Self Tutorial 7: Role of Predators Versus the Use/Control of Predators: Monday 8H30-9H30 29-30Th October

Self Tutorial 7: Role of Predators versus the use/control of Predators: Monday 8h30-9h30 29-30th October

Videos

"When we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else in the Universe." - John Muir (Noted Preservationist). Contrast this to Conservationist Gifford Pinchot who believed that natural resources should be used for the benefit of humanity - “the greatest good of the greatest number [of people] for the longest time.” (See First Week Lecture).

When wolves were reintroduced to Yellowstone National Park in the United States after being absent nearly 70 years, the most remarkable "trophic cascade" occurred. What is a trophic cascade and how exactly do wolves change rivers? George Monbiot explains in this movie remix. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ysa5OBhXz-Q

When whales were at their historic populations, before their numbers were reduced, it seems that whales might have been responsible for removing tens of millions of tonnes of carbon from the atmosphere every year. Whales change the climate. The return of the great whales, if they are allowed to recover, could be seen as a benign form of geo-engineering. It could undo some of the damage we have done, both to the living systems of the sea, and to the atmosphere. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M18HxXve3CM

Based on the documentary watched in class entitled “Strange Days on Planet Earth - Part 3 of 4 - Predator” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SIXAytRvDQ0&t=1771s

This is a series of videos described as the following:

Around the globe, scientists are racing to solve a series of mysteries. Unsettling transformations are sweeping across the planet, and clue by clue, investigators around the world are assembling a new picture of Earth, discovering ways that seemingly disparate events are connected. Crumbling houses in New Orleans are linked to voracious creatures from southern China. Vanishing forests in Yellowstone are linked to the disappearance of wolves. An asthma epidemic in the Caribbean is linked to dust storms in Africa. Scientists suspect we have entered a time of global change swifter than any human being has ever witnessed. Where are we headed? What can we do to alter this course of events? National Geographic's Strange Days on Planet Earth, premiering in Spring 2005 on PBS, explores these questions. Drawing upon research being generated by a new discipline, Earth System Science (ESS), the series aims to create an innovative type of environmental awareness. By revealing a cause and effect relationship between what we as humans do to the Earth and what that in turn does to our environment and ecosystems, the series creates a new sense of environmental urgency.

It has four parts. Part 3 dealt with predators and their role in ecosystem maintenance.

Summary of the Documentary

Deep in the wilds of Venezuela, the natural order is being turned inside out. Miles of savanna and verdant forest have given way to small, scattered islands with the construction of the controversial dam called lake Guri.

Fig 1. Lake Guri, Venuzuela, with a surface area of 4,250 square kilometres is one of the largest constructed to generate hydro-electricity. The dam has long been the focus of much controversy, because the lake it created forever destroyed thousands of square miles of a forest that was renowned for its biodiversity and rare wildlife, including the only place where the recently discovered Carrizal seedeater (a finch-like tanager) was ever found

Some of these islands are now overrun by bands of howler monkeys, a glut of iguanas and hordes of ravenous ants. What's driving this bizarre transformation? and could it be linked to other mysterious events around the world?

A team of scientists may have the answers. They believe that life on these islands is running amok in large part because the top predators are gone. In fact, in Venezuela and around the world, experts are learning that predators could play a crucial role in structuring entire ecosystems and when the predators disappear, the consequences may be dramatic.

Similarly, the majestic wilderness of Yellowstone National Park is also showing signs of change that some scientists trace to the depletion of natural predators. Familiar and revered forests have vanished. Researchers have recently put forth an amazing hypothesis linking these forest losses to the expulsion of the gray wolf some 70 years ago. Wolves were once a vital part of North American ecosystems before bounty hunters, starting at the turn of the century, decimated their numbers.

A big question for biologists worldwide is what has been the effect of removing large carnivores? In Yellowstone, researchers have looked for answers in the way wolves impact the ecosystem. This impact starts with their kills.

In a lot of ways, a wolf kill is not an ending but a beginning. Every wolf kill becomes an epicenter of animal activity, replete with ravens, magpies, coyotes, bald eagles and grizzly bears that feed on the wolf-kill remains. These kills then become extremely important to the ecological community of Yellowstone. In this way, one wolf kill serves hundreds. Perhaps, even more importantly, by hunting elk in particular, wolves literally may be reshaping the landscape. By keeping elk on the move, researchers say elk spend less time grazing on Yellowstone's aspen and willow trees.

Research suggests that the elimination of Yellowstone's wolves allowed the elk to browse aspens and willows unchecked. Though other factors may have played a role, it seems the disappearance of trees and streamside vegetation can, in fact, be traced to the missing wolves. Now, following the controversial reintroduction of wolves to the environment, where elk are on the run, trees and shrubs are starting to make a comeback.

It's not just on land that predators appear to be crucial. In the Caribbean, once-vibrant coral reefs are under attack by insidious algae. With the reefs suffocating under shaggy layers of algae, scientists are investigating the role that the loss of top predatory fish such as sharks, groupers and jacks have played in the reef's slow demise. As these large fish were decimated by fisheries, smaller fish became the next commercial target – including those vital grazers that kept fast-growing algae in check. With the grazers gone, the algae were free to take over.

In contrast to the above video are the two following papers which are based on the idea that large, charismatic, and predator species represent economic value that can a) support the financing of the conservation and b) support impoverished communities with economic benefits. This is through trophy and sport hunting.

Extracts from Publications

Sport Hunting, Predator Control and Conservation of Large Carnivores

Craig Packer1*, Margaret Kosmala1, Hilary S. Cooley2, Henry Brink3, Lilian Pintea4, David Garshelis5, Gianetta 6 1 1 7 7 8 Purchase , Megan Strauss , Alexandra Swanson , Guy Balme , Luke Hunter , Kristin Nowell 1 Department of Ecology, Evolution and Behavior, University of Minnesota, Saint Paul, Minnesota, United States of America, 2 Wildlife Demographics, Logan, Utah, United States of America, 3 Durrell Institute of Conservation and Ecology, Kent University, Canterbury, Kent, United Kingdom, 4 The Jane Goodall Institute, Arlington, Virginia, United States of America, 5 Minnesota Department of Natural Resources, Grand Rapids, Minnesota, United States of America, 6 The Zambesi Society, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, 7 Panthera, New York, New York, United States of America, 8 Cat Action Treasury, Cape Neddick, Maine, United States of America

Abstract

Sport hunting has provided important economic incentives for conserving large predators since the early 1970s, but wildlife managers also face substantial pressure to reduce depredation.

