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/) ' i5‘ ‘333 3% i . ‘\i‘ D‘E I‘S V E L O P I.N G A P R O G R E S S I V_E _J E W H H A L A C H A H

f John D. Rayner

HALACHAH is that aspect of Judaism which seeks to answer the question, V'ATTAH YISRAEL, MAH HA—SHEM ELOHEYCHA SHO-EL ME-IMMACH, "And now, 0 Israel, what does the Lord your God require of you?" (Deut. 10:12). It.is an enterprise which presupposes five affirmations:

that HA-SHEM exists, that he is SHO-EL, a God who makes demands, that these fiemands are

addressed to YISRAEL, the Jewish people, that they are knowable, and that they are doable. Each of these propositions TZARICH IYYUN, requires consideration.

God exists. But what do we mean by 'God' and how sure can we be that He exists? Would

He have to be a personal God in order to make demands? If so, what kind of a HALACHAH, if /“ any, is possible on‘tge basis of a naturalistic theology? What, for example, is the status of the MITZVOT in Reconstructionism?

God makes demands. But what kind of demands? Moral or ritual, and what is their inter— relationship and relative importance? Do they cover all aspects of life or are there 'neutral' areas in which it is a matter of indifference to God which of a plurality of options we take?

! God's demands are addressed, in the first instance, to Israel as the People of the

Cévenant. But where does that leave the rest of mankind? Is it satisfactory to regard

them as subject only to SHEVA MITZVOT B‘NEY NOACH, the Seven Noachide Laws?_ If there are other good things in Judaism, should we not wish to share them with non—Jews?

God's demands are knowable, for the question of the Deuteronomist, what does the Lord require of you, is not meant to invite the answer, "Who knows?" But how are they know— ablg? Through what channel of divine revelation or human discdvery or some combination of Ehe two?v And how knowable are they? With certainty or only with more 6r less prob—

ability? . ‘ N

God's demands are Aoable. That, too, is implied, and in another Deuteronomic passage

it is explicitly stated: KI HA-MITZVAH‘HALZOT ASHER ANOCHI M'TZAVV'CHA HA—YOM LO NIFLET

HI MIMM‘CHA, "This commandment which I command you this day is not too hard for you..."

(30:11). The view occasionally expressed by Paul that the Torah was given only to im—

press on us our inability to perform it theréfore stands contradicted by the Torah it— self. But though it is not impossible for human beings to do God's will, it is often

far'from easy. Just how difficult is it, then? How far does it 'stretch' human nature? And do the same requirgménts apply to all or is there a higher standard — MISHNAT CHASIDUT — expected of some?

All these questions deserve to be explored, and different individuals will answer

them differently. Nevertheless, with whatever qualifications, the five<§§fidéfiégfiél“ ’_%;§ affirmations I have stated would surely be endorsed by all who consider themselves re-

ligioué Jews. Therefore, having noted the complications, I hope I can safely assume that we are on common ground, and proceed.

LEO BAEC'K COLLEGE wj\‘ LIBRARY ‘ -2-

THe common ground is what makes possible, and indeed necessary, the halachic enter- prise. But the enterprise itself could, in theory, take various forms. In practice, however, one particular form has dominated Jewish life for so many centuries that we

tend to use the word HALACHAH as being synonymous with it, and to forget that there are other possibilities.

What shall we call the hitherto dominant form? None of the usual terms is wholly satisfactory. If we call.it the Traditional HALACHAH we imply that Progressive Judaism is untraditional. If we call it the Rabbinic HALACHAH we imply that Progressive rabbis

are not rabbis. If we call it the Talmudic HALACHAH we imply that it did not develop

after the talmudic age. If we call it the Orthodox HALACHAH we identify it with a

modern phenomenon — for there is an important sense in which Orthodox Judaism began in

the age of Emancipation - and beg the question whether it is the only legitimate inter-

pretation of the antecedent tradition. Perhaps the term least liable to misunderstand—

ing would be the Pharisaic HALACHAH, since it was the Pharisees who established the ground—rules of the system.

What that system is, and how it works, we all more or less know, and I have described

on other occasions my understanding of it, but so that we may not imfiose on it a definit-

ion, as it were, 'from the outside', let me quote from the writings of Rabbi Dr. Louis Jacobs whose phenomenal and sympathetic 'inside knowledge' of the system no reasonable person would question.

