SOVA Inappropriate Enforcement of Anti-Extremist Legislation in Russia
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5/25/2020 Inappropriate Enforcement of Anti-Extremist Legislation in Russia in 2017 / SOVA SOVA Print version. Published on www.sova-center.ru Center for Information and Analysis Original: /en/misuse/reports-analyses/2018/04/d39253/ Inappropriate Enforcement of Anti-Extremist Legislation in Russia in 2017 24 April 2018 Edited by Alexander Verkhovsky SUMMARY CREATION OF REGULATORY ACTS ТHE PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPAL TARGETS OF PERSECUTION : Ideological Opponents of the Authorities : The “Ukrainian Question” : The Fight against Activists of Nationalist Movements in the Subjects of the Federation : Prosecutions for Calls for Extremist Activities and Incitement to Hatred toward Public Officials : Side Effects of the Fight for Tolerance : Abusing Criminalization of Incitement to Hatred : Prosecution for “Rehabilitation of Nazism” : Fight against Insults to the Feelings of Religious Believers : Religious Groups : Hizb ut-Tahrir : Tablighi Jamaat : Followers of Said Nursi : Other Muslims : Jehovah's Witnesses : Scientologists : Falun Gong : Banning Materials of Other Religious Movements : Prosecutions for Extremist Symbols : Sanctions against Libraries : The Internet and Anti-Extremism : General Blocking Practices: Other Sanctions : Mass Media and Anti-Extremism A BIT OF STATISTICS Summary This report presents an analytical review of anti-extremist legislation and its misuse over the past year of 2017. SOVA Center has been publishing these annual reports on a regular basis since the mid-2000s to summarize the results of the monitoring carried out by the organization.[1] In 2017, Russian anti-extremist and anti-terrorist legislation was supplemented with new norms that restricted the rights of offenders convicted under the relevant articles of the Criminal Code. The laws to expand censorship in the field of online dissemination of information were adopted, and new initiatives appeared, which, in the near future, could allow the authorities to establish control over the work of foreign online social networks and search engines in Russia. https://www.sova-center.ru/en/misuse/reports-analyses/2018/04/d39253/?print=1 1/37 5/25/2020 Inappropriate Enforcement of Anti-Extremist Legislation in Russia in 2017 / SOVA We observed no radical changes in anti-extremist law enforcement in 2017 – evidently, they can be expected no earlier than mid-2018. Law enforcement agencies continue to take independent social network activity quite seriously, so activists can be sure that their Internet pages are under constant surveillance. The suppression campaign against criticism of Russia’s actions in the Ukrainian conflict – which, in the preceding years, used to trigger a particularly harsh law enforcement response – gradually began to recede into the background in 2017, giving way to the fight against the “revolution” and the opposition – hence the numerous law enforcement claims against supporters of Vyacheslav Maltsev and Alexei Navalny, as well as independent local activists. In some cases we consider these claims to be justified, in others they are obviously contrived, but, on the whole, the objective is to neutralize political opponents rather than ensure public safety. Law enforcement agencies are still trying to follow the program of enforcing tolerance, which they receive from the top, and, since quantitative indicators obviously play a leading role in assessments of their performance, the number of sentences under Article 282 of the Criminal Code for incitement of hatred on the Internet continues to grow. Cases of inappropriate prosecution under this article are as numerous as ever. The scope of extrajudicial blocking of online materials is growing. Law enforcement authorities continue to initiate criminal cases for insulting the feelings of believers, although the obvious absurdity of such cases gives rise to heated discussion in the society, and, occasionally, even to reconsideration and closing of the cases. Religious organizations and movements not officially classified as “traditional” for Russia face growing persecution. The flagship organization of Jehovah's Witnesses in Russia and all their local communities were banned from any further activities; believers have found themselves under threat of criminal prosecution. A criminal case for creating an extremist community has been opened against five members of the Church of Scientology in St. Petersburg. Other notable trends include a sharp increase in repressions against the followers of the banned Islamic religious movement Tablighi Jamaat and against Muslims studying the legacy of the Turkish theologian Said Nursi; we also observed excessively severe sanctions against supporters of the radical