Dalit Factor in Bihar's Politics

7. The (M aha) Dalit Fact or in
Bihar’s Polit ics

Shreyas Sardesai*

Until the 2010 election for the BiharAssembly, elections in the state were largely analysed in terms of a six caste categories – Upper castes, Yadavs, other OBCs, Pasis, other Dalits and Muslims. Since 2007 however, Bihar politics has witnessed new developments and the caste dimension of elections cannot be fully understood without taking into account two additional caste categories, namely EBCs or Extremely Backward Classes, and Mahadalits. This chapter seeks to analyse the emergence of latter and its implications. In August 2007, the Nitish Kumar led JDU-BJP government set up the Bihar State Mahadalit Commission to “identify the castes within Scheduled Castes who lagged behind in the development process” and to “study [their] educational and social status and suggest measures for [their] upliftment”. In April 2008, 18 Dalit castes were brought under the Mahadalit category to begin with. These are Bantar, Bauri, Bhogta, Bhuiya, Chaupal, Dabgar, Dom/Dhangad, Ghasi, Halalkhor, Hari/Mehtar/Bhangi, Kanjar, Kurariar, Lalbegi, Musahar, Nat, Pan/Swasi, Rajwar and Turi. Three months later Dhobi and Pasi castes were also added to the Mahadalit category based on the Commission’s recommendation and then Chamars were also included in the Mahadalit category by the state government in November 2009 on the grounds that they too were lagging in literacy and economic status andwere victims of untouchability at the hands of other Mahadalit

1

castes . The only sub-caste that was left out was Paswan or Dusadh

*

AuthorisResearchAssociateatLokniti,CentrefortheStudyofDevelopingSocieties.

1

See http://mahadalitmission.org/BMVM-about-us-list.php#. VZzGJxvzrIU for list of Mahadalit castes; accessed on June 3, 2015.

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(also part of the larger Pasi family) on the grounds that they were more literate and dominant among the Scheduled Castes (The Hindu, Nov 2009). Some political observers however saw the non-inclusion as a deliberate move by Nitish Kumar to settle a score with his political adversary Ram Vilas Paswan who has considerable clout among his caste men (The Telegraph, Feb 15, 2015). Recently (in February 2015) however the Dusadh caste was finally included in the Mahadalit category by then chief minister Jitan Ram Manjhi. Manjhi’s decision was read in the context of his rivalry with Nitish Kumar and his bid to emerge as a Dalit leader acceptable to all ahead of the 2015 BiharAssembly elections (Dasgupta 2015). This means that the entire Dalit population (all 22 sub-castes) in Bihar now falls under the Mahadalit category and is entitled to benefits from state government programmes implemented by the Bihar Mahadalit Vikas Mission which was set up in 2008 (The Indian Express, 2015). These programmes include Mahadalit crèches, provision of a health card for every Mahadalit family and the granting of three decimals of land to Maha Dalit families (The Hindu, Aug 2009). While the Mahadalit category was created ostensibly for socio-economic upliftment and governance reasons as cited above, it should also essentially be seen in political terms. Its creation was not just for social and economic justice but was also meant to shore up votes of the Mahadalits by giving them a separate identity and it paid rich electoral dividends for the JDU and the BJP in the 2010 assembly election. Since that election, Mahadalit politics in the state has continued unabated and Nitish Kumar’s move to make Jitan Ram Manjhi from the Musahar caste, the chief ministerof Biharsoon afterJDU’s 2014Lok Sabha debacle was yet anotherattempt by him to use the Mahadalit card. It was widely viewed as a ploy by Kumar to retain Mahadalit support for the JDU even as the party was losing support among its core base. It is another matter that the move backfired on Kumar as Manjhi revolted later due to his own personal ambitions. Desperate to hold on to power and with an eye on the 2015 assembly elections, Manjhi played victim accusing Nitish Kumar of humiliating a Mahadalit leader. He later went on to form his own party, the Hindustani Awam Morcha, and subsequently announced an alliance with the BJP (The Telegraph, Jun 2015). Caste has been one of the predominant aspects of Bihar politics and with the

