The Enthusiastic Claims of Some Aircraft Carrier Proponents Frequently Defy Reality
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
The enthusiastic claims of some aircraft carrier proponents frequently defy reality. The Carrier Myth n the 1990s, American aircraft By Rebecca Grant I carriers have been busier than ever, engaging mostly in “presence” op- erations and responses to local crises and flare-ups. “If you don’t have that forward deployed presence, you have less of a voice, less of an influence,” observed Defense Secretary William S. Cohen. From an operational perspective, the big-deck aircraft carrier no longer functions mainly as guardian of the high seas. Rather, observed British defense analyst Lawrence Freedman, the carrier has become “most valuable” as a “mo- bile air base.” Since Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the Navy has put its air wings through a major transformation, retiring older, hard-to-maintain aircraft such as the A-6 Intruder and modernizing its F-14 Tomcats and F/A-18C Hornets to carry precision munitions. The carriers have proven their value, but the claims of some carrier propo- nents frequently defy reality. Carrier In official statements, the Navy generate up to four sorties per strike effectiveness, though significant, has claims that “the carrier battle group, aircraft per day if the warship and been inflated to mythic proportions. operating in international waters, does its air wing shift into a surge mode. Dramatic film footage of carrier- not need the permission of host coun- This claim gives rise to the notion based aircraft being catapulted into the tries for landing or overflight rights.” that advanced stealth aircraft might skies frequently dominates televised They can operate independently and not be necessary, because the carri- coverage of periodic US crises with present “a unique range of options” to ers manage to get by without them. Iraq, even though that image does not the President, the service adds. The carrier myth has flourished in reflect actual composition of the joint budget-conscious Washington. Senior US force in the region. In early 1998, Going to Extremes officers are guarded in their remarks, Rear Adm. John B. Nath man, com- In its most extreme form, the but the defense press often picks up and mander of Task Force 50 aboard USS myth contains a declaration that air- amplifies backstage debates on issues Nimitz in the Gulf, actually declared, craft carriers can operate effectively such as the relative effectiveness of “I attribute the cessation of Iraqi no- without access to land bases, carry carriers and bombers, forward pres- fly zone violations to our presence” out sustained strikes against targets ence, life cycle costs, and the relative in the area. several hundred miles inland, and merits of new fighter aircraft. Carrier 26 AIR FORCE Magazine / March 1999 US Navy photo by PH2 Christopher Hollaway The Carrier Myth proponents sometimes trash Air Force called for carriers to strike an assertive, carriers. Moreover, because the carri- airpower. forward-based stance in key waters ers were expected to face attack from In the past decade, carrier air wings around the globe, where they would waves of Soviet Backfire bombers and have become more capable, fueling be poised to go immediately on the cruise missiles, the Navy embarked higher demand for carriers in joint offensive against Soviet targets and on a buildup of Ticonderoga–class operations. Even so, the 1990s have attack Soviet warships. The idea was Aegis air defense cruisers and Arleigh shown that the big-deck carrier is a that, in a war, the Soviet fleet would be Burke–class destroyers to handle air- specialized airpower asset, not a self- pinned down defending its own shores borne threats. This multibillion dollar sufficient substitute for land-based and sea approaches and thus unable expansion was deemed necessary in airpower. Getting to the heart of what to make trouble for US warships in the face of a massive challenge from carriers can actually do requires an the open ocean, the control of which Soviet naval forces. Navy officials said honest assessment of their strengths would be vital to the resupply of allies the 15-carrier force was the minimum and weaknesses as airpower assets in in Europe and East Asia. required to meet demands of forward joint operations. The new strategy caused an increase, positioning and independent offensive The Navy’s Maritime Strategy, for- from 12 to 15, of the number of de- operations in the Pacific, Atlantic, and mally introduced in the early 1980s, ployable groups built around big-deck Mediterranean. AIR FORCE Magazine / March 1999 27 Then, however, came the collapse of erate Force in Bosnia in 1995, nearly proved, and carriers undeniably have the Soviet Union and, with it, the rapid all of its strike sorties were carried out been