The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy
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The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy In cooperation with M. BRAINARD, Frankfurt • R. BRUZINA, Kentucky J. DRUMMOND, New York • A. MICKUNAS, Ohio T. SEEBOHM, Bonn • T. SHEEHAN, Stanford edited by BURT HOPKINS STEVEN CROWELL QQ IV - 2004 The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy General Editors Burt Hopkins, Seattle University Steven Crowell, Rice University Contributing Editors Marcus Brainard, Frankfurt/Main, Germany Ronald Bruzina, University o f Kentucky John J. Drummond, Fordham University Algis Mickunas, Ohio University Thomas Seebohm, Bonn, G erm any Thomas Sheehan, Stanford University Consulting Editors Pierre Adler, New York, New York Patrick Burke,Seattle University Damian Byers, Sydney, Australia Richard Cobb-Stevens, Boston College Natalie Depraz, University o f Paris IV (Sorbonne) John Drabinski, Grand Valley State U niversity R. O. Elveton, Carleton College Parvis Emad, La Crosse, Wisconsin Lester Embree, Florida Atlantic University Kathleen Haney, University o f Houston, Downtown James G. Hart, Indiana University Patrick Heelan, S.J., Georgetown University Friedrich Wilhelm von Herrmann, University o f Freiburg, Germany Nam-In Lee, Seoul National University, Korea Christian Lotz, U niversity o f Kansas James Mensch, St. Francis Xavier University, Canada Dermot Moran, University College, Dublin, Ireland Harry Reeder, U niversity o f Texas, A rlington James Risser, Seattle University Hans Ruin, Sodertorn University College, Sweden Karl Schuhmannt, University o f Utrecht, Netherlands Marylou Sena, Seattle University Nicolas de Warren, Wellesley College Olav K.Wiegand, University o f Mainz, Germany Edith Wyschogrod, Rice University Dan Zahavi, Copenhagen, Denmark Articles appearing in this journal are indexed in the Philosopher's Index. Copyright ®2004 by Taylor & Francis ISSN 1533-7472 ISBN 13: 978-0-9701679-4-1 (pbk) All rights reserved. No part of the material protected by this copyright may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, or by any infor mation storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the Publisher. Aim and Scope:The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy will provide an an nual international forum for phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy in the spirit of Edmund Husserl’s groundbreaking work and the extension thereof in the phenomenological tradition broadly con ceived. The editors welcome the submission of manuscripts containing original research in phenomenolo gy and phenomenological philosophy, contributions to contemporary issues and controversies, critical and interpretative studies of major phenomenological figures, investigations on the relation of phenomenolo gy and phenomenological philosophy to the natural and human sciences, and historical studies and docu ments pertaining to phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. Translations of classic and contemporary phenomenological texts are also welcome, though translators should make arrangements with the editors in advance. First published 2004 by Noesis Press Published 2015 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon 0X 14 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Groupy an informa business This page intentionally left blank Contents /. Essays RUDOLF BERNET HusserPs Transcendental Idealism Revisited 1 IAN ANGUS In Praise of Fire: Responsibility, Manifestation, Polemos, Circumspection 21 DIETER LOHMAR The Transition of the Principle of Excluded Middle from a Principle of Logic to an Axiom: HusserPs Hesitant Revisionism in Logic 53 TORSTEN PIETREK A Reconstruction of Phenomenological Method for Metaethics 69 RENAUD BARBARAS Sensing and Creating: Phenomenology and the Unity of Aesthetics 109 CHRISTIAN LOTZ Recollection, Mourning, and the Absolute Past: On Husserl, Freud, and Derrida 121 KARLHEINZ RUHSTORFER Adieu: Derrida's God and the Beginning of Thought 143 ROSEMARY R. P. LERNER Husserl versus Neo-Kantianism Revisited: On Skepticism, Foundationalism, and Intuition 173 SEBASTIAN LUFT A Hermeneutic Phenomenology of Subjective and Objective Spirit: Husserl, Natorp, and Cassirer 209 V HERIBERT BOEDER Truth in the First Epoch of Philosophy 249 MARCUS BRAINARD Epoché and Epoch in Logotectonic Thought 263 II. Texts and Documents EDMUND HUSSERL Tobacco-logisches / 274 Tobaccology 275 MARK VAN ATTEN AND KARL SCHUHMANN"** Introduction: Johannes Daubert's Transcript of Husserl's Mathematical- Philosophical Exercises (Summer Semester 1905) 284 JOHANNES DAUBERT Notizen zu Husserls Mathematisch-philosophischen Ubungen vom SS 1905/ 288 Notes from Husserl's