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Ecology Letters, (2015) 18: 74–84 doi: 10.1111/ele.12392 LETTER The risk-return trade-off between solitary and eusocial

Abstract Feng Fu,1* Sarah D. Kocher2 and Social colonies can be seen as a distinct form of biological organisation because they func- Martin A. Nowak2,3,4 tion as superorganisms. Understanding how natural selection acts on the emergence and mainte- nance of these colonies remains a major question in evolutionary biology and ecology. Here, we explore this by using multi-type branching processes to calculate the basic reproductive ratios and the extinction probabilities for solitary vs. eusocial reproductive strategies. We find that eusociali- ty, albeit being hugely successful once established, is generally less stable than solitary reproduc- tion unless large demographic advantages of arise for small colony sizes. We also demonstrate how such demographic constraints can be overcome by the presence of ecological niches that strongly favour eusociality. Our results characterise the risk-return trade-offs between solitary and eusocial reproduction, and help to explain why eusociality is taxonomically rare: eusociality is a high-risk, high-reward strategy, whereas solitary reproduction is more conserva- tive.

Keywords Ecology and , eusociality, evolutionary dynamics, mathematical biology, social , stochastic process.

Ecology Letters (2015) 18: 74–84

There have been a number of attempts to identify some of INTRODUCTION the key ecological factors associated with the evolution of Eusocial behaviour occurs when individuals reduce their life- eusociality. Several precursors for the origins of eusociality time reproduction to help raise their siblings (Wilson 1971). have been proposed based on comparative analyses among Eusocial colonies comprise two castes: one or a few reproduc- social insect – primarily the feeding and defense of off- tive individuals and a (mostly) non-reproductive, worker spring within a (Andersson 1984). These behaviours are caste. These societies thus contain a reproductive division of also frequently associated with a subsocial life history, where labour where some individuals reproduce and others forage parents and offspring overlap and occupy the nest simulta- and provision the young (Holldobler} & Wilson 1990, 2009). neously (Michener 1974; Gadagkar 1990). Insect species that have reached this remarkable level of In contrast to the relatively few origins of eusociality, losses social complexity have proven to be vastly successful in nat- or reversions back to solitary behaviour appear to be much ure, and are thought to comprise nearly 50% of the world’s more common (a very rough estimate indicates a minimum of insect biomass (Wilson 1971). Despite the apparent success of nine losses within the – nearly twice the number of ori- this strategy, only 2% of described insect species are eusocial. gins; see Wcislo & Danforth 1997; Cardinal & Danforth Here, we use a mathematical approach to improve our under- 2011). This suggests that the is diffi- standing of why such a successful life history strategy so cult to both achieve and maintain. However, some taxa have rarely evolves. nonetheless evolved highly complex eusocial behaviours where Eusociality has originated only 12–15 times within the caste differentiation is determined during development and insects, and perhaps 20–25 times within the entire individuals no longer retain the ability to perform all of the kingdom (Wilson 1971). Most of these evolutionary origins tasks required to reproduce on their own (obligate eusociality) have occurred in the order (the bees, and (Batra 1966; Crespi & Yanega 1995). In these cases, no rever- ) where there has been a single origin in (Wil- sions to solitary behaviour have been observed, suggesting son 1971), 2–3 origins in the wasps (Hines et al. 2007), and 4– that these species have crossed a ‘point of no return’ where 5 origins in the bees (Cardinal & Danforth 2011; Gibbs et al. reversion to a solitary life history is no longer possible 2012). As a result, much focus has been placed on under- (Wilson & Holldobler€ 2005). standing the factors favouring or disfavouring the evolution Here we calculate the emergence and extinction probabilities of eusociality within the social insects (Andersson 1984; of eusocial vs. solitary reproductive strategies. We use the Crozier 2008). haploid version of a simple model of eusociality from Nowak

1Theoretical Biology, Institute of Integrative Biology, ETH Zurich,€ 8092,Zurich,€ 3Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Switzerland MA,02138,USA 2Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, 4Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA,02138,USA Cambridge, MA,02138,USA *Correspondence: E-mail: [email protected]

© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd/CNRS Letter The risk-return trade-off of eusociality 75

