DOCSLIB.ORG

CHOICE – a NEW STANDARD for COMPETITION LAW ANALYSIS? a Choice — a New Standard for Competition Law Analysis?

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
CHOICE – a NEW STANDARD for COMPETITION LAW ANALYSIS? a Choice — a New Standard for Competition Law Analysis? GO TO TABLE OF CONTENTS GO TO TABLE OF CONTENTS CHOICE – A NEW STANDARD FOR COMPETITION LAW ANALYSIS? a Choice — A New Standard for Competition Law Analysis? Editors Paul Nihoul Nicolas Charbit Elisa Ramundo Associate Editor Duy D. Pham © Concurrences Review, 2016 GO TO TABLE OF CONTENTS All rights reserved. No photocopying: copyright licenses do not apply. The information provided in this publication is general and may not apply in a specifc situation. Legal advice should always be sought before taking any legal action based on the information provided. The publisher accepts no responsibility for any acts or omissions contained herein. Enquiries concerning reproduction should be sent to the Institute of Competition Law, at the address below. Copyright © 2016 by Institute of Competition Law 60 Broad Street, Suite 3502, NY 10004 www.concurrences.com [email protected] Printed in the United States of America First Printing, 2016 Publisher’s Cataloging-in-Publication (Provided by Quality Books, Inc.) Choice—a new standard for competition law analysis? Editors, Paul Nihoul, Nicolas Charbit, Elisa Ramundo. pages cm LCCN 2016939447 ISBN 978-1-939007-51-3 ISBN 978-1-939007-54-4 ISBN 978-1-939007-55-1 1. Antitrust law. 2. Antitrust law—Europe. 3. Antitrust law—United States. 4. European Union. 5. Consumer behavior. 6. Consumers—Attitudes. 7. Consumption (Economics) I. Nihoul, Paul, editor. II. Charbit, Nicolas, editor. III. Ramundo, Elisa, editor. K3850.C485 2016 343.07’21 QBI16-600070 Cover and book design: Yves Buliard, www.yvesbuliard.fr Layout implementation: Darlene Swanson, www.van-garde.com GO TO TABLE OF CONTENTS ii CHOICE – A NEW STANDARD FOR COMPETITION LAW ANALYSIS? Editors’ Note PAUL NIHOUL NICOLAS CHARBIT ELISA RAMUNDO In this book, ten prominent authors offer eleven contributions that provide their varying perspectives on the subject of consumer choice: Paul Nihoul discusses how freedom of choice has emerged as a crucial concept in the application of EU competition law; Neil W. Averitt and Robert H. Lande provide a detailed argument that enforcement agencies should adopt consumer choice as a new paradigm for antitrust; Peter Behrens lays out the historical origin of consumer choice as a concept grounded in German ordoliberalism; Robert H. Lande, in another contribution, provides an updated argument for why the US antitrust agencies should adopt consumer choice as the new model for antitrust enforcement; Elisabeth de Ghellinck discusses how economists approach the idea of consumer choice; Joshua D. Wright and Douglas H. Ginsburg draw on economics to argue that an economic welfare standard should remain the governing paradigm in antitrust enforcement rather than consumer choice; Steven Anderman discusses how the concepts of consumer welfare and consumer choice are used in EU competition law to reconcile it with intellectual property law; Neil W. Averitt and Robert H. Lande, in another contribution, argue that consumer choice can be used as a principle for understanding and unifying competition and consumer protection laws; Neil W. Averitt, in another contribute, provides practical guidance on how consumer choice can be used to improve competition and consumer protection laws at the enforce- ment and remedial stages; J. Thomas Rosch discusses whether, or the extent to which, consumer choice can be used to facilitate convergence between US antitrust law and EU competition law; Maurice E. Stucke draws on insights from behavioral economics to highlight when more choice is better for consumers and when it is not. This volume offers readers an exhaustive and multifaceted discussion of the crucial concept of consumer choice and its relevance for modern competition law. The editors would like to give their sincere thanks to the ten authors for their hours of labor dedicated to this unique collection of articles. GO TO TABLE OF CONTENTS CHOICE – A NEW STANDARD FOR COMPETITION LAW ANALYSIS? iii Table of Contents Editors’ Note .............................................................................................. iii PAUL NIHOUL, NICOLAS CHARBIT & ELISA RAMUNDO PART I: Consumer choice in EU and national competition law “Freedom of choice”: the emergence of a powerful concept in European competition law ...........................................................................9 PAUL NIHOUL Using the “consumer choice” approach to antitrust law ..........................41 NEIL W. AVERITT & ROBERT H. LANDE The consumer choice paradigm in German ordoliberalism and its impact on EU competition law ................................................................ 