Central Asia the Caucasus

CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Journal of Social and Political Studies

Published since 2000

Volume 12 Issue 2 2011

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Rustem ZHANGUZHIN represents the journal in Ukraine (Kiev) Tel.: (380-44) 524-79-132 E-mail: [email protected] CENTRAL ASIA AND THEE DCAUCASUS I T O R I A L B O A R DVolume 12 Issue 2 2011

Giuli ALASANIA Doctor of History, professor, Vice Rector of the International Black Sea University (Georgia) Bülent ARAS Doctor, Chair, Department of International Relations, Fatih University (Turkey) Mariam ARUNOVA Doctor of Political Science, leading research associate, Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS (Russian Federation) Garnik ASATRIAN Doctor of Philology, professor, head of the Department of Iranian Studies, Erevan State University (Armenia) Bakyt BESHIMOV Doctor of History, professor, Vice President, American University-Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan) Ariel COHEN Doctor, leading analyst, The Heritage Foundation, U.S.A. (U.S.A.) William FIERMAN Doctor of Political Science, Professor of Indiana University (U.S.A.) Paul GOBLE Senior Advisor, Voice of America (U.S.A.) Sergei GRETSKY Doctor, Chair of Central Asian Studies, Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State (U.S.A.) Xing GUANGCHENG Doctor of Political Science, professor, Deputy Director of the Institute for East European, Russian and Central Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (China) Alexander IGNATENKO President, Institute of Religion and Politics, Doctor of Philosophy, specialist in Islamic studies, leading expert of the Institute of Social Systems, Moscow State University, member of the Council for Cooperation with Religious Associations under the Russian Federation President (Russian Federation) Ashurboi IMOMOV Ph.D. (Law), assistant professor, head of the Department of Constitutional Law, Tajik National University (Tajikistan) Lena JONSON Doctor, senior researcher, Swedish Institute of International Affairs (Sweden) Klara KHAFIZOVA Doctor of History, Director, Center for Strategic and International Studies, professor at the International Relations and Foreign Policy Department, Kainar University (Kazakhstan) Jacob M. LANDAU Professor of Political Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Israel) S. Neil MACFARLANE Professor, Director, Center for International Studies, The University of Oxford (Great Britain) Alexei MALASHENKO Doctor of History, professor, Scholar-in-Residence, Ethnicity and Nation-Building Program Co-Chair, The Carnegie Moscow Center (Russian Federation) Abbas MALEKI Dr., Director General, International Institute for Caspian Studies (Iran) Akira Ph.D., History of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Program Officer, The Sasakawa Peace MATSUNAGA Foundation (Japan) Roger N. McDERMOTT Honorary Senior Research Fellow, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent at Canterbury (UK) Vitaly NAUMKIN Doctor of History, professor, Director, Center for Strategic and International Studies of RF (Russian Federation) Yerengaip OMAROV Professor, Rector of Kainar University, President of the Academy of Natural Sciences, Republic of Kazakhstan (Kazakhstan) Vladimer PAPAVA Doctor of Economics, professor, Corresponding member of the Georgian Academy of Sciences, Senior Fellow of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (Georgia) S. Frederick STARR Professor, Chairman, The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, The Johns Hopkins University (U.S.A.)

The materials that appear in the journal do not necessarily reflect the Editorial Board and the Editors’ opinion Editorial Office: CA&CC Press AB Hubertusstigen 9. 97455 Luleå SWEDEN WEB ADDRESS: http://www.ca-c.org

CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Journal of Social and Political Studies Volume 12 Issue 2 2011

IN THIS ISSUE:

REGIONAL SECURITY

Philipp RUSSIA, INDIA, AND CHINA Stollenwerk. IN CENTRAL ASIA: TOWARD CONFLICT OR COOPERATION? ...... 7

Jannatkhan SOME ASPECTS OF Eyvazov. THE THEORY OF REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEXES AS APPLIED TO STUDIES OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE ...... 17

Inomzhon BORDER LEGALIZATION UNDER Bobokulov. INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A REGIONAL SECURITY FACTOR IN CENTRAL ASIA ...... 25

Yelda Demirað, THE 2008 GEORGIAN CRISIS AND Burak THE LIMITS OF Tangör. EUROPEAN SECURITY GOVERNANCE ...... 34

4 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011

NATION-BUILDING

Bakhodyr POLITICAL COMPETITION Ergashev. IN CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS: OBJECTIVES, MEANS, AND MECHANISMS ...... 53

Beka CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM Chedia. IN GEORGIA AS A RESULT OF ITS POLITICAL INSTABILITY ...... 63

Serik SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC Beysembaev. DEVELOPMENT TRENDS IN KAZAKHSTAN SOCIETY (Based on Public Opinion Polls) ...... 71

Narciss THE FAMILY IN POWER: Shukuralieva. A NEW PAST FOR AN OLD COUNTRY ...... 87

REGIONAL POLITICS

Boris THE GREATER Zazhigaev. BLACK SEA REGION— A GATEWAY TO EURASIA ...... 98

Murat CENTRAL ASIA AND Laumulin. PAX IRANICA: COOPERATION AND INTERDEPENDENCE ...... 109

Maxim THE SHANGHAI Starchak. COOPERATION ORGANIZATION: OPPORTUNITIES FOR RUSSIA ...... 126

Ruslan Izimov. THE SCO AND THE WEST ...... 136

Guli U.S. STRATEGY Yuldasheva. IN CENTRAL ASIA: PROBLEMS AND ACHIEVEMENTS ...... 141

5 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

REGIONAL ECONOMIES

Gulnur THE CUSTOMS UNION: Rakhmatulina. HOW IT AFFECTS THE PRIORITIES OF KAZAKHSTAN’S ECONOMIC POLICY ...... 152

Andrei SOCIOECONOMIC Galiev. CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH IN KYRGYZSTAN’S ECONOMIC COMPLEX ...... 161

Igor THE TURKMEN ECONOMY: Proklov. YEAR-END RETURNS FOR 2010 ...... 175

FOR YOUR INFORMATION The Special Feature section in the next issue will discuss:

n Central Eurasia: Religion in the Sociopolitical Context

n Energy Policy and Energy Projects in Central Eurasia

n Regional Centers of Power and Their Policy in Central Eurasia

6 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011

REGIONAL SECURITY

RUSSIA, INDIA, AND CHINA IN CENTRAL ASIA: TOWARD CONFLICT OR COOPERATION?

Philipp STOLLENWERK MA (International Relations/Political Science), Higher School of Economics/University of Kent (Canterbury, U.K.)

Introduction

ince the beginning of the 21st century, the well in order to support domestic economic de- rise of Asia and, in particular, the success velopment and increase their influence on the in- S stories of her biggest players, Russia, India, ternational stage. Efforts in this direction have and China (RIC), have become a central topic of been made in recent years at several annual trilat- the academic community. Economists and busi- eral meetings, as well as at the two BRIC (Brazil, nessmen have lauded and enthusiastically de- Russia, India, and China) summits in Ekaterinburg scribed the unprecedented economic opportuni- (2009) and Brasília (2010). The idea of trilateral ties these huge markets offer.1 But several experts relations between Moscow, New Delhi, and Bei- also expect that, in the future, the three countries jing was proposed by Evgeny Primakov, Russia’s will, despite their cultural and historical diversi- former foreign minister and prime minister, on a ty, deepen cooperation in the political sphere as visit to India in 1998.2 China and India were not

1 D. Smith, The Dragon and the Elephant: China, 2 It is interesting to note that Joseph Stalin was the India and the New World Order, Profile Books, London, first to propose this alliance in 1921 when the Russian econ- 2008; S. Borodina, O. Shvyrkov, Investing in BRIC Coun- omy was in ruins after the civil war and the hopes for the so- tries: Evaluating Risk and Governance in Brazil, Russia, called proletarian revolutions in Europe turned out to be un- India and China, McGraw-Hill Professional, New York, justified (the last illusions about the European proletariat 2010. perished during the Soviet-Polish war of 1920). 7 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS very enthusiastic about the idea at first,3 but after are becoming increasingly institutionalized, sev- three meetings of their foreign ministers at inter- eral experts point to Central Asia as a potential national forums, an annual trilateral forum mech- area of rivalry among the three powers. anism was established in June 2005. As China This article seeks to respond to the question: expert Jean-Pierre Cabestan suggests, it was the Russia, India, and China in Central Asia: Toward commonly faced threat of terrorism after 9/11, as Conflict or Cooperation? It argues that competi- well as America’s increased presence in Central tion over energy resources and (to a lesser extent) Asia, that brought the countries together to dis- market access among RIC in Central Asia will cuss security cooperation in the trilateral format.4 inevitably increase over the next two decades. Some Russian specialists believe that the strength- This is due, in particular, to the contrasting for- ening of relations inside the triangle is caused by eign policy objectives of RIC and the crucial role the increase in Islamic extremism5 and apprehen- of Central Asia in their security strategies. Rus- sions about the prospect of a unipolar U.S.-led sia wants to guard its near export monopoly on world.6 Central Asian energy resources and reinforce its Although relations among Russia, India, and position in its traditional sphere of influence China today seem to be better than ever before and against competitors, while the Chinese goal, and to a lesser extent the Indian goal, to diversify and increase energy imports runs contrary to that. 3 But when the first bombs dropped on Yugoslavia in Moreover, China and India see each other as com- March 1999, the idea became quite topical: both Beijing (quietly) and New Delhi (openly—Indian Prime Minister petitors over the limited energy resources and as A.B. Vajpayee immediately stated the need to return to the rivals for influence in Central Asia and Asia. idea of a strategic alliance) expressed their interest. However, there are institutions and agreements 4 J.-P. Cabestan, S. Colin, I. Facon, M. Meidan, “La which might help to mitigate competition and China et la Russie. Entre convergences et méfiance,” in: Stratégie et prospective, A Collection, UNICOMM, Paris, permit compromises. China, Russia, and India are 2008, pp. 137-138. very concerned about the security threats emanat- 5 India (with a more than 140-million Muslim popu- ing from Central Asia and the increased presence lation), Russia (with a Muslim population in the Volga- of the U.S. in this region, which has led them to Urals region), and China (with a large Muslim population in Xinjiang) face similar problems and tasks in the event of a cooperate in the Shanghai Cooperation Organiza- rise of Muslim extremism. tion (SCO). 6 See: S. Lounev, “The Prospects of Interaction in the The article is divided into two parts. First, Russia-India-China Triangle,” in: Asia-Pacific: Security, Globalisation and Development, ed. by M.L. Sondhi, K.G. it will look at the strategies and goals of RIC in Tyagi, Manas, New Delhi, 2001; S. Lounev, “Treugol’nik Central Asia and how they are perceived by the ‘Rossia-Kitai-India:’ perspektivy i ogranichiteli sotrud- Central Asian states. Second, it will identify the nichestva,” in: “Bol’shaia Vostochnaia Azia:” mirovaia potential for cooperation or conflict by focusing politika i regional’nye transformatsii: nauchno- obrazovatel’niy kompleks, ed. by A.D. Voskresenskiy, on the existing cooperation mechanism—the MGIMO-Universitet, Moscow, 2010. SCO.

Part I: Strategies and Goals of RIC in Central Asia

Russia, India, and China have different foreign policy objectives in Central Asia. While some of their goals converge, others stand in stark contrast to each other.

8 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011

Russia

Russia’s power declined during the “wild 1990s” when President Boris Yeltsin looked to the West for support and orientation7 before gradually becoming disillusioned by the perceived lack of support and NATO’s eastward expansion.8 Nonetheless, the newly independent Central Asian nations retained their special importance for Russia and continued to be seen as its Near Abroad and traditional sphere of influence, where outside competitors were unwelcome.9 President Vladimir Putin’s term coincided with the beginning of an economic boom in Russia, mainly thanks to surging oil and gas prices. Under Putin, Russia’s vast energy resources replaced military capacities as the main means to increase influence on the international stage, although talk of Russia as an “energy superpower” is rather polemic and “often exaggerates Russia’s ability to use oil and gas as ‘weapons’ to augment Russian influence over its neighbors and on the world stage.”10 Despite Russia’s own abundant energy resources, the Kremlin spared no effort to restore its monopoly over the transit routes of oil and gas in Central Asia, which was lost after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Moscow relied on state-owned companies like Gazprom and Transneft to control export and import routes, while Russian companies heavily invested in various energy projects in the Central Asian countries.11 Furthermore, countries were discouraged from building new energy routes to Central Asia which would bypass Russia.12 Great effort was made to convince Central Asian nations like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan to participate in the South Stream project, although those states are also interested in alternative projects to decrease reliance on Russia. It was not until March 2011 that Russian Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin hinted at the possibility of abandoning the South Stream project in favor of a LNG project.13 Since Russia’s monopoly over the oil pipeline routes emanating from Kazakhstan disappeared when the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and the Atasu-Alashankou pipelines were opened, in 2008, Gazprom agreed to significantly increase payments to Central Asian countries for gas, which it then sells to European customers. Since European gas demand fell in the wake of the economic recession, Gazprom has been seeking a revision of Turkmenistan’s gas export price.14 After 11 September, 2001, Putin opted for cooperation with the U.S. and, despite domestic resistance, accepted the temporary deployment of American bases in Central Asia—not least because he hoped that the U.S. would solve the Taliban problem in Afghanistan and stop the spillover of Is- lamic extremism into other regions. After the Russian leadership realized that the U.S. was taking advantage of the situation and continuing to expand it military presence in and increase its influence on the Central Asian states (e.g. the Color Revolutions), Moscow changed its rhetoric and demanded U.S. withdrawal from the region.15 Putin understood that Russia had lost its hegemonic position in

7 The Russian media published letters from Foreign Minister Kozyrev to the U.S. State Department in which he in- quired about the specific political course Russia should take in specific regions. 8 R.H. Donaldson, Boris Yeltsin’s Foreign Policy Legacy, presented to the 41st Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Los Angeles, California, 18 March, 2000, available at [http://www.personal.utulsa.edu/~robert-donaldson/yeltsin.htm]; D. Trenin, “Russia’s Spheres of Interest, not Influence,” The Washington Quarterly, October 2009, p. 8. 9 R. Watson, “A ‘Yeltsin Doctrine’,” Newsweek, 10 October, 1994, available at [http://www.newsweek.com/1994/ 10/09/a-yeltsin-doctrine.html]. 10 P. Rutland, “Russia as an Energy Superpower,” New Political Economy, Vol. 13, No. 2, June 2008, p. 209. 11 Ch.E. Ziegler, “Russia and China in Central Asia,” in: J. Bellacqua, The Future of China-Russia Relations, The University Press Kentucky, Kentucky, 2010, p. 248f. 12 S. Woehrel, Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries, CRS Report for Congress, May 2009, p. 17. 13 R.M. Cutler, “South Stream May Disappear,” Asia Times Online, 18 March, 2011, available at [http://www. atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/MC18Ag01.html]. 14 I. Gorst, “Gazprom Escalates Turkmen Gas Price Dispute,” Financial Times, 2 June, 2009, available at [http://www. ft.com/cms/s/0/81e86c80-4f0b-11de-8c10-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1EOZjC6h8]. 15 S. Varadarajan, “China and Russia up the Ante in Central Asia,” The Hindu, 7 July, 2005, available at [http://www. hindu.com/2005/07/07/stories/2005070714961500.htm]. 9 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Central Asia and therefore increased security cooperation with China and the Central Asian states within the SCO to contain America’s influence in the region.16 In Russia’s eyes, the Organization (SCO) also strives to tackle security threats, in particular the extremism, Islamic terrorism, and separatism emanating from the North Caucasian republics, as well as drug trafficking. Because China is not only seen as a partner, but also as a competitor and rising power, Russia is also seeking to limit China’s influence in Central Asia.17 With the exception of raw materials, trade and economic relations between Russia and Cen- tral Asia are not particularly significant. According to the Russian Federation State Statistical Service, between 1995 and 2009, Russian trade increased from $5,230 million to $12,832 million with Ka- zakhstan, from $206 million to $1,283 million with Kyrgyzstan, from $357 million to $785 million with Tajikistan, from $272 million to $1,044 million with Turkmenistan, and from $1,713 million to $2,540 million with Uzbekistan.18 According to EUROSTAT, this amounted to less than 4% of Rus- sia’s total trade in 2008.19 Russia is still the most important trading partner for the Central Asian countries, apart from Kyrgyzstan, which already enjoys a higher trading volume with China.20

China

China accepted Russia’s hegemonic position in Central Asia in the past. According to Bobo Lo, this changed after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent increased American presence in Cen- tral Asia. Beijing was shocked that Moscow so easily accepted American troops in its neighborhood without even a note to China. “Almost overnight the Kremlin switched from a multivectoral approach to one unambiguously centered on comprehensive cooperation with the United States.”21 Beijing understood that Russia still placed greater significance on its relations with the U.S. than on Sino- Russian relations and that it had to react to the new situation in Central Asia. Even though Russia soon became disillusioned by America’s behavior and American-Russian relations deteriorated, China began intensifying its interaction with the Central Asian states. First, China has security concerns with respect to Central Asia. It fears that chaos or instability in the Central Asian states could strengthen the separatists in its Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Re- gion. Contacts between the Uighurs in China and Central Asia intensified after the breakup of the Soviet Union, and rebel actions in Xinjiang are often planned by separatists hiding in Central Asia. China, therefore, fears that Muslim extremism will spill over from unstable Central Asia into its sparsely populated western regions.22 Its presence in Central Asia furthermore serves Chinese interests because of Central Asia’s vast energy reserves and its geographical proximity. China’s hunger for energy, in particular oil (China is the world’s second largest oil importer), but also increasingly natural gas, has grown enormously in the last decades and is expected to grow further. Although dependence on Middle Eastern oil has al-

16 B. Lo, Axis of Convenience. Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., 2008, pp. 93-95. 17 A. Matveeva, A. Giustozzi, “The SCO: A Regional Organisation in the Making,” Working Paper 39, Regional and Global Axes of Conflict, Crisis State Research Centre, LSE, September 2008, p. 7. 18 Russian Federation State Statistical Service, available at [http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b10_12/IssWWW.exe/stg/d02/ 26-06.htm]. 19 EUROSTAT (Comex Regime 4), available at [http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/ tradoc_113440.pdf]. 20 Ch.E. Ziegler, op. cit., pp. 252-253. 21 B. Lo, op. cit., pp. 95-96. 22 A. Rashid, “China Forced to Expand Role in Central Asia,” Institute for Afghan Studies, 19 July, 2000, available at [http://www.institute-for-afghan-studies.org/Foreign%20Affairs/china/china_expand_role_0.htm]. 10 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 ready dropped to less than 50%,23 China aims to further diversify its energy supplies because over 80% of China’s oil is still transported through the Straits of Malacca and is therefore vulnerable to pirate attacks and blockades.24 Pipelines from Central Asia would be safer and cheaper in the long run, although Central Asia does not have enough energy resources to substitute Middle Eastern imports. So Chinese companies have been buying upstream energy holdings in Central Asia in the last decade. Although gas currently only plays a small part in China’s energy mix, it is expected to grow considerably.25 Gas reserves in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are therefore of great interest to Beijing. Although Moscow opposes pipeline projects which bypass it, the first Sino-Central Asian energy projects have already borne fruit. Since 2006, the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline has been pumping oil from Kazakhstan to China’s Xinjiang region, while the capacity is expected to grow in the next few years.26 In December 2009, a new Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline has broken “Russia”s long-standing stranglehold on Turk- menistan’s vast gas supplies.”27 Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will also deliver gas through this pipeline to China, enabling it “to diversify its imports through secure means of transportation.”28 With the exception of energy, trade relations between China and Central Asia are not particularly significant from China’s point of view, accounting for less than 1% of its total trade turnover. Nonethe- less, Sino-Central Asian trade grew rapidly between 1995 and 2007, from $391 million to $13,800 million with Kazakhstan, $231 million to $3,780 million with Kyrgyzstan, $24 million to $524 million with Tajikistan, $18 million to $350 million with Turkmenistan, and $119 million to $1,130 million with Uzbekistan.29 China has established trade missions in all the Central Asian countries and Chinese companies have heavily invested in infrastructure and transportation projects. As some experts suggest, China would like Central Asia to become economically integrated with the western part of Xin- jiang, “breaking down trade barriers, even if the Central Asian governments are wary.”30 The Central Asian states fear growing dependence on Chinese goods. While low-value goods have the potential to improve the standard of living in Central Asia, Chinese economic dominance and its consequences increasingly evoke resistance.31

India

After the breakup of the U.S.S.R. in 1991, “India was slow to grasp the significance of the strategic, geopolitical, and economic shifts in the former Soviet space” and focused on relations with Russia—although the Central Asian leaders wooed India.32 India did not begin increasing its engage-

23 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “China: Oil, Country Analysis Briefs,” November 2010, available at [http:// www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/China/Oil.html]. 24 A. Ullah, “India and China Competing for Malacca Straits in Burma,” SouthAsiaSpeaks, 23 June, 2009, available at [http://southasiaspeaks.wordpress.com/2009/06/23/india-and-china-competing-for-malacca-straits-in-burma/]. 25 N. Higashi, “Natural Gas in China. Market Evolution and Strategy,” International Energy Agency Working Paper Series, June 2009, p. 23, available at [http://www.iea.org/papers/2009/nat_gas_china.pdf]. 26 Ch.E. Ziegler, op. cit., pp. 249-250. 27 “Unknown: China President Open Turkmenistan Gas Pipeline,” BBC, 14 December, 2009, available at [http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8411204.stm]. 28 Ch. Durdiyeva, “China, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Launch Turkmenistan-China Gas Pipeline,” CACI Analyst, 20 January, 2010, available at [http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5254]. 29 Ch.E. Ziegler, op. cit., p. 253, Table 8.3. 30 E. Wong, “China Quietly Extends Footprints into Central Asia,” The New York Times, 2 January, 2011, available at [http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/03/world/asia/03china.html]. 31 M. Laruelle, S. Peyrouse, “Editor’s Note: Central Asian Perceptions of China,” The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 1, February 2009, p. 7. 32 V. Nadkarni, India and Central Asia, Script for presentation at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, 28 February-3 March, 2007, p. 1. 11 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS ment with Central Asia until the early 2000s and therefore has weaker ties with the Central Asian states than Russia and China have. Like China and Russia, India is also interested in stability and security in Central Asia and fears extremism and terrorism breeding there. If terrorists cooperate with partners in Afghanistan and Pakistan, this would have negative consequences for India’s security. India fears a “domino effect” across the entire region, as well as instability in China’s Xinjiang region, with which India shares a border.33 India’s energy hunger is growing rapidly, so it would like to gain greater access to Central Asian energy. In the past, it primarily relied on coal for its electricity sector and on oil for its transport sector. But as environmental awareness and international cooperation gradually grew, India began looking for cleaner alternatives, such as natural gas. While it has signed contracts to import LNG from Qatar, pipeline projects like the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) project, the Myanmar-Bangladesh-India (MBI) project, and the ADB-backed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline project have, despite many negotiations, not yet led to success.34 According to former diplomat Rajiv Sikri, India’s main dilemma is that there is no easy access to Central Asia. Afghanistan is still unstable, Pakistan is India’s ancient enemy, and Iran is unreliable and its routes economically less profitable. Xinjiang seems to be an option, but the relevant infrastructure is still insufficient.35 Furthermore, Chinese companies often offer a higher price (overpayment) than Indian companies to acquire energy assets in Central Asia and therefore gain a considerably larger share.36 Moreover, in 2002, the Reliance Industries Limited (RIL) energy company made huge gas discoveries in India’s eastern offshore regions. Gas from that source has been streamed since 2009. Further gas discoveries were made in the Krishna-Godavari basin in 2005. Shebonti Ray Dadwal nonetheless argues that India is still interested in the TAPI pipeline project because of the importance of “access to elusive Central Asian energy reserves and countering the expanding presence of China in Central Asia (Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan)… For India … the TAPI project could serve as the strategic link it has long sought within Central Asia, which it sees as its strategic neighborhood, and South Asia. The project could lead to, or even expand, existing trade, electricity and transit networks across Eurasia and allow Turkmenistan and India to diversify their trade and energy relations with countries in South Asia, the CIS countries and Europe.”37 An alternative would be the so-called SAGE project. This project was proposed as early as the 1990s and is a swap deal wherein Turkmen gas would be pumped into Iran’s northern Iran gas grid to feed India. The same amount of gas would be pumped by Iran into its southern pipelines to Chahbahar port and from there into a sub-sea pipeline to India.38 Trade relations between India and Central Asia are currently relatively insignificant—not least because of the access problem. India’s trade was $291.45 million with Kazakhstan, $84.6 million with Uzbekistan, $46.15 million with Turkmenistan, $32.56 million with Tajikistan, and $27.48 million with Kyrgyzstan between 2009 and 2010.39 Although still very low compared to Central Asia’s trade volume with Russia or China, bilateral trade between India and Central Asia is rising.

33 R. Sikri, Challenge and Strategy. Rethinking India’s Foreign Policy, SAGE Publications, New Delhi, 2009, pp. 164-165. 34 Sh.R. Dadwal, “The Role of Natural Gas and Central Asia in Indian Energy Security,” Journal of Energy Securi- ty, 26 July, 2010, available at [http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=254:the-role-of- natural-gas-in-indian-energy-security&catid=108:energysecuritycontent&Itemid=365]. 35 R. Sikri, op. cit. 36 A. Jackson, “China and Central Asia,” Turkish Weekly, 19 May, 2009, available at [http://www.turkishweekly.net/ news/77297/china-and-central-asia.html]. 37 Sh.R. Dadwal, op. cit. 38 Ibidem. 39 Government of India, Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Department of Commerce, Export Import Data Bank, Version 6.0, available at [http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/Default.asp]. 12 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 Part II: Central Asia

While the Central Asian states are eager to preserve their independence, they nevertheless see the necessity of establishing cooperation with their large neighbors, Russia and China, in the economic and security sphere. Although there is historical mistrust—further exacerbated by the Geor- gian-Russian war in 2008—toward Russia’s hegemonic ambitions, on the one hand, political and economic interdependence and their common history bring the countries closer together, on the other. While it would be more profitable for Central Asian countries to sell their energy resources directly to Europe or Asia, they are still largely dependent on the Russian-owned energy infrastructure. Growing Chinese influence is regarded with suspicion because of potential Chinese economic domination and increasing dependence on cheap Chinese goods. However, China’s huge market and growing energy hunger are also regarded as a great opportunity. It is therefore not surprising that the Central Asian states are trying to play off China and Russia (as well as the U.S.) against each other to reap the greatest profits from each of them, on the one hand, and are supporting the SCO as a tool to make the powers keep each others’ influence in Central Asia in check, on the other. They also profit from security cooperation in the SCO in the fight against extremism and terrorism. Ac- cording to Sikri, the Central Asian states generally regard India “as a benign power that does not pose any direct contemporary threat, whether ideological, demographic, or territorial. In fact, India has always held a tremendous cultural attraction, a certain romance and a mystique for the people of this region.”40 The Central Asian states are therefore disappointed that India has only been playing a marginal role in Central Asia since the 1990s and welcome it as an investor and “balancer” of China and Russia in Central Asia. Despite some tension due to competitive bids for energy assets, Russia, China, and India have managed cooperation in Central Asia surprisingly well so far. The main forum for discussion is the SCO, in which India is only an observer. In 1996, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan founded the Shanghai Five as a consultation mechanism to solve border issues. At subsequent meetings, the scope was broadened to include fighting terrorism and drug trafficking and, later, to coordinating economic cooperation. In 2001, the Shanghai Five formally became the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and Uzbekistan joined the club. The areas of cooperation were further expanded to include political issues, transportation, education, culture, and environmental issues. The Organization also has a permanent Regional Antiterrorist Structure (RATS) in Tashkent and a Secretariat in Beijing.41 Whereas China and Russia held bilateral Peace Missions in 2005 and 2009, the joint military exercises in 2007 and 2010 involved all the SCO members. The scope and sophistication of the joint military exercises have improved over time. The SCO members are united by the shared threats of extremism, terrorism, and separatism. These threats are regarded by RIC as transnational threats and therefore demand a joint response. All the countries have ethnic and religious minorities, a small number of which are engaged in terrorist or separatist activities—the line between separatist and terrorist activities is often unclear in SCO rhetoric. In Russia, groups in the North Caucasian republics have not given up the fight for independence, in China’s Xinjiang region insurgencies frequently occur, and the Central Asian states

40 R. Sikri, op. cit., p. 165. 41 A. Matveeva, A. Giustozzi, op. cit., pp.1-6; T. Tiara, Power Politics in Central Asia: China and Russia’s Relation- ship, International Studies Association Annual Meeting, New York, February 2009. 13 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS struggle to cope with internal instability. India often has to deal with instability in its Jammu and Kashmir region. Since 2006, the fight against the international drug mafia has become an important part of SCO cooperation since much of the world drug trade takes place in Central Asia. Furthermore, drug profits are used to finance extremist and terrorist activities.42 Although RIC have important economic links (and India in particular has important security links) with the United States, they are all concerned about the U.S. military presence in Central Asia, which has expanded significantly since 9/11, and the stationing of troops at Central Asian bases. Siddharth Varadarajan formulates the popular view of RIC as follows: “By selling its response to the 9/11 tragedy as part of a ‘Global War on Terrorism,’ the United States (U.S.) managed to receive unprecedented international backing for its projection of military power in the heartland of Asia.”43 Although SCO declarations underline that the Organization is not aimed against a third actor, Russia and China in particular are suspected of using it to check U.S. power in the region. U.S. troops were asked to leave the bases in Central Asian states such as Uzbekistan (which they did in 2005) and Kyrgyzstan (where a new deal was made). The U.S. also plans to expand training centers in Central Asian countries such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.44 Nonetheless, RIC and, in particular, China and Russia have different ideas about the tasks of the SCO and mistrust each other. While Russia wants to increase military and security cooperation within the SCO, China wants to boost cooperation in the economic sector and has proposed establishing a free trade area. As S. Aris points out, China “hopes that Russia and Central Asia become a reliable and significant source of raw materials.”45 The SCO members and India are all interested in regional stability and territorial integrity and, therefore, have increased their cooperation. Since all the countries have very similar objectives with regard to security, cooperation in this field will probably increase and be further institutionalized in the near future, with more ambitious joint military exercises to come. Agreements in the energy field will be harder to reach since, as pointed out above, Russia, as a net exporter of energy, has very different goals from China and India as net importers. Russia will probably continue to try and block pipeline projects which bypass its territory and seek to propose alternative projects that are more advantageous to its economic interests. Since the Central Asian states and China or India profit from direct energy trade, these interests might clash. Russia proposed a Central Asian energy club within the SCO in 2006 to prevent Sino-Russian conflicts over energy. The reactions of the SCO members were cautious. The current financial crisis that began in 2007/08 and hit raw material-dependent Russia extremely hard might have brought a breakthrough in Sino-Russian energy relations as the projects suggest. In fact, the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean Pipeline discussed since the mid-1990s finally opened, thanks to a Chinese loan, on 1 January, 2011 and will carry 15 million tons of crude oil annually from Russia to China for the next 20 years. Prior to this, Russia kept changing its attitude toward the project, whereby annoying China and Japan as potential customers.46 It was decided that a second leg, yet to be built, would run to the Pacific coast.

42 I. Tulyakov, “Shanghai Cooperation Organization to Accept Two Nuclear Enemies,” Pravda.ru, 11 June, 2010, available at [http://english.pravda.ru/world/asia/11-06-2010/113767-shanghai_cooperation-0/]. 43 S. Varadarajan, “Six Propositions about World Order and the Role of Russia, India and China,” in: N. Das Kun- du, Russia-India-China. Evolution of Geo-Political Strategic Trends, Academic Foundation, New Delhi, 2010, p. 39. 44 A. Shustov, “U.S. Armed Forces in Central Asia—Built to Last,” Ria Novosti, 12 August, 2010, available at [http:// en.rian.ru/international_affairs/20100812/160172555.html]. 45 S. Aris, Russian-Chinese Relations through the Lens of the SCO, NIS Center, Paris, 2008. 46 M. Stone, “Siberian Nights: The East Siberia-Pacific Ocean Oil Pipeline,” The Oil Drum, 27 February, 2007, available at [http://www.theoildrum.com/node/2311]. 14 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011

This serves Russia’s goal to diversify energy exports away from Europe and China’s goal to increase imports of non-Middle Eastern oil (import diversification). It also brings the countries politically closer together and might weaken the position of the Western powers in Central Asia. It could also have a positive impact on Russia’s Far East by providing jobs. This could help to ease Russia’s worries about its undeveloped and scarcely populated Eastern regions and Chinese migration. Ac- cording to Kevin Rosner, “The ESPO pipeline … embraces ideas advanced both through Eura- sian regional cooperation as well as through a bilateral Russia-China energy model. Further, it provides traction, if only indirectly, for advancing the Energy Club idea ‘and its observers’ which include Iran.”47 Since China and India are expected to double their oil demands by 2030, the quest to secure more energy resources in Central Asia could lead to increased competition or even conflict. Chinese and Indian companies are currently competing with their American and European counterparts and, although China has gained the upper hand in the last decade, India’s rapidly growing energy appetite is pushing it to secure further energy assets in Central Asia.48 In 2005, a Sino-Indian energy dialog was launched through an Indian initiative. A joint statement on energy cooperation was issued in April proposing joint survey and exploration of energy resources in third countries. At the same time, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) outbid India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Lim- ited (ONGC) for the Canadian Oil Company PetroKazakhstan and its second largest Kazakh oil reserves. Nevertheless, in January 2006, it was agreed to create a framework for joint bids on oilfields in third countries. According to Stein Tonnesson and Ashild Kolas, this has led to joint initiatives to acquire shares in oil corporations in Syria and Sudan. However, they point out that a Sino-Burmese deal, the U.S.-Indian agreement on nuclear power cooperation, as well as a joint energy deal with Iran in which China’s Sinopec acquired the far more important share run contrary to the spirit of this agreement.49 It is therefore probable that joint Sino-Indian energy initiatives in Central Asia will once again take the back seat to national interests. Trade between RIC and Central Asia is not particularly significant in terms of numbers. It has grown considerably in the last decade—although it started from a very low level. Although Russia is still the most important trade partner for all the Central Asian states (except Kyrgyzstan), if current trends continue, China will soon catch up. This will not only increase China’s economic influence, but also its political influence in Central Asia since these countries already seem to be extremely dependent on cheap Chinese goods. Since China’s influence in Central Asia is greatest in the economic sphere, it has proposed establishing a free trade area inside the SCO. Russia, whose political, security, and institutional links with Central Asian states are greater than Beijing’s, wants to increase cooperation in these spheres, while it feels vulnerable with regard to China’s rapidly growing economic influence. According to Bobo Lo, Russia therefore “play(s) on Central Asian fears of Chinese economic domination.” Consequently, Russia and Central Asia are unenthusiastic about “a more transparent commercial environment (which) would accelerate the extension of Chinese influence, undermine Russian interests, and make the local economies ‘China-dependent’ to an uncomfortable degree.”50 With India aiming to increase its economic influence in Central Asia

47 K. Rosner, “China Scores Again in Energy: Russia & Central Asia,” Journal of Energy Security, 12 February, 2010, available at [http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=230:china-scores-again-in-energy- russia-aamp-central-asia&catid=102:issuecontent&Itemid=355]. 48 A. Chandra, “Geopolitics of Central Asian Energy Resources and Indian Interest,” Journal of Peace Studies, Vol. 16, Issue 1-2, January-June 2009, pp. 1-4. 49 S. Tonnesson, A. Kolas, Energy Security in Asia: China, India, Oil and Peace, Report to the Norwegian Minis- try of Foreign Affairs, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, April 2006, pp. 50-53. 50 B. Lo, op. cit., p. 111. 15 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

(although Russia and China have a geographical advantage), this will probably lead to tension in the future. As Siddharth Varadarajan further points out, “there is often little coherence in the individual foreign policies of Russia, India and China between tactical short term positions on issues like Iran, Korea and the Middle East and the long term, strategic goal of multipolarity. (RIC remain) reluctant Asianists and their strategy is defensive rather than proactive.”51 This makes it extremely difficult for RIC to find a common approach to Central Asia.

Conclusion

While Central Asia currently seems to be the region where RIC have successfully managed to institutionalize and increase cooperation, tension will most probably rise in the near future. Although security is the sphere where cooperation might continue and increase, competition over the acquire- ment of energy assets and resources might lead to tension in RIC relations, with foreign policy objectives differing among the three countries. Efforts to improve cooperation in the energy sphere have been undertaken, but the results have been rather unconvincing so far. Russia dislikes Chinese and Indian pipeline projects, which would undermine its near monopoly on the energy transportation infrastructure in Central Asia, while China, India, and the Central Asian states prefer to bypass Russia and trade energy directly among themselves. Furthermore, Sino-Indian competition for energy will grow if no reliable cooperation mechanism can be established. Although statistics indi- cate that RIC trade with the Central Asian countries is rather insignificant, China’s (and possibly India’s) growing economic influence worries Russia because it translates into political influence through Central Asia’s growing dependence on cheap Chinese imports. Nevertheless, RIC have institutionalized cooperation and consultation within the SCO and the Organization is growing in scope and importance. Therefore, it might be possible in the short term to mitigate competition among Russia, India, and China in Central Asia and even increase cooperation initiatives. As Ninvedita Das Kundu points out, “it will definitely have a positive impact on Asian security if their ties could be further improved and more countries are persuaded to observe (their) … principles (non-alliance and non-confrontation).”52

51 S. Varadarajan, “Six Propositions about World Order and the Role of Russia, India and China,” p. 40. 52 N. Das Kundu, op. cit., p. 14. 16 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 SOME ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEXES AS APPLIED TO STUDIES OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE

Jannatkhan EYVAZOV Ph.D. (Political Science), Deputy Director, Institute of Strategic Studies of the Caucasus, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Central Asia and the Caucasus (Baku, Azerbaijan)

Introduction

he first shoots of a new regional political which offers the most comprehensive and effec- system appeared in the post-Soviet space tive explanation of how the security sphere is T early in the 1990s, the previous hierarchi- developing in the post-Soviet macro-region. How- cal system of which became anarchical when the ever, its application creates several problems, an Soviet Union collapsed, while the key vectors of assessment of which belongs to the range of ques- security interdependence of the newly independ- tions raised in this article. ent states remained in place. Here I have attempted to assess the region- onstrated a classical approach to the security complex con- al system which is functioning across the post- ception. Much later, together with co-authors (B. Buzan, Soviet space from the point of view of the Theo- O. Wæver, J. De Wilde, Security. A New Framework for Analysis, Rienner Publishers Boulder, London, 1998; B. Bu- 1 ry of Regional Security Complexes (TRSC), zan, O. Wæver, Regions and Powers, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003), he made an attempt to go beyond the limits of the classical conception of the security concept. 1 In 1983, Barry Buzan formulated the conception of The authors introduced, among other things, two types of the regional security complex in his People, States and security complexes (homogeneous and heterogeneous) and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Rela- the securitization conception to remedy the current dispar- tions (Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1983). This, ages with the classical conception of the security complex, as well as the second edition of the same work (B. Buzan, such as concentrating on the military and political spheres of People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Se- relations or inadequate attention to the non-state actors, curity Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Second Edition, which also create additional vectors of inter-sectoral inter- Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder, Colorado, 1991), dem- dependence.

On the Regional Security Complex Concept

The regional security complex (RSC) model rests on the interdependence among the key national security interests of a geographically compact group of states. Barry Buzan identifies RSC as “a

17 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely, so that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.”2 The intrinsic interdependence of the security of states under the RSC model is generated in several dimensions, such as common and conflicting interests, interdependent behaviors, and interconnected perceptions. And, of course, all of this has a regional geographic foundation. “They (the security complexes.—J.E.) represent the way in which the sphere of concern that any state has about its environment, interacts with the linkage between the intensity of military and political threats, and the shortness of the range over which they are perceived. Because threats operate more potently over short distances, security interactions with neighbors will tend to have first priority.”3 The relations within RSC are determined not only by the geographic proximity of the states involved, but also by the anarchic nature of the international political system. In other words, RSC is a geographically limited and materially and perceptionally specific example of international anarchy with the corresponding internal amity/enmity relationships.4 The mutual perception of amity/enmity is the key to the dynamics of the security relations within RSC. Barry Buzan has written on this score: “…regional security subsystems can be seen in terms of patterns of amity and enmity that are substantially confined within some particular geographical area.”5 The TRSC offers various types and forms of regional complexes; the most general typology distinguishes between standard and centered RSC.6 According to Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, in the centered RSC, the dynamics of security relations are determined by one power found in its center.7 The authors go on to identify three forms (depending on the specifics of the central actor) of this type: centered on a great power—Russia in the post-Soviet space; on a superpower—the United States in North America; and, finally, on an institution (institutional RSC)—the European Union.8 Both types (standard and centered) are anarchic albeit to different degrees. In the standard RSC, which has a relatively balanced power structure, the participants are more autonomous when it comes to establishing bilateral relations. In the centered RSC, on the other hand, these relations are de facto regulated by the central actor either with the help of the classical use of force or through institutional mechanisms, while the participants remain de jure independent.

Collapse of the Soviet Union and Emergence of a New Regional Security System

In the context of RSC evolution, the collapse of the Soviet Union meant a transfer from a rigidly hierarchical single actor to an anarchically organized regional system, RSC, to be more exact. The TRSC does not envisage this stage in RSC development; according to the TRSC, changes in the security complex structure either change it or transform its inner dynamics, while preserving

2 B. Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 190. 3 Ibid., p. 191. 4 See: B. McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations, Cambridge Univer- sity Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 63. 5 B. Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 190. 6 See: B. Buzan, O. Wæver, op. cit., pp. 55-61. 7 See: Ibid., p. 55. 8 See: Ibidem. 18 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 the RSC structure intact. Regional political integration (several states merge into one political actor) can be described as the final point according to the first scenario.9 This transformation stems from the changes in the first component— the structure’s ordering principle. What K.N. Waltz has to say about the two types—anarchic and hierarchic—of this ordering10 corresponds to the RSC transformations described above. Anarchy as the main attribute of relations within the RSC develops into a hierarchy very close to that present inside the states. “Beyond security community lies regional integration which ends anarchy and, therefore, moves the regional security issues from the national and international to the domestic realm.”11 The TRSC says that structural changes may occur in the regional security system even if the general structure of the complex remains intact. They are based on the differences in the dynamics of the relations within any given RSC. A transfer from one level of dynamics development to another is stimulated by changes in the amity/enmity relations. As distinct from the previous scenario, in this case the regional system remains anarchically organized, while the changes are limited to the perceptional-behavioral component of regional interdependence. The TRSC offers a general model of these changes and identifies the initial, final, and intermediary levels (chaos-a regional conflict formation- security regime-security community).12 This means that RSC restoration as a result of the Soviet Union’s collapse does not completely fit the way the TRSC describes the development of the regional security systems, however this restoration can be explained. This theory presupposes that regional systems develop through evolution and that the transfer from one level to another is caused by internal sociopolitical, economic, and sociocultural development of the member states accompanied by corresponding stages of maturity in their relations. In our case, the Soviet Union’s emergence as an integrated actor in the first third of the 20th century was nothing more than the strongest actors taking over the weakest. The evolution of the RSC to the level of a security community was cut short in a “revolutionary” way by enforced amalgama- tion. Within the TRSC, this situation is described as “overlay.” The key material and perceptional- behavioral problems that unite regional social-political units into an interdependence web remained unresolved, while the security relations dynamics were suppressed by harsh administrative measures typical of the Soviet Union. This explains why the weakening and later disintegration of the command- control system at the turn of the 1990s restored the anarchical ordering of the political structure in this space and the functionality of interdependence of the central security interests of the newly independent states typical of the regional complex. The RSC that came into being in the post-Soviet space was very specific; its size and the structural and political features set it apart from standard RSCs within which security interests are closely connected because of geographic proximity13 and are localized by a geographically compact inter-

9 See: B. Buzan, O. Wæver, J. De Wilde, op. cit., p. 12. 10 K.N. Waltz uses the ordering of the international and domestic systems to explain the difference between the anarchic and hierarchic types of ordering (see: K.N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, McGraw-Hill, Boston, 1979, p. 88). 11 B. Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, pp. 218-219. 12 According to B. Buzan, in the conditions of chaos, the entire set of the security relations in the region is determined by enmity since each of the regional actors sees an enemy in the others. As distinct from the initial level, amity is possible even at the first intermediary level—regional conflict formations—dominated by conflict relations among the actors. At the next intermediary level—security regime—regional states cooperate in order to settle the conflicts and avoid a war; they rely on mutually acceptable forms of behavior to achieve security in their relations. At the final stage of the transfer within the functioning security complex and according to Buzan’s conception, a security community appears in which conflicts have been resolved to the extent that none of the members fears aggression from any of the other members of the community. 13 See: B. Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, pp. 188, 189, 191, 195. 19 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS state constellation, and in which “the security dynamics of the region are not dominated from the unipolar power at its center.”14 According to Buzan and Wæver, the regional system of the post-Soviet space is a “centered great power regional security complex.”15 At the same time, the newly independent states formed their own local inter-state systems—the regional security sub-complexes in the European part (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia; Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine); in the Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia), and in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). The regional sub-systems were relatively autonomous, however Russia preserved its function of a center which bound them together into a “web” interdependence of the Post-Soviet Security Macrocomplex (PSM). In this structure Russia was the only geopolitical actor that could consistently project its influence on the regional scale; it was the key security factor for all the newly independent states in all the sub-complexes. This meant that the development of local complexes and the dynamics of the security relations among the member states and their ties with the “external” centers of power were dependent not only on the endogenous factors but also on Russia’s geopolitical activities.

PSM Evolution: The Points Where TRSC Does Not Apply

We have agreed that, first, in the early 1990s the hierarchical structure of the Soviet Union was transformed into an anarchic structure and formed, to borrow what Buzan and Wæver have to say, a “centered great power regional security complex,” which here is called the Post-Soviet Security Macrocomplex. Second, at the time of its emergence the PSM consisted of Russia and four regional sub-complexes (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia; Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine; Azerbaijan, Arme- nia, and Georgia; and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). Its evolution, however, revealed several problems which cast doubt on the PSM idea. In the most general form they can be discussed within the PSM border issue. For example, one wonders, while assessing the Caucasian segment of the PSM, whether the Caucasus as a whole should be seen as the RSC or the RSC is limited to three independent states— Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia? It must be said that in the post-Soviet period several authors tried to apply the TRSC to the Caucasus16 ; some of them tended to include broad sections in the spatial-political borders of the security region. Bruno Coppieters has the following to say about the spatial outline of the Caucasian RSC: “Both the Transcaucasus and the North Caucasus may be thought of as parts of a larger security complex, comprising Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and part of Russia. The North Caucasus continues to play a decisive role in the future of the Transcaucasus and the Caucasian security complex as a whole.”17 Svante Cornell goes even further: “…the Caucasus is a region; but more than being a region, it is a security complex: the national security of one of the Caucasian states cannot realistically be consid-

14 B. Buzan, O. Wæver, op. cit., p. 55. 15 Ibid., pp. 55, 62, 343. 16 See: B. Coppieters, “Conclusions: The Caucasus as a Security Complex,” in: Contested Borders in the Caucasus, ed. by B. Coppieters, Vubpress, Brussels, 1996, pp. 193-204; S.E. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers. A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus, Curzon Press, Surrey, 2001; B. Buzan, O. Wæver, op. cit. 17 B. Coppieters, op. cit., p. 195. 20 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 ered apart from that of the other two. As far as the three regional powers (Russia, Turkey, and Iran.— J.E.) are concerned, the security of the Caucasus does have a direct bearing upon the national security of these states that justifies their inclusion into the security complex.”18 Indeed, the security interests of these powers are involved in the region; or to be more exact, we are talking about an interdependence between them and the Caucasian states which, in some cases, ties together the central (existential) security interests of the three power centers and the region. For example, Armenia’s territorial claims to Turkey19 and the perceived threats and historical insults caused by the 1915 events in the Ottoman Empire, which the Armenians call genocide, are an interdependence of this type. There is a fundamental interconnection between Iran and Azerbaijan created by the tens of millions of ethnic Azeris living in Iran in the territory which is called “Southern Azerbaijan.”20 In both cases, the reference is to the territory and population, two elements of the state’s physical base which cannot, by definition, be removed beyond the limits of the state’s key security interests. A similar problem in the European segment of PSM (Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine) is related to the closest geographical neighbors, former socialist allies which joined the EU (Poland and Ruma- nia). We can hardly ignore the obvious national kinship between Moldova and Rumania and the two states’ perceptional-behavioral interdependence based on it. It is also impossible to ignore the West- ern Ukraine and Western Belarus issue with their Catholic Slavic populations, while looking at the web of interdependence which ties Ukraine and Belarus with Poland. From this it follows that having accepted the above examples of interdependence between the PSM states’ security and “external” actors, we should treat not only Russia, but also Turkey and Iran (the Caucasian segment) as parts of the PSM, as well as Poland and Rumania, at least, in the European segment. Iran (with the ethnic Turkmen who live as a compact group in its northern part and a score of still unsettled Caspian problems) should be included in the Central Asian sub-complex together with China (because of the “Uighur factor”). According to the TRSC, it is hardly realistic to expect that these actors can be treated as parts of the corresponding regional PSM sub-complexes; the theory rules out what is called “overlapping membership.”21 In other words, one and the same actor cannot belong to two or more RSCs. Hence Turkey and Iran, as elements of the Mid-Eastern RSC, and Poland and Rumania, as part of the Euro- pean (institutional) RSC, cannot belong to the PSM. The theory describes any power’s actual involvement in interactions within different complexes as “overlay” or “penetration.”22 It goes without saying that at the theoretical level, any discussion of regionalization in any sphere (the security sphere in our case) calls for a clear delimitation between regional systems. When identifying a constellation of geographically close states as RSC, the TRSC proceeds from the assumption that security interdependence among the constellation’s parts is much stronger than between them and the external actors.23 Regional complexes are separated by what is described as a zone of “relative indifference,”24 otherwise any regionalization theory becomes senseless. A power might be involved

18 S.E. Cornell, op. cit., p. 391. 19 Armenia claims an eastern part of Turkey called Western Armenia associated with the parts of the Ottoman Em- pire populated by Armenians. Today they are the vilayets of Erzurum, Van, Agri, Hakkari, Muº, Bitlis, Siirt, Diyarbekir, Erzincçan, Bingöl, Malatya, Sivas, Amasya, Tokat, and part of Giresun (see: Istoria Osmanskogo gosudarstva, obshchestva i tsivilizatsii, ed. by E. Ihsanoglu, Transl. from the Turkish, Vol. 1, Vostochnaya literatura Publishers, Moscow, 2006, p. 87 (History of the Ottoman State, Society & Civilization, ed. by Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, Istanbul, 2001). 20 Under the Treaty of Turkmanchay of 1828, the territory of Azerbaijan was divided between the Russian Empire and Iran and came to be known as Northern and Southern Azerbaijan. 21 B. Buzan, O. Wæver, op. cit., p. 48. 22 Ibid., p. 49. 23 See: Ibid., pp. 47-48. 24 B. Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 193. 21 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS in the security processes in several RSCs but, according to the TRSC, it can belong to only one regional system; in all other cases, it is a free geopolitical player involved in regional interactions in pursuance of its own interests. The extent to which the actor depends on regional interaction or, to be more exact, the extent to which these interests are important, is of vital significance. What if the interests concentrated in an “alien” RSC are of an existential nature for it and there are stable amity/enmity perceptions between it and the states of the regional complex which might provoke consistent regional activities? This brings to mind, once more, Turkey and Iran with their potential PSM involvement described above. The same question arises when one considers the Baltic region after its integration into the EU. If interpreted within the TRSC, the current security system in the Baltic region (with Latvia, Lithua- nia, and Estonia being EU members) does not give grounds to say that their security ties within the European Union are less important or looser than with the Russian Federation and other PSM elements. It would be wrong to believe, on the other hand, that integration has destroyed the security interdependence between the “new Europeans” and the post-Soviet space. Besides, the Baltic precedent makes it next to impossible to exclude its repetition with other PSM states. Afghanistan can be described as another digression from the PSM idea (in the Central Asian segment). Should this state be regarded as part of the Central Asian PSM sub-complex? Within the PSM conception, Afghanistan does not fit the structure of the local RSCs in Central Asia. Buzan regards it as unrelated to any of the regional systems; it is an “insulator”25 which sepa- rates one RSC from another, that is, a segment of the “relative indifference” zone wedged between the security complexes of Central Asia and South Asia. Today, however, this approach can be accepted with a certain amount of doubt. Indeed, today, the country can be hardly described as an independent and homogeneous actor to the extent sufficient at least for the securitization and creation of common (all-Afghan) security interests in relation to its neighbors. It entered the post-Cold War period in a state of political chaos and inner fragmentation; the civil war between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance was going on and was responsible for the country’s continued fragmentation. Chaos survived in the post-Taliban period and was intensified by the presence of foreign armed forces in its territory; we can hardly regard it as an actor. This period in the history of Afghanistan and the question of whether it belongs to any of the regional complexes directly refers to one of the two main problems of identifying RSCs which Buzan described as: “…in some areas local states are so weak that their power does not project much, if at all, beyond their own boundaries. These states have domestically directed security perspectives, and there is not enough security interaction between them to generate a local complex.”26 In the Central Asian space, Afghanistan looks like one of the weak states described by Buzan; while all the other states (even Tajikistan which lived through a civil war at the dawn of its independence) can be described as relatively more stable, their perceptions and security interests being oriented toward the outside world. At the same time, there are enough weighty arguments which allow us to count the country among the members of the Central Asian RSC if we look at the region “not from Afghanistan” but from the other members of the same complex. The thesis of the “relative indifference” zone can be used as an argument in favor of Afghanistan’s inclusion in the Central Asian RSC. According to the TRSC, the borders of the regional complexes are formed by “relative indifference” zones, while security interde-

25 B. Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 193; B. Buzan, O. Wæver, op. cit., p. 41. 26 B. Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 197. 22 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 pendence inside the RSCs is much stronger than between them and the “external” states,27 including the “insulators” which form the “indifference” zone. Interdependence, however, cannot be one-sided by definition; the same is true of securitization and involvement for the sake of the interests of security. If we agree that Afghanistan, for any internal reason, in particular because of its weakness as a state, does not concentrate its interests on its Central Asian neighbors and does not adjust its behavior accordingly, we should not think that the RSC members are equally uninterested in Afghanistan. From the very first day the RSC appeared in Central Asia, its members have regarded Afghanistan as a source of existential security threats and behaved accordingly in relation to their southern neighbor. They are interdependent at least in an ethnoterritorial sense (the northern part of Afghanistan is populated by Tajiks and Uzbeks) and by the so-called new threats: drug trafficking, religious radicalism, etc. This interdependence is objective, however the post-Soviet newly independent states are more aware of this than Afghan- istan. This and the possibility that these perceptions (in Afghanistan in particular) will increase fit the securitization conception well. Moreover, despite its current dependent and fairly pronounced amorphous conditions, Afghan- istan is moving toward stronger statehood and a vertical of political power. This and the prospect of it becoming stronger, which will allow it to build up its potential of power projection, will help create a stronger security concept and reorient securitization from internal to external phenomena and processes. This will boost the perceptional-behavioral aspects of interdependence between it and the post- Soviet Central Asian states. On the whole, current globalization and post-industrialism are pulling the rug out from under the “insulator-state” concept. Afghanistan and Mongolia (another “insulator” state according to Bu- zan), which historically belongs to Central Asia, serve as examples that this function is largely determined by the specifics of their internal development. The further a state has advanced toward post- modernity, the fewer the reasons to describe it as an “insulator.” This is fairly obvious because it presupposes its closer economic, social, cultural, and political interdependence with other states.

On PSM Transformation

The TRSC thesis on the “centered great power regional security complex” has been accepted as a model of the regional security system the post-Soviet space assumed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is equally obvious that including other powers besides Russia in these subsystems may de- value the PSM idea; this is true, however, only if we treat it as a relatively static system. When talking about the present security system across the post-Soviet space we should proceed from its fairly pronounced dynamism and unsteady nature. The Baltic states, in particular, prove that structural transformations are possible. Even if we agree with the TRSC that “overlapping membership” is impossible, we cannot exclude, in principle, a reorientation of Turkey and Iran’s security interests toward Central Eurasia, which might be needed for their involvement into the region’s security system. Since the TRSC does not regard the regional systems as static units, the principle of staticity should not necessarily be applied to regional concentration of the powers’ security interests. The TRSC’s mechanisms of securitization make it possible to expect these developments. Bu- zan and Wæver have the following to say about RSC seen through the prism of this mechanism: “A set

27 Ibid., p. 193. 23 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS of units whose major processes of securitization, de-securitization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another.”28 In the theoretical-methodological respect, the securitization phenomenon allows the TRSC to rise from the “Procrustean bed” of positivism. In other words, Waltz’s structure or, to be more exact, distribution of power in the system is not the main stimulator of the elements’ behavior. It is not the main trigger of securitization as well. As a relative phenomenon, the latter wholly depends on the actor: “Different actors securitize differently: different political and cultural situations enable securitization in different sectors and they have different dynamics.”29 While the central security interests of any actor are the product of the securitization process unfolding under the impact of numerous factors, any changes in these factors might transform the interests; hence they might become oriented toward an “alien” political space. The geopolitical processes underway in Eurasia display dynamism and changeability which generate factors conducive to shifts in the interests of the Eurasian powers. The outlines can be discerned: the deepening energy crisis has already readjusted securitization in this sphere and stimulated interstate competition in Eurasia. It can be said that under the pressure of securitization of the energy, migration, and other non-traditional threats, the European Union has become a holder of clearly formulated security interests concentrated on the post-Soviet space.

Conclusion

Early in the 1990s, the hierarchically arranged Soviet system was replaced with a developing anarchic regional security system, a process which received its fullest interpretation in the Theory of the Regional Security Complexes. It talks about the system which emerged in the post-Soviet space as “centered great power regional security complex,” the structure of which was formed (at the initial stage) by Russia and four sub-complexes (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia; Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine; Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia; and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). PMS’s further development revealed that not everything in the system of the post-Soviet space can be explained with the help of the TRSC. Today, when the security interests of the neighboring powers (Turkey, Iran, and China) are also involved in the PSM complexes, when the EU expanded to include the states of the Baltic RSC, and in view of the mounting dependence of the security interests of the states of the Central Asian sub-complex on Afghanistan, it has become much harder to identify the exact borders of the PSM. This speaks of instability of the present PSM structure, which provides more opportunities to consider it as a transition stage in the development of the security system in the post-Soviet mac- roregion.

28 B. Buzan B., O. Wæver, op. cit., p. 44. 29 Ibid., p. 87. 24 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 BORDER LEGALIZATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A REGIONAL SECURITY FACTOR IN CENTRAL ASIA

Inomzhon BOBOKULOV Ph.D. (Law), Doctoral Candidate at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy (Tashkent, Uzbekistan)

Introduction

he rapid changes occurring in today’s world it is “the most appropriate moral answer to terri- cannot help but have an impact on the tra- torial conflicts.”2 In contrast to other methods for T ditional perception of the state’s role in in- determining the border line (historical, geograph- ternational relations. While criticizing the princi- ical, economic, ethnic, etc.) or territorial title, le- ple of state sovereignty (as the central idea of gal regulations establish the boundaries of state statehood) and presenting numerous facts testify- power over the specified territory. Borders form ing to its erosion, contemporary researchers are an essential part of the structure of rules and in- coming up with alternative conceptions such as stitutions that enable separate political communi- “a world without borders,” “the end of geogra- ties to coexist.3 phy,” and so on. An analysis of the current state of interstate However, at the current stage of globaliza- practice in Central Asia (CA) shows that in addition, the border is still one of the most important tion to the distribution of shared hydropower re- fundamental principles of the inviolability of a sources, settlement of the Afghan crisis, and com- state’s territorial integrity, that is, an indispensible bating current threats to security, unresolved bor- condition of its existence. Despite all the assertions der and territorial issues are the most urgent prob- of a “decline in sovereignty,” at the beginning of lems of international law hindering the creation the 21st century, “thousands are prepared to die for of the necessary conditions for establishing mu- the creation of new state borders.”1 tually advantageous cooperation in the region. From the perspective of international law, In our opinion, the following three main the border, while helping to prevent interstate con- factors can be singled out among the factors pro- flicts, on the one hand, is a factor in their emer- moting delimitation and demarcation of state bor- gence, on the other. ders in CA. As a rule, territorial disputes arise between n First, the fact that independent entities of states over title to a particular territory (or part of international law—newly independent it). International law maintains the territorial sta- states—have formed in the region. tus quo and strengthens international security; and

2 M.G. Kohen, “International Law is the Most Appro- 1 A. Hurrell, “International Law and the Making and priate Moral Answer to Territorial Conflicts,” Geopolitics Unmaking of Boundaries,” in: States, Nations and Bor- (London), Vol. 6, No. 2, 2001, p. 169. ders: Ethics of Making Boundaries, ed. by A. Buchanan, 3 See: R.Y. Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in M. Moore, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, International Law, Manchester University Press, Manches- p. 287. ter, 1963, p. 2 (quoted from: A. Hurrell, op. cit., p. 279). 25 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

n Second, the emergence of cross-border reinforce the state borders, which was threats that make the CA borders vulner- with no doubt related to the contractual able. Almost all of the joint intergovern- and legal definition of their status. mental commissions on border delimita- n Third, the need to prevent the emergence tion were established when the well- of territorial disputes, enforce legal reg- known Batken, Sariasiya, and Bostanlyk ulation of the status of rented land, ensure events occurred in 1999-2000. Aggrava- communication between enclaves and the tion of the situation dictated the need to mainland, and so on.

