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The European Union and Cuba, in the Aftermath of Castro's 'Fall

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The European Union and Cuba, in the Aftermath of Castro's 'Fall Salvador de Madariaga Institute The European Union and Cuba, in the aftermath of Castro’s ‘fall’ -Joaquín Roy Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 4. No. 14 October 2004 This publication is sponsored by the European Commission. The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series is produced by the Jean Monnet Chair of the University of Miami, in cooperation with the Miami European Union Center. These monographic papers address issues relevant to the ongoing European Convention which will conclude in the Spring of 2003. The purpose of this Convention is to submit proposals for a new framework and process of restructuring the European Union. While the European Union has been successful in many areas of integration for over fifty years, the European Union must take more modern challenges and concerns into consideration in an effort to continue to meet its objectives at home and abroad. The main issues of this Convention are Europe’s role in the international community, the concerns of the European citizens, and the impending enlargement process. In order for efficiency and progress to prevail, the institutions and decision-making processes must be revamped without jeopardizing the founding principles of this organization. During the Convention proceedings, the Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Papers will attempt to provide not only concrete information on current Convention issues but also analyze various aspects of and actors involved in this unprecedented event. The following is a list of tentative topics for this series: 1. The challenges of the Convention: the ability to govern a supranational Europe or the return to intergovernmental cooperation? 2. How will the member states figure in the framework of the Convention? 3. The necessity to maintain a community method in a wider Europe. 4. Is it possible for the member states to jeopardize the results of the Convention? 5. The member states against Europe: the pressures on and warnings to the Convention by the European capitals. 6. Is it possible that the Convention will be a failure? The effects on European integration. 7. Similarities and differences between the European Convention and the Philadelphia Convention of 1787. 8. The role of a politically and economically integrated Europe in the governance of the world. 9. How important is European integration to the United States today? 10. The failure of a necessary partnership? Do the United States and the European Union necessarily have to understand each other? Under what conditions? 11. Is it possible to conceive a strategic partnership between the United States, the European Union and Russia? 12. Russia: a member of the European Union? Who would be interested in this association? Miami European Union Center Jean Monnet Chair Staff: University of Miami Joaquín Roy (Director) 1000 Memorial Drive Aimee Kanner (Editor) 101 Ferré Building Roberto Domínguez (Research Assistant) Coral Gables, FL 33124-2231 Nouray Ibryamova (Research Assistant) Phone: 305-284-3266; Fax: 305-284-4406 Markus Thiel (Research Assistant) E-Mail:[email protected] Wendy Grenade (Associate Editor) Web:www.miami.edu/eucenter Eloisa Vladescu (Editorial Assistant) The European Union and Cuba, in the aftermath of Castro’s ‘fall’ Joaquín Roy∗ The Jean Monnet Chair University of Miami Miami, Florida October 2004 ∗ Joaquín Roy (Lic. Law, University of Barcelona, 1966; Ph.D, Georgetown University, 1973), is Jean Monnet Professor of European Integration and Director of the European Union Center. (www.miami.edu/eucenter) of the University of Miami. He is the author of over 200 articles and reviews, 25 books, among them The Reconstruction of Central America: the Role of the European Community (North-South Center, 1991), The Ibero-American Space (U.Miami/University of Lleida, 1996), Cuba, the U.S. and the Helms-Burton Doctrine (University of Florida Press, 2000), Las relaciones exteriores de la Unión Europea (México: UNAM, 2001), and Retos de la integración regional: Europa y América (México: UNAM, 2002). His over 1,200 columns and essays have been appearing in newspapers and magazines in Spain, the United States and Latin America. The European Union and Cuba, in the aftermath of Castro’s ‘fall’ ♣ Background The announcement made by the Spanish government in September of 2004 to sponsor a new approach of the European Union relations with Cuba raised certain expectations and skepticism from seasoned observers, as well as apprehension in circles close to the dissident movement. After much hesitation in correcting one of the most polemical measures taken by the EU on Cuba in recent years, the Spanish embassy decided to invite again the