123 PETER BEHRENS Consumer choice as the best way to re-center the mission of competition law ..................................................................... 153 ROBERT H. LANDE PART II: Consumer choice — different perspectives Consumer choice: an economic perspective ........................................... 167 ELISABETH DE GHELLINCK The goals of antitrust: welfare trumps choice ......................................... 185 JOSHUA D. WRIGHT & DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG GO TO TABLE OF CONTENTS CHOICE – A NEW STANDARD FOR COMPETITION LAW ANALYSIS? v Consumer welfare and consumer choice in the reconciliation of the conficts between competition law and IPRs .......................................... 205 STEVEN ANDERMAN Consumer choice: the practical reason for both antitrust and consumer protection law ......................................................................... 229 NEIL W. AVERITT & ROBERT H. LANDE How “consumer choice” can unify the felds of competition and consumer protection law ......................................................................... 253 NEIL W. AVERITT Can consumer choice promote trans-Atlantic convergence of competition law and policy? ................................................................... 265 J. THOMAS ROSCH When more is better and when less is more: behavioral antitrust and choice ....................................................................................................... 283 MAURICE E. STUCKE GO TO TABLE OF CONTENTS vi CHOICE – A NEW STANDARD FOR COMPETITION LAW ANALYSIS? Contributors Steven Anderman Robert H. Lande University of Essex University of Baltimore Neil W. Averitt Paul Nihoul FTC:Watch University of Louvain Peter Behrens J. Thomas Rosch University of Hamburg US Federal Trade Commission Elisabeth de Ghellinck Maurice E. Stucke University of Louvain-la-Neuve University of Tennessee Douglas H. Ginsburg Joshua D. Wright United States Court of Appeals for the George Mason University School of Law District of Columbia Circuit GO TO TABLE OF CONTENTS CHOICE – A NEW STANDARD FOR COMPETITION LAW ANALYSIS? vii “Freedom of choice”: the emergence of a powerful concept in European competition law* PAUL NIHOUL [email protected] Professor of Antitrust Law, University of Louvain President, Academic Society for Competition Law I. Introduction Is Europe engaging on a path that will lead to the transformation of its competition policy? In the last few years, the European Commission has adopted landmark decisions bringing to the foreground a concept that had so far gained limited attention—the concept of choice, that is, the possibility, and the right, for customers to choose freely the products/services best corresponding to their needs, and the economic partners they want to deal with. * This article frst appeared, with minor differences, in Concurrences, n°3-2012, pp. 55-70. It is reproduced with the authorization of the Publisher. GO TO TABLE OF CONTENTS CHOICE – A NEW STANDARD FOR COMPETITION LAW ANALYSIS? 9 “Freedom of choice”: the emergence of a powerful concept in European competition law This new approach has not been limited to decisions issued by the Commission but has also been adopted by the European courts, i.e., the General Court (GC) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which, within the European Union (EU), have the highest authority to interpret European law, including the rules of competition. The consequence of this development may be the radical transformation of the justi- fcations used by European institutions to explain their decision to intervene, or not, in given cases. This new approach is analyzed in this essay, which is divided into three parts. In Part II, the essay examines cases where the emerging trend appears with the highest clarity. In Part III, it considers whether that trend remains exceptional or whether it can claim some basis in earlier cases and can be established in all the relevant provisions dealing with competition law. In Part IV, the new approach