Principles of uti possidetis and the Inviolability of Frontiers

Two principles of international law—uti possidetis (“as you possess”) and the inviolability of frontiers—have played a significant role in preserving stability in CA. The borders of the newly independent states that emerged in the post-Soviet expanse were defined in keeping with the uti possidetis principle of international law,4 which “is logically connected with the phenomenon of the obtaining of independence, wherever it occurs. Its obvious purpose is to prevent the independence and stability of new States being endangered…”5 This principle freezes the territorial title and applies to the State as it is, i.e., to the “photograph” of the territorial situation then existing.6 At first, the uti possidetis principle was customarily used in international practice with respect to land borders; later it was also applied to maritime borders. Referring to the decision of the U.N. International Court, many researchers say that it also applies to internal water areas and lakes.7 In contrast to Iran, which adheres to the condominium principle, that is, joint possession and execution of sovereignty based on agreements that were entered before the new ones were signed, the position of the newly independent states of the Caspian Region (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turk- menistan) is based on “the principle of continuity of territorial inheritance—uti possidetis.”8 In so doing, it should be noted that the uti possidetis principle cannot always serve as an effective legal means for resolving the border problems that arise between new states. To a certain extent this is due to the fact that, as a rule, the successor states do not always inherit “firmly established and appropriately secured frontiers,”9 which, as we know, should coincide with the resettlement of different ethnicities. The principle of inviolability of the state border was enforced for the first time at the regional level in the Final Act of the CSCE in 1975. Today, this principle constitutes one of the most fundamental principles of European (regional) and international security. The newly independent states of the post-Soviet expanse recognized the importance of this principle from the very beginning; it was enforced in the founding documents of the CIS as the legal basis of the interrelations among the Commonwealth’s participating States.10

4 See: N. Polat, Boundary Issues in Central Asia, Transnational Publishers, New York, 2002, p. 46. 5 International Court of Justice, Reports, 1986, p. 565. 6 See: Ibid., p. 568. 7 See: F. Humbatov, “On the Applicability of the Uti Possidetis Juris Principle During Delimitation of the Caspian Sea among the Littoral States,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 6 (60), 2009. 8 Ibidem. 9 B.M. Klimenko, A.A. Pork, Territoria i granitsa SSSR, Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia, Moscow, 1985, p. 90. 10 In particular, the Alma-Ata declaration of the Commonwealth of Independent States, available at [http://www. cis.minsk.by/main.aspx?uid=178] and the Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States of 22 January, 1993, available at [http://www.cis.minsk.by/main.aspx?uid=176]. 26 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011

In contrast to uti possidetis, the legal potentialities of the principle of inviolability of frontiers are much broader. Its provisions not only ensure recognition of the existing administrative borders, but are also aimed at preventing physical encroachments on them. The principle of inviolability of frontiers states that: 1) The participating States regard the existing frontiers as legally established in compliance with international law. 2) They will refrain now and in the future from assaulting these frontiers. 3) They will also refrain from any demand for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of part or all of the territory of the participating States.11 The principle of inviolability of frontiers has become the foundation for establishing interstate relations; moreover, its application has reduced the possibility of a serious conflict situation emerging between CA states (as has happened in several post-colonial regions of the world).

The Present State of and Problems in Interstate Relations on the Delimitation and Demarcation of the CA’s External Borders

Both the external and the internal borders of the CA states have been subjected to contractual and legal registration. With respect to the existing (established) state borders, the legal status of their separate disputed sections had to be defined. Turning the frontiers of administrative-territorial divisions into full-fledged borders of entities of international law was also envisaged. The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRA),12 the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI),13 and the Peo- ple’s Republic of China (PRC)14 are situated along the perimeter of Central Asia’s external borders. These borders, which were established in the second half of the 19th century, long served as the line separating “the former Union republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan” from the outside world.15 Their international legal status has been defined with sufficient clarity in corresponding agreements entered among the competing British, Russian, and Qing empires and later between the U.S.S.R., the U.K., China, and the above-mentioned states.

11 See: Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Helsinki, 1 August, 1975, available at [http://www.ena.lu/]. 12 The total length of the frontier between the Central Asian states and Afghanistan amounts to more than 2,000 km; 156 km of which are with Uzbekistan; 744 km with Turkmenistan, and 1,206 with Tajikistan. 13 Of the Central Asian states, only Turkmenistan has a land border (approx. 1,000 km) with the IRI. 14 The total length of the border of the Central Asian states with the PRC amounts to 3,150 km; 1,782 km of which are with Kazakhstan, 1,072 with Kyrgyzstan, and 450 km with Tajikistan, Renmin ribao, 26 April, 1996 (quoted from: A. Khojaev, Kitaiskiy factor v Tsentralnoi Azii, Fan, Tashkent, 2007, p. 135; N. Kerimbekova, V. Galitskiy, “On the State Border between Kyrgyzstan and China,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 5 (17), 2002). 15 It should be noted that many present-day problems relating to international legal registration of the state borders in Central Asia have historical roots. The Big Geopolitical Game between empires has made its contribution to violating the logic of administrative-territorial management of the region and a conflict-prone potential has been introduced (see: A. Prokhorov, K voprosu o sovetsko-kitaiskoi granitse, Moscow, 1975; A. Khojaev, op. cit.; W. Raczka, “Xinjiang and its Central Asian Borderlands,” Central Asian Survey (London), Vol. 17, No. 3, September 1998; F. Tolipov, “Granitsy gosudarstva i granitsy samoopredeleniia: politika bezopasnosti i politika natsionalizma v Tsentralnoi Azii,” Khukuk. Pravo. Law (Tashkent), No. 4 (20), 2000, and others). 27 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

But when the newly independent states appeared in CA, several loopholes were found in the contractual-legal definition of the border line. This primarily applies to resolving the problems the states of the region inherited from the past regimes regarding the disputed sections of border with the PRC. Between 1960 and the end of the 1980s, the Soviet Union and China exerted active efforts to delimit and demarcate their state borders. But the Union republics bordering on the PRC were not included in the talks16 held mainly by the foreign ministries of both states under the supervision of the Center.17 By the time the Soviet Union disintegrated, these talks were still going on. The PRC decided that settling border issues was the best way to establish relations with the newly independent Central Asian states. Talks on the disputed sections of the common border began in 1992. The same year, Kazakhstan and the PRC adopted a joint decision on common principles for settling border issues; the principles set forth in the document formed the basis for China’s talks with Kyr- gyzstan and Tajikistan.18 The sides preliminarily agreed that there were 19 disputed border sections constituting a total area of approximately 34,000 sq. km.19 China put forward several demands as an indispensible prerequisite for continuing the talks with the newly independent Central Asian states: mandatory recognition of the line of the Soviet- Chinese border agreed upon in the past; resolution of the problems on a bilateral basis (with each of the former Union republics); reduction in the size of border troops, and so on. Moreover, protection of the border was to be carried out by the forces of the Central Asian republics, that is, without Russia’s participation. But the bilateral format for holding the talks proposed by the Chinese side did not meet the interests of the CA states for the following reasons. n First, as mentioned above, the talks on defining the state border line were held without the direct participation of the Central Asian republics. So the states of the region could not ac- quaint themselves with the necessary documental and archive sources (minutes of the talks, maps, and so on) that were used by way of proof for legalizing the border. n Second, compared with China, which has a thousand-year state history and is a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, the newly independent Central Asian states did not have the necessary diplomatic experience in holding talks.20 So an alternative mechanism envisaging the participation of a united delegation of the CA states and Russia was offered for holding talks with the PRC. In 1993, a committee was formed for discussing and drawing up drafts of agreements on border issues. This committee was created within the framework of a working group formed in accordance with an agreement (adopted in September 1992 during the talks with China) on creating a united delegation of the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan for continuing the border talks with the PRC.

16 In accordance with Union legislation, the borders of the Union republics were defined as the state borders of the U.S.S.R. Consequently, border issues with neighboring states were resolved by the supreme bodies of the U.S.S.R. (see: U.S.S.R. Law on the State Border (quoted from: B.M. Klimenko, A.A. Pork, op. cit., p. 226). 17 See: “T. Usubaliev vystupil protiv oppozitsii i za territorialnye ustupki Kitaiu,” Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 16 May, 2002. 18 An agreement was reached with Kyrgyzstan on 6 May, 1992 and with Tajikistan on 11 March, 1993 (see: Xing Guangcheng, “Security Issues in China’s Relations with Central Asian States,” in: Ethnic Challenges beyond Border: Chi- nese and Russian Perspectives of the Central Asian Conundrum, ed. by Y. Zhang, R. Azizian, Macmillan, London, 1998, p. 208 — quoted from: N. Polat, op.cit., pp. 38-39). 19 See: SWB FE/1666 A 1/5, 15 April, 1993 (quoted from: N. Polat, op. cit., p. 39). 20 When emphasizing the importance of regulating the Chinese-Kyrgyz border in the context of Kyrgyzstan’s national security, Deputy of the Zhokorgu Kenesh T. Usubaliev noted that “Kyrgyzstan must have friendly relations with the PRC, which has a population of 1 billion 300 million people and a multi-million army” (Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 16 May, 2002).

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At present, the legal status of the disputed border sections between the PRC and the CA states has essentially been determined; a corresponding agreement between Kazakhstan and China was reached in November 1999.21 During regulation of the disputed sections, Kyrgyzstan entered three agreements: two in July 1996 and another (additional) in August 1999. By 2001, the sides had resolved all the disputed issues and completed delimitation of the state border. On 10 May, 2002, ten years of efforts by both states resulted in the signing of a Memorandum on Demarcation of the State Border Line.22 An agreement was reached between Tajikistan and the PRC at the beginning of 2011; the size and length of the borders of the disputed territories are what made its adoption such a long and ardu- ous process. In particular, China made demands on more than 300 km of the Tajik-Chinese border,23 which amounted to 28,000 of the 34,000 sq. km of disputed territory between the PRC and the CA states. Another factor was the civil war in Tajikistan, which prevented the republic from taking direct part in resolving the regional problems (including within the framework of the Shanghai Five). An Agreement on the Tajik-Chinese State Border (1999) and an additional Agreement on Demarcation of the Border and Settlement of Territorial Disputes (2002) were signed between the PRC and Tajikistan. On 12 January, 2011, the republic’s parliament ratified an intergovernmental memorandum, according to which approximately 3% of the 28,000 sq. km of disputed territory between the two states was transferred to the jurisdiction of the PRC.24 Thus, definition of the legal status of the borders in this part of the CA was completed. Defining the international legal status of the Caspian Sea was one of the most urgent issues with respect to delimitation and demarcation of the external borders of the CA republics; two out of the five regional states (Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) have direct access to it. The international legal status of the Caspian Sea was defined by the agreements of 1921 and 1940 between the Soviet Union and Iran, while the maritime borders were determined only between these states. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the number of Caspian states increased to five (Azerbai- jan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Russia, and Iran), which gave rise to the objective need to re-examine the status of the Caspian Sea. For this purposes, in 1996, a joint Special Working Group was instituted to draw up a Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea; Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Russia (three of the five Caspian states) settled their territorial disputes on a bilateral basis by entering agreements on the delimitation of maritime zones.25 According to an opinion popular among internationalist lawyers, the provisions of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 should be used to define the international legal status of the Caspian Sea. However, official Tehran, referring to the special status of the Caspian Sea (which is the largest lake in the world), does not think the provisions of the 1982 Convention apply; since 1991, Iran’s standpoint on this issue has remained unchanged.

21 This agreement was preceded by the Treaty on the State Border between the two states of 26 April, 1994 and additional agreements signed in July 1996, September 1997 and July 1998 (see: Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 11 March, 1999). 22 See: A. Khojaev, op. cit., p. 140. 23 See: V. Kasymbekova, “Kak uregulirovat territorialnye spory. Tadzhikskiy opyt,” 30 April, 2009, available at [http:// www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1241090940]. 24 See: O. Gritsenko, “Tadzhikistan zakonchil tsarskiy spor s Kitaem,” available at [http://www.centrasia.ru/ newsA.php?st=1294994040]; A. Dakli, “Tadzhikistan ustupaet 1 tys. kv. km Kitaiu,” available at [http://www.centrasia.ru/ newsA.php?st=1295129040]. 25 In 1998, Kazakhstan and Russia entered an agreement on demarcating the bed of the northern part of the Caspian Sea and signed a memorandum to it in 2002. A similar agreement (2001) and memorandum (2003) were entered between Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. On 14 May, 2003, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Russia signed an agreement on the point of intersection of the lines delimiting the contiguous sections of the bed of the Caspian Sea (see: “Text of the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea is 70-80% ready—Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” available at [http:/ /xronika.az/sng/print:page,1,3423-tekst-konvencii-o-pravovom-statuse-kaspijskogo.html]). 29 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

The IRI, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan (four of the five Caspian states) have not yet acceded to the above-mentioned agreements. Iran suggests dividing the Caspian Sea and its bed equally among the Caspian countries (that is, 20% to each of the littoral states),26 which the neighboring states do not agree with. If we proceed from the present political reality, the borders between CA and the Russian Feder- ation should be recognized as external, while during the time of the Soviet Union they were of an administrative-territorial nature. Of all the Central Asian republics, only Kazakhstan had a common border of more than 7,500 km with the Russian Federation (the longest land border in the world); its international legal registration proved to be a difficult process.27 Delimitation of the land border of the two states was enforced by the Agreement on the Russian-Kazakhstan State Border of 18 January, 2005. The creation of a joint demarcation commission in 2007 meant the beginning of the final phase in the contractual and legal registration of this part of the region’s borders.28 Legalization under international law of the border of each of the states taken separately could serve as the topic of an independent scientific study. So in this article we decided to restrict ourselves to an analysis of legalization of the state border of the Republic of Uzbekistan with its neighboring countries.

Uzbekistan— Other CA Countries

Uzbekistan is situated in the heart of Central Asia and borders on all the regional states.29 As of the present, the contractual-legal registration of the state border of Uzbekistan with three of the states bordering on it—Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan—has been completed. In the case of Afghanistan, the international agreements entered by the predecessor state retain their legal force on the basis of legal succession and are applied to the regulation of interrelations in this area.30 Corresponding agreements on delimitation and demarcation of the state border were en-

26 See: Iran Wants Equal Caspian Division of Waters, Seabed [http://www.upi.com/Science_News/Resource-Wars/ 2009/10/09/Iran-wants-equal-Caspian-division-of-waters-seabed/UPI-10581255113679/]. 27 The total length of the Kazakhstan state border amounts to approximately 14,000 km; 7,590 km of which are with the RF, 2,376 km with Uzbekistan, 1,782 with China, 1,241 km with Kyrgyzstan, 426 km with Turkmenistan, and 600 km of maritime borders along the Caspian Sea (see: E. Idrisov, “Uztoichivye tranitsy—zalog stabilnosti gosudarstva,” Diplo- maticheskiy kurier (Publication of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan—Astana), No. 1, 2000, p. 101; “Delimitatsia i demarkatsia gosudarstvennoi granitsy,” available at [http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/ru/ content/policy/issues/delimitation]). 28 Information on delimitation and demarcation of the state border of the Russian Federation, available at [http://www. rosgranitsa.ru/about/international/countries/delimitation]. 29 The total length of the state border of the Republic of Uzbekistan amounts to approximately 7,000 km; 2,376 km with Kazakhstan, 1,878 km with Turkmenistan, 1,283 with Tajikistan, 1,295 with Kyrgyzstan, and 156 km with Afghani- stan. The data regarding the length of the state border line are not final. During delimitation and demarcation, they could undergo certain changes. 30 The legal regime of the state border between the Republic of Uzbekistan and Afghanistan has been established by the Agreement on Border Issues (1946), the Treaty on the Regime of the Soviet-Afghan State Border (1958), the Treaty on Friendship, Good-Neighborly Relations, and Cooperation (1978), and the Agreement on the Status and Procedure for Op- erating and Maintaining the Road and Rail Bridge over the Amu Darya River (1982), and so on (see: P.A. Makkambaev, “Pravovoi rezhim Gosudarstvennoi granitsy Respubliki Uzbekistan i problemy ego sovershenstvovania: Synopsis of thesis for a candidate of law,” University of World Economy and Diplomacy, Tashkent, 1997, pp. 16-17).

30 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 tered with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. As for Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, delimitation of their joint border with Uzbekistan has entered the final phase. Turkmenistan was the first neighboring state with which Uzbekistan reached an agreement on delimitation of the state border. The Memorandum of the Intergovernmental Commission on Delim- itation set forth the absence of mutual territorial demands and recognition by the sides of the former inter-republican administrative border as the state frontier. On 22 September, 2000, the Treaty between the Republic of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan on Delimitation of the State Border was entered on its basis.31 It should be noted that as early as 16 January, 1996, an Agreement on Cooperation in Protection of the State Border was signed between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. From the viewpoint of preserving regional stability and security, two provisions of this document deserve special attention. 1. The Agreement confirmed recognition by the Sides of the border line on the basis of the administrative-territorial delimitation of the former Uzbek S.S.R. and Turkmen S.S.R. 2. Effective interception of the penetration of terrorist groups and other criminal elements, as well as the illicit transfer of weapons, was defined as the main objective of the international legal act.32 The Treaty on Delimitation not only enforced these provisions, it also had a positive effect on developing the legal base for ensuring border security. In our opinion, the key provision of the above-mentioned treaty is confirmation by the sides of the absence of any territorial demands against each other and settlement of all issues relating to drawing the state border line between the two neighboring states.33 This same document paved the way to the talks on demarcation of the state border in correspondence with topographical maps and drawing the border line between the two states based on their descriptions.34 In so doing, it should be noted that in addition to the contractual-legal registration of the Uzbek- Turkmen state border, there were also several other urgent bilateral cooperation issues concerning the operation of waterworks situated in the territory of Turkmenistan,35 entry and exit procedures for residents of border districts, and so on. These issues are still on the agenda and are discussed at meetings of the heads of state. Delimitation of the Uzbek-Kazakh border was carried out in two stages—from 1999 to 2001 and from 2001 to 2002. During these periods, the joint commission on regulation of the legal status of the common border created in 1999 drew up and adopted an agreement and two complementary documents were entered. On 16 November, 2001, an Agreement on Delimitation of the State Border was signed, which meant that the sides had come to terms on 96% of the common border line. But another extremely acute problem relating to the territorial title of several border population settlements (approximately

31 See: “Resolution of the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Ratification of the Treaty between the Re- public of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan on Delimitation of the State Border No. 176-II of 15 December, 2000,” Legislation Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan (Tashkent), No. 11, 2000, p. 167. 32 See: Agreement between the Republic of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan on Cooperation in the Protection of the State Border, Arts 1 and 3, Current Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan. 33 See: Treaty between the Republic of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan on Delimitation of the State Border, Art 1, Current Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan. 34 See: Treaty between the Republic of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan on Delimitation of the State Border, Art 4, Current Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan. 35 The matter concerns such canals of interstate significance as the main Karshi and the Amu-Bukhara canals. In addition to the border population of Uzbekistan, they are used by certain districts of Turkmenistan.

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4% of the joint border) still had to be resolved. Their legal status was defined by entering a Treaty on Separate Sections of the Uzbek-Kazakh State Border on 9 September, 2002. The Treaty envisaged that the village of Bagys and the district of the Arnasai reservoir (where ethnic Kazakhs compactly resided) belonged to Kazakhstan. Areas of the Southern Kazakhstan and Kzyl-Orda regions of Kazakhstan, which are mainly populated by ethnic Uzbeks, were used in land swap deals; the village of Turkestanets remained under the jurisdiction of Uzbekistan.36 So the residents of the CA countries were given the opportunity to exercise the right of option (choose their citizenship in the event of a change in the state affiliation of a territory in compliance with international law). Gradual settlement of the issues and taking into account the will of the residents of the border districts is having a very favorable effect on the relations among the states of the region. In February 2003, the Joint Commission approved a plan for demarcating the Uzbek-Kazakh state border, and in the spring of 2004, the sides began field work to designate the state border. Within the framework of the Joint Commission on Delimitation of the Uzbek-Tajik State Bor- der formed in 2000, the sides agreed to proceed from the decision of the Presidiums of the Supreme Soviets of the Tajik S.S.R. and Uzbek S.S.R. adopted in 1961. This was a very important step with respect to coordinating the sides’ standpoints regarding the regulatory-legal basis of border legalization. In October 2002, at a meeting of the heads of state of the members of the Central Asian Coop- eration Organization held in Dushanbe, a Treaty on the Uzbek-Tajik State Border was signed. This document was highly appraised by the leaders of the region’s countries. The Uzbek-Tajik treaty came into force on 24 March, 2009. In accordance with its provisions, the sides approved the line of most of the state border between the two states. The next stage in the work of the intergovernmental commission will be completing delimitation of the remaining small sections and demarcation of the Uzbek-Tajik state border.37 According to official data, the Uzbek-Tajik intergovernmental commission is currently working to establish the border line of the remaining sections, which are less than 60 km in length.38 Studies show that the strongest contradictions in current interstate relations of the CA countries with respect to contractual-legal registration of the state border are found within the Uzbekistan-Kyr- gyzstan-Tajikistan triangle. This is explained not only by legal problems, but also by issues largely related to the historical and physical-geographical features of the region. n First, it should be noted that since the national-territorial demarcation carried out in the 1920- 1930s, territorial title to specific sections of the border has remained one of the controversial issues in the interrelations of the former Union republics. This situation was aggravated even further by the existing practice of transferring territory from one republic to another for land tenure, building industrial facilities, and so on. The activity of commissions engaged in land swaps has not always led to the desirable results. n Second, there is no coordination in defining the legal foundations for regulating border problems, which is particularly characteristic of Uzbek-Kyrgyz relations. For example, Uzbekistan proposes proceeding from national-territorial demarcation; the Kyrgyz side, on the other hand,

36 See: The President of Kazakhstan meets with the President of Uzbekistan (according to the information of President.kz), available at [http://missions.itu.int/~kazaks/rus/archive/0209/n0209a.htm]. 37 See: Treaty on the Uzbek-Tajik State Border comes into force, available at [http://mfa.uz/rus/pressa_i_media_servis/ news/250309r_1.mgr]. 38 See: Cooperation between the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan, available at [http:// www.mfa.tj/index.php?node=article&id=498]). 32 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011

refers to the provisions of later documents that did not go through the corresponding approval procedure by competent republican and Union structures.39 n Third, contractual-legal registration of the state border is complicated by the existing objective physical-geographical and demographic conditions. The thing is that the most of the common border line among Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan requiring legalization runs through the Ferghana Valley. According to researchers, this sub-region is the “geopolitical nucleus” and “Achilles’ heel” of Central Asian security. National-territorial demarcation in the Ferghana Valley is a Central Asian reality with its cultural, ethnic, and linguistic communality and, at the same time, diversity. n Fourth, definition of the status of state borders under international law is closely related to resolving other problems, to which such issues as the efficient operation of joint transport routes, water use, trade development, and so on also apply. n Fifth, delimitation and demarcation of the state border of the three neighboring states is significantly complicated by the existence of enclaves, and they are all (8) situated in the Fer- ghana Valley: Barak (Kyrgyzstan) is on Uzbek territory, the enclaves of Uzbekistan (Sokh, Shakhimardan, Tosh-tepa, and Chongara) and Tajikistan (Vorukh and Kalacha) are on Kyr- gyz territory, and Sarvak (Tajikistan) is in the Pap district of the Namangan Region of Uz- bekistan. So another positive step in resolving regional problems could be entering a corresponding agreement on the status of the enclaves existing in CA under international law. In so doing, in contrast to the agreement on border delimitation, which directly regulates the legal status of the state border line, this document should contain an entire set of issues relating to the vital activity of the enclave: provision of a transport corridor, state border protection issues, deployment of military contingents, and so on.

Conclusion

Delimitation and demarcation of the state borders of the CA countries is a current imperative; if this issue is not resolved, it is highly likely that conflicts will emerge among the states of the region and external forces will interfere in their internal affairs. International law legally binds the members of the global community to observe the corresponding regulations and principles that ensure order and stability. The efforts of the CA states aimed at legalizing their state border lines under international law are primarily prompted by a desire to preserve and maintain regional stability and security. Enforcing title to borders and territory by means of international law will guarantee long-term stability in the region. By entering international agreements, the states are pledging to recognize the border lines being established and, more important, the absence of mutual territorial demands. This is

39 The Kyrgyz side proposed determining the state border on the basis of the results of the work of the Joint Land Swap Commission of the Governments of the Kirgiz S.S.R. and Uzbek S.S.R. of 1955 and defining the state border that was approved by a Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Kirgiz S.S.R. of 30 March, 1961. But it should be noted that the corresponding reports by these commissions were not approved by the Presidiums of the Uz.S.S.R. and the U.S.S.R. (see: A. Kozhikhov, “Bezopasnost v Tsentralnoi Azii. Ochagi mezhetnicheskogo napriazheniia v Tsentralnoi Azii,” available at [http: www.cvi.kz/text/Safety/Etnic/html]; “Kyrgyzstan i Uzbekistan iz 1 400 km uchastka obshchei granitsy soglas- ovali 290 km,” available at [www.kabar.kz]). 33 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS the only way the states can prevent loopholes in security and ensure a certain amount of stability in interrelations. In terms of settlement by the CA states of territorial and border issues stability has been achieved throughout the entire spectrum of bilateral relations.

THE 2008 GEORGIAN CRISIS AND THE LIMITS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY GOVERNANCE Yelda DEMÝRAÐ Associate Professor, Political Science and International Relations Department, Baºkent University (Ankara, Turkey)

Burak TANGÖR Associate Professor, Public Administration Institute for Turkey and the Middle East (TODAIE) (Ankara, Turkey)

Introduction

he clashes in the ethnic regions of South However, when the solution contradicted the in- Ossetia and Abkhazia are not only about terests of the international actors the clashes T Georgia’s territorial integrity. Moreover, when analyzed from a different perspective, it becomes clear that the ethnic problems in the region recognize the Saakashvili administration that came to power on the coattails of the “velvet revolution.” Later, Saa- are not only an issue between the ethnic groups and kashvili, who wanted to enter the region with “armed forc- the central government. The ethnic problems in es” before the 28 March, 2004 elections, was turned back Georgia also depend on a change in the perception at the Chorokhi River, the border between Ajaria and the of the external actors’ interests. This means that Georgian region of Guria. The crisis almost escalted into an armed conflict when Saakashvili’s response was to im- when the solution to problems coincided with the pose an economic embargo. When the U.S. and Russia in- interests of the international actors, Georgia was tervened, the crisis was subdued and temporarily settled able to solve the problem, as in the case of Ajaria.1 when the sides reached a consensus on 18 March, 2004. The tension between Saakashvili and Abashidze ended on 5 May, 2004 when Abashidze left Batumi for Moscow in 1 Aslan Abashidze, leader of the Ajarian Autono- the company of Igor Ivanov, the former Foreign Minister mous Republic, created tension by declaring that he did not of the Russian Federation and Secretary of the National

34 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 could not be resolved and the Georgian govern- its relations with the EU as an economic and po- ment was ineffective, as in the cases of South litical partnership that will culminate in EU mem- Ossetia and Abkhazia. The clashes determined bership in due course.3 not only the domestic policy of the Georgian In 2004, the EU and NATO expanded into government and the country’s social and eco- the former Soviet expanse. The Russians regard- nomic development, but also Georgia’s foreign ed NATO membership of the Baltic countries as policy. an encroachment on the country’s traditional pe- Consequently, in order to strengthen its riphery. The Russian leadership was alarmed by position and maintain its territorial integrity, the West’s active support of the regime change in Georgia shifted to the EU-U.S. axis in order to Georgia. The West was keenly interested in Rus- counterbalance Russia, which supported the eth- sia’s own neighborhood. As the primary Western nic minorities in the region. So it was argued that security organization, NATO epitomizes Russia’s the democratic breakthrough in Georgia in 2003 insecurities.4 happened because the local activists appealed to The first part of the study describes the the- EU norms and standards and because they re- oretical framework of governance and explains ceived strong support from the EU and its mem- the management, coordination, and regulation ber states.2 Moreover, the EU supported the mul- procedures practiced by the security-related in- tilateral efforts to constrain the use of force ternational institutions. The second part discuss- through arms control and disarmament initiatives es the Georgian crisis and its historical back- and provided financial and technical assistance to ground, to provide a better understanding of the projects aimed at combating the accumulation and crisis, and analyzes the interests of the interna- spread of small arms in Georgia and South Osse- tional actors that triggered the crisis. The third tia. The EU set up a rule-of-law operation in Geor- part takes a look at the programs being imple- gia, the EUJUST Themis operation (July 2004), mented by international institutions with respect which was not a military mission. Georgia views to Georgia. The concluding part evaluates the roles and impact of the international institutions during the crisis. Security Council. After this development, President Saa- kashvili imposed direct presidential rule in Ajaria on the basis of the power vested in him by the Georgian parlia- 3 See: Ibid., p. 58. ment on 6 May, 2004. 4 See: K. Mirwaldt, V.I. Ivanov, “Russia: Struggling for 2 See: E.J. Kirchner, J. Sperling, EU Security Govern- Dignity,” in: Global Security Governance, ed. by E.J. Kirchner, ance, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2007, p. 51. J. Sperling, Routledge, London, 2007, p. 240.

The Security Governance Approach

Security governance within the discipline of International Relations implies the shared use of administrative, economic, and political powers to ensure ongoing peace and stability in the international arena.5 The concept of shared understanding should be added to this description. Security governance requires both ideational and institutional bases.6 In other words, security governance depends on discourses as well as material components. Security governance includes three factors.

5 See: E.J. Kirchner, “Regional and Global Security: Changing Threats and Institutional Responses,” in: Global Se- curity Governance, p. 3. 6 See: M. Webber, “Security Governance and the Excluded States of Postcommunist Europe,” in: New Security Chal- lenges in Postcommunist Europe: Securing Europe’s East, ed. by D. Averre, A. Cottey, Manchester University Press, Man- chester, 2002, p. 44. 35 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

n Firstly, it is based on a horizontal (heterarchical) understanding of interaction among many actors. n Secondly, it includes institutionalization with its ideational and material (organizational structure) components. n Thirdly, it requires a common goal despite the existence of different interests. It is seen that states cooperate either to combine their capacities to resist another state or to realize interests they could not realize if they operated alone. Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin have stated that interstate cooperation is possible when the important interests of states are at stake.7 When states jointly benefit from cooperation, they form institutions to ease this cooperation and carry on cooperating. At this point, the efforts of many international institutions help to enhance governance in international relations. The concept of institution mentioned here not only covers organizations, but also includes repetitive and accepted behavior. Keohane defines institutions as formal or informal convincing and linked sets of rules which determine behavioral roles, defines the boundaries of activities, and shapes expectations.8 Understanding institutions as such depends on the prerequisite that they are voluntary formations. The international anarchical structure prevents cooperation among states due to their natural survival instinct; however, cooperation improves to the extent that institutions rehabilitate the problem of anarchy. The concept of “anarchy” in International Relations means the absence of a central authority. Anarchy has neither a positive nor a negative connotation. Even though anarchy is a concept describing the absence of a central authority over state authorities, it also describes the absence of rules and shows disrespect for common ideals, norms, regulations, and discourses. Nevertheless, states act in compliance with agreements and international institutions. When and if cooperation is reached and sustained, two major obstacles necessitated by anarchy have a significant presence in the realist thinking of international politics. The first of these is the state’s fear of being cheated and the second is its fear of the relative gains acquired from cheating. In terms of cooperation, the fear of being cheated is related only to the cooperation issue, but in terms of security the fear is constant, because a change in weapons allows shifts in the balance of power. If a state might gain an advantage by giving up on cooperation in security issues, it may cheat the state or states it cooperated with. To this end, states have to be alert with respect to observing the rules of cooperation agreements and must take measures against being cheated.9 This limits interstate cooperation. At this point, institutions lessen the fear about being cheated in a multitude of ways. Institutions enable intelligence gathering among cooperating states and increase the parties’ information about each other. As a result, states which have a tendency to cheat are more easily recognized and states which will be harmed by cheating become more aware. Moreover, rules cause an increase in the number of transactions. Institutionalized iteration makes cheating a high-cost option because states would be deprived of their future gains. Repetitive transactions also enable other states to condemn the cheating side. To explain, the cheating state is ousted from cooperation schemes while confidence-enhancing states easily find a place for themselves in such mechanisms and optimize their gains. Institutional- ized rules increase dependency by enabling transactions in many issues. Therefore, a state which chooses to cheat may be punished on several other occasions. This factor limits the will to cheat, if it does not eliminate cheating altogether. Just as institutions make the time and expenses required for negotia-

7 See: R.O. Keohane, L.L. Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” International Security, No. 20 (1), 1995, p. 39. 8 See: R.O. Keohane, “Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics,” in: International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory, ed. by R.O. Keohane, Westview Press, London, 1989, p. 3. 9 See: J.J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, No. 19 (3), 1994/95, pp. 10-12. 36 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 tions unnecessary, they also limit the running costs. In this context, institutions decrease the cost of cooperation and increase profitability.10 The anxiety over relative gains is mainly caused by two factors. The first of these is the number of major actors in the system. When the conflicting interests of only two states are in question, relative gain becomes important and cooperation becomes difficult. However, when there is a system in which many actors of relatively equal strength are present, the importance of relative gain decreases as each state finds ways to develop coalitions. The second factor is military relations. At times when use of military resources to solve a conflict is ineffective, the relative gain of states becomes less important and therefore cooperation becomes easier.11 Institutions ease the obligations dictated by anarchy. Institutions lower the running costs by providing information and hence provide states with easier-to-shoulder loads. In addition to this, as they create an area of cooperation, they furnish suitable points of coordination and promote mutuality and multilateral relations among states. The idea that institutions have to be active and convincing in order to operate stems from behavioral expectations.12 Since the rational prudence thought to be behind the actors’ behavior cannot fully explain cooperative interactions, beliefs and ideas also become important in explaining an act.13 That is why the governance approach also emphasizes discourses and identities. Discourses play an important role in the creation of threats. The meanings of discourses are cultural phenomena. In that context, threats are social and cultural products rather than social realities.14 Threat perception does not arise from the so- called objective international power structure. The discourses of actors who enjoy a superior position are more easily accepted in the international arena. At times when there are material threats, states choose to form alliances. When these material threats are disbanded, harmony within the alliance weakens. Therefore, after the breakup of the Soviet Union and the absence of a worthy enough re- placement, NATO should have become unimportant. An alliance is shaped by the values shared after it becomes functional. The institution of these rules shows resilience when faced with political change, because it is easier to reform the existing structure, which contains sets of values and rules and discourses, than to establish new institutions of international security cooperation.15 International institutions can be the major representatives of values. Finally, the understanding of security governance is backed by unity of aims. This unity of aims may be understood as the results obtained from both the structure and the process. Structurally, governance includes institutions, and these institutions, by dictating the entry rules, interaction rules, and behavior, establish special behavior patterns among the parties. In terms of process, governance is interested in following the results obtained by the actors and the methods they pursue to obtain them. This shows that in governance, aims reflect a composite of actor preferences. These preferences are similar most of the time, however, they may also sometimes compete with each other. Nevertheless, the obtained results, by necessity, do not cover all the aims of all the actors, but only those of most of the actors.

10 See: R.O. Keohane, J.S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, Longman, New York, 2001, pp. 1-31. 11 See: R. Powell, “Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations,” in: Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. by D.A. Baldwin, Columbia University Press, New York, 1993, pp. 209-233. 12 See: R.O. Keohane, “Governance in a Partially Globalized World,” The American Political Science Review, No. 95 (1), 2001, pp. 1-3. 13 See: Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change, ed. by J. Goldstein, R.O. Keohane, Cornell University Press, London, 1993. 14 See: J. Weldes et al., “Introduction: Constructing Insecurity,” in: Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger, ed. by J. Weldes et al., University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1999, pp. 10-17. 15 See: T. Risse-Kappen, “Identity in a Democratic Security Community: The Case of NATO,” in: The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. by P.J. Katzenstein, Columbia University Press, New York, 1996, pp. 357-399. 37 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

In post-Cold War conflicts in Europe, multinational institutions (the most effective ones being the U.N., NATO, the EU, and the OSCE) have assumed shared responsibilities in order to stabilize the political and economic environment in Europe. Division of labor among these organizations can be spontaneously determined by their capacity and organizational role, where there is no formally established hierarchy among the institutions. We shall argue these claims by adopting a deductive method. We shall largely rely on official documents to demonstrate how governance works among security- related international organizations. It appears that security-related international institutions somehow share the responsibility for overcoming the threats to Europe: as already mentioned, there is no formally established hierarchy among the institutions, and the functions of each institution can be determined by its capacity and institutional role. For example, NATO is mostly perceived as the best organization for military operations, whereas the EU is generally perceived as the best one for reconstruction in the post-conflict era. The crises in the Balkans provide evidence of this argument. The main focus of this study is to question whether the necessary conditions for security governance were established in the 2008 Georgian crisis. We argue that the different threat assessments made by the two most important actors, the U.S. and Russia, impeded the achievement of specific policy outcomes. This diminished the role of the international institutions in the conflict. The U.N. and OSCE had a low-profile role, since one of the sides in the war was the Russian Federation, while NATO and the EU, in neither of which Russia is a member, showed different profiles during the conflict: NATO, under U.S. control, seemed unsuitable, since it represented “hard power,” while the European Union was perceived as more appropriate since it represented “soft power” and pursued a more active role. To better understand the 2008 Georgian crisis and the role played by the international institutions, we will now focus on the historical and contemporary foundations of the conflict.

The Causes and Historical Foundations of the South Ossetian Problem

The most important reason for the Caucasian conflicts is the “divide and conquer” policy orig- inated by the Tsarist Russian, continued by the Soviet Union, and now used by the Russian Feder- ation. The Caucasian nations were artificially divided after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution and borders were drawn between them. However, the Soviet system unwittingly promoted ethnic consciousness among the Caucasian peoples, and this consciousness grew even stronger after the fall of the system. The south of Ossetia was joined to the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1922 as an autonomous region and North Ossetia was joined to the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic in 1925 with the same status. In 1936, North Ossetia was promoted to the status of an autonomous republic. The rising nationalistic demands during the breakup process of the Soviet Union affected the Ossetians in 1989, and South Ossetia claimed it wanted to break away from Georgia, unite with North Ossetia, and become the sixteenth republic of the Soviet Union. In 1990, the South Ossetian Soviet Democratic Republic was declared. The central Georgian government led by Zviad Gamsakhurdia responded to this by removing its autonomy and, in 1991, Georgia sent armed forces into the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali. The Ossetians appealed to the Union Government for protection of their constitutional rights during the rule of Mikhail Gorbachev, but to no avail. In 1992, the South

38 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011

Ossetians appealed to Russia once again, asking to join Russia, but the Yeltsin administration did not respond enthusiastically to their demands. Gamsakhurdia, who came to power in October 1990 and led Georgia to independence, pursued radical nationalistic policies against the minorities as he thought the South Ossetian and Abkhazian problems were Russia’s making. As the territorial integrity of the country began to be threatened by domestic disturbances, he was relieved from duty on 2 October, 1992.16 Eduard Shevardnadze, the former foreign minister of the U.S.S.R., who became the country’s leader, used his expertise from the Soviet era to promote Georgia to a positive position in the international arena. During the first years of his rule, Shevardnadze had to deal with both the supporters of former leader Gamsakhurdia—called the Zviadists—as well as the South Ossetian and Abkhazian problems,17 so he was forced to seek peaceful solutions. He especially blamed the Russian Federation for its support of the separatist movements and refused to join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). However, he, like many other Georgians, knew that Georgia was not fighting against Ossetia or Abkhazia, but against Russia, the military power of which was much stronger than the Georgian armed forces. He also understood that the solution to the problems lay in Moscow and so tried to protect his country’s territorial integrity by starting talks with Russian President Boris Yeltsin. In the end, he had to approve Georgia’s membership in the CIS as a requirement for his country remaining independent.18 Alongside these developments, Shevardnadze adopted pro-Western policies in order to counterbalance Russia’s influence on Georgia and because he believed he needed Western help to achieve real independence for his country. Shevardnadze, who contacted Russia to end the Georgian-Ossetian clashes, entered the Dag- omys Treaty with South Ossetia and agreed to the establishment of a peace force made up of Geor- gians, Russians, and North Ossetians.19 However, the South Ossetian demands to join the North and become part of the Russian Federation continued. The Russians, Georgians, and North and South Ossetians came together in 1996 and signed a memorandum on the re-establishment of Georgian-South Ossetian economic relations and on solving problems between the sides by peaceful means. The 1999 South Ossetian elections and the 2001 election of Kokoyty as South Ossetian president were declared illegitimate and rejected by the Georgian authorities. In the post-9/11 period, the U.S.’s presence in the region under the excuse of conducting a “war on terror” and the enhanced relations between Geor- gia and America prompted the Ossetians and Abkhazians to further improve their already good relations with Russia. Shevardnadze was forced to resign and was replaced in the January 2004 elections by Mikhail Saakashvili, who received 96% of the votes. This was prompted by Shevardnadze’s failure to deliver on his promises regarding democratization or to prevent bribery and nepotism in Georgia, in addition to the energy shortage crisis, public poverty, and the rising pressure of the opposition.20 Saakashvili

16 See: S. Cornell, “Georgia: From Unitary Dreams to an Asymmetric Federation,” in: Small Nations and Great Pow- ers: A Study of Ethno-Political Conflict in the Caucasus, ed. by S. Cornell, Curzon Press, Richmond, 2000, pp. 143-196. 17 For more detailed information on the roots and the development of the ethnic conflicts in Georgia, see: Y. Anchabadze, “Georgia and Abkhazia: The Hard Road to Agreement,” Caucasian Regional Studies, No. 3 (2&3), Special Issue, 1998, pp. 4-12. 18 See: A. Rondeli, “Regional Security Prospects in the Caucasus,” in: Crossroads and Conflict: Security and For- eign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia, ed. by G. Bertsch et al., Routledge, London, 2000, p. 49. 19 See: F. Corley, “South Ossetia between Gamsakhurdia and Gorbachev: Three Documents,” Central Asian Survey, No. 16 (2), 1997, p. 270. 20 In a research study about fighting corruption carried out by Transparency International (see: Transparency Inter- national, The 2002 Corruption Perceptions Index, available at: [http://www.transparency.org.html], 22 June, 2010), Geor- gia is 5th from the bottom among 133 countries. In another research study carried out by the United Nations in 1999, only 20 percent of the government budget was spent on targeted expenses (see: U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitar- ian Affairs, Early Warning Assessment, November 2003). Fifty-one percent of Georgia’s population lived below the poverty line and 23.6 percent of the people were unemployed. Between 1989 to the present day, a large number of people have 39 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS addressed the U.N. General Assembly in September 2004 and declared that economic development would be the basis of long-term peace and his administration would seek resolution of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia problems based on talks.21 However, the events that took place during the same year caused further tension between South Ossetia and the central government. Russia’s will to continue its presence in the region due to the ethnic tension and to add the region to its sphere of influence were the primary reasons for all this tension. Saakashvili, who was aware of this situation, stated several times that if the South Ossetian problem turned into war, it would be a war not between Georgia and South Ossetia, but between Georgia and Russia.22 The developments in the summer of 2008 did indeed confirm his remarks.

Historical Sources and Development of the Abkhazian Problem

Abkhazia, which was a Soviet Socialist Republic between 1921-1930 and was federatively joined to Georgia, became an autonomous republic within Georgia in 1930. The Abkhaz-Georgian tension began in 1978 with Abkhazia’s demand to form a separate Soviet Republic and leave the Georgian S.S.R. This turned into a conflict when the Soviet Union began to collapse.23 In the Lykhny Letter published on 18 March, 1989, the Abkhazians asked the U.S.S.R. authorities to reevaluate their nation’s regime and to turn Abkhazia into a republic on equal terms with Georgia; in 1990, the Abkhaz- ian Supreme Soviet accepted a motion that envisaged the status of state sovereignty. The Abkhazians did not take part in the elections won by Gamsakhurdia that followed the breakup of the Soviet Union and declaration of Georgian independence. At that time, Abkhazia’s attempts to secede from Georgia were supported by Russia, which wanted to punish Georgia for refusing to be part of the CIS. In 1992, the Abkhazian Supreme Soviet declared it accepted the 1925 Constitution, which recognized Abkhazia as a separate republic. Upon this declaration, Georgia declared war on Abkhazia; however, by September 1993, Abkhazian forces had taken complete control of Abkhazia.24 After Gamsa- khurdia was overthrown, Shevardnadze, who replaced him, accepted Georgia’s membership in the CIS on 22 October, 1993, which led to Russian-Georgian rapprochement and an appeasement of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. The Georgian-Abkhazian talks held on 1 December, 1993 in Gene- va under U.N. supervision, which were also attended by the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, had a positive outcome and the sides adopted a memorandum. It envisaged establishing a cease-fire in the region, accepting the presence of an international peacekeeping force, exchanging prisoners, and allowing forced migrants to return. The rapprochement between Russia and Georgia became official left Georgia to work in Russia and Ukraine (see: D.L. Philips, Stability, Security and Sovereignty in the Republic of Geor- gia. Rapid Response Conflict Prevention Assessment, Center for Preventive Action, January 2004, available at [http://www. ciaonet.org/wps/phd01], 15 December, 2004). 21 See: Kasým K. Soðuk Savaþ Sonrasý Kafkasya (The Caucasus in the Post-Cold War Era). Ankara: USAK, 2009, p. 71. 22 See: G. Özkan, Gürcistanda Yeni Yönetim, Etnik Ayrýlýkçý Bölgeler ve Güvenlik (New Government, Ethnic Secessionist Regions and Security in Georgia), in: Orta Asya ve Kafkasyada Güç Politikasý, ed. by M.T. Demirtepe, USAK Yayýnlarý, Ankara, 2008. 23 For detailed information on the cause, roots, and development of the Abkhazian problem, see: D. Lynch, “Sepa- ratist States and Post-Soviet Conflicts,” International Affairs, No. 78 (4), 2002, pp. 831-848; B. Coppieters, “The Politici- sation and Securitisation of Ethnicity: The Case of the Southern Caucasus,” Civil Wars, No. 4 (4), 2001, pp. 73-94. 24 See: Kasým K. op. cit., p. 67. 40 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 with the Declaration of Measures for Political Settlement of the Georgia-Abkhazia Conflict concluded in 1994. According to this document, Abkhazia would have its own state symbols, such as a constitution, parliament, government, coat of arms and flag, as well as domestic sovereignty. In issues such as foreign policy and foreign economic relations, the two sides would act together.25 Another important development after this declaration was the deployment of the Russian “peace corps” in Vaziani, Gudauta, Batumi, and Akhalkalaki.26 In other words, Russia used the Abkhazian problem to ensure Georgia’s membership in the CIS, establish its military presence in the country, and obtain a position of authority in the whole process with the help of its military presence under the guise of a peace corps. Another development was the Tbilisi Declaration concluded between Shevardnadze and Abkhazian leader Vladislav Ardzinba on 14 August, 1997. According to the conclusion the sides reached, the parties declared they would not resort to arms to solve the problem. At this point, Russia, which had achieved great success, focused its efforts on signing a conclusive peace treaty. Despite the peace process supported by all the parties involved, the armed conflict between the Georgians and Abkhazians started again on 23 May, 1998, however it soon ended. At the end of the second series of talks between the two sides in Geneva under U.N. supervision on 23-25 July, 1998, the 1997 Tbilisi Declaration was confirmed. Political talks continued under U.N. supervision in Geneva, with the inclusion of Russian and OSCE delegations. Russia joined the talks with the title of “facilitator” and as part of the Friends of the U.N. Secretary General group. On 3 October, 1999, a referendum on the presidential elections was held in Abkhazia and its result showed that 97% supported the independent and democratic state of Abkhazia. However, this result was not approved by the U.N., U.S., and European countries and was declared illegitimate. With the change in power in Georgia after the “velvet revolution,” a new period started in the Abkhazian problem. The continuous Abkhazian declarations stating that they refuse to be an autonomous part of Georgia and the 2006 Georgian capture of the Kodori Valley, which has strategic significance with regards to Abkhazia, put a halt to the peace process once more. The plan proposed by Saakashvili just before the April 2008 NATO Summit, which basically envisaged a return to the status quo enjoyed before the start of the conflict, was not accepted by Abkhazia. Indeed, the process which would end with the August war began in April 2008.

Conflicting Interests of Russia and the U.S. in the Southern Caucasus

The unique geographical location of the Southern Caucasus between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea has indeed served as a bridge or a barrier for Russia throughout the centuries. In the aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Southern Caucasus was supposed to be cordon sanitaire against the instability emanating from the south.27 In particular, Georgia was perceived by Russian strategists as a key component in Russia’s security policy in the Southern Caucasus. Thus, a pro-Russian Georgia was crucial for Russia to have a land access route to Armenia. In addition to this, the Caspian

25 See: V.A. Chirikba, “Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict and Its Aftermath,” in: Caucasus: War and Peace, ed. by M. Tütüncü, SOTA, Haarlem, Netherlands, 1998, p. 79. 26 See: D. Darchiashvili, “The Russian Military Presence in Georgia: The Parties’ Attitudes and Prospects,” Cauca- sian Regional Studies, No. 2 (1), 1997, available at [http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/crs/eng/0201-04.htm], 10 June, 2010. 27 See: D. Bazoðlu-Sezer, “Russia and the South: Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus,” European Security, No. 5 (2), 1995, pp. 303-323. 41 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS energy resources are also a component of Russia’s sphere of interests.28 Russia wants to be active in the Caucasian region, which is important in itself, and aims at playing a crucial role in the solution of conflicts. From 1991 to date, Russia has been trying to establish its power in the region and, to this end, it supported pro-Russian groups in the South Caucasian states. However, this wish of Russia came up against serious resistance, especially in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Another card Russia could play in the Southern Caucasus was ethnicity. Russia perceived the West’s move to the region via Georgia and Georgia’s desire to achieve rapprochement with the West, especially after the “velvet revolution,” as unacceptable. The Southern Caucasus is crucial for the United States both with respect to the transfer of Cas- pian energy resources to the international markets and to the region’s proximity to Middle East and Central Asia. In the wake of the 1993 Russian declaration of its Near Abroad Doctrine, U.S. Ambas- sador to the United Nations Madeline Albright, who visited Baku in September 1994, declared the region within the U.S.’s sphere of interests with her statement that “the U.S. cannot accept Russia having a special role in the Caucasus.” In 1996, when Russia’s military weakness was noticeable after the First Chechen War, the U.S. declared the Caucasus and the Caspian region an area of its own vital interests. The U.S., which wanted the South Caucasian states to adopt democracy and a free market economy, used aid programs as an important tool to support its aims regarding the region.29 The U.S., which wanted to increase its activity in the region, was in favor of pro-Western formations in addition to aid programs. In this context, NATO’s enlargement to the east was supported, and the U.S. tried to get the regional states to rely on it using the Partnership for Peace (PfP) project. In addition to PfP, GUUAM, another anti-Russian establishment in the region, was supported. Whereas the U.S. was interested in the Caucasian region with regards to the transportation of Caspian energy resources to the international markets before 11 September, 2001, after 9/11, security concerns took priority in America’s Caucasian policy. In addition to the issues mentioned, it can be claimed that the Black Sea also had an important role to play. The United States, which established bases in Bulgaria and Ruma- nia and supported the region’s Color Revolutions that brought pro-Western and pro-American regimes to power, also wanted to keep the Russian Federation away from the Black Sea. Probably the most definitive aspect of America’s focus on the region is its economic interests. The Americans, who do not want to depend solely on Persian Gulf oil, would like to acquire new resources in Asia and Africa and diversify energy flows to the West. As President Bush declared on 17 May, 2001, “diversity is important, not only for energy security but also for national security, overdependence on any one source of energy, especially a foreign source, leaves us vulnerable to price shocks, supply interruptions and, in the worst case, blackmail.”30

28 When the Soviet Union dominated regional sources, it was the second largest oil and natural gas producer before 1990. Later Russia sold the oil and natural gas bought cheaply from the Central Asian, Caspian, and Caucasian regions primarily to Europe and to the rest of the world at its market value. While the West was trying to create an Eurasian energy corridor from east to west to export the Caspian’s energy resources, Russia tried to preserve its monopoly on the existing pipelines and particularly objected to the U.S.-supported East-West pipeline project. If the regional resources went along the East-West route instead of north, the regional states could transfer their natural resources to the world’s market independent of Russia. Moreover, as a result of the income that was obtained in the long term from this action, these states could act more independently and adopt a policy supported by the West. Therefore, Russia used every tool at its disposal (political, military, and diplomatic) to retain control over the regional resources and states and to prevent the participation of the West in these resources (for more information, see: M.P. Amineh, H. Houweling, “Caspian Energy: Oil and Gas Re- sources and the Global Market,” Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, No. 2 (3&4), 2003, pp. 391-406; G. Bahgat, “Pipeline Diplomacy: The Geopolitics of the Caspian Sea Region,” International Studies Perspectives, No. 3 (3), 2002, pp. 310-327). 29 See: A. Cohen, “U.S. Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia: Building a New ‘Silk Road’ to Economic Prosper- ity,” 1997, available at [http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/1997/07/BG1132], 10 June, 2010. 30 M.T. Klare, “Global Petro-Politics: The Foreign Policy Implications of the Bush Administration’s Energy Plan,” Current History, March 2002, p. 102. 42 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 The Georgian-Russian War

While the entire world had its attention focused on the opening of the Olympic Games in Bei- jing, Georgian President Saakashvili launched a military operation against South Ossetia. This attempt, which could be described as mastery in the art of timing, did not in fact come as a surprise, since the declarations that began in early April hinted at what was to come in August. If we look back a few months before August, Russia announced that it would increase its military presence in the South Ossetian and Abkhazian autonomous regions and that it would go to all lengths to protect the Russian citizens (those given Russian passports by Russia) in the region. Georgia’s accusations that this essentially meant annexation increased the tension between Russia and Georgia on a daily basis. Rus- sia’s harsh response came as a surprise. The process leading to the Georgian crisis intensified when Georgia’s membership in NATO was not given the green light at the 4 April, 2008 Bucharest Summit, the implication being that Georgia should first achieve territorial integrity. The result of the summit disappointed the Georgian side, on the one hand, and encouraged Saakashvili to make his move to solve the “frozen problems” in the region, on the other. In fact, Russia was to blame by supporting Abkhazia and South Ossetia from the beginning and encouraging them to rebel against the central government, thus supporting Georgia’s dismemberment and making the situation worse.31 Russia perceived the steps taken by the West, such as the Color Revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyr- gyzstan, NATO’s enlargement efforts, the attempts to implement the missile shield project in Eastern Europe, and recognition of Kosovo’s independence, as a challenge. The events in the Caucasus can be seen as a natural outcome of this tension. When we look at the events that took place in the Caucasus in 2008, it can be said that they went well beyond the region and that Russia entered a new period. Indeed, the new foreign policy concept approved by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev shows this more clearly. The concept document, which stated that Russia should intervene in world affairs as a great power and that the unipolar structure in world politics was over, also stated that the U.N. was central in solving international problems and that NATO’s enlargement was perceived with unease. Russia, which has declared the region as its backyard since 1993, was against the transfer of the region’s natural gas and oil resources to the world markets bypassing Russia. For Russia, the 2008 Georgian Crisis was important in that it helped to strengthen its influence in the region and announce to the world that it was now a power to be reckoned with. Russia, which advocates territorial integrity within its federative structure, supported Serbia regarding Kosovo and now supported South Ossetian and Abkha- zian secession from Georgia. Abkhazia with its extensive Black Sea coast plays a vital role in Rus- sia’s domination of the Black Sea. When Russia attacked Georgia, it gave protecting its 70,000 South Ossetian “citizens” as its excuse. When Russia attacked the region, the security-related international organizations reacted. NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer renounced this move by describing it as “a direct violation” of many U.N. Security Council resolutions to which Russia itself was a signatory. Moreover, de Hoop Scheffer also questioned Moscow’s commitment to peace and security in the Caucasus.32

31 It can be stated that Russia achieved more than one goal by entering Georgia. For Putin, who often states in his speeches that the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. was the greatest disaster/tragedy of the twentieth century, the creation of a Great Russia designed to regain Russia’s strength and save the Russian people from a feeling of defeat and give them the dynamism became his most important objective after coming to power. In this context, Putin’s speech in February 2007, which criticized the U.S. and the unipolar world system, stirred up an acute response. 32 See: “North Atlantic Council Discusses Situation in Georgia,” NATO, 12 August, 2008, available at [http:// www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-0745DD58-902BDC72/natolive/news_43416.htm], 20 August, 2008. 43 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Taking NATO’s cue on the Georgian crisis, the leaders of the EU also denounced Medvedev. For instance, German Chancellor Angela Merkel labeled the move as “unacceptable;” France, which carried out periodic EU leadership, emphasized that Russia’s move was “against Georgia’s sovereignty, independence, and the principles of territorial integrity” and called for a political solution.33 Right afterwards, the EU leaders discussed the matter at a special meeting in Brussels at the request of French President Nicolas Sarkozy.34 The OSCE, on the other hand, branded this act as a violation of the principles of an organization of 56 members, one of which was Russia.35 This shows that the international security institutions shared the idea that Russia was violating the law and assuming an aggressive position.

The Role of the European Security Institutions

The U.N., which is seen as being responsible for preserving international peace and stability, and the regional institutions, which have obligations under Chapter 7 (Art 52) of the U.N. Charter, were expected to play their respective roles. Due to its organizational structure, the U.N. could not play a part in the Georgian crisis. The most important reason for that is surely the structure of the U.N. Security Council and its decision-making mechanism. The differences in opinion among the great powers prevented the Security Council from adopting a resolution. Again, in the OSCE, which is a pan-European establishment, such issues as organizational structure, the decision-making process, and differences in opinion among the great powers played an important part and the pre-crisis activities of the OSCE stopped after the crisis. The activities of NATO and the EU prior to, during, and after the crisis are significant and the acts of these two institutions are analyzed within the framework of governance below.