Sport hunting is an inherently risky strategy for controlling predators as carnivore populations are difficult to monitor and some species show a propensity for infanticide that is exacerbated by removing adult males.

Simulation models predict population declines from even moderate levels of hunting in infanticidal species, and harvest data suggest that African countries and U.S. states with the highest intensity of sport hunting have shown the steepest population declines in African lions and cougars over the past 25 yrs.

Similar effects in African leopards may have been masked by meso-predator release owing to declines in sympatric lion populations, whereas there is no evidence of over-hunting in non-infanticidal populations of American black bears.

Discussion

Mortality from state-sanctioned and illegal predator control likely contributed to the overall population declines of cougars and lions; while leopards are also killed as pests, the leopard’s CITES Appendix I status requires international approval for national export quotas, potentially providing safeguards against overharvest. However, leopard exports have declined in some countries, quotas have risen in others, and concerns have been raised over the level of problem animal off-takes and the management of leopard hunting practices. Further, leopard populations in many areas may have been ‘‘released’’ by large scale declines in lion numbers: lions inflict considerable mortality on leopards; consequently, hunting blocks in Tanzania’s Selous Game Reserve with the highest lion harvest intensities showed the largest increases in leopard harvests (P = 0.0059 after controlling for declines in lion off-takes, n = 45 blocks). Thus the full impact of current trophy hunting practices on leopards may not be fully apparent for several more years.

Harvest policies for infanticidal species such as lions, cougars and leopards that relied on ‘‘constant proportion’’ or ‘‘fixed escapement’’ could help protect populations but require accurate information on population size and recruitment rates, which are virtually impossible to collect; a harvest strategy of ‘‘constant effort’’ can more easily be achieved by measuring catch rates and regulating client days . Hunting efficiency could be reduced by banning or limiting the use of baits and hounds, but the absence of direct oversight in remote hunting areas would make enforcement difficult. Alternatively, the age-minimum harvest strategies illustrated in Fig. 1 could be implemented without risk of over-hunting, assuming that ages can be reliably estimated before the animals are shot rather than afterwards

Unsustainable levels of trophy hunting of lions and cougars appear to be driven by conflicts with humans and livestock: the intensity of lion hunting was highest in countries with the most intensive cattle production, and wildlife managers are under similar pressure from US ranchers to raise cougar off-takes. Thus an even more fundamental challenge for carnivore conservation will be to build community tolerance for predators by reducing the need for retaliatory predator control and by improving benefit sharing from well managed trophy hunting.

Effective conservation of these animals will require new harvest strategies and improved monitoring to counter demands for predator control by livestock producers and local communities.

Figure 1. Average number of adult females in population simulations where all eligible males are removed during a 6-mo hunting season each year for 100 yrs. Colors indicate outcomes for different age minima for trophy males; each line indicates average from 20 runs. A. Population changes for ‘‘social lions’’ follow the assumptions and demographic variables in ref. [1] except to restrict hunting to 6-mo seasons and to incorporate additional details of dispersal, survival and reproduction [44–46]. B. Population changes for a hypothetical lion population where males and females are solitary and each territorial male controls one female. C. Population changes for leopards based on long-term data from Phinda Private Game Reserve [33,47] and other sources [37,48]. D. Population changes for cougars based on demographic data from refs. [27,49–53]. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005941.g001

Figure 2. Domestic offtakes of a) cougars and b) black bears and CITES-reported trophy exports of c) lions and d) leopards. For US states: AK = Alaska, AZ = Arizona, CA = California, CO = Colorado, ID = Idaho, MN = Minnesota, MT = Montana, NM = New Mexico, NV = Nevada, OR = Oregon, UT = Utah, WA = Washington, WY = Wyoming. For CITES data: BW = Botswana, CF = Central African Republic, MZ = Mozambique, NA = Namibia, TZ = Tanzania, ZM = Zambia, ZW = Zimbabwe. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005941.g002

Figure 5. Sample of under-aged male African lions shot by sport hunters in various countries from 2004–2008. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005941.g005

Economic and conservation significance of the trophy hunting industry in sub-Saharan Africa

a,c, b a,c P.A. Lindsey *, P.A. Roulet , S.S. Romanach a Tropical Resource Ecology Programme, University of Zimbabwe, Box 167, Mt. Pleasant, Harare, Zimbabwe b c Universite´ d’Orle´ans, Laboratoire Ermes, Bur. 313, F-45 072 Orle´ans Cedex 02, France Save´ Valley Conservancy, P.O. Box 47, Birchenough Bridge, Zimbabwe

There is a lack of consensus among some conservation NGOs and African governments concerning the acceptability and effectiveness of trophy hunting as a conservation tool. This lack of consensus is due partly to a lack of reliable information on the economic significance and ecological impact of the industry. We provide a review of the scale of the trophy hunting industry, and assess both positive and negative issues relating to hunting and conservation in Africa. Trophy hunting occurs in 23 countries in Africa, with the largest industries occurring in southern Africa and Tanzania, where the industry is expanding. The trophy hunting industry has remained static or is shrinking in Central and West Africa. A minimum of 1,394,000 km2 is used for trophy hunting in sub- Saharan Africa, which exceeds the area encompassed by national parks. Trophy hunting is thus of major importance to conservation in Africa by creating economic incentives for conservation over vast areas, including areas which may be unsuitable for alternative wildlife-based land uses such as photographic ecotourism. However, there are a number of problems associated with the industry which limit conservation benefits. Several of these problems are common to multiple countries, suggesting that if solutions were developed, conservation benefits would accrue over large areas.

Key Points

4.Trophy hunting as a conservation tool

Trophy hunting has a number of characteristics which enable the industry to play a potentially key role in conservation out-side of national parks and where alternative wildlife-based land uses such as photographic ecotourism (tourism based on visitors paying for wildlife viewing opportunities) may not be viable.

4.1. Trophy hunting can be sustainable

Well monitored trophy hunting is inherently self-regulating, because modest off-take is required to ensure high trophy quality and thus marketability of the area in future seasons. Accordingly, off-takes for many species are well below avail-able quotas. On a local level, financial incentives for sustainable hunting are likely to be most effective where the same hunting operators are given tenure over hunting areas for multiple seasons.