is discussed as regard to its substance. II. An emerging trend 1. Leading case: France Télécom In Europe, the rules of competition are enshrined in the Treaties of the European Union that were concluded by the Member States and that organize the modalities of coex- istence between the Member States. As in the United States, these rules are formulated in general terms—thus permitting interpretation by the European Commission which, in many regards, designs the policy carried out in the name of competition, under the guidance and supervision of the European courts. This situation signals the importance of the case law when it comes to analyzing what competition policy is about in the European Union. Traditionally, this case law is divided into three categories depending on the type of behavior adopted by companies and challenged by authorities. One category concerns monopolization—called “abuse of dominance”
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Twelve Fallacies of the “Neo-Antitrust” Movement
    TWELVE FALLACIES OF THE “NEO-ANTITRUST” MOVEMENT Seth B. Sacher John M. Yun Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University George Mason University Law & Economics Research Paper Series 19-12 This paper is available on the Social Science Research Network at ssrn.com/abstract=3369013 TWELVE FALLACIES OF THE “NEO-ANTITRUST” MOVEMENT Seth B. Sachera and John M. Yunb Antonin Scalia Law School George Mason University May 1, 2019 Abstract Antitrust enforcement is back in the spotlight with advocates from both the political left and the populist political right demanding fundamental competition policy changes. While there are differences among those calling for such changes, several common beliefs generally unite them. This includes a contention that the writings and interpretations of Robert Bork and the Chicago School of economics have led antitrust astray in a manner fundamentally inconsistent with the original intent of the Sherman Act. Further, they are united by a belief that recent empirical, economic studies indicate the economy is becoming overly concentrated, that market power has been increasing dramatically, that performance in many, if not most, markets has been deficient, and that too much profit is going to too few firms. In this article, we identify and detail twelve fallacies of what we call the “neo-antitrust movement” and their associated claims. At the heart of these fallacies is a fundamental misunderstanding of economics and the consumer welfare standard that has been at the heart of competition policy since at least the 1960s. Additionally, there is a heavy reliance on studies that, upon closer scrutiny, do not support the positions of those who cite them.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Introduction
    1 Introduction The Australian Energy Market Agreement (AEMA) establishes a process for the Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC or ‘the Commission’) to assess and provide advice to the Ministerial Council on Energy (MCE) on competition in the retail electricity and natural gas markets of jurisdictions for the purpose of phasing out retail price regulation where effective retail competition is demonstrated (clause 14.11).1 1.1 Revisions to Statement of Approach In response to a request for advice by the MCE, this Statement of Approach sets out the proposed methodology and consultation approach the AEMC will adopt in conducting the retail competition reviews. The AEMC has previously prepared and published versions of the Statement of Approach which have been applied to the retail competition reviews undertaken in Victoria in 2007, South Australia in 2008 and the Australian Capital Territory in 2010. Over time, the MCE, in consultation with the AEMC, has periodically approved revisions and updates to the Statement of Approach to reflect developments and reforms in energy markets and revised timings of the AEMC’s remaining jurisdictional reviews. This latest MCE approved version of the Statement of Approach has been prepared for application to the New South Wales retail competition review in 2012-13. 1.2 Scope The scope of the competition reviews is set out in clauses 14.11(a) and (c) of the AEMA (see Appendix A). According to the AEMA, the aim of the competition reviews is to assess the effectiveness of competition in the electricity and gas retail markets for the purpose of the retention, removal or reintroduction of retail energy price controls.
