Demystifying Africa's Cyber Security Poverty Line

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Demystifying Africa's Cyber Security Poverty Line Demystifying Africa’s Cyber Security Poverty Line Tanzania Chapter The Africa Cyber Immersion Centre is a state-of-the-art research, innovation and training facility that seeks to address Africa’s ongoing and long-term future needs through unique education, training, research, and practical applications. For more information Serianu Limited contact: [email protected] http://www.serianu.com Tanzania Cyber Security 3 Report Content Editor’s Note and Acknowledgement Cost of Cyber Crime We are excited to finally publish the 2nd edition of Tanzania We estimate that cyber-attacks cost Tanzanian 4 Cyber Security Report 2017. 54 businesses around $99.5 million a year. Foreword Sector Ranking in 2017 2017 has seen a jump in cyberattacks or cybercrimes. Cyber security is no longer a concern fof the Ransomware, DDoS attacks, data breaches were all financial & banking sectors only. 7 synonymous with 2017. 56 Executive Summary Home Security It is in our own best interests to make sure everyone – from the young to the old, on The global landscape of cyber threats is quickly changing. snapchat, facebook and twitter - know and 9 60 practice basic security habits. Top Trends Africa Cyber Security Framework We analysed incidents that occurred in 2017 and compiled Attackers are now launching increasingly a list of top trends that had a huge impact on the economic sophisticated attacks on everything from and social well-being of organisations and Tanzanian citizens. business critical infrastructure to everyday 13 69 devices such as mobile phones. Top Priorities for 2018 Appendixes 19 We have highlighted key priorities for 2018. 71 Cyber Intelligence Statistics, Analysis, & Trends References We have monitored organisations’ network for malware and cyber threat attacks such as brute-force attacks 25 against the organisation’s servers. 74 2017 Tanzania Cyber Security Survey This survey identifies current and future Cyber security needs within organisations and the most prominent 38 threats that they face. Tanzania 4 Cyber Security Report Editor’s Note and Acknowledgement We are extremely pleased to publish the 2nd edition of the Tanzania Cyber Security Report. This report contains content from a variety of sources and covers highly critical topics in Cyber intelligence, Cyber security trends, industry risk ranking as well as home security. Over the last 5 years, we have consistently strived to demystify the state of Cyber security in Brencil Kaimba Africa. In this edition themed Demystifying Africa’s Cyber Security Poverty Line, we take a deeper look at the financial limitations impacting many Tanzanian organisations. Our research is broken Editor-in-chief down into the following key areas: Top Trends: We analysed incidents that Sector Risk Ranking: The risk appetite What can our readers look occurred in 2017 and compiled a list of for organisations varies. In this section, forward to in this report? top trends that had a huge impact on we rank different sectors based on their the economic and social well-being of risk appetite, number of previous attacks organisations and Tanzanian citizens. This reported, likelihood and impact of a This report GIVes section provides an in-depth analysis of successful attack. insiGHTFUL analYsis OF these trends. Anatomy of a Cyber Heist: This section CYBER SECUritY issUes, Cyber Intelligence: This section highlights provides a wealth of intelligence about trends and threats various Cyber-attacks, technical how Cybercriminals operate, from IN AFRICA. ITS sections reconnaissance, gaining access, attacking methodologies, tools, and tactics that are WELL researched attackers leverage to compromise and covering their tracks. This section organisations. The compromise statistics is tailored to assist Security managers and STRUctURED TO and indicators provided in this section identify pain points within the organisation. cater for THE NEEDS empower organisations to develop a OF all ORGanisational Home Security: In light of the increased proactive Cyber security posture and STAFF inclUdinG bolster overall risk. residential internet penetration, smart phone use and cases of Cyber bullying, it Board Directors. has become necessary to raise awareness Survey Analysis: This section analyses on Cyber security matters at a non- THE anatomY OF A the responses we received from over 700 corporate level. This section highlights key CYBER-heist WAS organisations surveyed across Africa. It challenges in the modern smart home and measures the challenges facing Tanzanian compiled with SECUritY sheds light on the growing issue of Cyber organisations, including low Cyber security bullying. implementers and budgets and inadequate security impact