Post-Totalitarian National Identity: Public Memory in Germany and Russia

Social & Cultural Geography, Vol. 5, N o. 3, September 2004

Post-totalitarian national identity: public memory in Germany and Russia

Benjamin Forest 1, Juliet Johnson2 &KarenTill3 1Department of Geography, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH 03755, USA; 2Department of Political Science, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec H3A 2T7, Canada; 3Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of ber 2017 ber 2017 m London, Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX, UK

Through a comparative analysis of Germany and Russia, this paper explores how participation in thememorialization processaffectsand reﬂects national identity formation 26 22 Nove 26 22

: in post-totalitarian societies. Thesepost-totalitarian societiesfacethe common problem of

08 re-presenting their national character as civic and democratic, in great part because their t national identities were closely bound to oppressive regimes. Through a comparison of three memorial sites—Sachsenhausen concentration camp memorial in Germany, and Lubianka Square and the Park of Arts in Russia—we argue that even where dramatic brary] a brary] i reductions in state power and the opening of civil society have occurred, a simple y L elite–public dichotomy cannot adequately capture the nature of participation in the process sit of memory re-formation. Rather, mutual interactions among multiple publics and elites, ver i differing in kind and intensity across contexts, combine to form a complex pastiche of public memory that both interprets a nation’s past and suggests desirable models for its h Un t future. The domination of a ‘Western’ style of memorialization in former East Germany i l l ust r at es how even r el at i vel y open debat es can l ead t o t he ex cl usi on of cer t ai n r epr esen- tations of the nation. Nonetheless, Germany has had comparatively vigorous public debates aynoo

M about memorializing its totalitarian periods. In contrast, Russian elite groups have typically circumvented or manipulated participation in the memorialization process, reﬂecting both a reluctance to deal with Russia’s totalitarian past and a emerging national identity less civic and democratic than in Germany. oaded by [ oaded l Key words: Germany, monuments and memorials, politics of memory, public memory, Russia. Down

Introduction symbols of a ‘people’ or nation (Halbwachs 1992 [1951]; Nora 1996; Till 2003). Nora, for As much recent scholarship suggests, ‘public example, describes how self-consciously con- memory’ develops and solidiﬁes through social structed commemorative places and events of and cultural processes rather than individual memory (lieux de me´moire) in modern France, psychology. Societies create ‘histories’ for including archives, parades, books and monu- themselves through material representations of ments, result from confrontational relation- the past in arenas that, in turn, function as ships between ofﬁcial and vernacular

ISSN 1464-9365 print/ISSN 1470-1197 online/04/030357–24 2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd DOI: 10.1080/1464936042000252778 358 Benjamin Forest et al.

memories. In that case, alternative, unsanc- The process of public memory is especially tioned forms of public memory oppose and evident during the political changes that ac- contest the dominant ‘official memories’ pre- company post-totalitarian transitions. A suc- sented by political elites. We argue that this cessful transition from totalitarianism to dichotomy between official (or elite) and ver- democracy arguably requires a public dis- nacular (or public) forms of memory is overly cussion about how a society remembers its simplistic. Mutual interactions among multiple recent past, including how the previous regime publics and elites, differing in kind and inten- repressed civil society through fear, silence and sity across contexts, combine to form a com- violence. Should such acts be defined as plex pastiche of public memory that both ‘crimes’? If so, who is held responsible: individ- interprets a nation’s past and suggests desirable uals, representatives of the state and/or society models for its future. Through an analysis of in general? Such questions are particularly two post-totalitarian societies, Germany and troublesome in societies in transition, especially ber 2017 ber 2017 m Russia, we argue that even where a dramatic in those cases where human rights abuses were reduction in state power and the opening of denied and (may still be) concealed by state civil society has occurred, an elite–public di- officials (Kramer 2001; McAdams 2001). Dis- chotomy does not adequately describe the na- cussions about ‘crimes’ and responsibility are 26 22 Nove 26 22 : ture of participation in the process of memory central to the politics of public memory, be- 08 t re-formation. cause national histories are (re)narrated Places of memory typically represent the past through such debates. through historical exhibitions, sculptures or as For societies undergoing political transition, brary] a brary] i focal points for commemorative events. They place-making and memory processes are y L may be symbolic spaces where officials and significant spatial practices through which the sit other social groups express their contemporary national past is reconstructed and through ver i political agendas to a larger ‘public’. The social which political and social change may be nego-

h Un and spatial nature of public memory affects tiated. There may be practical reasons for state t both symbolic representations and dominant ofﬁcials or groups to publicly acknowledge (or

aynoo conceptualizations of the nation. We deﬁne forget) victims of the previous regime and com-

M public memory as the cultural spaces and pro- municate post-totalitarian principles: commem- cesses through which a society understands, oration involves relatively little material interprets and negotiates myths about its past; investment and does not require most people to

oaded by [ oaded through those processes, dominant cultural un- change institutional and everyday practices. l derstandings of a ‘nation’ or ‘people’ may be Yet the memorialization process is far from

Down formed (Till 1999: 255). Yet there may not be straightforward. The reasons why a place may consensus amongst state and local elite groups be established and (re)situated through com- as to how and if these places should be remade, memorations or historical narratives may vary, because ‘official’ agendas vary. Further, differ- as will the ways such places of memory will be ent social groups, functioning as distinct ‘pub- interpreted and used. lics’ and counter-publics, may interact with The national and international contexts of officials or choose other actions that influence public memory in any given society also have the remaking of these places. As we demon- profound influences on the negotiation and strate below, public memory is an activity or definition of places of memory. In this respect, process rather than an object or outcome.1 Germany and Russia offer striking contrasts. In Post-totalitarian national identity 359

comparison to Russia, Germany has had a with a discussion of how the nature of partici- long-standing history of addressing and com- pation in public memory is fundamental to the memorating the crimes and victims of National re-presentation of national identity and mem- Socialism through various venues (war tri- ory in post-totalitarian societies. bunals, de-Nazification policies, political edu- cation programmes, museums at historic locations, memorials and so on). These at- Place, public memory and post-totalitarian tempts were uneven in the divided Germanies societies following the Second World War and have remained so since unification, resulting from What is required for a society to confront a both international coercion and in response to shameful past? Should a new regime memorial- local and national popular protests (Fulbrook ize past acts of state-perpetrated violence and 1999; Herf 1997). Although problems, contra- injustice as part of its heritage, and if so how? ber 2017 ber 2017 m dictions and silences remain in the post- How should the past—the memory of the vic- unification process of public memory (Dodds tims, the acknowledgement of ‘crimes’, and the and Allen-Tompson 1994; Smith 2000), Ger- confrontation of social responsibility—be rep- many has had relatively open and vigorous resented and remembered? While Germans 26 22 Nove 26 22 : public debates about its totalitarian periods, have long rigorously debated and negotiated 08 t including the German Democratic Republic such questions as a consequence of the legacies (GDR) past. In contrast, the most powerful of National Socialism, other states in transition Russian elite groups have typically circum- have also begun to explore these difficult ques- brary] a brary] i vented or manipulated public participation in tions in recent years. y L the memorialization process since 1991, Central to these public debates have been the sit reflecting both a reluctance to deal with Rus- processes of defining ‘criminal’ acts (in state ver i sia’s totalitarian past and an emerging national and/or international law) and assigning re-

h Un identity less civic and democratic than in Ger- sponsibility for such acts. What is the nature of t many. past acts and under what jurisdiction (cultural,

aynoo In this article, we ﬁrst review the connection state, international, humanity) should these

M between place and public memory, arguing that past acts be tried (if at all)? Questions also the speciﬁc nature of this relationship is es- emerge about individual and societal complic- pecially important in understanding national ity, denial and resistance, which become es-

oaded by [ oaded identity formation in post-totalitarian regimes. pecially complicated when state ofﬁcials l The article then examines three case studies continue to hold positions of power after the

Down from Germany and Russia. We first consider political transition. Citizen demands for com- debates over the renovation of the Sachsen- pensation, accountability and mourning for hausen concentration camp memorial in the prior acts of state-perpetrated violence may former GDR. In Russia, we examine place- also be difficult to adjudicate. In short, the based memory and forgetting at Lubianka larger social task of working through the his- Square (headquarters of the Soviet and now tories and lingering spectres of these pasts in Russian secret police) and the Park of Arts contemporary society is far from straightfor- (where several significant Soviet-era statues ward (Barkan 2000; Buruma 1994; Nevins found new homes after their removal from 2003). places of honour in Moscow). We conclude Post-totalitarian societies provide especially 360 Benjamin Forest et al.

