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MOSE (EXPERIMENTAL ELECTROMECHANICAL MODULE; ITALIAN: MODULO SPERIMENTALE ELETTROMECCANICO) Overview / summary of the initiative

Title: MoSE (Experimental Electromechanical Module; Italian: MOdulo Sperimentale Elettromeccanico)

Country: ( region)

Thematic area: Security,

Objective(s): 1. To protect from flooding the city of and the Venetian , with its towns, villages and inhabitants along with its iconic historic, artistic and environmental heritage. 2. To contribute to the socio-economic growth of the area and hence to the development of the port and related activities. 3. To guarantee the existing and future port activities inside the Lagoon in its various specificities of , Cavallino and Venice. Timeline: The launch of the project started in 1973, when for the first time the Italian Government took in consideration the realisation of mechanic structures to prevent Venice from flooding. 2003 (start of the works)-2019 (estimation) Scale of the initiative: EUR 5.493 million (2014 estimation) Scope of the initiative • Focused on new knowledge creation (basic research, TRLs 1-4): TO A CERTAIN EXTENT; the development and following implementation of the MoSE project have focused on knowledge creation and prototypes development since the 1980s. However, this is useful to the construction at the three of the Venice lagoon and mobile barriers. • Focused on knowledge application (applied research, TRLs 5-9): YES; the MoSE project aims to apply the developed technological solutions and to demonstrate its validity. Source of funding (public/private/public-private): Public funding: since 2003 (year of start of the works) the national government has been the financial promoter of the MoSE. The Law 443 of 2001, is the legislative instrument that establishes procedures and methods of financing for the realization of the great strategic infrastructures in Italy for the decade from 2002 to 2013, among which the MoSE project. Since 2003, other funds have been allocated to the Consortium Venezia Nuova. The MoSE consortium also relies on lending from credit institutions (private banks) and the European Investment Bank (EIB)1. Granularity of the initiative (initiative, policy approach) The MOSE is a project. Source (webpage) http://www.camera.it/temiap/temi16/2011scheda[064].pdf

Articles: http://www.lastampa.it/2017/10/11/scienza/ambiente/inchiesta/venezia-e-il-suo-mose-storia-di-un-fallimento- mfwrL5oVafcx0pBZf1w70K/pagina.html http://www.lastampa.it/2017/10/12/esteri/lastampa-in-english/venice-and-mose-story-of-a-failure- 2XRaxsCgFhcmKEXidalyxJ/pagina.html http://www.ilpost.it/2014/06/18/mose/

Reports https://www.mosevenezia.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/mose-e-salvaguardia.pdf+

Videos L'evoluzione morfologica della laguna di Venezia (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tIQ8tfgBpCI&t=790s) “In alto mare”, Report, RaiTre, 22/05/2017 (http://www.report.rai.it/dl/Report/puntata/ContentItem-c36818ca-3cee- 4b5b-8106-127567bc70a0.html)

Brief description of the initiative:

1 http://www.eib.org/about/accountability/complaints/cases/mose-venice.htm The MoSE is an integrated defence system consisting of a series of swing-floating fan winding pads capable of isolating the from the during dangerous high events (between 110 cm and 3 meters). The system does not obstruct navigation, does not interfere with port activities and does not alter the landscape. These works are geared to other complementary interventions such as strengthening the coasts, rising shores and pavements and retraining the lagoon, which today due to floods and morphological degradation, is progressively descending to the sea and the ground level is declining. In parallel with the construction of MOSE, the Venice Water Authority and Venice Local Authority are raising quaysides and paving in the city in order to protect built-up areas in the lagoon from medium high (below 110 centimetres (43 in), the height at which the mobile barriers will come into operation). Important activities are also underway to redress pollution in the industrial area of Porto Marghera, at the edge of the central lagoon. Construction began simultaneously in 2003 at all three lagoon inlets, and as of December 2016, more than 87% of the project has been completed. The infrastructural megaproject in the lagoon around Venice, is nearing its completion after almost 15 years of building. I: Background, origin, mission and ambition