The Role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Georgia

The history of NATO-Georgian relations dates back to when Georgia joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1992 (later renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997). In 1994, these relations further developed when Georgia joined PfP. Georgia joined the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) in 1999, thus further increasing the interaction between Georgia and NATO. Georgia is the first South Caucasian state to join the Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP). After the Rose Revolution in 2003, the focus on supporting Georgia’s domestic reforms intensified, in partic-

33 See: “West Voices Dismay at Russia’s ‘Unacceptable’ Move,” Spiegel, 26 August, 2008, available at: [http:// www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,574537,00.html], 6 April, 2011. 34 See: “Sarkozy Calls Special EU Meeting on Georgia/Russia,” Euronews, 24 August, 2008, available at [http:// www.euronews.net/2008/08/24/sarkozy-calls-special-eu-meeting-on-georgiarussia], 6 April, 2011. 35 See: “Press Conference on Georgia by Heikki Talvitie,” OSCE, 14 August, 2008, available at [http://www.osce.org/ cio/12323], 23 August, 2008. 44 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 ular through the development of Georgia’s first IPAP with NATO in 2004. Georgia was granted the position of Intensified Dialog on Membership Aspirations in September 2006. At their summit in Bucharest in April 2008, the NATO leaders agreed that Georgia would become a member of the Al- liance. After the August War, on 12 August, 2008, Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ms. Eka Tkeshe- lashvili and Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Ms. Eka Zguladze visited NATO headquarters. They met with Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer.36 At an extraordinary meeting of the North Atlan- tic Council on 12 August, 2008, the NATO ambassadors discussed the situation in Georgia. At this meeting, the alliance expressed its concern over the escalation of the crisis in Georgia, as well as its regret over the civilian losses and infrastructure damage. Moreover, it supported the EU and OSCE efforts aimed at finding a peaceful solution to the problem and quickly ending the violence. The NATO ambassadors claimed Russia was using disproportionate power and asked Russia to respect Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Here an example of mutual support and cooperation is seen in NATO’s declaration of its support of the EU and OSCE efforts. On 19 August, 2008, the North Atlan- tic Council foreign ministers analyzed the situation in Georgia and its effects on Euro-Atlantic security and stability. Finnish Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb, who was OSCE President at that time, told French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner about the diplomatic efforts carried out to date so that the EU chairing state and the NAC would know. The NAC was satisfied with the agreement between Russia and Georgia and emphasized the need for the agreement to be implemented at once and in full. NATO once more announced it supported Georgia’s territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence and agreed to assist the civilians affected by the conflict. The council denounced the use of force against the PfP and other international treaties. It is also stated that Russia was using excessive military force disproportionate to the peacekeeping role it pursued in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Under the six-article agreement, Russia was asked to remove its troops from the region. NATO declared it would provide military assistance if Georgia asked for it. This assistance would be rendered in the form of restoring damaged civilian infrastructure, evaluating the Defense Ministry and armed forces, reestablishing the air traffic system, and providing advice in cyber-defense issues. NATO Special Envoy to the Caucasus and Cen- tral Asia Robert Simmons paid an official visit to Georgia between 20 and 23 August. This visit showed how important Georgia was to NATO. On 27 August, 2008, the North Atlantic Council denounced Russia, which recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and demanded that Russia revise its decision. Moreover, the decision of the April 2008 Bucharest Summit adopted by the alliance leaders envisaged intense cooperation in order to prepare Georgia for its ultimate membership in the Alli- ance by means of democratic, institutional, and defense reforms. In September 2008, NATO enhanced its assistance to Georgia by establishing the NATO-Georgia Commission at the level of Foreign Ministers right after the crisis with Russia, thus paving the way for implementation of the measures envisaged by the Bucharest decision. To this end, Georgia was asked to prepare an annual national program. In December 2009, the NATO-Georgia Commission decided to accelerate its efforts. To this end, a yearly national program was created. This program was to replace the individual partnership plan. The basic priorities of cooperation between NATO and Georgia focused on transforming Geor- gia’s private and public sectors by redefining democracy, pursuing good governance, the rule of law, and sustainable social and economic development, and restructuring the defense sector. In the wake of the August 2008 crisis, reforming Georgian security by improving the country’s national defense

36 See: “Visit to NATO by Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Minister of the Interior of Georgia,” Press Release, 12 August, 2008. 45 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS plans also became a priority. Georgia engages in many cooperation activities with NATO and other partner countries through the PfP and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Georgia served with the NATO troops in Kosovo between 1999 and 2008 and provided critical support of the ISAF troops in Afghanistan, since the goods transported to these troops were delivered through Georgia. However, Georgia’s cooperation with NATO was not limited to this; it also assisted NATO in the war on terror. In this framework, Georgia became a member of the Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism (PAP-T). This includes sharing intelligence and analysis with NATO, enhancing national counter-terrorist capabilities, and improving border security. Georgia participates in NATO’s Operation Active Endeavor, an antiterrorist operation in the Mediterranean Sea, primarily through intelligence exchange. NATO supports Georgia, especially in terms of defense and security reforms. For Georgia, the priority is democratic inspection of its armed forces. The Partnership of Action plan on Defense Institution Building (PAP-DIB) supports these efforts. NATO and its allies allotted Geor- gia over 1 million to modernize its army. Georgia is strengthening its civil defense and natural disaster governance capabilities in cooperation with NATO and coordinating these efforts within the Euro- Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC). After the August 2008 crisis, the EAD- RCC coordinated the transfer of tons of material aid to Georgia.37

The Role of the European Union in Georgia

Relations between the EU and Georgia started in 1992 right after Georgia regained its sovereignty in the wake of the breakup of the Soviet Union. Bilateral relations further intensified after the 2003 Rose Revolution, which brought to power a new Georgian administration committed to an ambitious program of political and economic reforms. EU-Georgian bilateral relations are regulated by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) which came into force on 1 July, 1999. The agreement is based on common values, such as respect for democratic principles, the rule of law, and human rights, as well as on adopting a market- oriented economy.38 The PCA provides the legal framework for wide-ranging cooperation in political dialog, trade, investments, and economic, legislative, and cultural cooperation. The joint structures set up under the PCA (Cooperation Council, Cooperation Committee, and Subcommittee on Trade, Economic and Related Legal Affairs, as well as the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee) meet on a regular basis in order to monitor the implementation of the PCA. The European Neighborhood Pol- icy (ENP) Action Plan endorsed by the EU-Georgia Cooperation Council of 14 November, 2006 aims at fulfilling the provisions of the PCA, contributing to closer relations with Georgia, promoting a significant degree of economic integration, and deepening political cooperation.39 The implementation

37 It also coordinated assistance to Georgia in 2005, when the country experienced some of the worst flooding in its history, and in 2006, when forest fires broke out in southern Georgia. 38 EU assists Georgia financially through the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). By means of this instrument, the EU supports the development of democracy, the rule of law and governance, economic growth and reduction of poverty, and peaceful settlement of internal conflicts. Total EU grants to Georgia from various EU financial assistance instruments amounted to 505 million euro between 1992 and 2006. Moreover, Georgia participates in thematic regional programs with respect to democracy and human rights under the ENPI. Georgia has also benefited from assistance under the TACIS Regional Cooperation Program (Interstate Program), and also under the issue-related programs, such as TRACECA, INOGATE, and the Regional Environmental Center for Southern Caucasus in Tbilisi. 39 The inclusion of Georgia in the European Neighborhood Policy marked a significant step forward in EU-Georgian relations. As a first step in this direction, a Country Report assessing Georgia’s progress toward political and economic 46 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 of the Action Plan further intends to significantly advance harmonization of Georgian legislation, regulations, and standards with those of the European Union.40 Before the 2008 Georgian crisis, the European Union did not pursue an active policy aimed at reaching peaceful settlement of the armed conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Nevertheless, the EU granted some financial assistance to economic rehabilitation and confidence-inducing measures.41 The EU contributions were distributed by specialized U.N. institutions, as well as the Red Cross and the Red Crescent. The situation in Georgia was discussed at the EU Summit on 1 September, 2008. The EU leaders declared that talks with Russia on a new partnership pact would be postponed until Russia withdrew its troops to their pre-conflict position. Moreover, they asked Russia to revise its decision to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as two independent states. The EU sent a team of specialists to review the humanitarian needs in the crisis area. After that, civilian observers monitored the implementation of the peace agreements entered under EU mediation. The EU leaders agreed to grant Georgia construction help, a free trade agreement, and a flexible visa regime for the citizens of Georgia.42 Moreover, they withdrew their support of Russia’s membership in the World Trade Organization. On 15 September, 2008, the foreign ministers of 27 member states decided to send an unarmed civilian observation team to the region to supervise the implementation of the peace agreements dated 12 August and 8 September, 2008 and to help achieve normalization in the region. A civilian Europe- an Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) was deployed in Georgia on 1 October, 2008,43 which included 200 observers from 22 EU member states. The EU deployed this Mission in the shortest time so far. By August 2010, the EU Monitoring Mission had members from 26 member countries. EUMM Georgia supervises implementation of the articles of the Six-Point Agreement and subsequent implementation of measures throughout Georgia, including Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In doing so, the EUMM pursues close cooperation with the U.N. and the OSCE.44 One of the main tasks of EUMM Georgia is to monitor, analyze, and report on the situation pertaining to the stabilization process, focusing on full compliance with the Six-Point Agreement, including troop withdrawal, and on freedom of movement, as well as on violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. The second main task is to monitor, analyze, and report on the situation pertaining to the normalization of civil governance, focusing on the rule of law, effective law-enforcement structures, and adequate public order. The Mission will also monitor the safety of transport routes and energy infrastructures and utilities, as well as the political and security aspects pertaining to the return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees. The third main task is to promote a reduction in tension through liaison and facilitate contacts between parties and other confidence- building measures. And, lastly, it has pledged to inform the public about European policy and pro- reform was published on March 2, 2005. The Country Report highlighted areas in which bilateral cooperation could be feasibly and significantly strengthened. The ENP Action Plan covers a period of five years. The main EU cooperation objectives, policy responses, and priority fields can be found in the Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013. On the basis of bilateral priorities, a National Indicative Program (NIP) was also adopted in agreement with the Georgian authorities. The NIP covers the period from 2007 to 2010. For this period, an indicative total sum of 120 million has been allocated; in addition to the ENPI national program, Georgia will also benefit from the ENPI regional and interregional programs, plus a number of thematic programs, such as the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). 40 The Action Plan focused especially on strengthening democracy, adhering to the rule of law, human rights, and socioeconomic reforms, improving the business climate, alleviating poverty, settling conflicts, resolving justice and security issues, including border management, harmonizing regulations in various sectors, including energy and transportation, and enhancing regional cooperation. 41 Between 1997 and 2006, the EU contributed 33 million euro. 42 [http://eeas.europa.eu/georgia/eu_georgia_summary/index_en.htm], 6 July, 2010. 43 [http://eeas.europa.eu/georgia/index_en.htm], 6 July, 2010. 44 [http://www.eumm.eu/en/about_eumm/mandate], 6 July, 2010. 47 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS mote the EU’s future engagement. The EUMM is a civilian, unarmed mission and cannot use force anyway. It reports on the grievances of the local population, on problems relating to the approaching winter, on gender and human rights issues, on the security situation, and on the presence of military and police forces in the area.45 New concerns have arisen over the so-called frozen conflicts in the EU’s eastern neighborhood. The situation in Georgia with respect to Abkhazia and South Ossetia has escalated, leading to the armed conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 2008. The EU led the international response through mediation between the parties, humanitarian aid, a civilian monitoring mission, and substantial financial support.46 The Georgian crisis has demonstrated what can be achieved when the EU member states act collectively with the necessary political will. EU engagement continues with the EU leading the Geneva Process. Possible settlement of the Transnistrian conflict has gained impetus through active EU participation in the 5+2 negotiation format and the EU Border Assistance Mission.47 But the more complex the challenges the EU faces, the more flexible the EU must be.48 Lasting stability in the neighborhood requires continued effort by the EU, together with the U.N., OSCE, the U.S., and Russia. The conflict with Georgia has adversely affected the EU’s relations with Russia. The EU expects Russia to honor its commitments in a way that will restore the necessary confidence. A potential partnership between the EU and Russia should be based on respect for common values, particularly human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and market economic principles, as well as on common interests and objectives.49 The EU and NATO have worked well together on the ground in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, even if formal relations have not advanced. Since 2003, the EU has also deepened its relations with the OSCE, especially in Georgia and Kosovo.50 Europe’s dependence on Russian energy supplies has prevented the EU from threatening to impose economic or diplomatic sanctions on Russia. The main EU countries (Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and Spain) embody different sets of preferences in the way they choose to deal with Russia.51 The unwillingness of the EU to impose economic sanctions was viewed as a vindication of sorts for Russia’s position regarding Georgia and a grudging acceptance of its privileged interests in its immediate neighborhood.

The Role of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Georgia

The OSCE Mission to Georgia started on 13 December, 1992. Its basic activities can be divided into two categories: firstly, the political and military dimension of security and, secondly, the humani-

45 See: [http://eumm.eu/en/intro], 6 July, 2010. 46 The EU has provided 6 million in humanitarian aid for people affected by the conflict in Georgia. An international donor’s conference for assisting Georgia’s economic recovery was held in Brussels on 22 October, 2008. 47 See: Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, Brussels, 11 December, 2008, p. 6, available at [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/104630.pdf]. 48 See: Ibid., p. 9. 49 See: Ibid., p. 10. 50 See: Ibid., p. 11. 51 See: F. Parmentier, “Normative Power, EU Preferences and Russia: Lessons from the Russian-Georgian War,” European Political Economy Review, No. 9, 2009, pp. 49-61. 48 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 tarian dimension of security. The main task of the OSCE Mission to Georgia was to help find a peaceful solution to the Georgia-Ossetia conflict. To this end, the OSCE Mission implemented economic rehabilitation programs in both regions. The OSCE Mission also contributed to the efforts conducted under U.N. leadership to promote peaceful settlement of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. The OSCE Mission to Georgia began observing the U.N. operations in Abkhazia in 1994 and reported the developments to the OSCE and its member states in order to facilitate the Organization’s inclusion in the negotiations conducted under the U.N. umbrella. In 2006, it joined the Coordinating Council of the Georgian and Abkhaz Parties under U.N. supervision and designed to resolve such issues as security problems, the return of displaced persons and asylum seekers, and social and economic issues. The OSCE Mission representative also attended the meetings of the Joint Control Commission composed of delegations from Georgia, South Ossetia, North Ossetia, and Russia. It made proposals concerning demilitarization of the conflict areas and cooperation between the law-enforcement forces of the sides. One of the Mission’s important duties was to observe the Joint Peace Keeping Forces and the situation in the conflict zone and report back to the OSCE member states. It also implemented programs to sustain the OSCE’s aims: restoring infrastructure and the economy; developing a civil society and human rights by providing financial aid to non-governmental organizations (NGOs); encouraging objective presentation of the events in the media by educating journalists; and publishing the Joint Control Commission (JCC) newspaper. As part of the OSCE’s comprehensive response to the global threat of terrorism, the Mission assisted the Georgian Government in implementing United Nations (U.N.) Security Council Resolu- tion 1373 on antiterrorist measures and the U.N.’s 13 universal conventions and protocols against terrorism, to which Georgia has been party since June 2006. The Mission’s projects aimed to help the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs to develop its capacity to fight terrorism. A series of OSCE-organized crisis management training programs began in April 2006. In addition, the Mission assisted the Georgian authorities by offering examples of the best practices in the fight against terrorism from the experience of other OSCE Participating States. The Mission supported the Georgian Government and NGOs in developing and implementing an effective framework for anti-trafficking activities that is in line with OSCE anti-trafficking commitments and focuses on protecting the human rights of victims. After a series of OSCE-supported discussions, Georgia passed a new Law on Combating Human Trafficking in June 2006, which led to the approval of a new referral mechanism and a state fund to compensate and provide shelter for victims. The OSCE Mission to Georgia worked to strengthen the capacity of Georgian society and its institutions to move the democratization process forward, boosting their ability to conduct free and fair elections and establish democracy at all levels. The Mission supported the OSCE Office for Dem- ocratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in its efforts to bring Georgia’s Election Code into harmony with international standards and improve its consistency. In 2007, it held a series of working sessions jointly with the Council of Europe and under the leadership of the Deputy Speaker of the Georgian Parliament with all the relevant election stakeholders about reform of the Election Code. The discussions facilitated agreements among the political parties about the electoral issues that were introduced in the December 2007 Election Code amendments. After Russia blocked the extension of the Mission’s mandate at the 22 December, 2008 meeting in Vienna, the OSCE began wrapping up its operations in Georgia at the beginning of 2009, thus ending its 16 years of service in the region. Finnish Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb said he deeply regretted that the 56 countries were unable to find a solution to the tension with Russia regarding the issue of breakaway South Ossetia. Stubb, who said “the OSCE still has much work to do in the region,” also

49 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS stated that he hoped the talks about OSCE activities in the region would continue in 2009.52 To prevent loss of the Mission, the OSCE offered to establish parallel and reciprocal field offices in Georgia and South Ossetia and, as an alternative, Finland demanded a three-month extension of the Mission’s mandate. However, Russia, which prohibited OSCE monitors from entering South Ossetia, declined the offers. The OSCE Mission to Georgia began working in 1992 to help Tbilisi with conflict resolution, democratization, human rights, and the rule of law. The Mission had about 200 monitors, 20 military observers from among whom were allowed to stay until February 2009 in the wake of the August crisis between Russia and Georgia. Prior to the August 2008 conflict in Georgia, the number of Military Monitoring Officers in the OSCE Mission to Georgia amounted to eight, five of whom were permanently deployed in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. Following the August 2008 conflict, twenty additional Military Mon- itoring Officers were deployed. The twenty-eight Military Monitoring Officers operated in the areas adjacent to South Ossetia. Following the decision on 12 February, 2009 to extend this operation until 30 June, 2009, the number of Military Monitoring Officers was reduced to twenty. During its administrative closure, which was to be completed by 30 June, 2009, the reduced staff of the OSCE Mission to Georgia provided administrative and logistic support, as well as information and political guidance to the Military Monitoring Officers.

Conclusion

In the new political order established after the breakup of the Soviet Union, international security organizations have been functioning in the region to help sustain stability by strengthening the weak state structures and liberal market economy in Georgia and the disputed states of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The Russian-Georgian War in August 2008 showed quite clearly that the initiatives designed to pacify the region had not produced a security system capable of preventing or containing internal and inter-state conflicts.53 The activities of the international security institutions are shaped by internal and external elements. The internal elements include the institution’s membership structure, organizational mechanisms, aims, and scope and authority. The external elements cover the expectations and perceptions of the international actors—primarily states—regarding the role of the international institutions. These elements also defined the operational framework of the international security institutions during the 2008 Georgian crisis. If the internal factors of the international security institutions are analyzed, the Russian Feder- ation’s membership in these institutions played a decisive role. In this context, the participation of both the U.N., which played a pivotal role in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, and the OSCE, which played a stimulating role for cooperation and coordination during the conflict, was stymied due to the Russian Federation’s involvement in the problem. Due to the fact it was involved in the conflict and due to its membership status, Russia, a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, prevented the Council from making a specific decision on behalf of the international community. Even if other factors came into play here, the U.N.’s organizational membership structure and its decision-making

52 See: “OSCE Chairman Regrets Disagreement on OSCE Future in Georgia,” OSCE, 21 August, 2008, available at [http://www.osce.org/cio/50525], 23 December, 2008. 53 See: M. Çelikpala, “Security in the Black Sea Region,” Commission on the Black Sea Policy Report II, 2010, available at [http://www.blackseacom.eu/uploads/media/Black_Sea_Policy_Report_II_Security.pdf], 19 June, 2010. 50 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 mechanism were instrumental in this situation. When the U.N., which is a universal organization, fails to respond to a crisis that threatens peace and stability, regional organizations, based on Chapter 8 (Art 52) of the U.N. Charter, may intervene provided they follow the U.N. Charter’s rules and inform the U.N. Security Council of the developments. Hence, the U.N. protects international peace and stability by delegating power to a more appropriate international security institution. The OSCE, which is an Atlantic-Eurasian organization of which Russia is a member, played a passive role during the crisis and became an unwanted actor in the region after the crisis. Its excessive staff, its inability to compel its members to come to a consensus during decision-making, and the difficulties it has with putting decisions into practice undermine the OSCE’s ability to tackle major problems. While the OSCE may carry out its activities regarding issues that involve Georgia and the dominant actors in the conflict zone, it cannot become a reliable negotiator when these actors are in conflict. In the 2008 Georgian crisis, the OSCE failed to play a central role. Despite being an intergovernmental regional organization of similar and geographically close countries, NATO is the institution that contributes the most to maintaining international peace and stability and upholding the U.N.’s basic principles. The fact that the United States leads this organization is undoubtedly a vital factor. Under U.S. leadership, the allies work in cooperation in most cases that threaten international stability. During the 2008 Georgian crisis, these qualities helped NATO play a key role. However, the same qualities also prevented it from playing a dominant role, because NATO, which represents the West’s and, especially, the U.S.’s “hard power,” shied away from making a move that might change not only the regional, but also the global political balance. Moreover, the discussion of Georgia’s membership in NATO before the crisis and the fact that the other side of the conflict, Russia, is not a NATO member also prevented the Organization from appearing unbiased during the crisis. These factors forced NATO not to pursue a more active role. Since it has a sui generis polity, the EU also has a complex foreign policy structure. The EU, which has 27 member states, pursues the Community method in some cases and intergovernmental decisions in others. The EU, which tries to improve its capabilities and capacity from year to year in security and defense, is considered the most efficient international security institution in crisis management thanks to the instruments it possesses. The dependency of its members on Russia, especially in energy supply, prevents the EU from adopting an anti-Russian stand. However, the geographic locations in which EU and Russia are in competition with each other also prevent the EU from being pro-Russian. These factors obviously contributed to the EU being accepted as a mediator between the two clashing sides. In terms of external factors, even though the United Nations as mediator would be a solution sustained by the global community, the issues on which the international community could not agree, such as the right to self-determination, territorial integrity, and recognition, caused the Organization to be passive during and after the crisis. The OSCE failed to build confidence through the activities it began performing in 1992 and continued performing until the crisis, especially with Russia. This prevented the OSCE from playing a primary role in establishing confidence between the sides. There- fore, even though it is the most comprehensive of the regional security organizations, the OSCE, just like the U.N., was stymied in its activity due to the disagreement on crucial issues among its member states. As for NATO, despite being the organization with the greatest capability and number of sol- diers, it was ineffective in the 2008 crisis since it was seen as an organization that looked after West- ern, and particularly American, interests. Russia perceived NATO’s activities as reducing the former’s security and hence saw NATO as the other side of the conflict. Therefore, NATO was unable to play a security-establishing role in the crisis. After the crisis, even though its relations with Georgia ta- pered off, it kept the possibility of Georgia’s membership on the agenda and wants to be a crucial actor in the conflict zone. Since the EU cannot be a “hard power” due to its lack of military presence, it still has the presence of a “soft power” or normative power in crises. During the 2008 Georgian crisis, this

51 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS image facilitated its role as a mediator between the parties in the conflict. The multidimensional aspect of its relations with Georgia and the nature of its relations with Russia made it the ideal mediator in this crisis. In conclusion, in light of the external and internal factors, the U.N., NATO, and the OSCE saw a decline in their role in Georgia during and after the crisis, while the EU, in contrast, stepped up its activity. Such diversification among the international security institutions occurred due to the differences in their organizational structure and capabilities, their viewpoints, and their perceived roles. These institutions need to revise their programs in order to involve all the regional actors in stabilization of the region.

52 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011

NATION-BUILDING

POLITICAL COMPETITION IN CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS: OBJECTIVES, MEANS, AND MECHANISMS

Bakhodyr ERGASHEV D.Sc. (Philos.), Professor, Independent Researcher (Tashkent, Uzbekistan)

Introduction

olitical competition in the newly independent ing the same problem in the post-Communist states as an academic problem has acquired countries. P a new dimension under the impact of the re- Here I have analyzed the political competi- cent developments in North Africa and West Asia. tion processes underway in the domestic policy A large number of academic writings examine the development of political competition in Ja- E. Ismailov, “Vlast i oppozitsia nakanune i v period prezi- 1 dentskoy izbiratelnoy kampanii na Kavkaze,” Tsentralnaya pan, India, and Turkey, while Central Asia and Azia i Kavkaz, No. 1 (2), 1999; I. Antadze, “Parlamentskie the Caucasus2 plays an important role in analyz- vybory v Gruzii,” Tsentralnaya Azia i Kavkaz, No. 5 (6), 1999; V. Mesamed, “Demokratia i plyuralizm v musulman- skikh regionakh byvshego Sovetskogo Soyuza. K itogam 1 See: R. Fulle, Political Competition in India, Sweet konferentsii, organizovannoy Tsentrom rossiiskikh i vos- Briar College, Virginia, 1969, 120 pp.; Kap Yun Lee, Polit- tochnoevropeyskikh issledovaniy im. Cummingsa pri Tel- ical Competition and the Party System in Japan, Yale Uni- Avivskom universitete,” Tsentralnaya Azia i Kavkaz, No. 1 (7), versity, Yale, 1984, 139 pp.; P. Bernholz, R. Vaubel, Polit- 2000; A. Saidmuradov, “Uzbekistan: Political Parties on the ical Competition, Innovation and Growth in the History of Eve of the Parliamentary Elections,” Central Asia and the Asian Civilizations, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, Caucasus, No. 5 (29), 2004; V. Dolidze, “Political Parties Camberley, Northampton, 2004, 225 ðð. and Party Development in Georgia,” Central Asia and the 2 See: E. Ertysbaev, “Nekotorye aspekty prezident- Caucasus, No. 2 (32), 2005; K. Borispolets, “Elections in skoy izbiratelnoy kampanii v Kazakhstane (oktyabr-dekabr Central Asian States: Political Rivalry in a Transitional So- 1998 g.),” Tsentralnaya Azia i Kavkaz, No. 1 (2), 1999; ciety,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 1 (37), 2006. 53 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS of the Central Asian and South Caucasian coun- In 2009, the annual Country Reports on tries starting in 2009, the year Barack Obama Human Rights Practices, which appeared in the became president of the United States. first year of Barack Obama’s presidency, touched In 1975, Republican President Gerald Ford upon the social and political situation in some of (1974-1977) assessed the chances of Western de- the post-Soviet states (Russia and Uzbekistan mocracies in their rivalry with Marxism (particu- among others) and described the stimuli which larly in the regions bordering on Soviet Central could have added vigor to political competition: Asia and the Transcaucasus) as “military compe- 1. Opposition parties; tition must be controlled. Political competition must be restrained.”3 2. Alternative candidates to state posts; Said at the height of détente, four years later 3. Access to the media; this formula lost its meaning when the Soviet Un- ion, after capturing President Amin’s residence by 4. Free political campaigns; storm, invaded Afghanistan during the Democrat- 5. Removal of administrative barriers for all ic Administration of President Carter (1977-1981). involved in election campaigns, etc.5 This radically changed the situation in Central Asia along with the approaches to political competition. Later, in April 2009, speaking at the Turkish President Carter and the key figures of his parliament, President Obama pointed out that “de- administration (Zbigniew Brzezinski in particu- mocracy cannot be static”; he also spoke about a lar) were very impressed by the book To Build a “vibrant civil society” and “enduring commitment Castle by Vladimir Bukovsky, a prominent Soviet to the rule of law”6 (probably intending to stress dissident, published in 1978 and similar works the advantages of the American political methods which appeared at approximately the same time. as compared with the peaceful methods of dealing The Democrats developed their approach- with social conflicts in Muslim countries). es under President Clinton (1993-2001) when In June 2009, speaking at Cairo University, “new” Russia (still a big player in Central Asia Barack Obama went even further by calling for and the Southern Caucasus) under President “legitimate workings of the political process,”7 Yeltsin and some other countries (Azerbaijan, having in mind political competition in West Asia Armenia, Georgia, and Tajikistan) were facing the and North Africa, among other places. need to develop perestroika and achieve a political consensus at home.4 5 See: 2009 Human Rights Report: Russia; 2009 Human Rights Report: Uzbekistan, available at [http://www. 3 G. Ford, Address in Helsinki before the Conference state.gov]. on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1 August, 1975 6 B. Obama, Remarks to the Turkish Parliament, [www.usa-presidents.info/speeches/helsinki.html]. Turkish Grand National Assembly Complex, Ankara, Tur- 4 See: “Vybrannye mesta iz perepiski Borisa Yeltsina key, 6 April, 2009, available at [www.whitehouse.gov]. i Williama J. Clintona,” Rossia v globalnoy politike, 20 De- 7 B. Obama, Remarks at Cairo University, Egypt, 4 cember, 2010, available at [www.globalaffairs.ru]. June, 2009, available at [www.america.gov].

I. The Fundamental Definitions of Political Competition: Content, Indices, Types, and Levels in the Post-Communist Context

Why did the political competition issue come to the fore under Obama rather than earlier, under President Clinton?

54 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011

This is all very simple: during the first post-Communist decade, the Central Asian and South Caucasian republics still remembered the total domination of the Communist ideology represented by the C.P.S.U. The inertia of a strong government allowed many of the CIS presidents (particularly in the transition period) to cooperate with the parliamentary parties without becoming directly involved with the parties’ functioning. Party contradictions (inevitable in any country) provided the rulers of the newly independent states with a chance to play arbiter. Robert Kocharyan, former prime minister (1997) and former president (1998-2008) of Armenia, said in this connection: “It’s impossible to be a player and a referee on the field of political competition at the same time.”8 (In December 2010, President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan, whose conservatism is explained by his post, suggested that “healthy competition” should be distinguished from “intrigues”9; he probably wanted to say that the level of political culture in his country should be raised.10 On the other hand, one tends to agree with those sociologists who write that political competition boils down to intrigues, that is, playing a game and scoring points.11) It would be wrong to say that it was Russia alone, during the eight years of Putin’s presidency (otherwise called “vertical dictatorship”), that planted conservative ideas about political competition in the CIS countries. On 8 July, 2000, President Putin warned the Federal Assembly that “a strong government is interested in strong rivals” and “only in conditions of political competition is it possible to hold a serious dialog on the development of our state.”12 In December 2001, however, he deemed it necessary to say: “It must be truly healthy competition and not a fruitless struggle that weakens the state system and undermines the authority of the state.”13 Finally, in May 2004, Putin specified his ideas about unfair political competition as stemming from the desire to use it for personal gain, illegal funding of political parties, and the creation of a black market of voting technology and lobbying. (He described “the dreary monotony of party programs”14 as one of the reasons for the slack political competition. He meant to say that the ruling elite, which formally accepts political competition, wanted to keep it in check. Under Putin, political activity moved away from competition to a hierarchy.) Members of the so-called non-systemic opposition in the CIS countries (in Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus in particular) and the expert community offered their own opinions about the best model of political competition. Their somewhat spontaneous nature is explained by the events in Georgia in November 2003 and Ukraine in November-December 2004. It should be said that political scientists have noticed that greater political competition and straightforward rules of the political process increase the risk of a Color Revolution. (The new ruling elites in Ukraine and Georgia were against destructive interpretations of political competition. Victor Yushchenko insisted that political competition should be kept within the Constitution to avoid

8 Robert Kocharian describes the necessity for fair political competition at the 2012 elections as “imperative,” 7 February, 2011 (see: Information Agency “Mediamax,” available at [mediamax.am]). 9 S. Sargsyan, Statement on the Occasion of the 20th Anniversary of the Republican Party of Armenia, available at [president.am]. 10 See: “Prezident Armenii zayavil, chto ne predyavlaya ultimatuma glave koalitsionnoy partii,” 18 December, 2010, available at [newsarmenia.ru]. 11 See, for example: V. Fedorov, “Politicheskaya sistema stanovitsya bolee ustoychivoy, konkurentnoy i uprugoy. Ona ne idet v raznos,” 15 March, 2010, available at [www.liberty.ru]. 12 V. Putin, Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 8 July, 2000, available at [www.kremlin.ru]. 13 V. Putin, Speech at the Founding Congress of Yedinstvo i Otechestvo (Unity and Motherland) Party, 1 December, 2001, available at [www.kremlin.ru]. 14 V. Putin, Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 26 May, 2004, available at [www.kremlin.ru]. 55 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS damaging democracy; it should aim at “ideas and programs” and “seek compromises rather than confrontation.”15) The public became gradually convinced that political competition, first, strengthens the political system; second, needs an independent legislature, independent media, and proper funding of the political parties to function; and third, and most important, makes the election process more democratic and adds variety to the forms of political mobilization and public control methods. The events of March 2005 in Kyrgyzstan put the interaction between political competition and government efficiency on the agenda. According to political scientists, in practically all the CIS countries power relations, related to specific people rather than legal regulations, are mainly informal; this explains the unwelcome trends in political competition. Brice Bueno de Mesquita and George W. Downs of New York University, who analyzed the experience of China and the Mid-Eastern and CIS countries, pointed out that effective political competition calls for “strategic coordination” between the people and the government, “disseminating information, recruiting and organizing party members, selecting leaders, raising funds and holding meetings and demonstrations”16 being the main forms of such cooperation. (It was in September 1995 that President of Uzbekistan Karimov spoke for the first time about the need for political competition as part of a larger phenomenon of the new society—social competition with which “the traditional values of the Uzbek people should be harmonized.”17 In his later speeches, the president of Uzbekistan called for competition of opinions and ideas, as well as rivalry among parties (April 1999), and for disputes among all sorts of sociopolitical forces (July 1999). President Karimov expected that his country would achieve real political competition by early 2001.18 In August 2002 he spoke about competition in the information sphere.) The Andijan events of May 2005 in Uzbekistan brought to light the special role the intelligentsia (creative, academic, etc.) has to play in political competition. Many of the prominent political scientists of Uzbekistan described it as a buffer of sorts between the religious part of society and the secular political elite. All studies of political competition concentrate on the main actors; so far religion, relations between confessions, and reproduction of extremism have remained on the back burner. The “extremes” of political competition bring to mind the problem of its level. Central Asian and South Caucasian political scientists rely on a conception suggested by Gabriel A. Almond, a prominent American politologist, who proceeded from the quantitative support of radicalism, liberalism, and conservatism. In developing societies, the correlation is 45:25:30.19 It should be said that the Muslim republics of the CIS describe religious movements as radical. At that time, the Western democracies and expert community regarded Kazakhstan, a multi- confessional country with secular public and political practices, as the best example of the “secular state-political competition” pattern. U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan John Ordway called on the government of Kazakhstan to stimulate political competition and suggested that the opposition should move closer to the people. He believed that the social and economic problems should be identified, while the people should become involved in the political processes on a greater scale.20

15 V. Yushchenko, “Otvet na krizis v Ukraine dolzhen byt zhestkim,” 4 April, 2007, available at [www.president. gov.ua]. 16 B. Mesquita, G. Downs, “An Open Economy, a Closed Society,” The New York Times, 17 August, 2005. 17 I.A. Karimov, Uzbekistan na poroge XXI veka: ugrozy bezopasnosti, uslovia i garantii progressa, 1997, available at [www.press-service.uz]. 18 See: I.A. Karimov, “Po puti demokraticheskogo razvitia. Interview rabotnikam sredstv massovoy informatsii v svyazi s vsenarodnym referendumom,” 27 January, 2002, available at [www.press-service.uz]. 19 See: G. Almond, G. Powell, R. Dalton, K. Strom, Comparative Politics Today: A World View, Boston, 1974. 20 See: J. Ordway, “Interview gazete Vremya,” 31 January, 2006, available at [Russian.kazakhstan.usembassy.gov]. 56 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011

The people at the helm responded positively to these suggestions. In November 2006, President Nazarbaev said the following in one of his speeches: “Political competition is primarily a competition of ideas” (this resonates with Victor Yushchenko’s “political competition concentrates on ideas”). President Nazarbaev clearly indicated that only a party capable of “formulating the most efficient development strategy” could aspire to lead Kazakhstan society.21 The above suggests that it was in 1999-2000 that the leaders of the Central Asian and South Caucasian republics started talking about the need to encourage political competition. Significantly, it is believed, and not infrequently, that political competition boils down to rivalry among the principal actors (strong, including opposition, parties) and partly the media, which produces the necessary ideas, “methods, and ways to achieve prosperity.”22 Today, the leaders of the Color Revolutions are, likewise, calling for healthy and constructive competition with due account for the mentality, religiosity, and culture of the local people.

II. Joint Responsibility for Anti-crisis Programs. Competitive Ideas or Alternative Projects?

We should always bear in mind that political competition aims at capturing, holding, and using political power. Any analyst should never forget that as long as there is a powerful administrative resource (that is, “excessive” influence of the people at the top on political decision-making), many people will strive for power who seek illegal gains rather than democracy and the free market. (Social scientists point out that there is a reverse process: a non-competitive political milieu creates, multi- plies, and reproduces the administrative resource.23) The roles played by power and the administrative resource in political competition cannot be comprehended without taking into account the elite (formal, informal, counter-elite, situational elite, etc.) as an important actor. The people at the helm in the Central Asian and South Caucasian republics (with the exception of Georgia and Kyrgyzstan) declared, at least at the initial stages, that they intended to reproduce a high-quality elite (using “personnel training,” “personnel policy,” and other similar terms), having in mind a formal (nomenklatura) elite which, for obvious reasons, did not need political competition. The attitude toward the elite as an actor in political competition is best illustrated by the way it is treated in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, two of the largest Central Asian republics. The leaders of Uzbekistan accept the fact that outside the republic there is an interchangeable old (C.P.S.U.) and new (intellectual) elite.24 Inside the country this division is not acceptable. Nursultan Nazarbaev sees the elite as a group of people (leaders) of different generations; they possess considerable intellectual potential, behave responsibly, and are prepared to deal with socially

21 N.A. Nazarbaev, “Vystuplenie na VII syezde Grazhdanskoy partii Kazakhstana,” 10 November, 2006, available at [www.akorda.kz]. 22 Interview by Dmitry Medvedev to Chinese Central Television (CCTV). 12 April, 2011, available at [www. kremlin.ru]. 23 See: R.M. Nureev, “Ekonomicheskie sub’ekty postsovetskoy Rossii,” Mir Rossii, No. 3, 2001. 24 See: I.A. Karimov, “My vse zainteresovany v mire i stabilnosti,” 4 May, 2001; “Nikto ne smozhet svernut nas s izbrannogo puti,” 25 May, 2005; “Kontseptsia dalneyshego uglublenia demokraticheskikh reform i formirovania grazhdan- skogo obshchestva v strane,” 12 November, 2011, available at [www.press-service.uz]. 57 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS important issues. The elite should have a conservative wing, while its stability largely depends on the emergence of a middle class.25 The formal (nomenklatura) and informal (criminal among other things) elites of the Central Asian and South Caucasian states are still very vulnerable, partly because the West has not yet decided how to treat them. Some political scientists, such as Igor Yurgens, frequently talk about the appointed formal elite and describe it as thoroughly corrupt, bureaucratic, and, in many respects, pro-Russian. The expert community does not exclude the possibility that a Westernized elite (now potential leaders with no top posts) might come to power in Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus, which will make political competition more efficient. In 2006-2008, there were serious attempts in Uzbekistan to enlarge the legal field for the counter-elite and parliamentary opposition. In Kazakhstan, too, much was done to draw the systemic opposition (leaders of the Communist Party among others) into forming the power structures. It should be said that the counter-elite (constructive systemic opposition as the bulwark of liberalism of the intellectuals) finds it hard to function in the present conditions. Until the August 2008 crisis, corruption in the nomenklatura elite was more or less effectively kept in check by political competition. This was what political analyst and mathematician Georgy Satarov, a former Yeltsin aide, wrote in June 2006. In July 2008, President Medvedev spoke about political competition as an anti-corruption measure. It should be said that the problem of corruption (or rather its corporate form) became even more obvious at the beginning of the crisis as one of the factors triggering the crisis.26 On the whole, before the world financial and economic crisis, the world treated political competition as an anti-corruption mechanism differently than it does today. An analysis of numerous publications has revealed that the high fuel prices made some countries (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Russia) convinced that rapid GDP growth was achievable even if political competition was fairly weak and that all that was needed was anti-corruption measures designed to meet the “planned indices.” It was said, at the same time, that inadequate political competition would slow down economic growth, while the restrictions imposed on development of the expert community would deprive politicians of academic support. Warnings of this type came from the Center for Strategic Studies set up in 1999 under the Government of Russia and the Institute of Economics, RAS, the history of which goes back to 1930. An analysis of President Nazarbaev’s two speeches delivered at two forums of the National Democratic Party Nur Otan held in early and late 2008 (on the very eve of the world crisis) offers a graphic picture of the effective connection between anti-corruption efforts and political modernization. The president talked about involving the regional branches of the ruling party in combating corruption, the party’s territorial branches initiating the dismissal of top officials in bureaucratic and law- enforcement structures involved in corruption scandals, and the drafting of the Ten Crushing Blows at Corruption program.27 At the Anti-corruption Forum of the NDP Nur Otan, he sounded even more determined; he spoke about the need to teach the nation to be intolerant of corruption.28

25 See: N.A. Nazarbaev, “Doklad na pyatoy sessii Assamblei narodov Kazakhstana,” 21 January, 1999; “Vystuple- nie na XII sessii Assamblei narodov Kazakhstana,” 24 October, 2006; “Lektsia v ‘Nazarbaev-Universitete,’” 7 December, 2010, available at [www.akorda.kz]. 26 See: N.A. Nazarbaev, “Vystuplenie na Antikorruptsionnom forume NDP ‘Nur Otan,’” 6 November, 2008, available at [www.akorda.kz]. 27 See: N.A. Nazarbaev, “Vystuplenie na rasshirennom zasedanii Politsoveta NDP ‘Nur Otan,’” 17 January, 2008, available at [www.akorda.kz]. 28 See: N.A. Nazarbaev, “Vystuplenie na Antikorruptsionnom forume NDP ‘Nur Otan,’” 6 November, 2008, available at [www.akorda.kz]. 58 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011

On the eve of and during the world financial and economic crisis, there was a lot of discussion about what civil society, its institutions, and political parties could offer: competitive ideas or alternative projects. It was decided that the former was more likely. In the Central Asian and South Caucasian countries, the state and society proved unable, in the crisis situation, to arrive at effective anti-crisis programs born by political competition and interaction of different views and ideas, which, as Nino Burjanadze put it, “could be accepted by the people.”29 Combined, such programs could have helped the people in power to share responsibility and achieve an acceptable social-economic strategy. Outstanding American economist and Nobel Prize winner Douglass North was quite right when he wrote in 2006 that political competition was closely connected with economic competition and that “sustaining competitive democracy is possible only in the presence of economic competition and the emergence of sophisticated economic organizations.”30 This explains the paradoxical impotence of political parties, public institutions, and civil society at times of greatest social tension. This means that slack economic competition was responsible for equally weak political competition. (I have already written that the leaders of Uzbekistan proceeded from the “social competition = economic competition = political competition” formula, which confirms that political competition can only develop in a favorable economic milieu.)

III. Will the State Help the Municipalities to Become the Rostrum for Young Opposition Members?

To borrow an idea from Igor Yurgens, we can say that in the post-Soviet expanse the world financial and economic crisis created a social pact of sorts between the state and society, which was prepared to turn a blind eye to limited political competition in exchange for better social conditions. At the same time, the state repeatedly stressed its willingness to encourage this competition.31 During the crisis, however, the informal and situational elites of Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus regarded the state not only as “the main vehicle of anti-crisis programs.” There are many reasons why the elites should avoid confrontation with state power; the opposition needs it for the following reasons: 1. To attach a state status to its ideals and interests; 2. To make them part of the legal system; 3. To realize them through the mechanisms of executive power.32

29 N. Burjanadze, “Zhenskoe litso gruzinskoy politiki,” 22 January, 2011, available at [vlasti.net]. 30 D. North, J. Wallis, B. Weingast, “A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History,” Nation- al Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series, available at [www.nber.org]. 31 Significantly, on 23 October, 2010 First Deputy Head of RF Presidential Administration Vladislav Surkov said that if a political system became self-contained it degraded; the worst thing that might happen to the ruling party was to remain alone on the Olympus outside the reach of critics and immune to problems. 32 See: Yu.A. Nisnevich, “Rol konkurentsii v obespechenii sotsialno-politicheskoy stabilnosti i podavlenii korrupt- sii,” Vestnik Rossiiskogo universiteta druzhby narodov. Seria: Politologia, No. 3, 2009, pp. 3-17. Yuly Nisnevich, Doctor of Political Science, Professor, Director of the Institute of Problems of Liberal Development, State Duma deputy in 1993- 1995. 59 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Election campaigns give the most adequate idea of the state of political competition, which makes us wonder what new measures have been offered in this sphere? It was suggested, in particular, that the scope of those involved in politics be broadened in the near future, while in the more distant future, there are plans to carry out a technological revolution in the election system and improve voting technology with the help of electronic innovations. These approaches were tested during the 2011 presidential election in Kazakhstan; Ermuhamet Ertysbaev, aide of the President of Kazakhstan, admitted that the government had helped second- rate rivals register who could address at least some of the problems of socioeconomic modernization.33 The results of the election in Azerbaijan late in 2010 allowed the republic’s leaders to speak about much clearer trends toward fighting for the ideas and opinions voiced by the political opponents.34 According to American officials, the people of Turkmenistan want a better “quality of elections, competition in election, and development of local governance.”35 This is directly related to political competition. Brought down to the municipal level, political competition can acquire more vigor, a fact amply confirmed by the pre-term municipal elections in Georgia held on 30 May, 2010, on the initiative of President Saakashvili, along with the first direct election of the mayor of Tbilisi. After positively assessing the consultations between the ruling majority and the opposition, President Saakashvili went on to say: “I call on the Parties to become more interested in the people’s problems and to speak to them.”36 On 28 February, 2011, he told the parliamentary majority that “all of us should be closer to our electorate (this primarily concerns the regional deputies).”37 Meanwhile, despite the obviously developing political competition in Georgia, the political process there is still dominated by clear and seemingly immutable “rules of the game” accepted by all the parties. In the last two years, the political competition relations between the ruling majority and the opposition have been changing a lot: 1. The role and functions of the ruling party are being revised. 2. The ideas of a balanced representation of several parties alternating at the helm are being discussed. 3. The parliamentary opposition has become the “parliament’s orderly.” 4. Some non-parliamentary parties are involved in constructive efforts (by strengthening their governing bodies by means of influential bureaucrats). 5. Political competition is intensifying because different political parties are being drawn into it. Competition among the actors (as a by-product of political competition), as well as among the political parties, is of immense importance.

33 See: E. Ertysbaev, “Vybory v Kazakhstane de facto stanut referendumom,” 25 March, 2011, RIA “Novosti,” available at [www.rian.ru]. 34 See: I. Aliev, “Rech na pervom zasedanii Milli Mejlisa Azerbaidzhanskoy Respubliki,” 29 November, 2010, available at [www.president.az]. 35 R. Boucher, Turkmenistan-U.S. Relations, Ashghabad, Turkmenistan, 16 April, 2009, available at [turkmenistan.usembassy.gov]. 36 “President of Georgia Estimates Initiated Consultations with Opposition and Majority Positively,” 11 November, 2010, available at [www.president.gov.ge]. 37 “The President of Georgia Met the Parliamentary Majority,” 28 February, 2011 [www.president.gov.ge]. 60 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011

The description of political life in Russia as a “dreary audition”38 is fully applicable to Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus; the only difference is that in these regions those who “dropped out” of active politics cannot come back because, after all, party-building is but part of political competition and vice versa. The following is needed to accelerate party development: 1. Political culture should be upgraded so that political aggression is not taken for political competition. 2. The mechanisms of rotation of party leaders should be de-blocked. 3. The new elite should be drawn into competition inside parties and among parties to improve personnel selection. 4. So-called vertical lifts should start functioning, along with opposition to kleptocratic trends, incessant personnel rotation, etc. I have already written that political competition cannot be separated from economic competition; the new elite is born of greater attention to the middle class. China’s experience has demonstrated that it is not enough to merely transfer the rules and customs of one civilization (Western, in this case) to different conditions (post-Soviet, Asian, Muslim, etc.); political competition in a “well-fed society” is very different from that in a “society of paupers.” What is needed is painstaking work to ensure the interests of businessmen, farmers, and owners of intellectual property. In Kazakhstan, some prominent officials have pointed out that systemic opposition should receive financial support, that the country needs a party of businessmen to compete with NDP Nur Otan (to separate the government and business) and fight corruption, and that a two- party political system should be created.39 This obviously deserves the attention of Kazakhstan’s neighbors and their expert communities in particular. Analysts have agreed that the attempts to build political parties on a professional basis (the Agrarian Party of Kazakhstan, for example) can hardly be called successful; they say that a full-fledged multiparty system needs a lot of time to emerge and that political and corporate interests should be kept apart. (Significantly, the leaders of Azerbaijan agree that “business requires political support.”40) Political competition and radicalism and extremism are interconnected; in some of the Central Asian and South Caucasian countries the methods used to oppose these threats are being revised; it is also said that political outsiders should draft their own constructive alternative projects.41 Some think that the intelligentsia serves as a buffer between the radical part of society and the secular political elite; it should be said in this connection that if and when religious extremists are no longer demonized and if and when all restraints on political competition in any Muslim country are lifted, the state and society will acquire several more or less moderate Islamic movements instead of one aggressively extremist trend (Egypt has amply confirmed this), which will greatly improve the confessional situation. The events in Ukraine in 1994-2005 confirm that, in the absence of political competition, the country is not immune to catastrophic developments (especially during a regime change) which will inevitably push the country back.

38 G. Pavlovsky, “Strelba po srednemy klassu. Vzryv i posledstvia,” 26 January, 2011, Russky zhurnal, available at [www.russ.ru]. 39 See: E. Ertysbaev, “Revolutsia sverkhu?” 11 April, 2011, Megapolis, available at [megapolis.kz]. 40 I. Aliev, Rech na vstreche s predstavitelyami Gazakhskogo rayona, 9 February, 2011, available at [www. presidenr.az]. 41 See, for example: H. Babaoglu, “Logical End of Political Radicalism or ‘Democracy’ Game of Anarchists Com- pleted,” 8 April, 2011, Yeni Azdrbaycan Partiyasý, available at [www.yap.org.az]; Hikmet Babaoglu is Editor of Yeni Az- erbaijan, the newspaper of the ruling New Azerbaijan Party. 61 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Talking about Kyrgyzstan, we must agree that in an Asian country with somewhat subdued Muslim traditions, a secular past, and an unstable government, excessively active political competition (related to the parliamentary regime) is another threatening factor.

B y W a y o f a C o n c l u s i o n: The Westminster Space

It turned out that election of the head of government from among the leaders of parties with the majority of seats in the parliament proved to be the trickiest element of the Westminster system for introducing into Central Asia and Southern Caucasus. The same can be said about an efficient multiparty system, two-chamber parliament, and a vigorous parliamentary opposition. Despite all the talk in the Central Asian and South Caucasian countries about their intention to identify leadership potential in the ruling parties and even their obvious penchant for imitation democracy,42 they are not yet ready for deep-cutting Westminster reforms. So far, the political parties and civil institutions have been unable to offer alternative blueprints for the reforms. Meanwhile, alternative blueprints are the main product of political competition inside the country; they become possible in the conditions of a free market, economic freedom, propriety rights, rising prosperity, etc. In the absence of political competition, the government remains the only ruler on which the nation depends for its prosperity; this breeds indifference to the political process and high- tech achievements. Today, certain specific suggestions about how to enliven public and political life in the Central Asian and South Caucasian republics have been made, including: 1. Stabilizing the legal field of party-building. 2. Increasing the demand for efficient parties, especially in the opposition and right wing. 3. Transferring party competition to the local representative bodies of power. 4. Ensuring transparent elections of heads of local administrations. 5. Improving election laws, etc. The above might stir up political competition, while these measures should be implemented by analytical structures and political parties. I, in turn, would like to see a time when a grant-based system for funding analytical state structures will stir up competition among the non-state structures, when joint and open consortiums of state and non-state structures appear, and when legally justified JVs with foreign partners become a reality along with cases when the state officially cuts down grants to failed official structures, etc. We cannot exclude the possibility that the political market might be crammed with “fast moving consumer goods” based on vague formulas such as “accelerate democratic reforms at a fast pace,” “ensure close relations with the West,” “expose the intrigues of Russian imperialism in every way possible,” “return to the true sources of national history,” “de-Stalinize all spheres of life,” etc. Any of these slo- gans will be subjected to a severe test when the party that campaigned with it comes to power. Hillary Clinton has rightly pointed out that “competition in the idea market is as important as the competition in the economic market.”43

42 R. Coalson, “The Gun is Hanging on the Wall,” The Moscow Times, 10 January, 2008. Robert Coalson is a Rus- sian analyst for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty based in Prague. 43 H. Clinton, “Remarks. Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia,” 14 October, 2009, available at [www.state.gov]. 62 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011

Respect for knowledge and ideas and their treatment as a commodity and capital, as well as free exchange of them, form the cornerstone of effective political competition. Effective competition on the domestic political scene hinges on the attitude to alternative projects as one of the most important aspects of intellectual property.

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN GEORGIA AS A RESULT OF ITS POLITICAL INSTABILITY

Beka CHEDIA Ph.D. (Political Science), Head of Publishing Projects of the Tbilisi School of Political Studies (Tbilisi, Georgia)

Introduction

n the twenty years that have elapsed since For over twenty years now, Georgian poli- Georgia gained its independence, it has failed ticians have been discussing and disagreeing I to stabilize its political system; the republic about the new electoral systems and constitutional is busy looking for an adequate model of politi- amendments and addenda; they prefer to call their cal governance and territorial-administrative di- disagreements “nation-building.” The republic’s vision; there is no flexible and effective electoral citizens have become lost in a dense forest of le- system acceptable to all. gal formulas and political regulations. Year after year, the Constitution acquires In fact, these disagreements are the outcrop amendments and addenda which never resolve of a never-ending power struggle that does not the political contradictions and merely add to the allow the republic to stabilize its political sys- confusion. tem.

Traditions of Georgian Constitutionalism and the Quest for an Optimal Form of Governance

Georgia awakened to the need to limit executive power and increase the role of the parliament even before England acquired the Magna Carta in 1215. It was under the rule of Queen Tamar (the

63 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

12th century) that the Georgian aristocracy and commoners formulated the idea of a new branch of power, a Georgian parliament. K. Arslan, the leader of the 12th-century opposition, devised a two- chamber parliament: 1. Darbazi, one of the two chambers staffed with aristocracy and respected commoners, was expected to meet from time to time to discuss the situation and pass decisions: the decision execution belonged to the king. 2. Karavi was the chamber expected to function between the Darbazi’s sessions. The idea was not realized either in the 12th century or later. Georgia acquired a functioning parliament in 1918-1921. From the very first days of independence Georgia has been looking for the best form of state governance. The dilemma, however, remains unresolved: the public and the elite have not yet agreed either on a parliamentary or a presidential republic. This means that the traditions of Georgian constitutionalism are inseparable from the quest for the optimal form of governance. Elected in October 1990, the Supreme Soviet of Georgia (the name inherited from the Soviet Union) amended the still valid Constitution of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia of 1978. It removed the words “Soviet Socialist” from the Constitution, while in November 1990 it passed a law on a “transition period in the Republic of Georgia.” On 9 April, 1991, the Supreme Soviet passed the Law on Operation of the Constitution and Legislation of the Republic of Georgia, under which the Constitutional Commission set about writing a new Constitution based on the Constitution dated 21 February, 1921; for the first time in its history Georgia acquired a president. Very soon Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who filled the post of chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Geor- gia, was elected president. For a long time, the Georgians could not agree on whether he should call himself the first president of Georgia. His opponents insisted that this honor belonged to Noe Zhorda- nia, who headed Georgia in 1918-1921 (the first republic), even though under the 1921 Constitution the government was the highest executive power structure headed by a chairman with broad powers1 elected by the parliament for one year; the number of consecutive terms for one person was limited to two.2 Since the 1921 Constitution did not say anything about the post of president, Gamsakhurdia’s supporters prevailed. His opponents, who obviously preferred the traditions of the parliamentary republic of 1918- 1921, demanded that the newly introduced presidency be abolished as unacceptable for Georgia: concentration of supreme power in the hands of one person bordered on usurpation of power. Gamsakhurdia was removed from his post in 1992, while the Law on State Power essentially acted as the constitution until 1995 when a new Fundamental Law (which many compared to the American Constitution) was adopted. In the next 15 years, until the Rose Revolution, the new Consti- tution acquired 23 amendments and addenda. Starting in 1999, the Constitution was amended every year (except for 2007) (it acquired 6 amendments and addenda under President Shevardnadze). The first two amendments and addenda to the Fundamental Law introduced on 20 July, 1999 envisaged that parties running for parliament should receive no less than 7 percent of the votes (instead of the previous 5 percent).3 At first the people in power intended to write and enact a new Fundamental Law; later, however, they limited themselves to amendments and addenda which radically changed the political system and

1 See: The Constitution of the Republic of Georgia of 1921, Art 70. 2 See: Ibid., Art 67. 3 See: The 1995 Constitution of Georgia, Art 50.2 (1999 amendments). 64 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 the form of governance. Between November 2003 and 2010, the Constitution acquired 17 amendments and addenda, the first of which came into effect on 6 January, 2004. The latest, and most important, amendments and addenda were introduced on 15 October, 2010. Some of the regulations (protection of labor rights, the state’s obligation to encourage the physical upbringing of teenagers and young people, protect the environment, and inform citizens about the state of the environment) added a humane touch to the Fundamental Law. Enactment of most of the articles and new revolutionary amendments related to the political sphere was postponed until 2013. Georgia’s political establishment considers the European model of a parliamentary republic to be the ideal, however Georgia still remains a presidential republic even though the numerous amendments changed the head of the executive power branch’s scope of power. The 1995 Constitution followed the classical tradition of the division of power, although in fact it reinforced the system of presidential rule (even though the executive powers were split between the president and the government). Before that the collective form of governance was actively discussed; President Shevardnadze and his supporters convinced the country that a strong presidential power was indispensable in Geor- gia; the “strong arm” thesis was very popular at the grass-roots level.

The Coming Fateful Election and a New Post: “The Queen of England”

Under the original 1995 Constitution, the President of Georgia, as head of the Georgian state, doubled as head of the executive power branch; the Rose Revolution radically changed the Constitu- tion, which caused quite a stir among certain political groups. The amendment that passed on 6 February, 2004 read as follows: “The President of Georgia shall be the Head of the State of Georgia,”4 while executive functions belonged to the Government. Art 4 of the Constitution, “The President of Georgia,” acquired a new section called “The Govern- ment of Georgia.” The presidential administration was separate from the government, which meant that the amended Constitution strengthened the institution of presidency in Georgia. According to the amendments of 15 May, 2010, after 2013 the president will be called the “guarantor” of the state’s unity and independence rather than “head” of the Georgian state. In 2013, the president will lose his right to initiate referendums: this right will either be the prerogative of the parliament, or citizens (on the strength of 200 thousand signatures of voters collected across the country), or the government. Thus, the president’s powers will be considerably trimmed and the prime minister’s extended (see “The President of Georgia” Section in the Constitution). Under the 2004 amendments, the government was just one of the links in the executive power branch and was accountable to the president and the parliament. Under the 2010 amendments, in 2013 it will become the supreme body of executive power accountable to the parliament. In 2013, the prime minister will acquire the right to appoint and dismiss members of the government (until now, he has needed the president’s consent) and will be described as “the head of government” instead of the current “chairman of the government.”

4 Ibid., Chapter 4, Art 69.1. 65 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

After 2013, the parliament will retain its right to declare a vote of no confidence in the government with a two-fifth majority (instead of the previous one-third). Under the latest constitutional amendments, after 2013, the President of Georgia, very much like the Queen of England, will essentially be a figurehead; real power will belong to the prime minister. This means that Georgia will have to pass a couple of endurance tests: the parliamentary elections in 2012 and the presidential election in 2013. In view of the constitutional addenda of 2010, the riddle of who will rule the country will be solved by the parliamentary rather than the presidential elections. In 2012, the newly elected legislative structure will appoint a prime minister, which means that each and every one of the 150 parliamentary deputies will acquire special functions. It should be said that those members of the ruling party who fail the political loyalty test will find it hard to be elected to parliament. Today, few in the country doubt that the ruling party will nominate President Mikhail Saakash- vili to the post of prime minister. The 1995 Constitution limits the time one person may be president to two consecutive terms but says nothing about the terms in office for heads of government. The presidential election of 2013 will hardly correspond to Georgia’s political tradition, while the election campaign will look more like an entertainment show than a political event. The passions around the presidency will not subside soon for the simple reason that in Georgia this post is associated with power; the political community is discussing all possible candidates for the post. It is expected that one of the representatives of the so-called moderate opposition—leader of the Christian Democratic Party Giorgi Targamadze or head of the Free Democrats Party Irakli Alasania (who represented Georgia in the U.N.)—might be elected to the post. The Christian Democrats, who are in the minority in the parliament, actively cooperate with the government, while Irakli Alasania publicly congratulated a candidate of the ruling party on his election as mayor of Tbilisi (even though the other opposition groups and parties intended to go to court to contest the election results). The post might go to a member of the ruling party: if the post is filled by a member of opposition, the ruling elite will gain political points by demonstrating to the rest of the world that Georgia is a democratic country; on the other hand, this might undermine the legitimacy of both its own and the prime minister’s power because under the new Constitution the prime minister, the top executive, will be elected by the parliament (rather than by popular vote) as distinct from the president, who will be elected directly by the people. If direct elections put a member of the moderate opposition in the president’s seat, the nation might wonder under what mandate the prime minister, who has been approved by parliament, is acting. This means that if Mikhail Saakashvili becomes prime minister (if his party wins in 2012), the post of president will go to one of the members of his party, a person without undue political ambitions happy to become part of the country’s history (albeit as a president without any power). If the new form of governance is realized, for the first time in Georgia’s history as an independent country the same person will remain in power for more than two consecutive terms. It should be said that both previous presidents were removed from their post. Mikhail Saakash- vili had to resign before his first term had expired (in November 2007), however he not only won the pre-term elections, he also managed to remain in power. If he survives as president to the end of his second term, the tradition of regime change by popular unrest will be buried. There is another alternative: he could abandon his post before his second terms expires to run for parliament in 2012. If Saakashvili tales a post of prime minister, Georgia will acquire a new tradition of one and the same person remaining in power indefinitely.

66 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 Territorial Division

Territorial division has been and remains one of the most sensitive issues; the 1995 Constitution does not even mention it. At that time, Georgia’s jurisdiction did not extend to the republic’s two breakaway regions (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), so the leadership decided not to define the state’s territorial structure. Hoping for reunification, the political elite chose to leave this question open and did not touch upon it in the 1995 Constitution. The 1995 Constitution ruled: “The territorial state structure of Georgia shall be determined by a Constitutional Law on the basis of the principle of circumscription of authorization after the complete restoration of the jurisdiction of Georgia over the whole territory of the country.”5 So the country’s administrative-territorial division into districts remains as it was in Soviet times. Meanwhile, Shevardnadze established the institution of regional representatives of the president; the regions were formed in keeping with Georgia’s historical-ethnographic map: Kakhetia (with a population of 404.5 thousand); Lower Kartli (499.9); Inner Kartli (310.6); Mtskheta-Mtianeti (108.8); Imeretia (700.4); Samtskhe-Javakhetia (211.3); Racha-Lechkhumi and Lower Svanetia (47.6); Sameg- relo-Upper Svanetia (474.1); and Guria (139.8); the autonomous republics—Ajaria (386.9) and Ab- khazia, as well as the capital city of Tbilisi (1,152.5)—were treated as regions.6 Former South Ossetia was included in Inner Kartli, to which it belonged even before Soviet power was established. This arrangement was not confirmed either by the Constitution or by any other law; President Shevardnadze’s decision described the heads of the regions as the president’s plenipotentiary representatives; the people always called them governors. Ajaria, with all the rights of an autonomous republic, remained for a long time outside the scope of the Georgian Constitution; the same applies to Abkhazia, which did not comply with Georgian jurisdiction; Tbilisi, however, always regarded it as an inalienable part of the Georgian state. The fact that the Georgian legislators forgot about Ajaria and Abkhazia when drawing up the first post-Soviet Georgian Constitution of 1995 can be described as legal nonsense, which was cor- rected on 20 April, 2000 when Ajaria, as an autonomous republic, was added to the Constitution. On 10 October, 2002, the Constitution confirmed the status of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, while the Abkhazian language was described as the second state language (together with Georgian) in the territory of Abkhazia. The regime brought to power by the Rose Revolution tried to finally settle the issues of the country’s administrative-territorial division. Beginning in 2004, attempts were made to arrive at a new administrative-territorial division; it was decided to decrease the number of districts by joining some of them together. As a result, 75 administrative units became 25 districts, which eliminat- ed 9 territories. By the same token, the huge army of bureaucrats (9 governors and 75 district heads) could have been trimmed to 25 local “bosses,” but nothing changed: their number in the vertical of power remained the same (central, regional, district and village bosses). On 11 March, 2008, the Constitution acquired amendments which specified the status of the institution of governors and the division of the country into territories. The latest and most extensive constitutional amendments and addenda revived the discourse of federalization in the political and expert communities in the context of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It was repeatedly suggested that these historical areas become federal units within Georgia, the idea being buried by repeated bouts of conflict settlement efforts.

5 The Constitution of Georgia, original version, 1995. Chapter 1, Art 2.3. 6 [http://www.geostat.ge/?action=page&p_id=472&lang=geo]. 67 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

During the discussions of the latest constitutional amendments, The Freedom Institute, an NGO commonly viewed as the intellectual base of the Georgian rulers, came forward with states as new administrative-territorial units based on the existing historical territories. The idea of a United States of Georgia was dismissed as obviously absurd. Art 81 of the Consti- tution was amended with the understanding that the amendments would come into force after the presidential election of October 2013. Another attempt to revise the country’s administrative-territorial division was intercepted by a decision that, after 2013, governors would be appointed by the government, not the president. This did nothing to improve the country’s territorial division: it merely stressed that after 2013 the prime minister would be in charge. The problem of administrative-territorial division is part of another issue—a two-chamber parliament. Today it consists of one chamber, but the 1995 Constitution says: “After the creation of appropriate conditions and the formation of local self-government bodies throughout the whole territory of Georgia, two chambers shall be set up within the Parliament of Georgia: the Council of the Repub- lic and the Senate.”7 Today, the deputies elected by party lists and on a majority basis still work together in the one-chamber parliament. It should be said that the reputation of the deputies elected on a majority basis is dubious: they are known not so much for their political convictions as for being the wealthy owners of large businesses. Before the Rose Revolution, 150 of the 235 deputies of the Georgian legislature were elected by the proportional system, while 85 by the majority system. The 2004 constitutional amendments and addenda reduced the number of deputies: 100 out of 150 seats were intended for deputies elected on a proportional basis and 50 on a majority basis for the simple reason that the healthy rating of the party brought to power by the Rose Revolution did not need a “crutch” of majority deputies. On 12 March, 2008, having lost some of its rating points, the ruling party initiated another amendment to the Constitution under which the Georgian parliament remained a one- chamber structure with 150 deputies, half of them (75 seats) elected on a proportional and the other half on a majority basis.8 Some of the opposition members object to the majority system: they demand that the parliament be elected by party lists.