good cases for studying the negotiation and cludes democratic participation (cf. Ley and reformation of public memory precisely be- Olds 1988; Thomas 2002). While the politics of cause they must face such questions about past place-making and memory in public settings regimes. Totalitarian regimes differ from auth- (even in democratic states) is always marked by oritarian regimes in that they demand mass the spectres of past memorialization practices popular mobilization in support of the state, that served to legitimate state power,3 in post- mobilization that ranges from coerced, to indif- totalitarian societies commemorative genres ferently feigned, to genuinely enthusiastic. Even and representational forms—the monumental though the extent of actual mobilization may memorial on a pedestal, the museum-temple be limited, totalitarian regimes base their legiti- housing national collections and victories, macy on symbolic mobilization; even Fascist ofﬁcials ceremoniously laying wreaths on na- dictators claimed to rule ‘in the name of the tional memorial days—may be interpreted by people’ (Agnew 1998). Thus, as Cohen (1985: citizens and others as providing continuity, ber 2017 ber 2017 m 126) observes in regard to the Soviet case, rather than a break, with state power and ‘historical justice is a powerful “ethical-moral” social relations. Indeed, continuity may some- idea that knows no statute of limitations, es- times be a goal of such practices. pecially when reinforced by the sense that the In contrast, widespread participation in mak- 26 22 Nove 26 22 : whole nation bore some responsibility for what ing and remaking ‘public’ places of memory 08 t happened’. Nonetheless, widespread public canbebothameansandanendofpost-totali- participation and reckoning with the past did tarian transitions where the past is confronted not simply replace top-down state control in and a new civic-democratic society is created. brary] a brary] i either Germany or Russia. Indeed, as we dem- Critical discussion about the multiple meanings y L onstrate, the transitions had complex and am- of the forms, functions and locations of public sit biguous consequences for public memory in places of memory, as well as the pasts to be ver i both societies. remembered, may be a process through which

h Un If post-totalitarian societies choose to ad- past injustices can be confronted to work t dress previous crimes, the process of public through cultural trauma (LaCapra 1994), and

aynoo memory must reconcile collective and individ- to imagine different futures.

M ual participation and complicity in ways that Yet transitions may also result in a crisis of provide both penitence and catharsis.2 In such memory and representation, and a questioning societies, the recognition and acceptance of the of normative ‘regimes of place’ (McDowell

oaded by [ oaded past requires public participation for the very 1999). Societies cannot simply abandon past l reason that the previous regime excluded the cultures of memory or meanings of place.

Down ‘public’—in the active, democratic and deliber- Rather, continuities from past to present and ative sense—from state representations of the familiar narratives of self and belonging fre- nation. As a result, dealing with the past after quently appear in the discussions on the consti- the fall of the regime also demands public tution of memory in the media, through legal participation and attracts interest from citizens institutions, and local political and cultural in uniquely profound ways. Without genuine practices. We argue that the political and social involvement by a range of social groups and uncertainties that characterize transitions may citizens, representations of the past are simply in fact encourage a process of bricolage, a new form of state spectacle or propaganda whereby citizens and social groups use ‘a pas- that reinforces centralized authority and ex- tiche of materials at hand to create a coherent Post-totalitarian national identity 361

narrative of tradition, memory, and history’ a rich range of representational materials in her (Forest and Johnson 2002: 542). In such cases, analysis, problematically assumes that ceremo- it may be especially difficult for a society to nial speeches reflect the intentions of those in confront its recent past, particularly because power, and that newspaper articles represent the recent past remains part of the present, the populace. Such an approach implies that creating unexpected and unknown social insta- elites constitute a coherent group or that they bilities, and making it more difficult for people can impose their ideological understandings on to imagine possibilities for different futures. to seemingly passive subjects through grandiose Scholars have identified the ‘invention of public displays and monumental spaces. While tradition’ as a means to provide stability in a this may be true in certain ways and for certain seemingly chaotic present (Hobsbawm and forms of control, power cannot be conceived Ranger 1992). Yet they have not been as sensi- merely as a directional flow of ruler to ruled, or tive to the complex interactions of the range of described simply as repression and domination ber 2017 ber 2017 m participants in the process of public memory. (Foucault 1977a). Particularly in democratic or Social scientists influenced by Nora (1989) tend quasi-democratic settings, elites may need to to focus on elite roles in public memory forma- negotiate with diverse centres of power, or may tion and reformation, and when they do in- need to respond to popular understandings and 26 22 Nove 26 22 : clude citizen participation, they tend to assume interpretations. Even in totalitarian and auth- 08 t implicitly a dichotomy between elite/official oritarian regimes, individuals may choose to memory, on the one hand, and popular/ver- resist elite interpretations of monumental land- nacular memory, on the other. For example, in scapes through everyday practices, such as tell- brary] a brary] i her discussion of concentration camps in Ger- ing jokes (Atkinson and Cosgrove 1998; y L man memory, Koonz (1994: 261) distinguishes Hershkovitz 1993; Scott 1985). sit between official memory (expressed in cere- At the same time, recent work maintains the ver i monies and leaders’ speeches) and popular distinction between official and popular mem-

h Un memory (reﬂected in the media, newspapers, ory by assuming a crisis model of modern t oral histories, memoirs and opinion polls), and society, nostalgic understandings of the pre-

aynoo argues that ‘public memory is the battleﬁeld on modern and/or romantic depictions of political

M whichthesetwocompeteforhegemony’. struggle (Johnson 1999; Legg 2004; Sturken While we agree that there are differences in 1997; Till 2003). Nora, for example, describes the outcomes of public memory, the emphasis the disappearance of ‘true’ memory—embodied

oaded by [ oaded on this ofﬁcial/popular dichotomy results in an in cultural practices situated in milieux,or l incomplete understanding of the process of contexts, of memory—with the rise of his-

Down memory. Certainly there are methodological tory—self-reflexive acts of archiving and cere- reasons for emphasizing official memory, in- moniously re-enacting the past—through the cluding the limited nature of archival materials emergence of modern lieux,orsites,ofmemory and documents, and the investment of time (Nora 1989, 1996). As Legg (2004) argues, needed to research contemporary transitions. Nora’s nostalgia for a time when memory was Nonetheless, the epistemological assumptions ‘real’ prevents him from critically engaging underlying the official/popular memory di- with the contesting and heterogeneous chotomy also inform how scholars read such claimants to the idea of the French nation. documents and practices, and interpret power Nora’s project, continues Legg, mourns for the relations. Koonz, for example, while providing French nation, or at least the ideal of a time 362 Benjamin Forest et al.

with coherent state power as opposed to a Further, as Sturken (1997) demonstrates, not all pluralistic nationhood. Further, Johnson (1999) places that result from this entangled process of argues that Nora’s temporal framework treats memory are necessarily political, and warns of space as epiphenomenal to the process of his- the implicit romanticization of Foucault’s con- tory. ception of popular memory. Scholars who take seriously the ‘voices from Ultimately, the elite–public dichotomy is lim- below’ and what Foucault (1980) called ‘subju- iting because neither category is conceptually gated knowledges’ into the analysis of memory or politically coherent. Local, national and practices tend to focus on acts of resistance and even international officials, politicians and the creation of ‘alternative’ places of memory other elites may have very different ideas of in ways that also maintain the official and what places of memory mean, what forms they popular memory distinction (Bal, Crewe and should take, what pasts should be remembered Spitzer 1999; Davis and Starn 1989; Gillis (and in whose name) and what symbolic mean- ber 2017 ber 2017 m 1994a). Gillis (1994b) delineates a historical ings these places should communicate to a progression from pre-national to national to larger audience (other officials, locals, nationals post-national phases of commemoration, where or tourists). They may have different agendas in the final phase, social groups challenging for these places, and may compete with each 26 22 Nove 26 22 : elite and official depictions of national history other for control over monument sites, leading 08 t have severed the ideological coherence between to ideological conflict or incoherence (Agnew the nation and the state. Within this postmod- 1998; Forest and Johnson 2002). ern phase of commemoration, scholars often Likewise, there is seldom a coherent ‘public’ brary] a brary] i theorize alternative sites of memory as venues or populace. Rather, there are many publics, y L of resistance that challenge exclusive and total- sub-publics and counter-publics, each possess- sit izing national narratives, such as Young’s ing distinct political agendas, access to re- ver i (1993) counter-sites of memory by German sources and authority, and understandings of

h Un artists. Such alternative places are theorized, place (Fraser 1990). Their conceptualizations, t following Foucault (1977b), as popular sites of uses, experiences and understandings of speciﬁc

aynoo ‘countermemory’ deﬁnedintermsoftheirchal- places of memory may differ sharply depending