Low off-take rates mean that trophy hunting can play a key role in endangered species conservation (even when excessive hunting was the original cause of the conservation problem). Initially, when species are critically endangered, a complete cessation of all human-caused mortality is necessary. Subsequently, however, revenues from tightly regulated trophy hunting can provide important incentives for careful management, protection and re-introductions. On private land in South Africa, for example, trophy hunting has facilitated the recovery of bontebok (Damaliscus dorcas), black wildebeest (Connochaetes gnu) and cape mountain zebra (Equus zebra) by providing financial incentives for re-introductions (Flack, 2003). Similarly, the recovery of southern white rhinoceros populations was accelerated by incentives from trophy hunting, which encouraged re-introductions onto game ranches (Leader-Williams et al., 2005).

Trophy hunting can also play an important role in the rehabilitation of wildlife areas by permitting income generation from wildlife without jeopardizing population growth of trophy species (Bond et al., 2004). For example, trophy hunting operators are playing an important role in facilitating the recovery of wildlife populations in the Coutada hunting areas in Mozambique following the civil war (Lindsey et al., 2006).

4.2. Financial incentives for conservation

Our review highlights the fact that financial incentives from trophy hunting effectively more than double the land area that is used for wildlife conservation, relative to what would be conserved relying on national parks alone. Trophy hunting creates incentives for wildlife and habitat protection under a diversity of scenarios, from state- owned concessions where people are excluded and wildlife is actively protected such as the safari areas in Zimbabwe, areas where local communities live but where wildlife is the primary land use (e.g., Wild-life Management Areas in Tanzania and Botswana), and areas where wildlife is not necessarily the primary land use but where incentives from hunting provide incentives for conservation and the sustainable use of natural resources (e.g., Game Management Areas in Zambia). From a conservation perspective, we believe that the provision of incentives which promote wildlife as a land use is the single most important contribution of the trophy hunting industry.

4.3. Privately owned land

In southern Africa during the 1960s and 1970s, legislative changes granted landowners ownership of wildlife and/or the right to derive income from consumptive utilisation (i.e., utilization involving killing animals), resulting in large scale conversion of livestock ranches to game ranches (Krug, 2001). Trophy hunting has been a key stimulant behind the shift to game ranching and typically forms the entry point into wildlife ranching for former cattle ranchers (Bond et al., 2004). In Zimbabwe, trophy hunting was largely responsible for the conversion of 27,000 km2 of livestock ranches to game ranching (prior to the land redistribution programme) and a subsequent quadrupling of wildlife populations (Bond et al., 2004). In South Africa there are approximately 5000 game ranches and 4000 mixed livestock/game ranches with a population of >1.7 million wild animals (Bond et al., 2004). The con-version of livestock ranches to game ranching in South Africa continues at a rate of 5000 km2 per year (Flack, 2002). In Namibia, the shift to game ranching resulted in an 80% increase in wildlife populations during 1972–1992 (Barnes and De jager, 1996; Bigalke, 2000) and presently 15–25% of ranches are used for wildlife production (Krug, 2001).

4.4. State-owned land

Several African countries have allocated large blocks of land for wildlife utilization in addition to national parks, as game re-serves or wildlife/game management areas (Tables 2 and 3). Trophy hunting is vital in generating revenues for many of these areas, and justifying their existence in the context of increasing human populations and demand for land. Significantly, many of these state-owned concessions occur in countries which otherwise have a relatively small proportion of their land surface devoted to wildlife conservation such as Cameroon, Ethiopia and Mozambique (Tables 2 and 3).

4.5. Communally owned land

Trophy hunting is a key component of community conservation schemes in several countries. In parts of Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia and Tanzania, revenues from trophy hunting have resulted in improved attitudes towards wildlife among local communities, increased involvement of communities in CBNRM programs, requests to have land included in wildlife management projects, and in some cases increasing wildlife populations (Lewis and Alpert, 1997; Child, 2000; Weaver and Skyer, 2003; Baldus and Cauldwell, 2004b; Child, 2005). In Namibia, revenues from trophy hunting have been the primary stimulus for the development of wildlife conservancies on >70,000 km2 of communally owned land (Weaver and Skyer, 2003). In Tanzania, incentives from trophy hunting have been partially responsible for the decision of 50 of 80 villages neighbouring Selous Game Reserve to create Wildlife Management Areas where sustainable wildlife utilization is the primary land use (Baldus and Cauldwell, 2004b). In CAR, partnerships be-tween hunting operators and communities (established through the PDZCV programme) have provided the only in-come from wildlife (US$175,000 during 2003/2004) for local people during times of economic crisis, with the effect that poaching in hunting areas has declined and wildlife now occurs at higher densities in hunting concessions than in the neighbouring national parks (Roulet, 2004a; Renaud, 2005).

4.6. Trophy hunting generates revenues in areas where alternatives such as photographic ecotourism may not be viable

Trophy hunting is viable in several countries that receive few conventional tourists (e.g., CAR, Chad, and Ethiopia), and in remote parts of countries that are popular among tourists.

(e.g., northwest South Africa, and southern Tanzania). In Botswana, 74% of the wildlife estate relies on revenues from consumptive wildlife utilization (Barnes, 2001). Hunting has several advantages over photographic ecotourism which en-able the industry to generate revenues under a wider range of scenarios. For example, trophy hunting is potentially viable in remote areas lacking infrastructure, attractive scenery, or high densities of viewable wildlife (Wilkie and Carpenter, 1999; Lindsey et al., 2006). In addition, the hunting industry is also generally more resilient to political instability than tourism; with the onset of land redistribution in Zimbabwe, for example, tourist occupancy fell by 75%, whereas trophy hunting revenues dropped by only 12.2% (Booth, 2002; Bond et al., 2004).

Trophy hunting revenues are vital in part because there are not enough tourists to generate income for all protected areas. Even in the most visited countries such as South Africa and Tanzania, tourism revenues are typically sufficient to cover the costs of only some of the parks (Baldus, 2005) and certainly not to justify wildlife as a land use outside of protected areas. In countries with large parks networks and relatively little tourism such as Burkina Faso, Central African Republic and Zambia, wildlife may be conserved more effectively if some fully protected areas were designated as multiple use reserves where some trophy hunting is permitted (Baldus, 2005).