Hizb ut-Tahrir party, which has been recognized as terrorist in Russia, despite the fact that it does not practice violence. The number of people, charged with involvement in these associations, has grown more than 50 percent, and, with increasing frequency, defendants have been sentenced to real prison terms not only for participating in the activities of organizations recognized as terrorist (in this case an offender can face up to 20 years in prison), but also for participating in the activities of organizations recognized as extremist. Throughout the year, both legislative and law enforcement practices in the sphere of combating extremism remained a hotly debated topic. The society faced more and more issues related to the state’s invasion of the sphere of expression. In recent years, Russian citizens have often appealed to the European Court of Human Rights with complaints regarding the decisions by Russian courts that involve anti-extremist and anti-terrorist articles. Many of these appeals were communicated in 2017, and the first decision regarding the application of Article 282 has been issued, but it is unclear whether the position of the ECHR will have any effect on the Russian authorities’ course of action. Creation of Regulatory Acts In 2017, the government continued its prior course on tightening its control over the Internet. New laws in this area are logically consistent with the course on stopping distribution of banned materials online, which worries both Internet industry representatives and the human rights defenders. However, the innovations of 2017 have had little impact on law enforcement practice so far. https://www.sova-center.ru/en/misuse/reports-analyses/2018/04/d39253/?print=1 2/37 5/25/2020 Inappropriate Enforcement of Anti-Extremist Legislation in Russia in 2017 / SOVA In February 2017, the president approved changes to the Code of Administrative Offenses (CAO) that increased the liability of Internet providers for failure to fulfill their obligations to block pages based on information received from Roskomnadzor. A new Article 13.34 was introduced in the Code, establishing their liability in the form of a fine in the amount of three to five thousand rubles for government officials, 10 to 30 thousand rubles for individual entrepreneurs, and 50 to 100 thousand rubles for legal entities.[2] The law banning the use of anonymizers and VPN-services for access to blocked websites in Russia was signed in July and entered into force in November. The Federal Law on Information added a new Article 15.8, which requires such services to implement restrictions against banned materials under threat of sanctions, starting with blocking access to their own sites. At the same time, the regulations regarding the bloggers’ registry and their duties[3] were removed from the Law on Information and the Administrative Code due to their lack of effectiveness. The Article 15.8 has not been used yet, as of late February 2018. The draft legislation that seeks to fine search engines operators for failure to stop providing the links to prohibited sites (5 thousand rubles for citizens, 50 thousand rubles for officials, 500 to 700 thousand rubles for legal entities), introduced in the State Duma simultaneously with the above-described bill, passed the first reading in October; the second reading has not yet taken place. In November, amendments were made (and immediately came into force) to the Laws “On Information” and “On Mass Media” with regard to “foreign agents” media; among their other effects, the amendments created the widest opportunities for blocking Internet resources. They make extrajudicial blocking possible not only with respect to websites that contain calls for extremist activity, riots, or participation in actions without permits, as previously stipulated by Lugovoy’s law, but also of websites that contain materials from “undesirable organizations” as well as “information, allowing to access” to any of the above. The meaning of the phrase “information allowing to access” is not entirely clear. At the very least, it implies hyperlinks to the websites or any publications of “undesirable organizations” or to calls (even extremely dated ones) to participate in non- permitted actions – and such links can be found on numerous websites of all kinds. Probably, a website can also be blocked for posting instructions on obtaining anonymous access to problematic resources via VPN or anonymizers.[4] In mid-July, deputies Sergei Boyarsky and Andrei Alshevskikh (United Russia) introduced in the State Duma a legislative package that imposes on the administration of social networks the responsibility to remove illegal content and proposes million-ruble fines for non-fulfillment of this duty. The idea for one of the initiatives was borrowed from the authors of the notorious German law