M lenge to ofﬁcial and elite commemorative prac- upon their social positions and needs in the tices. present and projected future. As the case stud- This analytical emphasis on resistance and ies below demonstrate, at certain moments

oaded by [ oaded opposition simpliﬁes the agendas of various some publics enjoy greater support, resources l individuals and groups who may, at times, and access to authority than others, and thus

Down work together to create alternative or subaltern may actively change landscapes; at other times venues of memory (Frazier 1999). Following these publics are excluded (by state officials, Pile (1997) we argue that the underlying as- the media or other actors) in various realms sumptions about the domination–resistance (Staeheli 1997). Further, while some publics coupling are questionable (cf. Abu-Lughod may engage in passionate conflicts with local 1990; Sharp, Routledge, Philo and Paddison and national authorities over the politics of 2000). Social groups historically have interacted memory, in other circumstances many people with officials to establish state venues of mem- are simply indifferent to these monumental ory; officials and elites may also play significant conflicts. roles in the constitution of alternative places. In short, public memory is a political process Post-totalitarian national identity 363

that both creates and responds to power rela- umphing over ‘evil’. No other state so directly tions and identities. At the national scale, elites, addressed Cold War narratives of victory while publics and public spheres are dynamic, mul- simultaneously working through a totalitarian tiple, and intersecting social and spatial cate- past. Following unification, the workings of the gories that cut across and through local, urban, GDR regime were interrogated through legal regional and international affiliations and trials of leaders and border police, and federal power relations. Consequently, studies of pub- investigative commissions, a process based in lic memory require nuanced understandings of part on Germany’s experience dealing with the the complex relationships among these unstable National Socialist past (Deutscher Bundestag categories and social groupings that are con- 1994). This process included scholarly research tinuously created and recreated through place- and discussions over which public places of making, social memory, and their related memory in the former East should be closed, multi-scaled and shifting configurations of reformed or left open. Nonetheless, a relatively ber 2017 ber 2017 m identity and belonging. black-and-white representation of the GDR regime emerged to replace more nuanced understandings of East German society that had Place and public memory in Germany been prevalent for the previous twenty years 26 22 Nove 26 22 : (Fulbrook 1997). ‘The new historical picture 08 t Unlike other countries undergoing the tran- which was presented was one of heroes, vil- sition from East Bloc satellite state to Western lains, and victims: of an evil gang of criminals democracy, in Germany the history of the GDR at the top oppressing an innocent people be- brary] a brary] i is linked to the history of Germany’s other low, challenged only by a few resourceful y L totalitarian state, the Third Reich. Indeed, the heroes of the opposition’ (Fulbrook 1999: 226). sit very existence of the GDR was a direct legacy The post-unification narrative of East Ger- ver i of National Socialism; after the end of the man society drew from the familiar trope of

h Un Second World War, Germany and Berlin were ‘Germans as victims’, one dating back to the t partitioned and occupied, and later divided into 1930s, if not earlier, that projects responsibility

aynoo two states that came to symbolize a larger Cold for past actions on to an ill-deﬁned evil other

M War conﬂict. Not only did the National Social- (Assmann and Frevert 1999; Marcuse 2001). In ist past continue to haunt the new Germany, so this new myth, ‘ordinary’ East Germans were too did the ways that the past was remembered represented as ‘victims’ of repressive regimes

oaded by [ oaded andforgottenintheColdWarperiod(Herf and not held personally responsible for their l 1997). These hauntings were materialized in the actions (and inactions) supporting the st at us

Down ‘New Berlin’ and Germany through the estab- quo. Dominant cultural narratives also repre- lishment of new places of memory and the sented the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) remaking of GDR commemorative sites, in- as the ‘natural’ and inevitable model for a cluding sites of National Socialist violence unified German democratic state. Although the (Habermas 1997; Huyssen 1997; Till forth- German constitutional mandate required it, coming). there was no renegotiation of the Federal Re- Contemporary German discussions about the public’s Basic Law (similar to a constitution) at GDR totalitarian past were unique in another the moment of German reunification. Based in way: they were tied to Western narratives part on this omission, Habermas (1997) argues about ‘winning’ the Cold War, of ‘good’ tri- that post-1990 social memory did not reflect a 364 Benjamin Forest et al.

self-critical re-evaluation of the West German after the war, and would only make coming to state and political system. terms with the GDR past more difficult for Western mainstream magazines such as Der future generations (Aktives Museum 1990), Sp i egel , newspapers like the Frankfurter Allge- (Till, personal interviews with Christiana Hoss meine Zeitung and commentaries by former and Martin Becher, Active Museum academic Chancellor Kohl sent the message that East staff, Berlin, 1997). Yet memorials created by Germans needed to work through their pasts in the East German state located at sites of Na- order to become part of (West) German civil tional Socialist violence could not simply be society. A problematic understanding that the shut down. Instead, these places of memory ‘West’ had overcome its National Socialist past were renovated and their histories revised to and established a ‘normal’ democracy was im- reflect Western standards of pedagogy and his- plicit in this narrative. The numerous radical torical research. right activities that included xenophobic acts, The Sachsenhausen Concentration Camp ber 2017 ber 2017 m brutal attacks and even murder in places like Memorial Museum in Oranienburg, Branden- Rostock and Solingen were represented as an burg (near Berlin) in the former GDR was one East German youth problem. Yet evidence indi- such place where post-totalitarian social identi- cated a more complicated social situation, such ties were both constituted and challenged (Fig- 26 22 Nove 26 22 : as the activism and support of the radical right ure 1). A range of actors have articulated and 08 t in Western states (including activities by so- debated questions of social responsibility for called ‘necktie neo-Nazis’) and by West Ger- the dark national past through the functions, man voters who supported far right or forms and public meanings of this memorial. brary] a brary] i established conservative parties running on Certain aspects of this process have been troub- y L anti-foreigner campaigns. Rather than examine ling: the continued hegemony of conservative sit this violence within the shifting social contexts cultural narratives, such as Germans as ‘vic- ver i of unification, West German experts and crimi- tims’; the dominance of Western expert opin-

h Un nologists characterized former GDR citizens as ion; and the simultaneous lack of critical t morally ﬂawed (Ho¨rschelmann 2001). reﬂection about Western practices of memory.

aynoo Places of memory, their historical narratives Nonetheless, we interpret the discussions about

M and their social functions offer venues to ex- Sachsenhausen as a positive result of a long- plore how (and if) post-uniﬁcation German standing, albeit conﬂict-ridden, post-war West identities changed. Some scholars have exam- German politics of memory.

oaded by [ oaded ined the material erasure and reinterpretation Sachsenhausen was originally built as a l of GDR landscapes of memory in Berlin where ‘model’ concentration camp in 1936 and in-

Down numerous monuments were quickly torn down, cluded a SS-training camp and related labour Marxist–Leninist institutions were closed and camps; during the GDR period some of these street names previously dedicated to commu- buildings were reused by the People’s Army nist ﬁghters changed back to their pre-1933 and later the GDR police.4 Before this time, names (Azaryahu 1997; De Soto 1996; Till from 1945 to 1950, Soviet occupiers used Sach- 1996). Activist Western-based groups, such as senhausen (like Buchenwald) as a ‘Special theActiveMuseumofResistanceagainstFas- Camp’ to intern Nazi functionaries as well as cism in Berlin, argued that getting rid of the perceived enemies of the Soviet and emerging GDR past in the material landscape recalled GDR states. For ideological reasons, that his- the ‘forgetting’ of the National Socialist past tory of the camp was not ofﬁcially documented Post-totalitarian national identity 365 ber 2017 ber 2017 m