The (Maha) Dalit Factor in Bihar’s Politics

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assembly elections due in the state later this year, the question of who the Dalits of Bihar vote for in the context of the state’s new Mahadalit politics and Manjhi’s revolt assumes significance. This chapter will look at how the various Dalit castes have been voting in the state during Vidhan Sabhaand Lok Sabha elections over the last 15 years and whether their voting patterns offer any clues on what is likely to happen in the coming election. For the purposes of this chapter, Mahadalit refers to all the 18 castes that were designated as Mahadalit in the first recommendation in 2008 as well as the Dhobi caste. Pasis/Paswans and Chamars have been kept as separate analytical categories. If we go by the CSDS election surveys in Bihar that have been conducted over the years, on an average Mahadalit castes (19 castes) account for 4-5 percent of Bihar’s population and 24 percent of the total Dalit population. Pasis account for about 5-6 percent of the total population of the state and 37 percent of the Dalit population whereas Chamars are around 6-7 percent of Bihar’s population and 39 percent of the total Dalit population. The total Dalit population of the state as per Census 2011 is 15.9 percent (Tables 1 and 1a).

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Mahadalit Voting Patterns

Mahadalits, the poorest among Dalits, who were once behind the
RJD (44 percent voted for the party in the 2000Assembly election), have shifted allegiance towards the BJP and the JDU over the last fifteen years (Table 2). There has in fact been a steady decline in support among Mahadalits for RJD with every passing election since 2000. As per CSDS data, 33 percent Mahadalits voted for the RJD in the 2004 Lok Sabha election, 27 percent in the February 2005 Vidhan Sabha election, 22 percent in the October 2005 assembly poll, 12 percent in 2009 Lok Sabha election and 8 percent in the 2010 assembly and 2014 Lok Sabha elections. These figures show a clear pattern of declining Mahadalit support for the RJD. A party that once used to get nearly half the Mahadalit votes, now barely gets one in ten Mahadalit votes. The RJD’s loss has been the JDU and BJP’s gain. The two parties in alliance netted 33 to 36percent of the Mahadalit vote between 2004 and2009 and further increased the share to 40 percent in the 2010 elections. Among the two, the JDU did better than the BJP in 2004 and February 2005 whereas the BJP didbetter in October 2005 and 2009. It was in the 2010Assembly elections however that the JDU raced ahead of the BJP and outdid its alliance partner by a large margin getting 30 percent of Mahadalit support to BJP’s 11 percent. This dramatic rise in Mahadalit support for the JDU should be seen in the context of Nitish Kumar’s concerted attempts to woo the community through the setting up of the Mahadalit Commission during his first tenure. Since then the support of Mahadalits for the JDU has remained firm with 34 percent of them voting for the party in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections. The BJP, however, has been the biggest gainer with the party’s Mahadalit support rising dramatically between 2010 and 2014. The party has seen its Mahadalit support increase from just one in ten votes in 2010 to one in four in 2014 when it fought the elections on its own after its alliance with JDU came apart over Narendra Modi’s candidature for the post of Prime Minister. It must be emphasized however that the rise in the BJP’s Mahadalit support in 2014 came mainly at the expense of smaller parties and not the JDU. The JDU’s Mahadalit base remained intact during the 2014 election despite the party having contested on its own. With both the BJP and the JDU set to be on opposite sides once again in the upcoming 2015

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assembly elections, how badly the Mahadalit vote splits between the two parties remains to be seen. Assuming that many Mahadalits voted for the BJP in 2014 due to the Modi factor, the challenge for the party would be to retain their support, now that Modi would be less of a factor in a state election. The challenge for the JDU on the other hand is to convince the Mahadalits to stay with it now that Jitan Ram Manjhi, who it consciously cultivated as a Mahadalit leader, is no longer with the party. It still has some prominent Mahadalit leaders among its fold and will also be looking to bank on its alliance with the RJD and the Congress to make up for any lost votes on account of Manjhi’s defection. While the RJD and the Congress have not been doing well among Mahadalits, they nonetheless have been getting about 11 to 13 percent of the Mahadalit vote in the last two elections which could well prove to be significant for the JDU if things do down to the wire.