et al. (2010). In our model, solitary females produce offspring through the basic reproductive ratio, R0, and the extinction that leave the nest to reproduce individually, while eusocial probability, p, of a given lineage. These parameters are females produce a mix of offspring that remain in the natal described in detail below (Table S1). nest and others that disperse to establish new, eusocial . A solitary individual reproduces at rate b0, and dies at rate Those offspring that stay augment the size of the colony. We d0. Each offspring of a eusocial queen stays with their mother assume that the key reproductive parameters (oviposition rate, with probability q; otherwise she leaves to establish another successful raising of the young, and expected lifespan of new colony with probability 1 q. A eusocial queen with col- reproductive females) increase with colony size. ony size i reproduces at rate bi and dies at rate di. bi and di Our focus is not on explaining the origins of eusociality, are sigmoid functions of the colony size i with the inflection which has already been modelled in Nowak et al. (2010). point being at the eusocial threshold m. For simplicity, let us Instead, we attempt to explain the phylogenetic rarity of this start with assuming bi and di to be step functions of i: for trait by calculating the extinction probabilities of solitary vs. i < m, bi = b0 and di = d0; for i ≥ m, bi = b and di = d. Thus, eusocial reproduction in a stochastic model based on the the- eusociality confers an enhanced reproductive rate and a ory of branching processes (Harris 2002). We calculate the reduced death rate for a queen whose colony size reaches the probability that a lineage starting from a single, solitary indi- eusocial threshold (i ≥ m): b > b0 and d < d0 (henceforth vidual faces extinction, and we compare this with the extinc- referred to as the ‘eusocial advantage’). Later on, we will ver- tion probability of a lineage that starts with a single, eusocial ify the robustness of our derived results using more general individual. sigmoid functions (online appendix). Intuitively, the eusocial lifestyle appears to be risky because A single foundress can either die or successfully start a line- the production of non-reproductive workers before reproduc- age by giving birth to another reproductive individual. Each tive offspring results in a delayed reproductive payoff. Fur- queen reproduces independently of one another. In the light thermore, there is an opportunity cost associated with the of this, we can use a multi-type branching process to calculate non-reproductive offspring that remain in the nest instead of the ultimate extinction probability, p, of the lineage initiated establishing their own lineages. It is largely unknown whether by a single founding female. This value represents the chance this initial risk associated with eusocial reproduction can later that a given lineage founded by a single female will go extinct be compensated with higher reproductive rewards. To address over time t?∞. The converse of this is the emergence probabil- this question, we perform a comprehensive assessment of the ity,1 p, or the chance that a lineage founded by a single risks of population extinction for solitary vs. eusocial repro- female will persist over time t?∞. ductive life histories. We explicitly take into account the Since the daughters who stay with their mother assist to demographic and ecological factors involved in this process. perform tasks for the colony, the whole colony (consisting of We calculate and compare the population extinction proba- a reproductive queen and non-reproductive workers) can be bilities and basic reproductive ratios for solitary and eusocial seen as a sort of superorganism which differs in size and life histories. We show that eusociality is typically a riskier reproductive capacity (bi,di). We thus construct the type space strategy than solitary reproduction unless significant eusocial using colony size i (Fig. 1). benefits arise for small colony sizes. We find that, when it is For an infinitesimal time interval, Dt, a colony of size i dies available, obligate eusociality is a more successful strategy with probability diDt, increases its size to i + 1 with probabil- than facultative eusociality. These results suggest that the evo- ity qbiDt, and gives rise to a new colony of size 1 with proba- lution of eusociality is difficult because it requires a high bility (1 q)biDt. When a colony reaches the maximal size reproductive payoff generated by the immediate production of M, the subsequent offspring are required to leave the colony. a small number of workers. We also extend our model to Thus the colony of size M gives rise to a new colony of size 1 study population competition dynamics between solitary and with probability bMDt. For simplicity, we do not consider eusocial lineages under different ecological contexts, and we worker mortality. quantify the role that ecological niches play in facilitating the emergence and maintenance of eusociality. Altogether, these findings can explain both why origins of eusociality are rare bM but hugely successful and why reversions to solitary behaviour (1 q)b also occur. 3

(1 q)b2 (1 q)b1 qb qb qb MATERIAL AND METHODS 1 2 M 1 Following the deterministic model of eusociality studied in d d d3 dM Nowak et al. (2010), here we consider a corresponding sto- 1 2 chastic version for the case of asexual reproduction. This model-based approach can be used to evaluate the probability Figure 1 Schematic illustration of the stochastic branching model. We that a single, eusocial foundress in a population of solitary describe the stochastic emergence of eusociality using a continuous-time multi-type branching process, in which every colony of size i can be females (e.g. a eusocial mutant) will successfully give rise to a regarded as the i-th type. We set as M the largest possible size of each eusocial lineage. We explore this by varying three main eusocial colony, and thus there are total M distinctive types. A colony of parameters: birth rate, b, death rate, d and offspring dispersal size i can transform into the one of size i + 1 with rate qbi, reproduces a probability, q. We relate these variables in two major ways: new colony of size 1 with rate (1 q)bi, or dies with rate di.

© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd/CNRS 76 F. Fu, S. D. Kocher and M. A. Nowak Letter

i ... Let f (x1, x2, , xM;t) denote the joint probability generat- d þ bp1p2 ðb þ dÞp2 ¼ 0: ð6Þ ing function for the number of colonies of size j = 1, ..., M where p and p denote the extinction probability of the line- starting with a single colony of size i at time t. Using the 1 2 age initiated by a colony of size 1 and 2, respectively. Because backward equation for this continuous-time multiplicative of the eusocial advantage, we set b > b and d < d . We also process, we have 0 0 assume solitary reproduction is supercritical, that is b0 > d0. i df iþ1 1 i i We are primarily interested in the extinction probability of ¼ di þ qbif þð1 qÞbif f ðbi þ diÞf ; 1 i\M; ð1Þ dt the lineage derived from a single eusocial queen, p1, which is a dfM function of q: ¼ d þ b f1fM ðb þ d ÞfM; i ¼ M: ð2Þ dt M M M M qffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi 2 bðb0 þ d0Þþð1 qÞb0d ðbðb0 þ d0Þþð1 qÞb0dÞ 4ð1 qÞb0bðqb0d þ d0ðb þ dÞÞ p1 ¼ : ð7Þ 2ð1 qÞb0b

i The initial condition is f = xi,i = 1, ..., M. The formula for p1 can be simplified for extreme values of The fixed points of the equations are the ultimate extinction q. probabilities, pi, of the lineage initiated by a single colony of For q?0, size i. We will give closed form solutions for the extinction d0 probabilities for general cases. p1 ¼ : b0 Note that this is also the ultimate extinction probability of RESULTS the lineage derived from a single ‘solitary’ individual. A population of individuals cannot be sustained without For q?1, sufficient reproduction. This gives rise to the notion of a d0 d ‘basic reproductive ratio’, R , or the total expected number p ¼ þ : 0 1 b þ d b of (reproductive) offspring produced by an individual dur- 0 0 ing its lifetime. Simple deterministic models show that Furthermore, if the following condition holds, supercritical reproduction R > 1 is required to sustain a 0 b b0 b0 population (e.g. births must exceed deaths). Correspond- [ ð1 þ Þð8Þ d d0 d0 ingly, the condition R0 > 1 also ensures a stochastic super- dp1ðqÞ \ critical branching process in which the ultimate extinction We have dq 0 and hence p1(q) is a decreasing function probability of a given lineage is not definite but less than of q, which suggests that a eusocial queen (0 < q ≤ 1) has a one. greater emergence probability than a solitary one. We also find that the eusocial basic reproductive ratio, = = : Solitary reproduction RE ¼ b0ð1 qÞ ðd0 þ b0qÞþbb0q ½dðd0 þ b0qÞ ð9Þ Returning to our model, for q = 0 (e.g. all offspring disperse) Therefore, the following inequality is required for euscoial the above eqn 1 recovers the case of solitary reproduction. RE to be greater than the solitary RS: The solitary basic reproductive ratio RS is b b [ 1 þ 0 : ð10Þ b0 d d0 RS ¼ : ð3Þ d0 Note that since b0/d0 > 1, the critical b/d above which eusociality has a greater probability of emergence than soli- The extinction probability, p0, of the lineage derived from a single solitary individual can be easily found to be tary, eqn 8, is larger than the b/d obtained by simply requiring that eusocial RE is greater than solitary RS, eqn 10. This = ; [ ; d0 b0 RS 1 result can help us to understand why a higher eusocial RE rel- p0 ¼ ; : ð4Þ 1 RS 1 ative to a solitary RS alone is not sufficient to guarantee that a higher emergence probability for a eusocial queen relative to a solitary female. Eusocial reproduction with M = 2

Let us consider the simplest possible case of eusociality, with General case with M > 2 M = 2 and m = 2. This scenario gives us an intuitive under- standing of the results obtained with more general cases. The Supercritical condition for eusociality > ≥ extinction probabilities satisfy the following equations: We now turn to more general cases with M 2 and m 2. For notational simplicity, let us define li = biq for 1 ≤ i < M 2 ; d0 þ qb0p2 þð1 qÞb0p1 ðb0 þ d0Þp1 ¼ 0 ð5Þ and lM = 0; mi = bi(1 q) for 1 ≤ i < M and mM = bM. Let us

© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd/CNRS Letter The risk-return trade-off of eusociality 77