Ia: Origin Floods have caused damage since ancient times and have become ever more frequent and intense as a result of the combined effect of the rise in sea level and the drop-in land level caused by natural and man-induced phenomena. Today, towns and villages in the lagoon are an average of 23 centimetres (9.1 in) lower with respect to the water level than at the beginning of the 1900s and each year, thousands of floods cause serious problems for the inhabitants as well as deterioration of architecture, urban structures and the ecosystem. Over the entire lagoon area, there is also a constant risk of an extreme catastrophic event such as that of 4 November 1966 when a tide of 194 centimetres above sea level submerged Venice, Chioggia and the other built-up areas. Floods effects are exacerbated due to greater erosion by the sea caused by human interventions to facilitate port activities (e.g. through the construction of and artificial ); establishment of the industrial Porto Marghera area; and increased wash from motorized boats, which all aggravate erosion of morphological structures and the foundations of quaysides and buildings. In the future, the high-water phenomenon may be further aggravated by the predicted rise in sea level as a result of global warming. Following the flood of 4 November 1966 when Venice, Chioggia and the other built-up areas in the lagoon were submerged by a tide of 194 centimetres (76 in), the first Special Law for Venice (Law 171/73) declared the problem of safeguarding the city to be of "priority national interest". This marked the beginning of a long legislative and technical process to guarantee Venice and the lagoon an effective sea defence system. In 1984, due to the persistence of Venice lagoon flooding problems, the government – on the basis of a strong political consensus on this matter2 - enacted a second Special Law for Venice (Law 789/84). The new law, besides establishing the “Comitatone” (Italian: Comitato di indirizzo, coordinamento e controllo; chaired by the Italian head of government and composed (all with equal vote weight) by several Ministers, the Governor of the Veneto Region, the Mayors of Venice and Chioggia and two other mayors of the municipalities concerned) entrusted to the Consorzio Venezia Nuova (CVN, New Venice Consortium) the share of the project under the responsibility of the State. The CVN is the consortium of local and national enterprises in the construction and engineering sector (the tendering process was not open to foreign consortia) in charge of designing and implementing a safeguarding project for Venice. To the Venetian Water Authority (ministerial body, of the Ministry for Infrastructures), the role of controller of the budget allocated to the consortium and the achievement of the objectives. The CVN presented a complex system of interventions to safeguard Venice (the REA "Riequilibrio E Ambiente", "Rebalancing and the Environment" Project), which included mobile barriers at the inlets to regulate tides in the lagoon. In this context, between 1988 and 1992, experiments were carried out on a prototype gate (MOdulo Sperimentale Elettromeccanico, hence the name MOSE) and in 1989, a conceptual design for the mobile barriers was drawn up. This was completed in 1992 and subsequently approved by the Higher Council of Public Works then subjected to an Environmental Impact Assessment procedure and further developed as requested by the Comitatone. In 2002 the final design was presented and on 3 April 2003, the Comitatone gave the go-ahead for its implementation. In 2003 construction sites opened at the three lagoon inlets of Lido, and Chioggia. Regarding the name “MoSE”: before the acronym was used to describe the entire flood protection system, MOSE referred to the 1:1 scale prototype of a gate that had been tested between 1988 and 1992 at the Lido . The name also holds a secondary meaning: "MOSE" alludes to the biblical character Moses ("Mosè" in Italian), who is remembered for parting the Red Sea. After the official start of the works on the 14th May 2003, other milestones of the project are: - 2003: Major allocation of funds from the central government with the Law 443/2001, aimed to define and fund the main infrastructures for the future of the country; the law also established a new governance structure, according to which the main decisions for the safeguard of the Venetian lagoon should be taken