    [Show full text]
  • Google—Do Not Pass Go, Do Not Collect $200: Why the Tech Giant Is a “Bad” Monopoly
    Hastings Law Journal Volume 71 Issue 3 Article 7 4-2020 Google—Do Not Pass Go, Do Not Collect $200: Why the Tech Giant Is a “Bad” Monopoly Alicia Ginsberg Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Alicia Ginsberg, Google—Do Not Pass Go, Do Not Collect $200: Why the Tech Giant Is a “Bad” Monopoly, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 783 (2020). Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol71/iss3/7 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Notes Google—Do Not Pass Go, Do Not Collect $200: Why the Tech Giant Is a “Bad” Monopoly † ALICIA GINSBERG Congress enacted the Sherman Act in 1890 to promote competition and creativity in the marketplace. The Sherman Act prohibits agreements that restrain trade and lays out rules regarding monopoly power. This Note explores three distinct theories under which Google, one of the most successful technology companies in the world, could be found to have violated the Sherman Act. Specifically, in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, Google “ties” its products together and forces mobile device manufacturers to sign exclusive dealing agreements preventing them from purchasing products from Google’s competitors. Further, Google’s systematic obstruction of competing Android operating systems is a form of anticompetitive conduct in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
    [Show full text]
  • Node.Js As a Networking Tool
    Node.js As a networking tool 28.12.2010 About Contributor Co-founder Felix Geisendörfer node.js driver node-formidable Who are you? Node.js? JavaScript? Port = 80 ? Port != 80 ? Node's goal is to provide an easy way to build scalable network programs. Node.js • Created by Ryan Dahl • Google’s V8 JavaScript engine (no DOM) • Module system, I/O bindings, Common Protocols Network Edition Hello World $ cat hello.js var net = require('net'); net.createServer(function(socket) { socket.write('hello world\n'); socket.end(); }).listen(0x27C3); $ node hello.js & [1] 3591 $ nc localhost 10179 hello world Why JavaScript? 3 Reasons #1 - The good parts V8 (Chrome) SpiderMonkey (Firefox) JavaScriptCore (Safari) #2 - JS Engine Wars Chakra (IE9) Carakan (Opera) #3 - No I/O or Threads Non-blocking I/O Blocking I/O db.query('SELECT A'); console.log('query A done'); db.query('SELECT B'); console.log('query B done'); Time = SUM(A, B) Non-Blocking I/O db.query('SELECT A', function(result) { console.log('query A done'); }); db.query('SELECT B', function(result) { console.log('query B done'); }); Time = MAX(A, B) libev by Marc Lehmann libev • An infinite loop (event loop) • Polls the OS for events (select, epoll, kqueue, ...) • Allows you to register watchers / callbacks for the events you care about Buffers Buffers • Raw C memory allocation • Similar to an array of integers • Can be converted to and from JS strings Buffers buffer.write('Hello Buffer'); buffer.toString('utf-8'); buffer[0] = 23; buffer.slice(10, 20); Reverse Hello World $ cat reverse_hello.js
    [Show full text]
  • Competition Law and Policy & Intellectual Property
    UNCTAD ’s work in the fields of Competition Law and Policy & Intellectual Property 1 Agenda • Part 1: Presentation of UNCTAD ’s work in the field of Competition Law and Policy • Part 2: Presentation of UNCTAD ’s work in the field of Intellectual Property 2 Rationale for UNCTAD ’s work in the field of Competition Law and Policy (1/2) Competition Law and Policy considered as: • important pillar for a thriving market economy , – wherein competitive pressure hones productive efficiency and – stimulates product and process innovation fundamental to international competitiveness and economic growth; • tool for consumer access to a wider range of cheaper and better products ; • means to ensure that benefits from trade liberalisation are passed on to the consumers. 3 Rationale for UNCTAD ’s work in the field of Competition Law and Policy (2/2) Global dimension of conviction of benefits of competition: • In 1980, less than 20 countries had a competition law; • Today, more than 100 countries and regional organisations have adopted a competition law regime; • Competition law and policy have become a matter of interest for many developing countries; • Large number of developing countries have adopted competition laws and policies or are currently in the process of doing so. 4 Basis for UNCTAD's work in the field of Competition Law and Policy Adopted in 1980, the “Set ”: • sets out equitable rules for the control of anti - competitive practices addressed to companies and states; • recognizes the development dimension of competition law and policy;