now derive the condition for eusocial reproduction to be (Diekmann & Heesterbeek 2000). The entry Fij of matrix F supercritical. To do this, let us first obtain the expectation denotes the rate at which a colony of size j produces matrix K for the multi-type branching process as given in eqns new colonies of size i. The entry Vij of V denotes the @fið1; ...; 1; tÞ 1–2. The element of K is given by Kji ¼ . Denote by (influx) rate at which the class of colonies of size j @xj yi the mean number of colonies of size i and by y the vector move into the class of colonies of size i (i 6¼ j); the diago- of [y1, y2, ..., yM]. Then the mean behaviour of the branching nal entry (i,i)ofV denotes the total outflux rate of colonies process is described by of size i, including the death rate and the rate at which they move into other classes. The inverse of V is found to y_ ¼ Ky; ð11Þ be which corresponds to the deterministic ordinary differential 8 < = ; ; equations for eusocial reproduction (Nowak et al. 2010). The 1Qðdi þ liQÞ i ¼ j > V1 i1 = i ; \ \ ; 14 supercritical branching process requires a(K) 0, where a(K) ij ¼ : k¼j lk k¼jðdk þ lkÞ j i M ð Þ is the spectral abscissa (the largest of the real parts of the ei- 0 ; otherwise: genvalues) of the matrix K (Harris 2002). It is straightforward to verify the following matrix decom- Before proceeding further, let us define two matrices position: F ={Fij} and V ={Vij} as follows. 1 : mi; i ¼ 1; 1 j M; K ¼ F V ¼ðFV IÞV Fij ¼ ; ; ð12Þ 0 otherwise We obtain the supercritical condition after some algebra 8 (Diekmann & Heesterbeek 2000), ; ; < di þ li i ¼ j ; ; 1 Vij ¼ : li1 i ¼ j þ 1 ð13Þ aðKÞ [ 0 $ qðFV Þ [ 1; ð15Þ 0; otherwise: where q(A) denotes the spectral radius of a matrix A. There- We can see that both F and V have clear biological inter- fore, the eusocial basic reproductive ratio, RE, can be defined pretations and are the so-called ‘next-generation’ matrices as q(FV1), and has a closed-form expression as follows.

(a) b = 0.075 b = 0.450 b = 2.450 1.5 1.5 4.5

1.2 1.2

1 1 E E E R R R

1.2 1

0 0 0 0 0.5 1 00.5100.51 Probability to stay, q Probability to stay, q Probability to stay, q

(b) b = 0.075 b = 0.450 b = 2.450 0.3 0.3 0.3

1/6 1/6 1/6 Emergence probability Emergence probability Emergence probability

0 0 0 0 0.5 1 00.5100.51 Probability to stay, q Probability to stay, q Probability to stay, q

Figure 2 Stochastic emergence of eusociality. The upper row (a) shows the eusocial RE (eqn 16); the horizontal solid lines are the critical threshold R0 = 1, while the horizontal dot dashed lines are the solitary RS = b0/d0. The lower row (b) shows the ultimate emergence probability for one single eusocial queen to establish surviving lineages; the horizontal dot dashed lines are the emergence probability of a single solitary lineage, (b0 d0)/b0. The solid curves are the closed form evaluations of the emergence probabilities as given in eqn 20, and the circles are results obtained by numerically solving the differential equations (eqns 1–2). With increasing efficiency of eusocial reproduction (b), there exists an intermediate range of q values such that a single eusocial queen has a higher emergence probability than a solitary lineage. Relating emergence probability to RE, we find that the condition for the multi-type branching process to be supercritical (i.e. non-zero ultimate probability for eusociality to emerge) is equivalent to requiring RE > 1. Parameters: m = 3, M = 100, b0 = 0.12, d0 = 0.1, d = 0.05.

© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd/CNRS 78 F. Fu, S. D. Kocher and M. A. Nowak Letter

XM Yi mi lj ; K1 T : R ¼ : ð16Þ z1 ¼ maxf0 að K Þg ð20Þ E l d l i¼1 i j¼1 j þ j We note that this closed-form z1 agrees perfectly with the results obtained by numerically solving the differential equa- It is worth noting that the eusocial RE is exactly the same as the one obtained by applying the next-generation approach tions (Fig. 2). Figure 2 plots the emergence probability and to the deterministic eqn 11 (Diekmann & Heesterbeek 2000). RE of eusociality as a function of the probability to stay, q, We obtain a supercritical condition for eusociality based on with increasing eusocial birth rates b. For a small eusocial advantage, the emergence probability decreases monotoni- the basic reproductive ratio (‘R0’). Eusociality has a non-zero chance of emergence if the branching process is supercritical, cally with q until reaching certain extinction. As the euso- cial advantage further increases, the emergence probability i.e. a(K) > 0. This condition is equivalent to RE = q 1 has a peak for intermediate values of q. Eusocial lineages (FV ) > 1. Accordingly, if the eusocial RE exceeds one, then eusociality can eventually emerge with non-zero probability. have a greater emergence probability than solitary ones given a sufficiently large eusocial advantage and intermedi- Emergence probability ate values of q. For general cases with M > 2, we can derive a closed form Figure 3 visualises the comparison of the two critical condi- for the emergence probability of a single eusocial queen, tions for eusociality to have an advantage over solitary: (1) a higher R and (2) a lower extinction probability across the z1 = 1 p1, as follows. Let the vector z = [z1, z2, ..., zM], E entire parameter space (b/d,q). As also shown in Fig. 2, the where zi is the emergence probability of a single colony with supercritical condition for a single eusocial lineage to emerge size i. Let Λ=diag{m1, ..., mM} and I = diag{1, ...,1} (the with non-zero probability is exactly equivalent to requiring M 9 M identity matrix). Using zi = 1 pi, we obtain the fol- lowing ordinary differential equations for the time evolution the eusocial RE > 1 as given in eqn 16 (note that the grey of z after simple algebra: regions in the two panels of Fig. 3 are identical). The critical eusocial reproductive advantages that enable eusociality to _ T K ; z ¼ K z z1 z ð17Þ outcompete solitary reproductive strategies in terms of estab- with the initial condition z(0)=[1, 1, ..., 1]. The ultimate emer- lishment probability are much larger than the eusocial RE sim- gence probability can be given by ply exceeding the solitary RS (note that the blue region in the right panel is much smaller, compared with the left panel in T K K1 T K : K z z1 z ¼ð K z1IÞ z ¼ 0 ð18Þ Fig. 3). This result can be intuitively understood as follows. Start- For the supercritical branching process, we have zi > 0 for i = 1, ..., M. This leads to ing with a single founder queen, each surviving eusocial col- ony is likely to go through intermediate stepwise transitions 1 T detðK K z1IÞ¼0: ð19Þ until reaching the largest possible size M. Meanwhile, unlike solitary individuals, when a eusocial colony dies, it inevita- It follows immediately that z1 is determined by the spectral abscissa of Λ1KT. Therefore, we obtain the following closed- bly results in the simultaneous loss of all individuals belonging to that colony; much reproductive potential of form solution for z1,