Photographic ecotourism undoubtedly generates greater gross revenues than trophy hunting in Africa, and where large numbers of tourists visit, employment opportunities for local people can be higher than from hunting. For example, Tanzanian National Parks receive US$11 million/year from photographic tourism just from the Serengeti and Ngorongoro Conservation Area, whereas the Tanzanian Wildlife Division receives only US$10.5 million/year from hunting throughout Tanzania (Thirgood et al., 2006). However, hunting revenues are significant because they enable wildlife production to be a viable land use across a wider range of land uses than would be possible relying on revenues from photographic ecotourism alone.

4.7. Trophy hunting does not preclude other forms of resource use

In contrast to most national parks, many hunting areas in Africa permit regulated natural resource extraction by local communities in the form of grazing, firewood collection, and in some cases controlled subsistence hunting. The provision of revenues from trophy hunting combined with the retention of sustainable traditional user rights over natural resources has the potential to promote broad acceptance of conservation objectives.

4.8. Trophy hunting generates high revenues from low volumes of hunters

Trophy hunting generates considerably more income per client than ecotourism (Baker, 1997; Lewis and Alpert, 1997) though not necessarily higher gross revenues. In Zimbabwe and Tanzania, for example, revenues generated by hunting clients are respectively 30 and 14 times greater than those generated per photographic client (Chardonnet, 1995). Consequently, hunting revenues can potentially be generated with lower environmental impacts from littering, fossil fuel use and habitat conversion for infrastructure development (Go¨s-sling, 2000; Mayaka et al., 2004).

4.9. Trophy hunting as a tool for problem animal control

There is interest among clients in hunting problem animals (crop raiders or livestock killers) with the effect that trophy hunting has the potential to generate revenues from animals that would have died anyway and potentially to reduce indiscriminate revenge-killings of wildlife by angry local people. Over 50% of clients are willing to pay more or the same as typical trophy fees to hunt problem animals, even if they are poor trophies (Lindsey et al., 2006). Marketing hunts of problem animals may be difficult, however, because hunts are booked in advance and problem animals occur unpredictably in time and space. One option would be state wildlife agencies to auction the sale of problem animal hunts to operators as they occur. Hunting operators with interested clients could then extend their stay or take time out of their schedule to hunt the animal. Caution would clearly be required to ensure that animals are not falsely declared ‘‘problems’’ as an excuse for trophy hunting. Encouragingly, however, problem animal hunts by hunting clients in Zimbabwe have led to a reduction in the number of problem elephants killed (from several hundred to 125/year), due to increasing awareness among communities of their value of wildlife as potential trophies (Child, 2005).

4.10. The presence of trophy hunting operators can reduce illegal hunting

Lease agreements in some countries (e.g., Zambia, ZAWA, 1999; and Baldus and Cauldwell, 2004b) require assistance with anti-poaching from hunting operators in hunting con-cessions. Even where anti-poaching is not a legal pre-requisite, operators often conduct anti-poaching to protect the wildlife resource on which they depend (Hurt and Ravn, 2000). In Save´ Valley Conservancy in south eastern Zimbabwe, for example, revenue from trophy hunting enables hunting operators to employ approximately 150 anti-poaching game scouts. In Zambia, one of the achievements of ADMADE has been the use of hunting revenues to employ 500 village scouts for anti-poaching in Game Management Areas (Lewis and Alpert, 1997).

4.11. Relatively low leakage of revenues

Ecotourism packages are often booked through overseas agents, with the effect that a significant proportion of revenues are lost from host countries. By contrast, our website review indicates that most hunting operators working in Africa are based in Africa (92.6%) and many are based in the countries in which most hunting is conducted (88%). The fact that most hunting operators are based in-country does not necessarily mean that all revenues remain within that country, but available estimates indicate that leakage of revenues from hunting is lower than for photographic ecotourism. In Tanzania, for example, 33% of trophy hunting revenues accrue to the state, compared to 8% of tourism revenues (Baldus and Cauldwell, 2004b). Likewise, 75% of trophy hunting revenues remain within Botswana, compared to 27% of tourism revenues (Botswana Wildlife Management Association, 2001). However, in Central and West Africa, most operators are based in Europe and so significant proportions of revenues are leaked overseas (Roulet, 2004a).

Figure 1. Recent trends in gross annual revenues from trophy hunting in southern and East Africa. Data are derived from: Lewis and Alpert (1997), ZAWA (1999), Leader-Williams (2000), Botswana Wildlife Management Association (2001), Booth (2002), Chardonnet (2002), Van der Merwe (2002), Baldus and Cauldwell (2004), Bond et al. (2004), Professional Hunting Association of South Africa (2006), and Damm (2005a,b).

Figure 2. Recent trends in the number of foreign hunters visiting southern and East Africa. Data are derived from: Lewis and Alpert (1995), Elliott and Mwangi (1998), Hurt and Ravn (2000), Booth (2002), Chardonnet (2002), Van der Merwe (2002), Roulet (2004a), Baldus and Cauldwell (2004), Damm (2005a); Botswana Wildlife Management Association, Personal Communication; Professional Hunting Association of South Africa, Personal Communication.

Table 1. African trophy hunting statistics

a Country Operators # of clients Client Hunting days Revenues/ Animals shot/ Most hunted Jobs from (professional /year nationalities sold/year year (US$ year species hunting hunters) (%) million)

a b a a c a a a South Africa 1000 (2000) 8530 USA 57 Spain 8 73,938 100 53,885 Impala Warthog 5–6000 Germany 5 Kudu

a a a a a a a b Namibia ? (505) 5363 Germany 35 15,540 28.5 22,462 Gemsbok Kudu 2125 USA 21 Austria 8 Warthog a b a b a a c c d Tanzania 42 (221) 1,654 USA 45 Spain 20,500 27.6 7034 Buffalo Impala 4328 15 France 9 Zebra

d Impala Lechwe d a b b c d d e Botswana 13 (?) 350 USA 80 EU 12 5570 20 2500 Steenbok 1000 a b a a a a a a Zimbabwe 149 (545) 1874 USA 57 19,646 16 11,318 Impala Kudu ? Germany 9 Warthog Spain 6 d a b c b Zambia 22 (?) 250 ? ? 5 5436 ? ?

a b a a b b Cameroon 23 (47) 150–200 France (most) ? 2 960 ? 1200

CAR 19 (41) 100–200 France (most) ? 1.4 738 ? 1700 a b c d d Ethiopia 4 (15) 50–55 USA Denmark ? 1.3 ? Dik dik spp. ? Germany Lesser kudu d Bushbuck a c b a Burkina Faso ? (?) 250–350 EU (most) ? 0.6 994 ? ?

a b Benin ? (?) 80–100 EU (most) ? ? ? ? ? b Chad 8 (?) 50–100 EU (most) ? ? ? ? ? DRC 3 (?) ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Congo Brazzaville 1 (2) ? ? ? ? ? ? ?

a No estimates are available for Mozambique, or nations in Central and West Africa other than those listed.

b Professional Hunting Association of South Africa.

c Savannas Forever (a non-governmental organisation working on certification of hunting in Tanzania, contact person – Susan James).

d An unknown, but small number of additional operators also hunt on private land in Botswana and Zambia.

e Botswana Wildlife Management Association.

f Ethiopian Rift Valley Safaris.