Figure 1 The main gate of Sachsenhausen’s prisoner concentration camp, Oranienburg, August 1997. Photograph by K. Till. 26 22 Nove 26 22 : 08 t in the GDR. In 1961, in response to National were ignored because the historical exhibitions Socialist camp survivors’ demands, a memorial at Sachsenhausen created during the GDR em- brary] a brary] i complex was built, and Sachsenhausen, to- phasized the central role of communist prison- y L gether with Buchenwald (1958) and Ravens- ers (including GDR leaders) in anti-fascist sit bruck (1959) concentration camp memorials, resistance. Camp histories emphasized the in- ver i was transformed into one of the central com- ternational origins of camp prisoners (from 19

h Un memorative ritual sites of the GDR. A monu- different countries) and their heroic struggle t ment, museums and ceremonial events against Fascism, rather than describe the rea-

aynoo commemorated international anti-fascist resist- sons why Jews, Sinti and Roma, and other

M ance ﬁghters to support the myth of the East social groups, such as homosexuals, were se- German state (Morsch 1996, 2001; Wiedmer lected for genocide or persecution (Deutscher 1999; Young 1993). Bundestag 1994; Endlich 1992; Morsch 1996).

oaded by [ oaded After uniﬁcation, the new, Western directors An immediate goal of the new directors, there- l of Sachsenhausen faced the difﬁcult task of fore, was to work with National Socialist pris-

Down transforming this central symbol of East Ger- oner and survivor groups whose histories had man anti-fascist identity into a part of larger been underrepresented or misrepresented dur- national and international networks of histori- ing the GDR (Till, personal interviews with cal memory. They used recommendations from Gu¨nter Morsch, Oranienburg, 1997). a committee of historians and memorial mu- The emergence of new victim groups compli- seum experts commissioned by the state of cated this goal. Following uniﬁcation, human Brandenburg to evaluate these GDR concen- remains and mass graves were discovered at the tration camps (Endlich 1992). According to the Soviet internment ‘Special Camps’ at Sachsen- expert commission’s ﬁndings, the racist under- hausen and Buchenwald. Directors had to ad- pinnings of National Socialist persecution dress the concerns of newly formed Soviet 366 Benjamin Forest et al.

internment camp survivors and victim groups tims, and in the case of the GDR, for resistance whodemandedrecognitionoftheirsuffering fighters. In the case of Sachsenhausen this and who received local media attention. Ac- meant that only the triangular portion of the cording to museum directors, considerable ten- concentration camp proper was preserved as a sion among different victim groups emerged.5 historical site. When new directors proposed Indeed, at times these groups refused to sit on including the SS training camp, SS officer resi- the same memorial advisory and consulting dential units and inmate labour camps as part boards because National Socialist survivor and of the concentration camp memorial complex, prisoner groups felt that the internment camp a number of controversies ensued. groups equated their suffering with National First, the proposal to expand the memorial Socialist persecution. conflictedwithlocalplanstourbanizesomeof The new directors pursued a ‘decentralized the same area. In 1992–3, the City of Oranien- approach’ to reinterpret the artifacts, historical burg (near the camp site) sought to develop an ber 2017 ber 2017 m research and memorialization of the GDR pe- area that included the locations of the former riod, and to provide a more extensive represen- SS troop camp and SS officer residences (Stadt tation of the camp’s history under National Oranienburg 1992). The winning design of the Socialism and for the periods after 1945 (Till, public competition proposed a multi-use com- 26 22 Nove 26 22 : personal interviews with director Gu¨nter plex with residential units, office space, schools 08 t Morsch, Oranienburg, 1997, 2000). Directors and a sport centre (Ber l i ner M or genpost 1993; hoped to emphasize the historical significance Der T agesspiegel 1993; Stadt Oranienburg of the camp during National Socialism, but 1992). Although the proposal encouraged the brary] a brary] i also to include the post-war histories in new integration, rather than isolation, of the his- y L exhibits. The decentralized approach does two toric area and the contemporary city, camp sit things: it offers exhibitions about different as- directors and other West German memory ex- ver i pects of the camp’s historical layers at particu- perts objected, arguing that this was a ‘pro-

h Un lar sites and designates speciﬁcareasfor fanization’ of an important national historical t commemorative and mourning activities by dif- site.6 Oranienburg city ofﬁcials were initially

aynoo ferent victim and survivor groups at different confused about the intense criticisms and de-

M times of the year (Till, personal interviews with bates, but subsequently rescinded their initial Gu¨nter Morsch, Oranienburg, 1997, 1999, decision and selected a proposal by Daniel 2000) (also see Morsch 2001). This decentral- Libeskind that had been awarded honourable

oaded by [ oaded ized approach draws from the grassroots his- mention in the competition. Libeskind’s plan, l tory workshop and memorial museum called ‘Hope Incision’, rejected the premise of

Down movements that developed in the FRG in the urbanization, and called for a confrontation 1980s (Ru¨rup 2003; Till 1996), although new with the past through excavations, signs and historical research conducted after unification landscape designs that mark historic buildings has also had an influence. This approach, how- and significant sites (Forschungsgruppe ever, conflicts with commonly accepted East Stadt Dorf and Scha¨fer 1994; Libeskind 1993; German, and to a lesser degree West German, Stadt Oranienburg 1993: 63). These historical understandings of concentration camp memori- sites provide a dialogue with contemporary als before unification. Memorials in both the land uses such as schools, an international FRG and GDR were generally understood as youth centre, an Institute for Tolerance and an places of memory for National Socialist vic- Institute for Human Rights. Post-totalitarian national identity 367

These debates included more than historians, GDR citizens had practical reasons for their urban professionals and artists. Local residents involvement, many attended planning boards living in former SS officer neighbourhoods dur- and open meetings, discussed plans with archi- ing the GDR formed a citizen’s initiative op- tects and preservationists, and were active and posing preservation status of their homes. They influential in victim and survivor groups. In- wanted to prevent what they felt was the deed, one organizer of a homeowner citizen ‘Western’ usurpation of their newly acquired initiative group now volunteers at Sachsen- property rights, but also feared that their hausen’s main office. By confronting the com- neighbourhood would become a neo-Nazi pil- plex histories and perspectives of Sachsen- grimage site (Till, personal interview with citi- hausen as a historical place, the groups in- zen initiative organizer, Oranienburg, 1997).7 volved found ways to begin working through In negotiating the conflicts between Western post-totalitarian histories as well as German– historians and local East German citizens, the German post-war identities. ber 2017 ber 2017 m Libeskind architectural group became very important. Through discussions with the architects in formal and informal venues (including Place and public memory in Russia local pubs and coffee shops), local residents 26 22 Nove 26 22 : finally agreed to place their homes under Like Germany, Russia faced an internal debate 08 t ‘group’ historical preservation provisions, about its totalitarian past after the fall of the which will limit the changes they can make to communist regime. While repression and hu- those structures, but still allow the Libeskind man rights violations had characterized the brary] a brary] i project to be realized (Till, personal interview Soviet regime throughout its history, this de- y L with Mattias Reese, project co-ordinator, bate cut most deeply in regard to the Stalin era sit Daniel Libeskind Buro, Berlin, 1998). and the secret police. Under Josef Stalin, who ver i Although West German directors and mem- ruled the Soviet Union from the late 1920s until

h Un orial museum experts, and American–West his death in 1953, millions of Soviet citizens t German architectural teams played an were executed, exiled to labour camps, or

aynoo inﬂuential role in these public debates, the re- otherwise disgraced and traumatized (Conquest

M conceptualization of Sachsenhausen resulted 1973; Tucker 1990). Millions more denounced from a complex process of negotiation among their fellow citizens out of fear or desire for many actors with different personal and politi- advancement. The state security services, then

oaded by [ oaded cal interests in the future of this site, including known as the NKVD and already familiar with l representatives of various social victim and sur- the instruments of repression, carried out this