2 https://www.mosevenezia.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/mose-e-salvaguardia.pdf with the agreement of the local municipalities and the Veneto region: the body identified as responsible for mediating among the parties is the CIPE (Inter-ministerial committee for the economic planning); - 2013: beginning of the trials on the MoSE project (for tax evasion, unlawful funding and bribes), with the detention of several public officials (among whom the former Minister for Infrastructures and the Mayor of the City of Venice at that time), arrest warrants for more than 100 people and consequent start of the compulsory administration; - 2016: the competences of the Venice Water Authority (renamed Provveditorato alle Opere pubbliche del Triveneto; Italian: Agency to the Public Works of the Northeast of Italy) are conferred to the newly established Metropolitan city of Venice (new administrative layer established in 2014); Over the last years the length of the project has been repeatedly extended (especially due to the corruption and tax evasion trials since 2013), and the budget foreseen increased. Ib: Initiator The Italian central government, the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport; with the support of local authorities (Region and municipalities). Ic: Mission and ambition The main mission of the MoSE project is to protect Venice and of the other inhabited areas of the lagoon from flooding by high tide3s as well as sea level rise (up to 60 cm) due to climate change. The objectives can be summed up as follows: ▪ construction of mobile barriers at the lagoon inlets, enabling the temporary separation of lagoon and sea during events of high water level in the Adriatic; ▪ take other interventions of environmental and morphological restoration. To achieve these objectives, the Ministry for Infrastructure and Transport (Venice Water Authority office) has designed an integrated system of interventions: ▪ mobile barriers at the lagoon inlets, to come into operation only in case of high water (enabling temporary separation of lagoon and Adriatic Sea), ▪ local defence measures (mainly increasing the height of low-lying embankments and urban pavements), ▪ reinforcement of coastal protection along the barrier islands (e.g. Lido- island), ▪ morphological restoration of intertidal lagoon habitats. The culmination of the project is still ongoing: June 2020 is indicated as the new term for the end of the construction 4 and the start of management of the new plants, with the entry into force in December 2021 . Id: Decision making process In the late 1960s, the central Italian government defined floods in the Venetian lagoon as a matter of "pre-eminent national interest” and in the following decades issued both ordinary and special laws, linking the physical protection of the lagoon settlements against flooding to environmental restoration and socio-economic development. The government set the objectives to target, with the contribution of the input of the local authorities (municipalities and region). The CVN (Consorzio Venezia Nuova, English: New Venice Committee; established with the “Second special Law for Venice”, of 1984) is the body concessionary of the Ministry for Infrastructure and Transport, Venice Water Authority office: it is formed by the enterprises working at the MoSE project and is the responsible for the decision making for the implementation of the project. The CVN operates according to a ministerial General Plan of Interventions and is represented by the " Steering, coordination and control committee", established by prefectural provision to manage the communication and relation between the associated companies and the Directors on the MoSE project5. The Steering, coordination and control committee (also called “Comitatone”, Italian: Comitato di indirizzo, coordinamento e controllo, also established with Law 798/1984) expresses suggestions for a possible different allocation of the total authorized allocation in relation to particular needs connected with the implementation of the individual interventions6. The Committee, which is chaired by the Italian head of government, is composed (all with equal vote weight) by several Ministers (of Public Works, of Cultural and Environmental Heritage, of the Mercantile Marine, of the Environment, of Scientific Research), the Governor of the Veneto Region, the Mayors of Venice and Chioggia and two other mayors of the municipalities concerned. The Water Management Authority ( di Venezia) – which has been formally replaced by the Agency to the Public Works of the Northeast of Italy; Italian: Provveditorato alle Opere pubbliche del Triveneto) is a decentralized body of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport responsible for the management and hydraulic