5. Factors limiting the conservation role of trophy hunting

5.1. Private land

In Namibia, Botswana and South Africa, game ranches are re-quired by law to have perimeter game fencing (Bothma, 2002; Nuding, 2002), with the effect that natural wildlife migrations have been interrupted in some areas (Booth, 2005). In South Africa particularly, fenced ranches are small (8.2–49.2 km2) and often over stocked, resulting in ecological degradation (Bond et al., 2004; Patterson and Khosa, 2005). Ranchers with fenced properties often persecute ‘non- huntable’ predators such as wild dogs Lycaon pictus or cheetahs Acinonyx jubatus that they perceive to compete for potential trophies (Lindsey et al., 2005). Exotic species are frequently introduced onto game ranches to increase the diversity of saleable trophies (e.g., fallow deer Dama dama and lechwe Kobus leche in South Africa, black wildebeest and blesbok Damaliscus dorcas philippsi in Namibia) (Hamman et al., 2003; Lindsey, 2005). In some cases, ranchers purposefully hybridize closely related species (e.g., black and blue wildebeest Connochaetes taurinus) to offer unique trophy ‘species’ such as ‘red wildebeest’, or manipulate genetics to offer prized aberrant varieties such as white or black springbok (Antidorcas marsupialis) (Hamman et al., 2003).

There are also ethical issues associated with trophy hunting on some game ranches. These issues generally have relatively little relevance to conservation per se, but negatively impact public perception of trophy hunting as a conservation tool. These activities include shooting from vehicles; shooting female animals or young animals; luring animals from parks; using baits and spotlights; hunting leopards with dogs; put-and-take hunting (the practice of releasing trophies immediately prior to the onset of a hunt); and ‘canned hunting’ (the practice of shooting animals in small enclosures in which they have no chance of escaping the hunter). An estimated 80–90% of the lions hunted in South Africa for example, are believed to be canned (Damm, 2005a; Patterson and Khosa, 2005). Canned lion hunting is contentious and we believe that for trophy hunting to achieve wider acceptance as a valid conservation tool, such practices should be eradicated. Encourag-ingly, a panel of experts reporting to the South African Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism recently recommended that canned hunting and put and take hunting be prohibited in South Africa (SADET, 2005).

5.2. State and communally owned land

Despite some successes, local communities living in or near wildlife rarely benefit adequately from trophy hunting activities. We believe that the inequitable distribution of hunting revenues represents the most serious threat to the long term sustainability of the industry. Reasons for this inequity include; inadequate legislation enforcing community involvement, failure of national governments to devolve wildlife ownership to communities, and the lack of skills among communities required for them to run hunting operations or negotiate improved terms with operators (Lewis and Alpert, 1997; Murombedzi, 1999; Mayaka et al., 2004; Mbwaia, 2004; Child, 2005). In Botswana, for example, benefits accruing to communities are limited by a lack of marketing and management skills among communities, by inappropriate distribution of hunting revenues and through over-reliance on foreign hunting operators and donor agencies (Mbwaia, 2004). In Cameroon, <3% of trophy hunting revenues accrue to local communities, most of which are received by a small proportion of the population, with the effect that local people have negative attitudes towards conservation and trophy hunting (Mayaka, 2002; Mayaka et al., 2004). In Zambia, communities do not own wildlife occurring in Game Management Areas in which they live, and thus receive only 12% of hunting revenues (Lewis and Alpert, 1997). In Tanzania, most of the 25% of hunting revenues required by law to accrue to communities living in or adjacent to hunting areas reach only as far down as local council level, resulting in distrust of the government and resentment that hunting rights are reserved for foreigners (Nshala, 1999).

5.3. Quota setting, over shooting, undershooting

Most state wildlife departments lack the resources to census wildlife populations regularly and quotas are often based on guesswork (Caro et al., 1998a). In some areas, aerial censuses are done, but do not provide accurate estimates for small species or carnivores, are unsuitable for establishing quotas for blocks smaller than the home ranges of large species, and often do not involve consultation with local people (Taylor, 2001). Unsurprisingly therefore, quotas for some species are clearly inappropriate in parts of Africa. In Tanzania, species with patchy or limited distributions (e.g., sitatunga Tragelaphus spekei, puku Kobus vardoni, kudu Tragelaphus spp.) should be hunted more conservatively (Caro et al., 1998a), and in southeastern Cameroon, the current off-takes of bongo may be unsustainable (Elkan, 1994; Roulet, 2004a). In Zimbabwe, Grobbelaar and Masulani (2003) suggest that quotas for buffalo and elephant should be reduced to address declining trophy quality, and Loveridge and Macdonald (2002) have suggested that lion quotas should be reduced.

The value of wildlife as trophies creates pressure for the issuance of large and increasing quotas; in Tanzania during the 1990s, for example, hunting areas were split and the original hunting quotas retained for each portion (Baldus and Cauldwell, 2004b). Furthermore, state wildlife departments typically lack resources to enforce existing quotas. In Tanzania, for example, the Director of Wildlife recently issued a plea to hunting operators to respect quotas in light of wide-spread overshooting (Tanzanian Development Partners Group, 2006). In contrast, in parts of Zambia quotas are under utilised, reducing revenues from hunting and reducing incentives for conservation (ZAWA, 1999)

5.4. Allocating hunting areas

There are problems associated with the process of leasing hunting concessions in some countries with implications for conservation in those areas. In Tanzania, for example, concession areas are not leased on simple market principles; decisions rely on the discretion of a few individuals, resulting in reduced income for the state, nepotism, abuse of authority and corruption (Nshala, 1999). Tanzanian hunting areas are also often under-sold, with the effect that hunting blocks are sub-leased at up to 20 times their original price, resulting in a loss of income for the state (Baldus and Caul-dwell, 2004b).

