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When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given e.g. AUTHOR (year of submission) "Full thesis title", University of Southampton, name of the University School or Department, PhD Thesis, pagination http://eprints.soton.ac.uk i ii UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON ABSTRACT FACULTY OF LAW, ARTS & SOCIAL SCIENCES SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES Doctor of Philosophy MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN THE FIRST ENGLISH CIVIL WAR 1642 – 1646 By John Edward Kirkham Ellis This thesis sets out to correct the current widely held perception that military intelligence operations played a minor part in determining the outcome of the English Civil War. In spite of the warnings of Sir Charles Firth and, more recently, Ronald Hutton, many historical assessments of the role played by intelligence-gathering continue to rely upon the pronouncements made by the great Royalist historian Sir Edward Hyde, earl of Clarendon, in his History of the Rebellion. Yet the overwhelming evidence of the contemporary sources shows clearly that intelligence information did, in fact, play a major part in deciding the outcome of the key battles that determined the outcome of the Civil War itself. The present thesis, which is built on a detailed and comprehensive examination of a very wide range of seventeenth century sources, will show the extent to which intelligence-gathering operations developed in both scope and sophistication as the conflict expanded and covered the entire country. It will demonstrate how intelligence information was used to influence the military strategy of each side; and will conclude by showing how the use of intelligence information determined the outcome of the fighting – and hence the war itself. This thesis makes an important contribution to our understanding of the factors which enabled Parliament to defeat the king. It not only challenges the tenaciously held assumption that the intelligence operations conducted during the English Civil War were ineffective and inconsequential, but it also fills in the substantial gap in our understanding of the conduct of the military intelligence operations that were actually conducted during that conflict. The thesis also seeks to demonstrate that the intelligence-gathering expertise developed during the Civil War provided the basis for the intelligence techniques and organisation subsequently used by Thurloe during the Protectorate. iii LIST OF CONTENTS Page Title Page i Abstract ii List of Contents iii List of Maps iv Declaration of Authorship v Acknowledgements vi Chapter 1 – Introduction 1 Chapter 2 – The Historiography of English Civil War Military Intelligence 13 Chapter 3 – The Strategic Direction and Integration of Military Intelligence 41 Chapter 4 – English Civil War Intelligence Sources and their Military Applications 66 Chapter 5 – Establishing the Role of Intelligence – the Edgehill Campaign – 1642 98 Chapter 6 – Intelligence Operations in 1643 – the War Expands 120 Chapter 7 – Intelligence Operations in 1644 – the Tide Turns 150 Chapter 8 – The Triumph of Intelligence Operations – The Naseby Campaign of 1645 181 Chapter 9 – Conclusion 206 Annex A – English Civil War Scoutmasters 221 List of Abbreviations and Bibliography 224 iv LIST OF MAPS Page 1. The Edgehill Campaign – 1642 119 2. Main battlefields of 1643 and the area controlled by the king at the start of that year 149 3. Main battlefields of 1644 and the area controlled by the king at the end of that year 180 v DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP I, John Edward Kirkham Ellis, declare that the thesis entitled: Military Intelligence Operations during the First English Civil War 1642 - 1646 and the work presented in the thesis are both my own, and have been generated by me as the result of my own original research. I confirm that: . this work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research degree at this University; . where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been clearly stated; . where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed; . where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work; . I have acknowledged all main sources of help; . where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have made clear exactly what was done by others and what I have contributed myself; . none of this work has been published before submission. Signed: Date: 12 March 2010 vi Acknowledgements As many people and organisations have assisted me with my research, it is invidious to place them in any particular order. Clearly the team at the University of Southampton have been instrumental as they have guided my first steps in the academic world with an adroit combination of personal understanding and academic expertise. Understandably, I am most especially grateful to Professor Mark Stoyle, not just for his deft hand on the tiller which has been invaluable in introducing me to the traditions and demands of the academic world, but also for his understanding and insight which I have found exceptionally inspiring. I am equally appreciative of the assistance provided so expertly by Nick Graffy and the other staff of the Southampton University library, along with the staffs of the British Library, the Bodleian Library and the National Archives; all of whom handled my requests quickly, cheerfully and efficiently. I am also most grateful to the Southampton University training and administration staff, especially Mary Stubbington, for their advice and assistance. A very special acknowledgement is due to all my fellow PhD students who have been most helpful in guiding my first foray into the academic world. I am particularly grateful to Jennie Cobley who most helpfully answered my many procedural questions and willingly explained the practical aspects of academic life. I am especially grateful to Jo, my wife, not just for drawing up the three maps for this thesis, but also for her patience and understanding as we both settled down into ‘home-working’! The support of my family and friends has been a major factor in my extraordinary enjoyment of the last three years. I am most appreciative of their interest in a subject which was not of their choosing, and am equally grateful for their enthusiasm and encouragement which has been a major motivation for this project. Finally, I owe a special vote of thanks to my former colleague, Phillip Webb, who suggested the idea of studying for a PhD to me in the first place. 1 Chapter One Setting the Scene 1 Introduction The aim of this thesis is to explore the contribution made by military intelligence-gathering operations to the outcome of the English Civil War fought between 1642 and 1646. Whilst much has been written about the Civil War during the past three hundred and fifty years, surprisingly little research has been carried out into the conduct of intelligence operations. Although contemporary accounts of the Civil War have provided an insight into intelligence- gathering,1 it is only recently that research into a few of the Civil War campaigns has begun to explore the impact made by intelligence information upon the conduct and outcome of some of the key battles.2 As this new research has revealed that intelligence information did play a significant role in the outcome of many individual battles, it therefore appears to be an appropriate time to attempt to evaluate the broader impact that intelligence operations had upon the entire conflict. Following an extensive exploration of the contemporary accounts of the fighting, this thesis will challenge the long-held perception that intelligence-gathering during the English Civil War was amateurish and imprecise – and contributed little to the final outcome of the conflict. The claim that military intelligence-gathering was ineffective has often been supported by remarks made in the principal contemporary account of the English Civil War, The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England, written by the Royalist, Sir Edward Hyde, later Earl of Clarendon. The most frequently cited criticism appears in Clarendon’s account of the Edgehill campaign, when he described the intelligence-gathering conducted before the battle in the following terms: ‘the two armies, though they were but twenty miles asunder when they set forth, and both marched the same way, they gave not the least disquiet in ten days’ 1 See, for example, T. May, A Breviary of the History of the Parliament of England (London, 1655), pp. 250-252, 319, and 343-346; J. Sprigge, Anglia Rediviva. England’s Recovery (London, 1647, reprinted Oxford 1854), p. 27; and E. Hyde, The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England, together with an Historical View of the Affairs of Ireland (sixteen books, London, 1703-4), Book VI, p. 79. 2 See, for example, G. Foard, Naseby: The Decisive Battle (Kent, 1995), pp. 154-159 and 202; C. Scott, A. Turton and E. Gruber von Arni Edgehill: The Battle Reinterpreted (Barnsley, 2004), p.5; J. Day, Gloucester and Newbury 1643: The Turning Point of the Civil War (Barnsley, 2007), pp. 142-145 and 217-218; B.