In Principles 9: the Jewish Faith he writes: "Despite the qualifications we have noted, the older View is, on the whole, that of a more or less static body of laws, embracing the whole of life and every aspect of human conduct, dictated by God to Moses on Sinai and handed down from generation to generation. These laws are recorded in the Pentateuch, the 'Written Law', and have their elaboration in the ‘Oral Law', the latter being re-

corded in the Talmudic literature. New enactments and fresh interpretations were, to be

sure, introduced by the great Rabbinic teachers in each generation, but the core of the

teaching found in the later codes of Jewish law, such as the Shulhan 'Arukh, reaches

back to a direct communication by God to Moées at a given date in human history" (p. 290).

And in his latest book, The ~Tree 93 Life, Dr. Jacobs writes: "None of the traditional Halakhists ever dared, or, judging by their writings, ever thought, to take issue with, for them, the basic doctrine upon which the Halakhic structure is reared, namely, the infallibility of Scripture in its rabbinic interpretation and the infallibility of the

Talmudic rabbis as the sole and final arbiters of the Halakhah" (p. 237)

Accepting that as a correct characterisation of the Pharisaic HALAKHAH, we must note that it still dominates the life of large numbers of Jews. But that statement requires one or two qualifications. First, it holds true mainly among the genuinely Orthodox, who are only a minority, though a numerically and qualitatively large and impressive one, of the Jewish people. Secondly, it holds true, even among them, only to the ex— tent to which the HALAKHAH is still operative. It must not, therefore, be thought that 3} -3-

fihey observe all of the TARYAG MITZVOT._ Of the 613, as listed and classified in the

: Encyclopaedia Judaica on the basis of Maimonides' enumeration (Vol. 5, pp. 763—782), 197 rélate to Temple, Sacrifices and Priests, 18 relate to ritual purity, 20 relate

to agriculture, 4 to monarchy, 8 to Nazirites, 14 to slaves. That makes 261 command— ments practically all of which are nowadays inapplicable to practically all Jews. Nor

is that all, since it does not include the civil and criminal law, which might account

' for up to another 100 commandments, because in these areas most Jews are subject to the

jurisdiction of Gentile law. In other words, only about a half of the TARYAG MITZVOT are operative. But with that qualification,_the Pharisaic HALAKHAH does govern the‘ life of a substantial minority of the Jewish people.

Nevertheless, it is a minority. For the majority of Jews the Pharisaic HALAKHAH is no longer decisive, and to many of them it means little or nothing. Why is that? So

far as I know, a scientific historical study of the decline of subservience to Rabbinic Law since the Emancipation has yet to be written. But the main causes are obvious enough. One is the change in the social position of Jews, which has both attenuated their group cohesion and taken away from rabbinic courts such powers of law enforcement as they had previously possessed. Another is the general decline in religious faith.

Without a strong belief in a Divine Lawgiver there is little motivation to submit one-

self to the legislation supposed to emanate from Him. A third factor is the rise of

modern Bible scholarship which, for those aware of it and inclined to accept it, has rendered untenable the Fundamentalist premise of the Pharisaic HALACHAH.

On that subject let me recommend the splendid summary in Dr. Louis Jacobs' discussion of Maimonides' Eighth Principle in his Principles 9£_the Jewish Faith. In The Tree 2: Eigg Dr. Jacobs writes: "The real difference...between the traditional Halakhists and modernists...is on the question of how the Halakhah came to be and how it developed.

The basic question is the historical one, from which the practical consequences all stem. Indeed, the very nbtion that there is a history of the Halakhah and that it developed is anathema to the traditional Halakhist who operates on the massive assumption that

the Torah, both in its written form, the Pentateuch, and in its oral form, as found in the Talmgdic literature, was directly conveyed by God to Moses éither at Sinai or during

the forty years of wandering through the wilderness" (p. 238).

But there is more to be said. As Dr. Jacobs goes on to remark, "Revelation is a matter of faith rather than historical scholarship. Scholarly investigation into the authorship of the biblical books cannot by its nature make any pronouncement on whether the authbr or authors of a biblical book were inspired. What it can do and has succeeded

in’doing is to demolish the idea of verbal inspiration, of God conveying information to

purely passive human recipients" (p. 239).