The required contributions of concession area leaseholders to anti-poaching and community development are often vague and poorly enforced (e.g., Zambia, ZAWA, 1999; Baldus and Cauldwell, 2004b). In addition, the anti-poaching efforts of some operators cease at the end of the hunting season leaving a significant period with little or no protection for wildlife (Caro et al., 1998b). Finally, in some instances, leases for concession areas are too short with no guarantee of re-newal, reducing the willingness of operators to invest in anti-poaching, wildlife management or community relations (e.g., Mayaka et al., 2004).

5.5. Corruption

Corruption affects the trophy hunting industry in Africa at multiple levels, from government scouts who overlook the overshooting of quotas, to government ministers favouring certain operators when granting concessions (Lewis and Jack- son, 2005).

Duckworth (2004b) for example, suggests that corruption is one of the key problems facing trophy hunting in Ethiopia, and alleges that the Ethiopian Professional Hunting Association is used for the sole benefit of the president, to the detriment of other operators.

5.6. Competition with citizen hunting

In some countries, urban citizens are provided with sizeable hunting quotas at greatly subsidised prices, reducing the number of high value trophies that can be sold to foreign trophy hunters, thus reducing incentives for communities to protect wildlife (e.g., Botswana, Botswana Wildlife Management Association, 2001; Baldus and Cauldwell, 2004b; Zambia, ZAWA, 1999). Furthermore, citizen hunting is often poorly supervised and abused (Baldus and Cauldwell, 2004b).

5.7. CITES limitations

In some countries, CITES restrictions on trophy exports impose limitations on revenues from trophy hunting and thus incentives for conservation. In West Africa, for example, several species of key importance for marketing hunting are not on quota (Table 4), which severely limits hunting revenues. Elephant numbers are increasing in Burkina Faso, and legalized hunting of the species would make the country a more attractive hunting destination and permit the derivation of increased revenues from both from trophy fees and from the marketing of longer 15–21 day hunts (Damm, 2004). Elephants hunted in Cameroon are not importable into the US, with the effect that hunting operators routinely fail to utilize elephant quotas, limiting revenues from trophy hunting (Wilkie and Carpenter, 1999).

5.8. Failure to maximize revenues

In Central Africa, trophy fees and daily rates are under priced relative to other parts of Africa limiting incentives for conser-vation among local people (Wilkie and Carpenter, 1999; Roulet, 2004a). Similarly, daily rates and trophy fees have remained largely static in Zimbabwe during the last decade, and growth in the hunting industry has relied on increasing numbers of hunts and thus increased off-take rates (Booth, 2002; Booth, 2005).

5.9. Hunting bans reducing consumer confidence

In Botswana, the recent ban on lion hunting cost the trophy hunting industry 10% of total revenues (US$1.26 million), and adversely affected community conservation efforts (Peake, 2004b). Likewise, the 2001–2003 ban on trophy hunting in Zambia resulted in an upsurge in poaching due to the removal of incentives for conservation (Lewis and Jackson, 2005). Hunting bans also reduce consumer confidence in affected countries as hunting destinations (Peake, 2004b; Lewis and Jackson, 2005).

5.10. Inadequate regulation of the hunting industry

In some countries in West and Central Africa, and particularly in Cameroon, there is a lack of professionalism among trophy hunting operators due to a lack of formal training, and because concession areas are allocated through a non- transparent procedure which permits hunting by amateur operators (Mayaka et al., 2004). In most countries, operators are not obliged to belong to professional hunting associations or to comply with their standards, making disciplining errant operators difficult (e.g., Zambia, ZAWA, 1999; Booth, 2005). Regulating hunting operators in vast, remote hunting concessions is difficult, particularly given the lack of re-sources of most African state wildlife departments.

6. Potential solutions to problems affecting the trophy hunting industry

Research into the economic and ecological impacts of trophy hunting in Africa is urgently required. Detailed in-country studies are needed for each nation in which hunting occurs to permit improved assessment of the conservation role of hunting, diagnosis of problems, and the prescription of appropriate, site-specific solutions. For West and Central Africa, investigation into how hunting revenues might be increased is required. For countries where trophy hunting presently does not occur, such as Kenya, in-country assessments of the potential financial gains and conservation positives and negatives would provide a useful basis from which to decide whether to legalise trophy hunting, without relying on input from hunters or northern based animal welfare group.

Improved monitoring of wildlife populations is necessary to ensure that quotas are sustainable. Where trophy hunting occurs on communal land, simple, repeatable techniques should be used for censuses, and communities should be involved to develop a sense of responsibility for resource management (Taylor, 2001). Greater use should be made of indices such as trophy quality and catch effort to provide a simple and cheap means of determining whether quota sizes are sustainable.

Some of the problems associated with the trophy hunting industry could be addressed by improved enforcement of existing legislation. Improved enforcement could be conducted by state wildlife agencies or by an independent body. We suggest that hunting operators should be forced to belong to state-approved national hunting associations (with representation from mainstream conservation organisations) with the power to remove or suspend hunting licenses in the event of non compliance to hunting legislation. Annual member-ship levies would be used by the hunting association to monitor compliance to hunting quotas, minimum trophy sizes, use of qualified staff, and contributions to local communities and anti-poaching efforts.

New legislation is also required to tackle some problems associated with trophy hunting. For example, ownership of wildlife should be devolved to communities to permit direct receipt of benefits from hunting and thus create clear incentives for sustainable wildlife management. The provision of ownership of wildlife to private landowners had a rapid and major positive impact on wildlife conservation (Bond et al., 2004). The retention of state-ownership over wildlife in communally owned areas presently constitutes a major barrier to effective wildlife conservation over huge areas. The process of allocating hunting concessions should be made transparent, and based solely on market principles. Concession agreements should include unambiguous and significant mini-mum contributions to anti-poaching and community development which are subsequently enforced.

Incentives for improved conservation performance by hunting operators should be introduced. One suggestion is the development of a certification system, whereby hunting operators are rated in terms of their commitment to conservation, community development and hunting ethics (Lewis and Jackson, 2005; Packer, 2005; Lindsey et al., 2006). Most hunting clients are concerned that their hunt is conducted in a ‘conservation-friendly’ manner and would likely select for certified hunting operators (Lindsey et al., 2006). Certification should thus provide an incentive for operators to conduct hunts in a manner more conducive to conservation.