Decentralization of Power as an Anti-Revolutionary Measure

For over 20 years now Tbilisi has been the center of the republic’s political life; it was in the capital that President Gamsakhurdia and later President Shevardnadze were removed from their posts. Unwilling to repeat their fate, the present rulers decided to decentralize power: the Constitutional Court was moved from Tbilisi to Batumi, on the Black Sea shore. In 2009, the Georgian parliament ruled that the new parliament elected in 2012 would hold its plenary meetings in Kutaisi (the second largest city), which would split the parliament between Tbilisi and Kutaisi.9

7 The Constitution of Georgia, original version, Chapter 1, Art 4.1. 8 See: The 1995 Constitution of Georgia. Art 49.1; amendments of 12 March, 2008. 9 See: Ibid., Art 48.1; amendments of 24 September, 2009. 68 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011

The amendment was not enacted because, on 17 May, 2011, the parliament surprised the nation with a decision to move the legislature from the capital to Kutaisi; the Constitution would be amended accordingly. Relocation of the parliament planned for 2012, as well as relocation of the government and the prime minister, who in 2013 will head the state, will deprive Tbilisi of its status as the country’s political center; the president, however, will remain in Tbilisi. It is expected that Kutaisi will become the republic’s new capital, a logical surmise in view of the planned relocations. Tbilisi might no longer be the capital. On 15 July, 2010, when speaking at the Georgian National Manuscript Center, Catholicos- Patriarch of All Georgia Ilia II objected to the planned relocation on the grounds that the parliament should be closer to people (Tbilisi is home to over 1,152 thousand people, while the population of Kutaisi is about 150 thousand). The people in power have obviously set about “depoliticizing” the capital: the Auditing Chamber of Georgia and several other state structures have already been moved to Kutaisi; a new glass building for the parliament costing over 80 million is being built in Kutaisi. Refugees from Abkhazia and South Ossetia who lived in the vacated official buildings were moved from Tbilisi on the pretext of their political passions: refugees were the active core of all the protest rallies. Since the dawn of the Georgian national-liberation movement, the square in front of the parliament in the very center of the Georgian capital has been and (so far) remains the favorite place of all those wishing to protest in public. By the 2012 elections, the huge structure, one of the best examples of Soviet official architecture, will have been sold to foreigners (several foreign companies are con- templating the deal). This means that those wishing to contest the results of the 2012 elections will have nowhere to go. The Central Election Commission previously housed in the building of the former Museum of Marxism-Leninism, another favorite place of the discontented which has already been sold to foreigners, is scattered across the city; some of its offices can be found in the well-guarded building of the Tbilisi Department of Internal Affairs. This means that the people at the top have learned the bitter lessons of the past and are preparing for the coming elections in earnest.

Singapore-ization of Georgia and the Lee Hypothesis

Together with political modernization, economic development is another headache for the country’s leaders. In the last few years, they have been frequently referring to Singapore as the best possible economic model Georgia might borrow, with the emphasis on tourism as one of the main sources of wealth in the near future. The recent turmoil in the Arab states (in Egypt, the tourist Mecca, in particular) deprived what was said about future tourism-based prosperity of much of its sense. The 15 May, 2010 amendments to the Constitution are recommended as a “foreword” to the new economic policies: they guarantee economic liberalization and stronger protection of the rights of private owners. These amendments and addenda were passed to defuse what the opposition said about infringe- ments on the rights of ownership after the Rose Revolution.

69 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

The prospects of Singapore-ization caused a lot of concern: former President of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew (who formulated the hypothesis now known as the Lee hypothesis)10 linked rapid economic development with a harsh political regime. At his meeting with the teaching staff of a pro- vincial school, the president of Georgia had to explain that while the economic model of Singapore was perfect for Georgia, its political system would never strike root because of the Georgians’ national character. Those members of the academic community who side with the government are convinced that democracy needs economic freedom, but never fail to add: “On the other hand, a free economy may flourish for some time in an authoritarian expanse but, in the final analysis, only a free economy can serve as the foundation of a strong civil society.”11 They also declare: “So far we cannot say whether Georgia’s political reality tends toward authoritarianism or whether it is inclined toward democracy; it is a hybrid regime. They say that the Rose Revolution failed to confirm the democratic expectations of Georgian society. This is not true: the revolution was caused by corruption and inadequate democracy and won under the banner of ‘Georgia without corruption’.” During the years of independence, the conception of nation-building in Georgia did not change much. The first president formulated it as, “First independence, then democracy”; the second president as, “First stability, then democracy;” while the “revolutionary government” came up with, “First modernization and reforms, struggle against corruption, economic prosperity and security, then democracy.” The leaders of the Rose Revolution proceed from the idea that no radical reforms in any sphere are possible in the conditions of absolute democracy: “Democracy is the will of people who sometimes oppose reforms.” This is often said by those who side with the people in power and who are displeased with the “aborted” reforms (in the sphere of education, for example). The opposition, in turn, insists that the revolutionary leaders have digressed from their original goal: democratization of the country. The above suggests that Georgia might follow one of the modernization scenarios: either West- ernization” or “Singapore-ization.”

Conclusion

So far, the future of Georgia’s political system is vague even if we know that after 2013 it will no longer be a presidential republic. At the same time, the revolutionary wave in the Arab countries stirred up Georgian society. The political establishment wonders whether the Rose Revolution supplied the pattern or whether another revolution is in store for Georgia. While the latest constitutional amendments were being drafted, one of the regime supporters insisted that democracy in Georgia needed no revolution but a good Constitution, “because our Con- stitution falls short of the standards of democracy.”12 He referred to the Constitution which had been fundamentally amended in 2004, in the wake of the Rose Revolution. It should be said that the opposition resolutely objected to the constitutional amendments of 2004 as undemocratic. In any case, starting in 1999, the fundamental provisions of the Constitution of Georgia were changed practically every year, which means that the political system and the process of nation-building remain vulnerable in the face of various challenges.

10 See: A. Sen, “Democracy as a Universal Value,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 10, No. 3, July 1999, p. 6. 11 G. Nodia, “What is Needed to Build Democracy,” Tabula (Tbilisi), 26 April- 2 May, 2010, p. 13 (in Georgian). 12 Ibid., p. 12. 70 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011

Even though some of the latest extensive amendments and addenda of 15 October, 2010 have not yet been enacted, the political establishment is talking about new changes in the country’s Funda- mental Law. This means that Georgia’s political system will be subjected to new tests.

SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENT TRENDS IN KAZAKHSTAN SOCIETY (Based on Public Opinion Polls)

Serik BEYSEMBAEV Sociologist at the Strategy Center for Social and Political Research Public Fund (Almaty, Kazakhstan)

Introduction

dentifying young people as a separate social the local sociocultural environment that contin- group has been practiced since the differenc- ues to have the greatest influence on the younger I es in outlook between the younger and older generation. generations was first noticed. The generation gap, Demographers customarily classify people which has existed since the dawn of civilization, between the ages of 15 and 30 as young; howev- has become a target of study for thinkers and sci- er, the social sciences do not stipulate any precise entists; entire fields of research have appeared in social or age limits to define the concept “young philosophy, sociology, and psychology devoted people.” Usually the question of who to classify to relations between the generations, whereby as young is determined in each specific case based particular attention is focused on behavioral traits, on the scientific and applied tasks at hand. as well as on how values are formed among young Surveys on youth problems are not carried people as a whole, as well as in their individual out very often in the Republic of Kazakhstan groups. (RK), and the information available to the broad Today, there is a wealth of scientific infor- public is mainly journalistic (or synoptic) in na- mation that allows drawing up a universal portrait ture and usually extremely superficial. So it can of young people as a specific socio-demographic be said that there is essentially no serious research segment of society. The numerous studies show (including academic dissertations) in the repub- that, along with certain general characteristics lic aimed at studying young people. There is also (biological and psychological), young people liv- a dearth of specialists on youth affairs. However, ing in different countries of the world differ from an increased interest is currently being shown in each other in many parameters (both external and young people as a social phenomenon in Kazakh- internal). Despite the growing globalization, it is stan society. This is primarily due to the fact that

71 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS a new generation, which has grown up in essen- keeping close tabs on the moods of young tially very different conditions, is emerging to people and trying not to permit their rad- replace the old. icalization or the emergence of protest If we keep in mind that a person’s conscious groups. What is more, the political poten- socialization begins at the age of 7-8, more than tial of young people has become an ur- 25% of Kazakhstan’s population today can be gent issue in light of the events in Kyr- called “children” of the post-Soviet times. This is gyzstan and the Middle Eastern countries why it is particularly important to gain a clear idea (as we know, it is young people who form of what young people today are like, what quali- the nucleus of the revolutionary move- ties they possess, and how generational continu- ment in those countries). ity affects the situation in the country. The increased interest in young people has At present, the cross-generational relations given rise to numerous speculations among ex- on which public attention is focusing are exam- perts (both Kazakh and foreign). For example, it ined from the following perspectives: is popular opinion that there is such an obvious 1) From the sociocultural respect, a whole generation gap in Kazakhstan society that there set of questions is examined related to the is no need to scientifically prove it. There is also cultural identity of young people, as well a popular myth about the destructive potential of as to how they conform to the prevailing young people and about a youth revolt against the social standards. This includes the mor- political system that is supposedly brewing in the al characteristics of the younger genera- depths of society. tion, the special features of their world The supporters of the above-mentioned con- outlook, their attitude toward cultural jectures point out that Kazakhstan’s young peo- heritage, degree of religiosity, level of ed- ple have grown up in new conditions and, conse- ucation, and so on. The above-mentioned quently, are programmed in advance to reproduce parameters form the basis on which the a different sociopolitical structure. In so doing, as nature of cross-generational relations as mentioned above, there are no special studies that a whole is evaluated. It has become pop- might confirm or refute this hypothesis. ular in Kazakhstan society to think that a This article presents the results of opinion break in continuity has occurred that is polls (covering all age groups) which to some leading to the formation of a value and extent might fill the existing gap in the scientific cultural abyss between the older and understanding of Kazakhstan’s young people to- younger generations. This is due to the day and shed light on the discussion about the fact that over the past 20 years, the soci- nature of cross-generational relations. An attempt ocultural situation in the country has fre- has been made based on mass polls to draw a so- quently fallen under the influence of dif- cial, political, and value-cultural picture of the ferent movements and trends, and it is younger generation. young people who are the main expres- The research carried out by the employees sions of cultural diversity. of the Strategy Center for Social and Political Re- 2) From the political respect, young people search Public Fund in 2009-2010 by means of a are viewed as a potential bearer of the questionnaire survey of the adult population of idea of major political changes, howev- Kazakhstan (face-to-face) served as the empirical er, in the stable conditions in Kazakhstan, basis of this study. An average of 1,600 respond- this is not perceived as a threat to the ents took part in each survey; they were selected political system. Nevertheless, the meas- by means of a quota sample represented by place ures adopted by the state (for example, of residence (city-village), gender, age, and eth- the initiative to create a national youth nic affiliation (the data of the RK Statistics Agen- movement) show that the government is cy were used to form the sample). The survey was

72 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 carried out in each of the country’s 14 rggions the percentage of young people between 18 and (including the regional center and 2-3 villages in 29 in keeping with the sampled population each region) and cities of republican status (Al- amounted to no less than 30% of the total number maty and Astana). of respondents (in correspondence with the struc- Since only people who have come of legal ture of the population). In numbers, this amounts age are included in the sample in the national polls, to an average of 500 young people in a sample of the lower age limit of the youth group was 18. The 1,600 people (see Fig. 1). upper age limit of the group was determined based As the many years of observations show, the on the official interpretation of the term “young,” social-demographic structure of young people according to which citizens under 30 are consid- presented above is stable and was representative ered young (Law on Government Youth Policy of of this group in terms of such parameters as gen- the RK). It should be noted that in each survey, der and ethnic affiliation.

Figure 1 The Social-Demographic Structure of the Youth Sample

1) Gender: 2) Ethnic affiliation: Other Women Men nationalities Kazakhs 52.9 47.1 14.5 58.6

Russians 26.9

3) Education: 4) Family status: Married Higher, Incomplete 37.4 incomplete secondary higher 3.5 Civil 44.6 Secondary marriage general 3.5 23.7 Divorced 2.0 Secondary Widow/widower specialized Single 0.4 28.2 56.6

Social Life

The social wellbeing of people today is primarily determined by material and essential benefits, as well as the position they hold (status-related, official, and professional). Age as such is not an important criterion in the formation of social moods. Nevertheless, the studies we carried out in different years make is possible to identify such a consistent characteristic of young people as a high level of optimism and more positive perception of the world around them compared with people of the middle and older generations. For example, in a recent survey, every fifth young person said they were

73 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

“completely satisfied” with their life, while every second said they were “quite satisfied,” whereas there were noticeably fewer members of the middle and older generations who felt this way. A total of 25% of young people are dissatisfied with their lives, while 34% of the middle generation and 37% of the older generation fall into this category (see Fig. 2). Figure 2 Level of Life Satisfaction of Different Age Groups and Among the Population as a Whole (January 2010)

100% 5.1 7.2 90% 8.7 7.3 80% 19.8 Don’t know 25.4 29.5 24.7 70% Very dissatisfied 60% 50% Quite dissatisfied 53.0 40% 49.3 49.9 47.0 Quite satisfied 30% 20% Completely satisfied 10% 20.7 13.3 13.0 15.6 0% 18-29 30-49 50+ Overall

The next index that distinguishes young people from the older generation is the assessment of their family’s material status. According to the data obtained, young people are inclined to assess the Figure 3 Assessment of the Material Status of the Family by Different Age Groups and Among the Population as a Whole (January 2010)

100% 7.9 10.8 12.9 10.4 90% Don’t know 80% 70% Very bad 60% 59.1 63.7 63.3 Bad 50% 67.7 40% Average

30% Good 20% 28.9 20.8 22.3 10% 16.4 Very good 0% 3.3 2.8 1.0 2.5 18-29 30-49 50+ Overall

74 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 prosperity of their families somewhat higher than their parents. For example, 29% of young people regard it as good, whereas 21% and 16% of respondents from the middle and older generations, respectively, gave this assessment of the prosperity of their families (see Fig. 3). Kazakhstan’s young people also largely have a positive assessment of future changes in the material status of their families; 55% were certain that their prosperity would improve in the next year, while only 42% of the older generation shared their optimism. Do the above-mentioned assessments (relatively high) among young people show that they objectively live better than the older and middle generations? On the one hand, the survey shows that, compared with the other age groups, young people have a higher income. According to the data obtained during the poll, the average monthly family income among 18-29-year-olds amounts to 58,400 tenge (around $400) compared to 56,000 tenge among 30- 49-year-olds and 53,300 tenge in the 50 and older age group. Moreover, young people declare they have greater consumer possibilities than the older generation. But upon closer look we discover that there are no serious differences in the status of the age groups; the younger generation is reproducing the same socio-professional structure as the adult population. Moreover, 53.5% of young people do not have jobs (the relatively high level of unemployment in this group also shows the social vulnerability of young people); this applies to students, the unemployed, and housewives who are dependent on their relatives (see Table 1).

Table 1 Socio-Professional Characteristics of Different Age Groups and of the Population as a Whole (%, January 2010)

18-29 30-49 50+ Overall

Businessman, owner 2.4 7.5 3.8 4.9

Director, manager 1.6 2.2 1.0 1.7

Civil servant 5.9 7.4 3.8 6.0

Budget sphere employee (medicine, education) 6.3 13.8 7.3 9.7

Employee of a private company, bank 10.6 10.8 4.5 9.1

Farm worker 1.2 3.8 3.0 2.8

Industrial worker 5.9 10.1 6.3 7.7

Service employee 9.6 12.9 5.3 9.8

Pensioner (old age or invalid) 0.4 1.3 51.5 14.2

Student, pupil 28.4 — — 9.1

Unemployed, temporarily out of work 13.7 12.7 7.5 11.7

Housewife 11.4 13.1 4.8 10.4

Other 2.4 4.4 1.5 3.0

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So young people’s relatively positive attitude toward social issues can be put down to their lower degree of involvement in the public division of labor, low encumbrance with family and everyday concerns, and inclination toward maximalism when assessing their own conditions. It should be noted that the younger the age group, the more positive the mood; students between the age of 18 and 22 are the most optimistic. There are no significant differences in perception of the general situation in the country between young people and the older generation. It is assessed by all three age groups in approximately the same way: most people think it is favorable and calm, more than a quarter believe it to be unclear and tense, and approximately 4% regard it as critical and explosive (see Fig. 4). Figure 4 Assessment of the General Situation in the Country Broken Down into Age Groups and Among the Population as a Whole (January 2010)

overall 65.5 28.7 3.6

50+ 65.9 27.60 4.0

30-49 65.7 29.7 2.7

18-29 64.8 28.3 4.5

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Favorable, calm Unclear, tense

Critical, explosive Don’t know

The results of the survey show that young people feel basically the same way as the country’s adult population regarding society’s most urgent problems. Young people are mainly concerned about increasing food prices, high utility rates, and low income level. Nevertheless, some problems are strictly related to young people, such as the high cost of university education and not having their own housing. Moreover, young people are more concerned than adults about environmental problems, the low quality of education, and recreational problems (see Table 2). We should take a closer look at the unavailability of housing, since today it is difficult to over- estimate its significance in the life of young people who intend to start their own family. A special study determined that more than 60% of young people feel the need to improve their housing conditions (this figure is 54% among the members of the middle generation, and 48% among the older generation). Every fourth young member of the Kazakhstan population rents housing, while every third lives with his or her parents. Housing is most urgent for young people who live in the capital cities and particularly for those who have secondary specialized education and are in a civil marriage.

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Table 2 The Most Urgent Problems of Kazakhstan Society Broken Down into Age Groups and Among the Population as a Whole (%, January 2010)

18-29 30-49 50+ Overall

Increase in price of food and basic essentials 54.4 60.8 62.6 59.2

High utility rates 47.5 49.5 55.7 50.5

Low income level 37.7 41.7 31.2 37.7

Unemployment 30.8 32.8 25.5 30.2

Low quality of health care 24.0 26.6 33.2 27.5

High cost of study in higher educational institutions 33.8 21.3 21.8 25.4

Corruption 21.8 22.0 18.1 20.9

Unavailability of housing 25.5 17.3 7.7 17.4

Low pension level 8.6 8.3 34.9 15.4

Poor roads 14.9 15.0 11.4 14.0

Wage arrears 10.4 15.6 11.6 12.9

Insufficient number of kindergartens 13.6 14.8 8.7 12.8

Health problems 7.3 11.9 20.0 12.6

Crime 13.0 11.9 12.1 12.3

Low level of education 12.8 11.7 9.2 11.4

Problems with paying back loans 8.4 12.5 9.4 10.4

Environmental problems 12.4 9.4 6.4 9.6

Problems with drinking water supply 8.8 10.2 9.4 9.5

Recreational problems 6.7 3.4 2.7 4.3

No problems 2.0 1.7 0.7 1.6

Other 0.6 1.1 2.0 1.2

Don’t know 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.3

There is a clear lack of correlation between the life precepts of young people and the older generation when resolving certain problems. In the event the socioeconomic situation in the country worsens, most young people (63%) intend to look for ways to improve their lives themselves. This

77 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS position dramatically differs from the inclination that predominates among the older generation to patiently wait for better times (45%). It is obvious that in the context of the new market conditions and change in ideological references, the rising generation has formed as a more self-sufficient and independent socio-demographic group that prefers to take active steps (particularly in difficult situations) and rely primarily on itself. Radical ways to improve life are not popular among the country’s population; only 5% of young people are willing to openly oppose the authorities. Approximately, the same number of young people intend to leave the country if life becomes worse (see Table 3).

Table 3 Distribution of Responses to the Question “What Will You Do if the Socioeconomic Situation in the Country Deteriorates in the Near Future?” (%, January 2010)

18-29 30-49 50+ Overall

I will independently look for any way to improve my life 62.7 56.0 44.2 55.0

I will patiently wait for better times 21.9 27.1 45.4 30.3

I will try to emigrate 4.1 3.7 2.0 3.4

I will participate in mass protest demonstrations 2.3 3.9 2.5 3.0

I will join an organization intent on achieving a change in power 2.3 1.6 0.7 1.6

Other 0.2 0.2 — 0.1

Don’t know 6.6 7.5 5.2 6.6

Political Relations

After acquiring its independence, the country’s political development unfolded in keeping with a precise course aimed at establishing a strict vertical of power and ensuring a high degree of manage- ability of the domestic situation. As practice shows, the political model that has formed in Kazakhstan has proven effective; it has become a consensus for the population, managerial elite, and external political entities, thanks to which, during the past 20 years, the situation in the country has been developing normally without any social upheavals or ethnic conflicts (which cannot be said about other countries of the former Soviet Union). This stability has had an impact on the political consciousness of the Kazakhstan population (including young people). On the basis of the study results, some special features of the political consciousness of Kazakh- stan’s young people today can be identified. The fact that young people are not very involved in the

78 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 country’s political life is largely due to the slogan declared at the beginning of independence, “first the economy, then politics,” which resulted in de-politicization of the young people who grew up under the new regime and is confirmed by the results of sociological polls. According to the data obtained, only every fifth young person shows an ongoing interest in the political events going on in the country, while 22% of the young people polled are entirely indifferent to them. Figure 5 shows that an interest in political life is almost twice as high among the members of the middle and older generation.

Figure 5 Interest in the Political Events in the Country Broken Down into Age Groups and Among the Population as a Whole (March 2010)

100% 13.3 14.9 90% 21.9 16.5 80% Don’t know 70% Essentially not 60% 46.5 interested 58.0 50% 57.2 54.8 Interested now and 40% then 30% Always interested 20% 38.1 27.3 27.6 10% 20.0 0% 18-29 30-49 50+ Overall

The low level of civilian and electorate activity is a result of the low interest in politics. Accord- ing to the poll data, 54% of young voters are willing to take part in parliamentary elections, while every third has no attention at all of going to the polls (particularly if elections are to be held next weekend). It should be noted that the same index is noticeably higher in the older age groups. As the analysis shows, young people in large cities and members of non-Kazakh nationalities are less inclined to participate in voting. Young people living in rural places (68% of whom are willing to go to the polls) and young Kazakhs (66%) show greater civic consciousness. So it becomes clear that, in Kazakhstan’s conditions, electoral culture is still greatly influenced by Soviet tradition, according to which people participate in elections not so much to express their political will as to fulfill their civic duty. For entirely understandable reasons, this way of thinking predominates among the older generation, as well as among young people raised in a conservative rural environment (see Fig. 6). Despite their apolitical behavior, Kazakhstan’s young people still have quite a high level of loyalty toward the authorities; the president enjoys the trust of 82% of the country’s young people, the government is trusted by 60%, and the parliament by 54%. These data make it possible to claim that the young people of Kazakhstan, like the rest of the republic’s population, support the regime, although this attitude does not necessarily mean recognition of the authorities’ merits.

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Figure 6 Electoral Activity (for Elections to the Majilis) of Different Age Groups and Among the Population as a Whole (March 2010)

Overall 58.7 30.6 10.7

50+ 64.8 26.1 9.1

30-49 59.1 31.1 9.9

18-29 53.6 33.5 12.9

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Will go to the polls Will not go to the polls Don’t know

At the same time, 33% of young people do not trust the defense and security structures, and 44% mistrust the judicial system. It is interesting that young people are quite critical of the “fourth power” (the media)—41% trust it and 39% do not trust it. As for the opposition, every second respondent does not trust it, while every third does not know. So it can be claimed that young people’s support of the existing regime is based on trust in the head of state and his personal authority, which reflects the specifics of Kazakhstan’s political system with its strict centralization of power in keeping with the president’s policy. The above-mentioned assessments of the political entities have remained stable over the past few years both with respect to young people and among the entire population of Kazakhstan, and in this case we can talk about the consolidated nature of public opinion (see Fig. 7). So the conclusion can be drawn that Kazakhstan’s young people have a very low protest potential. Studies show that at present about 4% of young people are willing to participate in violent acts toward the authorities, while 6% are ready to take part in spontaneous meetings (3% and 5% among the population as a whole, respectively). But, as experience shows, a deterioration of social conditions is capable of significantly catalyz- ing an increase in protest moods among young people. A sharp increase in prices, unemployment, and drop in the standard of living in the country could arouse active dissatisfaction among 25% of young citizens and particularly among those who are not working or have a low level of income (28%). There is also a comparatively high level of protest moods among students (27%). On the whole, compared with the other age groups, young people more frequently express their willingness to participate in meetings and demonstrations: every fourth is ready to resort to illegal means of pressure on the authorities (only 15% of the 50 and older age group express such moods) (see Fig. 8).

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Figure 7 Young People’s Trust in the Power Structures and Other Political Entities (November 2009)

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

President of RK 82.0 8.3 9.6

Government of RK 60.1 22.4 17.4

Parliament of RK 54.2 25.4 20.4

Law-enforcement structures 48.5 32.9 18.6

Media 40.8 39.1 20.0

Courts 34.7 43.6 21.7

Opposition 19.3 49.5 31.2

Trust Do not trust Don’t know

Figure 8 Distribution of Responses to the Question “Do You Consider It Possible For Yourself Personally, or Do You Approve of Participation in Mass Protest Acts (Demonstrations, Meetings) Against an Increase in Prices, Unemployment, and Drop in Standard of Living?” (November 2009)

100% 9.8 11.9 8.5 10.3 90% 80% Don’t know 37.5 70% 38.4 41.6 Other 52.3 60% Do not think it possible at all 50% Probably do not think 40% 28.0 it possible 29.0 27.4 30% 24.1 Probably do think it possible 20% 16.7 13.9 14.1 Certainly do think it possible 10% 11.0 7.8 6.7 4.1 6.4 0% 18-29 30-49 50+ Overall

81 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Values and Precepts

The picture of young people’s political predilections would not be complete without analyzing their values. It is known that when it gained its independence, Kazakhstan, like other countries of the former Soviet Union, entered a time of major political and economic changes that led to a complete change in the ideological reference points of development. Restructuring of state governance and public relations began in Kazakhstan along the lines of the democratic countries. At the same time, a corresponding system of values and ideals was established that presumed the use of the attributes characteristic of them. In this respect, the question arises of the degree to which the Kazakhstan youth is receptive of the new values? Has it become imbibed with the ideals of the Western world or does it have other role models? During research of this problem, the respondents were asked what the most important values for them are, the list of which included categories of both a political and an ideological nature. The results obtained make it possible to identify a system of political values characteristic for the different generations. Not one of the alternatives offered in the survey questionnaire gathered a sufficient number of votes to be recognized as a prevailing social value. This shows that the political ideals of Kazakhstan society are still in flux, while the value system itself is in an amorphous state. Nevertheless, the rating obtained makes it possible to identify the precepts predominating in the mass consciousness. As the following table shows, such categories as “independence” and “justice” took first place, gathering 30% of the votes each. Whereby these two categories are equally significant both for the older age groups and for young people, that is, they are of a consolidating nature (from the viewpoint of the generation gap). But a more in-depth analysis of the survey results shows that, during the post-Soviet period, there has nevertheless been a shift in the value system of the younger generation. Such categories as personal safety and freedom are particularly important for today’s young people (each of them gathered 23% of the votes), while the middle and older generations prefer stability, order, and government assistance. So there has been an obvious shift away from the priorities of the Soviet era: the older generation raised on the principles of collectivism still places priority on common values that call for conservation of the situation, for young people, however, personal freedom is gradually moving to the forefront. The decrease in paternal moods among young people is also worth noting, which is closely cor- related with their inclination to rely on their own capabilities when resolving particular problems (see Table 4). It can be noted that individualism inculcated during the post-Soviet period exists in the consciousness of Kazakhstan’s young people, which presumes the priority of personal interest over public. Despite the decrease in their importance, conservative values still continue to play a significant role (particularly for the rural youth). So it would be more correct to talk not about a sharp turn, but gradual change in mental precepts in the consciousness of the rising generation. It is worth noting that democracy is not particularly appealing either to the adult population or to young people; its ideas have not succeeded in transforming into an ideological structure that society understands. So the conclusion can be drawn that democratization in the classical understanding has not occurred in Kazakhstan, probably because this process is frequently of a declared and guided nature. Correspondingly, there are no prerequisites for forming a demand for democracy among the broad masses of the country’s population. On the contrary, as the economic and political situation stabilized, the social foundation of conservatism became reinforced, with a tendency toward the state’s protective role. So, according to the surveys, even among young people, the number of supporters of state regulation of the domestic political and economic situation (50%) predominates over those who uphold liberalization (25%).

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Table 4 Distribution of Responses to the Question “Which of the Following Values Are the Most Important for You?” (%, choice of up to three alternatives)

18-29 30-49 50+ Overall

Independence 29.8 30.4 29.7 30.0

Justice 29.6 29.6 31.7 30.2

Personal Safety 23.1 19.9 18.9 20.6

Freedom 22.9 19.6 13.8 19.1

Stability 21.3 24.5 24.1 23.4

Order 21.1 24.2 26.4 23.8

Government Assistance 21.1 22.2 26.4 23.0

Personal Worth 13.2 8.8 7.6 9.9

Equality 12.8 14.6 13.3 13.7

Democracy 11.5 14.9 16.3 14.2

Morality 11.5 16.3 12.6 13.8

Conscience 9.3 9.3 11.7 9.9

Spirituality 8.1 8.8 10.3 9.0

Private Property 5.1 5.3 5.3 5.3

Solidarity 4.9 4.0 6.0 4.8

Tradition 3.8 4.0 4.8 4.1

Other 0.4 — — 0.1

Don’t know 7.5 7.6 5.1 6.9

On the basis of the data obtained, it can be concluded that, in the political respect, Western ideals have not found wide support (or understanding) among the rising generation and have not been “assimilated” as cultural models, styles of behavior, and ways of life. The distribution of responses to the question about what country (or union of countries) the people of Kazakhstan would like to live in shows this to a certain extent. For example, approximately the same number of respondents in each of the three groups would like to live in their own country (without it joining any other country) (an average of 36%); 16% of the respondents in the 18-29 age group would like to live in Europe, while this figure was almost three- fold lower among the members of the older generation. Moreover, it should be noted that approximately 16% of people older than 50 and 8% of young people are still nostalgic for the Soviet Union (see Table 5).

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Table 5 Distribution of Responses to the Question “If You Could Choose, Which Country or Union of Countries Would You Like to Live In?” (%, November 2009)

18-29 30-49 50+ Overall

In United Europe (the European Union) 15.5 8.8 5.9 10.2

In a united Union of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan 17.0 19.1 20.4 18.7

In the Commonwealth of Independent States—CIS (like now) 15.1 16.7 15.6 15.9

In a newly united Union of all the republics of the former Soviet Union (15 countries) 8.0 10.8 15.6 11.1

In my own country without it joining any other country 37.0 35.5 34.7 35.8

Don’t know 7.4 9.1 7.9 8.2

Analyzing young people’s perception of particular historical events is an important aspect in understanding the value orientation of young people. It is known that after the countries of the former Soviet Union acquired their independence, critical reassessment of the history of the Soviet period occurred. Designing and interpreting the Soviet past to comply with the changed reality have become important components of the ideological policy of the regimes in the newly independent states. Within the framework of the educational process, the new generation has been presented with a “revised” version of history that gives a fresh interpretation of the cultural and historical heritage of the Soviet Union. In 2009, a special study was carried out in 14 post-Soviet countries under the Eurasian Monitor project (for more detail, see: [eurasiamonitor.org]), during which particular attention was focused on studying how different age groups representing the different eras (Soviet and post-Soviet) perceive history. Table 6 presents the separate results of this study, which graphically illustrate certain characteristics in the historical consciousness of the people of Kazakhstan (during the poll, the respondents were asked to assess the significance of certain key events in the Soviet and post-Soviet history of the 20th century). n First, the rising generation clearly knows much less about history than the adult population; the further back in time an event occurred, the less young people know about it. For example, 22% of the respondents in the 18-29 age group do not know anything about the February Revolution (while only 9% of the 50 and older age group do not know), 13% do not know about the formation of the Soviet Union, and 2% know nothing about the victory over Fascist Germany. n Second, despite the fact that the Soviet period is largely assessed positively by all of Kazakh- stan’s population (apart from the tragic events of 1937-1938), there is an ambiguous attitude among the different age groups, due to generational differences, to the actual collapse of the

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Table 6 Assessment by Different Age Groups of the Main Events of the 20th Century (%)

Assessment

Historical Events Age group neutral positive negative Don’t know of this event Have not heard

1. February Revolution of 1917 18-29 21.9 12.4 20.7 27.1 17.9 in the Russian empire 30-49 9.8 12.7 24.1 35.0 18.3 (fall of autocracy) 50+ 9.1 11.5 23.3 40.9 15.2

2. Ascension to power of 18-29 14.4 9.8 25.6 38.0 12.1 Lenin and the Bolshevik Party 30-49 5.8 15.0 21.0 49.1 9.2 (October Revolution of 1917) 50+ 5.4 10.5 17.2 58.8 8.1

18-29 13.0 5.2 20.5 52.4 8.9

3. Formation of the Soviet Union in 1922 30-49 6.0 6.0 16.5 60.7 10.7

50+ 4.7 4.4 13.9 68.6 8.4

4. Political court cases 18-29 15.0 65.4 8.9 4.0 6.6 in 1937-1938, mass arrests, repressions and shooting of 30-49 6.3 74.6 7.6 5.1 6.5 political prisoners 50+ 5.4 73.6 7.4 5.7 7.8

5. Germany’s capitulation 18-29 1.7 4.6 2.9 87.3 3.5 to the Soviet Union in May 1945 (victory of the Soviet Union 30-49 1.1 3.6 2.2 91.3 1.8 in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945) 50+ 0.7 5.1 4.4 88.5 1.4

18-29 4.9 31.7 14.4 35.45 13.5

6. Collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 30-49 1.6 45.1 16.7 27.0 9.6 50+ 0.7 49.0 16.2 25.7 8.4

18-29 1.2 2.3 7.2 85.6 3.7 7. Acquisition by Kazakhstan of its independence in December 1991 30-49 0.9 2.7 6.7 86.6 3.1 50+ 0.7 1.0 6.8 89.2 2.4

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Soviet Union. The older and middle generations perceive this event very negatively (45% and 54%, respectively), while young people are more inclined to regard it as a positive turn in the country’s history (35%). n Third, despite all the existing differences, there are no categorical differences between the generations in their assessment of the events of the historical past. And although the importance of the Soviet heritage is gradually declining, it does not threaten a split in values between the generations. Attention is drawn to the fact that the same traits are inherent in middle-aged people as in the older and younger generations. So it can be presumed that middle-aged people are a kind of buffer zone that ensures generational continuity and acts as a link in the transfer of values.

I n L i e u o f a C o n c l u s i o n: Is There a Generation Gap in Kazakhstan?

The comparative data obtained help to answer one of the key questions of the topic under review, “Is there a generation gap in Kazakhstan?” Before answering this question, we should clarify what precisely the “generation gap” is and how it is manifested? According to well-known Russian sociologist G.V. Osipov,1 this gap occurs when, due to its socialization, the younger generation does not identify itself with the main social standards (ideological, legal, distributional), rejecting them, thus alienating itself and attempting to reproduce a different political and ideological structure. The concept “gap” (“split”) acquires key significance in this event, since it gives rise to profound differentiation between the generations (most often between the older and younger) with respect to fundamental life values and precepts. In social life, age differences can be manifested in an imbalance in the professional structure of society in terms of age, or in a decline in the social status of one of the groups. In the cultural sphere, the generation gap could cause the emergence of different types of stere- otypes (the Pepsi generation, transition-age children, and so on), or phobias (for example, geronto- phobia). But more often than not the generation gap is manifested in the political and ideological sphere, since the new generation often refuses to accept the established sociopolitical standards and acts as an advocator of cardinal changes. It is no accident that the concept of “generation gap” came to the fore in the 20th century, when young people in different parts of the world became the main participants in antigovernment demonstrations (the youth rebellions of the 1960s in Europe, the Cultural Revolution in China, the Decem- ber events in Almaty in 1986, and so on). After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the topic of relations between the generations was raised anew in essentially all the newly independent states. In some countries, this problem boosted the activity of extremist movements (the Baltic countries and Russia), in others it was manifested in political (electoral) behavior (for example, in Moldova and Ukraine, young people vote differently from the older age groups), and in still others revolutionary masses appeared ready to engage in active illegal acts (Kyrgyzstan). If we keep in mind all the above, it becomes clear that Kazakhstan has no obvious signs of a generation gap today. The studies show that despite the difference in life values (according to some

1 G.V. Osipov, Sotsiologia i obshchestvo, Moscow, 2007. 86 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 parameters), the young people of Kazakhstan are still oriented toward reproducing the existing social structure and assess the situation in the country within the framework set by public opinion. In the political respect, young people do not stand out in terms of their radical views, rather, on the contrary, they support the official policy, expressing, in so doing, loyalty to the existing government. The conclusion can be drawn that today’s younger generation identifies itself as part of the system of social and political relations that has formed in Kazakhstan and, accepting the standards that pre- dominate in society, is trying to adapt to the current conditions and looking for ways to express itself within the existing system of coordinates. As for public policy, there are no radical youth organizations in Kazakhstan, while the electoral behavior of young people is relatively predictable and does not differ from the actions of other age groups. Moreover, it should be noted that during Kazakhstan’s 20 years of independence, the protest activity of its population has never been of a markedly youth nature. At present, most of the active and politicized young people are trying to realize their potential within the ranks of Zhas Otan (which is the youth wing of the ruling party). Moreover, the civil service is the most attractive place to work for students. In addition to the stability of the domestic political situation, weak transformation of the social institutions (school, family, army), differentiation of society along other lines (not age-related), etc., the present author believes one of the most important factors ensuring generational continuity in Kazakhstan to be the system of traditional values that continues to play an important role in the socialization of the younger generation. Sociologists studying the reasons for the absence of generational differences among the residents of the Central Asian countries in assessments of the Soviet period of history have also come to the same conclusion (participants in the Eurasian Monitor project). Transfer of the cultural and spiritual heritage is an important component in bringing up children in Kazakhstan society. As a rule, in every Kazakh family, the rising generation is inculcated with reverence of the customs and legacy of their ancestors, respect for the elderly, and a solicitous attitude toward history. This makes the sociocultural connection between the generations stable and relatively independent of external circumstances.

THE FAMILY IN POWER: A NEW PAST FOR AN OLD COUNTRY

Narciss SHUKURALIEVA D.Sc. (Political Science), Independent Researcher (Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan)

Introduction

he Bakiev family, which remained in pow- try and never hesitated to violate the division of er in Kyrgyzstan for five years, relied on for- power principle. To tighten their grip on power, T mal and informal methods to rule the coun- its members held forth about their noble ancestry 87 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS and distorted the past to secure the future. The of felonies)2 was one of President Bakiev’s last Tulip Revolution, officially recognized as a pop- efforts to commemorate the Tulip Revolution. ular revolution and a protest against the corrupt The law was not enacted; in 2010, two authoritarian regime, was described as a turning weeks of pompous jubilee celebrations were fol- point in the country’s history.1 lowed by the April revolution which removed The myth placed Bakiev and his family in President Bakiev from power. the center of events: monuments, new street Here I have analyzed the public speeches, names, books and articles, scholarly conferences, interviews, commentaries, and publications of films, theatrical productions, etc. were created to members of the Bakiev family and their ideolo- plant the myth in the people’s minds. gists which appeared in 2005-2010 to answer the A draft law on amnesty for the people ac- following questions: What role did revision of the tively involved in the events of March 2005 and past play in family governance? What were Bak- iev’s real goals before and after the revolution? guilty of premeditated crimes (with the exception What sort of information was expected to com- prise the chronicles of the family’s glorious his- 1 See: K. Isaev, The Year 2005. The Beginning of Ren- tory compiled by the Bakievs and their ideolo- aissance of Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek, 2005 (in Kyrgyz); T. Ken- gists? What position did Bakiev hold as president ensariev, “A Democracy Experience in Kyrgyzstan: Histo- and how did he interpret the March 2005 events? ry, Realities, Prospects,” in: An Experience of Democratic Reforms in the Eurasian Expanse: Comparative Models and Practical Mechanisms, ed. by A.M. Baymenov, B.K. Sultanov, 2 See: “Prezident nameren obyavit amnistiyu k 5-leti- Almaty, 2006 (in Kazakh). yu martovskoy revolutsii,” AKIpress, 23 March, 2010.

The Family in Power and the Glorious Past

The Bakievs, many of whom filled high state posts or led informal structures, had enough power to falsify the true history of the country. Six brothers comprised the core of the president’s large (even by the Kyrgyz standards) family: n Zhusupbek (born in 1951) was Deputy Director of the Development and Investment of Com- munities Agency; n Kanybek (1956) headed the village Yrys administration and the Teyit agricultural community; n Zhanybek (1958), after reaching the rank of lieutenant general (with the help of his brother president), headed the State Protection Service and controlled the republic’s defense and security structures; n Akmatbek (1960), Director of Saly-Ata (which translates from the Kyrgyz as Father Saly), was also known as shadow governor of the Jalal-Abad Region and (according to a widespread conviction) “controlled everything and everyone;”3 n Adylbek (1961) was advisor to the foreign minister and chairman of the National Karate Fed- eration of Kyrgyzstan;

3 O. Zhuk, “8 epizodov iz zhizni Akhmata Bakieva,” Delo No., 3 December, 2010. 88 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011

n Maratbek (1963) was appointed ambassador to Germany as soon as his brother came to power. The president’s elder sons (born in his official marriage to Tatyana Petrova) also belonged to the ruling clan. Marat, the eldest, was Deputy Chairman of the State Security Committee and tried to spread his influence to the other defense and security structures to trim the power of his uncle Zhanybek. Maxim, the president’s younger son, headed the Central Agency for Development, Investments and Innovations and in this capacity controlled all the financial flows coming from abroad. In no time, he became a de facto second in command in the republic. At 32 he nurtured much more daring ambitions: “anointed” as the future potentate, he expected Art 52 of the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Repub- lic to be amended accordingly.4 The president was naturally at the very top of the governing hierarchy; the regime, the result of his own efforts and those of his clan, contradicted the division of power principle. Centralized power and vast authority in the absence of institutionalized responsibilities allowed Bakiev to transform the events of March 2005 into the Tulip Revolution and commemorate it accordingly; the presidential decrees, speeches, and publications were “a compass pointing the way” for those implementing his ideas.5 The regime placed its stakes on the media, but the information they supplied was fairly contradictory: the president talked of his policy as designed to promote democracy while also continuing the authoritarian traditions. It should be said that the democratic and authoritarian versions Bakiev supplied never contradicted one another. As distinct from the president, the family enjoyed much greater freedom when talking about the present and revising the past; their unyielding position never took into account the expectations of the international and domestic actors. In short, the discourse of the ruling clan was completely devoid of a democratic component. The relatives never shunned authoritarian arguments; they never hesitated to talk to journalists and were never too shy to hold forth about their heroic deeds; they named streets after themselves and even erected monuments to themselves. The president’s family was lauded in books, articles, and films. All sorts of family foundations poured money into cultural events designed to glorify the clan and its members and confirm the family’s domination in the republic. The discourse the presidential family diligently developed was used by civil servants, pro-government journalists, and politicians; this helped the president legitimize his grip on power and everything he was doing. On the other hand, there was no agreement in the family on certain issues related to the distant and, most important, recent past, March 2005 in particular: the varied opinions about the country’s recent history did not completely fit the president’s version of events. Despite the conflict between the president’s ambivalence about the past and his relatives’ authoritarian approach, the media and all sorts of printed matter agreed on the prevailing version expressed, in particular, by Zh. Sariev and his Duty to the Fatherland. The Roads to Follow… President

4 According to Art 52 of the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic, “If the President is unable to exercise his powers for reasons stated in this Constitution, the Toraga (Speaker) of the Jogorku Kenesh (Parliament) thereafter shall exercise his powers until the election of a new President. If the Toraga is unable to exercise the powers of the President, the Prime Minister shall carry out his duties then henceforward until the election of the new President of the Kyrgyz Republic.” The planned changes would have passed on this right to Maxim Bakiev. It was mainly the opposition media and politicians who talked about the political decisions being made during Kurmanbek Bakiev’s rule aimed at facilitating the power transfer to his son. 5 A. Bakachiev, “Human Rights are the Highest Value. Interview by A. Makeshov with Public Prosecutor of the Alamedin District,” Erkin Too, No. 88 (1802), 21 November, 2008, p. 9. 89 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Kurmanbek Bakiev6 and by S. Zholdoshev and S. Tokoev in The Descendants of Teyitkhan7 and The Suzak District: Time and People.8 The authors demonstrated extensive knowledge of the artistic means employed by hagiogra- phers and no mean skill when applying their methods to their own creations; they revised the past to present a new version of tribalism and regionalism. The Kyrgyz were described not as a single people but as a fragmented community which, before the advent of communism, lived in clans and tribes. It should be said that official ideologists presented the relatively egalitarian social structure as an impressive hierarchic system crowned by the Teyit tribe, to which the presidential family belonged. To add plausibility to these inventions, it was suggested that further research be carried out.9 According to K. Azimov, the Teyit tribe (which belonged to the Ichkilik tribal group) was not merely “one of the most important tribes” but “the cornerstone of the Kyrgyz;”10 it gave birth to 11 khans; the last, 11th, khan being the president.11 It turned out that president’s namesake Kurmanbek, an epic baatyr (hero) of the 16th-17th centuries who fought for his people’s freedom and independence, was one of the president’s ancestors.

Figure 1 The Kyrgyz Khans of the Teyit Tribe (according to K. Azimov)

Aryk Teyit Eshimkan Beknazar Teyitbek

Kurmanbek Seyitbek khan Shyrdabek Sydykbek baatyr

Kurmanbek Aryk Mamat Asan Bakiev

S o u r c e: The author’s own scheme based on: Zh. Sariev, op. cit., pp. 19-24.

6 See: Zh. Sariev, Duty to the Fatherland. The Roads to Follow… President Kurmanbek Bakiev. Documentary Nar- ration, Bishkek, 2009 (in Kyrgyz). 7 See: S.N. Zholdoshev, S.I. Tokoev, The Descendants of Teyitkhan, Bishkek, 2010 (in Kyrgyz). 8 See: The Suzak District: Time and People, ed. by S. Stambekov, A. Akzholov, M. Ashirbaeva, Bishkek, 2009 (in Kyrgyz). 9 See, for example: S.N. Zholdoshev, S.I. Tokoev, op. cit.; Zh. Sariev, op. cit. 10 Zh. Sariev, op. cit., p. 22. 11 See: Ibid., p. 23. 90 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011

K. Azimov did not limit himself to the arguments described above; he put the term azho (ruler or potentate)12 into circulation, which became instantly popular with the media, political community, intelligentsia, ordinary people, and even Bakiev’s opponents. Soviet times received more or less similar treatment (with no references to the class struggle or repressions); the egalitarian idea of communism was replaced with a hierarchy organized around the Jalal-Abad Region (Suzak District), home of the Bakiev clan. His father, Saly Bakiev, an employee of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs and later of the KGB, who “kept officers of the security service on a short leash,”13 was presented to the nation as a hero, one of the outstanding members of the Teyit tribe and of the region where he lived. All of them were loyal to the country and had fought for the glory of the Motherland.14 According to many of those who lauded the ruling family, the Soviet period was a haven of social security and prosperity, largely thanks to the Bakievs, who filled high posts under Soviet power.15

Figure 2 The Clan-Tribal Hierarchy (according to K. Azimov)

Bakiev Kurmanbek

the Bakiev family

the Aryk Teyit clan

the Teyit tribe*

the Ichkilik tribal group * Kyrgyz On kanat (Right Wing) tribal group Sol kanat (Left Wing)

* The Teyit tribe consisted of twelve clans: Aryk Teyit, Kara Teyit, Sary Teyit, Bay Teyit, Tokum Teyit, Uyghur Teyit, Chal Teyit, Zhaman Teyit, Chapan Teyit, Kochkor Teyit, Chygyr- chak Teyit, Aytemir Teyit.

S o u r c e: The author’s own scheme based on: Zh. Sariev, op. cit., pp. 19-24; S.N. Zholdoshev, S.I. Tokoev, op. cit., p. 137.

12 Sometimes the media used the term as the Kyrgyz variant of the word “president.” 13 º. T»l»bekov, Life Dedicated to the Revolution, or the Bakiev Brothers. A Story Based on Documents, Bishkek, 2007, p. 17 (in Kyrgyz). 14 For example, streets were named in honor of Abdyvasit Bakiev (the president’s uncle) and Saly Bakiev (the president’s father); a stipend in honor of Gulnara Bakieva (the president’s niece) was established for scientific achievements. 15 See: M. Shadi uulu, “President Bakiev of Nookat,” Aalam, 23 April, 2009, p. 8. 91 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Similar methods were used to glorify and legitimize the Bakievs’ activities during Akaev’s very much demonized regime to make the Tulip Revolution, which brought Bakiev to power, look inevitable. In this way, those who ruled the country changed the past to make it part of the present, and one that packed a hard punch at that.16

How the Bakievs Tried to Achieve Self-Legitimization

In a country where formal legal institutions had lost their credibility, the March 2005 events required strong ideological underpinnings. The new regime, likewise, needed legitimacy. The new- comers in the corridors of power preferred to stick to the principle of continuity of power, but they had to rely on the rhetoric of renovation as an important part of their rule. The memory of the revolution was intended as a cognitive, emotional, normative, legal, moral, and institutional justification of the Bakievs’ claim to power, irrespective of what really happened in the country in March 2005. Nothing of what had happened could be described as a coup, yet everything should be commemorated as a revolution: in politics, how people are made to remember the past is more important than what actually happened; in this sense the present creates the past.17 Each and every revolution has its own heroes; in Kyrgyzstan, the Bakievs claimed this pedestal. The glorious image of the family acquired much more clarity against the background of the neutral- ized opposition and limited pluralism. O. Tolobekov’s Life Dedicated to the Revolution, or the Bakiev Brothers,18 full of family pho- tographs, is best described as a myth or heroic epos of the members of the president’s clan. Zhusupbek Bakiev, one of the president’s brothers presented as the key figure of the March revolution, died a year later of heart failure. His tombstone bears the following inscription: “He dedicated his heart to the people and gave his life to the Fatherland,” which became a mantra and finally made him “one of the organizers and leaders of the popular revolt against the injustices of the previous rulers.”19 In this way, the revolution was personalized while one person (invariably related to the Bak- ievs) represented collective willpower and collective drive. Commemoration of the name of the president’s brother and the memory of the revolution are closely related to the traditional cult of the dead. A school, a park, and a street were named in honor of him, while a monument and a museum were intended to glorify his life. Zhanybek, another equally influential brother, set up and headed the Zhu- supbek Bakiev Foundation. The sanctified dead brother was the ruling family’s unrivaled argument. March 24 was declared a National Holiday: gala events swept the country in which the local authorities, singers, dancers, artists, and athletes all participated. Popular jubilations lauded the members of the ruling clan. Two weeks before the riot that removed the Bakiev regime from power, Gov- ernor of the Batken Region A. Tagaev wrote: “The changes bred hopes that this government would serve the people.”20

16 See: E. Florescano, “Od historiipomnika w³adzy, do historii wyjaniaj¹cej,” in: Po co nam historia? przek³ad Mróz M. wstêp £epkowski T., Warszawa, 1985, pp. 71-72, 78. 17 See: M. Zió³kowski, Przemiany interesów i wartoci spo³eczeñstwa polskiego, Poznañ, 2000, pp. 92, 105. 18 See: º. T»l»bekov, op. cit., pp. 8, 12. 19 See: Vyshla v svet kniga “24 marta 2005 g.—Narodnaya revolutsia,” Kabar, 22 March, 2006. 20 A. Tagaev, “Narodnaya revolutsia vernula doverie i nadezhdu naroda,” AKIpress-Ferghana, 24 March, 2010. 92 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011

The jubilee events which extolled the Bakievs as heroes were but only one of the methods the ruling family used to boost its new image. Kurmanbek Bakiev himself wrote several books to present his own ideas about the past and present. In his Martovskaia revolutsia: istoricheskiy vybor naroda (The March Revolution: the His- toric Choice of the People),21 the president took the trouble to discuss his closest circle and oppose it to Askar Akaev’s family. In 2005, Bakiev wrote: “The events of March 2005 were the result of usurpation of power by one man, one family, and its closest circle which placed their selfish aims above the destiny of the people and the country. This is a grave lesson for us all.”22 The harsh criticism of the nepotism of the previous regime served as a suitable background for presenting the Bakievs’ laudable traits. The following methods were used: n First, self-representation with use of the epic traditions of the Kyrgyz and folklore images: heroes of our day, the family members inherited positive personal traits from the previous generations and continued the glorious deeds of their great and noble ancestors. The Bakievs spared no effort to depict themselves as sincere, honest, good-natured, and hard-working people who “lived on their earnings alone”23 and regretted the hard lot of the country and its citizens.24 n Second, self-representation through their deeds: they posed themselves as heroes of the revolution unable to remain indifferent to injustice and forced to fight the regime. “It was thanks to Zhusup Bakiev that the huge rallies did not develop into serious clashes.”25 The large family was described as a well-organized institution in its own right and, together with the Peo- ple’s Movement of Kyrgyzstan, led those who protested against the corrupt power. n Third, self-representation as victims of the regime: the people were treated to a long story of the persecutions the Bakievs had suffered; they were presented as revolutionary martyrs: “…our family had to live under the pressure of the powers that be;”26 “aware of the scandalous law- lessness, Zhanysh Bakiev naturally could not stand by and watch. He tried to fight for justice and again suffered for his efforts.”27 Zhusup Bakiev was the central figure; his death was used as proof of his sincerity and total dedication to the people and the country; it was the family’s sacrifice to the cause of justice. n Fourth, self-representation through populism; the Bakievs needed grass-roots support and never tired of saying that the president’s family was not only part of the Kyrgyz people, but also stood above it. All of its members (starting with the father) held high offices in Soviet times: “All of them, each following his own path, acquired vast life experience; they filled high posts and were needed in the country.”28 Reference to the past justified their key positions in post- revolutionary Kyrgyzstan.

21 See: K. Bakiev, Martovskaia revolutsia: istoricheskiy vybor naroda, Bishkek, 2010. 22 K. Bakiev, “O natsionalnoy strategii razvitia i blizhayshikh zadachakh. Poslanie Prezidenta KR K. Bakieva nar- odu Kyrgyzstana,” MCN, 29 September, 2006. 23 This meant that they were hard-working and honest people with a modest lifestyle who relied exclusively on their official earnings (see: “K. Bakiev. He was a Public Figure Totally Dedicated to the People. Interview by º. T»l»bekov,” in: º. T»l»bekov, op. cit., p. 6). 24 See: K. Bakiev, “Vozvrata k prezhnim poriadkam ne budet,” Obshchestvenny Rating, 29 December, 2005; verba- tim report of President of the KR K. Bakiev’s answers in Russian during live broadcast by GTRK on 20 December, 2006, available at [http://www.president.kg/press/vistup/1844/], 25 July, 2009. 25 K. Bakiev, Martovskaia revolutsia: istoricheskiy vybor naroda, p. 63. 26 Ibid., p. 61. 27 Ibid., p. 62. 28 “K. Bakiev. Proritetov ne menyau,” Interview by D. Evlashkov and P. Negoitsa, Rossiiskaia gazeta, 27 January, 2006; federal issue No. 3982. 93 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

High posts were a natural part of the family’s biography, yet the people still feared that the clan system of state governance and usurpation of power might be revived. The president quenched these fears by saying that in contrast to the Akaevs, his family “never interferes in the affairs of the state and appointments.” Each of its members was independent and never needed support from the president; at the same time Bakiev wrote “nobody can influence me.”29 The president argued that the members of his family had the right to pursue professional careers; their appointments to high posts allegedly met national interests, while the honesty, diligence, and professionalism of the Bakievs guaranteed their loyalty to the people and the state. The consistent efforts to make heroes out of the Bakievs and their glorification planted the idea of a social structure opposed to unjust power: a hierarchy of individual and collective elements. Empirical studies of the relevant elements show that the president, his late brother, and then the entire Bakiev family were at the very top of the hierarchy, while the Suzak District, the Jalal-Abad Region, and the republic’s south were places of revolutionary glory. The origins of the ruling family ensured a privileged position for the southern clans; the myth about the revolutionary victory of the people from the south of the republic allowed the Bakievs to occupy the central place in the power structure. Figure 3 The Official Hierarchy of the Revolution Heroes

Bakiev Kurmanbek

Bakiev Zhusupbek

the Bakiev family

people of the Suzak District

people of the Jalal-Abad Region

people of the south of the republic

people of Kyrgyzstan

S o u r c e: The author’s original scheme.

Bakiev and his family managed to move to the very top mainly because democracy was practically undeveloped. The ruling clan manipulated the memory of the revolution to fortify the symbolic

29 K. Bakiev, “Vozvrata k prezhnim poriadkam ne budet.” 94 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 foundation of the present in which not only the president, but also his closest circle, had access to the very limited resources. By interpreting the revolutionary events in its own way, the family managed to add legitimacy to a state order in which it de facto stood above the Constitution and laws and was unaccountable to any branch of power, while also establishing control over private property. The opposition and symbolic elite that sided with it were kept in check, freedom of speech and the press was restricted, while support of the official version of symbolic reality was encouraged: the people in power decided what should be remembered and what should be forgotten. The Bakievs never wanted an attractive façade: they persistently worked toward a version of the past that would convince the people and help them to become an imagined loyal community.30

The Revolution as Presented in Kurmanbek Bakiev’s Discourse

During his five years in power, Kurmanbek Bakiev regularly referred to the revolution and the March 2005 events in his public speeches, interviews, commentaries, and publications, but this did not help the ruling elite to arrive at a logical ideology and united position regarding the revolution. In 2010, the president wrote his Martovskaia revolutsia: istoricheskiy vybor naroda, which presented his very specific explanation of the revolution; he moved away from his previous thesis to offer a totally new opinion about the revolution, the people, and the state. Published on the fifth anniversary of the March revolution, it was intended as a new form of commemoration of the revolutionary events and of readjustment of the mechanisms of power. The book was viewed as a new ideology of power and a “textbook of sorts for the top crust of our political community wishing to ensure a dignified future in deeds rather than in words,”31 that is, a return to the authoritarian system. On the eve of Revolution Day, copies of the book signed by the author were distributed among the participants at Yntymak Kurultayy and chosen officials from all the branches of power. Unity was not achieved, probably because the “chosen” had no time to read the book: in April 2010, the Bakiev regime was removed from power. It should be said that the memory of the revolution was needed only to add legitimacy to Bak- iev’s power as part and parcel of the strategy of an immediate response to the changes inside the country and beyond it.32 The need to keep in line with the changing expectations of the people and the desire to maintain the status quo interfered with the process of revolutionary commemoration, which consisted of two intertwined—democratic and authoritarian—narratives. These versions were applied either separately, depending on the external conditions, or simultaneously, in the interests of legitimizing power. The contradiction between the democratic and authoritarian forms of legitimization was largely created by the very ambiguous nature of the March 2005 events. The old regime was discredited, new people came to power, but nothing changed in the functioning of the political institutions, social structures, and the government. Despite official recognition of the formal and legal transfer of power, the March events radically changed the mentality and behavior of the people; most of the country’s pop-

30 See: B. Szacka, Czas przesz³ypamiêæmit, Warsaw, 2006, pp. 54-58; B. Anderson, Imagined Communities, Lon- don, New York, 2002, pp. 155-162. 31 M. Zalikahnov, “Predislovie,” in: K. Bakiev, Martovskaia revolutsia: istoricheskiy vybor naroda, p. 8. 32 See: A. Portinov, Wielka Wojna Ojczyniana w polityce pamiêci Bia³orusi, Mo³dawii i Ukrainy, Respublica nowa jesieñ, No. 7, 2009, p. 26. 95 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS ulation was involved in voluntary civil mobilization when they protested (actively or passively) against the Akaev regime. The population of the pro-government regions, which supported the government at the elections and referendums, poured into the streets; passive and apathetic groups, likewise, joined in the process. The regime was brought down, which can be described as an achievement of the nation’s emotional state.33 The memory of the revolution, which some people hailed with enthusiasm and hope and others with fear and apprehension, was mainly associated with the time of Bakiev’s presidency; the very fact that the memory was alive in the present generation made complete canonization of the March 2005 events impossible. The new government, forced to compete with living memory, tried to use democratic rhetoric as a cornerstone of its own legitimization. The government tried to transform living memory, on the one hand, while merging with it, on the other, which would have made it impossible to form any opinion about the revolution and its driving forces (that is, whether it was the people who won or whether it was a mere product of political construing). When molding the democratic version, Kurmanbek Bakiev never relied on refined conceptions stemming from fairly complicated and logically consistent constructs. He felt much more at ease dealing with popular ideas about democracy, never going beyond banal rhetoric and typically populist policies. This moved to the fore the idea that the revolution was a unique historical event which returned power to the people, that is, the myth of a social contract.34 It was a myth about the freedom-loving Kyrgyz people who selflessly fought aggression and tyranny; the idea of statehood and freedom which had been cultivated for centuries was finally realized when the sovereign people created a state of their own. It should be said that Askar Akaev, likewise, spoke of the freedom-loving Kyrgyz people; it was restored in more or less revised form (with the stress shifted to the Tulip Revolution) in Bakiev’s discourse. The events of March 2005 and Kurmanbek Bakiev’s advent to power were described as a turning point in the country’s life and the starting point of renovation; freedom had been returned to the people, while the present government was determined to serve it. The discourse left the people the right to oppose if the new leader usurped power; sovereignty could have rebelled once more to restore legality of power.35 Kurmanbek Bakiev dressed the memory of the revolution in different attire: according to his authoritarian version, the revolution was not a struggle for liberation or restoration of the lost rights and freedoms. The authoritarian image presented popular protest not so much as a result of political opposition, but as a result of the inadequate satisfaction of social needs. The stress was not so much on limiting the president’s power by means of the Constitution as on resolving all sorts of social issues (eliminating unemployment, guaranteed economic growth, and road building). The revolution was

33 See: H. Arendt, On Revolution, London, 1990, p. 34; P. Sztompka, Socjologia, Kraków, 2002, pp. 28, 39; E. Maty- nia, Performative Democracy, Boulder, London, 2009, pp. 6-10. 34 See: H. Arendt, op. cit.; P. Sztompka, op. cit., pp. 30-31. 35 The new government used the legitimating elements of Akaev’s regime. This is clearly illustrated by what Minis- ter of Economic Development and Trade of the KR Akylbek Zhaparov said in 2009. In his interview with Kyrgyz tuusu, he reproduced Bakiev’s position by saying that the new leaders should learn the political lessons of the people’s revolution: “The revolution has taught us what democracy is; it clarified the ideas and positions of the Kyrgyz people. Under our Con- stitution, the people are the source of power, while the president (Akaev.—N.Sh.) forgot this; he scorned the people and ignored their needs. If the president does not think about the people, they will up and drive him out of Kyrgyzstan, regardless of his power. To sum up—this is a lesson.” The idea of the sovereign people survived until the April revolution of 2010 when a wave of popular protests removed President Bakiev from his post (see: A. Zhaparov, “We Received a Bankrupt State,” Kyrgyz tuusu, No. 21, 23 March, 2009, p. 9; T. Kenensariev, “Osnovnye istorichekie etapy razvitia suverennogo Kyrgyzs- tana,” p. 9, available at [http://arch.kyrlibnet.kg/uploads/30.Kenencariev%20T..pdf]). 96 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 presented as a feat of overcoming fear and indecision; its definition as a “victory of the sovereign people”36 was resolutely rejected. The people had been abandoned, while a new “father of the nation” in the person of Kurmanbek Bakiev assumed the duty of looking after his orphaned tribesmen. This structure of reminiscences made it easier to legitimize the authoritarian model of power and ensured recognition of the political structures and laws of the predecessors.