3 Exceptional tide peaks occur periodically in the northern Adriatic Sea, mainly between autumn and spring, when the astronomical tides are reinforced by the prevailing Bora and Scirocco seasonal winds that hamper the usual reflux. 4 http://nuovavenezia.gelocal.it/venezia/cronaca/2017/03/29/news/nuovo-rinvio-per-il-mose-in-funzione-soltanto-all-inizio-del- 2022-1.15110185 5 https://www.mosevenezia.eu/consorzio-venezia-nuova/ 6 http://www.camera.it/temiap/2014/06/26/OCD177-344.pdf protection of the Venice Lagoon7. It has developed a specific Monitoring Plan which includes, in addition to the continuation of monitoring during the construction phase, the monitoring of the interventions and investments8. The “Comitatone” is given technical support by the Pan Office (Italian: Ufficio di Piano, established in 2004) with the role of providing a comprehensive view of the Venetian lagoon safeguard activities and of the MoSE project implementation, as well as their constant verification and evaluation. After the start of the compulsory administration, the CVN has been at first managed by commissioners and technical directors. Finally, in 2017, the central government has entrusted the head of the Agency to the Public Works of the Northeast of Italy as only commissioner for the completion of the MoSE project: the central government has then 9 taken de facto full control over the project . Ie: Linkage to other governance levels The first governance of the MoSE project (before the start of the compulsory administration by central governmental bodies) was strictly linked to: ▪ the central government: the Prime minister and several ministers are part of the Steering, coordination and control committee (the so-called “Comitatone”), as well as the representative of the Venice Water Authority (body of the Ministry of environment), ▪ regional and local (municipal) authorities: representative of the Veneto region was part of the Steering, coordination and control committee (the so-called “Comitatone”), as well as representatives of the municipalities of the lagoon area (Venice and Chioggia). The second governance of the MoSE project (after the start of the compulsory administration by central governmental bodies) was still strictly linked to the central government and the regional and local (municipal) authorities, whose representatives were member of the Steering, coordination and control committee (the so-called “Comitatone”). The influence of the central government, however, increased: the commissioners and technical directors have been appointed by the Prefect of Rome (with the agreement of the Interior Ministry – Home Office). The current governance (since 2017) is strictly linked to the central government, as the unique commissioner to the MoSE project is now the head of the Agency to the Public Works of the Northeast of Italy (Italian: Provveditorato alle Opere pubbliche del Triveneto), which is a position dependent from the Ministry for Infrastructure. If: Geographical scope Local level: City of Venice Lagoon, Italy. Ig: Time span The time span of the initiative changed repeatedly: started in 2003, the end of the works is fixed for the 31st December 2021 (3 years later than last official rescheduling). Due to the problems faced by the Consortium in the implementation of the project (especially for the mechanic dams, which are already subject to usury), new delays are expected. II: Formation IIa: Driving forces Key actors: ▪ The Italian central government, the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport; ▪ Consorzio Venezia Nuova (The Consortium New Venice): is the authority responsible for the work in trust of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport – Venice Water Authority (previously named Ministry of Public Works); ▪ The Comitatone is the body for policy, coordination and control of the objectives established by the special legislation issued for Venice and the lagoon; ▪ Municipalities of Venice and of Chioggia; ▪ Important Italian construction companies, cooperatives and local businesses10, which are members of the CVN: particularly influence as they established themselves as sole contractor and beneficiary of public funds since the beginning of the 1980s (with Law 798/84), until the tails on tax evasion and bribery (started in 2013). Contextual factors/drivers: ▪ Increase in number of dangerous tides and memory of the losses and economic backlash consequent to the 1966 disastrous tide11; ▪ Interest and initiative of the local government and enterprises to put in place a system to protect the Venetian lagoon and its activities;