7. Conclusion

Trophy hunting is a major industry in parts of Africa, creating incentives for wildlife conservation over vast areas which otherwise might be used for alternative and less conservation friendly land uses. The trophy hunting industry is increasing in size in southern Africa and Tanzania, and the scope for the industry play a role in conservation should increase accordingly. Presently, however, the conservation role of hunting is limited by a series of problems. Several of these problems are common to multiple countries, and some (such as failure to allocate sufficient benefits to communities, leakage of income and corruption) also affect the photographic ecotourism industry (Christie and Crompton, 2001; Walpole and Thouless, 2005). Developing solutions should thus be a key priority for conservationists, and success would confer large-scale benefits for conservation.

Now we get to the case of South Africa’s canned hunting

In class we will watch

Special Assignment: The Con in Conservation - part 1

SABC Digital News Published on 5 Aug 2013

In this episode we investigate the so-called "green con", where volunteers are paying exorbitant amounts to come to South Africa to hand raise lion cubs under the impression that they are doing it for conservation. Activists allege that most of these cubs end up in a "canned" hunt or as breeding robots for farms.

We also focus on the alleged abuse of the permit system for the breeding and hunting of lion and ask whether the country needs to have standardised regulations across all provinces. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hav-1GuVcWQ

Special Assignment: The Con in conservation - part 2 (watch in your own time)

SABC Digital News Published on 6 Aug 2013

Part 2 looks at the lion bone trade which has grown hugely over the past few years. Many people know about how the rhino is being poached for its horn, which is used in traditional medicines in Asia, but few know that lion bones are also being used as a replacement for tiger bones in tiger bone wine in Asia, since the tiger numbers have plummeted so drastically. There are concerns that the trade, which is now just a by-product of the hunt, will eventually spill over into wild lion populations. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2G3HX4Qq_84

The Economics of Captive Predator Breeding in South Africa By Ross Harvey, South African Institute of International Affairs - August 2018

Executive Summary

In July 2018, without public consultation or scientific substantiation, South Africa’s Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) raised its annual lion skeleton export quota to 1,500, up from 800 the year before. These skeletons are supplied by the predator breeding industry, which breeds lions in captivity for multiple and sometimes overlapping purposes.

This is a report in two parts.

The first is a formal academic review of the scientific and ‘grey’ (reports and newspaper articles) literature pertaining to the predator breeding industry. It interrogates the most recent attempt to quantify the economic significance of the industry and finds its conclusions questionable for a number of reasons. One of its claims, for instance, is that the predator breeding industry provides positive conservation value. The review examines this claim against the available literature and finds it dubitable. Even if the conservation impact was neutral, it is not clear that the genetic impairment and welfare problems justify the continuation of the industry, even under the banner of ‘sustainable utilisation’ and the ‘wildlife economy’ doctrine. This is especially important if the theoretical possibility of future adverse conservation consequences is strong. Finally, it examines the dynamics of the lion bone trade and questions whether predator breeding can satisfy demand for tiger and lion derivative parts in East-Southeast Asia. If, as it seems, legal bone exports provide a laundering channel to feed the illicit wildlife trade, South African authorities are well advised to reconsider their current position and instead set the export quota to zero.

The second part of the report provides a framework for assessing the claims – made by the predator breeding industry – of economic significance and positive conservation value. The literature is relatively clear that these claims do not correspond to reality, but no work yet exists in the public domain that tentatively quantifies the costs and benefits of the industry. The word ‘tentatively’ is used because the next steps required are a full forensic audit of the industry and a more rigorous cost-benefit analysis using the most appropriate scientific methods. Neither of these research propositions can be fulfilled without a full dataset of the industry and its revenue flows. This report aims to provide a foundation on which future work can be built. In doing so, it provides more data than existing work to date. From that data, it demonstrates that current efforts to quantify the economic significance of the predator breeding industry are inadequate and likely misleading. For instance, jobs currently undertaken by volunteer tourists crowd out local labour participation. One major finding, for instance, is that potentially as many as 84 full time jobs that would otherwise be available to local job-seekers are currently undertaken by volunteer tourists who falsely believe that they are contributing to conservation. The report also demonstrates that the industry in its current form has no conservation value. To market it in that way is therefore disingenuous. In summary, the opportunity costs and negative externalities of the captive predator breeding industry in South Africa warrant substantive public policy reform and highlight the urgent need for more well-informed regulation.

Read full report: Harvey_Final Report – Captive predator Industry

Sheree Bega

Premier Helen Zille’s DA-controlled government and CapeNature have come under fire for a controversial draft proposal that gives farmers and landowners in the Western Cape a licence to “massacre” black-backed jackal, caracal and bushpig.

The Landmark Foundation, a conservation NGO, says the conservation agency’s draft protocol with the Predator Management Forum is “nothing less than a global indigenous species extermination effort” and accused Zille’s government of gross maladministration.

CapeNature said the proposed protocol proposes best management practices for dealing with animals that cause livestock damage, a “400-year-old problem” in the Western Cape. “The underlying principle is to implement holistic management methods. Only after all holistic and non-lethal management tools have failed, will an individual damage-causing animal be targeted, and not the species as a whole.”

But Dr Bool Smuts, who runs the foundation, said the approval of poison collars, uncontrolled cage traps, daytime hunting and the use of prohibited gin traps, hunting dogs and helicopter hunts considered in the proposal “flies in the face of the principles the agreement ambiguously espouses”.

Smuts said the protocol would allow the return of hunt clubs, hot pursuit actions and “indiscriminate barbaric culls, much like the Oranje jag of old”. The methods approved would, “by virtue of their non-selective, barbaric and ecologically damaging nature, kill off non-target species and target entire species for decimation.

“The system promoted is nothing less than a province-wide extermination cull of several species.”

CapeNature said it had received 70 public comments for the “Co-Operative Agreement between the Predator Management Forum and CapeNature: guidelines for the management of bushpig, black-backed jackal and caracal responsible for agricultural losses within the boundaries of the Western Cape”. Public comment closed this week. Among these were from Dereck Joubert of the National Geographic Big Cats Initiative and an Emmy-award winning wildlife documentary maker, who said he was disturbed by the proposal.