    [Show full text]
  • Comparative Market Structures in Developing Countries
    380. 141 LI7" M671 No. 75 i"J- _ , Comparative Market Structures In Developing Countries by Marvin Miracle The University of Wisconsin LAND TENURE CENTER Madison, Wisconsin 53706 Comparative Market Structures in Developing Countries. 380.14i Wisconsir Uniro Lard Tenure Center. NTIS M671 Comparative Market Structures in Devel­ j)b oping'hp. Cou;triesoMarvh-7 P. Miracle. 19'0° I-,r /0L6 Bibliographic footnotes. C LTC Repriit -,o, 75. i. Markets. 2. Capital markets. 3. Marketing - Agricultural commodities, I. Miracle, Marvin P. IT. Title. Reprinted from Nebraska Journal of Economics and Business, Vol. 9, No. 4, Autumn 1970. Copyright by the University of Nebraska, 1970 COMPARATIVE MARKET STRUCTURES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES* Marvin Miracle Associate Professor,Departmentof AgriculturalEconomics and Chairman,African Studies Program Universityof Wisconsin Market structures in developing countries arc of interest for a number of reasons. Apart from the possibility that market structure may have an important impact on the rate of economic growth-a possibility that will not be explored here-market structure is of interest because it clearly affects the distribution of income, a subject that is increasingly of interest among those working on the problems of developing countries. It is also of interest because economic theory has its widest applications when per­ fect competition can be assumed. In fact, in absence of evidence to the contrary, something close to perfect competition is nearly always assumed by planners in developing countries. The literature on market structures in developing countries-which are here defined to exclude Communist-bloc countries-is relatively thin, un­ usually widely scattered, and so far has resulted in few insights as to the impact of market structure on the pace and character of economic devel­ opment.
    [Show full text]
  • General Report on the Activities of the European Union Gnrl Report General 2010 Nteatvte Fteerpa No — on the Activities of the European Union 2010
    NA-AD-11-001-EN-C ISSN ISSN 1608-7321 GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION GENERAL GENERAL REPORT 2010 ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION UNION EUROPEAN THE OF ACTIVITIES THE ON — 2010 doi:10.2775/59174 EN EUROPEAN COMMISSION Price (excluding VAT) in Luxembourg: EUR 7 The European Union 0500 km Açores (PT) Reykjavík Ísland Madeira (PT) Canarias (ES) Guadeloupe (FR) Martinique (FR) Suomi Paramaribo Finland Guyane Norge Suriname Réunion (FR) (FR) Helsinki Brasil Helsingfors Oslo Sverige Stockholm Tallinn Rossija Eesti Moskva United Kingdom RƯga Latvija Danmark Baile Átha Cliath Éire København Dublin Lietuva Ireland Vilnius R. Minsk Nederland Belarus' London Qazaqstan Amsterdam Berlin Warszawa België Brussel Polska Bruxelles Deutschland Belgique Kyïv Luxembourg Praha Paris Ukraʀna Luxembourg ýeská republika Slovensko Bratislava Wien Moldova France Schweiz Liechtenstein Budapest Bern Suisse Österreich Chiúinău Svizzera Magyarország Slovenija Ljubljana Zagreb România Hrvatska Sakartvelo Tbilisi Bucureúti Bosna i Beograd Azԥrbaycan San Marino Hercegovina Portugal Monaco Srbija Haʀastan General Report on the Activities of the European Union — 2010 Andorra Sarajevo Ȼɴɥɝɚɪɢɹ Yerevan Crna Priština Bulgaria (Azԥr.) Madrid Gora Lisboa Italia Kosovo ɋɨɮɢɹ Roma Podgorica * UNSCR 1244 Sofia Iran Skopje European Commission España Città del Vaticano Tiranë P.J.R.M. Shqipëria Ankara Directorate-General for Communication Türkiye ǼȜȜȐįĮ Publications Ellada ǹșȒȞĮȚ Athinai Alger 1049 Brussels Souriya Rabat Tunis ȁİȣțȦıȓĮ ȀȪʌȡȠȢ Lefkosia Iraq Lefkosa El Maghreb El Djazâir Valletta Kypros BELGIUM Tounis Malta Kibris Libnan Beyrouth Dimashq Member States of the European Union (2011) The General Report on the Activities of the European Union — 2010 Candidate countries was adopted by the European Commission on 16 February 2011 under reference number SEC(2011) 189.
    [Show full text]
  • Advanced Eu Competition Law, Brussels 2019 What’S New for 2019?