forensic INVestiGators awareness that eventually translates to limited capabilities to anticipate, detect, Africa Cyber Security Framework (ACSF): IN MIND WHILE THE TOP respond and contain threats. In order to assist businesses in Africa, priorities section especially SMEs, we developed the Africa Cyber Security Framework (ACSF). This caters for Directors Cost of Cyber Crime Analysis: Here we section highlights the four (4) key domains closely examine the cost of Cybercrime in and Senior EXECUTIVes. of ACSF which serves to help businesses Tanzanian organisations and in particular, to identify and prioritize specific risks plus gain a better appreciation of the costs to We have also highlighted other steps that can be taken to address these the local economy. We provide an estimate social issues such as home risks in a cost effective manner. of this cost, which includes direct damage security that plays an important plus post-attack disruption to the normal role away from the corporate course of business. standpoint. Demystifying Africa’s Cyber Security Poverty Line Tanzania Cyber Security 5 Report Appreciation Commentaries In developing the Tanzania Cyber Security Report 2017, the Serianu CyberThreat Aashiq Sharif Intelligence Team received invaluable collaboration and input from key partners as listed below; CEO - Raha - Liquid Telecom Tanzania Ltd Ben Roberts We partnered with Kabolik an IT and Business consulting firm based in Tanzania whose prime focus is enabling clients Chief Technical Officer, to get the best value from their information and IT assets Liquid Telecom Group by developing holistic end-to-end solutions that release customers to focus on their core business and activities. Dr. Carina Wangwe Kabolik provided immense support through research and Head, ICT - SSRA (Social Security provision of statistics, survey responses, local intelligence on Regulatory Authority) top issues and trends highlighted in the report. Dr. Edward Hoseah CEO - Hoseah & Co. Advocates, The USIU’s Centre for Informatics Research and Innovation Former DG-PCCB (Prevention and (CIRI) at the School of Science and Technology has been our Combating of Corruption Bureau) key research partner. They provided the necessary facilities, research analysts and technical resources to carry out the ASP Joshua Mwangasa extensive work that made this report possible. Deputy Head of Cybercrime Unit, TPF (Tanzania Police Force) The ISACA-Tanzania Chapter provided immense support Eng. Peter Ulanga through its network of members spread across the country. Key statistics, survey responses, local intelligence on top CEO & Fund Manager, issues and trends highlighted in the report were as a result Universal Communications Service Access of our interaction with ISACA-Tanzania chapter members. Fund (UCSAF) Adv. Josephat Mkizungo Senior State Attorney - The Serianu CyberThreat Attorney General’s Chambers Intelligence Team Joseph Mathenge We would like to single out individuals who worked tirelessly Chief Operating Officer, Serianu Limited and put in long hours to deliver the document. Olabode Olaoke Eric Ochaka Samuel Keige Mark Muema PricewaterhouseCoopers Dadi Masesa George Kiio Nabihah Rishad Barbara Munyendo Margaret Ndungu Dr. Peter Tobin Kevin Kimani Morris Ndungu Privacy and Compliance Expert, BDO Consulting, Mauritius USIU Team Jeff Karanja Ms. Paula Musuva Kigen Kuta Jamilla Uchi Information Security Consultant Folarin Adefemi Isaac Demystifying Africa’s Cyber Security Poverty Line Tanzania 6 Cyber Security Report Building Data Partnerships In an effort to enrich the data we are collecting, Serianu continues to build corporate relationships with like-minded institutions. Recently, we partnered with The Honeynet Project ™ and other global Cyber intelligence organisations that share our vision to strengthen the continental resilience to cyber threats and attacks. As a result, Serianu has a regular pulse feeds on malicious activity into and across the continent. Through these collaborative efforts and using our Intelligent Analysis Engine, we are able to anticipate, detect and identify new and emerging threats. The analysis engine enables us identify new patterns and trends in the Cyber threat sphere that are unique to Tanzania. Our new Serianu CyberThreat Command Centre (SC3) Initiative serves as an excellent platform in our mission to improve the state of Cyber security in Africa. It opens up collaborative opportunities for Cyber security projects in academia, industrial, commercial and government institutions. For details on how to become a partner and how your organisation or institution can benefit from this initiative, email us at [email protected] Design, layout and production: Tonn Kriation Disclaimer The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position
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