7 https://www.google.be/search?ei=IT0xWvL4FcWagAaSvaiYCg&q=provveditorato+nordest+venezia+arsenale+comune +mav&oq=provveditorato+nordest+venezia+arsenale+comune+mav&gs_l=psy- ab.3..33i160k1l4.6483.8669.0.8801.4.4.0.0.0.0.99.387.4.4.0....0...1c.1.64.psy-ab..0.2.188....0.NEn1eV-csq4 8 http://sistemavenezia.regione.veneto.it/content/monitoraggi-mose 9 http://corrieredelveneto.corriere.it/veneto/cronaca/17_novembre_14/sara-stato-finire-mose-430d750a-c90a-11e7- 8a48-f3682c995302.shtml 10 http://nuovavenezia.gelocal.it/venezia/cronaca/2014/06/04/news/scheda-il-consorzio-venezia-nuova- concessionario-del-mose-1.9359429 11 http://www.comune.venezia.it/it/content/distribuzione-decennale-delle-alte-maree-110-cm ▪ Success of other similar projects in other European countries (e.g. Thames Barrier in the United Kingdom, Delta Plan in the Netherlands); IIb: Approach The approach is top-down, and closed to external participation. The MoSE project was designed and implemented by decision of the national authorities with the participation of the local authorities (Veneto region and municipalities). IIc: Citizen involvement The MoSE project has been widely communicated to the general public (especially, due to the controversies it arose). Citizens of the municipalities of the Venetian lagoon, the national audience, as well as the scientific community, has been informed to: ▪ Telematic means (e.g. website, videos, newsletters, etc.) ▪ Conferences, public meetings and workshops ▪ Guided tours at the construction fields However, citizens have not been directly involved in the design and implementation of the mean features of the MoSE project, apart from the fact of being educated to the biodiversity and environment of the Venetian lagoon. III: Technical and political feasibility IIIa: Technical feasibility assessment The technical feasibility of the initiative was done through studies: the ISPRA (Istituto superiore per la protezione e la ricerca ambientale; English: Higher Institute for Environmental Protection and Research) assessed the environmental impact of the project, while the CVN and the Minister for infrastructures commissioned technical assessment of the project. Mechanisms were put in place to assess the technical feasibility during the lifetime of the initiative, particularly after the increase in costs and the first technical problems surged. IIIb: Ex ante technical and risk assessment The CNR (National Research Council) in 1980 launched a public contest to collect ideas for Venice safeguard. ISPRA (Istituto Superiore per la Protezione e la Ricerca Ambientale) was identified as an independent institution, and validated and controlled the environmental monitoring activities, evaluated environmental data released, checked if environmental targets were met. Previously to the start of the MoSE (officially, in 2003), public authorities carried out some impact and risk assessment, as there were concerns related to the environmental and economic viability of the project. These were: ▪ Detailed and extensive investigation to identify effective solutions to solve the problem of high water; ▪ Implementation of agreements among several bodies to improve coordination and procedural efficiency; ▪ Involvement of international, independent experts to implement and validate environmental impact studies results. However, according to recent studies the impact assessment was limited to a specific sector and did not take into account the potential negative effect the functioning of the MoSE could cause to the port, an economic sector still particularly relevant to the city. Even though the MoSE has been projected so as to minimise the interruption of maritime traffic, the interference with port activities during the closing of the mobile barriers is unavoidable. As a consequence, the functioning of the MoSE induces additional costs to port activities. Besides the side effects on the economy of the Venetian area, there are evidenced of poor technical assessment. During last few years, with the completion of the first measures, several incidents have happened: an important structure collapsed at the first sea storm a few days after the test, the gate of the Malamocco basin not completed according to the masterplan, the distinguishing “swelling” box which broke when submerged at the bottom of the lagoon, the malfunctioning of the submerged joints of the gates. IIIc: Success factors Main technological breakthrough: rows of mobile gates installed at the Lido, Malamocco, and Chioggia inlets that are able to isolate the Venetian Lagoon temporarily from the Adriatic Sea during high tides, which allows to leave the lagoon accessible to boats. Other technological breakthroughs: At the Malamocco and Chioggia channels, locks systems (similar to those of the Panama ) to allow boats to cross the MoSE project’s moving dams when operating, as there would be difference in height between the sea and the lagoon. IIId: Incentives The incentives and resource allocation to engage stakeholders have not been defined. Societal involvement has been guaranteed in recent years through a well-structured communication strategy (e.g. workshops in schools). IIIe: Political and societal assessment Recent conservative government at a national level had a particular interest for the realization of large infrastructure investments (e.g. TAV project, Messina Bridge project, etc.), as proved by the fact that the MoSE project is one of the strategic infrastructure the central government heavily financed with the Legge Obbiettivo (English: Law Objectives) in 2001. Governments of coalitions composed of parties of the whole political spectrum (left and right parties, according to the Italian political system) were favourable to the MoSE project. However, left-wing local administrations and central governments have shown higher concern of the impact of the project on the environment. IIIf: Interim political and societal assessment The MoSE project has been currently object of political debate due to its critical issues; however, due to the continuous delays, the implementation and finalisation of the project are not link to any political cycle. Moreover, all central governments and local administrations have been – with different approaches - favourable to the project. The initiative was democratically legitimised: local residents of the municipalities of the Venetian lagoon, Veneto region and national government repeatedly voted pro-MoSE coalitions into power. IIIg: Financial risk assessment Financial risk assessment was made up-front; however, it did not prove having been sufficiently accurate. The CVN’s activities have been put under scrutiny and criticised for the high spending, until the beginning of the trails against some of its members (for tax evasion, bribery). The budget has repeatedly revised upwards and significantly increased. Concerning the port’s activities, recent studies – more accurate than those done in the past – have proved that these may be jeopardised by the MoSE operating. IV: Governance: organisation, management and coordination