What, in other words, has been abundantly demonstrated, not only by Dr. Jacobs but by generations of scholars since Abraham Geiger, is the human element in the literature, both biblical and post—biblical, containing the supposedly divine legislation. There is clear evidence of interaction between Judaism and other cultures and of responsiveness _ 4 _

.~to changing conditions and needs. As a result, the former sense of assurance that

‘ traditional Jewish law always and invariably expresses the Divine Will has become

diminished. That is about as far as Dr. Jacobs seems prepared to go in assessing the

consequences of the refutation of Fundamentalism. 25 years ago, in Jewish Values, he

wrote: "The pressing problem for the modern Jew is that he cannot be as sure where the

29323 is to be found as Were the Egggg students of the pre-critical age...The modern believe: though he subscribes to the ancient doctrine of ‘Egggg from Heaven'...recog-

nises the need for a good deal of sustained thinking on what is meant by Egggg, by Heaven, and by 3393!...The serpent, in the book of Genesis, asks Eve: 'Did God really say...?‘ (Gen. 3:1). This is the burning question which torments the modern, religious

Jew" (pp. 23, 25).

In fact, as Progressive Jewish thinkers have been saying for 100 years and more, the situation is much worse. For the Torah includes a number of laws about which many Jews have long felt, not only uncertain whether they are of divine origin, but certain that

they are not. To say that is, of course, to be challenged to give examples, and if one

gives examples one is liable to be accused of being negative about the Torah when, in

reality, one feels mainly positive and even enthusiastic about it. But that risk has to be taken. Let me therefore give just two examples, though they could be multiplied

a hundredfold. Why are there in all probability no Jews, outside the ranks of the strict-

1y Orthodox, who pay the slightest attention to the law of SHA—ATNEZ, forbidding the wearing of garments of mixed wool and flax (Lev. 19:19)? Surely it is because they just don't believe that matters of such triviliaty concern the Creator 6f the Cosmos! And if it be objected that the reason for this commandment is uncertain, not only does that not alter the incredulity of the great majority, but there are other instances in

which the reason is all too plain, all too human and all too ignoble. Take, for example, the prohibition against intermarriage with Ammonites and Moabites, even if they convert

to Judaism or are the descendants of such converts (Deut. 23:4). The motive 13 explicit— ly stated: "Because they did not meet you with bread and water on the way, when you came forth out of Egypt, and because they hired against you Balaam the son of Beer..." The motive, in other words, is vindictiveness of a kind which most modern Jews find themselves

quite unable to attribute to God but feel bound to see, on the contrary, as an affront

to His compassionate character. Admittedly, this particular law became academic nearly 2,000 years ago, but only because it was decided that the descendants of Ammonites and

Moabites were no longer identifiable (Yad. 4:4); and other objectionable laws, such as that of the MAMZER (Deut. 23:3), were.not so annulled.

The trouble, therefore, is not only that modern scholarship tells a different story

from the traditional one regarding the history of the texts, but that a close inspection

of the content of the texts renders impossible, for those who don't feel bound by it as a matter of faith, the traditional view that they always reliably express the Divine Will.

For all these reasons, acceptance of the Pharisaic HALACHAH, at least in the tradition—

al manner, is for many Jews quite simply not an available option. Among them Iqfifi§§__»:9 ‘ "_5_

'include myself; and if the same applies to my audience, we are still on common ground.

What other options do we have, then? One, clearly, is to reject the HALACHAH alto—

gether. According to Dr. Jacobs, such rejection is, broadly speaking, characteristic

of Progressive Judaism. "With varying degrees of emphasis," he writes, "the attitude

of Reform and Liberal Judaism is, on the whole, one of rejection of the Halakhic element in Judaism" (Principles 9: the Jewish Faith, p. 291). He goes on to qualify that remark, admittedly, and speaks of "interesting developments" to the contrary "in recent years“

(ibid.), but his conclusion nevertheless is that "the Halakhah is not considered bind—

ing upon Jews in any authoritative sense according to the Reform interpretation in Judaism" (ibid.). That was written in Prificiples g: the Jewish Faith in 1964, but Dr. Jqpobs' perception of Progressive Judaism does not seem to have changed much. In his

latest book, for instance, he remarks: "There are many religious Jews who see supreme

value in the vocabulary of Jewish worship provided by the Halakhah in all its ramific— ations and for this reason have not the slightest desire to embrace that interpretation

of Reform Judaism in which the Halakhah is relegated to very much a secondary place"

(Egg Eggg g§_gi§g, p. 246).