Conclusion

I have posed myself the task of showing how President Bakiev and his family transformed the egalitarian past into a rigidly hierarchical one. As the myth had it, the clan displayed a lot of heroism before and during communist rule, during the years of independence, and in March 2005. To do this I had to answer the question: How did the mechanisms of commemoration of the Tulip Revolution and the Bakievs’ coming to power help to legitimize their rule? I have identified and described the main elements of the pronouncements of the head of state, his family, and the ideologists of the regime. On the one hand, despite inner tension and disagreements, the viewpoint of the family and the ideologists was more or less identical, while the authoritarian narration never recognized the subjective role of the people. The past was presented as a time of heroes, all of them ancestors of the ruling family. On the other hand, Bakiev’s rhetoric was never based on any systematized ideology. As distinct from his relatively independent family, he had a flexible response to all the internal and external stimuli; he frequently shifted his position, which explains the democratic-authoritarian ambivalence in his treatment of the revolution. On the one hand, the revolution was presented as a culmination of the social contract which supplied a democratic description of the role of the people, the government, and the state. On the other, the memory of the revolution was used to realize the authoritarian aims and preserve the status quo. This means that the analysis of the images of the past and the March 2005 events suggests contradictory conclusions; on the whole, however, the clan-centered hierarchic structure, which rested on the ruling family, predominated. The aspects and mechanisms used to create the image of the past can be regarded as a combina- tion of formal and informal structures in which the boundaries between the public and the private have been erased.

36 H. Arendt, op. cit.; P. Sztompka, op. cit., pp. 69-113.

97 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

REGIONAL POLITICS

THE GREATER BLACK SEA REGION— A GATEWAY TO EURASIA

Boris ZAZHIGAEV Ph.D. (Political Science), Professor, Head of the Chair of International Relations and Foreign Policy, Pro-Rector of the Kiev International University (Kiev, Ukraine)

Introduction

t all times the Black Sea Region has played South Asia) as a geopolitical segment of the Persian an important role in the life of the Eurasian Gulf states and the Middle East, Brzezinski called it A people; it was on the shores of the Black the “Eurasian Balkans” and believed that the term Sea that great empires flourished and disappeared. “power vacuum” described the situation to a tee.1 Today, it is the source of the worst threats The Black Sea Region and its unique natural of the 21st century that still linger in the larger part and man-made strategic facilities occupy a highly of the post-Soviet expanse; it is also a seat of “fro- advantageous geopolitical place on the globe. The zen conflicts” largely associated with instability Crimean Peninsula, which in the late 1980s and in the Greater Middle East. The present political early 1990s was a target of fierce contention, should and ideological contradictions in the region inter- be mentioned in particular. The region’s geopolit- fere with the eastward progress of liberal and ical potential and the dynamics of global evolution democratic values. have turned it into a subject for scientific scrutiny, Despite all sorts of external and internal largely prompted by the novelty of the problems threats, the Greater Black Sea Region (a triangle created by the processes unfolding before our eyes. formed by Russia, Europe, and the Islamic world) The region’s specifics and importance have so far remains a relatively calm area, most of the made it a regional and global phenomenon, three states of which are distinguished by a European foreign policy vector. 1 Z. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard. American When looking at part of the Black Sea Region Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books, and the Caucasus (together with Central and part of New York, 1997, p. 123. 98 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 aspects of which can be described as especially II. The new geopolitical landscape of the Great- interesting: er Black Sea Region. I. The regional and global changes in the Black III. Clash of civilizations in the context of the glo- Sea Region in the post-bipolar world. bal evolutionary confrontation.

I. The Regional and Global Changes in the Black Sea Region in the Post-Bipolar World

In the post-bipolar period, the area has been living through consequential tectonic changes caused by the emergence of a great number of independent states and enclaves fighting for their independence. During the Cold War, the region was a target of confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (see Fig. 1); today it is a regional enclave. Figure 1 NATO-Soviet Bloc Confrontation in the Bipolar World

99 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

In the wider sense, the region is a patchwork of political interests of the various states belonging to it and their economic spheres of influence. Turkey, Rumania, and Bulgaria are NATO members (the latter two are part of the European Union). Ukraine serves as a buffer between the West and Russia, while Georgia, which has opted for the Western development vector, lives under Russia’s pressure and lightens it for Azerbaijan and Armenia. The latter has no diplomatic relations with Turkey, the region’s leader. Bulgaria, Rumania, Ukraine, and Georgia are actively looking for their national and regional identities. Russia, which has outlived its “post-empire syndrome,” is trying to defend its interests in the global geopolitical game. The Soviet Union’s disintegration deprived it of control not only over a large stretch of the Black Sea coast and its aquatic area, but also over the strategically important Crimean Peninsula. The situation in the Black Sea theater of operations has changed beyond recognition; today the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) is 2-3-fold smaller than the Turkish Navy2; in the past it competed with the NATO United Mediterranean Force. In 1991, the Soviet BSF, with a Navy Department staff of around 10 thousand, hired 60 thousand civilians (office and manual workers). It consisted of 835 ships of practically all classes, including 28 submarines; 2 antisubmarine cruisers; 6 GM cruisers and first-rate ASW; 20 second-rate large antisubmarine vessels, destroyers and second-rate patrol vessels; about 40 patrol vessels; 30 small missile ships and missile boats; about 70 minesweepers; 50 landing ships and craft; and over 400 naval aircraft. The fleet also included 2 divisions of antisubmarine vessels and destroyers; 1 division of submarines; 2 divisions of fighter aviation and missile-carrying naval aircraft; 1 division of coastal defense; and scores of separate brigades, regiments, battalions, divisions, companies, and batteries.3 By 2011, the BSF retained about 50 warships and boats, as well as several scores of auxiliary vessels; the numerical strength of naval aircraft and coastal defense had decreased manifold. In the next 10 to 15 years, most the BSF ships will become physically unfit for service.4 Some experts think that Russia’s BSF is declining: only 30 percent of its ships are battle-worthy. Today, it has no aviation to speak of and no ship-repair yard; the accident that befell Alrosa deprived Russia of what was believed to be its only battle-worthy submarine.5 The BSF’s only GM cruiser looks more like a floating target than a battle-worthy warship.6 With no open access to the Mediterranean (or the World Ocean), the Black Sea Fleet is doomed during war time: it has no chance of getting out of the Black Sea trap sealed by NATO forces which are 30-40-fold stronger, thus making its strategic importance negligible. Russian sailors regard the BSF as a comfortable place with good wages and good retirement prospects. Today, the BSF in Sevastopol is nothing more than a potential threat to the city’s Ukrainian population. According to U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine John Tefft’s secret cable, former president of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma “downplayed the strategic importance of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF), saying it could dispatch a ship to scare Georgia, but it would be no match for the Turkish fleet.”7 The talk took place on 2 February, 2010, on the eve of the second round of the presidential elections in Ukraine.

2 See: V.V. Zaborskiy, “Kuda plyvet VMF Rossii?,” available at [http://zpolk.ucoz.org/news/kuda_plyvet_vmf_rossii/ 2009-11-03-23], 20 March, 2011. 3 See: I. Kramnik, “Chernomorskiy flot. Tsena sily,” KorrespondenT.net, 12 May, 2010, available at [http:// korrespondent.net/worldabus/1075441-ria-novosti-chernomorskij-flot-cena-sily], 19 March, 2011. 4 See: Ibidem. 5 See: K. Zheleznov, R. Korsovetskiy, “Podvodnaya lodka ‘Alrosa’ vernulas v Sevastopol,” Komsomolskaya pravda (v Ukraine), 2 November, 2009, available at [http://kp.ua/daily/211109/203234/], 21 March, 2011. 6 See: V. Voronov, “Kak umiraet Chernomorskiy flot,” Part 1, available at [http://flot.com/nowadays/structure/black/ bsfisdying.htm], 12 March, 2011. 7 [http://turkishnavy.blogspot.com/2010/12/wikileaks-and-turkish-navy.html]. 100 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 II. The New Geopolitical Landscape of the Greater Black Sea Region

No matter how varied and no matter how vague, the Black Sea Region is a definite and stable geographical unit which divides the North from the South and the East from the West, that is, the rich countries from the poor countries; being found within the strategic triangle (see a scheme in the right- hand lower corner of Fig. 1) formed by the Islamic world, Asia, and Europe the region faces numerous external and internal threats. NATO, the United States, and their EU partners are showing a lot of geopolitical interest in the region. The hearings in the U.S. Congress testify to the fact that America needs the region to diversify energy fuel supplies from non-OPEC members which serve an alternative to the Persian Gulf countries. It is suggested that America should establish contacts with countries with predominantly Mus- lim populations (as opposed to radical Islamism), support independence of the South Caucasian and Black Sea coastal states, and encourage their advance toward democracy. The recommendations of 2001 stressed the following: “Increase diplomatic efforts and encourage financial investment to promote the flow of Caspian energy resources along an East-West corridor (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan)” which “will ensure that a large portion of Caspian oil flows through non- OPEC countries and countries that do not have competing interests (Russia and Iran both have extensive oil and gas supplies).”8 The United States regards the “viability and stability of global energy supplies and diversification of supply” as one of the most important geopolitical tasks. “As President Bush has noted, ‘Diver- sity is important, not only for energy security but also for national security.’”9 “Caspian discoveries are at least equal to and may prove larger than those in the North Sea. The Caspian’s resources are located in countries possessing predominately pro-Western orientations that are not currently members of OPEC. The addition of Caspian oil could weaken the OPEC monopoly, providing greater lev- erage over the pricing policies of Saudi Arabia and other OPEC countries, ultimately contributing to lower world oil prices.”10 All the more so as the recent natural calamities in Japan suggest that in the absence of a safe and effective alternative to traditional energy resources, mankind will continue using them (at least in the near future), which explains why access to the energy resources of the Middle East and Siberia determines the vectors of world politics. The twenty years that have passed since the Soviet Union’s disintegration have pushed the Black Sea Region back into the 18th century when Russia and the Ottoman Empire were locked in a struggle for the Black Sea. Today, however, the strategic statuses of the region’s states are very different from the geopolitical landscape of the latter half of the 18th century: Russia no longer controls the important stretches of the Black Sea coast (Ukraine and Georgia have gained their independence, while Bulgaria and Rumania, former members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, have joined NATO) and the Crimea. The Crimean Tatars (exiled under Soviet power) returned to the Peninsula, a fact that breeds a negative attitude among the local people toward what remains of the morally obsolete BSF still stationed in Sevastopol.

8 The Caucasus and Caspian Region: Understanding U.S. Interests and Policy, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventh Congress, First Ses- sion, 10 October, 2001, p. 1, available at [http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa75632.000/hfa75632_0f.htm], 22 March, 2011. 9 Remarks of President George Bush to the Capital City Partnership, St. Paul, Minnesota, 17 May, 2001, available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/20010517-2.html], 18 March, 2011. 10 B. Shaffer, U.S. Policy toward the Caspian Region: Recommendations for the Bush Administration, available at [http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/brenda_shaffer_policy_recommendations.doc], 27 March, 2011. 101 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Ukraine’s position on the Peninsula is greatly weakened by the well-organized Crimean Tatars who aspire to set up an autonomy and who are supported by Turkey (its claims to the Crimea going back into the past), which is building up its military might. With each passing day, the possibility of the Crimean Tatars setting up their own state looks more and more realistic, which is breeding concern among the Slavic population. “The Turks are pouring money into the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatars, training clergy, and building new houses in the Crimea. In short, they are creating a large group of people oriented primarily toward Turkey.”11 Russia, on the other hand, has lost the support of the Peninsula’s Slavic population (particularly the Russians and Ukrainians). The last elections to the Supreme Soviet of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea brought the pro-Russian political forces a meager 3 seats out of 100.12 In 2011, Russia stopped funding and later closed down the Russian Cultural Center in Simferopol and its branches in Alushta, Bakhchisaray, Dzhankoy, Armyansk, Yevpatoria, Feodosia, Kerch, and the villages of Krasnogvar- deyskoe and Zuya.13 With the strategically important Crimea and its military infrastructure, as well as practically the entire stretch of the northern coast and its transport infrastructure (extremely important for the economies of all regional states), Ukraine occupies the key position in the Black Sea Region. However, it has not yet identified its foreign policy interests or its domestic priorities. So far this is a classical depraved state, about which Machiavelli said: “For the corruption I speak of, is wholly incompatible with a free government… That its original institutions are no longer adapted to a city that has become corrupted, is plainly seen in two matters of great moment, I mean in the appointment of magistrates and in the passing of laws.”14 This is a “[universal] state in its last agonies” (A. Toynbee),15 in which the nomenklature (which passes itself for the elite) is fighting for survival. The oligarchs who rule the country by criminal methods with the help of the special services and defense and security structures use power to line their pockets. The political processes underway in Ukraine pushed it into the corner the great Italian politician described in his Discourses: “All the great emigrations of nations have been and continue to be from the cold and barren region of Scythia, because from the population there being excessive, and the soil ill able to support them, they are forced to quit their home, many causes operating to drive them forth and none to keep them back.”16 According to the poll conducted in 2010 by the International Institute of Education, Culture and Ties with the Diaspora at Lviv Polytechnic National University, 49 percent of the young men (under 30) polled were prepared to emigrate from Ukraine… Whole families were prepared to emigrate.17 The country’s future is threatened by the state of its economy, army, and navy, as well as by the growing demographic crisis and increasingly obvious fragmentation.

11 T. Flint, “Karmanny tigr Chernogo morya,” available at [http://www.from-ua.com/politics/415036e46b590/ ], 29 March, 2011. 12 See: “Deputatskie fraktsii Verkhovnogo Soveta ARK,” available at [http://www.rada.crimea.ua/structure/factions/ 5], 22 March, 2011. 13 See: D. Smirnov, “Ruka Moskvy’ usokhla. Russkiy kulturny tsentr v Simferopole zakryvaetsya,” Sobytia, No. 4 (254), 2011, available at [http://www.sobytiya.com.ua/public/9075], 27 March, 2011. 14 N. Machiavelli, Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius, Transl. from the Italian by Ninian Hill Thomson, M.A., Public Domain Books, 1883, Book I, Chapters 17 and 18. 15 A. Toynbee, A Study of History, Abridgement of Volumes VII-X by D.C. Somervell, Oxford University Press, New York, 1957, p. 4. 16 N. Machiavelli, op. cit., Book II, Chapter 8. 17 See: “Forty-nine Percent of Young People in Western Ukraine Want to Emigrate,” Ternopol Internet-newspaper Poglyad, 11 March, 2011, available at [http://poglyad.te.ua/2011/03/49-molodi-zahidnoji-ukrajiny-hochut-vyjihaty-z-kra- jiny-na-postijno/], 22 March, 2011 (in Ukrainian). 102 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011

The regional balance of power is best illustrated by the changed correlation of forces between the Turkish and Russian navies; the two countries have limited themselves to a “regional arms race” in which Turkey, which modernized its fleet comprehensively and on time, has scored several points. It should be said that throughout its history Turkey has attached great importance to the Black Sea Region; the Ottoman Empire looked at the Black Sea as “its inland reservoir” which no foreign power could enter and waged incessant wars with Russia to preserve and/or establish its control over the sea and the Crimea. Control over the Bosporus and Dardanelles, which connect the Black Sea with the World Ocean, remains as important a foreign policy task as ever for Turkey and NATO (of which Turkey has been one of the most reliable members since 1952). The situation in the Northern Caucasus (which belongs to Russia) can be described as a historical atavism: the central and local governments are no longer coping with the developments there. Russia relies on force and methods that have nothing to do with international and domestic law to remain in the region. Most of the democratic states do not recognize the Russian power structures in the North- ern Caucasus as legitimate. There is the opinion that the civil guerilla war in the Russian part of the Caucasus can be described as a national-liberation war with potentially far-reaching geopolitical repercussions for Eur- asia and the rest of the world. I am convinced that the Russian Caucasian republics are bringing Rus- sia’s inevitable disintegration closer; this will inevitably diminish its world political role. The United States has included the Black Sea Region in the sphere of its political interests. The American Administration specified the basic trends of its policy in the Black Sea and the Caspian Region in November 1999 at the Istanbul OSCE Summit. A special statement spoke about America’s and Turkey’s stronger regional positions as opposed to Russia’s interests. The Bush Administration brought together all the actions undertaken within the Big Program for regional unity along the U.S.-Turkey- Greater Caucasus line. Washington intended to promote America’s national interests in the form of America’s presence in the strategically important areas.18 Turkey, the EU membership of which is nowhere in sight, vacillates between the East and the West and between the need to look after its national interests and its sense of national pride. Ariel Cohen, a prominent American analyst and senior research fellow in Russian and European Studies and International Energy Security at the Heritage Foundation, wrote in his U.S. Strategy in the Black Sea Region: “Compounding Turkish acrimony toward the West and its involvement in regional matters is the reluctance by EU leaders to support Turkish accession. Their hesitation is breeding resentment among the Turks… EU indecisiveness also strengthens Turkish ties with other nations, including Russia, that are convinced that the West will never accept Muslims into their ‘clubs’.”19 In recent years Turkey has been clearly demonstrating that it intends to move away from the United States and NATO (of which it is a member); it is believed in some quarters that it is one of the most anti-American countries in the region and, probably, in the world. Ankara wants a much more important regional role than that assigned to it by the U.S. and EU. In an interview with Kavkazskiy uzel, Director of the Harvard Black Sea Security Program Sergey Konoplev said: “As a NATO member Turkey guarded the southeastern flank and stood opposed to the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Today, it can hardly be described as a NATO member. It tries to keep the Alliance out of the region to deal with regional security problems either single-handedly or together with Russia.”20

18 See: The Caucasus and Caspian Region: Understanding U.S. Interests and Policy. 19 A. Cohen, I. Conway, “U.S. Strategy in the Black Sea Region,” Backgrounder, No. 1990, 13 December, 2006. Pub- lished by The Heritage Foundation, available at [www.heritage.org/research/RussiaandEurasia/bg1990.cfm], 14 March, 2011. 20 S. Konoplev, “Dlya Prichernomorskogo regiona glavnym yavlyaetsya sokhranenie mira, reshenie sushchestvuy- ushchikh confliktov i ukreplenie ekonomicheskikh svyazey. Interview Kavkazskomu uzlu,” 26 January, 2011, available at [http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/180157/], 26 March, 2011 103 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Turkey is trying to pursue a dual foreign policy; Ankara would like to capitalize on contradictions between America, the EU, and Russia in the energy security sphere and their desire to gain the upper hand in the European energy market. On the other hand, it owes its economic advance to Russian hydrocarbons; Russia supplies more than 70 percent of Turkey’s natural gas.21 Recently (especially after the Russian-Georgian war of 2008), Iran became more active in the Black Sea Region and the Caucasus: it established closer relations with Georgia (which irritates Rus- sia) and is paying much more attention to Azerbaijan and Armenia. In fact, “much of the instability that has plagued the region has resulted from the actions of rival powers: among them, the U.S., Russia, Iran and Turkey. In the early 1990s, Moscow’s activities contributed to the escalation of many local disputes in the region to all-out wars.”22 According to American analysts, “the Caucasus, particularly the mountain areas that straddle the North and South Caucasus, are a potential Afghanistan, with all its consequences for us (the U.S.—B.Z.).

Figure 2 The New Landscape of the Greater Black Sea Region

21 See: H. Fiona, T. Omer, “Turkey and Russia: Axis of the Excluded?” Survival, Vol. 48, No. 1, Spring 2006, available at [www.brookings.edu/views/articles/fhill/2006_survival.pdf], 20 March, 2011. 22 The Caucasus and Caspian Region: Understanding U.S. Interests and Policy. 104 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011

There are many weak states, which do not control their entire territory. International terrorism directed against the United States has never appeared there, but there are many ruthless and lawless acts against local governments and private citizens that show its potential.”23 The Black Sea Region is a geopolitical mêlée of cultures; it is involved in international (legal and illegal) trade and is open to all sorts of ideological and religious impacts and attempts by external forces to gain firmer positions in it. This is particularly true of the United States, which is consistently promoting its national interests in the region. Disintegration of the bipolar system caused tectonic shifts; today, Turkey, still the outpost of NATO’s global policies, has to diversify not only its economic goals, but also its foreign policy aims to the detriment, in some cases, of Atlantic solidarity. The region’s policy is determined by the relations between Turkey and Russia; two opposing and cooperating regional poles with diametrically opposite economic and political interests rooted in their objective civilizational trends: upsurge and economic growth, on the one hand, and disintegration and universalization24 of states (Russia and Ukraine), on the other. This process explains the consolidation of the political antipodes (Russia and Turkey) determined to limit the political and economic (energy) influence of the third countries (the U.S. and EU in particular) in the region. Iran and the South Caucasian states, as well as the North Caucasian republics, will play a much greater role in the Black Sea Region. This will help the world actors to promote their geopolitical interests in the area. Russia and Turkey will be gradually squeezed out: “velvet” expansion of West- ern civilization is inevitable.

III. Clash of Civilizations in the Context of the Global Evolutionary Confrontation

The clash of civilizations is one of the two key development trends in the world today. It seems that in the Black Sea Region it should be regarded as a clash between two worlds: the world of liberal democracy (the EU, U.S., and NATO) and the world of tyranny—from the North African total- itarian despotic regimes of various kinds to “universal” post-Soviet autocracies and kleptocracies.25 This is not a conflict of civilizations (in line with the theories of Huntington and Danilevskiy), but rather a clash between the good forms of government and the “three utterly bad” ones (N. Machi- avelli).26 The future of the world and the vector of its development, as well as the global and regional repercussions, depend on who will win in the coming clash over the Greater Black Sea Region. Be- cause of its patchiness, vagueness, and instability, the region will become a main instrument of global world politics, which will change the political map of Eurasia (from Turkey and Iran to the APR). The academic community on the whole agrees with the above. O. Vorkunova, a fellow at the RAS Institute of World Economy and International Relations and the head of the Peace and Develop-

23 Ibidem. 24 A “universal state” is perceived here, according to Toynbee, roughly as an empire that has outlived itself and lost its ability to develop. Such states “arise after, and not before, the breakdown of civilizations… They are not summers but ‘Indian summers,’ masking autumn and presaging winter” (A. Toynbee, op. cit., p. 2). 25 See: Kleptocracy from ancient Greek êëÝðôåéí—steal and êñÜôïò—power; literally, power of thieves—an ideological tag attached to a rogue-controlled government. 26 See: N. Machiavelli, op. cit., Book I, Chapter 2. 105 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS ment Research Center, has written that “the key to the future of Eurasia is found in the Black Sea- Caspian Region. Today, it is associated with the breathtaking geopolitical ‘Big Oil’ and communication scenarios and with the so-far virtual idea of an alliance with the European Union and the region’s future. They all will be affected, to different degrees, by the strategic choice of the South Caucasian and Balkan states.”27 There are two obvious, and antagonistic, vectors in world politics clearly seen in the Black Sea Region: on the one hand, Russia is trying to keep the other actors (the EU, U.S., and NATO) away and to control the largest share of fuel flows to the EU and Turkey. The Kremlin is determined to regain Soviet influence in the Middle East and North Africa to interfere, in one way or another, in policy of the oil- and gas-producers. Its dual position in relation to the North African democratic revolutions of 2011 and criticism of the U.N. and NATO (Putin described the attack on Libya as a “crusade” and the U.N. SC resolution as “incomplete and flawed”).28 This is veiled support of the kleptocratic regimes of Northern Africa (Libya in particular) and the Middle East. Russian experts write about the lost weapon trade profits (“…the profits lost by the Russian military-industrial complex because of the Libyan crisis is about $4 billion”) and warn that “practically any country which does not fit the liberal matrix and has any amount of mineral riches might find itself on the list. Should we expect the same or…?”29 According to analysts, the North African and Middle Eastern regimes are identical to the political systems in Russia and Ukraine (with the advent of Viktor Yanukovich to power, Ukraine has been sliding toward a regime of a nomenklatura kleptocracy). On the other hand, America, the European Union, and NATO stand opposed to Russia’s expansion to the Mediterranean and the Middle East where it is seeking greater influence on the local states. Its intentions were obvious back in the early 2000s: in his Renewing the Atlantic Partnership (a review of the Report of an Independent Task Force chaired by Henry A. Kissinger and Lawrence H. Summers), Charles A. Kupchan, senior research fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, wrote: “A wider Europe could ensure that peace, democracy, and prosperity continue to spread eastward, thereby converging with what could be similar trends in Russia.”30 In the foreseeable future, the United States, NATO, and the European Union (each with its own and common interests of promoting the liberal-democratic values) will play roles equal to that of Russia in the Black Sea Region. The United States and NATO look at it as a springboard from which they will move on to the Greater Middle East, an alternative source of energy resources, and a buffer zone to cushion the threats coming from the South. The EU is more concerned about economic issues and is prepared to forget, for a while, its geopolitical and geostrategic interests (within its NATO partnership). In the 21st century the region has become a point of bifurcation of the civilizations where the antagonisms of the regimes are clearly seen. On the one hand, the region attracts the “universal” (Toynbee) post-Soviet (in fact “medieval”) states and the already exhausted “people’s democracies” of North Africa and the Middle East (born and developed in the latter half of the 20th century under Soviet patronage).

27 O.A. Vorkunova, “Sredizemnomorye-Chernomorye-Kaspiy—‘pogranichie’ v mirovoy politike,” in: Sredizemnomo- rye-Chernomorye-Kaspiy: mezhdu Bolshoy Evropoy i Bolshim Blizhnim Vostokom, Institute of European Studies, RAS; Grantitsa Publishing House, Moscow, 2006, p. 46. 28 “Putin snova raskritikoval voennuyu operatsiyu v Livii,” Segodnya.Ua, 24 March, 2011, available at [http://www. segodnya.ua/news/14235042.html], 29 March, 2011. 29 E. Ponomareva, “Strategiya unichtozheniya Livii,” available at [http://www.mgimo.ru/news/experts/ document183886.phtml], 4 April, 2011. 30 Ch.A. Kupchan, Renewing the Atlantic Partnership, Report of an Independent Task Force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, U.S.A., 2004. 106 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011

On the other hand, the “open society” led by the United States is trying to control the world’s energy resources and manage the global economy (including the EU and such fast-growing emerging economies as China and India), as well as to contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Coordinated policies will allow the United States to rally even more support to deal with the recent most acute problems (Iran’s nuclear file and WMD proliferation), wage a global war on terror, and ensure energy security. The rule of the cliques in the Arab countries which grew rich on natural resources has ended. Unlike what happened in the former Soviet republics, the wave of democratization in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, Algeria, Libya, and Syria is rising from below. We can say that this is the first result of the so-called Mediterranean Union, a project launched three years ago by President Sarkozy. It speeded up democratic changes on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. In the near future, the democratic changes of 2011, which have already caused dramatic changes in the Mediterranean, will greatly affect the strategic balance of power in the Black Sea Region. Rus- sia’s strategic claims to domination, not only in the Mediterranean, but also in any other part of the World Ocean, will be trimmed to a great extent. The unipolar world headed by the United States and NATO (as the guarantor of global security) is the only option for the West: its failure will bury the “open society.” As an agonizing universal state with obvious signs of approaching disintegration, Russia might degenerate into a semi-colony up to and including loss of statehood. “The huge country might collapse in the near future… The system is unlikely to survive for more than five years… Brzezinski predicted its collapse in 2012… According to the RAS Institute of Soci- oeconomic Studies, in 2011 in Russia there were 4 million homeless, 3 million beggars, about 5 million waifs, and about 3 million prostitutes roaming the streets and railway stations registered by the district police departments. About 1.5 million Russian women are engaged in the same business in Europe and Asia. Over 1 million are kept in prisons that have room for no more that 700 thousand. In the notorious 1937 there were 200 thousand fewer prison inmates in the country (the Soviet Union) with a much larger population. In 2006, the WB rated Russia 96 (out of 175 countries) in terms of this index. On a ten-point scale, Russia has a score of 3.8 in terms of the efficiency of its state governance and 1.9 in terms of rule of law. This better suits the destitute African countries and the already dead Latin American dictatorships… Today there are more orphans than in May 1945: 750 thousand today compared to 678 thousand children who lost their fathers in the war and whose mothers died of hunger and illnesses… According to the WHO, there are 37-42 million alcoholics in the country. In 20 years, Russia has lost 23 thousand settlements. “Russia is the 7th country in the world in terms of number of billionaires… They pay the world’s lowest taxes: 13% against 57% in France and Sweden; 61% in Denmark; and 66% in Italy. Half of Russia’s national riches belong to 1.5% of its population.”31 Leader of the State Duma CPRF faction Gennady Zyuganov confirmed these figures, collated and summarized by Ukrainian journalist G. Bursov, at a meeting between President Medvedev and the leaders of both chambers of the Federal Assembly on 17 January, 2011. He said in particular: “Whole regions of Russia are losing their Russian population… According to international criteria, this can be described as nothing short of genocide.”32 The unipolar world model, EU expansion, and NATO’s eastward movement are the instruments used by the “open society” to stand opposed to the agonizing “universal” kleptocracies (armed with

31 G. Bursov, “Krakh ‘russkogo mira’: krizis, gnienie, raspad,” UNIAN Ukraina, available at [http://www.inosmi.ru/ politic/20110207/166314712.html], 25 March, 2011. 32 Vystumplenie G.A. Zyuganova na vstreche s Prezidentom RF D.A. Medvedevym, 17 yanvarya 2011, available at [http://www.kprf.org/showthread.php?t=9757], 27 March, 2011. 107 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS cynicism and militant populism) of the post-Soviet model. George W. Bush put this in a nutshell when he said, we are living in “an era of barbarism emboldened by technology.” In his Farewell Parade, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld amplified by saying: “We live at a time when our enemies mix an extremist ideology with modern weaponry and have the ability to kill thousands—indeed even hundreds of thousands—of our people in a single, swift, deadly stroke.”33

By Way of a Conclusion

The Black Sea Region is an area of clashing interests between two political antagonists; I have in mind forms of governance. Niccolò Machiavelli wrote, “There are altogether six forms of government, three of them utterly bad, the other three good in themselves, but so readily corrupted that they too are apt to become hurtful… It is easy to pass imperceptibly from the one to the other. For a Mon- archy readily becomes a Tyranny, an Aristocracy an Oligarchy, while a Democracy tends to degenerate into Anarchy. …And in this way grew the recognition of Justice.”34 The Black Sea Region, a meeting place of Europe, Africa, and Asia (this is a geostrategically unique location), has become an arena of clashes between the global political and economic (energy) interests of the “open society” with the “good forms of government” and the universal kleptocracies governed by the “utterly bad” regimes.35 Russia regards the Black Sea Region as the last bastion of totalitarianism (Arnold Toynbee described this as determination of the founders and masters of the universal state to remain in power no matter what36 ), which allows it to keep the West and the onslaught of liberal-democratic values in check. The United States, EU, and NATO are prepared to use the region as a springboard from which democracy (the only instrument which makes it possible to preserve the values of the “open society”) can be pushed eastward, thus opening the doors to the energy resources of the Caspian, Central Asia, and Russia’s Asian part. The Black Sea Region might play the central role in re-orientating the energy interests of the global world actors (China, Japan, and the APR countries in particular) from North Africa and the Middle East to Russia’s depopulated Asian part and create conditions in which the liberal world will spread its control to the global economy. There is every reason to believe that the Black Sea Region will serve as the starting point for the West’s “soft” expansion and reorganization of the “dying remnants of the Soviet empire,” Russia and Ukraine in particular.

33 Farewell Parade, As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, The Pentagon, Washington, DC, Friday, 15 December, 2006, U.S. Department of Defense, available at [http://www.defense.gov/speeches/ speech.aspx?speechid=1073]. 34 N. Machiavelli, op. cit., Book I, Chapter 2. 35 Ibidem. 36 See: A. Toynbee, Postizhenie istorii, Moscow: Airis-Press, 2006, p. 513. 108 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND PAX IRANICA: COOPERATION AND INTERDEPENDENCE

Murat LAUMULIN D.Sc. (Political Science), Senior Research Fellow at the Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies (Almaty, Kazakhstan)

Introduction

or ten years now, Iran, Afghanistan, and are dominated by the Pashtoons, the state-form- Tajikistan have been establishing a Persian- ing nation, who are dead set against all attempts F- speaking community in Central Asia. The to split the country into ethnic units. The U.S.-led Turkic republics of Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and occupation authorities, likewise, are firmly op- Turkey started moving toward a Turkic-speaking posed to Iran’s stronger influence on the Tajik and community as soon as the Soviet Union ceased to Hazara minorities. exist. The Persian-speaking countries acquired Tajikistan is a homogenous part of Central their chance in the early 2000s when the Taliban, Asia; its ties with the region and the post-Soviet an inveterate opponent of the IRI, was overthrown expanse are too strong to allow it to completely and Tajikistan ended its civil war. integrate with the Iranian world. To strengthen its In fact, the entire region is more or less in- position in both countries, Tehran is contributing volved: Tajikistan is a Central Asian state, while to their large-scale economic, energy, transport, the other two are its close neighbors with a long and humanitarian projects. history of belonging to the region at one time or It should be said that, in the past, the Irani- another. an culture extended to Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Today, Central Asia, Iran, and Afghanistan Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey, Iraq, and vast are- have economic interests, security concerns, and as in the Middle East, which gives the IRI the op- geopolitical imperatives in common. Iran, which portunity to push its influence westward. With no badly needs a wider Pax Iranica, is the natural chance of exploiting the ethnic and linguistic af- driving force behind integration of the Persian- finity there, Tehran relies on the Shi‘a minority, speaking countries, a far from easy mission in the which is rapidly developing into an important present geopolitical and international context. In political factor in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and the Afghanistan, the Persian-speaking communities Gulf countries.

Iran—the Center of Pax Iranica

In one way or another, Tehran’s foreign policy invariably involves Central Asia. This is true of its relations with Russia, China, Pakistan, India, Turkey, and the South Caucasian states; the Middle East being the only exception.

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Many of its problems are caused by its very specific international status and the foreign policies of its leaders, whose nuclear ambitions have isolated the country once more from the rest of the world. In the 1990s, Iran restored its relations with the outside world and, at the turn of the 21st century, more or less successfully reformed its economy. Today it is entering another period of economic stagnation. In the last two decades, Iran has acquired the status of a regional power and is determined to confirm its regional and global ambitions by building up its military-strategic (missile and nuclear) potential to the detriment of its economic health. The international economic sanctions expected to trim its nuclear ambitions do nothing for its social and economic sphere. Its ethnic diversity (there are several large ethnic groups in the country, whereby Persians are no longer in the absolute majority) adds more problems. Ethnic Azeris, whose numbers have increased over recent years, regularly stir up ethnic discontent or even riots in Iranian Azerbaijan. For a long time now, Iran and its political regime have been and remain a target of numerous leftist and nation- alist terrorist groups. In 2004-2005, the United States became resolved to undermine the Iranian regime from the inside, the provocation of ethnic disagreements being one of the means to this end. The recent events which shook the country in the wake of the presidential election looked very much like the Color Revolutions in Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet expanse stirred up by external forces. It seems that similar methods will be applied to Iran: its ruling regime should either be removed or at least weakened to push the country toward neutrality on the international scene and force it to drop its nuclear program. As the dominant religion and ideology, Islam is the key element of Tehran’s foreign policy: Iran is the only Muslim state determined to export the Islamic revolution beyond its borders. Inside the country, the social sphere and economy are based on Islam. In the last fifteen years, Iranian (Shi‘a) nationalism and pragmatism have moved to the fore in Tehran’s dealings with the outside world. While Islam remains an important element of the country’s foreign policy rhetoric, the Iranian leaders proceed from the country’s national interests and are not averse to exploiting the Islamic factor, particularly in the Middle East. This means that security and stability in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Caspian depend on what is going on around Iran; its destabilization or involvement in a large-scale conflict might upset the Central Asian region. A large-scale military crisis around Iran, as well as its nuclear file, will draw the big geopolitical players (the U.S., Russia, China, Europe, and the Islamic world) into it. This will destabilize the central part of Eurasia and change the military-strategic situation in Afghanistan and Iraq. The external factor has been and remains an important or even decisive element of Iranian foreign policy. Its basic principles formulated at the dawn of the Iranian revolution—“neither West nor East but Islam,” export of the Islamic revolution, and priority of the Muslim world on the foreign policy agenda—have somewhat changed. Its new constructive approach to foreign policy ended its international isolation of the first post-revolutionary years. Iran established contacts with the European Un- ion, the Arab world, and Russia. The Iranian leaders, however, were still worried about the Middle East settlement and destabilization in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Gulf where American military forces are stationed. President Ahmadine- jad is resolved to make his country a regional power and a leader of the Muslim world; he speaks about common Islamic values, interests, and global aims to smooth out the traditional disagreements between the Sunni and the Shi‘a; he has even moved closer to Saudi Arabia, which is not only America’s key ally in the Gulf, but also Iran’s traditional rival determined to limit its impact in the region. China is another very important foreign policy partner: better relations with it mean another ally among the countries with a say in international relations and the opportunity to attract the investments badly needed for development of Iran’s economy. In the 1990s, China, which for some time had been officially encouraging nuclear energy production in Iran, retreated under Washington’s pressure. It

110 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 had, however, helped Tehran at the initial stages of its nuclear program. Arms trade opened many doors to the Iranian market for China and greatly advanced bilateral relations. Oil-rich Iran was indispensable for China’s dynamic economy and an important part of China’s strategic interests. The Chinese factor plays an important role in Iran’s international status undermined by Amer- ica’s mounting pressure. The two countries have moved closer to oppose the United States: Iran needs China as a geopolitical ally, economic partner, and source of strategic technology, while China needs Iran’s energy resources. Moreover, seen from Beijing, Iran looks like a strong anti-American outpost on the Central Asian borders. It could, at some point, become part of China’s strategic salient—Xin- jiang, Central Asia, the Middle East. Today, both Iran and China insist that the U.N. should have a greater role to play in reviving Iraq. China has several reasons to be interested in Iran: Tehran can be used as both a diplomatic instrument in the geopolitical games in the Middle East and Central Asia and an important source of the energy resources needed to feed China’s rapidly developing economy, while the country can also help to establish a new route for Chinese exports. Today, scores of Chinese companies are involved in all sorts of projects in Iran: they are building metros in Iranian cities, railways, and TV networks and are involved in oil and gas production. Still wider contacts might create a new trade route commonly described as the North-South corridor to connect India, Iran, and Russia as an alternative to the Suez. Today, some people in Iran think that its Chinese agenda can be used to move closer to multilateral cooperation among Tehran, Beijing, Moscow, and Delhi. Both China and Iran are driven by their shared concerns about the United States’ unilateral policy; Chinese and Iranian politicians are worried about the American military bases which have already appeared in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. Iran plays one of the key roles in the Middle East, which means that none of the conflicts can be settled without it. Recently, Iran shifted its attention to Turkey and its Islamist leaders; the developments in the region suggest a much wider platform, which can be tentatively described as anti-Arabic. There is information that Iran is not seeking a nuclear status: it merely wishes to obtain a “virtual nuclear weapon state” status similar to that of Canada and Germany; the three countries are part of the non-proliferation regime. The “virtual nuclear weapon state” status means that the country knows how to enrich uranium and agrees to use the results for peaceful purposes. If Washington and its allies agree to meet Iran halfway, Tehran will abide by the additional protocol which stipulates IAEA control. This means that Tehran is striving to establish a multipolar world under the U.N. aegis, with Iran and other Muslim states being one of the poles; it considers Central Asia to be part of the Gulf area and a zone of its vital economic interests. The Islamic Republic consistently insists on energy transportation routes from Central Asia across its territory as the cheapest and, therefore, economically most expedient. Iran’s political and intellectual communities mistrust Russia; the so-called partnership between the two countries is a product of the hostility of the United States and its allies toward Iran. The country, which has an observer status in the SCO, sought full membership and was rejected by Russia and China to avoid America’s negative response. Tehran is convinced that the SCO members treat it as their partner; it is involved in decision-making at all stages. Iran will exploit Russia’s contradictions with other countries to promote its own interests and is seeking a regional power status to communicate with the West. On the other hand, it seems that the Kremlin cannot come to any agreement about the Iranian file: sources in the top leadership claim that the Iranian file “is one of Putin’s personal responsibilities” and that he has the final say on all issues of importance. Indeed, in the first months of 2010, President Medvedev repeated in public that sanctions were unavoidable, while Prime Minister Putin was much vaguer. Iran’s claim to a regional status of any consequence moves the Caucasus and Central Asia into the sphere of its foreign policy interests, even though the northern sector of its interests depends much less on its domestic policy and ideology.

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Today, Tehran’s long-term interests in the Caspian boil down to involvement in economic, political, cultural, and other contacts in Central Asia and the Caucasus, as well as in the regional system of interdependence, which cannot function without Iran. Iran is seeking greater involvement in energy resource production and transportation and, therefore, a stronger position in the Caspian; it wants to bring its gas to the European and Asian markets to become the region’s transit hub and play a more active role in setting up and operating a united Mid- Eastern electric power system. Its international involvement is expected to remedy the systemic faults of the Iranian fuel and energy complex. Iran is resolved to keep the extra-regional powers (the United States and Israel in particular) out of the Caucasus; it agrees with Russia, which believes that none of the extra-regional actors should be allowed to meddle in the domestic affairs of the Caucasus, the Caspian, and Central Asia. Recently, Tehran has been building up its military presence in the Caspian Basin in an effort to prevent the United States and Europe from developing strategic cooperation with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan; it is modernizing its Caspian forces and naval police as part of its Caspian navy. The country’s leaders are acting under the pressure of a “foreign irritant” and do not conceal this. From the very beginning, Iran sided with Russia on the new legal status of the Caspian sea/lake; the sea and its resources should be used jointly by the five littoral states (condominium) with the help of interstate structures and companies entrusted with offshore oil and gas production. As distinct from its Caspian neighbors, Iran has retained the share of the seabed and subsoil it had during Soviet times because it has never been engaged in offshore oil and gas production or survey. It is much less willing to be involved in squabbles over the Caspian resources than the other Caspian states. Its current situation does not depend on energy production in the Caspian, while in the future it might profit from this lucrative enterprise, a positive, yet not vitally important, factor. In 2007, Iran began trying to transform the Caspian Five into a new regional economic structure—an organization of the Caspian states in which Iran will play the first fiddle. All the Caspian states hail the idea of demilitarization of the sea. In the past, the United States tried to help Baku re- organize its naval forces, allegedly to protect the BTC oil pipeline, and invited Ashghabad and Astana to engage in military-technical cooperation in the Caspian. Geography, which left Iran with a small sector in the southern part of the sea, and geology, which has so far revealed no considerable energy reserves, are two factors which determine Iran’s position on Caspian delimitation. Formally, Tehran refused to recognize the northern agreements1 by saying that “any changes in the legal regime related to the use of the Caspian Sea’s mineral resources should be approved by the five littoral states,” and suggested that each of the states receive an equal part (20 percent) of the seabed. This infringes on the interests of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, with which Iran should negotiate first in order to arrive at a mutually acceptable decision. In July 2001, Iran demonstrated its resolution to rebuff all unilateral actions: an Iranian warship and two jets forced Azeri research vessels to leave the area of the Alov, Araz and Sharq oil fields in the Caspian. Recently, however, Tehran retreated from its implacable position: it is prepared to talk and forget the red lines; it has become interested in some of the Caspian projects. To add weight to its position and strengthen its presence in the Caspian, Iran has launched independent prospecting for gas and oil in the southern part of the sea, particularly in areas to which Azerbaijan might also have a claim. It obviously intends to emulate its neighbors: first claim oil and gas fields and then invite others to the negotiation table; however, unlike its neighbors, it has not yet started this process.

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To find out the real volumes of its resources, it will have to move into the deep-water area of its sector, for which it has neither the expertise nor the technology. The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), which has two offshore platforms in the Caspian Sea, had to turn to foreign companies. So far, Iran has done nothing to explore and use its offshore oil and gas resources. As time goes on, it will find it much harder to deal with neighbors who have already divided the sea’s northern part. The Ira- nian leaders have accepted the situation and want to cooperate with the other players. They just want to be one of the active participants in the sphere of energy production. Iran also wants to be actively involved in the transportation of Caspian oil and to increase the amount moved across its territory; it wants to acquire more oil for its modernized and newly built oil refineries in the country’s north. Iranian oil could be moved to China across Central Asia, but so far there are neither specific plans nor decisions regarding this. Swap deals are another, partly realized, alternative for transporting Caspian oil: oil from other littoral states is moved to the Iranian Caspian ports, while Iran sends out equivalent volumes of its oil through its Gulf ports. In the Caspian, it uses Neka as the main port and Noushahr and Anzali as sub- sidiaries. In the Persian Gulf, it relies on Kharg Island. Iran has found it hard to attract the Russian and Azeri players in the Caspian market: with many other alternatives at their disposal, they have not shown any interest in the Iranian route up to now. Iran is still developing its infrastructure, which is expected to provide Iranian companies with a greater role in energy transportation in the Caspian. So far, like its Caspian neighbors, the country does not have enough state-of-the-art tankers, and Tehran is very well aware of the advantage it could gain here. By enhancing its tanker fleet and filling the vacant niche in the market, Iran could satisfy at least some of its energy-related ambitions in the region and also use this advantage as an additional argument for having raw hydrocarbons sent to its ports. If and when Iran acquires enough state-of-the-art tankers, the NIOC will be able to act as a transit country and a broker for transit of large volumes of oil from the Caspian: so far the other littoral states do not intend to acquire large tanker fleets. This explains why Iran is insisting on the principle of free navigation in the Caspian. This coincides with what Moscow wants, which means that this principle stands a good chance of being approved when the sea’s legal status is negotiated. Iran’s position in the gas sphere in the Caspian is explained by its intention to increase its own gas exports and have as much gas as possible transited through its territory. In the past few years it has been concentrating on gas exports: its expanded export capabilities are fortifying its position at the talks on gas transit across third countries. Today Iran is interested in two international projects that appear to have good prospects: the Iran- Pakistan-India gas pipeline (IPI) and the European Nabucco project. Unrelated to Tehran’s interests in Central Asia and the Caucasus, they affect the IPI’s aims and position in the region. Until recently Iran was interested in two other alternatives for transporting its gas to Europe—through Turkey, if the present infrastructure were extended, and through the Southern Caucasus to Ukraine, Poland, and on to Eastern Europe. Iran’s involvement in South Stream will unite the pipeline systems of Iran, Azerbaijan, and Russia; Iran will not only diversify its export routes, it will also strengthen its position in the Caucasian gas market and gain access to the region’s economic and political life. On the whole, Tehran’s Central Asian policy is absolutely correct and balanced: the pragmatic wing of the Iranian political community knows that culture and revival of the cultural community are a much better vehicle of Iranian influence. From the very beginning, Iran has been very interested in the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) as a way to consolidate the region. A project shared by Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, it is designed to bring them closer together. Iran, as one of the leaders, is actively participating in implementing the projects in order to raise the relations among the partners to a higher level of mutual trust, add to its political weight in the region, and eliminate some of the problems caused by political isolation.

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Tehran insists that the country’s common culture and history, shared borders and economic foundations, and ancient trade contacts with the region all bode well for developing cooperation between Iran and the regional states; the pipeline issue is not only of economic but also of strategic importance for Iran. Its interest in the energy transportation routes in Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus consists of at least three components: first, Iran aspires to become the region’s energy transportation hub, which can be described as the most ambitious of its political and economic aims. Its territory offers the shortest and, therefore, most profitable oil and gas export routes between the former Soviet Cas- pian republics and the world markets. Iranian experts have been talking about this for twenty years now. Second, Tehran is striving to gain access to new energy markets via new oil and gas export routes. Third, Iran wants to provide the oil refineries in the country’s north with stable deliveries of oil, gas, and electric power; it aims to gasify some of its regions; and ensure uninterrupted power supply throughout the year. Closely intertwined, the three components should be regarded as a single whole. Its geographic location makes its interest in energy transportation much more logical and the possibilities of its realization much more numerous than its claims to be involved in mining Caspian mineral resources. In the last 15 years, Iran has been supplying its northern provinces on a regular basis with oil and gas from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Its consistent interest in gas exports to the foreign markets is supported by another, no less important, interest to become a transportation hub for energy resources of the entire region. It expects to send oil from nearly all the Caspian countries and gas from Turkmenistan in particular across its territory (thus hoping to eliminate the need for this gas to be transported through the planned Trans-Caspian and Trans-Afghan gas pipelines). The relations between Iran and Turkmenistan, which are prompted by economic and political expediency, stand apart from Tehran’s relations with the other Central Asian capitals. Neither of the two is worried about domestic collisions on the other side of the border, while international isolation adds to their mutual attraction. As distinct from Iran’s relations with the other Caspian neighbors, its relations with Turkmen- istan stand on a much firmer foundation of close cooperation in the energy and other spheres. There is the Mashhad-Sarakhs railway which, in 1996, provided Iran with access to previously closed Cen- tral Asia. Over 90 percent of Turkmen oil is exported through Iran. In the late 1990s, they jointly built the Balkanabat-Ali Abad power line to connect their energy systems; in March 2003, they signed a Memorandum on Cooperation in the Fuel and Energy Sector, under which they are performing a contract on electric power export from Turkmenistan for a period of 10 years; the completed project will allow Iran to import $140 million-worth of electric power from Turkmenistan every year. Half of the payment will arrive in money form and the other in the form of spare parts, commodities, products, equipment, and services for the industrial facilities and organizations of the Ministry of Power and Industry of Turkmenistan. One kWh of Turkmen electric power costs $0.02. Since 1997, Turkmenistan has been exporting up to 6 bcm of gas every year to the north-east of Iran along the Korpeje–Kurt-Kui gas pipeline, which covers 5 percent of the country’s needs. The new Dauletabad-Sarakhs-Hangeran gas pipeline will double the volume, with some of the gas being sent to Turkey on a swap basis. At the same time, Iran obviously wants to decrease its dependence on Turkmen gas or rid itself of this dependence altogether. In June 2009, the two capitals agreed to increase the volumes of annual gas supplies to 14 bcm and build another pipeline. Before that Russia imported between 30 and 42 bcm of gas from the Dau- letabad fields every year. Iran moved in when, in April 2009, Russia reduced the amount of gas it transports from Turkmenistan. Today, Turkmenistan supplies Iran with 8 bcm of gas a year transported from the Korpeje gas fields in the country’s west to Kurt-Kui. The additional branch of the Dau-

114 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 letabad-Sarakhs-Hangeran pipeline commissioned in December 2009 will gradually bring the volumes up to 20 bcm. The failed Transcaspian gas pipeline project increased the chances of Iran’s participation in Nabucco; the country will finally be able to realize its ideal scenario: selling its own gas and moving Turkmen gas across its territory. As an SCO member, Iran will be more actively involved in its energy sphere if it steps up cooperation in this field; this will greatly affect the position of Russia, China, and the Central Asian CIS countries. Involved in the less competitive (from Russia’s point of view) Asian market, Iran will not be in a position to reduce the share of Russian gas in the European market. Russia and the other SCO countries will be able to influence Iran’s energy policy and, in this way, its behavior in the security and non-proliferation spheres. It seems that Iran’s confrontation with the West (and the United States in particular) will remain at least at the present level, whereas the risk of an armed conflict will rise.

Afghanistan—A Bridge in the Persian-Speaking Expanse

In many respects Afghanistan is the key security factor for Central Asia because of its geographic location, complicated domestic policies, ethnic and confessional diversity, and deep involvement in the worldwide shadow economy. Today it is caught in the entangled web of interests of many states and non-state forces. The developments in this country cross the borders to cripple the security of its direct and even more distant neighbors. This fully explains the close and unflagging attention of Pakistan, India, Iran, the post-Soviet Central Asian states, China, and Russia to what is going on in Afghanistan. The developments in this country and around it will greatly affect the geopolitical situation in Central Asia and its security. On the one hand, the Central Asian republics (and Russia for that matter) need the counterterrorist operation to succeed. On the other hand, the military-strategic presence of the United States and its NATO allies in Afghanistan and some other nearby states creates tension with Russia and China, which the Central Asian countries must take into account. Since 2003, the ISAF (set up in 2001 on a decision of the U.N. Security Council) has been operating in Afghanistan under the NATO aegis. NATO’s involvement not merely tests political solidarity between the United States and its European NATO allies, the Alliance is also looking for a new place in the world, as well as new functions and a wider responsibility zone. Nothing has changed under the Democratic Administration of President Obama, despite his talk about the need to revise the Afghan strategy and Washington’s relations with its European NATO partners. And although the new strategy may have made noticeable changes to the old Republican patterns (related to an integral approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan or the so-called political amnesty for the Taliban), America is largely following the political course of previous Administration. Security threats created by radical Islamism and drug trafficking, rather than the economy, constitute Russia’s main interests in Afghanistan. In a wider geopolitical context, Russia is concerned about the military-strategic activities of the United States and its NATO allies in the region. At the regional level, Russia is returning to its support of the Northern Alliance in the form of the so-called security belt to respond to the country’s increasing decentralization. At the Sochi meeting with representatives of Pakistan, Iran, and Tajikistan, Russia presented its position on Afghanistan in very specific terms: Moscow expects that foreign troops will remain in the country for several more years before responsibility can be safely shifted to the Afghan army and the

115 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS police. The transition period will create certain threats for Russia, which expects the revival of Tali- ban activities and increased drug trafficking. The expert community is convinced that Russia should maintain balanced contacts with all of Afghanistan’s ethnic groups (which will require closer contacts with Pakistan) while keeping in mind that the national minorities will be unable to establish law and order in the country. Russia can and should be involved in the country’s economic reconstruction and promote economic cooperation at the regional level in particular. President Karzai managed to secure Moscow’s promise to continue rendering significant assistance to his country even after 2014 when the international coalition leaves Afghanistan. Some time ago, Beijing was very worried about the security threats emanating from Afghani- stan; the Operation Enduring Freedom caused concern about the military presence of America and NATO close to the Chinese borders. The new leadership headed by Chairman Hu Jintao, who concentrated on adequate supplies of mineral resources, changed the main policy tack in Afghanistan to economic expansion. Beijing decided in favor of business cooperation, rather than military involvement, which it presented as its aid to the world community. The sum of $150 million Beijing contributed to Afghanistan’s reconstruction within the framework of the international program is fairly modest (compared to Japan’s $900 million). Beijing prefers to give money to small agricultural projects; late in March 2010, President Karzai visited China where the two leaders signed agreements which made China the greatest investor in the mining projects in Afghanistan. Beijing is mainly interested in the considerable mineral resources neglected because of the war; it is believed that China might become the only serious investor in Afghanistan with a special interest in the raw materials sector. So far its achievements in Afghanistan look impressive against the failures of the states involved in the conflict. Recently, the top crust of Pakistan’s political establishment concluded that what Islamabad wants for Afghanistan has little in common with what Washington wants in this country. Pakistani strategists have come up with a road map of their own, which they are trying to impose on Karzai. It is believed that Islamabad is tilling the soil for a new game in the Afghan geopolitical field if and when America pulls out of the country and the Taliban is invited to the negotiation table to talk about its involvement in the official power structures. Some experts are convinced that Islamabad is liquidating the Taliban leaders to resume its grip on the movement and encouraging the moderates ready to start talking with Kabul after 2011 while bearing in mind Pakistan’s interests. The fairly large Indian community in Afghanistan maintains traditional economic and cultural ties with India, which has already made large investments in road building in Afghanistan; it has an embassy in Kabul and four consulates; the Taliban never leaves India’s facilities in peace. By the mid-2008, India had contributed $1.15 billion to the country’s reconstruction; it is the fifth largest donor. The money is spent on infrastructure, humanitarian aid, building modern institutions, and personnel training. Delhi is paying for the 217-km Zaranj-Dilaram highway between the southwestern border of Afghanistan and its ring road. At a cost of $180 million, this highway will join the road which connects the Iranian port of Chah Behar with the Afghan border and will provide India with access (via the Iranian port and Afghan territory) to the Central Asian markets. Indian projects include maintenance of roads and supply lines, energy-producing facilities, and hospitals; India will help to improve the education and training of diplomats and civil servants. India is using its satellites to bring television to Kabul and ten provinces of Afghanistan; it is also paying for new power lines for the country. Iran is interested in its relations with Afghanistan not so much because of their common border as because of the strong American and NATO military groups stationed there. At the official level, Tehran supports the internationally recognized government of Afghanistan; it is one of its largest trade and economic partners with large investments in some of the projects in Western Afghanistan.

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The Iranian leaders are dead set against talks with the Taliban. In March 2010, President Ahmadine- jad visited Afghanistan to feel out the situation and assess the moods prevailing among the country’s political leaders and the limits of President Karzai’s powers imposed by the U.S. military presence. He had in mind another strategic task: the country should not become a military lever to be used as a security threat or a pressure instrument. Tehran’s interest in what the White House is doing in Afghanistan is well-justified and quite understandable. Iran’s economic aid is intended to consolidate its position in Afghanistan; it is seeking more stability in the country, a stronger central government, much more vigorous anti-drug efforts, return of the Afghan refugees, and intensified regional cooperation and trade. Today, it is involved in all sorts of projects, while bilateral trade is developing by leaps and bounds. By late 2006, Iran was exporting consumer goods and foodstuffs totaling $500 million to Afghanistan every year; the total turnover amounted to $1 billion. Every day between 400 and 500 Iranian wagons crossed the Iranian-Afghan border. The first Iranian bank was opened in Kabul to encourage bilateral trade. Tehran is active in reconstructing and extending the country’s economic infrastructure; financial aid totaling $560 million (promised in 2002) was spent during five years on expanding the power network; in 2005, a power line with a total capacity of 132 kWh which, at the first stage, brought electricity from the Iranian border to Herat was commissioned; potentially its capacity could be increased ten-fold to bring electric power to other cities. Iran built a 122 km-long highway costing $65 million to connect its northeast with Herat; it is building a highway between Western Afghanistan and the Iranian port of Chah Behar on the Gulf, an alternative to the Pakistani route via Gwadar to provide Afghanistan with access to the sea. Iran is building dams, schools, polyclinics, and other social facilities; its financial aid has topped $1 billion. Iran built a road between Dogarun and Herat which will be extended to Maymana; it is also implementing a trans-Afghan corridor project (Iran-Uzbekistan-Afghanistan) of strategic importance for both countries and the Central Asian republics and is exerting immense efforts to train specialists in information technology for Afghanistan. Afghan refugees are a headache for both countries; since 1979 Iran has given shelter to over 3 million. Drug trafficking is another big problem which mars bilateral relations. Iran has already spent over $800 million on fighting drugs and drug trafficking. On the whole, Kabul expects Tehran, its regional partner, to support its rehabilitation efforts on a large scale. The Iranian regime uses financial levers to interfere in Kabul’s domestic policy. In October 2010, it became known that Iran was supplying Kabul with considerable sums of money. The Iranians admitted the fact; it is believed that the Afghan authorities spent the money on buying the loyalty of members of the country’s parliament, elders, and the moderate Taliban. A pro-American government in Kabul brought to power to legalize the American and NATO military presence in the country as a result of national reconciliation or complete rout of the Taliban will deprive Iran of any more or less efficient political instruments to influence Afghan developments. If American troops remain stationed in Iraq, Iran will find itself in geopolitical pincers. Iran will not gain much if the Americans pull out of Afghanistan before the crisis has been finally settled. Many regional integration projects will be buried if the Afghan conflict spreads far and wide and confrontation between Kabul and the Taliban develops into open hostility. In this case, Tehran will be forced to side with the official authorities in Kabul. If the situation remains unchanged after 2011, that is, if confrontation between NATO and Ka- bul, on the one hand, and the Taliban, on the other, continues, Iran will preserve its present position in the region. Afghanistan is still potentially the most likely source of instability in Central Asia. The expert community is convinced that after regaining power the Taliban will move on. Islamabad looks like

117 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS the most likely target: in more or less peaceful times, former President of Pakistan Musharraf and his special services could preserve relations with the United States while flirting with al-Qa‘eda and the Taliban. A total crisis in Afghanistan, which might hit the country when the coalition has removed its forces, is fraught with all sorts of complications up to and including a coup in Pakistan with its nuclear weapons falling into the hands of extremists. The experts, analysts, and special services disagree on what may happen. Some of them believe that the danger is exaggerated and Central Asia is absolutely safe. Better informed analysts, however, believe that clandestine activities of the Islamists and extremists should not be ignored and that they are closely connected with organized crime and the drug mafia. For twenty years, Tashkent remained absolutely independent when dealing with Afghanistan, or rather with its northern Uzbek-populated enclave. American and NATO occupation left Uzbekistan two spheres of political involvement: creating and maintaining the so-called security belt and establishing intensive economic ties to integrate the enclave with Uzbekistan; it supplies the northern part of Afghanistan with electric power and oil products. In practice, everything Tashkent is doing there encourages separatist trends among the Uzbeks (or Uzbeks and Tajiks). It actively supports Moscow’s idea of a security belt in the north of Afghan- istan. In April 2008, at a NATO/EAPC Summit in Bucharest, President of Uzbekistan Karimov was very open about his country’s approach to the problem. Later, in August 2009 at the SCO summit in Dushanbe, he confirmed it. He pointed out that (1) there is no military solution to the Afghan problem, an opinion that is gaining wider currency among an increasing number of states; (2) the most acute social problems (poverty and unemployment) should be addressed without delay. Today, a great share of the able-bodied population, young people in particular, are left without means of subsistence, the situation being actively exploited by extremist fight- ers and drug pushers; (3) conflict settlement should take into account the Afghans’ confessional and national specifics (confirmed by the numerous wars in the past in which external forces were involved). Tashkent believes that the 6 + 2 Contact Group for Afghanistan, which functioned under the U.N. aegis, should be restored; NATO, an active participant in the settlement process, should become one of its members. At the non-official level Tashkent is convinced that, first, no compromise with the Taliban on matters of fundamental importance is possible; second, the Afghans and the world community should know that what is going on in this country is spearheaded against the terrorists, not the Afghans; third, any concession will invite an offensive on all fronts—military, geopolitical, information, ideological, psychological, etc. This means that everything possible should be done to deprive the terrorists of their sources of conscripts. On the whole, Tashkent believes that the international peacekeeping operation will go on for a long time. For geographic and historical reasons and because of its ethnic connections, Turkmenistan needs peace and stability in Afghanistan and wide economic cooperation with this country. The Turkmen leaders are concentrating on the gas pipeline expected to bring gas from Dauletabad to the Hindustani Peninsular via Afghanistan. Astana’s position on the Afghan issue can be described as active. At the 2006 London Confer- ence on Afghanistan, it supported the Treaty on Afghanistan between the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the international community, which identified the time within which the

118 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 country’s economy should be restored and enumerated the related social and economic projects, as well as the most urgent regional security problems (including drugs). In 2009-2011, Kazakhstan allocated $1.5 million under the cooperation plan with Afghanistan. In 2008, Kazakhstan allocated $2.4 million for school construction and $50 million under the international educational support program to pay for training Afghan students in Kazakhstan. Between 2006 and 2010, the country acquired an economic agenda which included investments in railway construction, as well as prospecting and mining mineral resources (oil, gas, iron ore, coal, and copper) in Afghanistan. On the whole, Astana sides with all the peace initiatives and processes which bring conflict settlement closer: Kazakhstan is fully aware that Afghanistan is one of the key factors of regional security in Central Asia. America’s “new strategy” in Afghanistan boils down to “leave in order to stay.” The United States cannot pull out of Afghanistan and leave Pakistan alone to deal with its Islamists without risking its own security and endangering its numerous allies and client states (particularly in the Middle East). America and NATO will gradually decrease their military presence at a much slower pace than in Iraq; it is expected that Washington will keep its 30- to 50-thousand-strong military contingent in the country to prevent its military and political destabilization. It should be said that the interests of the key players (America, Russia, and China), which differ at the global level, are identical in Afghan- istan and can be described in a nutshell as stability at any cost.