Down vivor groups; memorial advisory boards, edu- political persecution. cators, historians, politicians and memorial Although the Communist Party distanced it- museum directors; homeowners’ citizen group self from much of this legacy during the initiatives; historic preservationists; city Khrushchev-era de-Stalinization campaign officials; city planners; architects; and others. (when, for example, Stalin’s body was removed Debates largely arose in response to memorial from the Lenin Mausoleum), this selective re- preservation proposals, planning competitions, writing of history occurred without significant media coverage about historical and archaeo- public participation. The ‘excesses’ of the logical findings, citizen initiatives and other regime were blamed on Stalin as an individual, related contemporary events. Although some even as his bloody efforts to collectivize and 368 Benjamin Forest et al.

industrialize Russia were tacitly approved (Co- Russia, no majority understanding emerged hen 1985; Khrushchev 1956). Moreover, the that saw such public remembering as necessary communist representations of Stalinist history for the future health of the state (Suny 1999). did not lead to signiﬁcant change in the secret Many Russian political elites had held high police apparatus (by then renamed the KGB), positions in the Soviet party and state appar- which merely scaled back its intimidating activ- atus, and often this translated into a desire to ities (Knight 1988). Under Brezhnev the crimes downplay or simply ‘move past’ the past. Simi- of the Stalin era were once again swept under larly, much of the population did not see the the rug, not to surface again until Mikhail past, on balance, as something to be ashamed Gorbachev introduced glasnost in the 1980s of, or believed that energy and resources should (Tumarkin 1994). be invested in public displays of repentance. Gorbachev signalled his willingness to ad- For example, a survey by the respected agency dress the past by releasing physicist and activist VTsIOM found in early 2003 that over half of ber 2017 ber 2017 m Andrei Sakharov from exile in Gorky, encour- Russians polled viewed Stalin’s role in Soviet aging the ‘rehabilitation’ of individuals exiled history as ‘probably’ or ‘deﬁnitely’ positive or murdered in the Stalin era, and in general (VTsIOM Analytic Agency 2003). Indeed, the opening up Soviet history to public discussion New Russian Barometer surveys sponsored by 26 22 Nove 26 22 : and evaluation. Human rights groups emerged the Centre for Public Policy at the University of 08 t at this time as well. The most important of Strathclyde since 1993 consistently show that these, Memorial, aimed to reveal and acknowl- large majorities of Russians rate the pre-per- edge the dark past by (among other efforts) est r oi k a political and economic systems much brary] a brary] i erecting a national monument to victims of more highly than the current ones (Rose 2002). y L political repression (Smith 1996). However, this Moreover, unlike Germany, Russia was not sit movement of memory angered those who joining a ‘West’ whose political discourse de- ver i viewed the overall contributions of Stalin and manded a reckoning with the past. As a result,

h Un the secret police in a more positive light (An- unlike Germany’s Neue Wache memorial, Rus- t dreeva 1990 [1988]; Ligachev 1993). It is not sia as yet has no recognized central national

aynoo coincidental, for example, that the heads of the monument to the victims of political re-

M KGB and the Ministry of the Interior played pression. prominent roles in the failed attempt to over- As in Germany, conﬂict over memory in throw Gorbachev in August 1991 (Daniels Russia cannot be described as an elite–public

oaded by [ oaded 1993). These controversial and painful debates battle. Rather, debate embraces majority elites l about the past contributed to the collapse of andpublicswhoprefertoforget,andminority

Down the Soviet regime. When the Russian Feder- elites and publics who ﬁght to remember. In ation then emerged as an independent state, for most cases, however, the process of public the ﬁrst time Russians as a nation had to think memory cannot be described as one of nego- about incorporating and recognizing this aspect tiation and compromise. In the typical pattern, of Soviet history in their public memory. leading political elites erect and remove monu- Unlike in Germany, though, the question in ments with little effective outside input (Forest Russia was not how to recognize and memori- and Johnson 2002). If minority elites and public alize the totalitarian past, but whether it should groups mobilize to oppose these efforts, ma- be openly acknowledged as a problem at all jority elites listen but rarely reverse their deci- (Applebaum 1997; Kramer 2001; Weir 2002). In sions; only reactions from other politically Post-totalitarian national identity 369 ber 2017 ber 2017 m

Figure 2 Lubianka Square, Moscow, August 2001. The Solovetskii stone is on the left. The arrow indicates the former location of Dzerzhinskii’s statue in the centre of the square. Photograph by 26 22 Nove 26 22 : B. Forest and J. Johnson. 08 t

powerful forces prove effective.8 If the minority recognizing its totalitarian past (Figure 2). This brary] a brary] i opposition is loud enough, majority elites may is a tale of three monuments—one old, one y L ‘mobilize’ broader public opinion in their fa- new and one not yet constructed—and the sit vour through commissions, polls and proposed imposing headquarters of the state security ser- ver i referenda, using these tools to justify their ac- vice looming over it all. The ﬁrst monument, to

h Un tions. In addition, particularly in terms of Soviet secret police founder Feliks Dzerzhinskii, t elites, ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ can refer not stood in the centre of the square until 1991.

aynoo simply to numbers, but to power resources. Since its removal, different elite groups have

M With former security services head Vladimir made three efforts to restore it. The activist Putin as president, for example, Russian elite organization Memorial installed the second groups wishing to reinterpret the past in a more monument, a small stone from the Solovki

oaded by [ oaded positive light now have a supporter at the top. gulag, in a park on the square’s edge in 1990. l As the case studies of Lubianka Square and the The third, a proposed central national monu-

Down Park of Arts reveal, the battle over whether and ment to victims of political repression, has how to remember the past in Russia remains never been erected despite Memorial’s contin- sensitive and complex, yet far more circum- ued fundraising and lobbying efforts. scribed than that in Germany. For Russians, Dzerzhinskii symbolizes the order, the terror and the power of the Soviet regime. In August 1991, after the failed coup Lubianka Square attempt, crowds surrounded the monument and tried to tear it down. The Moscow city The changing face of Lubianka Square in government, riding the populist wave, acquired Moscow epitomizes Russia’s conundrums over a crane and removed it (Luzhkov 1996). After- 370 Benjamin Forest et al.

wards, as disillusionment with the Russian pol- monument’ and that it should be returned to itical, economic and social situation set in, the the square (Filimonova 2002). empty circle of grass where Dzerzhinskii’s While the Communist Party, the FSB and monument had stood became a festering sore in their supporters cheered Luzhkov’s proposal, the heart of Moscow. During the 1990s, the liberal parties and human rights groups conflict over the restoration of Dzerzhinskii— protested (Abdullaev 2002). The Union of and thus, symbolically, the Soviet past—was a Right Forces party proposed a Duma resolution conflict fought principally among elites. In De- condemning the idea, which failed for lack of a cember 1998, the State Duma (Russia’s lower quorum. Liberal political elites joined human legislative house) overwhelmingly passed a res- rights groups for a small protest demonstration olution to restore the statue ‘as a symbol of the on Lubianka Square, and circulated a petition fight against crime’. The Agrarian Party, Com- against the move (A ssoci at ed Pr ess 2002). munist Party and several smaller parties sup- Memorial re-released its 1998 statement against ber 2017 ber 2017 m ported the resolution, while only Yabloko (the restoration, but admitted in the new preface party of liberal, educated urban intellectuals) that restoring the statue ‘is supported by opposed it unanimously (Tolstikhina 1998). influential forces at the top of Russia’s political Moscow mayor Yurii Luzhkov forcefully re- power structure’ (Memorial 2002). Despite the 26 22 Nove 26 22 : jected the resolution, but on the grounds that it opposition from minority parties and human 08 t violated the principle of local control. The rights groups, a reliable nationwide poll re- Agrarians and Communists proposed a similar vealed that Russian public opinion favoured resolution in the State Duma in July 2000, but Luzhkov’s proposal, with 56 per cent support- brary] a brary] i this time could not muster enough votes to pass ing Dzerzhinskii’s restoration, 30 per cent not y L it (Uzelac 2000). expressing an opinion and only 14 per cent sit This dynamic changed again in the years speaking out against it (Public Opinion Foun- ver i after Putin’s election in 2000, as the president dation 2002).9

h Un symbolically and rhetorically re-interpreted the Throughout the debate, Putin himself re- t place of the security services and the Stalinist mained silent on the matter. As Sakharov

aynoo past in a more positive light (Forest and John- Foundation director Yurii Samodurov ob-