busy meeting on-station require- demise of the once fearsome Soviet by precision-weapon-capable F/A-18s. ments in the Med and Gulf and showing fleet. The decline has continued in the The deck mix had changed, too. The force in events like the Taiwan Strait era of the Russian Federation. A-6s were gone, leaving 14 F-14s and crisis of 1996. Yet claims of sustainable 37 F/A-18s in the wing. carrier firepower and high sortie rates Doctrinal Disaster Along the way, forward presence re- were unproven. A carrier’s ability to Of equal significance was Operation quirements replaced warfighting require- pro ject sustained firepower depended Desert Storm—a doctrinal disaster for ments as the major factor in the sizing on generating numerous sorties, and the Navy. One who makes that point of the carrier force. Former Secretary claims for high sortie rates are key to is Adm. William A. Owens, the now- of Defense Les Aspin in 1993 said, “If the carrier myth. retired former vice chairman of the we base our carrier needs solely on the Several mid-1990s operations in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Owens stated: regional threats, we could end up with Balkans provided real-world tests of “Little in Desert Storm supported the fewer than we need to maintain a strong carrier striking power in a littoral envi- Maritime Strategy’s assumptions and carrier battle group presence around ronment. Beginning in April 1993, US implications. No opposing naval forces the world.” naval aviators joined with Air Force and challenged us. No waves of enemy Aspin’s Bottom–Up Review of 1993 NATO allies to enforce a UN–mandated aircraft ever attacked the carriers. No authorized 11 active and one reserve no-fly zone over Bosnia. Six carrier submarines threatened the flow of men training carrier, but Cohen’s Quadren- battle groups eventually took a turn on and materiel across the oceans. The fleet nial Defense Review returned to a re- station in the Adriatic from early 1993 was never forced to fight the open-ocean quirement for 12 active carriers. Even through December 1995. battles the Navy had been preparing for with the increase, then–Vice Adm. Bosnian airspace was only about 100 during the preceding 20 years.” Donald L. Pilling claimed, “With 12 miles from the typical carrier launch For carrier advocates, Desert Storm carriers, we can barely meet our overseas site. Even with a benign environment constituted a wake-up call. For example, commitments.” from which to launch, the Navy gen- they realized that no naval aircraft was He maintained 12 carriers couldn’t erated only 8,290 sorties, about 10 able to drop autonomously designated provide 100 percent coverage of the percent of the NATO total. The total laser-guided bombs. In addition, a report Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, and west- was exceeded by both the French air by the Center for Naval Analyses in ern Pacific. Covering all three regions force (12,502 sorties) and the Royal Alexandria, Va., pointed out that carrier full-time “takes 14 or 15 carriers,” Air Force (10,300 sorties) during the aircraft flew just 6,297 sorties over land according to Pilling. same period. For its part, USAF flew to drop bombs, working out to only about To compensate, the Navy began to 24,153 sorties, 31 percent of NATO’s 24 sorties per day per carrier. “gap” (that is, leave carrier-less) the total production. The experiences of USS Theodore Med for a few months each year, with The limits on littoral operations were Roosevelt, CVN-71, were representa- occasional gaps in the Persian Gulf. again evident in NATO’s first actual tive. CVN-71 arrived on station near Maintaining two carriers on station at use of military power—Operation Qatar with 20 F/A-18 multirole fight- any hub—for example, during a crisis Deliberate Force. Over two weeks in ers, 18 A-6 medium bombers, and 18 with Iraq—strained the entire fleet, August and September 1995, NATO F-14 fleet defense interceptors. Over disrupting everything from deployment aircraft conducted a campaign to 43 days of the war, the F/A-18s aver- cycles to ammunition allotments. defend safe areas and degrade Bos- aged only 1.28 sorties per aircraft per nian Serb military effectiveness by day. Roosevelt “surged” during a brief Starring Role striking targets around Sarajevo and ground war in late February 1991. The By the mid-1990s, carriers had the throughout Serb–controlled territory result: an average of 2.03 sorties per starring role in a new littoral strategy. in northwest Bosnia. aircraft per day. The air wings could generate more US naval aviators now had precision After Desert Storm, the Navy quickly firepower, and the “requirement” for guided weapons, a coordination cell in recognized that it was time for new think- presence was firmly embedded in Pen- the Combined Air Operations Center, ing. The chief of naval operations, Adm.