Is that judgment to be accepted? Certainly there has been much indifference and even

some hostility towards HALACHAH in some Progressive circles. But I believe that Dr. Jacobs underestimates the amount of serious concern with halachic matteFS'there has also

been, and indeed I can't help feeling than his perception of Progressive Judaism owes more to general impressions, including negative §tereotypes, than to direct acquaintance

with the by now extensive literature of Progressive Judaism. I get that feeling, for instance, when I read in Principles 92 the Jewish Faith that "both Réform and Orthodoxy commit what is known as the ‘genetic fallacy'. This is to judge an idea or an instit—

ution by its origin...Reform points to the lowly origin of certain Jewish practices and

draws the conclusion that these are now outdated" (p. 294). Surely most exponents of Progressive Judaism have not been so silly! That is all the more obvious from the

example Dr. Jacobs proceeds to give, which is nothing less than Yom Kippur! When has Progressive Judaism ever played down Yom Kippur because "as the highly developed spirit—

ual institution we know today" it is "very late and certainly post—Mosaic" and because

"even in the Pentateuchal account there are traces of primitive elements" (3239;)? Similarly, in $23 2323 g: Eigg, in what I suppose to be an aLlusion to Progressive Judaism, gfi:;fiiifl§ speaks of an attitude which "draws the conclusion from the new knowledge that

the whole concept of revelation must be discarded" (p. 242). But nobody who is acquaint—

ed with the writings of, amohg scores of like-minded scholars, Claude Montefiore, could

fail to be aware how earnestly they struggled precisely to evolve a doctrine of Reve— lation compatible with the new knowledge. Therefore Dr. Jacobs' evaluation of Pro— gressive Judaism seems to me to stand in need of some revision with the same meticulous- ness and fair-mindedness which he brings to bear on other subjects.

But rejecting, as he does, .the Progressive approach as well as the Fundamentalist

one, what‘does Dr. Jacobs propose? The answer is the 'Middle Way' or 'Third Attitude'

of Conservative Judaism, or rather a 'right—wing‘ form of it which he traces back to ‘; _ 6 _

2échériah Frankel (Principles, p. 296). Here are a few quotations which will indicate

sufficiently what it amounts with an occasional "There . to, comment of mine. are to be

found many Jews today who are convinced that a third way is possible, that one can be

perfectly free to investigate the origins of Jewish observances and come to conclusions

concerning these which are at variance with tradition, without giving up the conceptf‘pf of] the mitzwoth as divine commands" (Principles, p. 292). Comment: 232 MITZVOT? All them? Why? "On this view the mitzwoth are divine commands for me both because they

have come to be such through the long history of my people and because they speak to

my own situation as a human being in need of God" (EEEQL; p. 296). Comment: Al; of them? "The 'middle way' approach is the only one possible for the Jew who refuses to fetter

the spirit of free, unbiased inquiry into origins but who, at the same time, loves Jewish

observance and recognises its tremendous spiritual power" (3219., p. 300). Comment: The 93;¥_way? Is it not possible for Progressive Jews to love and appreciate Jewish observ- ance? "Jewish Law, the Hakkhah, affords scope for diversity, flexibility, and creativity"

(232g, p. 17). Comment: Egg gggg scope? Certainly more than most people realise, as Dr. Jacobs has brilliantly demonstrated in his new book, but enough to meet the challenges of

our time? "The third attitude...which is followed in this book as the nearest to the

truth, is thak what is called for is not an abandonment of the concept of revelation but

its reinterpretation" (EQEQL, p. 242). Comment: Isn't that exactly what Progressive Judaism says? "On this view, it can no longer be denied that there is a human element

in the Bible, that the whole record is coloured by the human beings who put it down in writing, that it contains error as well as etefnal truth, but that it is in this book

or collection of books that God was first revealed to mankind and that here, and in the subsequent rabbinic commentary, including and especially through the Halakhah, He speaks to us today" (EEEQL). Comment: In 2;; of it? How 353 that be if it contains error as well as truth? "The religious appeal to hispory is that, whatever their origins, nish