“It seems to me you’re opening up an avenue for a wave of very active sport hunting against smaller predators in large numbers that will end in the eventual annihilation of these species. I have no doubt that what you are starting today will be the end of any natural and balanced ecosystem in your region.”

Smuts said Cape Nature and the DA administration had handed over the management of the Western Cape’s biodiversity to an industry lobby group with an “atrocious record” in biodiversity management and this amounted to “biological asset stripping” of our natural heritage.

“Even as late as April, only sweetheart organisations have been included in any discussions with DA-run institutions. The Premier even appointed a sweetheart forum to advise her on welfare issues, actively excluding critical stakeholders.”

Recently, Smuts and Zille were embroiled in a public spat over what Smuts dubbed the “Bredell cull” when CapeNature issued over 480 permits for landowners to kill damage-causing jackal and caracal. Each landowner was granted a licence to kill 10 animals a day – five caracal and five jackals – for six months, which Smuts described as the authorisation of the largest cull of biodiversity in Africa with close to 900 000 animals “permitted for destruction” last year alone.

Zille accused Smuts of being “highly inventive”, while he called her “arrogant”.

CapeNature says Smuts’ figures are fictitious and exaggerated. But Smuts added: “What is being proposed here is a further grand-scale wiping out of some natural occurring species, while the management and execution is being outsourced to the agricultural lobby groups.”

Harry Prinsloo of the Predator Management Forum said the issue was emotional.

“I represent 20 000 farmers. We live with nature. Why on earth does anybody think we’ll be part of a massacre? Let’s rather talk of controlling the numbers.

“We are trying to make a living. We have a big problem with predation and these animals cause millions in damage. Yes, some of the methods are of a cruel manner by shooting something, or gin traps, but sometimes it’s necessary. Jackal and caracal are beautiful animals, but sometimes you have to take uncomfortable decisions.”

UK Government: Huge increase in badger cull will see up to 42,000 shot

Ministers expand England’s culling area by 70% to try to curb TB in cattle as scientists dispute programme’s effectiveness.

The controversial badger cull in England has been hugely expanded into 10 new areas, with up to 42,000 animals now due to be shot in an attempt to curb tuberculosis in cattle, up from 32,500 last year.

The farming minister George Eustice claimed the cull is starting to show results in Gloucestershire and Somerset, with drops in tuberculosis incidence, but did not highlight a rise seen in Dorset.

Scientists say a lack of statistical analysis in government documents means there remains no concrete evidence that the cull is working. The Badger Trust condemned the expanded cull as “largest destruction of a protected species in living memory”.

The 10 new cull zones are in Cornwall Devon, Somerset, Gloucestershire and Staffordshire, and represent a near 70% rise in the area affected. A separate new zone has also been approved in Cumbria, which is in the low-risk part of England for the disease. Cull zones now cover vast swathes of many counties: 68% of Devon, 63% of Dorset and 54% of Cornwall.

Ministers and many farmers argue the badger cull is a vital part of curbing bovine tuberculosis (bTB), which led to 33,000 cattle being slaughtered in England in 2017 at a cost of £100m. The government is offering £700,000 over four years to help groups vaccinate badgers, although it spent £6.6m on culling in 2017 alone and the total culling cost to date is estimated at about £40m.

Scientists say culling could actually spread the disease even further by disrupting badger populations. They say a more rigorous testing regime and further restrictions on the movement of at-risk cattle, along with badger vaccination, are the key to ending the epidemic.

“Bovine TB remains one of the greatest animal health threats to the UK,” said Eustice. “There is no single measure that will provide an easy answer, which is why we are committed to pursuing a wide range of interventions to protect the future of our dairy and beef industries and eradicate the disease within 20 years. No one wants to be culling badgers forever, so the progress reported today is encouraging.”

Each cull area is set a minimum and maximum number of badgers to be shot. This is to ensure the animals are not wiped out locally, while still killing enough to be effective. Scientists have previously criticised the government-set targets as “ridiculously easy”. In the new cull zones, the minimum number of badgers to be killed is 24,550 and the maximum is 42,029.

Eustice said that in the Gloucestershire and Somerset areas, where culling began in 2013, bTB incidence in cattle has fallen from 10.4% before the culling to 5.6% and from 24.4% to 12.0% respectively. However, documents show it has risen from 15.9% to 20.6% in Dorset.

Prof Rosie Woodroffe of the Zoological Society of London, who conducted a landmark 10-year trial on badger culling, said: “It does look like it is going down in Gloucestershire and Somerset, but ‘looks like’ is not good enough. The big drop in Gloucestershire happened only in year four of culling and might be a blip.

“They have done no statistical analysis at all. So there is not yet evidence to be confident that the policy is working.” A review of the government’s TB policy is due within three weeks. Woodroffe said: “It makes you wonder why they are reviewing the policy if they are just pushing ahead anyway.”

Dominic Dyer, CEO of the Badger Trust, said ministers “have today given the green light to the largest destruction of badgers in living memory. More badgers could be killed in the next few months then the last five years combined.”

Badger cull policing cost £800,000 in one county

He said the cost to taxpayers was £1,000 per badger culled and that vaccination would be far less expensive: “A national badger vaccination programmes combined with improved TB testing for cattle, tighter biosecurity and cattle movement controls, will be far more effective. This is a far better outcome for farmers, taxpayers and for the future survival of badgers.” Ellie Brodie of the Wildlife Trusts said: “It is unacceptable that the government has not waited for the results of their own review before forging ahead. The badger cull is a dangerous distraction from addressing the main route of bTB transmission in cattle, which is between cattle. We’re calling on the government to invest in medicine, not marksmen.”

In contrast, Stuart Roberts, vice-president of the National Farmers’ Union, welcomed the drop in incidence in Gloucestershire and Somerset and the expansion of the cull, saying: “We must have every option available to us to tackle bTB – including cattle testing, cattle movement restrictions, biosecurity advice, vaccination and control of the disease in wildlife.

Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MNkyz3JGJXY

In this speech Dominic Dyer, newly appointed CEO of the Badger Trust, speaks out about how millions of pounds have been wasted by the government on the badger cull. He explains how the Welsh government have successfully declined BTB in their cattle with much a much more cost effective badger vaccinating scheme. The badger cull debate is not only about animal rights and humane killing, it's also about finding a way to reduce BTB in cattle in a cost effective manner, the recent cull has failed on both these grounds.