M son 2002; Kurilla 2002; Traynor 2000). At the served, ‘We cannot imagine the German chan- same time, Putin made strong efforts to re-con- cellor not protesting if the mayor of Berlin solidate political power in the hands of the decided to erect a monument to the head of the

oaded by [ oaded presidency while taming both the Duma and Gestapo. Here, it is possible’ (quoted in Rodin l assertive local leaders like Luzhkov. As a result, 2002).10 However, an ofﬁcial statement from

Down Luzhkov reversed his position on the Dzerzhin- the Kremlin did come four days after skii question. When Nikolai Patrushev, head of Luzhkov’s proposal, when deputy chief of staff the FSB (the KGB’s successor and current occu- Vladislav Surkov attempted to defuse the ten- pant of the Lubianka), publicly said in Septem- sion by stating that ‘today, some are calling for ber 2002 that he would like to see Dzerzhinskii the restoration of the Dzerzhinskii statue; to- back in his former place of honour, Luzhkov morrow others will demand the removal of apparently interpreted it as a hint from Putin Lenin’s body from the mausoleum … both (Abdullaev 2002). Attempting to curry favour [ideas] are equally inopportune’ (quoted in with the powerful president, Luzhkov stated Birch 2002). As a result, in January 2003 the that Dzerzhinskii’s statue was an ‘excellent Moscow City Council ﬁnally rejected Post-totalitarian national identity 371

Luzhkov’s proposal to restore the statue, on the Up until now, even after many discussions and two grounds that it would cause unnecessary dis- design competitions, Memorial has not received a cord (O’Flynn 2003). The centre of the square conclusive answer to the question of whether or not thus remained empty, its fate (like that of the the monument will be established. Or has the monument itself) still unresolved. Solovetskii stone … already become this monu- Given this signiﬁcant, near-successful effort ment? … The work of recent years demonstrates to restore a central symbol of the totalitarian that the perpetuation of memory exceeds the powers past, the second monument on Lubianka of one social organization. (Memorial 2002) Square—the Solovetskii stone—seems ever- smaller and more incongruous. As its inscrip- In short, following Memorial’s placement of tion states, ‘The society “Memorial” was the Solovetskii stone in 1990 and the removal especially nominated to provide this stone from of Dzerzhinskii’s statue in 1991, the transform- the territory of the Solovetskii camp and to ation of Lubianka Square arguably represented ber 2017 ber 2017 m erect it in memory of the millions of victims of the greatest success in recognizing victims of the totalitarian regime’. Memorial placed this the Soviet state. Yet even this success was monument in October 1990 with the express ambiguous, both because of the resistance (and co-operation of the Gorbachev regime and the apathy) faced by Memorial in its efforts to 26 22 Nove 26 22 : Moscow city government, at a moment when a construct a central monument to the victims of 08 t few powerful elites preferred to remember the Stalinist repression, and because of subsequent Soviet past in order to transcend it. For almost attempts to return Dzerzhinskii to his pedestal. a year, Dzerzhinskii’s statue and the Solovetskii As the conﬂicts over Lubianka Square demon- brary] a brary] i stone stood across the street from each other, strate, many Russian elites and publics would y L as duelling symbols of a state tearing itself not only prefer to forget the injustices of the sit apart. After Dzerzhinskii’s removal, its location past, but to symbolically restore their perpetra- ver i served as a rallying point for anti-communist tors to a place of honour.

h Un protestors and victims of the Stalinist regime. t Its presence, however, is also a constant

aynoo reminder of the absence of a third monument, ThePark of Arts

M a proposed national monument to the regime’s victims. Memorial has laboured almost alone On the evening of 22 August 1991, the Moscow in this seemingly lost cause to construct a city government used cranes to remove the

oaded by [ oaded central symbol of memory and atonement. This statues of Dzerzhinskii and other Soviet leaders l lengthy, so-far futile effort to construct a cen- from their pedestals in the centre of Moscow.

Down tral monument contrasts sharply with the rapid These statues ended up in the Park of Arts construction of a prominent state-sponsored (sometimesalsoreferredtoas‘TheParkof monument to those who died at Moscow’s Totalitarian Art’). Subsequently, the park came Dubrovka theatre in October 2002 during a to play an unusual role in the re-conceptualiza- hostage crisis perpetrated by armed Chechen tion of public memory. Not only did local separatists. Just one year after the attack, Putin political elites engage in a concerted effort to presided over the well-publicized unveiling of a de-politicize the statues, but Yurii Luzhkov large monument commemorating the victims also approved the erection of an immense and (Yablokova and Valueva 2003). As Memorial’s reviled statue to Peter the Great on the river- website ruefully observes: bank by the park’s edge. Local elites carried 372 Benjamin Forest et al.

out both the de-politicization of the Soviet been buried in the sculptor’s garden until it was statues and the construction of Peter the Great ‘resuscitated’ and placed in the park in 1991 with little public input (Forest and Johnson (Boym 2001). Ironically, the Stalin statue thus 2002). Yet several public groups actively (and reappeared at the same moment that his leader- futilely) protested against the statue of Peter ship was most severely called into question. the Great, while the de-politicization strategy Then, at the height of Luzhkov’s anti-commu- met resistance only from Dzerzhinskii’s sup- nist sentiments in 1998, the amateur artist Ev- porters. genii Chubarov donated a sculpture group At ﬁrst, the Soviet statues sat forlorn and symbolizing the gulag to the park, which unmarked in a weedy corner of the park. But in promptly erected it behind Stalin’s statue. Both 1996, the Moscow city government formalized a de-politicizing description and the stone rep- the display by restoring the statues, installing resentations of the gulag stood together with small plaques identifying the ﬁgures, and nam- the statue, epitomizing the tension over the ber 2017 ber 2017 m ing the area the Park of Arts. The new park Stalinist past. was placed under the jurisdiction of Muzeon, a Luzhkov’s decision to erect a huge, 60-metre- subsidiary of Moscow’s Committee on Culture, high statue of Peter the Great nearby more and became a display area for contemporary accurately indicated how many political elites 26 22 Nove 26 22 : artistic works. By the summer of 1999, former preferred to remember the past—by skipping 08 t Soviet leaders shared the park with a rose over the Soviet period entirely and glorifying garden, abstract religious art and numerous Russia’s Tsarist period (Figure 3). Although the busts. city ostensibly held a public competition to brary] a brary] i The most important Soviet-era statues had design the monument, Luzhkov’s favourite y L plaques describing the subject, artist, material sculptor Zurab Tsereteli got the commission sit used and where the piece had been displayed. (Smith 2002). After the statue took up its dom- ver i After this description, the plaques attached to inating position on the Moscow skyline in

h Un the statues ended with a depoliticizing dis- 1997, two public groups spoke out against it. t claimer: ‘It has historical and artistic value. One group, a coalition of artists led by gallery

aynoo The monument is in the memorializing style of owner Marat Gel’man, pressed for a public

M political-ideological designs of the Soviet pe- referendum on removing the statue. Luzhkov riod. Protected by the state’. Characterizing promised to create a commission to study the these statues in historical and artistic terms matter, but this proved to be merely a stalling

oaded by [ oaded intended to drain them of contemporary politi- tactic. As Smith (2002) notes, Tsereteli’s sup- l cal signiﬁcance by politically decontextualizing porters in the political and art worlds then

Down the works and emphasizing their alleged artistic carried out a massive campaign in the press to value. Indeed, the pieces were placed haphaz- defend the sculpture and to publicize the re- ardly and the descriptions never referred to ported $12 million cost of dismantling it. The more than a single statue. mayor’s efforts to mobilize ‘public opinion’ Only the display surrounding Stalin’s statue paid off, with surveys revealing that only 12 per had obvious political symbolism, and it is cent of Muscovites wanted to hold the ‘costly’ clearly an unusual case. Unlike the other, re- referendum, and, although many had reserva- cently removed Soviet-era statues, the Stalin tions about the monument’s aesthetic merits, a statue was a casualty of the de-Stalinization full 86 per cent spoke against dismantling it process under Khrushchev, and had reportedly (Itar-Tass 1997). Armed with this data, the Post-totalitarian national identity 373

body from his mausoleum on Red Square. Al- though the group did not actually detonate the explosives, they declared the monument ‘symbolically destroyed’ (Kamakin 1997). Thus, the transformation of the Park of Arts demonstrates how leading Russian politicians have often chosen to avoid confrontations with the totalitarian past. De-politicizing Soviet statues and icons through their placement in the park represented an attempt to circumvent the kind of vigorous, participatory debates charac- teristic of German public memory. The statues of Soviet leaders in the Park of Arts remained ber 2017 ber 2017 m in their new places, silent witnesses to a past that many Russian elites and publics preferred not to remember. In addition, Luzhkov’s decision to construct the widely detested Peter the 26 22 Nove 26 22 : Great statue illustrates how organized public 08 t groups have often been marginalized in the memorialization process. Although the statue faced challenges from public groups with very brary] a brary] i different compositions, ideologies and motiva- y L tions, Luzhkov and his city government used sit their inﬂuence to marshal the support of ver i broader ‘public opinion’ and justify the statue’s

h Un presence. The statue remained despite its un- t popularity, exempliﬁed by an aborted attempt

aynoo to blow it up—a far cry from the ‘normal’

M process of negotiation in Germany. Figure 3 Peter the Great statue, Moscow, July 1999. The Park of Arts lies in the foreground.

oaded by [ oaded ‘Public’ culturesof memory l Photograph by B. Forest and J. Johnson.