Observances have come to be the most effective vehicles for the worship of God" (EEEQL, p. 246). Comment: Again we must ask: fig; of them? From my brief comments theLgiI?E:6fijfi§:§éiiigLfifEf:ffiaf1§§9§5]"pfisiggéitfiiiinbéudléar. If the record is human and not free from error, then it seems just too incredible a coincidence that the mistaken view of it as divine should nevertheless have produced, as Dr. Jacobs seems to be saying, lg meilleur g3 tous les mondes possibles, and a close

inspection of the content of the package does not seem to me to confirm it. I do not find, for example, that prayers for the restoration of the Temple and its sacrificial

cult "speak to my own situation as a human being in need of God" or are "the most

effective vehicles for the worship of God." Which is not to say that Dr. Jacobs' position is not wholly to be respected. Considering the immensity of his learning and

the depth of his love for Judaism, it deserves more than respect: it deserves reverence.

Nevertheless, I cannot go along with it, and if the audience finds itself in the same position we are still on common ground.

I cannot, however, view in the same way all manifestations of Conservatism. Espec— ially within the Progressive movement itself it is often nothing more than an4§gfiiétiofif3 of guilt, a yearning for respectability, a hankering after the form rather than the /~V~—‘»\4.-r»—_.tr< ~ M7~.rx.\\, xv”, " K_ V.AL r...~»-«-:,M_f*\- .-\\V 07_“/ 3‘ _ 7 _

,substance of tradition, and a sentimental pietism. I offer two examples out of many.

The 15th benediction of the T'FILLAH begins: ET TZEMACH DAVID AVD‘CHA M'HERAH TATZ—

MIACH, "Speedily cause the offspring of Your servant David t6 flourish." It is a prayer for the restoration of the Davidic monarchy. A Frogressive equivalent would be a prayer for the establishment of God's Kingdom. But the new §9§g§_g§ Prayer,

Volume I, has: MALLE V'YAMEYNU DIVREY DAVID AVDECHA, "Fulfil in our time the words of Your servant David..." Egg; words is neither explained nor obvious. What is obvious

_is that 'the words of David', like the flowers that bloom in the spring, tra-la—la, have nothing to do with the case, and that his name is dragged in only to give the prayer an appearance of traditionality. My second example comes from the recent 'merger' talks, in the course of which it was at one stage suggested, by way of bridging

one of the present differences between the Reform and Liberal movements in this country, that we should agree on a reciprocal GET in Hebrew and English. Rabbi Michael Leigh objected. "The suggestion," he saiq in a written 'Minority Report', "is quite un— acceptable simply because it would not be a Get at all." And that in spite of the fact that the Aramaic GET originated in Babylonia in Amoraic times whereas it is perfectly

clear from the sources that in Tannaitic times a GET written in Hebrew or in any other

language was perfectly acceptabCle (Git. 9:3; Git. 19b). Now it is astonishing enough

that a Progressive movement of the 20th century, whiéh affirms the equal rights of men

and women, should for so many years have gone albng with a unilateral divorce document, but that a Progressive rabbi should insist 2g rigueur on an Aramaic text which was devised in Babylonia in the 4th century for no other purpose than that it should be

understood even by the most ignorant, since Aramaic was their vernacular, betokens a traditionalism gone mad. It is lamentable that such attitudes should have been

allowed to torpedo a historic opportunity, which may never come again, to advance the cause of Progressive Judaism in this country.

It is also regrettable, you may well think, that I should have spent so much time

discussing views which I find unacceptable bef6E§_E§§E§ésto my main topic, which is

the task, as I see it, before Progressive Judaism, but I believe it has been a necessary clearing of the ground in order that we may see clearly what that task entails. And

even now I must ask you to let me stay with Conservatism a little longer, by way of

a transition to my conclusion. For what is happening in the Conservative movement in America may contain one or two object lessons for us. ,fi# 7,” ,/‘~«- ~"- w»_ Conservative Judaism has always tended to beGégg§:éi:32igiéi:ggfit§fs ofapgiggfzvHé same applied to Reform Judaism in Britain until a few years ago. I; fig; hays of Rabbi

Harold Reinhart and Rabbi Werner Van der Zyl, ZICHRONAM LIVEACHAH, it was quite imposs—

ible to find out where it stood on Fundamentalism or any other controversial issue.

Nevertheless it has generally been true in America that what Reform Judaism does today,

Conservatism Judaism does tomorrow. But there has been a time lag. For example, in

the matter of women's rights, the Conservatives have dragged their feet. And now they are paying the penalty, for the Reform movement, which has always been forthright in

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éuchamatters, is steaming ahead, whereas the Conservative movement has come to a stand-

-still or gone inCto reverse. As a result there is now a re—appraisal going on in the

Conservative rabbinate of which I should like to give two instances.