(a) Eusocial RE (b) Stochastic emergence 1 1

0.5 0.5 Probability to stay, q Probability to stay, q

0 0 100 101 102 100 101 102 Eusocial, b/d Eusocial, b/d

Figure 3 Stochastic emergence and R0. The plot compares the critical conditions for eusociality to have an advantage over solitary, in terms of higher R0 and higher stochastic emergence respectively, across the parameter space (b/d,q). In the left panel (a), the grey-shaded area denotes the eusocial RE <1,in the red-shaded area, eusociality has a lower R0 than solitary, and in the blue-shaded area, eusociality has a higher R0 than solitary. In the right panel (b), the grey-shaded area denotes definite extinction of eusociality, in the red-shaded area, eusociality has a lower emergence probability than solitary, and in the blue-shaded area, eusociality has a higher emergence probability than solitary. We show that the branching process is supercritical, which is equivalent to RE > 1. Therefore, the grey-shaded areas in both panels are identical. The critical eusocial advantage, b/d, above which eusociality has a higher emergence probability than solitary, is much higher than the one above which eusocial RE is greater than solitary RS. Parameters: m = 3, M = 100, b0 = 0.12, d0 = 0.1, d = 0.05.

© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd/CNRS Letter The risk-return trade-off of eusociality 79

(a) (b)

Figure 4 Eusocial reproduction may be no better than solitary at averting the risk of extinction. The left panel (a) shows the shaded region where eusocial

RE is larger than solitary RS. The right panel (b) shows the shaded region where eusociality has a greater chance of emergence than solitary. Eusociality + can have a greater probability of emergencepffiffi than solitary only when the ratio of solitary reproduction b0/(b0 d0) is less than a critical threshold, rm. For = 5 1 the eusocial threshold m 3, rm ¼ 2 . rm decreases with m and converges to 1/2 for large m. In contrast, eusociality can always have a larger R0 than solitary for any given ratio of solitary reproduction b0/(b0 + d0). Parameters: m = 3, M = 100.

these colonies with intermediate sizes is thus being wasted. mX1 i1: As a consequence, much larger reproductive advantages are p1 ¼ ð1 a0Þa0 ð21Þ required to offset such inefficiency of eusocial reproduction i¼1 with respect to averting the risk of extinction. The condition for p1 to be smaller than the extinction prob- ability of the lineage derived from a single solitary individual Resilience against extinction: solitary reproduction vs. eusocial p0 = (1 a0)/a0 is reproduction m1 m2 ... \ : We find a range of parameters where solitary reproduction is Wmða0Þ¼a0 þ a0 þ þ a0 1 0 ð22Þ m1 m2 ... ‘unbeatable’. In these cases, as long as the solitary reproduc- The above polynomial Wmða0Þ¼a0 þ a0 þ þ tive ratio exceeds a critical value, there is no eusocial advan- a0 1 always has a unique positive root, denoted by rm,in tage that exists where eusocial reproduction would be (0,1). Thus, eusociality can have an advantage over solitary favoured over solitary reproduction. This may explain why (in terms of lower extinction probability) if and only if the eusociality is taxonomically rare: eusocial life histories can ratio of solitary reproduction a0 = b0/(b0 + d0) 0), it requires very large eusocial benefits initiated by a single queen with full eusociality (q = 1) is lower to reduce the extinction relative to solitary reproduction (Figs. than that of a single solitary individual, then it is advanta- 3 and 4). geous for the eusocial queen to utilise a fully eusocial strategy For m = 3 we find (q = 1) to minimise the risk of extinction. To simplify our notations, we can normalise the birth and pffiffiffi 5 1 death rates with their sum bi + di in the ordinary differential r ¼ 0:618; 3 2 equations in eqns 1–2 without changing the original fixed pffiffiffi points. Let a = b /(b + d ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ M. Then a = a = b / 1 þ 5 i i i i i 0 0 RSð3Þ¼ 1:618; (b0 + d0) for i < m; ai = a = b/(b + d) for i ≥ m. The extinc- 2 tion probability, p1, of the lineage derived from a single fully We note that this critical value is the ‘golden ratio’. For eusocial queen is m = 4,

© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd/CNRS 80 F. Fu, S. D. Kocher and M. A. Nowak Letter

0 1 Roles of ecological niches in origins and reversals of eusociality  1 2 pffiffiffiffiffi 1=3 r @ 1 17 3 33 A 0:544; In addition to the demographic considerations addressed 4 ¼ ÀÁpffiffiffiffiffi 1=3 þ þ 3 17 þ 3 33 above, a consideration of the specific ecological context (which determines the competition dynamics between solitary R 4 1:193: Sð Þ and eusocial strategies) is key to understanding the origin and \ m = Because Wm1ða0Þ Wmða0Þ¼ð1 a0 Þ ð1 a0Þ2, maintenance of eusociality (Chenoweth et al. 2007; Chase & & the unique root rm within (0,1) for Wm(a0) = 0 is monotoni- Myers 2011; Kocher et al. 2014; Wilson Nowak 2014). cally decreasing with m and converges to 1/2 for large Mathematically, this means that we should consider the sce- m values, which implies that RS(m)?1 for large m.As nario where the branching process is dependent on the total a result, as the eusocial threshold m increases, it becomes population size X. Specifically, we assume that the birth rates more likely that the solitary reproductive ratio b0/d0 of solitary and eusocial lineages are rescaled respectively by a 0 exceeds the threshold RS(m), making it impossible for population regulation factor, /S and /E; that is, b0 ¼ /Sb0, 0 eusociality to have a higher probability of emergence than and bi ¼ /Ebi, and the death rates remain unchanged. For solitary. In other words, the larger m, the more prone euso- solitary reproduction /S = 1/(1 + gSX) and for eusocial repro- cial reproduction is to extinction than solitary reproduction. duction /E = 1/(1 + gEX), where the coefficients gS > 0 and Figure 4 depicts the parameter region of reproductive gE > 0 quantify the effects of the underlying ecological patch rates where eusociality has a higher RE (left panel) and has on the population competition dynamics between social a higher emergence probability (right panel) than solitary forms. The limited carrying capacity introduced in this sce- RS respectively. Provided with sufficiently large b and small nario always leads to the fixation of one strategy or the d, the eusocial reproductive ratio can exceed the solitary extinction of both strategies depending on the initial condi- one (Fig. 4a). Thus, eusocial reproduction is a ‘high reward’ tion, thereby not allowing coexistence between eusocial and strategy. But if the solitary reproductive ratio is above a solitary in the same ecological patch. threshold value, RS(m), switching to eusocial reproduction We can still use the extinction probabilities calculated cannot reduce the extinction probability any more than before (i.e. gS = gE = 0) to predict the evolutionary outcomes solitary reproduction does, regardless of how large the euso- for very small values of gS and gE (0 < gS,gE 1, which cial advantages are (Fig. 4b). Thus, it is also a ‘high risk’ should be relevant because of tremendously high carrying strategy. capacity of social insects seen in nature). In the absence of This result mathematically demonstrates the demographic any population competition (i.e. gS = gE = 0), coexistence hurdle that eusocial lineages must overcome in order to happens with probability (1 pe)(1 ps), only solitary become established. The eusocial reproductive strategy is emerges while eusociality goes to extinction with probability risky because of the opportunity costs associated with the pe(1 ps), only eusociality emerges while solitary goes to non-reproductive offspring that remain in the nest and fail extinction with probability ps(1 pe), and both lineages go to to establish their own colonies and reproduce, as well as extinction with probability pspe. Here, ps and pe denote the the delay in return of eusocial benefits contingent on a cer- extinction probabilities of solitary and eusocial lifestyles for tain colony size. These costs associated with eusociality given initial conditions. Because extinction, if fated to happen, resemble the ‘two-fold cost’ of sexual reproduction where takes place in short time scales for branching processes, the only half of the parental genome is passed on to offspring co-existent state that happens with probability (1 pe) (Brian 1965). (1 ps) for gS = gE = 0 will be dominated by and eventually

N = 1 N = 10 N = 100 (a)S (b)S (c) S 1 1 1 0.9 Solitary, simulation 0.9 0.9 Eusocial, simulation 0.8 Solitary, prediction 0.8 0.8 0.7 Eusocial, prediction 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 Emergence probability Emergence probability 0.2 Emergence probability 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1