    Comp Delivered by Law Comp 28th Annual Law ADVANCED EU COMPETITION LAW, 25 November 2019 Digital Era Focus Day Or Mergers & Verticals Workshops BRUSSELS 2019 26 & 27 November 2019 Main Conference Days Connect with Europe’s largest competition law Le Plaza Hotel, Brussels community. Get your definitive annual update Knowledge Partner Media Partners and then dig deeper into what matters most to you Supporting Networking Reception Host Networking Lunch Host Sponsor Sponsors Associate Sponsors +44 (0)20 3377 3279 • [email protected] • law.knect365.com/advanced-eu-competition-law-brussels/CMS_LawTax_CMYK_from101.eps ADVANCED EU COMPETITION LAW, BRUSSELS 2019 WHAT’S NEW FOR 2019? 50+ In-house Counsel Speakers From a Variety of Sectors Bringing unique practical insights to the programme Michael Kefi Marceline Tournier Celine Fang Senior Antitrust Counsel EMEA Associate General Counsel EMENA & Global Principal Counsel Antitrust, Uber Head of Antitrust Ethics & Compliance Nestlé Legal Arm Comp Miriam Van Heyningen Catherine Higgs Thomas Gorham Senior Legal Counsel Law Global Head of Competition Law Director & Associate General Counsel Shell International GSK Procter & Gamble Oliver Bethell Romanie Dendooven Saar Dierckens Head of Competition, EMEA Legal & Corporate Affairs Director Senior Counsel Competition Google Anheuser-Busch InBev Siemens 6 Break Out Focus Streams Tailor your experience and dig deeper into what matters most to you Main Conference Day 1, 14:00 - 15:20 Main Conference Day 2, 14:30 - 15:50 Stream 1 Stream 2 Stream 3 Stream 1 Stream 2 Stream 3 VERTICALS & INFO STATE AID & BIG MERGER CARTELS DOMINANCE EXCHANGE ENFORCEMENT DATA CHALLENGES CONTROL & CO-OPERATION & COMPLIANCE 100+ Leading Experts on 40+ Sessions The Commision, NCAs, in-house and external counsel all in one room! This year’s programme is creating more opportunities than ever before for industry experts from all sides to get involved as a speaker.
    [Show full text]
  • The More Economic Approach to European Competition Law
    Conferences on New Political Economy 24 The More Economic Approach to European Competition Law Edited by Dieter Schmidtchen,Max Albert, and Stefan Voigt Mohr Siebeck Manuscripts are to be sent to the editors (see addresses on page 357). We assume that the manuscripts we receive are originals which have not been submitted elsewhere for publication. The editors and the publisher are not liable for loss of or damage to manuscripts which have been submitted. For bibliographical references please use the style found in this volume. ISBN 978-3-16-149414-7 eISBN 978-3-16-156553-3 ISSN 1861-8340 (Conferences on New Political Economy) The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche National- bibliographie; detailed bibliographic data is available in the Internet at http://dnb.d- nb.de. 2007 by Mohr Siebeck,P. O. Box 2040,D-72010 Tübingen. This book may not be reproduced,in whole or in part,in any form (beyond that permitted by copyright law) without the publishers written permission. This applies particularly to reproductions,translations,microfilms and storage and processing in electronic systems. The book was typeset and printed by Konrad Triltsch in Ochsenfurt-Hohestadt on non- aging paper and bound by Großbuchbinderei Spinner in Ottersweier. Contents Dieter Schmidtchen: Introduction ................................. 1 Christian Kirchner: Goals of Antitrust and Competition Law Revisited ........................................................ 7 RogerVan den Bergh: The More Economic Approach and the Pluralist Tradition of European Competition Law (Comment) ..... 27 Wulf-Henning Roth: The “More Economic Approach” and the Rule of Law ................................................. 37 Roland Kirstein: “More” and “Even more Economic Approach” (Comment) ...................................................... 59 Clifford A.
