent to a community is considered, there needs to be a clear understanding ahead of time between the IMT and Forest on what are acceptable outcomes for putting fire on the ground around a community. For example, burning

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out before the fire reaches the community vs. waiting for the fire to come to the community.

Regional & Local Priority 1. Communication was unclear in relation to the location of the planning area to take the fire to safer ground and reducing the exposure factors associated with this decision. Increased emphasis on exposure and risk vs. gain conversations between the IMT and the Forest would be appropriate in future risk assessment discussions. 2. With the current Southwest drought conditions, it may be more likely that the 80th percentile probability in FSPro will be reached. There will be a need to recognize early on that under the current conditions, fires may move more quickly, and grow exponentially. This may require the development of a long term strategy around risk and values to be protected while managing the next few operational periods. 3. Designating an individual on a District with good WFDSS skills to document and track the decision content in the WFDSS decisions and MAPs will allow the Initial Attack Incident Commanders to manage the fire. Skilled fire program application specialists who can calibrate the WFDSS model inputs are instrumental when running, interpreting, and communicating model outputs. 4. There is a need for the Forest and cooperators to revisit the CWPP fuel treatments and assess the need for additional treatments, to protect the identified VARs. 5. When faced with complex public and stakeholder issues, consider using a team of Liaison Officers (LOFR) to assist the IMT. 6. We need to meet people where they are through the creation and fostering of relationships on a year round basis. 7. Ensure all communities that become affected by the incident are provided public information to offer reassurance and up-to-date information as the incident unfolds. 8. With long term incidents, the Line Officers need to be mindful of overworking the staff, and request outside assistance early on, as soon as the incident appears to be large and long duration. As this occurs there becomes a need to anticipate this need, then determine how to best use or not use the assistance with focus on building strong partner relationships.

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Enclosure: Implications of Fire History in Southwestern Forests- Fire Management Response and Fire Severity

Fire is a keystone process across southwestern landscapes; and has been recognized in resource management activities since 1975 in the Gila Wilderness. Wildfires have burned across this landscape, shaping the vegetative composition and structure of this forested environment for centuries. As a result of past management practices AAs, Line Officers, and IMTs have increased decision space relative to strategies and tactics on wildfires. This was evident in developing the strategies and tactics in response to the Whitewater-Baldy Complex.

Fuel Treatment Effectiveness reports in Region 3 indicate hazardous fuels treatments are effective in reducing fire behavior and achieving control objectives on wildfires. This was evident within the fire perimeter, where previous fuels mitigations efforts adjacent to the community of Mogollon, and Willow Creek contributed to the success of protecting these communities. Roads through recent thinning and prescribed fire treatments were also used as control lines.

Burn Severity Conclusions within the Whitewater-Baldy Fire Perimeter: o 93% of areas that burned with high severity had no fires in the past 10 years. o Over 70 percent of the ponderosa pine/woodlands burned at low to moderate severity. o Over 50% of the acres of dry and wet mixed conifer burned at moderate to high severity. o Historically dry mixed conifer would have burned more frequently with less severity, and the wet mixed conifer would have exhibited patches of high fire severity. Currently, due to lack of fire in the dry mixed conifer types, it was observed that the entire mixed conifer (dry and wet) matrix burning with high severity.

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Fire History in the Gila Wilderness: The Gila NF is recognized nationally as a leader in the use of fire. The table below captures the recent fire history in and adjacent to the Gila Wilderness from 2002-2011.

Calendar Year Wildfire Acres 2002 52,297 2003 135,567 2004 29,035 2005 89,008 2006 51,526 2007 172,145 2008 81 2009 914 2010 1,245 2011 95,429

Predominantly low to moderate fire severity occurred on the east half of the fire, where a rich fire history is present. Predominantly moderate to high fire severity occurred on the west half of the fire, where fire history is absent. The 2011 Miller’s Fire footprint served as a barrier to fire spread during the fire.

FSPro Challenges Specific and Lessons Learned on the Whitewater-Baldy Complex Fire Spread Probability (FSPro) models, using historical and current weather parameter and fuel type and fuel moisture; generate probabilities of the fire impacting geographical locations over a select period of time, generally seven to fourteen days. The initial FSPro analyses for Whitewater-Baldy were bounded by expected results based on past experiences with fires on the Gila National Forest. FSPro can be highly customized to fit the observed fire behavior of the site. This is a very important and useful attribute of the model, but can be a trap when dealing with conditions outside recent experience and expectations. The cumulative influence of successive drought years was not well represented in the initial model runs. Energy Release Component (ERC) values, which drive how FSPro determines weather and fuel moisture scenarios, were relatively low and did not represent the cumulative dry fuel conditions especially at higher elevations.

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Common FSPro Errors and Factors Leading to Poor Results

Common Errors: 1. Number of Fires - too few fires used for the simulation. 2. Live Herbaceous Fuel Moistures – calculated values were accepted but were inappropriate or too low. 3. High Forecast to Analysis Length Ratio - too many forecast days were selected given the length of the analysis. 4. Landscape Change Rules - use of landscapes with no adjustments to canopy characteristics or fuel models. 5. Entering Notes - lack of documentation, especially where non-standard inputs were used. 6. Burn Period – defaults were often used without considering the observed fire behavior. Factors that may contribute to poor results 1. Start and End Periods for ERC - season length is often too short. 2. Wind Start and End Hours and Wind Type - defaults commonly accepted. 3. Marking an Analysis as “Complete” - analyses are accepted that appear to be calibration runs.

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FSPro Fire Spread Probability May 27, 2012

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