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Chamar Voting Patterns

Like the Mahadalits, the Chamars too have over the last fifteen years moved away from the RJD, Congress and other smaller entities towards the BJP, JDU and the BSP. The BJP, which in 2000 got 7 percent or less than one in ten Chamar votes, has made significant inroads into the Chamar vote base (Table 3). The party got nearly one in seven Chamar votes in the 2010 assembly polls and one in five Chamar votes in the 2014 Lok Sabha election. If we take into account the Chamar votes polled for BJP’s alliance partner the LJP in the 2014 election, then the Chamar vote figure for BJP alliance touches 34 percent or one third. Meanwhile the combined vote share of the JDU, RJD and the Congress among Chamars was not far behind in 2014 at 30 percent. Interestingly, the largest proportion of Chamar votes in Bihar has been going to the Bahujan Samaj Party or BSP for a long time now. Mayawati’s party has been getting between one-fourth and one-third of the Chamar votes. The BSP’s high point was in 2009 when it got 35 percent of the Chamar votes. This should be seen as a rub off of Mayawati’s landslide assembly election victory in neighboring Uttar Pradesh in 2007. Although Chamar support for the BSP in Bihar dipped somewhat in 2010 and 2014, the party continued to get the highest share of the community’s votes in the state. In the 2014 Lok Sabha election for instance, the BSP got 26 percent of the Chamar vote which was greater than the BJP’s share at 20 percent. This is extremely significant as even amidst the so-called Modi wave more Chamars voted for the BSP than the BJP. With both the BJP alliance and the JDU- RJD-Congress locked in a tight battle for Chamar votes as of 2014, the BSP’s substantial Chamar base (26 percent as of 2014) assumes great importance in the run up to the 2015 assembly elections. This is because both the alliances would be looking to make a dent into the BSP’s fairly large core base. Mayawati may not be much of player in Bihar’s politics but her fairly solid following among Chamars in the state makes her an important factor, even if in a limited way. A tactical or hidden understanding with her party by either of the two alliances may well prove to be a game changer in a close election.

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Table 3
Dalit Vote in Bihar: Chamar Voting Pattern

Party

2000

2004

LS
2005 Feb
2005 Oct
2009 LS

2010

2014

LS

BJP LJP
7NA
3

7

5

8
5
17
9
77
15
5
20 14 17
7
2
JDU RJD Cong. BSP Oth.
20 31 11 18 11

5

19

12
5
16 12
4
27 11
7
25
3
16

3

6

25 29
24 26
35 15
28 20
26

10

45

Note: 2014 - RLSP vote and NCP vote included in Oth; they got less than one percent Chamar vote. 2005 Oct - NCP vote included in Oth; it got less than one percent Chamar vote. 2005 Feb - CPI, CPM, NCP included in Oth; they got less than one percent Chamar vote. 2004 - NCP vote included in Oth; it got less than one percent Chamar vote. 2000 - Samta, BPP vote & CPM, JDS-MCor-SJDR vote included in Oth; Samta, BPP got 3 pct Chamar vote; CPM, JDS-MCor-SJDR got <1 pct. NA means not applicable.