    [Show full text]
  • Effective Competition and Corporate Disclosure A
    EFFECTIVE COMPETITION AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE A CRITICAL STUDY by RAZAHUSSEIN M, DEVJI B. Sc. (Econ)», University of London, 1961 Barrister-at-Law, Honourable Society of Middle Temple, London, 1962 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION In the Faculty of Graduate Studies We accept this thesis as conforming to the required staricTardT THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September, 1968 In presenting this thesis in partial ful• filment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study* I further agree that permission for ex• tensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver 8, B. C. Canada. ABSTRACT Economic activity in the United States and Canada is predominantly performed by corporations. They are by far the largest private employers of workers, the biggest investors and the predominant instrument of production. They are rapidly growing in size, are generating sufficient funds internally to carry out most of their expansion programs, and are diversifying into unrelated activities. Their affairs are increasingly managed by professional executives who have little, if any, stake In the risk capital. The shareholders, who are legally pre• sumed to exercise control over the powers and actions of corporate executives, are normally too numerous and scattered so as not to be in a position to have a significant influence on the policies of the corporations.
    [Show full text]
  • Citations and Herding: Why One Article Makes It and Another Doesn't
    ASSOCIATION FOR CONSUMER RESEARCH Labovitz School of Business & Economics, University of Minnesota Duluth, 11 E. Superior Street, Suite 210, Duluth, MN 55802 Citations and Herding: Why One Article Makes It and Another Doesn’T Simon Quaschning, Ghent University, Belgium Mario Pandelaere, Ghent University, Belgium Iris Vermeir, Ghent University, Belgium The purpose of this paper is to draw a link between citations and the choice overload paradigm and show that herding plays a role in citing behavior. In addition, parallel with an increase in the number of published papers, we observe an increase in the strength of herding in citation. [to cite]: Simon Quaschning, Mario Pandelaere, and Iris Vermeir (2011) ,"Citations and Herding: Why One Article Makes It and Another Doesn’T", in NA - Advances in Consumer Research Volume 38, eds. Darren W. Dahl, Gita V. Johar, and Stijn M.J. van Osselaer, Duluth, MN : Association for Consumer Research. [url]: http://www.acrwebsite.org/volumes/16061/volumes/v38/NA-38 [copyright notice]: This work is copyrighted by The Association for Consumer Research. For permission to copy or use this work in whole or in part, please contact the Copyright Clearance Center at http://www.copyright.com/. Advances in Consumer Research (Volume 38) / 747 Chocarro, Raquel, Monica Cortiñas and Margarita Elorz (2009), “The Impact of Product Category Knowledge on Consumer Use of Extrinsic Cues: A Study Involving Agrifood Products,” Food Quality and Preference, 20(3), 176-86. Hakanen, Ernest. A. (1998), “Counting Down to Number One: The Evolution of the Meaning of Popular Music Charts,” Popular Music, 17(1), 95-111. Iyengar, Sheena.
    [Show full text]
  • Competition: Antitrust Procedures in Abuse of Dominance Article 102 TFEU Cases
    Competition: Antitrust procedures in abuse of dominance Article 102 TFEU cases Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the whether there are any barriers to this; the existence European Union (TFEU) prohibits abusive conduct by of countervailing buyer power; the overall size and companies that have a dominant position on a strength of the company and its resources and the particular market. extent to which it is present at several levels of the supply chain (vertical integration). An Article 102 case dealt with by the European Commission or a national competition authority can What is an abuse? originate either upon receipt of a complaint or through To be in a dominant position is not in itself illegal. A the opening of an own–initiative investigation. dominant company is entitled to compete on the Assessing dominance merits as any other company. However, a dominant company has a special responsibility to ensure that its The Commission's first step in an Article 102 conduct does not distort competition. Examples of investigation is to assess whether the undertaking behaviour that may amount to an abuse include: concerned is dominant or not. requiring that buyers purchase all units of a particular product only from the dominant company (exclusive Defining the relevant market is essential for purchasing); setting prices at a loss-making level assessing dominance, because a dominant position (predation); refusing to supply input indispensable for can only exist on a particular market. Before competition in an ancillary market; charging excessive assessing dominance, the Commission defines the prices. product market and the geographic market.
    [Show full text]