At the 1980 Convention of the Rabbinical Assembly Rabbi Harold S. Kushner gave an 1 address entitled lg the Conservative Movement Halakhic? in which he made the following remarks: "The Conservative movement has owed itself a crisis on the issue of the author-

ity of halakhah virtually since its foundation...Now that the time of growth has yield—

ed to a time of consolidation, the crisis has caught u$\kith us...Conservative Judaism is not halakhic because Conservative Jews are not halakhic, and increasingly even Con-

servative rabbis are not halakhic...My impression is that they feel they have the right to choose what they will do as Jews...All our sermons won't get the genie of permissive—

ness back in to his bottle...The Jewish tradition which was able to adjust, after the

fall of the First Temple, from being a nation-state to being a religious commUnity, which was able to adjust after the fall of the Second Temple from a cult-centéiéafhéljéigfifkb;a mitzvah-centered religion, will now have to adjust to the revolution of the last 200 years which has seen autonomous morality replace the life of obedience and conformance. In 1980, halakhah and halakhic rabbis can condemn, inveigh, persuade, and lament. The one

thing they cannot do is compel and command" (Proceedings, pp. 364—367).

My other illustration comes from the 1983 Cohvention of the Assembly at which Rabbi

Philip Sigal, a former Chairman of its Law and Standards Committee and author of a book entitled Egg Dimensions }g_Judaism, made these refreshingly honest and courageous state— ments: "We yearn for legitimacy. Not seeing ourselves as the true orthodox we feel like

dissenters, and subconsciously accept the stigma attached to us by our detractors...ln our time Eiggfl haolam demands of us that we once and for all espouse absolute, uncon- ditional equality on every level of ethical and ritual halakhah for women. The same —L~ rabbis who allowed a woman to give testimony in the case of agunah would today extend their concern to gittin and to ordination. The question feally resolves itself into whether Judaism is any longer capable of meeting the challenges of the future" (339: ceedings, pp. 95f).

Rabbi Sigal went on to outline some of the 'unfinished business' of the Assembly in which he included "such questions as the nature of sacrament, the status of mixed marriages, the obsolescence of many of our kashrut practices, and biomedical problems arising from contemporary medical science and technology" (EEEQL, p. 97). He then turned to liturgical matters, pleading for the omission of prayers expressing Jewish particularism in an arrogant way, urging revision of the traditional cycle of Torah readings and Haftarot, saying that "certainly the time has come to abolish the EEEEE," hoping that the new Conservative prayerbook would avoid sexist language and be "broader and more inclusive of humanity in prayers for social good and universal peace," reminding his colleagues that in 1967 they had voted "with a clear majority to provide the option in our movement of dropping the second day and aligning our calendar with Israel" but had then compromised on Rosh Hashanah and should now rethink that compromise and realign their holy days with those of the Torah. Here it will be noted that at a time when (:::§ _ 9 _

Afierican Conservative rabbis are advocating the abolition of the Second Day of Rosh

Hashanah, British Reform rabbis are reintroducing it!

Rabbi Sigal continued: "Our halakhah should begin to go in depth into the current problems affecting the ecology, nuclear weapons and toxic wastes. We must declare smoking to be EEEE, prohibited...We must interdict all traffic with nuclear weapons... Our concept of milhemet mitzvah, or what Christiancity calls the 'just war' must now be comprehensively.reexamined" (pp. 98f). He then said: "A question of extreme urgency that we have procrastinated dealing with for too many years is the status of a child born to a Jewish father and a non—Jewish mother," pointed out that the matrilineal principle of the Mishnah in no way related to "the realities of modern society," and maintained that to perpetuate that principle was "to perpetuate a grave injustice". Finally, he maintained that "what we truly need in our Conservative movement...is what social thinkers today refer to as a paradigm shift. The old model of a Dow-Jones

Shul§an ggggg index must be dispensed with...To be religious and to pursue spirituality is not synonymous with pietism, or traditionalism" (pp. 98—101).

I have quoted Rabbi Sigal at length partly because I find what he has to say so interesting in itself and partly because it has provided us, incidentally, with a pretty good agenda for the Progressive Halachah, which is our real subject.