0 0 0 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 Eusocial, b/(b + d) Eusocial, b/(b + d) Eusocial, b/(b + d)

Figure 5 Emergence of eusociality from population-size-dependent branching processes. Shown are the emergence probabilities of eusociality and solitary, starting with one single eusocial individual and NS solitary individuals together (NS = 1, 10, 100, respectively). The branching process is dependent on the 0 = 0 = total population size, X: the birth rates change as b0 ¼ b0 ð1 þ gSXÞ and bi ¼ bi ð1 þ gEXÞ while the death rates remain constant. There is good agreement between predictions (solid lines) and simulations (circles). Parameters: gS = gE = 0.0001, b0 = 0.55, d0 = 0.45, b = 1 d, q = 1, m = 2, M = 2.

© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd/CNRS Letter The risk-return trade-off of eusociality 81

(a) (b)

(c) (d)

Figure 6 Origins and reversals of eusociality depends on the ecological context under consideration. The left panels show the emergence probability of a single eusocial mutant in a population of (a) NS = 2223 and (c) NS = 222 solitary individuals. The right panels (b) and (d) show the emergence probability of a single solitary mutant in a eusocial population consisting of 452 colonies of size 1 and 698 colonies of size 2. In (a) and (b) the ecological patch has exactly the same impact on solitary and eusocial reproduction (gS=gE); in (c) and (d) the ecological patch represents a niche that strongly favours the eusocial rather than the solitary lifestyle (gS≫gE). The vertical lines mark the theoretical threshold values, derived from eqn 24, for (a, c) origins and (b, d) reversals of eusociality. Simulation results agree perfectly with the theoretical predications. Parameters: (a, b) gS = gE = 0.0001, (c, d) gS = 0.001, gE = 0.0001, b = 1 d, b0 = 1 d0, q = 1, m = 2, M = 2, (a, c) fixed solitary reproduction rates b0 = 0.55, d0 = 0.45, (b, d) fixed eusocial reproduction rates, b = 0.7, d = 0.3.

taken over by the one having a higher effective R0 in the case one species almost at carrying capacity in an ecological patch of gS,gE > 0. To illustrate how our approximation method and calculate how likely a single mutant can take over the works, let us consider again the simplest possible case with entire population. As shown in eqn 24, for eusociality it M = m = 2 and q = 1. For solitary reproduction, RS = /Sb0/ becomes easier to evolve and also more resilient against rever- 2 = d0; for eusocial reproduction, RE ¼ /Ebb0 ½dð/Eb0 þ d0Þ. sals once established, with decreasing values of gE/gS, i.e., Substituting X = (b0 d0)/(gSd0) into the inequality of when the ecological niche is increasingly biased towards RE > 1, we obtain the critical ratio b/d above which eusoci- favouring eusocial reproduction. Our analytical predictions ality dominates over solitary, agree perfectly with agent-based simulations: as compared to  2 the case where the ecological patch exerts exactly the same b gEðb0 d0Þ d0 gEðb0 d0Þ = [ 1 þ þ 1 þ : ð24Þ effects on solitary and eusocial reproduction (gS gE, Fig. 6a d gSd0 b0 gSd0 and b), the presence of an ecological niche that strongly ≫ If eusocial reproduction satisfies the above condition, then favours eusociality (gS gE) makes it easier for eusociality to emerge and is also more robust against invasion by solitary the emergence probability of eusociality and solitary is 1 pe lineages (Fig. 6c and d). These results highlight how the and pe(1 ps), otherwise being ps(1 pe) and 1 ps respec- tively. Moreover, when solitary and eusocial reproduction existence of ecological niches that favour eusociality can help eusociality to overcome the aforementioned demographic fare exactly the same in the ecological patch (gS = gE), the hurdles. above condition can be greatly simplified into b/d >2b0/d0. Figure 5 shows that the approximation above works very well for small g = g 1 and for different initial numbers of sol- S E DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION itary individuals. Additionally, it requires greater eusocial advantages for a single, eusocial individual to emerge and We have calculated the extinction probabilities associated with eventually take over a larger population of solitary individuals solitary and eusocial reproductive strategies. In general, we (i.e. larger NS). find that solitary lineages are more stable than eusocial ones Finally, let us take into account the effects of ecological and this conclusion is robust to model variations (online niches on the origin and maintenance of eusociality. We simu- appendix, Figs S1 and S2). This finding could help to explain late the density-dependent branching processes starting with both the relatively few origins of eusociality as well as the

© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd/CNRS 82 F. Fu, S. D. Kocher and M. A. Nowak Letter many subsequent losses. There are substantial demographic nest-site availability (Stark 1992). Other studies have demon- hurdles that make eusociality both difficult to establish and strated similar benefits in small carpenter bees ( spp.; sometimes hard to maintain. Sakagami & Maeta 1977; Rehan et al. 2010, 2011). Our comparative results on extinction risk further support Regardless of the mechanism, it is clear that eusocial colo- the following conclusion: the emergence of eusociality is diffi- nies containing a small number of workers can gain large cult because it requires relatively large reproductive advanta- reproductive benefits. Surprisingly, in some allodapine ges over solitary strategies. Furthermore, these pronounced populations where these large payoffs have been well docu- advantages have to arise immediately with the production of mented (Schwarz et al. 1998; Tierney et al. 2000; Thompson a small number of workers. We derived a closed-form super- & Schwarz 2006; Chenoweth et al. 2007), multi-female nests critical condition for eusociality to have a non-zero chance of only occur in a small subset of the allodapine populations emergence if and only if the eusocial RE > 1, as given in eqn (Joyce & Schwarz 2006). Our results can explain why – 16. We show that this RE, although derived for the stochastic because even with high reproductive rewards, eusociality still branching process, is exactly the same as the one obtained by carries a higher risk of extinction than their more stable soli- the deterministic model in Nowak et al. (2010). For eusocial tary counterparts (Fig. S2). lineages to have a lower risk of stochastic extinction than soli- Our initial analyses were based on a model of eusocial tary ones, the reproductive ratio for eusocial queens (RE) can- behaviour where offspring dispersal rates were not allowed to not simply exceed that of solitary females (RS), rather the vary with the colony size. This approximates a facultatively reproductive advantage for eusocial reproduction must be eusocial colony where all daughters are capable both of repro- very large (Fig. 3). Provided sufficiently large reproductive ducing on their own or remaining in the nest as helpers. In advantages, eusocial queens can always have a larger R0 than this model, facultative eusociality is still capable of emerging solitary, but only when the ratio of solitary reproduction is with sufficient reproductive payoff and intermediate values of lower than a critical value, b0/(b0 + d0)

© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd/CNRS Letter The risk-return trade-off of eusociality 83 can help to mitigate the demographic constraint on the emer- Aviles, L. (1999). Cooperation and non-linear dynamics: an ecological gence of eusociality as well as protect against potential rever- perspective on the evolution of . Evol. Ecol. Res., 1(4), 459–477. sals due to invasion attempts by solitary mutants. This finding Batra, S.W.T. (1966). Nest and social behavior of halictine bees of India. Indian J. Entomol., 28, 375. is not unprecedented; previous applications of birth-death Brian, M.V. (1965). Social Insect Populations. Academic Press, London models have suggested that the origins of eusociality might be and New York. most likely to occur in situations where strong ecological con- Cardinal, S. & Danforth, B.N. (2011). The Antiquity and Evolutionary straints favour cooperation (Aviles 1999). For example, harsh History of Social Behavior in Bees. 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Evol., 65, 926 939. Greene, A. (1984). Production schedules of vespine wasps: an empirical test of the bang-bang optimization model. J. Kans. Entomol. Soc., 57, ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 545–568. Haggard, C.M. & Gamboa, G.J. (1980). Seasonal variation in body size We thank the editor, M. Schwarz, S. Bonhoeffer and three and reproductive condition of a paper wasp, Polistes metricus anonymous referees for constructive comments, which helped (Hymenoptera: ). Can. Entomol., 112, 239–248. us to improve this work. We are grateful for support from the Harris, T.E. (2002). The Theory of Branching Processes. Courier Dover European Research Council Advanced Grant (PBDR Publications, New York. Hines, H., Hunt, J., O’Conner, T., Gillespie, J. & Cameron, S. (2007). 268540), the John Templeton Foundation, the National Sci- Multigene phylogeny reveals eusociality evolved twice in vespid wasps. ence Foundation/National Institute of Health joint program Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA, 104, 3295–3299. in mathematical biology (NIH grant no. R01GM078986), the Holldobler,€ B. & Wilson, E.O. (1990). The Ants. Harvard Univ Press, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (Grand Challenges grant Cambridge, MA. 37874), and the USDA NIFA postdoctoral fellowship pro- Holldobler,€ B. & Wilson, E.O. (2009). The Superorganism: The Beauty, gram. Elegance, and Strangeness of Insect societies. WW Norton & Company, New York. Joyce, N.C. & Schwarz, M.P. (2006). Sociality in the Australian AUTHORSHIP allodapine bee Brevineura elongata: small colony sizes despite large benefits to group living. J. Insect Behav., 19(1), 45–61. F.F., S.D.K. & M.A.N. conceived the model, performed Kocher, S.D. & Paxton, R.E. (2014). Comparative methods and social analyses, and wrote the manuscript. evolution in bees. Apidologie, 45(3), 289–305. Kocher, S.D., Pellissier, L., Veller, C., Purcell, J., Nowak, M.A., Chapuisat, M.et al. (2014). 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