Tajikistan—Periphery of Pax Iranica?

There is a more or less concerted opinion that Tajikistan is the region’s weakest link in terms of its internal situation and external security. This mostly stereotypical opinion is confirmed by the Is- lamic opposition inside the country, the rivaling clans, the increasingly active militants, the impossibly low living standards, Afghanistan’s negative impact, full-fledged drug trafficking, etc. Tajikistan has had the hardest lot: in Soviet times the living standards were low, the birthrate high, the infrastructure undeveloped, and the public institutions traditional and archaic to the highest degree. During perestroika, the republic was the first among the other Soviet republics to acquire an Islamic party—the Islamic Resurrection Party (IRP). For several years now, its people have been living in the midst of serious changes at home and abroad. President Rakhmon is consistently building a so-called power vertical in an effort to consolidate his regime and state institutions; the republic aims at de-Russification and is trying to shed its excessive dependence on Moscow. It spares no effort to attract investors from Russia, Iran, China, the European Union, and America; China and Iran are showing a great interest in the republic’s economy. Dushanbe has joined forces with Tehran and Kabul to establish a Persian-speaking community; India is another important partner. Tajikistan belongs to the CIS and SCO; it is a member of the OIC, ECO, and OSCE and is actively cooperating with NATO. Through the EurAsEC and CSTO, Dushanbe is also involved in post- Soviet integration. The West sees Tajikistan as an important source of energy for Afghanistan. Dushanbe, in turn, is busy promoting its own ambitious plans of domestic and regional hydropower production countered by Uzbekistan and, to a lesser extent, by Kyrgyzstan. Russia is dead set against Tashkent’s insistent desire to seek international assessment of Tajikistan’s large-scale hydropower projects (the Rogun HPP) to keep the West away from regional affairs. Iran treats Tajikistan as its main and close regional partner with their relations, particularly cultural, being rooted in ethnic communality. Tehran extends humanitarian aid to the Tajiks. In Septem- ber 2004, President Hatami visited Dushanbe where the two presidents signed a memorandum under

119 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS which Tehran was expected to acquire a controlling stake in the Sangtuda HPP-1 being built on the River Vakhsh, the largest of the joint projects. This caused a lot of irritation and opposition in Russia. In 2006-2008, the two countries moved into new spheres, such as civil engineering, transport, agriculture, energy production, and machine-building. Tajikistan wants to see Iran among the SCO’s full members; despite their contradictions, Moscow, Beijing, and Delhi have accepted the Tajik-Ira- nian tandem. Iran and Tajikistan cooperate in the military-technical sphere; Iran paid for new uniforms for the Tajik army, communication means, small arms ammunition, and a JV for sewing military uniforms. Tehran would not mind extending military cooperation to the three Persian-speaking countries (Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Iran) for the sake of regional security. If realized, this cooperation will add efficiency to anti-drug efforts and to fighting international terrorism. Some think, however, that Iran intends to use Tajikistan as a springboard for interfering in the international operation in Afghanistan. Recently, Iran has been consistently building up its presence in Tajikistan; there is a lot of talk about a visa-free regime between the two countries for the sake of closer economic cooperation. In 2010, Iran with $65.5 million in direct investments in the Tajik economy outstripped many other countries (Russia among them) as one of the largest investors. The trade turnover between the Iran and Tajikistan reached $201.7 million. In the fall of 2011, the Iranian Sangob company intends to commission the Sangtuda HPP-2 on the River Vakhsh, after which it will immediately move on to three other hydropower projects: two Nuro- bod HPPs with a capacity of 350 megawatts each on the River Vakhsh and the Ayni HPP (170 megawatts) on the River Zaravshan. Iran will take part in the Shurob and Dashtijum hydropower projects and, together with Pakistan, will set up a united electric power grid in Tajikistan. The two countries have always considered energy production, transportation, water resources, road building, trade, and culture as priority spheres of cooperation. Tehran insists that Dushanbe abide by the 2008 agreement, which envisages a Persian-language educational and cultural TV channel. Dushanbe is accused of deliberate delays, while the Tajik leaders are merely trying to avoid another round of Islamic propaganda directed at the younger generation. Tajikistan is pinning its hopes on cooperation in uranium mining: Iran, determined to go ahead with nuclear power production (despite international resolutions), needs access to the republic’s uranium resources (about 13 percent of the world’s total), which means that this sphere will come to the fore in the near future. President Rakhmon visited Iran in March 2011 on an invitation from its president to stimulate closer cooperation between the two countries. Iran sees its relations with Tajikistan as cultural and religious cooperation between two nations with a common past. Iran’s economic involvement has a political dimension as well: it is Tehran’s response to America’s military and economic presence in the region. Between 2001 and 2004, military cooperation between Russia and Tajikistan subsided; Dush- anbe was compelled to increase its pressure on Moscow in view of America’s military presence and the money Washington paid Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan for use of its bases on their territory. The Tajik leaders demanded preferences; they postponed enactment of the Treaty on the Status of and Requirements for Deployment of a Russian Military Base in the Territory of Tajikistan signed back in 1999. For some time the sides discussed the possibility of “investments in exchange for the base.” Moscow was seeking control of Tajikistan’s defense industry, while Dushanbe wanted to write off the debts for training its military and obtain contracts on modernizing its armaments for its military plants. American authors are puzzled by the air defense system Russia set up in Tajikistan since Afghanistan, the main source of threats and instability in the region, has no missiles. Moscow is seeking not so much its stronger influence in the republic (it is strong enough) as keeping other players and

120 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 their bases away (after all, Tajikistan is free to invite other states and their bases if relations with Russia worsen). In 2007, under the Treaty on the Status of and Requirements for the Deployment of a Russian Military Base, Russia started moving its troops from the airport of Dushanbe to Ayni, while Tajikistan (seeking and not receiving enough money from international structures and other countries) changed its approach. In the hope of obtaining larger investments, it confirmed its cooperation with Russia as its strategic vector, which buried America’s hopes of moving into Tajikistan. Moscow, too, failed to obtain the best possible conditions and, late in August 2008, it signed a treaty on wider military and military-technical cooperation and accepted the terms under which it would share the Gissar airport with the Tajik military. By declining Russia’s claim to unilateral use of the airport, Dushanbe expected, if problems arose, to put pressure on Moscow by inviting other countries and their military forces to the airbase. For some time now, Russia and Tajikistan have been concentrating on large-scale hydropower and mining projects (in addition to their traditional security concerns about the situation along the Afghan border, the Nurek space-surveillance station, drug trafficking, etc.). In 2004, during the visit of then President Putin to Dushanbe, it was agreed that Russia’s Rusal Company would move in to take part in the last stages of the Rogun HPP with a capacity of 3.6 thousand megawatts. Russia left the project when Dushanbe refused to give it the controlling stake in the station. In 2009, the Rogun project acquired regional and international dimensions. Uzbekistan, objected to the project, while Kyrgyzstan accepted it; Russia and Kazakhstan changed their positions several times. Tashkent, very concerned about the dam, which would inevitably change the stream-flow regime and create a water deficit for the millions of people living on the lower reaches of the transborder river, insisted on international assessment. In March 2010, Astana sided with it, while Moscow objected. Dush- anbe, in turn, ignored Tashkent and its arguments; the resultant tension forced the EU to interfere. Dushanbe, meanwhile, is playing its anti-Russian card: the republican leaders are prepared to seek American investments in all sorts of projects (hydropower production in particular); they argue that the Americans will inevitably be attracted by projects related in one way or another to Afghani- stan. Experts believe that Tajikistan has performed a U-turn turn toward the United States. Uzbekistan is as determined as ever to prevent construction of the Rogun HPP; about one hundred and fifty trains of construction material for Tajikistan have piled up in its territory. Even if Tajikistan gathers enough money to start the project, it will never break the transport blockade. From time to time Moscow makes use of the labor migrant issue, an important factor of bilateral relations between Russia and Tajikistan, to put political pressure on President Rakhmon. Today, Russia has to take China and Iran into account as the potential largest investors and donors. Iran is involved in several hydropower projects in the republic, as well as in railway and road construction; it is creating free economic areas to facilitate investments and trade. These developments are eased by the fact that Moscow has lost much of its former influence in the republic and has to apply more pressure on it. In August 2010, when talking to President Rakhmon in Sochi, President Medvedev told him that Moscow was displeased with Dushanbe, which had failed to fulfill its numerous promises: it has not paid for the electric power supplied by Russia; it has not stationed Russia’s troops at the Gissar airbase, and it has failed to resume broadcasting of the RTR-Planet TV channel. Behind closed doors, Moscow explained to Dushanbe that it was prepared to discuss the involvement of Inter RAO UES in the project for building medium-sized HPPs on mountain rivers and to cancel the higher tariff on Russian oil products as soon as Dushanbe fulfilled its earlier promises. An apple of discord between Russia and Tajikistan is the Gissar airfield (the Ayni airbase) not far from Dushanbe (a semi-rundown airdrome built in Soviet times and restored by Indian special-

121 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS ists),2 where Russia was to deploy its aviation. Back in 2004 the sides agreed that Russia would move its planes and pilots stationed at the Dushanbe civilian airport there. When Tajikistan banned training flights for five Su-25 assault planes, they were moved to the Kant airbase in Kyrgyzstan. Russia is interested in Gissar mainly because under the agreement between the two countries Russian military planes would be serviced free of charge at Tajik military airdromes. However, this means that Tajikistan would gain nothing at all from Russia’s military presence in its airfields. With a 3,200-meter airstrip, the airbase is the largest in Tajikistan; it is suitable for all plane types; this means that America and NATO will not mind using it. The final decision on which country will use it has been postponed until 2014. Moscow is prepared to meet Tajikistan halfway on the issue of lower tariffs on oil products used inside the country. Earlier Tajikistan, very much like Belarus, earned money by selling them to third countries. Russia asked Dushanbe to present the balance sheets on supply and demand: the Russian budget would lose about $170 million every year on the annulled tariffs. During his visit to Dushanbe, Robert Simmons, NATO Secretary-General’s Special Represent- ative for the Caucasus and Central Asia, said the Alliance might set up its anti-terrorist center in Tajikistan. He described Kulob and the Ayni airbase in the city of Gissar not far from Dushanbe as the best possible bases. On the other hand, in 2010, when in Dushanbe, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Robert Blake said that the United States had no such plans. This does nothing for relations between Moscow and Dushanbe; in fact, the rise in domestic tension in September 2010 due to the escape of a large group of opposition members, terrorist acts, and assaults, might have been instigated by external forces. On the other hand, the situation inside the republic demands better relations with Russia. The second Russian military base being set up in the republic3 will raise the popularity of the Tajik president, whose rating has been declining for some time now. Dushanbe is actively involved in security- related cooperation; in April 2010, Tajikistan hosted joint command-post exercises Rubezh-2010 of the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces with the participation of military units and task forces of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. In September 2010, the republic provided use of its territory for the local anti-drug operation Kanal-Yug, which involved the anti-drug services of Ka- zakhstan, Russia, and Tajikistan, as well as security and customs services, structures of the ministries of internal affairs, border guards, and the financial intelligence services of these countries.4 In fact, if Tajikistan fails to stabilize the situation in the near future (the events of late August- early September 2010 show that the threat of destabilization is real), the region’s three worst problems—Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and southern Kyrgyzstan—will merge into a vast seat of conflict. Moscow is aware of the threat, which means that it should look for and find ways to keep Rakhmon in power for the sake of stability in the republic. The counterterrorist Operation Enduring Freedom and Tajikistan’s 1,200-km stretch of common border with Afghanistan made Tajikistan an indispensable part of the coalition’s forces. Early in 2002, the republic opened an air corridor for the military-transport aviation of the NATO members. In the context of the Afghan operation, the republic could become the U.S.’s main partner and ally in Central Asia. Recently, cooperation between the two countries has acquired more vigor, how-

2 Reconstruction cost $70 million which was shared by the sides. India invested $19.9 million. Russia hopes to station military facilities of its 201st division there. 3 On 10 November, 2010, Tajikistan and Russia agreed to guard the Tajik-Afghan border together. The Russian expert community believes that their country wants to return to the border in expectation of the fact that America might want to pull its forces out of Afghanistan and move them to Tajikistan. 4 During the operation, the sides instituted 6 thousand criminal cases, 1,108 of which were related to drug trafficking; they confiscated over 1.3 tons of drugs (including 52 kg of heroin, 50 kg of hashish, 1 ton of marijuana, and over 400 kg of precursors). 122 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 ever the Tajiks have not made any important statements yet that might allow Washington to regard the republic as a reliable and predictable partner. Both NATO and the United States view Tajikistan as a key partner in light of the planned expansion of the counterterrorist operation. By the time the Americans hinted that they were willing to talk to any interested Central Asian country about the transit of military and non-military freights and about the so-called temporary military bases, the Tajik leaders were already openly displeased with Rus- sia’s position on the Rogun HPP project. The United States prefers to “wait and see:” the Americans are no longer criticizing President Rakhmon’s domestic policy record—they are waiting to see how things develop in Afghanistan. At the current stage, the United States sees Tajikistan as a strategic springboard rather than a target of lucrative investments. The country’s future as another “new partner” of the United States in Central Asia (and possible military NATO and U.S. bases in its territory) depends on Washington-Dushanbe cooperation. The United States extends considerable economic assistance to the republic; it has already built two bridges across the Panj (and paid in part for another two bridges) to connect Tajik territory with Afghanistan. Direct transport outlets to the Indian Ocean via Afghanistan are all-important for a country cut off from the region by Uzbekistan. The Obama Administration, determined to bring the counterterrorist operation to its logical conclusion, moved cooperation with Tajikistan higher on its foreign policy agenda. Potentially, the Amer- icans can offer much wider cooperation to any of the Central Asian states up to and including American military bases in their territory. Dushanbe stands a good chance of exchanging its involvement for several economically profitable projects. In February 2009, President Rakhmon visited the NATO Brussels headquarters where he said that NATO, the key security element in Afghanistan, should actively cooperate with its neighbors, Iran, and particularly Tajikistan because of its long border with Afghanistan. He meant to say that Tajikistan was allowing the Alliance to use its railways and roads for non-military transit in exchange for investments in the republic, which has been badly hit by the world economic crisis. The Americans offered a variety of assistance which the republic (with practically empty coffers) could not refuse. Today, America has allocated over $1 billion in loans and aid; this sum may increase. Early in February 2010 in Washington, Tajikistan and the United States discussed four blocks of issues: the political and economic situation in the region; implementation of water and hydropower projects; transportation projects; and the situation in Afghanistan. The Tajik leaders are prepared to invite the Americans to participate in investments in their economy, particularly in power engineering. In the military sphere Dushanbe is willing to set up a training camp where the Tajik military (so far trained in Russian military centers) would be trained by Americans. The United States would like to move its troops stationed at Manas (in Kyrgyzstan) to the Ayni airfield to support the NATO forces in Afghanistan. The United States has not abandoned its plans to carry out a military operation against Iran, which means that Washington will either insist on exclusive use of the Ayni airfield or its joint use with the Tajik military for a fixed rent and investments in several economic projects in the republic (including those financed by China: power engineering, transportation, roads, and tunnels). This is precisely what the Tajik leaders are counting on. In June 2010, Washington announced that it was prepared to allocate $10 million to build a military training center for Tajikistan to be opened in 2011. This means that as long as the Americans remain in Afghanistan they will build up their military presence in Tajikistan. According to Brussels, and contrary to what some experts say, Tajikistan is a weak rather than a “failed” state. It suffers from poverty and experiences electricity shortages in the winter despite its

123 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS huge hydropower potential. The threat of destabilization is very real because of its direct proximity to Afghanistan with its ethnic Tajik population (35 percent of the country’s total). Europe mainly extends its help through the European Commission and the German government. The European Union aims at lowering the poverty level and helping to maintain functional civil services; it is also engaged in a wide-scale program of budget support in the social sector. The EU intends to use the human rights dialogs in Kazakhstan to demand that Dushanbe provides civil society members and the Red Cross with access to prison inmates; ratifies the optional protocols to the Convention against Torture and the Convention on the Elimination of All Possible Forms of Discrimination against Women; decriminalizes libel and slander; bans child labor at cotton plantations; bans torture in national legislation; provides free access to legal services for the poorest population groups; and compensates for resettlement for state purposes. From the very beginning, India has been and remains one of Tajikistan’s priority Asian partners. India’s interest in Tajikistan is largely explained by its proximity to the Afghan-Pakistani belt. Delhi is actively seeking a stronger military-political position in Tajikistan on its own and in cooperation with the other actors of world politics. It has already established its first outpost in Farkhor on the Tajik-Afghan border; it paid for a military hospital, which was later moved to Kabul, and an air strip to be used by the Northern Alliance. India was rather troubled at first when Tajikistan, mainly through the offices of Pakistan, joined the Islamic OEC and OIC. In 2002, India joined the reconstruction project of the Ayni airfield, in which it invested about $20 million; the project involved 150 Indian military specialists, mainly engineers and auxiliary units. It intended to station 12 MiG-29 fighter planes at the reconstructed airbase. It seems that by drawing India into the project Moscow intended to contain Beijing’s increasing political impact in the region and, probably, add weight to the SCO military component (India has an observer status in the SCO). Since that time the situation has changed radically: India has revived its formerly slack military relations with the United States, which has made Indian planes in Tajikistan an unwelcome prospect for Moscow. The Kremlin put pressure on the Tajik president demanding that he should annul the Indian contracts. Economic cooperation between the two countries is realized through the loans and grants India extends to Tajikistan (to buy Indian commodities and services) and free aid. India helps with small scale construction projects (like a fruit-processing plant in Dushanbe) and hotels; it transfers batches of pharmaceutical products and supports municipalities. With no common border with Tajikistan, India has to rely on Pakistan to import electric power from Tajikistan. India, which has a lot of Soviet-made military equipment, is helping to modernize similar equipment for Tajikistan; India trains Tajik land and air forces; Indian students study medicine at the Tajik State Medical University. Recently, the share of Chinese businesses in the Tajik economy has risen; the two countries are engaged in a political dialog; they are working on various new economic projects; and the prospects for their economic cooperation have become much clearer. It should be said that China regularly extends free financial aid to the Tajik Defense Ministry; in the last ten years, China spent $10 million on these purposes; the two countries are actively cooperating within the SCO. On the whole, in the last few years, China has invested nearly $1 billion in the form of loans in Tajikistan, as well as $250 million in building new roads and modernizing old ones. Afghanistan and Tajikistan maintain close cultural and economic relations in four spheres in particular: (1) transborder trade (up to $20 million); (2) hydropower production;

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(3) joint struggle against drug trafficking and extremism; (4) development of cultural ties within the Persian-speaking world. The two countries are moving ahead in energy production; when commissioned, the Sangtuda HPP (built jointly by Russian and Iranian companies) will generate extra electricity that can be exported to Afghanistan and on to Pakistan. Russia helped to build a power line from the Tajik border to Pul-i-Kumri, which will be extended to Kabul and Pakistan. Dushanbe and Kabul plan to build a HPP cascade on the Panj (13 stations with a total capacity of 17,720 megawatts and annual production of 86.3 billion kWh). The project inherited from Soviet times requires an international consortium with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan as its members. Dushanbe is using the Afghan factor in its own foreign policy interests; the government of Tajikistan capitalizes on the Afghan factor to expand its military cooperation with the United States. From time to time bilateral relations are marred by conflicts: in September 2010, Tajik border guards had to use grenade launchers and machine-guns to stop Afghan militants. As the only non-Turkic-speaking country in Central Asia, Tajikistan stands apart from its neighbors; it survived a cruel civil war which undermined its economy and the social sphere along with its international status. The echo of the civil war, the impossibly slow economic rehabilitation, and the extremely low standards of living negatively affect the republic’s political context. Tajikistan’s relatively modest economic and political weight at the regional level aside, the republic is critically important for the region’s security and stability. Its stronger ties within the Persian- speaking community with Iran and Afghanistan are, on the whole, a positive regional factor. Its close ties with India and China’s mounting economic impact on the republic’s future should not be ignored. Indeed, China’s large-scale economic presence in Tajikistan will affect the region as a whole. Tajikistan is a small but a very much needed link in Central Asian integration within EurAsEC, the Customs Union and, in the future, the Common Economic Space.

Conclusion

Today, we are seeing efforts to create a Persian-speaking world. Recently we saw the failed attempts to set up Pax Turcica as a vague alliance of Turkic states on a common Turkic basis with Ankara’s leadership. The process ran into a dead end, although Turkey remained a welcome partner of the CA countries in many spheres and Azerbaijan’s key ally. The Persian-speaking countries are looking for ways to move closer, whereby their common language is clearly not the main motivation in this respect. Here, as elsewhere, economic and political factors carry more weight. All the Central Asian countries want, for different reasons, to enlarge their international spheres; a more or less consolidated bloc of Persian-speaking countries will help them to confront the West, the Islamic world, and the CIS (the latter is especially important for Dushanbe). It should be kept in mind that in the future Tehran plans to expand the bloc by adding the Shi‘a world. The Turkic states should respond in one way or another to these developments; each of the states can respond differently. Turkey cannot ignore Iran’s stronger position even though in recent years they have essentially become allies. Much closer relations between Afghanistan and Iran (and moving further away from Pakistan) are in the interests of all the actors (particularly India) with the exception of the United States. Tajikistan is in a much more difficult situation: the Central Asian states see it as part of the region, while for Russia it is an inalienable part of the CIS. Uzbekistan might react the most acutely; most of the large-scale transport and communication projects can only be realized across its territory.

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China’s response is hard to predict: it is developing into the largest investor in Tajikistan (it would be negatively disposed to a Turkic alliance because of the Uighur factor). In any case, Beijing has no reason to rejoice at the appearance of another group of states (even if headed by Iran, which is its ally). We can expect a political response to these developments in the near future—from Russia and China (with respect to Tajikistan), from the West and the U.S. (with respect to Afghanistan), and from Pakistan (with respect to any of the countries involved).

THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION: OPPORTUNITIES FOR RUSSIA

Maxim STARCHAK Chairman of the Youth Department Advisory Board, Russian Association of Political Science (Moscow, Russia)

Introduction

he striving of the People’s Republic of Chi- —skillfully using the SCO in the fight na (PRC) for leadership is being increas- against separatism in the XUAR; T ingly manifested within the framework of —actively preventing the spread of U.S. the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), influence in Central Asia; which plays an important role on the world political arena. After transformation of the Shang- —implementing educational programs for hai Six into a regional organization, China, with the young people of the Central Asian the aim of further increasing its political and countries. economic influence in the region, was able to By continuing to reinforce its position in the insist on the organization’s secretariat being lo- region and in the SCO, China is trying to acquire cated in Beijing. the status of the organization’s informal leader.1 In order to achieve its goals, the PRC is tak- However, despite China’s activity, Russia, ing the following steps within the framework of which is pursuing its own national interests in the the SCO: region engendered by the historical close ties that have developed with the Central Asian countries, —strengthening trade relations with the also has every opportunity to significantly in- Central Asian states granting them multi- crease its influence in the SCO. billion loans; —exerting active efforts to gain a stronger 1 See, for example: K. Syroezhkin, “China in Central foothold in the oil and gas fields of Cen- Asia: From Trade to Strategic Partnership,” Central Asia tral Asia; and the Caucasus, No. 3 (45), 2007, p. 49. 126 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 Security Problems— Opportunities for Russia

The SCO, which is heir to the Shanghai Five (formed in 1996 to resolve the border disputes among China, Russia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan), was created in mid-2001. The organization declared fighting the “three evils”—terrorism, separatism, and extremism—to be its main political priority. However, apart from drawing up various proposals and recommendations, gathering and analyzing information, and holding regular anti-terrorist exercises, the activity of the SCO and Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), which began functioning in 2004, has not yielded any specific results so far. The organization’s member states have no internal mechanisms for responding to terrorist group assaults or separatist demonstrations, there are no unified headquarters for coordinating joint action, and no spheres of responsibility have been determined. By the end of its chairmanship in the SCO (2009), Russia had succeeded within the framework of RATS in drawing up a Convention against Terrorism, an Agreement on Training Staff for Anti- Terrorist Formations, and a Cooperation Program for 2010-2012. The organization’s participants expressed the desire to continue holding joint anti-terrorist exercises, which fully meets Russia’s interests (of all the SCO countries, it has the most experience in fighting terrorism and training staff). So this was the first time the member states confirmed the need to take real steps to resolve the tasks set by the Charter and other fundamental documents of the SCO. Within the framework of the SCO, Russia has not only succeeded in drawing China into resolving the security problems in Central Asia, but also in inclining it toward military-political cooperation, which is helping to make Beijing’s policy and interests regarding an increase in its influence in Central Asia more predictable. However, Russia has not yet been able to increase its military cooperation with Beijing within the framework of the SCO. In 2007, during the SCO conference of defense ministers, Anatoli Serdi- ukov (Russia’s defense minister) came forward with an initiative to prepare a general document for the next conference on the main vectors of military cooperation within the organization.2 And although Mr. Serdiukov’s proposal did not pass, during the sitting of the Council of SCO Heads of State held in October 2009, Russia and China signed an agreement, according to which the sides pledged to inform each other of their plans to launch ballistic missiles. Russia should pay more attention to the conflict potential that exists in the SCO member states, as well as in the organization’s future member states. It is precisely the development of cooperation in security and conflict settlement that could give Russia the opportunity to preserve and strengthen its leadership in the SCO. As for China, it is not participating in world politics and is not engaged in resolving global security issues or conflict settlement (apart from the Korean question). The PRC is pursuing an extremely cautious and what is believed to be balanced policy: the country is not participating either in nuclear disarmament, or in settling Middle Eastern and other conflicts (including regional), or in events relating to the crisis in Yugoslavia and the Caucasus. Moreover, China is not pursuing any security policy, and its presence in the conflict regions is related exclusively to realizing its own economic interests. Russia, on the other hand, which is actively involved in global security, has its own view on how to resolve the existing problems and conflicts, which could strengthen its position in the SCO.

2 See: O vizite ministra oborony Rossii A.E. Serdiukova v Kirgiziiu, Press Release, 27 June, 2007, Russian Embas- sy in the Kyrgyz Republic, available at [http://www.kyrgyz.mid.ru/press_rel/07_03.html]. 127 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

The SCO summit in Ekaterinburg, at which a meeting was held between Dmitri Medvedev and the leaders of Pakistan and Afghanistan, played an important role in resolving the existing disputes and conflicts. Russia’s mediation gave Hamid Karzai and Asif Ali Zardari (who accuse each other of aiding and abetting terrorists and being unable to control the territory of their states) the opportunity to discuss their further relations. The trilateral meeting among the presidents of Russia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan held at the SCO summit served as confirmation of Moscow’s willingness to resolve the Afghan problem and develop relations with Pakistan, which is suffering from onslaughts by Taliban militants. According to Dmitry Medvedev, “so-called Afpak is precisely what everyone participating in the talks and other measures relating to Afghanistan should be discussing today.”3 This statement underlined the fact that Russia, in contrast to the U.S., understands that the Afghan problem cannot be resolved without settling the situation in several provinces of Pakistan, which requires adopting immediate measures to destroy the terrorist camps existing in the territory of this country. According to President Dmitry Medvedev, Russia is willing to help the coalition countries both at the political level and in implementing joint trilateral economic projects4 (including in the form of relevant transit support measures). So Russia is potentially willing to draw the U.S. into cooperation with the SCO in the Afghan question. Former president of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf, came to Kazan in May of 2010, and it is highly unlikely that the Russian leadership missed this opportunity to meet with him. It goes without saying that Moscow had every intention of using Islamabad to increase its role in Afghanistan. Delegations of leaders of the Pashtoon tribes began visiting Russia, and Russia’s top statesmen made more frequent trips to Kabul. Moreover, in May 2009, a Russian-Afghan Forum was held in Moscow. In 2002, the SCO deemed it expedient to create an anti-drug security system (along the perimeter of the Afghan border) designed to eliminate the threats coming from Afghanistan. In 2004, an Agreement on Cooperation in the Fight against the Illicit Circulation of Drugs, Psy- chotropic Substances, and Their Precursors was signed at the Tashkent SCO summit. A year later, a protocol was signed on creating a SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group for the purpose of drawing up proposals and recommendations for carrying out cooperation, primarily in border control, and combating drug trafficking. However, the signed agreements have not yet been executed. In order to step up SCO activity in the anti-drug vector, in 2007 former Russian president Vladimir Putin suggested adding “financial security belts” to the existing “security belts” and involving the financial monitoring services of the SCO member states in these efforts. In 2009, at the Council of Heads of Government, he took his proposal further by stating the need to “raise the efficiency of SCO RATS and begin carrying out preventive measures aimed at fighting the laundering of revenue obtained by criminal means.”5 This active political position on Russia’s part was instrumental in holding an international conference on Afghanistan within the framework of the SCO on 27 March, 2009 in Moscow. A joint action plan for the SCO member states and Afghanistan on fighting terrorism, the illicit circulation of drugs, and organized crime (in the Afghan vector) was adopted at the conference. It was decided to hold a conference of senior officials of anti-drug structures, as well as draw up corresponding documents and agreements for strengthening cooperation in this area. The plan also envisaged the

3 See: Press conference on the Results of the Sitting of the Council of Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Portal of the President of Russia, 16 June, 2009, Ekaterinburg, available at [http://news.kremlin.ru/ transcripts/4465]. 4 See: Ibidem. 5 See: V. Putin takes part in a sitting of the Council of Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organi- zation (SCO), Website on the Russian Federation Government Chairman V.V. Putin, 14 October, 2009, available at [http:// news.kremlin.ru/transcripts/4465]. 128 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 possibility of creating anti-drug (regional) and specialized SCO centers for training specialists in drug fighting, as well as the need to cooperate with the CSTO and involve Turkmenistan and Afghanistan. Moreover, the SCO should focus attention on fortifying the Tajik-Afghan and Uzbek-Afghan borders, as well as on drawing up an assistance program for the border and customs services of the organization’s member states aimed at improving their technical equipment and material security. In October 2009, a protocol was signed at the Council of SCO Heads of State on cooperation in training and raising the qualifications of customs agency officials. It should be noted that through the CSTO and its experience, Russia can strengthen its leadership in the anti-drug and customs sphere of cooperation by opening a special training center within the framework of the SCO.

Enlargement of the SCO— Opportunities for Russia

The enlargement of the SCO has long been on the agenda despite the temporary moratorium introduced in 2006. At the Ekaterinburg summit, the head of the chairing state said that drawing up the document for welcoming new countries into the organization would be accelerated. In 2004, a document entitled Provisions on the Status of Observer in the SCO was signed. The same year, Mongolia joined the SCO as an observer, and in 2006, a corresponding request from Be- larus was submitted. At the SCO summit in Ekaterinburg, Belarus and Sri-Lanka were granted the status of the organization’s partners. So it can be concluded that drawing up Provisions on Permanent Representatives of the SCO Participating States is far from perfunctory; if not next year, in two years the organization’s ranks could well be replenished. It is presumed that two or three countries could become SCO members. It should be kept in mind that Mongolia, Iran, India, and Pakistan are SCO observers. Mongolia acquired the status of observer in 2004 and the other three became observers in 2005. So who can become members of the SCO and what role will they play in the organization? Mongolia, for example, is only interested in being an observer (the country became the first member of the SCO Club of Observers) and it has never had any intention of becoming a full-fledged SCO member. Mongolia is striving to develop partner relations with Russia, but it does not want to fully depend on China, which, in its opinion, is playing a dominant role in the SCO. Moreover, Ulan-Bator is establishing close ties with the U.S., Japan, and the EU, and joining the SCO might interfere with this process.6 As for India, as Russia’s strategic partner in the Asian region, it could become its key ally in the SCO, as well as one of the important links in forming a unified Eurasian energy market. But whereas 3-4 years ago, India was anxious to become a full member of the organization, this is no longer such an appealing prospect since the country has not established any cooperation with the SCO member states, apart from Russia, and does not share the anti-American policy they pursue. New Delhi is much more interested in developing broad cooperation directly with Russia than in joining blocs that have aims India finds ambiguous. It should be noted that Pakistan declared its desire to join the SCO as an observer earlier than India; and the same is happening now. Islamabad was the first to say it wanted to become a full-fledged member of the SCO, which means that India will most likely want to keep up with its neighbor. Islam-

6 See: T. Tserendorj, “Mongolia i regionalnye sistemy bezopasnosti,” in: Kontseptsii i podkhody k regionalnoi bezopasnosti: opyt, probelmy i perspektivy vzaimodeystiia v Tsentralnoi Azii, Documents of the 4th Annual Almaty Conference (7 June, 2006), Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Research under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Almaty, 2006, pp. 212-228. 129 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS abad’s request7 should help Moscow to incline India to joining the SCO. It is very possible that this is the reason for Russia stepping up its policy toward Afghanistan, which meets New Delhi’s interests. Moreover, Russia has repeatedly stated that it will only consent to Pakistan becoming a member of the SCO if India also joins the organization. Pakistan’s striving to join the SCO significantly increased after the American missile strikes in border areas with Afghanistan; Islamabad believed that joining the organization would protect Paki- stan from any unwarranted attacks by the U.S. If Russia can persuade India to join the SCO (Pakistan will most likely also immediately become a member), it will be able to initiate a discussion of non-dissemination of WMD in the region and draw China into this process at the same time, which fully meets the Kremlin’s interests. Moreover, if India and Pakistan join the SCO, the organization will have to resolve the Kashmir conflict. It should be noted that since 2007 India and Pakistan have been gradually returning to a peaceful dialog about the disputed territories in Kashmir and have also revived economic cooperation (particularly in building a gas pipeline from Iran). Russia has experience in organizing Indo-Pakistani talks; thanks to Moscow’s efforts, a meeting between the heads of India and Pakistan was held for the first time after the November terrorist acts in Mumbai (former Bombay). It was in Russia that the sides agreed on a meeting of foreign ministers, but it was far from easy to revive contacts between the two countries, since New Delhi thought that the terrorist acts were organized by members of the Pakistani terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Taiba. So joining the SCO will make it possible for Pakistan and India to resolve the Kashmir problem, and it will also help to turn the organization into a force of world significance, in which Russia will play a much more prominent role. Iran was the second country to apply for membership in the SCO; President Mahmoud Ahmadine- jad has been attending all the SCO summits since 2006 and lobbying in every way for his country’s membership in this organization. Iran’s membership in the SCO could create several problems, one of which is related to the country’s nuclear program. Iran will only have the opportunity to join the SCO if Moscow succeeds in convincing Tehran to make “nuclear” concessions. Iran’s membership in the SCO could also be hindered by its tight policy in division of the Caspian, which is explained by its striving to possess oil resources beyond the boundaries of its territory. Moreover, Iran’s membership in the SCO could reduce to naught the efforts aimed at normalizing relations between Russia and the U.S. and ultimately give the organization an anti-Western proclivity. It is possible that some problems can be resolved by including the U.S., as well as its allies and partners (Turkey, South Korea, or Japan), in the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group. If Japan joins the Contact Group, this might prevent the Central Asian states from being drawn into any alliances (for example, the Central Asia + Japan Forum) in the SCO expanse which exclude the participation of Russia and China.8 With Russia’s active assistance, the SCO could well become a structure that could assume responsibility for the Iranian nuclear program and convince Tehran to cooperate with the IAEA. More- over, the SCO expanse could be an additional lever for Russia in the Caspian talks. Iran’s membership in the SCO could in the long term become a restraining factor in China’s expansion in the Eurasian expanse, as well as give Russia the opportunity to realize its idea of creating a “gas OPEC.”

7 President of Pakistan Pervez Musharraf submitted an application for Pakistan’s permanent membership to the SCO secretariat during his visit to China in February 2006. 8 See: K.L. Syroezhkin, Problemy sovremennogo Kitaia i bezopasnost v Tsentralnoi Azii: Monografiia, Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Research under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Almaty, 2006, p. 227. 130 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011

Russia is also interested in enlargement of the SCO since full-fledged membership of any of its observers will promote development of the Energy Club project. Moreover, enlargement of the SCO will help to intensify the fight against terrorism and illicit drug circulation.

SCO-NATO Rivalry

It is popular belief that the SCO is an anti-Western and anti-American organization, which is confirmed by the following arguments: 1. The SCO is an alliance among Russia, China, and non-democratic states which regularly carry out military exercises. 2. The U.S. has supposedly been denied the status of observer. 3. Iran, which is a threat to international security, is one of the SCO observers. 4. The SCO adopted the Astana Declaration calling on the U.S. to set the deadline for withdraw- ing American bases from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. It cannot be denied that in 2005, the SCO countries were indeed worried about the U.S. gaining a stronger foothold in the CA region and using its military bases to try and replace the existing author- itative regimes with more democratic and liberal (and, naturally, pro-American) ones.9 Moreover, Russia, which is still the leading partner of the CA countries, tried to prevent any increase in their military cooperation with the U.S. In June 2009, at the SCO summit in Ekaterinburg, Dmitry Medvedev received Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who informed him that he intended to ask Kurmanbek Bakiev (then president of Kyr- gyzstan) not to insist on the decision declared in Moscow at the beginning of the year to shut down the American military base at Manas in Bishkek. At the subsequent meeting between Dmitry Medvedev and Kurmanbek Bakiev, an agreement was reached on joint anti-terrorist activity that envisaged in particular ensuring the transit of cargo for the international forces in Afghanistan. An agreement was also reached on turning the NATO military base in Kyrgyzstan into a Transit Shipment Center. So, thanks to the SCO, Russia had the opportunity to reduce the presence and role of the U.S. in the CA region. Resolution of the above problems is extremely urgent since the NATO community believes that “establishing a formal dialog with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization might help strengthen NATO’s role in Central Asia.”10 Cooperation among NATO, the U.S., and the SCO can only be realized in fighting terrorism and drugs in Afghanistan. And this does not require granting the U.S. any kind of official status; it is entirely sufficient to create a SCO-NATO Council or include the alliance in the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group.

Economic Cooperation Opportunities in the SCO

According to SCO General Secretary Bolat Nurgaliev, “the SCO was initially conceived as a structure capable of efficiently ensuring security; now, however, the emphasis is being increasingly

9 See: E. Viazgina, Izmenenie otnosheniia Rossii i Kitaia k Tsentralnoi Azii i razvitie sotrudnichestva v ramkakh SHOS, Information-Analytical Center for the Study of the Sociopolitical Processes in the Post-Soviet Expanse at Moscow State University, 7 August, 2007, available at [www.ia-centr.ru]. 10 R. Weitz, “Renewing Central Asian Partnerships,” NATO Review, Issue 3, Autumn 2006. 131 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS placed on coordinating and intensifying regional integration. It is understood that progress in resolving the socioeconomic problems existing in all the states will guarantee that the security and stability problems in the region are also resolved.”11 However, despite the development of various institutions, the signing of agreements, the holding of ministerial meetings, and the existence of 20 specialized structures, in the eight years since the organization was founded real economic cooperation continues to be of a declarative nature. Essen- tially only two projects for building roads to Central Asia are being implemented and these were begun without the participation of the SCO. Not one of the existing 120 economic programs that cover 11 areas of cooperation have been implemented; and China’s intention to grant a $900 million commodity loan remains on paper since the mechanisms for its implementation and sphere of application have still not been determined. Russia resolutely rejects the idea of government financing of the SCO’s economic programs, thus preventing the formation of a Development Fund, the need for which was emphasized in the Declaration adopted in 2005. In order to look for nongovernment investments, Russia put forward an initiative to create a SCO Business Council (BC) and an Interbank Association (IBA). Keeping in mind the growing role of these two structures, at the summit in Ekaterinburg, the heads of the SCO member states suggested using them to minimize the consequences of the crisis and develop economic cooperation. Russia is still not ready to make government contributions to the development of SCO projects (although it is investing in bilateral projects), which prevents activation of the economic component of SCO activity. But it should be noted that the Russian side is the main regulator of nongovernment investments for SCO projects. At the meeting of the heads of the organization’s member states held in October 2009 on the initiative of the Russian side, a decision was made to create a Unified Investment Project Base. According to Chairman of the Board of Vneshekonombank Vladimir Dmitriev, the matter concerns approximately 35 projects totaling $6 billion, and it is possible that they will be implemented in all the SCO states, whereby monetary operations among them will be done in the national cur- rencies of the organization’s member countries, which will make it possible to put the idea of rejecting payments in dollars into practice. In order to reinforce its position in the SCO, Russia is taking more active steps to look for (or issue) funds to implement multilateral economic projects, in which it would be expedient to involve China since this could significantly increase the organization’s potential. At the summit in Ekaterinburg, China expressed its willingness to independently grant $10 billion to multilateral cooperation with the SCO Central Asian countries. At present, the PRC is cooperating with Central Asia in the bilateral format. Russia should make greater effort to advance projects in the SCO in the spheres that interest it, for example, in the ore mining industry. Russia needs hundreds of thousands tons of lead a year, but it does not have its own deposits, whereas Central Asia does. Tens of millions of dollars are needed to resolve this problem; according to geochemist S.A. Vorobiev, these are investments that Russian cannot offer by itself.12 Russia can only look for them within the framework of multilateral cooperation and primarily within the SCO. The energy industry is another vitally important sphere for Russia. In 2006, former Russian president Vladimir Putin proposed creating an Energy Club within the framework of the SCO with the participation of oil and gas exporters and importers, which was to act as a mechanism for coordinating policy in the extraction, production, transportation, and distribution

11 See: “Organizatsionnoe stanovlenie SHOS proizoshlo,” Azia-Strategia, 3 April, 2007, available at [http://www. asiastrategy.ru/?tm&mat_id=492&PHPSESSID=f5da72f00d421c981680781da6cacf32]. 12 See: Parliamentary Component of Multilateral Cooperation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. From the records of 26 February, 2006, Official website of the Federation Council of the Russian Federal Assembly, available at [http:// council.gov.ru/files/journalsf/item/20070725100417.pdf]. 132 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 of resources, as well as in the development of infrastructure in the organization’s member states and observers. The idea of creating an Energy Club was based on the development of trilateral energy diplomacy among Moscow, Astana, and Ashghabad. Despite the fact that Turkmenistan is neither a member of the SCO nor its observer, signing an agreement on building a Caspian gas pipeline cannot help but affect the organization’s interests. So in order to successfully implement the above-mentioned project, Turkmenistan must join the partnership within the framework of the SCO.

Opportunities in the Humanitarian Sphere

The SCO Charter adopted in 2001, which is the organization’s fundamental document, sets forth that cooperation in the humanitarian sphere is one of its priority tasks. But the first multilateral cooperation programs in various humanitarian spheres were not adopted until 2005. As for Russia, its activity in the humanitarian sphere is limited to holding an annual Rose of the World festival within the framework of the SCO, but this is not enough to make the organization attractive to the younger generation. In October 2009, Vladimir Putin suggested organizing an Intervision Song Contest within the framework of the SCO. Media support in holding this major event could help Russia to become a driving force behind contemporary cultural life in the SCO region. Vladimir Putin’s proposal to create a SCO university, the model for which is being built on the network principle with a single program consisting of several disciplines, could help to strengthen Russia’s position in education.13 Study courses will be offered at several higher education institutions of the SCO member states and will be available to students from all the organization’s states. A mandatory prerequisite will be courses in both official languages of the SCO (Russian and Chinese), whereby students will have the opportunity to participate in the study program at different universities, for example, take part of it at an educational institution in their own country, and part at another educational institution in one of the project’s member states.14 In this respect, it should be noted that Central Asian students know Russian (to one extent or another) from childhood, so Russian higher educational institutions will be in higher demand. Moreover, Russia has the opportunity to supervise the training of employees for different SCO structures. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggested creating a working group within the framework of the organization for developing the main approaches and principles of staffing the SCO’s permanent structures. A SCO Youth Council was created in May 2009 in Ekaterinburg to enhance cooperation among the young people of the organization’s countries in education, culture, and sports. As of the present, the organizers of the SCO Youth Council have developed projects relating to job-finding, student exchanges, and holding language teacher conferences and contemporary music festivals in the organization’s countries. China has proposed a project that envisages organizing youth camps in the SCO member states. Through its educational expanse and the Russian language, Russia has every opportunity to retain its influence on the future generation of the SCO countries; it can propose projects for professional

13 Study courses will initially be offered in five disciplines: regional studies, information technology, ecology, nano technology, and energy. 14 See: A.V. Lukin, “SHOS: itogi rossiiskogo predsedatelstva,” Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn, No. 9, 2009. 133 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS schools, short-term retraining courses, and youth educational camps. The leading Russian higher educational institutions could organize various contests that require that their participants have diverse knowledge in the history, politics, and economy of the SCO member states. The CA countries’ public health sphere, which is characterized by underdeveloped hospital care, an acute shortage of qualified personnel, and the impossibility of rendering medical assistance to people living is remote districts, is in need of extensive support from the SCO. In order to resolve health care problems, Russian representatives of the Business Council put forward an initiative to form mobile groups of medical specialists from Russia. However, their activity in the CA countries is still unor- ganized and inconsistent. So all the SCO member states need to pool their efforts in order to resolve the problems existing in the public health system in the CA countries. The Russian initiative to create a Shanghai Health Organization (SHO) could become an ana- logue of the WHO and unite the efforts of the SCO countries in implementing programs to raise the quality of medical assistance. Moreover, the SHO could become a tool for advancing Russian medical goods and services, primarily in China. Russia can also increase its influence in the SCO by cooperating in disaster prevention; the CA region is periodically subjected to landslides, earthquakes, drought, and freezing temperatures, while local specialists from the Emergency Ministry services who do not have the proper professional training and experience cannot adequately and rapidly respond to the challenges of natural disasters. Despite the fact that the first comprehensive exercises to eliminate the consequences of emergencies were carried out by the Ministry of Civil Administration of the PRC, Russia succeeded in lobbying a decision to open a SCO Joint Disaster Response Center in Moscow. According to Head of the Russian Emergencies Ministry’s International Department Yuri Brazhnikov, “the Center will be responsible for coordinating the activity of the SCO countries in emergencies and joint efforts in humanitarian response.”15 In 2009, an expert group was created on Russia’s initiative within the framework of the SCO for developing conceptual approaches to resolving migration problems. As Russian Special Representa- tive in the SCO Leonid Moiseev said, “the SCO is dealing with the migration problem in a pioneer way; we simply sensed the problem that would inevitably arise in the relations among the organization’s countries on time.”16 It should be noted that migrants from the SCO countries mainly go to Russia. Therefore, Russia can be a driving force behind the formation of a migration regulation mechanism and the establishment of employment centers in its territory. Unfortunately, the residents of the SCO member countries are very poorly informed about the organization’s current activity (not to mention the population of the observer countries), so awareness campaigns that make extensive use of the media and Internet are needed to further strengthen the common humanitarian expanse. The efficiency of the SCO’s official website should also be raised; it should post not only official news bulletins, but also informational and analytical information in all the languages of the SCO member states and observers (along the lines of the U.N. and NATO websites). Russia has succeeded in setting up a Russian-language Internet portal [www.infoshos.ru] devoted to SCO activity and the problems of its member states and observers. The portal provides free access to articles in Russian, Chinese, and English published in the InfoSCO magazine, thus performing a vital role in informing the population, expert community, and political circles of the CA region and the whole world.

15 See: “Emergency Response Centers within the Framework of the SCO Will Open in Moscow and Astana,” Info- SCO Information Agency, 18 October, 2009, available at [http://infoshos.ru/ru/?idn=4996]. 16 See: “The SCO Has Already Occupied Its Place in World Architectonics,” InfoSCO Information Agency, 23 April, 2009, available at [http://www.infoshos.ru/ru/?idn=4490]. 134 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 Conclusion

The SCO is increasingly becoming an unofficial forum for discussing the most important problems of Eurasian security. At the security forum of the Council of Euro-Atlantic Partnership held in Astana, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said that he thinks the SCO is very interesting in terms of ensuring security throughout the region.17 Moreover, thanks to Russia, the SCO has begun to discuss security issues that do not relate directly to the organization’s member states: the DPRK nuclear program, the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, and normalization of relations between Islamabad and Kabul, as well as between New Delhi and Islamabad. Intensification of the SCO’s role in ensuring comprehensive security in the Eurasian expanse is extremely important since there is no other organization in this region to assume responsibility for resolving the numerous problems that exist there. Today, the U.N. is not capable of resolving the problems of all the world’s regions. Nor is the U.N. playing a leading role in settlement of the Afghan question. Russia is becoming the main mediator in the conflict settlement. In the struggle against terrorism and drug trafficking within the framework of the SCO, Russia should continue active military cooperation with China, which envisages enhancing the consultation mechanism between the two countries. In order to prevent duplication of the activity of the CSTO, the SCO should engage in resolving the wide range of security problems existing in the states bordering on the organization’s member countries. The CSTO, in turn, should engage as before in purely Central Asian security problems existing close to the region’s borders. The future development of the SCO is closely related to the organization’s enlargement; new members might create new problems related primarily to security. As for Russia, enlargement of the SCO will make it possible for it to increase its role in the organization and reduce China’s activity. The U.S., which is showing an interest in the SCO’s activity, regards its inclusion as an observer as an opportunity to reduce the organization’s role and strengthen control over the strategic Russia- China alliance. In this way, the SCO’s cooperation with the U.S. and NATO should be built on the basis of mutual interests. Inclusion of the U.S. or NATO in the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group or in a separate SCO- NATO/U.S. Council should activate cooperation, accelerate settlement of the Afghan problem, and raise Russia’s role. In order to have the opportunity to control China’s economic strivings in Central Asia, Russia should more actively propose its own economic projects in the spheres it is most interested in. Invest- ment in multilateral economic projects by means of the BC and IBA will help to reduce China’s bilateral activity in the region and involve it in making use of the SCO’s potential. Russia is functioning quite successfully in the humanitarian sphere and should continue to develop new programs in education and culture, as well as in the framework of the SCO University and SCO Youth Council, in order to further increase its influence. One of the important strategic tasks in the sphere of humanitarian cooperation is the need to create a grant fund, the financial support of which could be assumed by the SCO Business Council itself. So, in face of the changes going on in the world, various regional and interregional associations and groups are forming that are striving to minimize the negative impact of the global economy and U.S. policy.

17 See: “Gensek NATO: SHOS interesnaia organizatsiia v plane obespecheniia bezopasnosti v regione,” InfoSCO Information Agency, 26 June, 2009, available at [http://www.infoshos.ru/ru/?idn=4449]. 135 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

In light of the regionalization processes going on in the world and distribution of spheres of responsibility, the creation and activity of the SCO is the answer to the challenges of globalization. Russia should keep on the ball, particularly since the SCO is offering it a good opportunity to control developments of events in the region, which it should in no way miss.

THE SCO AND THE WEST

Ruslan IZIMOV Research Fellow, Department of Foreign Policy Studies, KISI under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Almaty, Kazakhstan)

Introduction

he world community is showing an ever number of skeptical (at best) or even negative as- mounting interest in the Shanghai Coopera- sessments have cropped up in numerous articles. T tion Organization (SCO), which appeared in The relations between the West and SCO are 2001 on the basis of the Shanghai Five. The United developing under the impact of the bilateral rela- States (and the other NATO members for that mat- tions between the United States and individual ter) is apprehensive of China’s stronger regional SCO members and their rivaling interests in many profile and the SCO’s possible anti-Western vec- regions, Central Asia in particular. This means tor for the simple reason that the Western political that future cooperation among the interstate secu- and academic community knows next to nothing rity structures present in the region depends on about the new structure and the negotiations inside whether the West revises its SCO policy and it. These fears do nothing for the relations between whether the SCO members (Russia and China in the SCO members and the West, where a large particular) reciprocate.

How the West Sees the SCO

Today, there is no agreement about the SCO and its policies in the world, however the number of positive Western assessments of its future is growing, probably because much more is being written about the organization. The West is gradually revising its formerly negative opinion. In 2001, as soon as the Shanghai Five became a full-fledged regional organization, its members clearly outlined their aims and responsibilities. As a relatively new regional structure of multisided cooperation, the SCO is ready to talk to all states and multilateral structures and cooperate with them. According to the SCO Charter and other official documents, “the SCO is a non-military organization; it does not act against third countries or international organizations. It aims at opposing the new non- traditional security threats.”

136 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011

The member states stand together against the transborder threats (international terrorism, religious extremism, and illegal trade in drugs and armaments) with no clear state borders. This means that the use of force is ineffective and that the member states should act together in the sphere of politics and diplomacy rather than building up their military-political capabilities. It is not an anti-Western or an anti-American structure, since its members do not object to the regional presence of Western states and international organizations. None of its documents speaks negatively of the United States or any other Western country; it members, in fact, are convinced that tighter security at the global and regional level requires closer cooperation with other international structures. Certain objective trends, however, are causing concern in the West and are seen as the first steps toward “anti-NATO of the East.”1 These concerns are caused by several factors. n First, the level of SCO international recognition is rising together with the large Asian countries’ increased interest in it: Iran, Pakistan, and India are consistently seeking SCO membership, even if their full membership is fairly doubtful. The West, however, fears any possibility of two nuclear powers and Iran, which claims the role of a regional leader, joining the SCO: this looks very much like a potential threat to Western strategic interests in Asia.2 n Second, not infrequently, Western analysts point to closer relations between Moscow and Bei- jing within the SCO.3 They are not quite right: the two countries’ rivalry in Central Asia (within the SCO) cannot be described as a conflict, however nor are their relations cloudless. It should be said, however, that, as they develop, Russia’s and China’s relations with the Central Asian countries implicate the West’s limited presence in the region. n Third, the SCO members repeatedly indulged themselves in negative comments about the West and the United States in particular. Contrary to the commonly shared opinion that the SCO members do not intend to confront the West (the U.S.), all of them are openly displeased with the Western policies in the Central Asian Region; this was amply confirmed by the Declara- tion of the Astana 2005 Summit4 which suggested for the first time that the term of America’s military presence in the Central Asian republics should be clearly defined. From the very beginning, the SCO members have been rejecting the unipolar world, an objective of the United States, which is seeking the role of a global leader. The analytical community is convinced that “while it does not seek to oppose Washington either globally or re- gionally, the SCO does not want any links with Washington either. This means it wanted to get along without the U.S. but not go against it.”5 n Fourth, the Western countries are very concerned about the SCO military exercises. Its antiterrorist exercises called Peaceful Mission 2010, which took place in September 2010, received very negative media coverage in the West. Britain’s Daily Telegraph likened the SCO to the Warsaw Treaty Organization; The New York Times accused China and Russia of seek-

1 Not infrequently, Western analysts regard the SCO as an eastern alternative to NATO (see, for example: [http://www. infoshos.ru/ru/?idn=330]). 2 It should be said that the West will not object to India’s SCO membership because of its good relations with the United States and the other Western countries. China will object to its membership if Pakistan is left outside the SCO: Bei- jing’s relations with Delhi are too complicated. 3 See: “Uverennaya postup Vostoka vyzyvaet drozh u Zapada,” 18 August, 2007, available at [http://www. fergananews.com/article.php?id=5292]. 4 [http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1120666800]. 5 For more detail, see: I. Safranchuk, “The Competition for Security Roles in Central Asia,” Russia in Global Poli- tics, Vol. 6, No. 1, January-March 2008. 137 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

ing control over Central Asia’s natural resources through the SCO, while Süddeutsche Zei- tung suspected the SCO members wanting to set up a power center independent of the West. Le Figaro of France and Yomiuri of Japan were of a similar opinion. The West is very much displeased with the plans of some of the SCO members to become more involved in a military-political settlement in Afghanistan. The above shows that the West fears that the SCO might develop into an alliance of the largest Asian powers (China, Russia, Iran, India, and Pakistan). These fears are premature, to say the least: the SCO can become a military-political alliance only if and when it resolves its numerous organizational problems and reaches an agreement on how to admit new members. The following latent contradictions prevent the SCO from developing into an efficient security factor in the region: 1. Today, the SCO members are pursuing their own aims and are guided by their national interests to the detriment of collective goals. Russia regards its involvement as another confirmation of its claims to global or, at least, regional leadership. China is using the SCO to pene- trate Central Asia; the local countries and Russia, in turn, do not object to this. The Central Asian SCO members rely on it as a counterbalance to Russia’s and China’s presence in the region. The Central Asian countries need the SCO so as not to be left outside the regional and global security structures. 2. The SCO members have not yet agreed on the priorities. Russia and China are drawing closer together while engaged in mounting latent rivalry over the spheres of influence in the region. Today, their different ideas about the SCO’s future interfere with political decision-making within the SCO. The leaders of both countries are moving ahead to insist on their own version of the SCO’s future. China is building up its economic presence on a bilateral basis, outside the SCO. Russia is working hard to preserve its role in the region: the Customs Union is one such practical step intended to stir up cooperation in the security sphere. This affected the economic relations inside the SCO and trimmed China’s ambitions in the Central Asian countries. 3. Everything said about the SCO’s anti-Western nature does not hold water. Today, the local states are developing their bilateral relations with the West. In fact, the Central Asian countries want to preserve good relations with the Western powers; some of them regard the NATO military bases in their territories as an antiterrorist measure and guaranteed regime stability. We should bear in mind that American observers were invited to the 2010 Tashkent SCO Summit (for the first time in many years). 4. The SCO military potential and the antiterrorist exercises do not give grounds to call the SCO “NATO of the East.” In his article “The SCO Cannot Become a Military Union,” Secretary General of the SCO Research Center at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Sun Zhuangzhi pointed out that “the military-political component is not a dominant one; the exercises of the SCO member states are frequently conducted jointly with many countries and organizations, including NATO, and they are invariably antiterrorist.”6 5. The SCO members favor their organization’s more active involvement in the Afghan settlement in cooperation with the U.S. and NATO. The SCO members, in particular, believe that they need a dialog with NATO and the United States to jointly fight terrorism. They point out that a structural conflict with the U.S. and NATO in the geopolitical and military spheres should be avoided.

6 Sun Zhuangzhi, “The SCO Cannot Become a Military Union,” 24 November, 2010 (in Chinese), available at [http:/ /news.163.com/10/1124/17/6M97CJE900014JB6.html]. 138 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011

The above shows that those who write that the SCO is developing into a military-political organization that stands opposed to the West are wrong. It seems that many of the external observers are holding forth on the SCO’s anti-American nature because they find it hard to reconcile themselves with the fact that the world has acquired another efficient structure. Russian expert Alexander Lukin has written on this score: “Attempts to transform the SCO into an anti-Western or an anti-American bloc are doomed to failure since that would run counter to the vital interests in cooperation with the West in many areas. At the same time, while actively working to ensure the interests of its own members in particular, the SCO may meet—and already does—with misunderstanding and even hostility on the part of those who see the world as unipolar, while presenting their own interests as universal.”7 Despite the illusory nature of the threat the SCO presents to Western interests in Asia, Washing- ton has several strategic plans designed to prevent the SCO from developing into a larger and stronger structure; the Greater Central Asia project being the main one. According to Western analysts, the SCO is still an enigma of sorts which probably challenges the West in Eurasia.

Cooperation between the SCO and the West: Problems and Prospects

Today, the international structures which represent the West and the East in Central Asia are locked in latent confrontation. The West is concerned with the fact that Russia and China belong to the same structure; the SCO members (China in particular) do not like the fact that a counterterrorist coalition is fighting on the CA borders. The SCO’s intention to be more actively involved in peaceful settlement in Afghanistan suggests that it should closely cooperate with NATO. So far, however, these structures have not begun a constructive dialog; there is no political will to cooperate and coordinate their actions. It seems that cooperation between the SCO and the West is impeded by bilateral relations between some of the SCO members and the United States and other Western members. I have in mind America’s relations with China and Russia, which might play an important role in forming new international political configurations. Today the relations between the United States and China can be described as vague. In the wake of President Obama’s first visit to China late in 2009, the relations between the two countries deteriorated: U.S. Congress passed a decision on selling weapons to Taiwan totaling $6.4 billion; Dalai- Lama was invited to the White House; Google was involved in an incident; Washington moved closer to New Delhi, etc. The United States and China cannot agree on the exchange rate of the yuan. For several years now America has been insisting on its higher exchange rate: it is commonly believed in America that it should be at least 40% higher. This was the linchpin of the G 20 discussions in November 2010 in South Korea. The Chinese leaders and some Chinese political scientists are fairly negative about the Greater Cen- tral Asia project: they are rightly convinced that it is intended to contain China’s influence in the region.8

7 A.V. Lukin, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: What Next?” Russia in Global Politics, No. 2, July-Septem- ber 2007. 8 See: Pang Guang, “Corrections of the U.S. Central Asian Policy and Starr’s Greater Central Asia Project,” The Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (in Chinese), available at [http://www.coscos.org.cn/200806022.htm]. 139 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

America and China disagree on many things, however their ideological incompatibility is the main stumbling block. The United States regards Communist China as an anti-democratic state, while its rapidly growing economy looks like a challenge to America’s world hegemony. This explains why the U.S. Administration leaves no tack unused to limit China’s presence in Central Asia and elsewhere. Their far from simple relations negatively affect the relations between the SCO and the West. The relations between the United States and Russia are not simple either. The two capitals agreed to “reset” their bilateral relations with no real progress: they remain rivals. Washington and Moscow are operating under the spell of the Cold War, while no positive shifts can be expected in the near future either. It should be said that the Central Asian countries will hardly profit from the worsening relations between the two powers: they will have to take sides with one or the other of them: the conflict between Russia and Georgia and Moscow’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states being ample evidence of this. America does not want confrontation with Russia or worsened relations with the regional countries. The NATO Lisbon Summit of 11-12 November, 2010 showed that the United States was resolved to move the Alliance further eastward, but, according to the new strategy, the NATO members should take Russia’s interests into account, even if not seek its opinion. It seems that cooperation between the SCO and the West hinges on the relations between China and Russia, on the one hand, and the United States and other Western countries, on the other. It should be said that China’s involvement and its fairly ambitious plans are mainly responsible for the SCO’s negative image in the West. The relations between Beijing and Washington determine the nature of interaction between the main security structures (SCO and NATO) in Central Asia. We should take into account the fact that Russia and China are trying to contain America’s and NATO’s pressure in the region; both countries are very negative about the Partnership for Peace Program, which presupposes cooperation between the local countries and NATO.