Mathematical-Philosophical Exercises, Summer Semester 1905 289 LESTER EMBREE Introduction: Dorion Cairns's Review of Eugen Fink's "The Problem of Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology" 319 DORION CAIRNS Review of Eugen Fink's "The Problem of Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology" 323 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS 341 vi Husserl’s Transcendental Idealism Revisited Rudolf Bernet Husserl-Archives, Leuven It is widely known that Ideas I,1 appearing in 1913, was the first publica- tion in which Husserl explicitly argued in favor of a phenomenological ide- alism. It is also well known that this standpoint immediately incited dispute as well as astonishment, with the controversy surrounding it still alive today. The surprise of the students and first readers, as well as the fact that Ideas I never uses the term ‘idealism’ by name to characterize the nature of tran- scendental phenomenology, managed to make it seem as if it came about as a result of a sudden or at least hastily made about-face on Husserl’s part, and not through a decision that had been extensively reflected upon. Thanks to a recently published volume of Husserliana which compiles the principal texts by Husserl on transcendental idealism,2 we can take account of how the Husserlian position concerning phenomenological idealism had, for the most part, already been established by 1908. Likewise, the famous “Nachwort” to Ideas I written in 19303 clearly shows that Husserl maintained his idealism up until the end of his days—all the while insisting that Ideas I had gone astray in suggesting that such a form of idealism coincided with a solipsistic conception of transcendental subjectivity. —————— * Translated from the French by Basil Vassilicos. 1. Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie, ed. Karl Schuh- mann, Husserliana III/1 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976); English translation: Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Intro- duction to a Pure Phenomenology, trans. F. Kersten (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1982); henceforth cited as Ideas I. 2. Edmund Husserl, Transzendentaler Idealismus. Texte aus dem Nachlaß (1908–1921), ed. Robin Rollinger and Rochus Sowa, Husserliana XXXVI (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003). Following the initial reference, all volumes from Husserliana are cited as Hua with volume and page references. 3. Edmund Husserl, “Epilogue,” in Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989), 405–30. The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy IV (2004): 1–20 ISSN 1533–7472 • ISBN 0-9701679-4-6 2 RUDOLF BERNET The phenomenological idealism of Ideas I, such as it is set out in its “Fun- damental Phenomenological Consideration,” is the outcome of a phenomeno- logical investigation concerning the conditions of the possibility of authentic knowledge of objective reality. Because the establishment of these conditions of possibility is for Husserl a matter of an examination of the manner in which objective reality is intuitively given to consciousness, rather than any sort of in- quiry into the logical nature of reason, the analysis of “external” perception comes to play a predominant role therein. Already this perception (and not only the judgment based on it), involves a “positing” (Setzung) of the reality of things and the world. Moreover, it is incumbent on this form of perception— inasmuch as it is the experience of a givenness of the thing itself, “in the flesh” (leibhaft)—to justify belief in the existence of the world. However, such a legit- imization of objective reality by perceptual consciousness can only avoid the contradictions of psychologism on the express condition that this conscious- ness, serving as the epistemological foundation for the existence of objective re- ality, does not itself belong to that reality. This is why the task of a “phenome- nological reduction” is to purify perceptual consciousness of any apperception as an empirical reality before perceptual consciousness can be given the task of validating or “constituting” the existence of a transcendent empirical reality. For a phenomenology that, as a “critique of knowledge,” can only hold the positing of the existence of an objective reality to be legitimate to the ex- tent that, at the same time, this existence is testified to in “pure” consciousness in the form of an intuitive phenomenon, the meaning of the existence of the world necessarily depends on transcendental consciousness. For the most part, phenomenological idealism is nothing other than the solemn proclamation of such a dependence of the truth-value of the positing of the existence