Down As Staeheli (1996) suggests, many scholars tend to assume that a ‘public place’ like a memorial mayor’s commission decided to leave the statue can be equated with the ‘public sphere’. Yet to in place. do so fetishizes places of memory as objects Not long after this decision, another group rather than ongoing sets of processes through ‘spoke out’, but in a very different way. In July which understandings of political community 1997, the obscure ‘RSFSR Revolutionary Mili- and social identity are negotiated. Further, by tary Council’ placed plastic explosives around mistaking the physical existence of ‘public the monument and threatened to blow it up in places’ as evidence of a public sphere, scholars protest of Luzhkov’s threats to remove Lenin’s do not pay enough attention to the ways that 374 Benjamin Forest et al.

place-making processes produce publics. The be evaluated by comparing different total- three case studies presented here indicate how itarian periods within German history at public memory is a process, rather than ma- particular historic sites. These same directors terial object or outcome. The comparison of may not have supported such a process in the German and Russian public memory since 1989 former West Germany in the 1980s because highlights the distinct ways in which multiple they may have interpreted the Kohl admini- elites and publics typically engage in the memo- stration’s cultural politics as an attempt to blur rialization process, illustrating why studies of the categories of National Socialist victim and public memory should move beyond the simple perpetrator (see Habermas 1989; Maier 1988; dichotomy between ‘elite’ and ‘public’. Till 1996). Sachsenhausen shows how GDR These examples also demonstrate the com- and even FRG approaches to representing plex ways various ‘publics’ re-narrate national and remembering totalitarian pasts can be history(s) through place-making. Groups may reconceptualized. ber 2017 ber 2017 m have different agendas and conceptions that In the new Germany, emerging practices of sometimesleadtoelite–publicconflicts, but public memory may conflict with existing nar- that may also engender elite–elite and public– ratives, political cultures and social hierarchies public conflicts. The category of ‘counter-mem- that limit the participation and influence of 26 22 Nove 26 22 : ory’ as ‘resistance’ is too simplistic: a range of some groups—notably former East German cit- 08 t actors and groups may act in ways not necess- izens—but there is still a sense that the ‘nor- arily structured by opposition to state or elite mal’ or proper process of memorialization domination. Furthermore, civic organizations involves vigorous public debates and nego- brary] a brary] i and interest groups may have highly differenti- tiation rather than simple top-down, elite- y L ated access to public forums that affect their driven decision-making. Civic organizations sit power and influence in the process of public play a central role in these discussions and ver i memory. processes, and a broad array of publics success-

h Un Discussions and events about Sachsenhausen, fully engaged ‘ofﬁcial’ memorial and planning t for example, took place in a range of venues, proposals to produce new conceptions of Ger-

aynoo including the local and national media, artistic man identity through a confrontation with the

M practices, public competitions and protests. past. While these discussions were at times quite In contrast, Russian civic organizations have contentious, overall the process resulted in been both less interested and less inﬂuential in

oaded by [ oaded negotiation and the incorporation of different publicly confronting the more troublesome as- l perspectives. Participants see the current pro- pects of the Soviet past. The relative lack of

Down posal for Sachsenhausen’s future development interest—with the notable exception of Mem- as a compromise solution that incorporates orial—reﬂects a broadly shared opinion that different layers of history, contemporary social such ‘reckoning with’ or ‘atoning for’ the So- views and Western humanitarian (or universal- viet past is unnecessary for contemporary Rus- ist) hopes for the future. sians and would devalue the more positive Moreover, given the complex histories and aspects of Soviet history. This indifference does post-uniﬁcation debates about Sachsenhausen, not carry over into other realms of public some Western museum memorial directors now memory, however. Peter the Great’s immense argue that different claims to ‘victim’ status and aesthetically questionable statue provoked and social responsibility for past crimes should intense outcry, both organized and diffuse. Post-totalitarian national identity 375

Similarly, civic and elite groups have co-oper- for Research/Dean of the Graduate School ated to erect or restore many cultural and (Grant in Aid) at the University of Minnesota religious monuments across Russia. provided research support for this article. We More importantly, though, elites in local, would like to give special thanks to Derek provincial and federal governments have cap- Alderman, Owen Dwyer and Steven Hoelscher tured the memorialization process for those for their help and encouragement, and for or- public sites with potential political resonance. ganizing this special issue. Thanks also to Rob This is not to say that powerful Russian politi- Kitchin, David Sibley and two anonymous re- cians ignore popular opinion; indeed, they are viewers for their thoughtful comments on ear- attentive to the national ‘visions’ that public lier versions of the article. monuments convey, and manipulate such monuments in order to associate themselves with attractive symbols and to bolster their legiti- ber 2017 ber 2017 Notes m macy. Rather, as the case studies illustrate, their control over the process contributes to 1 We use the term public memory to emphasize the circumscribing debate over and recognition of complex interactions and tensions within and between the more controversial aspects of Soviet his- elite and other social groups. The term public implies 26 22 Nove 26 22 : tory. political engagement and discussion, whereas cultural memory need not be political (Sturken 1997). 08 t This comparative perspective in discussions 2 See the voluminous literature about working through of public memory highlights the shifting nature the past in Germany (Assmann and Frevert 1999; of inclusions and exclusions of various publics Jaspers 1961; Kittel 1993; Reichel 1995). brary] a brary] i and sub-publics. Conﬂicts over memorializa- 3 On hauntings, ghosts, memory and place, see Bell y L tion in Germany since 1989 show how even a (1997), Gordon (1997), Pile (2002) and Till (forth- sit coming). relatively open and participatory culture of ver

i 4 Information for this section comes from numerous public memory still privileges experts in ways personal interviews, newspaper articles and participant-

h Un that can exclude or diminish other perspectives. t observations collected and conducted by Till from 1995 Russia demonstrates, however, that such ex- to 2001. On the history of Sachsenhausen, see Endlich (1992), Morsch (1996), Till (forthcoming) and Wiedmer aynoo clusion is relative: post-totalitarian societies (1999). M may develop a top-down rather than a more 5 Forty-one national associations exist for the pre-1945 participatory culture of public memory, ulti- prisoner groups; 17 are the most important numerically mately placing greater constraints on the ways and have national Sachsenhausen committees. In Ger-

oaded by [ oaded in which a nation can imagine a new identity many, three Sachsenhausen committees exist (West l for itself. Berlin, East Germany and West Germany); other national associations include the Central Council of Ger- Down man Jews, the Central Council of Sinti and Roma, four homosexual organizations and the Social Democratic Acknowledgements Working Group. The foreign groups, according to Morsch, are uniﬁed and have national groups with The authors contributed equally to this article subgroups. The prisoner advisory board consists of and are listed alphabetically. The Nelson A. representatives from up to twenty groups, including Rockefeller Center at Dartmouth College, the post-1945 groups (Till, personal interviews with Gu¨nter Morsch, Oranienburg, 1997). Association of American Geographers (Anne U. 6 Similar debates emerged for development proposals at White Grant), the Alexander von Humboldt Ravensbru¨ck and Auschwitz (see Charlesworth 1994; Foundation and the OfﬁceoftheVicePresident Dwork and van Pelt 1996). 376 Benjamin Forest et al.