Conclusion

There are no mechanisms of cooperation; there are no agreements and no regulatory base that can be used to promote cooperation between the SCO and NATO. So how can structures with different strategic interests and capabilities cooperate in the region? There is an obvious need for efficient mechanisms to ensure cooperation among all sorts of multilateral structures. It seems that the region needs a new security architecture; after all, the SCO and NATO have many identical interests in the region. The Alliance needs cooperation with the SCO countries to create new corridors to deliver supplies to the counterterrorist forces in Afghanistan, while drug trafficking from this country is a headache for both sides. The West could delegate its observers to the SCO to improve relations with this structure. Much is written in the West about the United States joining the SCO as an observer or a dialog partner. The White House, on the whole, is of the same opinion. In his statement, Assistant U.S. Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Robert Blake said, “The United States has not made any decision about whether we are going to seek some sort of status, yet this is not excluded.”9

9 “Robert Blake: SShA ne stremyatsya k chlenstvu v ShOS,” available at [http://www.newsland.ru/News/Detail/id/ 457728/cat/94/]. 140 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011

Kazakhstan, in turn, is convinced that it should develop a constructive dialog with NATO to promote Euro-Atlantic partnership and the Partnership for Peace Program as a good basis for a political dialog and practical cooperation. The world community is much more interested in the SCO than before; the leading geopolitical power centers are not letting the structure out of their sight. They are trying to obtain fuller information about it because their fears of its transformation into a military-political alliance are as alive as ever. For objective and subjective reasons, cooperation between the SCO and the West is not as effective as it should be in the present conditions. It should be said that the Central Asian Region is a place where the interests of the leading powers are concentrated and polarized; this means that the structures present in the region should start talking among themselves so as to prevent local contradictions escalating into an open confrontation.

U.S. STRATEGY IN CENTRAL ASIA: PROBLEMS AND ACHIEVEMENTS

Guli YULDASHEVA D.Sc. (Political Science), Professor at the World Politics Chair of Tashkent State Institute of Oriental Studies (Tashkent, Uzbekistan)

Introduction

he events of the last decades have again potential, and planned transportation and demonstrated the close interconnection pipeline routes; T among all the parts of the international re- n it has extremely rich natural and human lations system. The main masterminds of world resources; development are now finding that they too are be- n it is close in territorial-geographical, his- ing drawn into the processes going on in vitally torical-cultural, and demographic terms important geopolitical zones of the world far be- to the hotbeds of instability in the Islam- yond their own borders. ic world; The Central Asia region is one of these zones for the following reasons: n most of the global challenges and threats (territorial, ethnonational, religious, en- n it is geostrategically located at the inter- vironmental, and so on) are concentrat- section among many of the existing, ed in its territory. 141 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

In this context, establishing political equi- U.S. does not have a clear strategic conception librium in Central Asia that is favorable for all the (the changing international political situation regional actors, integrating the region into the periodically calls for its adjustment) or specif- global economic expanse, and maintaining sus- ic ways and methods to implement its plans, as tainable democratic development meet the inter- well as by the fact that the geopolitical and geo- ests of stability and development of the entire economic interests of other countries clash in system of international relations. the region. The strategic imperatives of American foreign This article attempts to analyze the evolu- policy regarding Central Asia, on which the U.S.’s tion of the main trends and mechanisms of U.S. claims to global leadership largely depend, have not strategy in Central Asia (from 1991 until the changed during the entire post-bipolar period. present), in addition to the most important prin- However, it is also true that stabilization ciples and factors predetermining the current sit- in Central Asia is hindered by the fact that the uation in the region.

Fundamental Principles of the U.S.’s Central Asian Strategy

1991-1993. The collapse of the Soviet Union and formation of the newly independent states meant the beginning of a new era for the U.S. that symbolized the victory of Western ideals and democratic values.1 It was presumed that the United States would claim global hegemony and present a model of Western market democratic values in the new world order. U.S. strategy in Central Asia was also conceptually based on the assumption that democratic states are not usually inclined to fight each other.2 It was important for the U.S. to acquire “strategically compatible partners” in Eurasia “who, prompted by American leadership, might help to shape a more cooperative trans-Eurasian security system;”3 post-Soviet Central Asia might become such a partner (due to its geostrategic location). But there were few in the West (with the exception of a handful of Sovietologists) who had any true idea about Central Asia. When the newly independent states first formed, all that could be done was keep track of the events going on in them and more carefully analyze the region before going on to define the conceptual foundations of regional policy. The withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan, which made a certain contribution to promoting stabilization in the region, was one of the noteworthy events of this period. 1994-1997. During this period, Washington gained a more or less adequate understanding of the region’s special features, which were largely defined by its geopolitical environment. During these years, the foundations of U.S. long-term strategy in Central Asia were laid and have been preserved, with a few insignificant changes, to this day. The discovery of rich deposits of energy resources in the Caspian region in the mid-1990s played an important role in forming U.S. strategy in Central Asia. This pushed the economic factor into the foreground, since it helped to lower the West’s dependence on Middle Eastern oil in light of the Ira- nian-American confrontation and instability in the Middle East. In this context, one of the most im-

1 See: F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, The Free Press, New York, 1992. 2 See: J.L. Ray, Democracy and International Conflict, University of South Carolina Press, Columbus, 1995. 3 Z. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books, New York, 1997, p. 198. 142 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 portant objectives of this strategy was to prevent the CA countries from being drawn into the orbit of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). The potential joining of two oil-bearing zones (Central Asia and the Middle East) acquired both geopolitical (with respect to ensuring world leadership) and geo-economic significance for the U.S. since most of the potential Eurasian transportation and pipeline routes could be laid through Central Asia. In that event, the U.S. needed to have control over the energy resources and transportation corridors of the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. So the West put forward its plan to lay transportation and pipeline routes that presumed the participation of the Central Asian states. This would make it possible to include them in the future in the expanded Euro-Atlantic community. According to the American establishment, this task could primarily be carried out with successful political and economic modernization of the CA states, which would stimulate similar processes in the countries situated along the Great Silk Road. The main ideas of U.S. policy toward Central Asia were set forth in Senator Sam Brownback’s Silk Road Strategy in October 1997. Russian and Iranian pipeline routes posed the main obstacles to implementing U.S. strategy in Central Asia, due to which the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline acquired increasing significance. According to Washington, Turkey could and should become the gateway through which Cas- pian oil reached the Western markets, as well as serve as a secular model of development for the new CA states. However, the U.S.’s comprehensive promotion of the BTC project in the 1990s led to a real geo- economic war over access to the Caspian’s energy resources, particularly since Afghanistan’s internal instability made it impossible to launch a route through its territory. Consequently, the Clinton administration’s initial course toward strategic partnership with Rus- sia was gradually replaced by a striving to limit its traditional influence in the CA countries. Ameri- can-Chinese relations also underwent serious changes, since China, which was augmenting its economic presence in Central Asia, increasingly regarded the U.S. as its main geopolitical adversary. On the other hand, after the war in Yugoslavia, the U.S.’s disagreements with the EU countries became more acute; moreover, America’s European partners favored a “critical dialog” with Iran, which did not suit the White House at all: America feared the consequences of Iran’s economic development stimulated by the inflow of European investments and advanced technology.4 It should be noted that within the framework of its Central Asian policy, the U.S. showed a special interest in Kazakhstan as the largest energy-producing CA state. Uzbekistan, as a state most vulnerable to the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, rendered the U.S. special support in the foreign policy sphere. On the whole, the CA republics showed great interest in developing full-scale relations with a global nation that had significant economic and military-political potential and was also capable of rendering them regional security support. Moreover, the prospect of acquiring access to the world markets by implementing various transportation and energy projects was particularly important for the region’s landlocked countries. The period between the mid-1990s and the Andijan events in 2005 was characterized by increased contacts between the CA countries and the U.S. in the military, political-diplomatic, educational, scientific, and cultural-educational spheres, as well as in the development of energy projects. 1998-2000. The ascent to power in Iran of moderate reformer Mohammad Khatami and the Dialog among Civilizations he introduced in 2001 aggravated the previously designated geopolitical and geo-economic differences between the U.S. and its European partners. An increasingly larger

4 See: Ch. Lane, “Germany’s New Ostpolitik: Changing Iran,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 6, November/Decem- ber 1995, pp. 77-89. 143 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS number of countries (including Russia, China, and the CA states) supported the idea of a critical dialog with the IRI. U.S. policy, which was aimed at opposing projects in which Iran participated, aroused increasing discontent among the CA countries. For example, the American leadership’s tardiness in issuing a license to the Mobile Company for participating in swaps with Iran had a very negative effect on the export of oil from Turkmenistan. The American side also froze deliveries carried out via the main gas pipeline through Iran that was laid with the assistance of a consortium headed by the British-Dutch Royal Dutch Shell Concern. At the same time, certain changes occurred in Tashkent’s perception of Iran with respect both to Tehran’s cautious and flexible tactics toward Central Asia and to the hope of strengthening Khatami’s pro-Western course and normalizing Iranian-American relations. Uzbekistan felt that the U.S. was not giving due attention to the region’s security problems relating primarily to the situation in Af- ghanistan. As for Tajikistan, the U.S. thought it enough to officially include it (in January 1994) on the list of countries belonging to the zone of Iranian dominance and possible spread of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism.

From Strategic Partnership to Alienation in U.S.-CA Relations

2001-2005. After the September events of 2001, the U.S.’s penetration into Central Asia significantly accelerated. The democratic and socioeconomic problems in the country began being viewed from the perspective of America’s own security. In this respect, completing modernization and Cen- tral Asia’s entry into the world community, as well as Afghanistan’s political restructuring, were associated in the U.S. with the formation of a new American-centered world order.5 Revision of the U.S.’s foreign policy doctrine in Central Asia in 2002 resulted in the adoption of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act authorizing the development of democratic civil authorities and institutions not only in Afghanistan, but also in all the CA countries, as well as the revised U.S. Na- tional Security Strategy confirming the country’s geopolitical interests in the Caspian and Central Asian regions and Washington’s willingness to uphold them. The Bush administration employed a wide range of measures to promote the U.S.’s active involvement in the CA region: n relying on a new doctrine of preventive unilateral actions and placing the stakes on an ad hoc coalition of goodwill when resolving global security problems; n imposing sanctions against geo-economically important Iran (Central Asia’s regional neighbor) that has been among the countries listed as part of the axis of evil since 2002; n putting political and economic pressure on the CA states in human rights and democracy issues (see Table 1);

5 It is reflected in corresponding geopolitical doctrines, such as the Greater Middle East, and later in its logical extension, the Greater Central Asia project, where the Central Asian region and the Middle East are joined into a single ex- perimental geo-economic zone which has not found due support in the CA countries with their different political preferences and interests and different levels of development. 144 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011

Table 1 U.S. Assistance to the CA Republics in Support of Democracy, Social and Market Reforms, Security, and Development in 2002-2005 ($m)

Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 Country Kazakhstan 90 92 74.2 53.2

Kyrgyzstan 95 56.6 50.8 50.4

Turkmenistan 18.1 11.1 10.4 16.3

Uzbekistan 220 86.1 50.6 91.6

Tajikistan 160 49 50.7 59.9

S o u r c e: Documents of the U.S. State Department for the corresponding years [www.usinfo.state.gov].

n relying on Kazakhstan as an influential player in the Caspian and world oil-and-gas market; its joining the BTC energy project will be of decisive significance in promoting American strategy in Central Asia. In the globalizing world, the steps taken and economic sanctions imposed by the U.S. have frequently been ineffective, which has significantly complicated its relations with many regional actors, including traditional allies (the EU and Turkey). The situation has also been aggravated by the U.S.’s military and technical involvement in the Big Game around the Caspian Sea, which has been gradually turning into one of the most militarized regions of the world. It should be noted that in the context of the ongoing Iranian-American confrontation, the introduction of anti-Iranian sanctions, and the insufficient economic assistance, the implementation of energy transportation projects vitally important for Central Asia’s development essentially ground to a halt. This applied in particular to the implementation of large-scale plans to ensure Uzbekistan’s access to the sea routes (including access to the Black Sea and Pacific ports) drawn up under the European TACIS Program. As it was noted in Tashkent, “in order to carry out the difficult tasks facing the region’s road builders, we need ongoing and comprehensive support… Due to insufficient financing … only around 40% of more than 9,400 km of general use roads in need of repair, according to the established standards of between-repair terms, are actually repaired.”6 At the same time, “the indices of the inflow of foreign direct investments into Uzbekistan per capita are still the lowest among the countries with a transition economy.”7 Central Asia gradually distanced itself from the United States. The main reasons for this were insufficient financial support and investments, U.S. pressure with respect to human rights and democracy, as well as the increase in geopolitical differences between Washington and its traditional allies. Moreover, the West’s continued economic pressure on the region and the U.S.’s anti-Iranian strategy,

6 S. Li, “Dorogi, kotorye my obustraivaem,” Narodnoe slovo, 28 August, 2004. 7 A. Rasulev, R. Alimov, “Strukturnye preobrazovaniia i povyshenie konkurentosposobnosti ekonomiki Uzbekistana,” Obshchestvo i ekonomika (Tashkent), No. 6, 2003, p. 202. 145 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS which excludes Tehran’s participation in energy transportation and other projects, created reasons for Central Asia’s further socioeconomic and political instability and its increased orientation toward China, Russia, and Iran. For example, almost 60% of the import of Uzbek cotton was reorient- ed toward the Iranian port of Bander Abbas8; Russia occupied first place among Uzbekistan’s six leading trade partners for the first 9 months of 2005 with 19.2% of export (151.9% of the level of the first 9 months of 2004), while Iran was in third place with 6.8% (125.6% of the level of the first 9 months of 2004).9 The description of Central Asia’s reorientation would not be complete without mentioning the closing of the American airbase in Khanabad (Uzbekistan) and cooperation of the Eurasian countries in the SCO and EurAsEC. At that time, Washington tried to rethink Central Asian reality and expressed doubt that Central Asia was a priority interest for the U.S. But Washington did not give up, recognizing that it had three targets of strategic interest in Central Asia—energy resources, security, and increased freedom through reforms.10 In order to improve the situation, the U.S.-led West, striving to gain a stronger foothold, supported Kazakhstan’s application for chairmanship in the OSCE in 2009. 2006-2008. During these years, in addition to the U.S.’s unsuccessful strategy in Central Asia, George Bush’s Middle East and Afghan policy also failed. The data of sociological polls carried out at that time showed the extent to which Americans perceived the threats coming from these regions as real: 79% of the respondents (compared with 72% in 2005) considered international terrorism to be an “extremely important” threat to national security, while 58% (45% in 2005) placed Islamic fundamentalism in this category (of which such countries as Iran, for example, are a source).11 In striving to create an anti-Iranian coalition, the U.S. exerted perceptible efforts to overcome its differences with the EU and strengthen strategic partnership with Turkey. The Bush Administration took certain steps to move closer to Russia, which was tussling with China for influence in Central Asia. Washington regarded Moscow more as a partner and not as a threat to the country’s security interests. Moreover, constructive partnership with Russia might have put a stop to the creation of a widespread anti-American coalition and formed a counterbalance to China’s growing might. American-Russian cooperation focused primarily on joint participation of the two nations in the peaceful rehabilitation of Afghanistan and on the elimination of other potential hotbeds of instability in the CA region. Meanwhile, the White House continued to declare that exporting oil and gas from Kazakhstan without passing through Russia and Iran was one of the priority tasks of U.S. foreign policy. Attempts were also made to reorient the region toward South Asia by creating a new energy grid. This idea was manifested in reorganization of the U.S. State Department, in which a Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs was created. American diplomacy in Central Asia also became more active. In particular, in addition to Washington’s support of Kazakhstan’s possible chairmanship in the OSCE in 2009, Astana was also promised additional investments in the energy sector, including in the diversification of oil and gas

8 See: T. Tashimov, “Povorot na Vostok,” Ekonomicheskoe obozrenie (Tashkent), No. 10 (73), 2005, pp. 45, 47, 49. 9 See: Ekonomika Uzbekistana, Informational and Analytical Review, January-September 2005, Center for Effective Economic Policy, Tashkent, No. 11, December 2006, p. 55. 10 See: “Chestnye vybory mogut sdelat Kazakhstan ‘liderom’ v Tsentral’noi Azii,” available at [www.usinfo.state.gov/ russian], 21 November, 2005. 11 See: “Polls: Americans, Europeans Share Increased Fears of Terrorism, Islamic Fundamentalism,” Transatlantic Trends, Washington, D.C., & Brussels, available at [www.transatlantictrends.org], 6 September, 2006. 146 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 export routes. The U.S.’s efforts in this vector resulted in the signing of an agreement between Azer- baijan and Kazakhstan in July 2006 on the transportation of hydrocarbons from Kazakhstan through the Caspian Sea and on via the BTC pipeline. Moreover, Washington increasingly recognized that further waging of the antiterrorist war was impossible without Uzbekistan’s active participation in it. However, the region’s high conflict potential and instability made the U.S.’s strategic partnership with the CA countries extremely unstable. And Central Asia began moving more toward the Eurasian vector in its development, which prevented enlargement of the U.S.’s military and political presence in the region.

New Trends—New Hopes and Prospects 2009—To the Present

When the Barack Obama Administration came to power in 2009, the nature of the U.S.’s participation in the region’s affairs significantly changed. In particular, the new U.S. president gave up the tactic of unilateral action that Bush had upheld and tried to restore and reinforce alliance relations with the CA countries, as well as expand strategic partnership and establish a dialog with the Islamic world, including Iran. The Obama Administration preferred more cautious and restrained approaches in issues pertaining to democracy and human rights. Due to the change in tactics in Central Asia and the need to look for a counterbalance to Chi- na’s growing might, Washington announced its intention to strategically reset its relations with Russia. In 2009, the Obama Administration launched a special mechanism aimed at expanding cooperation with the CA countries. During the consultations, the discussion focused on trade development, human rights, democratic reforms, defense cooperation, and regional security problems, including the situation in Afghanistan. But Washington’s actions did not pursue any precise strategy, which is explained by the ongoing rather strong conservative opposition within the country and the indefinite situation in the world. The White House’s statements were mainly declarative. In the meantime, the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan became increasingly aggravated, international tension over Iran’s nuclear program grew, and the domestic situation in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan became worse. Within the framework of the activated multilateral discussions on regional security issues related primarily to Afghanistan,12 Uzbekistan again put forward the initiative to create a 6+3 Contact Group with the participation of Russia, China, and Iran. In so doing, the initiative to transform the northern transit route of military shipments to Afghanistan into one of the routes of the present-day Silk Road is a measure that would be of benefit to all the regional actors. Implementation of this project would help to stabilize and promote the economic revival of the entire region, turning it in the future into a central Asian trade route hub. After rethinking its strategy, the U.S. announced that Central Asia was playing a “vitally important role” in implementing Washington’s long-term plans to restore the Great Silk Road. The Turk- menistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline (TAPI), actively promoted by Ashghabad, as well

12 See: G. Yuldasheva, “Afganskiy factor v tsentralnoaziatskoi politike: vzgliad iz Uzbekistana,” available at [www.ia- centr-ru], November 2010. 147 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS as the Northern Distribution Network (mainly used to accommodate military deliveries to Afghani- stan), in which Russia and Uzbekistan have been playing the main role, became the tools for implementing this plan. These initiatives resulted in the formation of Barack Obama’s National Military Strategy, which envisages the creation of new military bases in Afghanistan and its neighboring territories. The U.S. plans to play the role of guarantor of regional security and expand its military and political presence in Central Asia. According to Washington, Uzbekistan is the key country in the region (from the viewpoint of ensuring regional security, military infrastructure, as well as due to its geostrategic location at the crossroads of Central Asia’s transportation and energy arteries). Washington also continues to support oil-and-gas-rich Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, encourage parliamentary democracy in Kyr- gyzstan,13 and draw Tajikistan into carrying out the regional plans. According to several influential experts,14 the Obama Administration should follow seven critical guidelines in the CA region: 1. Put Central Asians themselves, not Russia, China, Iran, or other neighboring powers, at the center of America’s approach to the region. 2. American policy cannot be naïve—strategic and economic competition does exist. The United States must respect neighboring powers’ legitimate interests in Central Asia and work with Russia and China wherever feasible. 3. Rely on capabilities that the U.S. uniquely can offer to Central Asian governments, citizens, and businesses, such as proprietary industrial and scientific technologies, business skills, and military technologies. 4. Multiply U.S. strengths by working closely with international partners, including EU countries, Turkey, Japan, South Korea, and India. 5. Enhance cooperation with the private sector to further multiply U.S. strengths. 6. Remain mindful of the need for a regional strategy: integrating Central Asia into long-dis- tance trade, encompassing continental routes across Asia, also has direct benefits for surround- ing countries, including China, Russia, India, Europe, and the Middle East. 7. Pursue a multidimensional policy in Central Asia that includes all the integral components of security, trade, and human rights. In essence, the listed guidelines are aimed at forming a new balance of forces and interests in Central Asia under U.S. leadership. One of the U.S.’s indisputable advantages is its military-political, economic, and scientific-educational resources, the rational use of which is capable of strengthening stability and promoting Central Asia’s development. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Robert Blake listed the country’s priorities in the Central Asian region as follows: —support international efforts in Afghanistan;

13 See, for example: Briefing of Assistant of State Secretary Blake for Journalists in Kyrgyzstan, available at [America.gov], 14 March, 2011. 14 See: E. Feigenbaum, “Seven Critical Guidelines for U.S. Foreign Policy in Central Asia,” Council on Foreign Relations, available at [www.businessinsider.com/seven-guidelines-for-us-central-asia-policy], 23 February, 2011. 148 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011

—build a strategic partnership with India; —develop more durable and stable relations with the Central Asian countries.15 Activation of U.S. policy in the Central Asian vector and possible fortification of the country’s position in the region is causing concern in other states. In addition to the leftovers of Cold War thinking, there is still a certain amount of tension in Central Asia’s geopolitics. This is shown by the difficulties in the U.S.’s relations with Russia and China. Moreover, the U.S. is very concerned about Turkey’s foreign policy (Middle Eastern and Eurasian) preferences. It cannot be denied that clear signs of rapprochement have been designated among the U.S., EU, and Russia. For example, the new strategic conception of the North Atlantic Alliance approved in Lisbon says that NATO is no longer a threat to Russia. According to some experts,16 NATO’s new strategy should serve as a basis for forming a global anti-Chinese coalition. The reality of such proposals is partially confirmed by the results of a survey carried out in Feb- ruary 2010 by the Rasmussen Reports Company: half of Americans think that China is a long-term threat to the U.S. A survey carried out by CNN gives an even higher result: 58% of U.S. residents think that China is a threat to the security of their country.17 It is becoming increasingly obvious that building a new world order makes no sense without Russia’s active participation and presence in the region. It is no accident that Vice President Biden called for going beyond the Great Game and spheres of influence.18 The U.S. understands that without Russia it will essentially be impossible to resolve the Afghan problem, fight drug trafficking, and stabilize the situation in Kyrgyzstan. In July 2009, an American-Russian Bilateral Presidential Com- mission was created under the supervision of Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev to determine spheres of mutually advantageous cooperation and strengthen international security. However, on the other hand, several experts are concerned that fortification of the U.S.’s position in the Caspian Basin means linking the sanitary cordon—the Baltic states-Ukraine-Southern Caucasus—with Central Asia, thus isolating Russia along the entire southern perimeter of its borders.19 Moreover, it is assumed that the U.S. and NATO are trying to replace the SCO with a Northern Dis- tribution Network, turning the latter into the driving force behind economic and military-political integration of the CA countries. The U.S.’s foreign policy problems are intensified by domestic policy differences. Some experts note that the question of the country’s future has still not been resolved; there is a struggle going on in the American establishment between those who want, like Barack Obama, to accommodate the U.S. to the reality of the 21st century and those who would like to remain in the 1990s and make the rest of the world follow suit.”20 On the whole, keeping in mind the difficulty and unpredictability of the situation, the U.S. today has become more realistic in its assessments. As head of the New York representative office of the

15 See: R. Rozoff, “Washington Intensifies Push into Central Asia,” available at [www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL1101/ S00127/washington-intensifies-push-into-central-asia.htm]. 16 See: Sh. Sultanov, “Voina protiv Evrazii. Razmyshleniia o novoi strategicheskoi kontseptsii Severoatlanticheskogo aliansa,” Rossiia-Islamskiy mir, No. 49, 8 December, 2010. 17 See: U.S. State Department. USA Forum on Facebook—Priorities of the Obama Administration in South and Central Asia, available at [www.america.gov]. 18 See: Speech by Vice President Biden at Moscow State University on 15 March, 2001, available at [www. america.gov/st/eur-russian/2011/March/20110315105450x0.7276226.html], WHITE HOUSE/Office of the Vice President, 10 March, 2011. 19 See: V. Iakubian, “Kak dolgo Moskva budet terpet antirossiiskuiu aktivnost Berdymukhammedova i Alieva,” IA REGNUM, available at [www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1295472840], 19 January, 2011. 20 V. Iasmann, “Ne toropites khoronit Ameriku,” IA REGNUM, available at [www.centrasia.ru/ newsA.php?st=1292143920], 12 December, 2010. 149 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Institute of Democracy and Cooperation A. Migranian rightly notes, at the present stage, Washington is gradually giving up the role of world policeman and the practice of direct interference in the internal affairs of other countries.21 The U.S. is returning to the policy of so-called splendid isolation which envisages not domination and the country’s direct presence in the regions that are vitally important to it, but maintenance of the balance of forces in them. So a serious balance of forces will be created in Central Asia, since neither the U.S. nor Russia are interested in China’s domination in this region.

In Lieu of a Conclusion

The main orientations of U.S. strategy in Central Asia have not significantly changed and are in general aimed at building an American-centered world order based on a balance of forces and interests among the leading world nations. Resolving most of the problems relating to the energy and political aspects of U.S. security, as well as forming a new system of international relations, depends on the results of the Afghan campaign, the key instruments of which are the TAPI projects and Northern Distribution Network to Afghanistan. Instability in Central Asia is increasingly aggravated by the radicalization of the Middle East and expansion of the zone of activity of extremist forces; it will take immense efforts on the part of the world community to resolve this issue. But the region’s numerous socioeconomic and political problems cannot be overcome using the former mechanisms of bloc thinking or isolated and weakly coordinated alliances of states that employ outmoded methods and means of conflict settlement. In this respect, the provisions of the theory of the democratic peace regarding the role of democracy in reducing international conflicts look entirely justified. At least today, there is no other way to achieve peace and consent among nations. It should be noted that the theory of public democracy put forward by the U.S., which envisages the creation of more favorable conditions for reaching a consensus among different social groups, societies, and countries, is entirely justified and meets the interests of most countries. Certain Western values may not be accepted, but in order to maintain peace and stability in any part of the world, universal standards of human rights definitely need to be observed. It seems that the U.S., which is advancing generally positive objectives and tasks, has overesti- mated its possibilities and resources in pursuing preservation of its leadership in the world and in striving to limit the influence of certain regional forces in Central Asia. In particular, it has taken Washington decades to finally recognize Russia’s positive role in ensuring security in Central Asia (particularly in the context of China’s growing influence there). It is entirely obvious that today American-Russian partnership is a necessity: only joint efforts will be able to prevent fundamentalist regimes from coming to power in the CA countries (this could be promoted by the unstable situation in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, neighboring Afghanistan, and Paki- stan, as well as in the Middle Eastern states). As time has shown, the U.S.’s main failure has been its ineffective anti-Iranian policy (in particular, the anti-Iranian sanctions), which has greatly limited the inflow of investments into the priority energy transportation projects for Central Asia. As for U.S. assistance in the development of democracy and the observance of human rights in Central Asia, they are uneven and totally depend on the energy preferences of the super power. At the

21 See: A. Migranian, “SShA vybiraiut ‘blestiashchuiu izoliatsiiu,’” available at [svpressa.ru/society/article/40433/]. 150 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 same time, the Western community has been oriented toward the same methods and accelerated rates regarding the universal democratization of the Central Asian countries as were used in the transformation of the Soviet Union, without keeping in mind the local specifics and historical experience of the countries. Intensification and the overall dynamics of development of positive trends in American-Central Asian relations depend on a set of internal and external factors that include the following: n a consensus on the fundamental issues of regional policy among the main political forces, both in the U.S. itself and at the international level; n coordinated and streamlined equal and mutually advantageous multilateral partnership in Cen- tral Asia; n closer American-Russian partnership in Central Asia in the interests of ensuring regional security and a possible counterbalance to the increase in China’s domination in the region; n mobilization of political will and Central Asia’s greater resolve to overcome the existing differences in the interests of large-scale integration and stability of the entire region.

151 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

REGIONAL ECONOMIES

THE CUSTOMS UNION: HOW IT AFFECTS THE PRIORITIES OF KAZAKHSTAN’S ECONOMIC POLICY

Gulnur RAKHMATULINA Ph.D. (Econ.), Senior Analyst at the Investment Profitability Analysis Agency (Almaty, Kazakhstan)

Introduction

azakhstan has been a member of the Cus- tronically and regularly exchange information toms Union (CU) for more than a year now. from commodity import statements and regard- K This has inevitably affected how its econ- ing indirect tax payment by taxpayers. omy functions and given rise to a broad public dis- Participants in foreign trade transactions cussion of the prospects for this kind of integra- can get up to a 50-day deferment on VAT and tion union, its advantages, and its possible detri- excise tax payments. All of this stimulates the ex- ment to the country’s economic development. pansion of economic trade ties among the CU During the first year of its life, the Customs participating states and helps to boost their re- Union had a relatively positive impact on Ka- ciprocal goods turnover. zakhstan’s economy. However, what real advan- Kazakhstan’s trade volume with the CU tages does Kazakhstan business gain from the countries in 2010 increased by 28.1% and CU? First, reciprocal trade barriers among its amounted to almost 20% of the republic’s total participating states have been removed. Customs goods turnover.1 The total amount of value add- registration at the internal borders of the CU was cancelled on 1 July, 2010. Moreover, the tax 1 See: The Customs Union is yielding its first positive agencies of the CU states now communicate elec- results (see [www.kazinform.kz]). 152 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 ed tax receipts on imports from the Russian Fed- of 2009.2 On 1 July, 2011, customs control is eration between 1 July, 2010 and 31 December, transferred from the internal borders of the CU to 2010 amounted to 91.2 million tenge, which is the periphery of the participating states, which 1.2-fold more than for the corresponding period will also promote further development of recip- of 2009. VAT on imports from the Republic of rocal trade among them. Belarus between 1 July, 2010 and 31 December, 2010 amounted to 3.7 million tenge, which is 2 See: The Customs Union brings the Republic of Kazakhstan 95 million tenge in VAT receipts (see 1.3-fold more than for the corresponding period [www.zakon.kz]).

Unanswered Questions

Kazakhstan business is experiencing certain problems in the Customs Union. Transferring to something new is never an easy task. The old laws do not always correlate to the new circumstances and business contracts long in effect do not lend themselves to new interpretation. In particular, Vice President of the Kazakhstan Independent Association of Businessmen T. Nazkhanov noted in an interview: “Even optimists are disappointed with the Customs Union. Not one businessman has said that things have become more profitable or easier in response to our question ‘Has doing business become better or worse?’; on the contrary, most respondents are of the same opinion: the situation has only changed for the worse. The expectations of businessmen have not been justified. The new regulations are hampering long-established and streamlined supply patterns… Even positive initiatives are ultimately turning into problems for businessmen.”3 What are the reasons for this situation? n First, as many businessmen note, active ties have not yet been established between the state and business. The CU’s contractual-legal base was formed in a very short time; by way of comparison, it took the European Union nine years (from 1959 to 1968) to establish a customs union. Kazakhstan business, on the other hand, had no time to react or participate in drawing up the necessary documents. The CU’s regulatory-legal base was created “from above” as it were. As Chairman of the Kazakhstan Independent Association of Businessmen notes, the corresponding ministries and departments did not coordinate their activity with businessmen before the CU began to function. Some of the associations represented in the working groups and able to participate in drawing up measures to protect manufacturers either did not have the opportunity to formulate their viewpoints or could not achieve appropriate protection of their interests and ensure advantageous conditions for their industry.4 n Second, the CU has led to a significant hike in prices. For example, the price of merchandise purchased in Russia has risen on average by at least 10-20%. External tariffs have also risen. Whereas before Kazakhstan joined the CU, the average level of import duties amounted to 6.2%, when the Unified Customs Tariff (UCT) was introduced, the average level of import duties on merchandise from third countries rose to 10.6%. It stands to reason that this has had an effect on the inflation rate in Kazakhstan. For example, in the first quarter of 2011, inflation in the republic amounted to 3.7% (in January-

3 G. Nurbekova, “Tamozhennyy soiuz—razocharovanie dazhe dlia optimistov,” Silk Way. Torgovlia bez granits, Information and Analytical Bulletin, No. 2, 2011, p. 13. 4 See: Ibid., p. 16. 153 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

March 2010 it was 2.9%). The galloping inflation rate during the first three months of 2011 was caused by the 6.0% increase in the price of food products during this time (in January- March 2010 it rose by 3.7%). Non-food products rose in price by 0.9% (in January-March 2010 by 1.1%) and paid services by 3.6% (in the first quarter of 2010 by 3.7%) (see Fig. 1).5 According to many experts, one of causes of this inflation was Kazakhstan joining the CU. Whereas prices used to be kept under control by means of cheap products from China, joining the CU has caused a hike in the import duties. And this set off inflation in the republic.6

Figure 1 Inflation in Kazakhstan and Its Components in the First Quarter of 2010 and 2011 (%)

6 6

3.7 3.7 3.7 3.6 4 2.9 3

2 1.1 0.9 1

0 Inflation Food products Non-food products Services

S o u r c e: Data of the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

In particular, the duties levied on imports from China increased by an average of 20%. And this is very disadvantageous for Kazakhstan’s manufacturers, many of whom purchase component parts and raw material from the PRC. The increase in the price of Chinese imports justifiably has an impact on the cost of the commodity, the turnover rate, the amount of circulating funds in the company, and its financial prosperity. Moreover, the accelerated movement of goods and rise in supply of Russian and Belarusian commodities (which are more expensive than Kazakhstan’s goods) in the CU have led to an increase in the price of products made by domestic manufacturers. “We cannot keep prices at a lower level than they are in Russia and Belarus, so there is no point in thinking they can be brought down, we can only stop them from rising,” claims Chairman of the Union of Business Women of Kazakhstan M. Kazbekova.7

5 See: On the Situation in the Financial Market, Press release of the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 8 of 6 April, 2011, available at [www.nationalbank.kz]. 6 See: D. Karimova, “Galop, eshche galop,” Biznes i vlast, 4 March, 2011. 7 See: Ibidem. 154 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011

The increase in cost of processing export-import transactions within the CU and with third countries is one of the reasons for the rise in consumer prices. “And of course an increase in the cost of commodity registration will ultimately lead to an increase in the price of those commodities.”8 At the beginning of 2011, new regulations were introduced requiring that additional documents be furnished during foreign economic transactions. For example, commodities from third countries must now undergo an expert’s examination and registration, which is a paid service and means the businessman has to fork out more money. Moreover, when commodities are transported from one CU country to another, instead of two official documents as before, a total of six documents must be submitted to the state agencies: two applications and a statistics form (similar to a customs declaration) to the tax agencies of the import country and the export country. All of this only complicates the circulation of documents among the CU countries. This process should be simplified (by introducing a product bar-code on electronic tax declaration forms, for example). The extra itemization required for imported commodities is also hindering their movement among the CU countries. “When pencils used to be imported, we put them all in the same commodity group with the same code, now they have to be itemized and sorted into several groups, as well as described in terms of length, color, etc. This requires filling out additional columns in the forms and leads to an immense increase in the cost of importation, particularly with respect to medication and component parts, since each commodity group must be registered on a separate sheet appended to the customs declaration, and only three commodity groups fit on the same page. The cost of each additional page is 20 euro.”9 It is now physically impossible for a customs agent to submit 5-8 declarations a day, as before, which is another reason for the increase in cost of processing export-import transactions within the CU and with third countries. A set of declarations that used to take 15 minutes now takes at least one hour.

Transborder Bureaucracy

The use of certificates of origin is an urgent problem in the Customs Union. An agreement has been signed between Kazakhstan and Russia on mutual recognition by the customs agencies of the participating states of certificates of origin. However, when commodities cross from Kazakhstan into Russia, the shipper must replace the Kazakhstan certificate with a Russian one. And when the commodities arrive from Russia, the Russian shipper is issued a Kazakhstan certificate. This means certificates are paid for twice: first in one state, and then in the other. A unified certificate is needed that will be recognized throughout the CU territory and allow shippers to freely cross the borders. At present, a unified product list has been approved in the CU to which a unified certificate of origin applies. But so far this list includes only 205 commodities from the inventory of the foreign economic activity of the CU states. The participating states must continue their efforts in this direction to cover the entire inventory of commodities. This will help to establish unified principles of reciprocal trade and expand economic trade ties within the CU. The need for the manufacturer to register a separate certificate of origin for each batch of goods during export transactions in the CU countries is also a serious problem and leads to a waste of time and money. This issue must be resolved and a more flexible mechanism formed for developing reciprocal trade among the CU countries. At present, the Customs Union Commission is examining the

8 Ia. Razumov, “Besprimernye trebovaniia detalizatsii importiruemykh tovarov mogut privesti k udorozhaniiu impor- ta,” Silk Way. Torgovlia bez granits, No. 2, 2011, p. 17. 9 Ibid., p. 18. 155 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS draft of a development strategy for a unified system of technical regulation and adoption of sanitary, veterinary, and phytosanitary measures for 2011-2015. The drawing up and adoption of this document will be an important stage in developing integration cooperation among the CU countries and increasing the volume of reciprocal goods turnover. Another important problem that arose as a result of the sluggishness of Kazakhstan’s authorized agencies must also be mentioned. The matter concerns the register of suppliers from third countries. Many Kazakhstan businessmen have long established relations with suppliers from third countries, and joint business has been gaining momentum. But due to the fact that many partner suppliers were not entered in the above-mentioned register on time, Kazakhstan businessmen are having to look for and establish new contacts with those suppliers on the register of the Russian side. This is causing interruptions in the delivery of raw material from third countries and breaking down long-established partner ties. Businessmen are again having to go through all the groundwork, accomplished by trial and error, to establish relations with new partners, which is having a negative effect on Kazakhstan business as a whole and on the quality of the products manufactured in particular.10 All of this points to the need to strengthen ties between the state and business. Ministries and departments must work more actively with business representatives, associations, and unions, supply more information, collect reviews, and take account of the assessments gathered in their work. The need to step up the participation of business in the functioning of the CU has been repeatedly noted, in particular by representatives of the Kazakhstan Association of Manufacturers and Sellers of Alcoholic Products, KazAlko.11 Bringing the national legislation of the CU countries into harmony with each other is one of the topics on the agenda. For example, relatively favorable conditions have been created in Kazakhstan for importing alcoholic products. In particular, Russian manufacturers can participate in Kazakhstan’s internal market under Kazakhstan’s excise tax rates, which are much lower than the Russian rates and amount to 400 tenge for 1 liter of absolute alcohol (keeping in mind the 60% increase on excise tax for alcohol since 1 January, 2011). By way of comparison, in the Russian Federa- tion, excise tax translated into Kazakh tenge amounts to approximately 1,200 tenge for absolute alcohol. Moreover, licensing fees in Russia and in Kazakhstan are incommensurable. For example, the licensing fee for importers in Kazakhstan amounts to 10 monthly calculation indices (MCI) (1 MCI = 1,273 tenge, 10 MCI = 12,730 tenge). In the Russian Federation, a one-time license costs 1,000 minimum wage rates (MWR) (1 MWR = 4,330 rubles, 1,000 MWR = 4,330,000 rubles = 902,083 tenge), and the cost of a general license amounts to 15,000 MWR. Moreover, in Kazakhstan one-time import licenses are issued for one year with no restrictions on the amount of alcoholic products imported. In Russia, a one-time license is issued for only 2 months with restrictions on the amount of imported products. The amount of imported alcoholic products is limited to 10% of the total annual amount of products sold in the country. Moreover, on 1 July, 2010, Rospotrebnadzor made a decision envisaging that imported products must be state registered and entered on the importer register. And from 1 January, 2011, alcoholic products may only be imported into Russia in special vehicles, that is, using transportation means that are licensed to engage in this type of activity. These factors are significantly hindering the development of mutually advantageous cooperation between Kazakhstan and Russia and restricting the access of Kazakhstan manufacturers to Rus- sia’s internal market. So it is vitally important that the ministries and departments of the CU countries enhance their coordination and cooperate more closely with the business community. The decisions made at the

10 See: G. Nurbekova, op. cit., p. 14. 11 See: “Rossia i Kazakhstan ne schitaiut neobkhodimym unifitsirovat’ eksportnye tamozhennye poshliny v ramkakh EEP,” Panorama, 5 November, 2010. 156 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 interstate level with respect to intensifying regional integration must ensure the interests of small and medium business (SMB). This is also extremely urgent for Kazakhstan, since the development of SMB is instrumental in the country’s economic growth, in forming a middle class, and in strengthening social stability in society.

Tarrification of Trade Flows

The lack of coordination in transport fees for freight shipments in the CU is another problem for Kazakhstan manufacturers. In particular, international transit rail fees in the Russian Federation are much higher than in Kazakhstan. This means that Kazakhstan manufacturers pay 2.5-fold more than Russian manufacturers for transit of their products through Russia. Establishing a reduced fee for shipping Kazakhstan’s mining and smelting products by rail through Russia is a hard nut to crack. This problem was discussed by the representatives of the Association of Ore Mining and Smelting Enterprises of Kazakhstan at a round table meeting called “The Customs Union: From Theory to Prac- tice” held on 1 November, 2010 in Astana. In other words, Kazakhstan manufacturers are still not reaping any real benefit from integration in practice. It stands to reason that forming coordinated transport fees is largely the task of the Unified Economic Space. But attempts to resolve the problem of fees within the EurAsEC have been going on for quite some time now. The departments of the participating countries need to step up coordination of the principles of an economic and transportation policy, since the main goal of the CU, and of the Eurasian Economic Community as a whole, is to create conditions for the free movement of goods, capital, and services. And this, in turn, will promote the sustainable development of the participating countries and augment their economic potential. In order to develop transport cooperation within the CU, the problem of rail shipment taxation must be resolved. In particular, since 1 July, 2010, Russian Railroads has been levying a value added tax of 18% on international shipments to Kazakhstan. The Customs Union Commission made a decision on 20 September, 2010 that required the Russian side to make amendments to the corresponding legislation to cancel this practice. But the decision envisages every kind of shipment apart from rail.12 This means that Kazakhstan businessmen are still not enjoying the anticipated decrease in the cost of shipping goods by means of Russian rail. “We, the people of Kazakhstan, cannot imagine a railroad being able to act as a ‘state within a state’ outside the general state policy.”13 So bringing the national legislation of the CU countries into harmony with each other and creating real conditions for the free movement of goods, capital, and services are high priority tasks. In this respect, the governments of the CU participating states should coordinate efforts better with the corresponding ministries, departments, and business associations in order to smooth out all the rough edges of the new cooperation mechanism and fully create a climate that favors interaction among our countries. Moreover, Kazakhstan must urgently create a separate structure (under the Kazakhstan Ministry of Economic Development, for example) for monitoring and analyzing the measures carried out within the framework of the CU and for evaluating their impact on the activity of Kazakhstan companies. It is very important for Kazakhstan to pursue an adequate economic policy in the CU. For example, if Russia’s trade policy is compared with Kazakhstan’s, it can be concluded that state policy in Russia has always been aimed at supporting the domestic manufacturer. This can be seen, for example, from the average customs duty rates that were in effect in Kazakhstan and Russia before the CU was established. When the Unified Customs Tariff (UCT) was formed, the Kazakh side was forced to

12 See: Ya. Razumov, “Zheleznaia doroga—‘gosudarstvo v gosudarstve’: problemy nalogooblozheniia v Tamozhen- nom soiuze,” Silk Way. Torgovlia bez granits, No. 2, 2011, p. 20. 13 Ibid., p. 21. 157 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS raise the customs tariffs on many goods. In particular, the amount of UCT for Kazakhstan increased on average by 4.4% (see Table 1). Table 1 Comparison of the Arithmetic Mean of Import Duties in Kazakhstan and in Russia and the Unified Customs Tariff (%)

Kazakhstan Russia UCT

Arithmetic Mean 6.2 10.6 10.6

For industrial goods 4.6 9.4 8.5

For agricultural goods 12.1 15.1 16.7

S o u r c e: Information of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Russia actively supports the agroindustrial complex. In particular, the state helps Russian agricultural manufacturers to settle up to half of their loans, which has given a powerful boost to development of Russia’s food industry. The following trend is seen in fish processing. Russian manufacturers buy fish in Kazakhstan at relatively profitable prices. Most Kazakhstan companies comply with this since only seven companies have the Euro certificates needed to export their products to the Far Abroad (the U.S., Canada, Germany) (by way of comparison, there are 70 such companies in Russia), whereby there are fishing quotas for Kazakhstan companies. This means that Kazakhstan enterprises are left without raw material, while the bulk of fish processing is concentrated in Russia. The same thing is also happening in the dairy industry. Russian companies buy up dairy products in the border areas, while Kazakhstan imports approximately 90% of cheese, as well as curds.14 In this respect, rendering real support to the domestic manufacturer and creating conditions for the development of small and medium business should become the top priority of Kazakhstan’s economic policy. Today, certain measures are being taken in the republic to develop business. In particular, the Kazakhstan government submitted a draft Law on Making Amendments and Addenda to Some Leg- islative Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Licensing Issues to the parliament for approval on 10 March, 2011, which envisages cancelling 331 of the 1,051 licensing documents in effect. There are also plans to reduce the number of entities required to obtain licenses for their activity in agriculture and environmental protection. The licensing procedures are to be simplified in order to save time. Applying the “one stop” principle in all state agencies will make it possible to significantly accelerate the processing of all documents. The new draft law is also introducing such regulations as mandatory document examination within two days and elimination of the need to notarize the submitted documents. The principle of “silence is a sign of consent” applies to all licensing procedures: if a state agency does not submit a justified refusal before the set deadline, the licensing document is considered issued. Implementation of these regulations will undoubtedly help to speed up business in the country and develop entrepreneurship.

14 See: G. Nurbekova, op. cit., p. 15. 158 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 The CU: Great Expectations

However, with respect to the recent introduction of various innovations to simplify procedures in the business sphere, the justified question arises of why was it necessary to have more than 1,000 licensing documents in the first place? After all, these documents create nothing but obstacles and cause a deterioration in the business climate in the republic. According to the research of the World Bank and International Financial Corporation Doing Business 2010, Kazakhstan is 63rd in terms of the Ease of Doing Business Ranking, which means there is much room for improvement. Introducing the above- mentioned regulations will make it possible to solve this task to some extent. Today, small and medium business needs as much assistance as possible in stepping up its activity. The numerous artificial barriers and obstacles to business are the main reason for the less- than-20-percent share of SMB in the total volume of the republic’s GDP. As we know, in developed countries, small and medium business accounts for more than half of GDP. The share of the economically active population engaged in small business in Kazakhstan amounts to 25%. By way of comparison, in developed countries small business accounts for up to 50-80% of all those employed. This shows that the situation in this sector of the economy must be improved. At present, Kazakhstan has quite a large number of organizations that support SMB. They include both government and public organizations. But there is no unified structure that is directly responsible for coordinating their work and ensuring qualitative implementation of SMB support programs. The number of measures being drawn up and implemented in the business sphere is also high. But the businessmen themselves do not hear about them on time. There is no unified information system for supplying the latest information about small and medium business projects, and this is also hindering the development of the business sector in the republic. Today, the Program of Accelerated Industrial-Innovative Development of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2010-2014 and the Kazakhstan Industrialization Map for 2010-2014 are being implemented in Ka- zakhstan. And it is very important that these documents include as many small and medium business projects as possible. Conditions must be created for raising the competitiveness of SMB entities, in particular, a more flexible mechanism for their credit provision. Resolving these problems is especially important in the context of the functioning of the CU and in forming a Unified Economic Space (UES) in the future. At present, the CU countries have drawn up the regulatory and legal basis for the UES. The main agreements were adopted for creating the Unified Economic Space at the Interstate Council meeting of the EurAsEC held on 9 December, 2010 at the head of state level. They included agreements for carrying out a coordinated economic policy, free movement of capital and labor, interaction in the infrastructure branches (power engineering, transportation, communications), and technical regulation. The indicated documents are the basis for executing the four UES principles (the well-known four freedoms: the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor). Within the UES, unified conditions will be created for competition, which will make it possible for business to interact under equal conditions. All barriers that hinder free access to infrastructure (pipeline, rail transport) will be removed, and the principles of a unified tariff policy will be introduced. The Kazakhstan manufacturer will gain access to the markets of Russia and Belarus and there will be greater opportunities to participate in the capital of joint ventures in the partner countries. And, in our opinion, the creation of the UES will give business activity in Kazakhstan an enormous boost both in the domestic market and in the CU states. However, the main task is to raise the competitiveness of Kazakhstan’s manufacturers. If Kazakhstan goods are competitive within the country, they will also enjoy demand in the other CU countries. That is, the UES will be a kind of dress rehearsal before jointing the WTO. If Kazakhstan can withstand the competition in the UES, it will be able to become an equal partner in the WTO and function efficiently in this international organization.

159 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

The decisions made on 9 December, 2010 by the EurAsEC Interstate Council will be an important factor in intensifying the integration interaction among the CU countries in the real sector of the economy. In particular, the agreements reached with respect to forming a common oil and petroleum product market within the UES will help to develop Kazakhstan’s export potential, increase the volume of oil transportation to the world markets, and fill the domestic market with high-quality petroleum products. For example, in accordance with Art 2 of the Agreement on the Procedure for Organizing, Managing, Operating, and Developing Common Oil and Petroleum Product Markets of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Belarus, and the Russian Federation, the main principles for forming a common market are non-application by the Sides in reciprocal trade of quotas and export customs duties and priority fulfillment of the needs of the UES states for oil and petroleum products. According to Art 5 of the Agreement, the Sides shall establish unified tariffs for the transportation of oil and petroleum products throughout the territory of the CU countries. In accordance with Art 6 of the Agreement, the Sides shall coordinate the indicative balances of production, consumption, delivery, and import and export of oil and petroleum products every year before 1 October. An intergovernmental agreement (adopted on 15 December 2010) on an increase in the capacity of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium to 67 million tons will also make a significant contribution to raising the volume of Kazakhstan’s oil export. The agreements adopted within the UES could give an additional boost to development of the republic’s mining and smelting complex. The formation of a unified transport tariff policy and a decrease in rail shipment tariffs within the UES in the future could significantly augment the competitive advantages of the mining and smelting complex in Kazakhstan. However, the shortage of rolling stock is still a serious problem for the industry. So experts in the mining and smelting industry are emphasizing the need to draw up an agreement on the creation and use of a unified wagon fleet in the UES, which could resolve the problem of increasing deliveries of Kazakhstan’s products to the world markets. On 9 December, 2010, an agreement on ensuring access to the services of natural monopolies in the energy industry was also signed at the EurAsEC Interstate Council meeting, which will create conditions for forming a common electricity market in the CU. The participating countries will be able to freely trade electricity within the CU. This principle is particularly pertinent for Kazakhstan, since the republic’s energy-deficient western regions are not hooked up to the energy grids of the other regions of the Republic of Kazakhstan. At present, the Western Kazakhstan Region uses electricity from Russia, which is much more expensive than Kazakhstan’s. Now that the agreement has been signed, the western regions will be able to receive electricity from the northern regions of Kazakhstan via Russian grids. Electricity will be transmitted through the Russian Federation for consumers in West- ern Kazakhstan by means of interconnected and simultaneous deliveries of equal amounts of electricity from the northern part of the unified electricity grid of Kazakhstan to the unified electricity grid of Russia and from the unified electricity grid of Russia to the western zone of Kazakhstan’s unified energy grid via delivery points located on the Kazakhstan-Russian border. Introduction of a transit-substitu- tion scheme will rid Kazakhstan of the need to purchase expensive electricity from the Russian supplier. This is a great advantage, since in 2006-2010 the tariffs for Russian electricity have increased seven times, constituting 250%. TOO Akzhayykenergosauda also received a notification from OAO INTER RAO UES this year on a rise in the price of electricity on 1 January, 2011 to 13.2 tenge per kWh, which constitutes an increase of 160%.15 The above-mentioned agreement will make it possible to improve the financial-economic situation of the energy-supplying company and save approximately 390 million tenge on the difference in price. The revenue of TOO Ekibastuz GRES-1, which will supply electricity to Western Kazakhstan in amounts that substitute the volumes supplied by OAO INTER RAO UES, will increase by approx-

15 See: M. Makulbekov, “V pravovoi baze EEP polnostiu uchteny natsionalnye interesy Kazakhstana,” available at [www.kazinform.kz]. 160 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 imately 1 billion 680 million tenge, whereby the amount of net profit will increase by approximately 673 million tenge.16

Conclusion

The development of regional integration and mutually beneficial cooperation has indisputable advantages for Kazakhstan. It is providing opportunities for stepping up business, cooperating in the infrastructure branches, promoting free movement of goods, capital, and services, and developing the country’s export potential. However, successful implementation of the indicated vectors requires a major boost in the competitiveness of the Kazakhstan economy. In this respect, the modernization of industrial production, its industrial-innovative development, the creation of a favorable business climate in the republic, and the formation of a powerful business class should become the top priorities of Kazakhstan’s state policy. Then the advantages of forming the CU and UES will be much higher than the disadvantages. On the whole, integration cooperation among the CU participating states should be primarily oriented toward the interests of the business sector, for the sake of which this project was begun. In- tensifying interaction among the ministries and departments of the participating states both with respect to each other and to the business communities of these countries is also of vital importance.

16 See: Ibidem.

SOCIOECONOMIC CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH IN KYRGYZSTAN’S ECONOMIC COMPLEX

Andrei GALIEV Senior Lecturer at Turan University, MA in Teaching English (MTE), and MA in Business Administration (MBA) (Almaty, Kazakhstan)

Introduction

he regional economic complex should be defined place and function. “The region’s eco- viewed as an aggregate of interrelated com- nomic complex is a functioning and, consequent- T ponents, each of which has its own clearly ly, relatively stable system, while it is also evolv- 161 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS ing and changing.”1 This article aims to show how Kyrgyzstan’s regional economic complex is distinguished by historically caused contradictions 1 T.G. Rozanova, Regionalnaia ekonomicheskaia sis- which seriously interfere with the successful de- tema, Moscow, 2005, p. 3. velopment of its economy.

Historical Background

The territory of present-day Kyrgyzstan has never been a unified whole; the South and the North developed under different conditions within the framework of different state formations.2 After establishing Soviet power, the Bolsheviks, intent on eradicating all remnants of the past, deliberately destroyed the traditional social structures of the Kyrgyz people. Regional and district division began to gradually take over tribal and patrimonial division as a source of Kyrgyz self- identification, particularly in society’s relations with the ruling communist political establishment. By virtue of the special features of the Soviet system based on the centralized redistribution of resources, every Kyrgyz community wanted the leader of the republic to be someone from their own region who would help to develop his “small motherland.” So regional division began to acquire political and social importance. From the historical viewpoint, the 1930s were a turning point in the social, economic, and cultural history of Kyrgyzstan. During these years, the traditional lifestyle reached a crisis point and contemporary industrialization began. Collectivization and improvements in irrigation and the agrarian sector as a whole brought about profound changes in the rural districts. However, immense changes also occurred in the correlation of the size of certain ethnic groups, and a rift formed between the cities and the villages. At the very beginning of World War II, the Soviet government posed the task of turning the fraternal republics in the rear into a powerful military-industrial arsenal in the shortest time possible. A strategic program was drawn up, according to which the Urals, Western Siberia, Kazakhstan, and Central Asia were to become rear hubs for producing technology, weapons, industrial products, and food, as well as population evacuation zones. During the war, 36 large industrial enterprises went into operation in Kyrgyzstan and new branches emerged. At that time, the number of industrial workers rose from 36,000 to 46,000, and the share of industry in Kyrgyzstan’s national economy increased from 50.2% in 1940 to 67.5% in 1945.3 The enterprises moved from the European part of the Soviet Union were mainly relocated in the North of Kyrgyzstan (in the Chu Region and in Frunze).4 On the strength of the new enterprises created in the republic, the gross volume of industrial production rose manifold during the postwar years. Power engineering, the machine-tool industry, and the manufacture of silk, leather footwear, and canned food, etc. rose at a rapid rate. During the first post-war Five-Year Plan, more than 20 major enterprises were put into operation and many plants and factories were reconstructed. The gross volume of industrial production rose 4.2-fold in 1950 compared with 1940. Machine-building (such plants as Kirgizavtomash, the Frunze Car Assembly Plant, the Frunze Agricultural Machine-Building Plant, Torgmash, the Osh Pump Plant, and so on), the electrotechni-

2 See: N.A. Madaliev, Istoria arkheologicheskogo izucheniia Iuzhnogo Kyrgyzstana (regionalnyy istochnikovedcheskiy analiz), Synopsis of a thesis for a PhD in History, St. Petersburg, 2003. 3 See: S.K. Kerimbaev, Sovetskiy Kirgizstan v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voyne 1941-1945 gg., Frunze, 1985; E. All- worth, Central Asia. A Century of Russian Rule, Columbia University Press, New York, 1990, p. 57. 4 See: Iztoria kirgizskoi SSR, Vol. 2, Frunze, 1968, p. 101. 162 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 cal industry (the Kaindin Cable Plant, Kirgizelectrodvigatel, Tiazhelectromash, the Issyk Kul Asso- ciation of Electrotechnical Plants), and tool engineering (the Orgtekhnika plant in Minkush, and the control and measurement instrument plant) were among the most dynamically developing industries in Kyrgyzstan. In terms of machine-building development, Kyrgyzstan, which manufactured more than 200 types of products, occupied second place in Central Asia after Uzbekistan, and first place in terms of truck, pump, and gas stove manufacture. The products manufactured in the republic were exported not only throughout the Soviet Union and socialist countries, but were also purchased by France, Germany, and Great Britain. In so doing, the raw material industries were essentially counterbal- anced by the processing industry and machine-building. This proved to be a relatively efficient structure that permitted the attainment of a stable economy. In terms of many of the products manufactured, Kyrgyzstan was a true monopolist in the Soviet Union: baling machines, steam boilers, many radio parts, and so on were produced only in Kyrgyzstan. In 1979, the share of the urban population of the republic reached 39%.5 However, industrial development also had its flaws. Enterprises and transportation means often sat idle or functioned inefficiently. Task plans designed to produce many types of commodities and improve their quality were not fulfilled. Industry mainly grew by virtue of a perfunctory increase in the number of enterprises and workers. A constant inflow of qualified personnel was needed for the republic’s industry to continue developing at the same rate. But most of Kyrgyzstan’s population lived in rural areas, which was in no way conducive to augmenting the number and professional level of workers from among the indigenous people. This resulted in the intensive migration of workers from the industrial areas of the Soviet Union to Kyrgyzstan.6 More than 500 large enterprises were built during the years of Soviet power.7 Significant changes occurred in the territorial location of industry. In the prerevolutionary period, the few artisan enterprises were mainly located in the south of the country. In the postwar years, two major industrial zones formed—the North and the Southwest. The North zone put out 2/3 of the industrial production and was distinguished by relatively well-developed machine-building, metal processing, electricity generation, building material production, and the light and food industry. The Southwest zone put out 1/3 of the industrial production and was distinguished by well-developed nonferrous metallurgy and the fuel and textile (cotton and silk) industry. North Kyrgyzstan is one of the republic’s two economic-geographic regions and is distinguished from South Kyrgyzstan by its high level of urbanization, industrialization, socioeconomic development, and large Russian and Russian-speaking population, which predominated until 1990. The Chu Region, Bishkek, and the Issyk Kul Region situated in the north of the country have traditionally been part of North Kyrgyzstan since the time of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union. Two other regions, Talass and Naryn, are sometimes also included geographically in North Kyrgyzstan. This is also because the Kyrgyz living there consider themselves part of the so-called northern clans, although most indices show that these regions are more reminiscent today of the South. This particularly applies to the Naryn Region. Even back in Soviet times, the difference in socioeconomic development and demographic trends of these two regions of the republic was quite dramatic. The flatter northern territories were largely populated by Russians, Ukrainians, Germans, and others who had higher professional training and a more stable demographic structure (moderate natural increment and higher share of able-bodied population, etc.). Moreover, the country’s capital, the town of Frunze (Bishkek), is situated in the north, and many people wanted to live and work there.