IVa: Governance The Committee for Policy, Coordination and Control (the so called “Comitatone”) is designed to manage all measures for the safeguard of Venice. It is the body for policy, coordination and control of the objectives established by the special legislation issued for Venice and the lagoon (see Law no. 798/84). This Committee was made up of representatives of the competent authorities and institutions (Ministries of Infrastructure and Transport, Environment and Territorial Protection, Cultural Heritage and Activities, University Education and Scientific Research), the Chairman of the Water Authority, the Chairman of the Veneto Regional Authority, the mayors of Venice and Chioggia and Treporti-Cavallino Local Authority and two representatives of the other local authorities along the lagoon boundary). It is chaired by the President of the Council of Ministers. The secretary of the Committee is the President of the Venice Water Authority. The Comitato Venezia Nuova is the sole concessionary of the State for the implementaiton of the MoSE project. Competent for the proposition of technical solutions and their implementations, it has also been established by the special legislation issued for Venice and the lagoon (see Law no. 798/84). The Venice Water Authority was a decentralized organ of the Ministry of Infrastructures and Transport (formerly the Ministry of Public Works) established in 1907, directed by a president appointed by the Head of State after hearing the Council of Ministers. It was based in Venice and was responsible for the management, safety and protection of the hydraulic system in the North-eastern Italian regions. It had the role of control on the budget spending and object achievement of the MoSE project, on the CVN activities. It was suppressed by the central government in 2014 following investigations concerning the MoSE. Since 2014, the governance has profoundly changed: the commissioners and technical directors appointed by the central government have been directing the CVN. In 2017, the director of the Agency to the Public Works of the Northeast of Italy (Italian: Provveditorato alle Opere pubbliche del Triveneto; former Venice Water Authority) has become responsible for the direct supervision and management of the MoSE project. IVb: Progress monitoring The ISPRA (Istituto Superiore per la Protezione e la Ricerca Ambientale) was identified as an independent institution in charge of the environmental monitoring activities, evaluate environmental data released, check if environmental targets are met. The Committee for Policy, Coordination and Control (the so called “Comitatone”) was formally responsible for all measures for the safeguard of Venice. It is the body for policy, coordination and control of the objectives established by the special legislation (see Art. 4 of Law no. 798/84). The control system also included crossed audits and verifications implemented at different levels by a number of bodies: a) the High Council of Public Works (Ministry for Infrastructure and Transport), the Venice Water Authority Technical Committee (The Venice Water Authority), the Venice Water Authority Panel of Experts (The Venice Water Authority Safeguarding Dept.), and the Consorzio Venezia Nuova. Following the launch by the European Commission of the infringement procedure 2003/4762 for violation of the Community Directives 79/409/EEC ("Birds" directive) and the subsequent complementary delay 4763/2003 for the violation of Directives 79/409 / EEC and 92/43/EEC (Habitats Directive) within the realization of the MoSE project, the Venice Water Authority prepared a specific document called "Plan of compensation measures, conservation and environmental requalification”. The implementation of this plan aimed to fulfil the obligations under the Habitats Directive 92/43/EEC and the Birds Directive 2009/147/CE, which included both the continuation of monitoring during the construction phase of the work and the monitoring of compensation operations. The executor of the site monitoring activities, on behalf of the Venice Water Authority, is CORILA, a consortium made up of university institutes and research institutions, supervised by the Ministry of Education, University and