Pasi Voting Patterns

The Pasi community, politically, socially and economically the strongest of all Dalit sub-castes of Bihar, has stayed loyal to Ram Vilas Paswan and their voting pattern over the years has been determined by which party Paswan’s LJP has been in alliance with. In election after election, Paswan has been successful in transferring the Pasi vote to the party he has aligned with. In 2004 when LJP was in alliance with the RJD and Congress, 58 percent of the Pasis voted for the RJD (Table 4). In the February 2005 assembly election when Paswan tied up with the Congress, 40 percent voted for the LJP and 20 percent for the Congress, higher than for any other party. In October 2005 when Paswan contested the elections on his own, nearly half the Pasi community voted for the LJP. In 2009 when the LJP contestedin alliance with the RJD, 50 percent

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of the Pasis voted for alliance with the RJD alone netting 34 percent of their overall vote. In 2010, the LJP-RJD alliance secured 55 percent of the Pasi vote. Finally, in the 2014 Lok Sabha election when LJP tied up with the BJP, 41 percent of the Pasis voted for the BJP. Clearly, the Pasi vote is the most predictable and it can therefore be safely concluded that with Paswan once again contesting in an alliance with the BJP for the 2015 assembly elections, Pasis are almost certain to throw their weight behind the BJP.

Table 4
Dalit Vote in Bihar: Pasi Voting Pattern

Party

2000

2004

LS
2005 Feb
2005 Oct
2009 LS

2010

2014

LS

BJP LJP
21 NA 11 28
9
12 12 15 58
3
16 40
4
4
47
7
8
16 18 34
6
5
24 16 31
7
41 19

6

JDU

RJD Cong. BSP Oth.
12 20
-
16
3
72

-

4

9

3

2

31

-

8

19

9

14

18

Note: 2014 – RLSP vote and NCP vote included in Oth; RLSP got 5 percent Pasi vote; NCP got one percent Pasi vote. 2005 Oct – NCP vote included in Oth; it got less than one percent Pasi vote. 2005 Feb - CPI, CPM, NCP included in Oth; they got less than one percent Pasi vote. 2004 - NCP vote included in Oth; it got less than one percent Pasi vote. 2000 - Samta, BPP vote & CPM, JDS-MCor-SJDR vote included in Oth; Samta, BPP got 7 pct Pasi vote; CPM, JDS-MCor-SJDR 6. NA means not applicable.

Conclusion

For the last two decades or so, elections in Bihar have been mainly understood by political analysts in terms OBC and Upper caste voting preferences which have been dissected threadbare and have dominated the analytical discourse. Dalit voting preferences on the other hand have

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not received similar detailed attention, at least not as much as they have in neighbouring Uttar Pradesh. However, the upcoming 2015 election is likely to force political analysts as well as political parties to go beyond this OBC and Upper caste-centric approach for Bihar as Dalit choices could well play a decisive role. There has been a reinvention of Dalit identity in the state over the last eight years, Nitish Kumar was the one who created the Mahadalit category in the first place. But in recent times, Jitan Ram Manjhi has tried to play the same card more aggressively after being handpicked for the post of chief minister by Nitish Kumar and later after being dislodged. Some of his decisions during his tenure as the Chief Minister such as incorporating Paswans in the category of Mahadalit and increasing entitlements of Dalits were aimed at cultivating his image as a Mahadalit leader. Before Manjhi, Bihar had had two chief ministers belonging to the Dalit community - Bhola Paswan Shastri (1968-1972) and Ram Sundar Das (1979-1980). However, while they had operated within a political structure dominated by upper castes and OBCs, Manjhi refused to play second fiddle to his OBC boss Nitish Kumar. With Manjhi now deciding to fight the elections with the BJP, questions have been raised whether this would bring any swing of the Dalit votes in favour of the BJP. Though Manjhi belongs to Musahar, which is a Mahadalit caste, his own caste has been a staunch vote base of the CPI(ML) in thier strongholds. It remains to be seen whether Manjhi is able to get pan-Mahadalit support and if the order non-Musahar, non-Paswan Mahadalit castes also rally behind him. How the BJP’s core support base, the upper castes, reacts to Manjhi also remains to be seen. Manjhi after all had made some very controversial