Actually, what we need is three things: an epistemology, a methodology and an agenda.

In the remaining few minutes let me briefly restate my views, which I have discussed more fully on other occasions, regarding all three?

First, then, epistemology, phe theory of knowledge. I believe that the Divine Will is knowable, but not with certainty, as the Pharisaic Halachah supposes, but only with varying degrees of probability. It is knowable because we are created in the Divine

Image, whiéh, if it means anything, means that we have a capacity for recognising re— ligious and moral truth when we see it. Where do we see it? First and foremost in

Scripture. Not because Tradition tells gs that Scripture is inspired but because we can see for ourselves that it is; because there is that in us which responds to its inspired quality. Rabbi Dr. Louis Jacobs, in his Principles 9£_the Jewish Faith, cites from the Yalkut a discussion on the Psalm verse, TORAT HA—SHEM T'MIMAH, M'SHIVAT NAFESH

(19:8), namely whether the Torah restorésthe soul because it is perfect or whether it is perfect because it restores the soulv(pl 300). We Progressives would be inclined to say, rather, that it is perfect £9 Egg extent to which it restores the soul. Therefore Scripture is indeed inspired, and so is the subsequent Pharisaic-Rabbinic tradition.

I would go along with much of what Dr. Jacobs, among others, éé§g Ebofipfififié wilifofwthe Jewish people, as expressed in the development of the Halachah, itself being a vehicle of Divine Revelation. But neither Scripture nor Talmud is inspired throughout. The human element, with its proneness to error, is always and everywhere present. Therefore we cannot ascribe either to the biblical or to the post—biblical literature an absolute authority. At best we can ascribe to it a presumptive authority,xfiééning that, in the absence of a good reason to the contrary, what it€saySVis-to be accepted. But even that _ 10 _

fibrmulation, which I first proposed at a meeting of the Council of Reform and Liberal

I —Rabbis in 1970 (Reform Judaism, ed. Dow Marmur, pp. 122f), now seems to me to require

rephrasing, for there are whole vast areas of Halachah in which there is, as it were,

an all—pervading 'reason to the contrary' because they are predicated on assumptions

unacceptable to us, for instance, regarding the inferior status of women, the hereditary privileges of the priesthood, the desirability of sacrificial worship, the importance

of ritual purity, the defiling effect of menstruation, and the legitimacy in principle of capital and corporal punishment. At any rate, we cannot accord to the classical

literary sources of the Halachah 9933 than a presumptive authority, and therefore what they legislate needs to be weighed against the individual conscience, the needs and con— sensus of the community, and still other considerations, including historical and scient—

ific knowledge as relevant. It is from the interaction of these various considerations that conclusions must be drawn. These conclusions will not have certainty, only a measure

of probability, but since we live in an age in which certainty is unattainable (and I take

that to be the chief characteristic which distinguishes our time from the Middle Ages) that

is the most we can ever hope for.

From this thumb—nail sketch of the epistemology of a Progressive Halachah, the method- ology follows. Clearly what we must do on any given subject is to investigate what the Written and Oral Torah have to say aboutC£§::§H§:EE§§:E§§jV§t§Hit§§:igEESI§E§E§TE§E—inher- preters. That will require scholars who have an adequate knowledge of the literature,

and considerable competence in the handling of it, combined with a sound historical approach; and since we have very few such people at present, we must hope, and perhaps plan, that Leo Baeck College will produce them. But that is only the first stage. The

second stage is to consider whether the motives in question are valid ones, and if so,

whether the laws that were formulated in the past to give expression to these motives

are still the most appropriate and effective means for doing so in the circumstances of

our time. That will require religious and ethical as well as psychological and other

judgments in regard to which it will be important to have contributions from lay people as well as rabbis, and from experts in the relevant disciplines, such as psychology,

sociology, jurisprudence, medicine and so forth. It will therefore be necessary to establish the appropriate machinery for such consultation.

Furthermore, we shall need to consider carefully how the results of such deliberations

are to be presented. In general, it seems to me that we should include in our reports

the sources we have used, the thought—processes which have taken place, and the diversity

of opinions which has manifested itself, if that is the case, and we should always make

it clear that our conclusions are tentative and in principle subject to revision in the

future. Beyond that, we must distinguish three areas. The first is personal observance.