5 See: M.Kh. Abuseitova, et al., Istoria Kazakhstana i Tsentralnoi Azii, Textbook, Bilim, Almaty, 2001, p. 579. 6 See: S. Attokurov, Promyshlennost Kirgizii v poslevoennye gody (1946-1955), Frunze, 1975, pp. 77-80. 7 See: Istoria Kyrgyzstana: XX vek, Textbook for higher educational institutions, Bishkek, 1998. 163 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

In Soviet times, southern employees were always undeservedly infringed upon, and fewer financial and material resources were sent to the South. Since it was so far from the capital and separated from the rest of the country by an impassible mountain range, the southern region of Kyrgyzstan found itself on the periphery. When talking about the structure of the Soviet state, well-known expert S. Kara-Murza writes: “It was a production organism of an entirely different type, unknown both in the West and in old Russia. Western experts still have no idea about how Soviet enterprises were organized, why one enterprise was responsible for the waste treatment facilities or heating of an entire town, why the polyclinic, housing services, kindergarten, and pioneer camp were all financed from its budget. In the economic, technological, and social respect, dividing this system up would have meant a national disaster, the dimensions and outcome of which we can still not fully comprehend.”8 However, despite all of this, organization of the Soviet national economy was extremely contradictory, since its development was primarily dictated by ideological motives and not by economic expediency. The principle of regionalism was deliberately ignored and the century-old economic traditions of specific ethnic groups were not taken into account. A contradictory situation developed in Kyrgyzstan: although it had an extremely rich raw material base for developing the light and food industry, branches of the machine-building and metal-processing industries were implanted artificially in it without the metallurgy industry or raw material base necessary for this, and without the required industrial traditions and skills among the indigenous population. Raw material for Kyrgyzstan’s machine-building industry was produced in Belorussia, processed in Ukraine, certain parts were made in Russia, while dump trucks were assembled in Kyrgyzstan; then all of this was distributed by the Soviet State Planning Committee in Moscow. At the same time, a large percentage of agricultural raw material was exported from Kyrgyzstan itself in an unprocessed state. For example, 87% of untreated fur, 74% of cotton fiber, 76% of washed fleece, and 88% of woolen and cotton fabric. All of this was naturally accompanied by immense financial, transportation, and many other expenses. (Documents of the Soviet State Planning Committee for 1978-1984.) But the main thing in the conception of the Soviet unified national economic complex was the fact that the Soviet state deliberately failed to create production plants with a full production cycle— raw material-processing-finished product—in any of the Union republics. Economists calculated that the Union republics were bound by a network consisting of more than five billion economic ties, mainly artificial. Raw material and qualified blue- and white-collar workers for Kyrgyzstan’s machine-building plants were brought in from other regions of the Soviet Union due to the deliberate local absence of a targeted and well-conceived system for drawing the indigenous population into industrial production, especially into branches that played a vital role in scientific-technical progress. As a result, the share of workers from the indigenous population amounted to 5-8% at many machine-building plants. And in 1977, the republic’s industry as a whole could boast no more than 15.5% of blue- and white- collar Kyrgyz workers.9 In 1970, the Kyrgyz made up 43.8% of the republic’s total population, only 14% of which lived in the cities. The urban population was largely augmented by external migration. Qualified workers who came to Kyrgyzstan from different regions of the Soviet Union were provided with housing and other favorable conditions to help them socially adapt, which naturally created grounds for ethnic contradictions. The agricultural Osh and Jalal-Abad regions of Kyrgyzstan differ vastly in the economic and cultural respect from the country’s northern districts. These differences were clearly manifested in Soviet times too. For example, the North tends more toward the Kazakh steppes, forming

8 Quoted from: S. Kozhemiakin, “Lipovaia nezavisimost,” Pravda, 25 May, 2009. 9 See: Istoria kyrgyzov i Kyrgyzstana, Bishkek, 1999. 164 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 with it, in the words of G. Sitnianskiy, a “Eurasian community” in counterbalance to the rest of settled Muslim Central Asia.10 The backwardness of the light industry stood out in stark contrast to the development of heavy industry. Insufficient attention to enterprise reconstruction meant that the quality of most of the production of the light industry left much to be desired. By the beginning of the 1980s, extensive industrial development had reached its limits. Attempts continued to retain extensive development of agriculture, but the main efforts went to increasing gross volume rather than to improving the quality of the products manufactured or to ensuring production efficiency. As a result, the net cost of agricultural production increased. Although it gained its political independence at the beginning of the 1990s, Kyrgyzstan continued to be dependent on other states economically,11 since in the unified national economic complex the republic’s industry largely specialized in the production of raw material and semi-finished products. When the Soviet Union disintegrated, the established economic ties were broken and the republic found itself in extremely dire material and financial straits.12 Along with Tajikistan, the Kyrgyz Republic (KR) occupies the least advantageous geographical location in Central Asia (CA) and has an extremely limited mineral-resource base. This, along with its inefficient economic policy and social instability, has placed the economic system in a difficult position.

The Economic Complex and the Challenges of Independence

Production in Kyrgyzstan decreased by 27% in 1992 compared to 1989, whereby unemployment rose abruptly and the standard of living dropped. Privatization was thought to be the answer to a healthier socioeconomic situation in the country. The Law on General Principles of Decentraliza- tion, Privatization, and Entrepreneurship in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan adopted on 20 December, 1991 formed the legal base for privatization in Kyrgyzstan.13 According to most experts, all the revenue from privatization went directly into the pockets of the president’s entourage.14 Privatization resulted in 67 enterprises of the machine-building industry being sold for an average price of 1.1 million soms, although their net asset value was hundreds of times higher. For example, an open-pit coal mine in Tash-Kumyr along with all its equipment—excavators, bulldoz- ers, etc.—was privatized for 1.3 million soms, although the cost of one excavator alone was more than 2 million soms. Property that served the whole nation, was created over decades, and should have ensured the republic’s residents and their descendants a decent life was sold for a song to a bunch of swindlers.15 Moreover, even the miserly amounts gained from privatization (the real value of the privatized facilities, according to experts, amounted to $24 billion) did not reach the state’s coffers. According to the data of the State Property Committee, the estimated cost of the facilities priva-

10 See: G. Sitnianskiy, “Evraziyskaia obshchnost,” available at [http://www.postsoviet.ru/print.php?pid#179]. 11 See: A.A. Akunov, Gosudarstvennoe upravlenie Kyrgyzstana v tranzitnyy period, Bishkek, 1999. 12 See: A.A. Asankanov, O.J. Osmonov, Istoria Kyrgyzstana (s drevneyshikh vremen do nashikh dney), Bishkek, 2002, p. 474. 13 See: U. Chotonov, Suverennyy Kyrgyzstan: vybor istoricheskogo puti, Bishkek, 1996, pp. 83-87. 14 See: “Shans dlia Maksima, Adilia i Aydara,” AIF Kazakhstan, No. 38, 2010. 15 See: “Privatizirovali vse ili eshche chto ostalos?” Epokha, 5 May, 2004. 165 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS tized in the first five years amounted to around 14 billion soms. However, only 0.3 billion actually reached the treasury. The most valuable equipment was further exported as scrap metal. The new bosses were not interested in production continuing or in its modernization, all they thought about was instant gain. Production itself either stopped entirely or was severely cut back. Whereas, for example, 48,000 cen- trifugal pumps were produced in 1990, only 74 were put out in 2000, and the same applied to electric machines, the manufacture of which amounted to 1,263 and 26, respectively. Whereas in 1980, the republic’s industry accounted for 55.6% of the gross domestic product, in 2008, it accounted for only 14%; whereby high-tech production—instrument-building and machine-building—was dealt the se- verest blow.16 The situation was also aggravated by the fact that the caste approach of the administrative elite excluded the participation in the drawing up and implementation of programs of analysts and experts who represented nongovernmental structures. Many experts believe that the country’s ruling elite has been unable to this day to get on the right track and define the objectives and directions of the country’s development. This is shown by the many and mainly unsuccessful attempts to implement state programs after the country gained its independence.17 It is largely explained by the absence of strategic thinkers in the ruling elite of independent Kyrgyzstan capable of drawing up their own draft of the country’s long-term development strategy and ways to implement it. S. Slepchenko, an analyst from the Perspektiva Analytical Consortium, noticed this and explained it as follows: “Things have developed in such a way that during the past one hundred years Kyrgyzstan has not had the opportunity to form a full-fledged social stratum with a strategic vision of the country’s future. It began its independent life without a strategy. Unfortunately, no major changes have occurred in the ensuing years; indeed, the situation has possibly even worsened.”18 Kyrgyzstan is mainly an agrarian country where two thirds of the able-bodied population are engaged in agriculture, which produces 40% of GDP. Agriculture has played a significant role in the country’s economy for a very long time. So an analysis of the socioeconomic situation in agriculture is extremely important.19 The country’s total land area amounts to 19.6 million hectares, 10.6 million of which, or 55.8%, are suitable for farming. Of all the arable land (including vegetable plots), 12.3% is used as plough land, 0.1% is virgin land, 0.4% is used for perennial crops, and 1.7% for hay making; natural pastures account for 85.6%.20 Agriculture began declining in the 1990s when the collective and state farm system was destroyed. During President Akaev’s rule, the Kyrgyz authorities began carrying out the “recommendations” of Western financial institutions regarding the establishment of farming enterprises. They issued the country multimillion loans and grants for this which, according to most people of Kyrgyzstan, did not reach the ordinary farmers but found their way into the pockets of the highest officials. As a result, agriculture turned into a variegated conglomerate of more than 300,000 small farms which found it difficult to function normally. Wide-scale development of agriculture was impossible without major credit and financial investments. When the reforms began, the government started distributing the multimillion loans through the Dyykan Ordo Association and Dyykan Bank, but they were squandered across-the-board by agents and only a small amount reached the farmers.

16 See: “Privatizirovali vse ili eshche chto ostalos?” 17 See: Z. Kudabaev, “Nekotorye itogi stanovlenia svobodnoi ekonomiki v Kirgizskoi Respublike,” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia, No. 2, 2005. 18 “Sovremennye preobrazovania na prostorakh SNG,” Delovaia gazeta, 23 May, 2008. 19 See: General information on the agrarian sector of Kyrgyzstan (see [http://www.centralasia-biz.com/cabiz/kirgizstan/ agrarny/abt_agrarny_kg.htm]). 20 See: State of agriculture in Kyrgyzstan (see [http://www.kazakh-zerno.kz/index.php?option=com_content&view= article&id=27647:2010-12-04-04-12]). 166 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011

When journalists asked a well-known political scientist, Professor A. Kniazev, in 2007 how realistic it was to expect people to invest in Kyrgyzstan, he replied: “We have a vicious circle here. On the one hand, investments are the anchor that can stop the economic crisis from advancing and improve the situation. While on the other, large investments are impossible because of the obvious incompetence of the Kyrgyz government, the impossibility of securing its guarantees, and the obvious weakness, lack of confidence, and lack of systematic coherence in its work. The same is also seen in the president’s entourage. In addition, the parliament is unpredictable and unprofessional. All of this does not bode well for attracting investors to our country. A vicious circle? Yes. But without investments the Kyrgyz economy cannot be raised.”21 Western experts assess the investment climate in the country as unfavorable primarily due to the corruption among the upper crust and the social instability.22

New Government, Old Problems

The new government that came to power after March 2005 did not change anything. During his election campaign trip to the Naryn Region, now former president Kurmanbek Bakiev said that compared to 2005 financing of agriculture had increased seven-fold.23 This statement was very out of synch with the actual situation. Moreover, the efficiency of a specific measure is shown not by the amount of money spent on it, but by the end result. And this is far from positive. It is a well-known fact that there is a direct correlation between the size of a farm and its productivity. The smaller a farm, the less opportunity it has to acquire state-of-the-art agricultural technology and fertilizers or to carry out reclamation work. The average size of a farm in Kyrgyzstan is 3 hectares (by way of comparison, in the U.S. it is around 200 hectares). So most farms are returning to a primitive way of farming. They are resorting to beasts of burden instead of tractors and combines, while there is no point in even mentioning rational land use. As a result, harvest yield, according to specialists, has decreased by 40-60%. Most farms have returned to natural farming, while thousands of young people who cannot find work in the village are migrating to the cities where they are swelling the ranks of outcasts and vagrants. At the same time, according to Head of the National Secretariat of Initiative of the Central Asian Countries for Land Resource Management K. Kulov, “…approximately 100,000 hectares in the republic are unused. Plough land is turning stony and unsuitable for planting crops… Moreover, more than half of all the plough land is salinized, waterlogged, or subjected to wind erosion.”24 The state’s withdrawal from the village and its dumping all the problems onto the shoulders of the small farmer, who is simply unable to cope with them, are to blame for this. In our opinion, the Kyrgyzstan leadership made a big mistake when it decided to join the WTO. In so doing, it pledged not to overstep the 5% threshold in budget subsidizing of agriculture, although all other developing countries set this threshold at 10% when they joined the WTO. In addition to this,

21 A. Kniazev, “Natsionalnaia ideologiia Kirgizii voobshche ne mozhet byt pridumannoi,” available at [http://www. centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1186519620], 8 August, 2007. 22 See: Strany i regiony mira v sovremennykh mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniiakh, ed. by M.S. Ashimbaev, A.Zh. Sho- manov, Institute of World Economy and Policy under the Foundation of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Almaty, 2006, p. 432. 23 See: “Sdelano mnogo,” Obshchestvennyy reyting, 2009. 24 K. Kulov, “Problemy zemlepolzovania v Kyrgyzstane,” De-fakto, 28 April, 2009. 167 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS the Kyrgyz authorities established a zero rate of export subsidies for agriculture. Now Kyrgyzstan has found itself a hostage of the unconsidered decisions of its former rulers, and it will be very difficult for it to extricate agriculture from the ongoing crisis. Production from Iran and China is being imported into Kyrgyzstan, since the products of these countries are cheaper than those produced in Kyrgyzstan. Its WTO obligations prevent it from rejecting these imports. According to several Kyrgyz experts, Kyrgyzstan has become a country that is feeding off the economies of other countries. Not one branch is functioning as it should.25 Former minister of agriculture of Kyrgyzstan A. Nogoev maintained that “if intelligent people had carried out land and agrarian reform, we would have a well-developed farming sector today… At first glance, everything seems to have been done correctly: land was given to private entities and a new class—farmers—has appeared. But without systemic state support, these farmers have been left to deal with the problems on their own.”26 Admittedly, the minister goes on to contradict himself and the facts by saying: “I want to emphasize that Kyrgyzstan’s food safety is in no way threatened…”27 Incidentally, many experts believe that the hopes of raising the economy as a whole by enhancing agriculture are totally absurd and entirely unjustified. n First, no world economy builds development on agriculture; on the contrary, most developed states subsidize this branch from the state budget. n Second, there is no farming culture in Kyrgyzstan. No amount of international grants or loans can change the mentality about working the land. n Third, there is no precise conception of agricultural development in the country. n Fourth, there are no qualified managers, agronomists, or farmers, and Kyrgyzstan has no intelligent marketing strategy in the sphere of agricultural production. Due to the increasing problems in agriculture, which has become the country’s main economic sector, the problem of poverty is growing. Most experts agree that poverty threatens the state’s sustainable development and that it stems from poor state management and all-out corruption at all levels of the bureaucracy. However, A. Oslund, former advisor to former president Askar Akaev, believes: “Kyrgyzstan is one of the most attractive countries and the only free country in the post-Soviet expanse. In Kyrgyzstan, the genial population, well-educated representatives of civil society, and open- ness are prospering like nowhere else in the territory of the former Soviet Union.” Oslund goes on to say: “At the beginning of the post-communist transition period, Kyrgyzstan surprised observers thanks to Askar Akaev, who occupied the post of president from 1990 to 2005. The simplified tax system promoted an upswing in small business. Timely land reforms and low fiscal taxes for small farmers boosted a rise in agriculture. Moreover, Kyrgyzstan became the first CIS country to enter the WTO in 1998, which promoted active trade with China. Thanks to the excellent reform of public health, the life expectancy of the male population has increased by four years, and these indices are better than in Kazakhstan.”28 In 2009, former president Kurmanbek Bakiev took a working trip around Kyrgyzstan’s regions. His speeches mainly focused on the imminent growth in industry, stability of the economic situation in the country, and the need to raise the population’s standard of living. According to the press, Bak- iev was generally pleased with what he saw. But he continued to hope for assistance from abroad. He

25 See: M. Niazov, “U nas ostryy defitsit politicheskikh sil, sposobnykh vyvesti stranu iz krizisa,” Reporter-Bishkek, No. 16, 15 May, 2009, p. 4. 26 Ibidem. 27 Ibidem. 28 “Novyy shans vystroit’ Kyrgyzskuiu demokratiiu,” 30 April, 2010, available at [http://diesel.elcat.kg/lofiversion/ index.php?t3884618.html]. 168 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 said: “Despite certain difficulties associated with the world economic crisis, the economy of our country is steadily developing. According to the economic growth statistics for this year (2009), our country ranks second among the CIS countries.” Bakiev repeated this phrase several times in different villages he travelled to within the span of one week. He also often repeated the promise to make life easier for businessmen, lower the number of audits, and clamp down on corruption. All of this was to be done in the interests of raising the population’s standard of living.29 However, in reality, as experts maintain, more than 50% of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP is formed from trade mediation activities and rendering services. So during the reforms several miscalculations and flaws were admitted, and new difficulties and contradictions appeared: n the material-technical agricultural base has been depleted; and technology, equipment, agricultural buildings and structures have been destroyed and squandered; n production has catastrophically dropped, resulting in lower profitability and earning capacity of agriculture; n there are not enough funds for purchasing agricultural machinery and equipment, seeds, fertilizers, fuel and lubricants, and so on; n previously used fertile land has been abandoned; n unemployment and poverty is widespread in the rural areas, particularly among young people; n difficulties have arisen in selling the produce raised. Small towns are in dire straits. Due to the unequal starting opportunities and conditions, the disproportions in the development of small towns and urban-type settlements have become even more glaring during the transition period. Despite adoption of the Conception of State Policy Regulation and the Small Town Socioeconomic Development Program of the Kyrgyz Republic, which set forth objectives and tasks, the general problems and ways to overcome them, as well as priority areas in the socioeconomic development of small towns for 1998-2000, many of the problems of small town development have only become worse.30 In so doing, the opportunities for reforming small towns and urban-type settlements by means of privileges, donations, grants, and sponsor funds have largely been exhausted. The high level of unemployment and drop in the standard of living below the poverty line are problem issues for essentially all of Kyrgyzstan’s small towns and settlements, which is causing an increase in migration. Serious contradictions have formed in hydropower engineering. In terms of its hydropower potential, Kyrgyzstan occupies third place in the CIS after Russia and Tajikistan. But only 8% of its hydropower resources are being used, whereby rather irrationally. Kyrgyzstan, a country with enormous potential for electricity production, is suffering from an energy crisis, sometimes electricity is switched off for 10 hours a day. So it goes without saying that enterprises cannot operate reliably. At the same time, in 2009, when there was not enough electricity for domestic needs, Kyrgyzstan exported around 12 million kWh a day to Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan’s energy system has long been built on rigorous exploitation of the Toktogul GES alone without investing in its reconstruction or maintenance in proper working condition. This has resulted in increased losses in the energy system. Energy consumption cannot be paid for on time, so

29 See: G. Mikhailov, “Ekonomika Kirgizii okhvachena krizisom, odnako vlasti obeshchaiut neminuemoe protsvet- anie,” Nezavisimiaia gazeta, 29 October, 2009. 30 See: “Malye goroda Kyrgyzstana,” available at [http://municipalg.narod.ru/cc.htm]. 169 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS debts have become a great problem. An attempt to reform the energy industry (divide the sector into several independent structures and privatize them) made the situation even worse. At present, according to experts, the losses reach up to 45%, while power engineers owe the budget almost two billion soms. Corruption is cited as one of the main reasons for the unsuccessful reform of this sector. The wear and tear on equipment at some hydropower stations is reaching 80%. When the Tok- togul GES went out of operation in Kyrgyzstan on 15 April, 2009, Almaty and part of the Almaty Region were left without electricity for many hours. All of this shows the major problems and contradictions in Kyrgyzstan’s power industry.31 As Central Asian analyst E. Marat notes, “due to precisely drawn up pyramid schemes, which have been profitable for only a chosen few in this sector, Kyrgyzstan is collecting a mere 30% of the fees for the electricity it produces, while even according to rough estimates more than $40 million in profit are squandered every year by means of fraud.”32 During a sponsor conference in July 2010 in Bishkek, Roza Otunbaeva said: “Ensuring transparency in the energy sphere, which was the most corrupted under the country’s former leaders, is a super important task.”33 It should be noted that Kyrgyzstan’s geographical location has had a significant influence on the energy system being divided into two parts: the South and the North. In terms of capacity balances, the northern part of the energy system suffers from a shortage of energy, while the southern part has an energy surplus. The real throughput capacity of the high-voltage power line of the Toktogul GES (HL 500 kW) cannot ensure the predicted increase in energy consumption of the country’s north, which hinders economic development potential.34 Studies show that an increase in the country’s economy along with a 4% rise in energy consumption a year means that approximately ten new 220-500 kV power transmission lines will have to be built before 2020 for transmitting the surplus electricity from the south to the north of Kyrgyzstan. In addition to hydropower resources, Kyrgyzstan also has sufficient coal supplies. In Soviet times, Kyrgyzstan’s miners produced 7-8 million tons of coal. Kyrgyzstan was in fourth place in terms of reserves in the Soviet Union (after the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine). Coal reserves amounted to 1.3 billion tons. Today, Kyrgyz mines produce an average of 400,000 tons a year. The rest of the coal required (more than 1 million tons) is brought in from Kazakhstan.

Disproportions in Regional Development as the Foundation of Social Conflict

The socioeconomic contradictions are most acute in South Kyrgyzstan. The Ferghana Valley, a permanent seat of instability and site of many contradictions, arouses particular concern among all experts, analysts, and politicians without exception. The Ferghana Valley is distinguished by a high level of overpopulation, growing unemployment, and intensifying Islamicist moods. More than 7.5 million people live in the valley, 75% of whom reside in rural areas. The population density in it reaches 500-600, with as many as 1,000 people per sq. km in some places. In terms of this index, the Ferghana Valley yields to only one region in the entire world, which is located in the south of China.

31 See: “Avaria v Kyrgyzstane paralizovala Almaty,” Karavan, No. 16 (089), 17 April, 2009. 32 The Jamestown Foundation Center, available at [http://www.rursor.ru/article.aspx?id=8281]. 33 “Chto eshche nam nuzhno sdelat?” Litsa, 29 July, 2010. 34 See: A. Prashchaeva, “Energeticheskie problemy Kyrgyzstana i puti ikh resheniia,” Nezavisimiy obozrevatel stran Sodruzhestva, No. 5, 2010. 170 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011

The fact that many different ethnic communities live in the valley (including in the territory of Kyr- gyzstan) acts as a powerful conflict-prone factor. Uzbeks constitute the majority of the population in all of the Ferghana Valley’s regions. Russian scientist I. Artemov said: “The living spaces of Central Asia are confined by deserts and mountains, so a further demographic revolution could lead at the turn of the 20th and 21st century to attempts to redistribute spheres of national influence within the region and expansion beyond it, where ‘the only vector of movement is toward the north,’ that is, to Kazakhstan.”35 The enclaves of Sokh, Shakhimardan, Kalacha, and Jangayl are situated in Kyrgyz territory in the Batken Region. The Kyrgyz enclave of Barak and the Tajik enclave of Sarvan are in the Ferghana Region of Uzbekistan. There are also two Tajik districts in the Batken Region—Vorukh and Western Kalacha.36 “Due to their geographical location and isolation from the mainland, the enclaves are quite a significant source of tension,” says Mamazhan Berdishev, an employee of the state administration of the Batken Region. “The local residents must pass through border and customs posts several times a day, which wears people out, and during checks the controlling bodies demand money from them, which leads to disputes that aggravate the situation in the enclaves.”37 The residents of the enclaves complain about the shortage of plough land and pastures. This is leading to clashes among the residents of neighboring villages. More than 700,000 Uzbeks, 18% of the country’s population, live in Kyrgyzstan, mainly in the south. As a rule, they are merchants and businessmen, that is, a socially active group of people. South Kyrgyzstan (including the Ferghana Valley) is an extremely complicated, contradictory, and volatile region. Former chairman of Kyrgyzstan’s National Security Service K. Imankulov said on 18 January, 2005: “Extremists can nominate candidates for deputy in order to lobby laws through them and turn Kyrgyzstan into a springboard for gaining control over the whole of the Ferghana Val- ley.” According to him, there is “information that some still insufficiently known politicians think it possible to organize uprisings.” But the only revolutionaries the opposition can count on are the lumpen youth, who cannot name one political party, but are willing for money to participate in demonstrations, and “it only takes a couple of provocations for blood to be spilled.”38 The “us-them” factor (northerner-southerner) can be clearly seen here. The people striving for power primarily try to rally people from their own district (fellow countrymen) around them. “Look at Bakiev and his entourage. They are absolutely incompetent, irresponsible people with a very pro- vincial and predatory mentality. They have decided that they have been given power to earn money exclusively for themselves.”39 Despite the mass exodus of the Russian-speaking population, the size of the population in Kyr- gyzstan’s capital, Bishkek, more than doubled between 1999 and 2009.40 This shows that it is essentially the only place in the country where it is possible to live quite prosperously. On the whole, the population of Bishkek amounts to approximately 20% of the country’s total population. Zbigniew Brzezinski has described Central Asia as “the Eurasian Balkans,” stating that “their diverse ethnic composition makes them [the Central Asian countries] vulnerable to internal and external conflicts, which cumulatively tempt intrusion by more powerful neighbors.”41 As Kazakhstan political scientist D. Satpaev says: “neither Askar Akaev, nor Kurmanbek Bakiev took it upon themselves to give due

35 I. Artemov, “Rossia i Sredniaia Azia,” Nash sovremennik, No. 7, 1992, p. 142. 36 See: “Ferganskaia dolina,” Ekspress-Kazakhstan, 17 October, 1994. 37 E.V. Saliev, “V ‘Mertvoi petle’,” Oazis, No. 11, 2010. 38 N. Ayyp, “Kyrgyzstan mozhet byt ispolzovan ekstremistami kak baza dlia zavoevaniia vsei Ferganskoi doliny,” Kyrgyz Weekly, 19 January, 2005. 39 A. Kniazev, “Znakomye momenty vlasti,” AIF Kazakhstan, No. 16, 21-27 April, 2010, p. 7. 40 See: “Bishkek kak Noev kovcheg,” De-fakto, 22 October, 2009. 171 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS attention to the economy, a sphere of such vital importance. And this is in a country where the number of poor people is critical and the disproportion among the regions in economic development is also colossal. And there is essentially only one place in Kyrgyzstan that is developing more or less normally—Bishkek, which is literally a state within a state.”42 In Bishkek, the poverty level amounts to 22.4%, in the Chu Region, it is 46.3%, and in the Osh Region, it reaches 67.2% (according to the National Statistics Committee for 2007). In so doing, the unemployment level in the south of the country is on average 80%. The state of natural resources and level of industrial development, agriculture, and trade have a significant impact on the standard of living. From this it follows that the remote villages in the high altitude and foothill districts with a poorly developed economy and culture and the overpopulated southern regions are the poorest. In 2008, consumer goods amounting to 5,000 soms per capita were produced in the Chu Region, to 875 soms in the Naryn Region, to 1,434 soms in the Issyk Kul Region, to 725 soms in the Osh Region, to 629 soms in the Jalal-Abad Region, and to 2,700 soms in Bishkek. As we can see, the difference is enormous.43 Per capita income in terms of region in 2006 varied insignificantly: from 1,023.8 soms (11%) in the Jalal-Abad Region to 1,932.9 (20%) in the Chu Region. So the residents of the most lucrative Chui Region earn an average of 809.1 soms (9%) more than those who live in the low-income Jalal-Abad Region. If income is considered in dollar terms, the difference between the highest and lowest income regions amounts to $24. Per capita income reaches $27 in the Jalal-Abad and Naryn regions and to $51 in the Chu Region. The average per capita income for Kyrgyzstan as a whole amounts to 1,417.3 soms a month, or $37.44 The once favorable, even prosperous by Kyrgyz standards, Issyk Kul Region is also gradually turning into a poor region due to the revolutionary disturbances. According to Toktagul Kokchekiev, ex-advisor at the local ministry of internal affairs, when people were polled, 99% said: “‘In Soviet times, we lived as though in paradise. But now we are starving.’ I suggest that the deputies raise the question of urgently acceding Kirghizia to the Russian Federation at the very first session of the new parliament in October 2010.” Like in the rest of the republic, the situation is also difficult in the Issyk Kul Region, which has an unemployment rate of 17.4%. This region is unique in that it is the country’s resort zone and is popular among the residents of many of the CIS countries. In the holiday season, the local residents try to earn enough money in 3-4 months to see them through the whole year. In the other seasons, most of the population do not receive a steady income. On the whole, the highest unemployment level is in the south of the country. The high birth rate, which is typical of the Osh, Jalal-Abad, and Batken regions, is causing a rapid increase in the population. Southerners constitute 51% of the total size of Kyrgyzstan’s population. The absence of industrial enterprises in this region means that most of the residents are engaged in irrigated farming, which is aggravated by a constant shortage of irrigation water. According to the year-end report for 2007, the lowest human development index of 0.650 was registered in the Batken, Naryn, and Osh regions, while the highest was in Bishkek, the capital (0.828).45 The state of the economy in the southern regions of Kyrgyzstan leaves much to be desired. The low standard of living and pernicious unemployment are driving people from their homes in search of

41 Z. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books, New York, 1997, p.130. 42 Zh. Baitelova, “Bunt tolpy ili volia naroda?” Information and Analytical Portal of the Republic, 9 April, 2010. 43 See: Statistics Yearbook of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2008, National Statistics Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, Bishkek, 2008. 44 See: D.K. Osmonbetova, “Bednost v Kyrgyzstane i ee otrazhenie v pokazateliakh vodopotrebleniia,” Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta, Seriia 6, Ekonomika, No. 3, 2010, p. 66. 45 See: UNDP Report in Kyrgyzstan, 2010. 172 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 a living. According to the statistics, a huge number of Kyrgyzstan’s residents work as labor migrants in Russia and Kazakhstan (90% of them are from the southern regions). In 2007 alone, they sent more than $1.5 billion in earnings to Kyrgyzstan.46 Most of the migrants from Kyrgyzstan go to Russia, where their number reaches almost 500,000 people. Their remittances amount to approximately $1.5 billion a year, which is equal to almost half of the republic’s budget. In the past five years (2004-2009), approximately 100,000 people from Kyrgyzstan have acquired Russian citizenship. It should be noted in particular that labor migrants from Kyrgyzstan are not only trying to find temporary work in Russia, they would also like to settle there permanently. The contradictions have become acutely aggravated since the end of 2008, after the beginning of the economic and financial crisis in Russia and Kazakhstan. Migrants have lost their jobs and been forced to return home. By the middle of 2009, more than 4,500 unemployed who had returned from Russia and Kazakhstan were counted in the city of Osh alone, according to the city branch of the State Migration and Employment Committee. However, many experts maintain that the actual picture is much more serious than the official statistics. “If labor migrants return home en masse, we can expect social upheavals,” says well-known political scientist Nur Omarov. “The army of potential unemployed will bring with it problems which the state structures are not ready for, or to be more precise, do not know how to resolve.”47 Deutsche Welle notes that unemployment is an officially recognized problem in Kyrgyzstan. Referring to its own sources in Kyrgyzstan, the publication claims: “They [returning work migrants] are steadily increasing with each passing day. Witnesses are even talking about entire train carriages filled with migrants returning home to Kyrgyzstan.”48 In the southern districts of Kyrgyzstan, where the unemployment problem is particularly acute, the situation on the labor market is beginning to acquire a catastrophic nature. Due to devaluation of the som and economic problems, Kyrgyzstan has become the poorest CIS country with a per capita GDP, according to the 2009 year-end report, of only $630. The weak economies of its main neighbors, Russia and Kazakhstan, are preventing Kyrgyzstan from developing. The increase in unemployment and the government’s desire to cut back on budget spending, shifting the burden onto the citizens, have become fertile ground for discontent. The festering contradictions led to another revolution in April 2010. According to experts, “such revolutions will keep on happening until someone comes to power who will resolve the country’s problems and not transfer the levers of governance of the country and economy to his own clan.”49 Deputy Director of the Institute of CIS Countries V. Zharikhin said: “Bakiev tried to maintain a balance between the traditionally hostile North and South in Kirghizia. But then everything got out of hand. What is happening now in Kirghizia was triggered by people having their economic interests affected. The trigger could have been privatization of the hydropower industry, which began to be taken away from the northerners. The second factor was Bakiev’s striving to stay in power for long years and the statement that the Kurultai, and not the people, should decide who will be president.”50 Contradictions and rivalry between the North and the South run like a veritable refrain through the entire history of independent Kyrgyzstan. Askar Akaev agrees with A. Kniazev that one of the factors triggering the March 2005 state coup was the aggravation of interregional contradictions. “I, as president, declared the city of Osh to be the second capital of the republic; many people from the

46 See: B.B. Esenalieva, “Sovremennyy rynok truda i trudovaia migratsiia v Kyrgyzstane,” Vecherniy Bishkek, 20 June, 2009. 47 “Migranty vozvrashchaiutsia v Kyrgyzstan, kotory ne gotov ikh priniat,” Litsa, 4 May, 2009. 48 [http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1239680820]. 49 “Chem zakonchitsia bunt v Kirgizii,” Komsomolskaia pravda, 9 April, 2010, p. 3. 50 “Gorkiy opyt sosedey,” Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 14 April, 2010. 173 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

South were incorporated into the country’s leadership; and the southern youth gained wide access to education. Socioeconomic policy was drawn up with priority attention to the needs of the South. But there was not enough time for all of this to bear fruit, while the difficulties, particularly with unemployment, in the South grew.”51 After Bakiev was overthrown in April 2010, his supporters suggested that he declare one of the southern cities, Osh or Jalal-Abad, as the republic’s capital. Most experts agree that the main prerequisites of the negative events in Kyrgyzstan were the disproportions in the country’s regional development, the contradictions within the regions themselves and between them, the serious shortcomings in resolving socioeconomic problems, and the inefficien- cy of the mechanisms applied for ensuring sustainability of the economy and establishment of long- term relations with the main trade partners. The ethnic conflict that flared up on 11 June, 2010 in the south of Kyrgyzstan threatens the stability of the entire Central Asian region. The Kyrgyz state, which has essentially collapsed, is unable to cope with the situation and can only hope for help from the outside.52 As the traditional class of merchants in these districts, Uzbeks are usually better off than the Kyrgyz, who are historically a nomadic people earning a living from farming and unskilled labor. The economic inequality between the two ethnic groups is one of the reasons for the tension, contradictions, and conflicts. There is also an economic component in this tension. Throughout the Soviet era, the Uzbeks, who have always lived in the south of Kyrgyzstan, prospered, making use of the old trade networks traditionally unavailable to the nomadic Kyrgyz, who were mainly shepherds. Following the dissolu- tion of the Soviet state, “successive Kyrgyz governments have encouraged a muscular, ethnic-based nationalism.”53 Russian President Dmitri Medvedev said at a press conference on the results of talks with Barack Obama: “The country (Kyrgyzstan) is essentially divided de facto into parts, civilian clashes continue, including, which is particularly grievous, on ethnic grounds, many people have been killed, the authorities proved incapable of preventing what happened.”54 Separatists are calling for Kyrgyzstan to be divided into two democratic republics: the Southern with its capital in Osh and the Northern with its capital in Bishkek, delegating equal powers to them. The provisional government thinks these ideas are dangerous, and ex-premier of Kyrgyzstan Felix Kulov is sure that “the people will never support such a statement.”55 Prime Minister of Kyrgyzstan A. Atambaev said on 24 January, 2011: “Trends toward Kyrgyzstan’s disintegration indeed exist. The Kyrgyzstan government should conduct a coherent and sober policy. Rational and constructive forces, which I think there are more of in our country, understand that the matter does not concern only the economic situation, but also Kyrgyzstan’s integrity, its existence and independence. Some foreign and local experts say that there are trends toward the republic’s collapse. And this is in fact true. The economy, of course, is the main fulcrum. But without stability and ethnic accord it will be difficult to develop that economy.”56

Conclusions

Kyrgyzstan’s unsystematic and chaotic development during the years of sovereignty along with the absence of a clearly conceived strategy supported by all of society have given rise to a mass of

51 A. Kniazev, Gosudarstvennyy perevorot 24 marta 2005 goda v Kirgizii, Bishkek, 2007, p. 161. 52 See: G. Mirzaian, “Kto potushit Ferganskuiu dolinu?” Ekspert, No. 24, 21 June, 2010. 53 See: I. Greenberg, “Between Uzbekistan and a Hard Place,” available at [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/ 2010/08/10/between_uzbekistan_and_a_hard_place]. 54 Nezavisimaia gazeta, 26 June, 2010. 55 [http://kara-balta.ru/forum/archive/index.php/t-1004.html]. 56 [http://www.kginfo.org/index.php?newsid=1909]. 174 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 contradictions and problems which the country tried to resolve by means of confrontation. This has also given rise to the permanent instability that has created the image of Kyrgyzstan as one of the most unpredictable states in the post-Soviet expanse. The exacerbating contradiction between the traditional nature of society and the challenges of globalization, which are reducing to naught the national characteristics of the Kyrgyz people, were and remain the source of instability at the systemic level. This contradiction also came into play in Soviet times, when an attempt was made to foist socialism, bypassing feudalism and capitalism, on the people of Kyrgyzstan, who had still hardly emerged from the tribal society. Kyrgyzstan’s problems are also directly related to the contradictions between the North and the South. The most prosperous regions of the North are Bishkek, the Chu Region, and the Issyk Kul Region. The least prosperous, or, to be more exact, depressive are the regions of the South: the Osh, Jalal- Abad, and Batken regions. So there is no point in talking about Kyrgyzstan’s smoothly functioning economic complex. It appears that these poorly interacting parts of the same country and the contradictions between them are only getting worse, which in the future, if systemic and integrating measures are not pursued, could lead to even greater aggravation of the socioeconomic situation in Kyr- gyzstan with all the ensuing political consequences.

THE TURKMEN ECONOMY: YEAR-END RETURNS FOR 2010

Igor PROKLOV Ph.D. (Econ.), Research Associate at the Central Asia, Caucasus, and Ural-Volga Region Study Center, RAS Institute of Oriental Studies (Moscow, Russia)

Introduction

he year 2010 rounded off many of the so- observers were initially skeptical about the in- cioeconomic development programs adopt- dices these programs produced since they T ed in Turkmenistan 10 years ago while seemed to present an exclusively rosy picture of Saparmurat Niyazov was still in power.1 Many the situation in the country. For example, according to the plan announced in 2001 by Minister 1 See: Strategy of Socioeconomic Transformations in of the Oil and Gas Industry and Mineral Resourc- Turkmenistan Until 2010; Development Program of the es K. Nazarov, Turkmenistan should have pro- Turkmenistan Oil and Gas Industry between 2000 and 2010; duced 120 bcm of gas and 48 million tons of oil Development Program of the Textile Industry Until 2010; Development Program of the Cotton-Cleaning Industry in 2010, while exporting 100 bcm and 33 mil- Until 2010, and so on. lion tons, respectively. However, as the further 175 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS data for 2010 show, the actual figures were much age, to say the least. According to the Turkmen more modest, primarily due to the unfavorable leaders, only a few circumstances, which re- market situation in recent years. All the same, the quired the mobilization of both foreign and do- fact that such programs made it possible to for- mestic policy efforts to overcome, prevented mulate the main priorities and vectors of devel- economic prosperity from being achieved. First, opment, laying the foundation for perhaps not the existing gas- and oil-producing capacities such rapid but nevertheless stable growth, should had to be modernized, the old gas pipelines re- be given its due. paired, and new routes for delivering energy Although the world crisis that began in 2008 resources to potential consumers laid; and sec- did not directly affect Turkmenistan’s financial ond, agreements had to be reached with the con- system and the country recovered from the crisis sumers themselves. As the events of the past two independently without any external financial sup- decades have shown, this was a far-from-easy port, the Turkmen leadership was nevertheless task: solvent consumers are a long way off, while faced with the need to thoroughly re-examine its close neighbors are also rich in energy resourc- strategic plans. This primarily concerned adjust- es and ready to put up competition at the first op- ing the reference points in the country’s energy portunity. In these conditions, the Turkmen lead- policy. The crisis clearly showed that placing ex- ers (first Saparmurat Niyazov and then Gurban- clusive priority on the export of energy resources guly Berdymukhammedov) were very well was fraught with serious economic risks, not to aware and are still well aware that only a sophis- mention the fact that it could well doom previous- ticated multi-vector energy policy and diversi- ly reached contracts and solemnly registered fication of deliveries will make it possible for the agreements to remain on paper. country to draw closer to its designated goals. It As we know, Turkmenistan owns large sup- cannot be denied that the strategy of diversifi- plies of natural gas, so the choice the leadership cation pursued has begun to bear fruit, and in the made after the country acquired its independence next decade the set tasks could be fully imple- of placing the main stakes on the fuel and energy mented. complex as the driving force behind all the other Despite the slump in the market, many world branches of the national economy is entirely log- players are interested in strengthening their foot- ical and justified. But it eventually became under- hold in Turkmenistan’s energy industry. In so stood that the country’s large reserves of natural doing, its reluctance to become politically and resources might not only be a great boon, but also economically dependent in new ways on more an enormous bane, mainly for the country’s ordi- powerful players is prompting the country’s lead- nary people. ership to adopt what at times appear to be unusu- The potential profits from energy resource al ways of organizing public life and managing the export should have made the country prosperous national economy, which is often criticized by the and raised the standard of living above the aver- world community.

The Macro Economy

In 2010, high GDP growth continued to be observed in Turkmenistan, which according to official data amounted to 9.2%. Announcing this figure when summing up the year-end returns, President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov noted that the active policy of diversification of the economy and of the energy resource delivery markets has had a positive influence on economic development as a whole. Foreign investments have increased. Inflation has decreased to 0.1%. A stable exchange rate is being maintained in the country.

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The official viewpoint on the country’s economic progress is also very optimistic. “If we are talking about the positive changes in the country in general, an interesting and graphic fact can be presented. Whereas, for example, the share of agriculture in GDP used to amount to almost 40%, today it has dropped to 10%, i.e. decreased four-fold, while the share of industry and construction has risen almost three-fold, constituting almost 60% of GDP today,” noted Berdymukhammedov.2 Observers of the International Monetary Fund mission also forecasted an increase in Turkmenistan’s GDP in 2010 of no less than 8.1%. In their opinion, the creation of the Stabilization Fund formed from the state budget surplus of recent years, the amount of which is currently more than 16% of GDP, has had a positive effect on the economic situation in Turkmenistan in the context of the global financial crisis. Assessing the information coming from Turkmenistan, we must agree that in the past few years certain changes for the better have occurred in the country. The country has turned into one huge construction site. Whereas under Niyazov construction costing tens of millions of dollars was carried out, now we are talking about hundreds of millions of dollars. Nevertheless, Turkmenistan’s economy is still closed and not easy to understand. For example, official statistics are extremely fragmented and non-transparent, whereby frequently interspersed with redundant information. Most of the macroeconomic indices are given in relative terms and percentages. The country’s budget shows only the general figures for the revenue and expenditures. Table Macroeconomic Indices

Indices 2010 Growth rate, %

Growth rate of GDP in comparable prices, % n/a 109.2

Composite consumer price index (December 2010 in terms of December 2009), % n/a 104.77

Investments in basic assets, million manats 28,465.3 114.1

Foreign trade turnover, $m 17,882.8 97.6

Export 9,679.2 103.8

Import 8,203.6 91.2

Foreign trade balance, $m 1,475.6 n/a

Average monthly wage, manats 707.5 112.1

Execution of state budget for 2010 In % to the set task

Revenue 125.1

Expenditures 92.2

S o u r c e: Data from the website of the Turkmenistan State Statistics Committee.

In 2010, Turkmenistan’s per capita GDP in terms of PPP (purchasing power parity), according to the UNDP Human Development Report (2009-2010), amounted to $7,052. According to the hu-

2 See: [http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1348500.html#ixzz15yiuI145]. 177 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS man development index, Turkmenistan heads the group of countries with an average level of human development (Turkmenistan occupies 87th place and China 89th, while on the list of countries with a high level of human development, Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine occupy 61st, 65th, and 69th places, respectively, and Albania ranks 64th).3 As in the past, the citizens of Turkmenistan receive prescribed allowances of certain consumer goods and services free of charge, such as gas, electricity, water, table salt, gasoline, and diesel fuel. The regulated prices of other goods and services have remained at the same level for more than 10 years now, including above-limit consumption of electricity and gas. The only exception is the price of above-limit (more than 120 liters a month) consumption of gasoline and diesel fuel, as well as public transportation fees (including domestic air flights) which have risen slightly, but still remain relatively low. However, according to many assessments by Western experts, the standard of living of the population remains extremely low, although Turkmen live better than the citizens of other Central Asian countries (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan). As for agriculture, the government assesses 2010 as the most propitious year since the country gained its independence in 1991. In 2010, for the first time in many years, approximately 1.4 million tons of wheat were gathered (with a plan of 1.6 million) and 1.3 million tons of cotton. The cotton harvest, as Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov reported, “greatly exceeds the needs of the country’s industrial enterprises.” The official authorities see the bumper harvest as a natural outcome of the reforms carried out in the country’s agroindustrial complex, i.e. the higher purchasing price of the produce yielded by dehkan farms, the more advantageous loans they are offered, and the improvement in infrastructure. Nevertheless, it is too early to talk about a steady trend in good harvests. According to different assessments, Turkmenistan’s demand for grain is evaluated at 2 million tons, so the country will have to import wheat as before. As for the cotton industry, the country’s leadership has set local textile manufacturers the task of fully processing all the cotton produced in the country in the future. According to official data, the government has invested more than $1 billion in the development of this industry, $300 million of which are foreign (including Turkish) investments. The government of Turkmenistan plans to raise the volume of investments in the industry to $2 billion by 2020. It should be added that in November 2010 the price of cotton on the New York stock exchange reached a record $1.3863 per pound, which is about $3,049 per ton. On 1 January, the minimum wage in Turkmenistan was 598 manats (around $205), while work pensions amounted to between 120 and 532 manats ($50-180). The price of food has also increased, as well as the fees for services rendered the population.

The Energy Industry and Investments

However, many observers are not so optimistic in their assessment of the economic situation in the country. The shrinking of the world energy resource markets as a result of the 2008 crisis dealt a hard blow to the state budget and threatened the disruption of several ambitious projects. According to Gazprom, the Russian gas holding bought only 10 bcm of gas in 2010 in Turkmenistan instead of the 30 bcm envisaged by the contract, which certainly had a negative effect on currency receipts. According to different data, approximately 40-45 bcm of gas and more than 10 million tons of oil were

3 See: [www.undp.org/publications/hdr2010/en/HDR_2010_EN_Complete.pdf]. 178 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 produced in 2010.4 There can be no doubt that any further increase will be related to the reexamina- tion of export contracts. As we know, the country’s main source of wealth is its vast gas reserves. According to British Petroleum, Turkmenistan occupies 4th place in proven gas reserves (8.1 tcm)5; according to official Turkmen data, explored reserves amount to 24.6 tcm. The vicissitudes of the country’s domestic and foreign policy are revolving precisely around these reserves, primarily with respect to issues relating to the search for and diversification of energy resource delivery routes beyond the country. The onset of gas deliveries to China in 2009 became an important event, since completion of the first section of this gas pipeline was a breakthrough for Turkmenistan in overcoming its monopoly dependence on Russia and was also declared a great benefit for China, which is in increasing need of energy resources. However, these expectations proved premature and Turkmenistan’s hopes for significant swelling of the state and near-state treasury are still in vain. In 2010, no more than 5 bcm of gas were delivered to China, and a further increase in deliveries will also occur very gradually. But it is obvious that China never intended paying a high price for Turkmen gas. Although specific items in the gas contracts have not been disclosed, according to unofficial data, the Russian price of one cubic meter of gas is about $60-80 higher than the Chinese. And Turkmenistan will be paying for the multi- billion loans it received earlier from China out of the revenue it obtains from deliveries to the Celes- tial Kingdom: evidently the Turkmen leadership is beginning to appreciate the strength of China’s friendly arm, which prefers to tightly squeeze its partner by the throat. Berdymukhammedov’s visit to China on the eve of the opening of the Shanghai exhibition did not evoke a rise in export gas deliveries in the near future, whereby the Chinese side has not been rushing to issue new loans either. Nev- ertheless, the sides confirmed their interest in strategic partnership. For example, in June, during a visit by He Guoqiang, a member of the Permanent Politburo Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, to Ashghabad, the sides agreed to build the second section of the Turkmen- istan-China gas pipeline, which will make it possible to increase deliveries of Turkmen natural gas to the PRC in the future above the previously specified 40 bcm. In September, the Bagtyiarlyk gas com- pressor station was put into operation, which should become an important part of the gas transportation system in the direction of China. Turkmenistan presented a large and diverse exhibit at the world EXPO-2010 exhibition in Shang- hai (the PRC). Along with carpets, books, and video clips about Turkmenistan, the exhibit consisted of stands presenting the achievements of the country’s state oil and gas companies. The Ministry of the Textile Industry, the Ministry of Public Health, the State Committee of Tourism and Sport, and the Ashghabad Model House also demonstrated their achievements. Despite the vicissitudes in the gas industry, increased interest in Turkmenistan is being shown not only by large international companies, but also by smaller companies. This interest is partly due to the fact that Turkmenistan has been able to survive the financial crisis without outside assistance. For example, on 1 February, an International Turkmenistan Investment Forum and an exhibition of Turkmen commodities opened in the capital of the United Arab Emirates. This was the first time Turkmenistan had carried out this kind of undertaking aimed at broad publicizing of its economic achievements. Members of the government, many other high-ranking leaders, and top managers took part in the forum on the Turkmen side. According to the official statement, the main task of the first Turkmenistan Investment Forum abroad was to attract foreign investments and raise the export potential of such branches of the country’s economy as the oil and gas sector, the energy industry, the textile industry, transportation, telecommunications, construction, the agroindustrial complex, and the water industry.

4 See: [www.oilnews.com.ua/news/article6630.html]. 5 See: BP Statistical Review, 2010. 179 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

From 17 to 19 November, the 15th International Oil and Gas of Turkmenistan-2010 Exhibition was held at the Ashghabad Exhibition Complex, in which, along with national state concerns such as Turkmengaz, Turkmennebit, Turmenkhimia, the Turmengeologia State Corporation, and Turkmen- bashi Oil Refinery Complex, more than 160 foreign participants also took part, including Petronas, Dragon Oil, Wintershall, Bentec, Gazprom, TMK, Stroitransgaz, Tatneft, Integra, Komatsu LTD, Technip, and others.

The Prospects for New Gas Pipelines

An international conference called “The Oil and Gas Industry of Turkmenistan: Today, Future Development, and International Cooperation,” which drew around 700 delegates, including many executives from Europe and the Middle East, as well as the heads of the leading foreign oil and gas companies, was held right after the exhibition in Ashghabad. The main topic of this international conference was further diversification of deliveries of Turk- men energy resources. Based on the new data of geological surveys, since Gurbanguly Berdymu- khammedov came to power, Turkmenistan has stepped up its activity in this vector and been conducting an extremely tight and pragmatic policy. In addition to the existing routes to Russia, China, and Iran, Turkmenistan is actively probing the possibility of gas deliveries within the framework of two other projects: Nabucco and TAPI. Speaking at the conference, Vice Premier of the Turkmen Government B. Khojamukhamme- dov (who is responsible for fuel and energy complex affairs) said that the country is ready to deliver 40 bcm of gas to Europe every year (in addition to Russia, China, and Iran).6 EU representative, Am- bassador Norbert Jousten, said at the same conference that the EU regards Turkmenistan as a reliable new potential partner in energy resource deliveries. In his words, the EU clearly understands that Turk- menistan could become the main gas supplier for the European Union, while European companies are willing to buy gas on the border of Turkmenistan and organize its transportation to the European markets. He also emphasized that in the event of successful energy cooperation between the EU and Turkmen- istan, the latter would gain a “mature, attractive, and growing energy market for its gas.” At the same time, another EU representative, Chairman of the Gas Working Group of the Council of European Energy Regulators Walter Boltz said that the European Union was counting on Turkmenistan assuming responsibility for delivering the necessary amount of gas before Europe acquired the corresponding gas transportation infrastructure. He emphasized that Turkmenistan, which has already entered contracts for gas delivery to Russia, Iran, and China, should guarantee the amounts of gas Europe is interested in.7 Despite the skeptical attitude of many experts, primarily Russian, about the prospects for Nabucco, particularly in the context of the agreements with Russia about building a Caspian gas pipeline, this project could well be implemented in the mid term. In contrast to Russia, which has been earning exclusively on the subsequent resale of Turkmen gas, Turkmenistan will acquire a real consumer in the form of the EU, which will also try to reduce its dependence on gas deliveries from Russia. Recognizing such prospects, in 2010, Turkmenistan began using its own funds to build a major East-West trans-Turkmen gas pipeline with a capacity of 30 bcm for delivering gas from its eastern

6 See: [http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1355719.html]. 7 See: [http://www.k2kapital.com/news/421280/]. 180 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 fields in the westerly direction. After this project is implemented (it is presumed that the pipeline will take around 5 years to build), Turkmenistan will have the ability, depending on demand, to move additional volumes of raw hydrocarbons in both the westerly and easterly direction. As for possible obstacles to implementing the Nabucco plans due to the unresolved status of the Caspian among the five Caspian countries, when talking at the third summit of the Caspian states in November 2010 in Baku, the Turkmen leader announced that the Trans-Caspian pipeline might be built with the consent of his country and Azerbaijan, without taking into account the gas interests of the other littoral states—Russia, Iran, and Kazakhstan.8 Also, referring to the raw material base for the project of the Nabucco gas pipeline, the Turkmen prime minister said: “As early as 2011, Turk- menistan will need a market for the gas produced offshore by Malaysia’s Petronas Company in the amount of five billion cubic meters.”9 In 2010, the Turkmen side helped to ensure the accelerated processing of questions relating to building the TAPI gas pipeline. Several meetings of the Technical Working Group for the Turkmen- istan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline project, attended by leading specialists from all the participating states of this transnational project, as well as representatives of the Asian Develop- ment Bank, were held during the year, and with particular frequency between August and December. As a result of intensive efforts, the sides managed to coordinate the main technical and commercial parameters of the future gas pipeline and natural gas delivery conditions and begin preparing the final version of an intergovernmental agreement on building the TAPI gas pipeline. The renewed interest in this project is mainly prompted by the annual growth (around 10%) in the demand for energy resources in India and Pakistan. While working on the agreement, the Pakistani side held a presentation on ensuring security of the gas pipeline project in the territory through which the future pipeline will pass. In turn, the Turk- men side furnished potential buyers with information about the resource base of the natural gas for the TAPI gas pipeline. As we know, the Asian Development Bank financed drawing up the feasibility report of this project in 2005, the cost of which is estimated at $7.6 billion. The length of the pipeline will be 1,730 km, beginning from the gas delivery point in Turkmenistan (the Dovletabad field) to the population settlement of Fazilka in India on the border with Pakistan. The capacity of the pipeline will amount to approximately 33 bcm of gas a year, up to 14 billion of which will go to Pakistan and India, and 5 billion will go to meet Afghanistan’s needs. If construction begins in 2011, the pipeline might be ready by the end of 2015. On 13 December, a summit of the leaders of the project’s participating states was held in Ash- ghabad, during which the presidents of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, and an Indian minister signed an intergovernmental agreement on building a trans-Afghan gas pipeline (TAPI). The framework agreement on the gas pipeline among the governments of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India was signed by the branch ministers of the four countries. At the same time, it was agreed that the other documents would be drawn up and signed in the first six months of 2011. The main question, as always, is the price of the delivered gas. Despite the important political and economic significance of this project, many experts justifiably doubt it will actually be implemented: the pipeline route passes through volatile areas on the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan. There are no precise dates for beginning the project and the transit fees have not been determined. However, even more important, it is not clear who will finance the project

8 See: [http://belarus.regnum.ru/news/1356421.html]; Russia in the Post-Soviet Expanse: Year-End Returns for 2010, available at [http://kavkaz.ge/2010/12/21/regnum-rossiya-na-postsovetskom-prostranstve-itogi-2010-goda/], 21 December, 2010. 9 See: [http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1355719.html]. 181 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS and in what amounts, or who can guarantee security of the pipeline and how, particularly since its construction promises to be extremely difficult. It is highly likely that the consortium will have to come to terms with the Taliban, giving some of the revenue to the tribe leaders in return for their promise to guard the pipeline in the sections that pass through their territory. Nevertheless, this project has positive potential for the entire region. First, laying a gas pipeline through Afghanistan could become an important factor in strengthening the intra-Afghan dialog and promote an increase in trust among all the sides, as well as help to boost the country’s economy and build international cooperation. Washington is also supporting the project, which was announced by U.S. State Secretary Assist- ant for Central Asia Susan Elliot in November at a conference in Ashghabad. She said that the project still has a long way to go, but the benefit from it could prove enormous. It will make a contribution to Afghanistan’s development and provide the necessary energy resources for the growing economies of Pakistan and India.10 Another reason for U.S. support is its interest in Islamabad and Delhi satisfying their energy hunger by means of Turkmen gas rather than Iranian. Tehran has been lobbying the Iran-Pakistan- India gas pipeline project for several years now. Although Russia is not participating in the project, its implementation is playing into Moscow’s hands. Priority implementation of TAPI could draw off resources and lower Ashghabad’s desire to join the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline project which will make it possible to transport Turkmen gas to Europe bypassing Russia. TAPI’s achievements cannot help but please Moscow. But Russian Vice Premier Igor Sechin’s statement that “Gazprom is willing to participate in TAPI as a contractor, as an engineering company, and as a participant in the consortium” aroused an acute response in Turkmenistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ashghabad announced that “the participation of companies from other states that are not participants in the project is the prerogative of the countries involved in the project.”11 Cooperation with Iran in the gas sphere has also been continuing on a positive note. On 28 Novem- ber, a ceremony was held in Serakhs in the southeast of Iran to launch the operation of the Iranian branch of a gas pipeline that will transport Turkmen gas. The Khangeran-Sangbast branch of the gas pipeline was built for hooking up to the Dovletabat-Serakhs-Khangeran gas pipeline that went into operation in January 2010. This is the second route for delivering Turkmen gas to Iran. The first gas pipeline, Korpeje–Kurt-Kui, was put into operation as early as 1996 in the west of Turkmenistan. Both gas pipelines are capable of increasing the annual deliveries to Iran to 20 bcm of gas a year. The Ira- nian Ministry of the Oil Industry announced in April 2010 that before the end of 2010 the annual volume of Turkmen gas import would increase to 40 mcm compared to 32 mcm.12

Turkmenistan-Russia

As for relations with Russia in 2010, fuel and energy complex issues continue to be the main topic in the dialog between the two countries. On 9 January, deliveries of Turkmen gas to Russia were revived, although the volume of deliveries, as mentioned above, amounted to 10 bcm, which is 3-4-fold lower than in previous years. According to unofficial information, the average annual price of Turkmen gas for Gazprom amounts to $200-250 per 1,000 cu m. Although during the numerous meetings, Russian and Turkmen officials pledged their adherence to previously reached agreements

10 See: [http://www.rosbalt.ru/2010/12/13/800006.html]. 11 See: [http://www.turkmenistan.ru/ru/articles/35358.html]. 12 See: [http://www.capital.trendaz.com], 27 November, 2010. 182 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 on cooperation in the fuel and energy sphere, Russia made it clear that due to the current situation in the Western gas consumption market there was no point in hoping for an increase in import volumes. The fate of the Caspian pipeline has become directly dependent on the European gas situation, prompting the sides to postpone its implementation. The Russian side stated positively that trade relations would continue to be activated, in particular, Russian-Turkmen and Turkmen-Russian trade houses have been established in Moscow and Ashghabad, and Turkmen-Russian and Russian-Turkmen business councils have been actively working during the year. In 2010, the Russian-Turkmen Commission for Economic Cooperation continued to function. On the Russian side, the commission is headed by Russian Vice Premier Viktor Zubkov, and on the Turkmen side, by deputy chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers, Turkmen Minister of For- eign Affairs Rashid Meredov. In 2010, more than 120 joint projects and contracts were implemented in Turkmenistan for a total of around $1 billion, including with the participation of such Russian companies as Silovye mashiny, KAMAZ, Itera, and Mobilnye telesistemy. A total of 138 Russian-Turkmen joint ventures are operating in the Turkmen market. On 2 November, during a sitting of the intergovernmental Rus- sian-Turkmen Commission on Economic Cooperation, documents were signed that will make it possible to begin full-scale international rail and ferry travel between the ports of Makhachkala and Turk- menbashi.13 The sides examined the possibility of organizing deliveries of agricultural technology to Turkmenistan by incorporating the potential of Russia’s Rosagrolizing Company. Viktor Zubkov highly appraised the positive dynamics of cooperation in education and science. In 2010, the number of sti- pends granted to Turkmenistan for study in Russian higher educational institutions increased from 275 to 317. During the commission’s work, the sides agreed on the need to develop tourist relations between the countries, which might help to alleviate the tough visa regime. Nevertheless, despite the fact that over the past few years a positive trend has been designated in bilateral economic trade, humanitarian, and cultural relations between the two countries, observers note signs of cooperation curtailment. The decrease in export of Russian gas to Europe, accompanied by the worsening of the financial state of Russian energy companies (including Gazprom), the halt in gas purchases in Turkmenistan, and Turkmenistan’s active steps to diversify its foreign relations are all ultimately undermining Russia’s position in Turkmenistan. The situation with the MTS Company is a pertinent case in point. On 21 December, the Turkmen side revoked the license of Russia’s MTS mobile phone operator, which had been successfully working in the country for five years. MTS had more than two million customers in Turkmenistan. The reason for this step, according to unofficial data, was the desire of the Turkmen side to obtain a larger share in the business (51% of the shares) and revise the profit redistribution conditions. Prior to this, management had been entirely in the hands of MTS-Barash Communications, although a representative of the Turkmen side was also one of the managers. In so doing, profit was distributed not in correlation with the share of the owners, but under a separate agreement, according to which the Turkmen side received 30-40 percent. In addition to MTS, a national provider—Altyn Asyr—operates in Turkmenistan, with a clien- tele of around only 20,000 due to the poor quality of communication and underdevelopment of the service complex. Curtailment of the mobile operator’s activity right before New Year came as a very unpleasant surprise for many Turkmen and provoked stampedes at Altyn Asyr’s offices. But the national mobile phone operator does not provide services beyond the country. Altyn Asyr users can only send and receive text messages within the country, international text messages and calls are off limits. It is impossible to call or send messages beyond Turkmenistan, the company does not have a roaming contract with any mobile phone company in the world.

13 See: [http://ïðàâèòåëüñòâî.ðô/docs/12817/]. 183 Volume 12 Issue 2 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Conclusion

The situation with the Russian MTS company is very indicative for the investment climate in the country, which is characterized by the lack of clear regulations and high risks. As during the time of Saparmurat Niyazov, the Turkmen leadership has a very selective approach to choosing its partners. Business can usually only be carried out in the country under personal agreements with high-ranking officials. This is related primarily to the fact that the main sectors of the economy, industry, construction, and agriculture are kept under strict government control. According to the economic freedom index popular in the West prepared by the Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal, Turkmenistan ranked 171 out of 179 countries and was recognized as “mostly unfree.”14 On the whole, 2010, a roundup year of the first decade of the 21st century, was successful for Turkmenistan. But the energy vector of the economy and dependence on the fluctuations in the market situation created by Turkmen gas consumers make the overall socioeconomic situation very vulnerable and require constant efforts from the country’s leadership aimed at looking for new approaches to the rapidly changing energy dialog. In these conditions, the Turkmen leadership will have to resolutely defend its national interests while adapting to the new challenges.

14 See: [http://gtmarket.ru/news/state/2010/01/21/2487].

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