Research. Consequently, in 2008, a Program Agreement was signed between the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Infrastructures and Transportation (Venice Water Authority) and the Veneto region, in which the Ministry of the environment and protection of the territory and the sea, in order to close the procedure of infringement 2003/4762, fulfils the function of guarantor of the proper conduct of monitoring and compliance with community rules, using ISPRA for monitoring the monitoring of construction sites and the compensation measures of the MoSE12. Subsequently, in 2009, with a specific Agreement between Ministry of the environment and protection of the territory and the sea, Water Authority of Venice and ISPRA, signed the mutual commitments were defined for the period of three years from the signing of the act, specifying the ISPRA related activities. Said Agreement was subsequently 13 extended until 31/12/2012. . IVc: Public-private involvement The first governance was a public and private matter, as the management of the implementation of the MoSE project involved private stakeholders (enterprises member of the CVN) and public representatives (from the central government and the local authorities). Following governances are more dependent from the public sphere, due to the direct involvement of commissioners and authorities appointed by the central government. IVd: Communication and dissemination The communication and dissemination for the public is well-developed14: ▪ Regular meetings (“Cantieri Aperti” Initiative) are held on the MOSE, with the presentation of the Venice Coastal and Environmental Protection Plan of its lagoon and technical visits to the Arsenale (dry docks and control rooms) and to the port mouths15; ▪ Workshops for primary, secondary, high schools and high schools of the City of Venice continue, where students are offered meetings, designed according to the age of the children, who have the aim of illustrating the MOSE and which are an opportunity for debate and analysis; ▪ Two information points open to the public with updated information on the system of interventions for environmental and coastal defence of Venice and its lagoon and on the progress of work in progress (one at the Arsenale Nord, and one in the heart of the city, in Rialto); ▪ To implement the exchange of information and know-how within the international technical-scientific community, the MOSE management organises networks and opportunities for meetings between research and training institutes, to identify solutions for the defence against the effects of climate change. V: Resources and budget needs/availability Va: Scale The budget estimated has been increasing over the years. 1989: 1.65 billion euro 2001: 1.91 billion euro (2002: 450 Meur are allocated for the start of the works) 2013: 4.987 billion euro 2014: 5.493 bullion euro It is not possible to quantify the human resources involved in the implementation of the project. Vb: Funding sources Public funds from the Italian Government, the European investment Bank (EIB) and the European Commission. Fixed investment of 5.493 million euros (agreed in 2005). The Venezia Nuova Consortium borrowed 800 million euro with the EIB and other credit institutions16 (which have been later on refunded). Vc: Allocation of the budget 2015: The MOSE project is estimated to cost €5.496 billion, up €1.3 billion from initial cost projections. The national governments have assigned to the safeguard of Venice, during the course of 30 years approximately (from Law no. 798 of 1984) almost 13 billion euros divided as follows: ▪ 55.1% to the State in concession (Consorzio Venezia Nuova); ▪ 17.9% at the City of Venice; ▪ 16.3% to the Veneto region; ▪ 2.5% to the Municipality of Chioggia; ▪ 2.4% to the State in direct administration (Venice Water Authority). The remaining part, 5.8% of the total, was distributed to 17 others subjects involved in safeguarding: three Ministries, the Province of Venice, the Municipality of Cavallino-Treporti, the two local universities, three port institutions and airports, three cultural bodies, three religious bodies, a scientific research consortium. VI: Policy mix and integral (‘holistic’) use to deploy mission-oriented R&I-initiatives