Here, I think, we must 3199 much weight to what Rabbi Kushner says about individual

freedom and autonomy, and recognise that we cannot compel - indeed, should not wish to compel — but only guide. Nevertheless, such guidance is much needed and often requestedJT~ .w‘_ 4;N_/__,~_.\*,WV._WN\ ,,’ i“; A\ and we have a duty to provide it. (E? §;§9_ggqg t9 cultivate the cohcept 6? the M TZVAH,’§ 'p. _ 11 -

' in'the sense of a voluntarily accepted devotional discipline, and the renewed emphasis ‘ 6n that concept in American Reform Judaism (see, e.g., the 'Four Essays on Mitzvah‘ in the CCAR's §§§§§>g§_Mitzvah, 1979) is to be welcomed. Secondly, there is the area of communal observance, both congregational and movemental (if you will allow me to coin that term). Here guidance is not enough. We have to legislate, for communities cannot exist without rules, not even in the age of 'permissiveness' and 'autonomous morality'. All the more let us be sure that we legislate wisely, that we do so as democratically

as possible, and that our rulings always remain open to revision in the light of altered circumstances or fresh thought. The third area is that of social policy. Here we can only exert our influence, as individuals and as communities, on the legislative pro-

cesses of the country in which we enjoy citizenship. But it is both our democratic

right and our religious duty to make a Jewish contribution to the amelioration of

society. In that sense, at least, the Halachah addresses itself not only to Israel.

but, through us, to humanity. TIKKUN OLAM isnot just something God does in the eschatological future; it is something E3 should be doing here and now.

As for the Agenda, I suppose that in the personal sphere we should address ourselves,

as always, to the cultivation of holiness, more difficult than ever to achieve in our

time but also more sorely needed, by whatever Observances are in our judgment most

likely to promote that end. In the communal sphere we should give priority to the

problem of mixed marriages, the statfis of their children, the type of activity which our American colleagues call ‘outreach‘, and the integration of the unmarried. In the

social sphere we need to give our attention to the new problems of medical ethics, the

care of the aged, the prevention of violence and war, the protection of the environ-

ment, and the feeding of the Third World. These are just a few suggestions. _The possibilities are endless. We shall have to be alert to newly urgent issues as they

arise, and use sensibly our scanty resources in the effort to respond to them. If

we produce from time to time, in addition to new liturgies, well—researched articles, pamphlets, monographs and responses to governmental inquifiies, we shall be making our

hontribution to the development.of a Progressive Halachahr

It will not be the same as the Pharisaic Halachah, not even a patched up, revivified or otherwise modified version of it. It will be a different Elgg of Halachah, operat- ing with similar yet significantly different presuppositions, ground-rules, criteria and decision-making processes. But it will address itself to the self—same question,

V'ATTAH YISRAEL, MAH HA—SHEM ELOHEYCHA SHO—EL ME-IMMACH. And if the thought of vent—

uring into uncharted territory is frightening, I have three closing comments to make. (1) The new Halachah will not be £233 different from the old. For it will draw its gfiidance mainly from the Jewish past, and if the Jewish_past contains as much wisdom

as we believe it does, that wisdom will largely shape it. Only those who have little faith in the wisdom of the Jewish past could suppose that nothing but blind allegiance

to it is able to keep us within its sphere of influence. (2) In so far as the new

Halachah will nevertheless be different from the old, let us comfort ourselves with -12-

:thé'thought that even Moses, according to the well—known story in the Talmud (Men. _. 29b), didn't understand what Rabbi Akiva and his disciples were talking about whefi they were

discussing his law! (3) According to another, equally famous talmudic story (BM 59a—b),

when the prophet Elijah was asked how God had reacted to that incident in which Rabbi

Joshua, basing himself on common-sense, had stbod up against the arguments of Rabbi

Eiiezer, even to the extent of dismissing the intervention of a Heavenly Voice, on the

ground that Scripture says, LO BA-SHAMAYIM HI, that the Torah is not in heaven, (Deut.

30:12), Elijah answered: God laughed and said, My children have defeated Me, My child—

ren have defeated Me. So, too, as we develop a new Progressive Halachah, occasionally

at variance with the old Pharisaic one, if we do so L'SHEM SHAMAYIM, for God's sake,

we may humbly hope that He will say of us, 'My children have defeated Me,‘ and smile with approval.

Leo Baeck College 11th Annual Summer Study Week 24th June, 1985