7 Oranienburg gained a reputation for radical right ac- AssociatedPress(2002) Activists protest Dzerzhinsky statue tivity after uniﬁcation, and visitors to the camp were plan, 17 Sept. harassed by neo-Nazis, visitor books had anti-Semitic Atkinson, D. and Cosgrove, D. (1998) Urban rhetoric and entries and the camp suffered physical defacements, embodied identities: city, nation, and empire at the including an arson attack on the so-called Jewish bar- Vittorio Emanuele II monument in Rome, 1870–1945, racks in 1992 (Oranienburger Generalanzeiger 1995). Annals of the Association of American Geographers 88: 8 One recent exception to this trend was Moscow mayor 28–49. Yurii Luzhkov’s decision to abandon plans to build Azaryahu, M. (1997) German reuniﬁcation and the politics numerous monuments representing characters from of street names: the case of East Berlin, Pol i t i cal Geogr a- Mikhail Bulgakov’s novel MasterandMargarita in the phy 16: 479–493. wealthy Patriarch’s Pond area. The outcry among local Bal,M.,Crewe,J.andSpitzer,L.(eds)(1999)Acts of residents was so great that Luzhkov scaled back the M emor y: Cul t ur al Recal l i n t he Pr esent .Hanover,NH: project considerably, agreeing to erect only a simple Dartmouth College, University Press of New England. monument to Bulgakov himself (Balmforth 2003). Balmforth, R. (2003) Moscow literary site saved after 9 Support in Moscow itself was more mixed, with a residents protest, Reuters,1April. ber 2017 ber 2017 VTsIOM poll showing 44 per cent in favour and 38 per Barkan, E. (2000) The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and m cent opposed (Saradzhyan 2002). Negotiating Historical Injustices. New York: W.W. Nor- 10 Ironically, there is a memorial space at the former ton. Gestapo Headquarters in central Berlin, called the Top- Bell, M. (1997) The ghosts of place, Theory and Society 26: ography of Terror International Documentation Cen- 813–836.

26 22 Nove 26 22 tre. In contrast, however, this space functions as an : Berliner M orgenpost (1993) Wohnungsbau rund um das ‘open wound’ of the city and nation, rather than as a

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26 22 Nove 26 22 Till, K.E. (1996) Place and the politics of memory: a

: de la Russie, cet article explore comment la geo-ethnography of memorials and museums in Berlin,

08 participation dans le processus de comme´mor- t PhD dissertation, Department of Geography, University ation peut intervenir et trouver son expression of Wisconsin. Till, K.E. (1999) Staging the past: landscape designs, cul- dans la constitution d’une identite´ nationale de brary] a brary] i tural identity and Erinnerungspolitik at Berlin’s Neue socie´te´s post-totalitaires. Compte tenu que

y L Wache, Ecumene 6: 251–283. leurs identite´s nationales e´taient lie´es de pre`s a` sit Till,K.E.(2003)Placesofmemory,inAgnew,J.,Mitchell, des re´gimes tyranniques, les socie´te´s post-total- K. and O´ ’Tuathail, G. (eds) Companion to Political ver i itaires se confrontent aujourd’hui au proble`me Geography. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 289–301. Till, K.E. (2005) The New Berlin: Memory, Politics, Place. familierdesere-pre´senter un portrait national h Un t Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (forth- civique et de´mocratique. Nous mettons en com- coming). paraison trois lieux de comme´moration: le aynoo Tolstikhina, A. (1998) They’re ready for restoration: State monument comme´moratif du camp de concen- M Duma moves to return Iron Felix to his pedestal, Segod- tration de Sachsenhausen en Allemagne, et le nia,3Dec.:1,6. Traynor, I. (2000) Capital letters: Russia’s new strongman Carre´ Lubianka et le Parc des Arts en Russie. puts Stalin back on a pedestal, The Guardian,13May: Nous soutenons que meˆme si le pouvoir de oaded by [ oaded ´ l 14. l’Etat a e´te´re´duit de manie`re dramatique et que Tucker,R.(1990)Stalin in Power: The Revolution from la socie´te´ civile a e´merge´, un mode`le dichoto- Above, 1928–1941. New York: W.W. Norton. Down mique simple opposant l’e´lite au public ne per- Tumarkin,N.(1994)TheLivingandtheDead:TheRise met pas de comprendre la nature de la and Fall of the Cult of World War II in Russia.New York: Basic Books. participation dans le processus de la reconstitu- Uzelac, A. (2000) No Lubianka return for KGB founder, tion du souvenir. Plutoˆt, des interactions Moscow Times,8July:3. mutuelles entre une multitude de publics et VTsIOM Analytic Agency (2003) VTsIOM Nationwide d’e´lites, se distinguant a` travers divers contex- Survey, February 28–M arch 3, 2003, http:// tes par type et par intensite´, se combinent en un www.russiavotes.org/Mood rus cur.htm# 395 (accessed 11 January 2004). pastiche complexe du souvenir public qui per- Weir, F. (2002) Wary of its past, Russia ignores mass grave met a` la fois d’interpre´ter le passe´ d’une nation site, Christian Science M onitor,10Oct.:1. et de pre´coniser des mode`les se´duisants axe´s 380 Benjamin Forest et al.

RDA illustre comment les de´bats passablement tivo de tres sitios de memoriales—el memorial ouverts peuvent exclure certaines repre´senta- del campo de concentracioń de Sachsenhausen tions de la nation. Neánmoins, des de´bats pub- en Alemania, la Plaza Lubianka y el Parque de lics assez vigoureux ont e´te´ tenus en Allemagne Artes en Rusia, sugerimos que auń cuando se sur la comme´moration des e´poques totalitaires reduce drama´ticamente el poder del estado y se qui l’ont marqueé. Le cas de la Russie fait abre la sociedad civil—un simple dicotomáı contraste. Les groupes d’e´lites ont le plus sou- elite-pu´blico no capta adecuadamente la natu- vent neutraliseóuembrouille´ la participation raleza de participacioń en el proceso de re-for- au processus de comme´moration. Ils sont peu macioń de la memoria. Ma´s bien, interacciones dispose´s a` reconnaˆtreı le passe´ totalitaire du mutuas entre mu´ltiples elites y pu´blicos, de pays et re´pugne a`l’identite´ nationale en e´merg- varios tipos e intensidades a trave´s de contex- ence qui est moins civique et de´mocratique tos, se combinan a formar un pastiche com- qu’en Allemagne. plejo de memoria pu´blica que tanto interpreta ber 2017 ber 2017 m el pasado de una nacioń como sugiere modelos Mots-clefs: Allemagne, monuments comme´mo- deseables para su futuro. La dominacioń de un ratifs, souvenir public, Russie. estilo occidental de memorializar en el antiguo Alemania Oriental demuestra como hasta los 26 22 Nove 26 22 : debates relativamente abiertos pueden excluir a 08 t Identidad nacional en las sociedades posto- ciertas representaciones de la nacioń. No ob- talitarias: la memoria pu´blicaenAlemania stante, en Alemania han habido debates pu´bli- yRusia cos comparativamente ene´rgicos sobre co´mo brary] a brary] i memorializar sus peródosı totalitarios. Por con- y L Por un ana´lisis comaprativo de Alemania y traste, grupos e´lites rusos han burlado o manip- sit Rusia este papel explora co´mo participacioń en ulado participacioń en el proceso de ver i el proceso de memorializar afecta y refleja la memorializar, lo cual refleja tanto una reticen-

h Un formacio´n de identidad nacional en las so- cia a tratar su pasado totalitario como una t ciedades postotalitarias. Estas sociedades pos- identidad nacional emergente menos c´vicaı y

aynoo totalitarias se enfrentan al problema comu´n de menos democra´tica que la de Alemania.

M co´mo re-presentar su cara´cter nacional como c´vicoı y democra´tico, pues sus identidades na- Palabras claves: Alemania, monumentos y cionales han estado estrechamente ligadas con memorials, la pol´ticaı de memoria, memoria

oaded by [ oaded re´gimenes opresivas. Por un estudio compara- pu´blica, Rusia. l Down