Social & Cultural Geography, Vol. 5, N o. 3, September 2004 Post-totalitarian national identity: public memory in Germany and Russia Benjamin Forest 1, Juliet Johnson2 &KarenTill3 1Department of Geography, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH 03755, USA; 2Department of Political Science, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec H3A 2T7, Canada; 3Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of ber 2017 ber 2017 m London, Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX, UK Through a comparative analysis of Germany and Russia, this paper explores how participation in thememorialization processaffectsand reflects national identity formation 26 22 Nove 26 22 : in post-totalitarian societies. Thesepost-totalitarian societiesfacethe common problem of 08 re-presenting their national character as civic and democratic, in great part because their t national identities were closely bound to oppressive regimes. Through a comparison of three memorial sites—Sachsenhausen concentration camp memorial in Germany, and Lubianka Square and the Park of Arts in Russia—we argue that even where dramatic brary] a brary] i reductions in state power and the opening of civil society have occurred, a simple y L elite–public dichotomy cannot adequately capture the nature of participation in the process sit of memory re-formation. Rather, mutual interactions among multiple publics and elites, ver i differing in kind and intensity across contexts, combine to form a complex pastiche of public memory that both interprets a nation’s past and suggests desirable models for its h Un t future. The domination of a ‘Western’ style of memorialization in former East Germany i l l ust r at es how even r el at i vel y open debat es can l ead t o t he ex cl usi on of cer t ai n r epr esen- tations of the nation. Nonetheless, Germany has had comparatively vigorous public debates aynoo M about memorializing its totalitarian periods. In contrast, Russian elite groups have typically circumvented or manipulated participation in the memorialization process, reflecting both a reluctance to deal with Russia’s totalitarian past and a emerging national identity less civic and democratic than in Germany. oaded by [ oaded l Key words: Germany, monuments and memorials, politics of memory, public memory, Russia. Down Introduction symbols of a ‘people’ or nation (Halbwachs 1992 [1951]; Nora 1996; Till 2003). Nora, for As much recent scholarship suggests, ‘public example, describes how self-consciously con- memory’ develops and solidifies through social structed commemorative places and events of and cultural processes rather than individual memory (lieux de me´moire) in modern France, psychology. Societies create ‘histories’ for including archives, parades, books and monu- themselves through material representations of ments, result from confrontational relation- the past in arenas that, in turn, function as ships between official and vernacular ISSN 1464-9365 print/ISSN 1470-1197 online/04/030357–24 2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd DOI: 10.1080/1464936042000252778 358 Benjamin Forest et al. memories. In that case, alternative, unsanc- The process of public memory is especially tioned forms of public memory oppose and evident during the political changes that ac- contest the dominant ‘official memories’ pre- company post-totalitarian transitions. A suc- sented by political elites. We argue that this cessful transition from totalitarianism to dichotomy between official (or elite) and ver- democracy arguably requires a public dis- nacular (or public) forms of memory is overly cussion about how a society remembers its simplistic. Mutual interactions among multiple recent past, including how the previous regime publics and elites, differing in kind and inten- repressed civil society through fear, silence and sity across contexts, combine to form a com- violence. Should such acts be defined as plex pastiche of public memory that both ‘crimes’? If so, who is held responsible: individ- interprets a nation’s past and suggests desirable uals, representatives of the state and/or society models for its future. Through an analysis of in general? Such questions are particularly two post-totalitarian societies, Germany and troublesome in societies in transition, especially ber 2017 ber 2017 m Russia, we argue that even where a dramatic in those cases where human rights abuses were reduction in state power and the opening of denied and (may still be) concealed by state civil society has occurred, an elite–public di- officials (Kramer 2001; McAdams 2001). Dis- chotomy does not adequately describe the na- cussions about ‘crimes’ and responsibility are 26 22 Nove 26 22 : ture of participation in the process of memory central to the politics of public memory, be- 08 t re-formation. cause national histories are (re)narrated Places of memory typically represent the past through such debates. through historical exhibitions, sculptures or as For societies undergoing political transition, brary] a brary] i focal points for commemorative events. They place-making and memory processes are y L may be symbolic spaces where officials and significant spatial practices through which the sit other social groups express their contemporary national past is reconstructed and through ver i political agendas to a larger ‘public’. The social which political and social change may be nego- h Un and spatial nature of public memory affects tiated. There may be practical reasons for state t both symbolic representations and dominant officials or groups to publicly acknowledge (or aynoo conceptualizations of the nation. We define forget) victims of the previous regime and com- M public memory as the cultural spaces and pro- municate post-totalitarian principles: commem- cesses through which a society understands, oration involves relatively little material interprets and negotiates myths about its past; investment and does not require most people to oaded by [ oaded through those processes, dominant cultural un- change institutional and everyday practices. l derstandings of a ‘nation’ or ‘people’ may be Yet the memorialization process is far from Down formed (Till 1999: 255). Yet there may not be straightforward. The reasons why a place may consensus amongst state and local elite groups be established and (re)situated through com- as to how and if these places should be remade, memorations or historical narratives may vary, because ‘official’ agendas vary. Further, differ- as will the ways such places of memory will be ent social groups, functioning as distinct ‘pub- interpreted and used. lics’ and counter-publics, may interact with The national and international contexts of officials or choose other actions that influence public memory in any given society also have the remaking of these places. As we demon- profound influences on the negotiation and strate below, public memory is an activity or definition of places of memory. In this respect, process rather than an object or outcome.1 Germany and Russia offer striking contrasts. In Post-totalitarian national identity 359 comparison to Russia, Germany has had a with a discussion of how the nature of partici- long-standing history of addressing and com- pation in public memory is fundamental to the memorating the crimes and victims of National re-presentation of national identity and mem- Socialism through various venues (war tri- ory in post-totalitarian societies. bunals, de-Nazification policies, political edu- cation programmes, museums at historic locations, memorials and so on). These at- Place, public memory and post-totalitarian tempts were uneven in the divided Germanies societies following the Second World War and have remained so since unification, resulting from What is required for a society to confront a both international coercion and in response to shameful past? Should a new regime memorial- local and national popular protests (Fulbrook ize past acts of state-perpetrated violence and 1999; Herf 1997). Although problems, contra- injustice as part of its heritage, and if so how? ber 2017 ber 2017 m dictions and silences remain in the post- How should the past—the memory of the vic- unification process of public memory (Dodds tims, the acknowledgement of ‘crimes’, and the and Allen-Tompson 1994; Smith 2000), Ger- confrontation of social responsibility—be rep- many has had relatively open and vigorous resented and remembered? While Germans 26 22 Nove 26 22 : public debates about its totalitarian periods, have long rigorously debated and negotiated 08 t including the German Democratic Republic such questions as a consequence of the legacies (GDR) past. In contrast, the most powerful of National Socialism, other states in transition Russian elite groups have typically circum- have also begun to explore these difficult ques- brary] a brary] i vented or manipulated public participation in tions in recent years. y L the memorialization process since 1991, Central to these public debates have been the sit reflecting both a reluctance to deal with Rus- processes of defining ‘criminal’ acts (in state ver i sia’s totalitarian past and an emerging national and/or international law) and assigning re- h Un identity less civic and democratic than in Ger- sponsibility for such acts. What is the nature of t many. past acts and under what jurisdiction (cultural, aynoo In this article, we first review the connection state, international, humanity) should these M between place and public memory, arguing that past acts be tried (if at all)? Questions also the specific nature of this relationship is es- emerge about individual and societal