VIa: Policy mix Financial support for the development of the prototype and the project, from the central government. Also, loans for public financial institutions (i.e. the European Investment Bank).

12 In light of these determinations, the European Commission therefore decided to close the aforementioned infringement procedure during the meeting on 14 April 2009. 13 http://sistemavenezia.regione.veneto.it/content/monitoraggi-20092012 14 https://www.mosevenezia.eu/comunicare-il-mose/ 15 https://www.mosevenezia.eu/mose-cantieri-aperti-tutti-prenotati-i-posti-disponibili/ 16 https://www.mosevenezia.eu/i-finanziamenti-per-il-mose/ VIb: Engagement of citizens Citizens have been engaged only via public meetings, workshops and field visits to the construction sites. No direct engagement of citizens in the design and implementation of the project. VII: Embeddedness of and connectivity with related initiatives (regional, national, supranational, global) VIIa: Relationships/links/synergies to similar initiatives elsewhere Other initiatives similar to the MoSE project are: ▪ Thames Gates, in the United Kingdom; ▪ Delta Plan, in the Netherlands. VIIb: Links to UN Sustainable Development Goals No specific/direct link to the UN SDGs. VIII: SWOT analysis

VIIIa: Strengths ▪ The project would allow the port of Venice to continue being one of the most important in the western (as the lagoon would not be closed, as happens in the case of some of the dams built for the Delta Project); ▪ The project does not only focus on the construction of the dams, but it takes into consideration other complementary works; ▪ The project has a clear focus on the protection of the environment and biodiversity of the lagoon; ▪ The mission is easily communicable to the general public; VIIIb: Weaknesses ▪ Negative opinions off several institutions (later on overturned by legal means or ignored by the national or local authorities favourable to the project)17; ▪ Poor financial and environmental risk assessment; ▪ Absence of call for bids before the identification of the CVN as only concessionary of the State; ▪ Lack of real involvement of the public and civil society, as well as lack of sufficient involvement of expert groups (e.g. on the port activities, economists); ▪ The project does not avoid the high tide phenomenon which strikes the most emblematic parts of the City of Venice, such as Piazza San Marco, as the MoSE would be operating for exceptional tides only; ▪ Poor governance (as proved by the changes in the governance and that the central government took over it); ▪ The design and implementation of the project was very long; ▪ The technology used was based on out-of-date research; VIIIc: Opportunities ▪ The economy of the Veneto region and of the City of Venice continue to be ones of the highest of Italy and of the region; ▪ The safeguard of Venice and the Venetian lagoon continue to be one of the main interest for the national central government; ▪ The safeguard of Venice is under global scrutiny; VIIId: Threats ▪ Continuous increase of sea level, due to climate change and melting of the poles ice; ▪ Late 2000’s recessions and scarcity of funds; ▪ Flooding, wave motion, eustasy (a change of sea level throughout the world, caused typically by movements of parts of the earth's crust or melting of glaciers), land subsidence, erosion and environmental degradation18; VIIIe: Lessons learned It has been identified that collusion between the local (and also national) political and economic spheres has produced corruption, mismanagement of public funds and wrongdoing in the implementation of the project. The lack of a call for bids is an indication of evidence of collusion, resulting in the MoSE project being managed by enterprises without the capacities to complete the masterplan. Moreover, the negative opinions of several institutes and organisations have not been duly taken in consideration: alternative projects have not been subject to study and development, and not sufficient funds have been dedicated to the design of smaller-scale initiatives. The negatives effects on the environment and the local economy have already been assessed.

17 http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2014/06/04/news/mose_35_arresti_per_tangenti_anche_il_sindaco_di_venezia- 88004605/?ref=HREA-1 18 Science and engineering in the future of venice