representatives of the Cuban dissident groups to the reception of the 12 of October. However, the highly political content of the speech given by the new Spanish ambassador, advancing that changes were in the making, produced a visible irritation in the dissident movement and the political opposition in Spain. This was apparently a preview of more conflicts to come, in view of the accidental arrival and expulsion of a Spanish member of Congress and director of international relations of the Partido Popular, in the company of two other Dutch deputies. The protest filed by the Netherlands government and the pressure created in the media made the prospects of a reformatted EU policy towards Cuba even more doubtful. Moreover, with the EU machinery barely recovered after this crisis, pondering about the alternatives, the accident suffered by Fidel Castro, with the potential of affecting his decision-making powers, has made the European future measures even more cautious. In any case, the recent and current state of affairs of EU-Cuba relations, with Spain at the center, is wider in scope and details, filled with complex dimensions and actors. A year ago, Fidel Castro dramatically selected the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of his failed attack against the Moncada Barracks in Santiago de Cuba on July 26, 1953, for his rejection of any kind of humanitarian assistance, economic ♣ This paper is a follow-up commentary of an updated, shortened version of a paper presented at the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) meeting held in Las Vegas, Nevada, on October 6-9, 2004. This study reflects updated portions of three successive working papers: “The European Anchoring of Cuba: from Persuasion and Good Intentions to Contradiction and Frustration”. Miami European Union Center/Jean Monnet Chair, Vol. 2, No. 6, May 2002. (http://www.miami.edu/EUCenter/royworkingpaper_cuba.pdf); “A Review of the European Perceptions of Cuba”, Working Paper No. 12, February 2003, ( http://www.miami.edu/nsc/publications/pubs-WP- pdf/12WP.pdf.), “The European Perception of Cuba: from Frustration to Irritation”, Miami European Union Center/Jean Monnet Chair, Vol 3, No 2, August 2003. (http://www.miami.edu/eucenter/royfinal.pdf). Documentary appendixes included in this version apply as a supplement to the present, shortened, and updated format. Research on recent developments has been partially facilitated by grants awarded by the European Commission. A considerable number of Latin American, Caribbean, and European government officials, and EU Commission, Council and Parliament staff members have contributed with details and comments. All of them have elected to remain anonymous. Aimee Kanner and Wendy Grenade have provided partial editing. 1 cooperation, and political dialogue with the EU and its Member States, within the insertion in the benefits of the Africa, Pacific, Caribbean (ACP) group, through the Cotonou Agreement, successor of the Lomé Convention, signaling one of the lowest points in European-Cuban relations.1 Just days before the anniversary of the prelude of the Cuban Revolution, the EU had issued a harsh criticism of the regime’s latest policies and personal insults against some European leaders (notably, Spain’s José María Aznar), in essence freezing all prospects of closer relations. Having survived the end of the Cold War and the perennial U.S. harassment, the Castro regime seemed to have lost its most precious alternative source of international political cooperation, if not economic support. Subtle signals of a rapprochement in 2004 as a result of the change of government in Spain after the March elections and a review of the EU collective attitude had not confirmed a substantial shift in either the European or the Cuban positions, leaving Cuba at the same apparent disadvantageous situation. This serious setback was the result of the harshness of the reprisals against a number of dissidents and the death sentences imposed on three hijackers of a ferry in April 2003. These developments pushed back a series of rapprochement measures maintained by the EU and most of its Member States with the expectation of contributing to facilitate the political transition. In spite of the fact that the Cuban government justified its actions in view of the perceived threat presented by the increased activity of the internal opposition and the backing provided by the U.S. government to the dissidents, the bluntness of the response (disproportionate imprisonment and summary executions by firing squad) was too much to swallow for Brussels. The measures taken by Cuba generated an unprecedented worldwide protest not limited to the usual conservative sectors in the United States and the Cuban exile community. Traditionally tamed governments in Europe made explicit complaints. Important individual backers of the Cuban regime abandoned
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