DOCSLIB.ORG

SMALL WARS JOURNAL FEB 4, 2010 Smallwarsjournal.Com

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
SMALL WARS JOURNAL FEB 4, 2010 Smallwarsjournal.Com VOLUME 6 NUMBER 1 SMALL WARS JOURNAL FEB 4, 2010 smallwarsjournal.com In This Issue We're Back CORDS and the Whole of Government Approach: 1 Well, we never really went away. We Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Beyond, by Richard Weitz, Ph.D. helped 332 pieces get the visibility they're Getting Past the First Cup of Tea, by J. Andrew Person 10 due by publishing them in single article format since September, 2007. But this Examining the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ 15 issue announcing some of the winners of Civil Military Operations: A Small Power Securing Military our first writing competition (see p. 5) Relevancy in Nontraditional Military Roles, by Delilah Russell marks our return to regular publishing of Clio in Combat, The Transformation of Military History 24 select works in a proper journal style. We Operations, by LTC John A Boyd, Ph.D., US Army will continue to bring you what we can when we can: news and commentary via Task Force Stryker, Network Revolution, 32 by CPT Jonathan Pan, US Army the SWJ Blog, longer pieces via the Jour- nal online, and now these regular "print" Book Review of Ben S. Malcolm's White Tigers, My Secret 40 issues, too -- at least this freely distri- War in North Korea. Reviewed by MAJ Bradford Burris buted PDF e-zine that you can print your- Haiti: Boots on the Ground Perspective, 42 self if you so choose. Look for another by Col Buck Elton, USAF edition shortly with more winners and more news about Small Wars Foundation. About the Writing About Small Wars Foreign Policy - Dave & Bill Competition, p. 5 Foundation, p. 23 column, p. 2 CORDS and the Whole of Government Approach Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Beyond by Richard Weitz, Ph.D. Grand Prize Winner, Question #2 ernment adopted a novel civil-military strategy All too often, the U.S. national security sys- that achieved remarkably rapid if limited successes tem has proven unable to integrate its diplomatic, under trying conditions. The experience offers les- military, economic, and other elements of national sons to current and future U.S. policymakers as power adequately. The weak integration, due pri- they grapple with new COIN challenges. marily to poor interagency cooperation, has pre- sented particular problems for the United States when waging counterinsurgencies. The new U.S. Background counterinsurgency field manual, FM 3-24, points Until 1968, U.S. and South Vietnamese mili- out that ―military efforts are necessary and impor- tary forces concentrated on killing the Viet Cong tant to counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts, but they (VC) insurgents and North Vietnamese combat are only effective when integrated into a compre- units present in the Republic of (South) Vietnam hensive strategy employing all instruments of na- (RVN) as well as disrupting, primarily through air tional power.‖1 strikes and ground interdiction offensives, the flow The case of the Vietnam War—sometimes of reinforcements and supplies through the Ho Chi misperceived as a counterinsurgency failure— Minh Trail from North Vietnam to the South. In shows how the United States can conduct such addition, Operation Rolling Thunder sought to in- campaigns more effectively. Confronting what until duce Hanoi to curb its support for the insurgency recently was the most extensive counterinsurgency by inflicting measured pain through aerial bom- and nation-building challenge the U.S. national bardment. Neither South Vietnamese military security community had ever faced, the U.S. gov- units nor the many American combat forces that entered after 1965 proved very adept at defeating 1 Headquarters, U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-24: Coun- the insurgents or preventing the infiltration of reg- terinsurgency (Washington, D.C., December 15, 2006), p. 2-1. VOL. 6, NO. 1 - FEB 4, 2010 SMALL WARS JOURNAL ular North Vietnamese units and logistical support into the South. The Viet Cong regularly retained Watch for Robert Haddick's weekly the initiative and contested the control of the Gov- editorial, This Week at War. Friday ernment of (South) Vietnam (GVN) over large evenings at Foreign Policy. areas. Critics of the attrition strategy then adopted by U.S. and RVN forces called for greater efforts at MALL ARS OURNAL local area defense, aggressive small-unit patrolling S W J that relied on surprise ambushes rather than mas- Editor in Chief Dave Dilegge sive firepower, and ―pacification‖ measures to wea- Publisher Bill Nagle ken popular support for the insurgency. Small Wars Journal is published by Small Wars Founda- In the context of the Vietnam War, ―pacifica- tion, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit. If you value this material, tion‖ referred to ―the collection of programs by please consider supporting us in our efforts to bring it to you. which the United States attempted to assist the Saigon government to gain control over and build Business Office popular support throughout the RVN.‖2 The objec- 4938 Hampden Ln, #560 tive of these programs, which received increased Bethesda, MD 20814 [email protected] resources as the war progressed, was to deprive the VC of support among the rural population by pro- Volume 6, No. 1, © 2010, Small Wars Foundation. tecting villagers from VC intimidation through mil- Permission is granted to print copies for personal, non- itary, police, and intelligence activities. The expec- commercial use. Since we are in this together, Small Wars Journal publishes under the Creative Commons BY-NC-SA tation was that the enhanced security would de- 3.0 license to provide for certain limited uses; per crease support for the insurgency by establishing http://smallwarsjournal.com/site/terms/. All other rights conditions for sustained economic growth and reserved. more effective GVN performance. Successful paci- fication requires a whole-of-government approach to achieve the tight connection between the military No factual statement should be relied upon without further and civil dimensions of the conflict. Although paci- investigation on your part sufficient to satisfy you in your independent judgment that it is true. fication involves non-military programs such as land reform and good governance measures, it en- CKNOWLEDGEMENTS tails an essential military security dimension as A 3 well. The population needs long-term security to This issue and the SWJ writing competition are made poss- feel comfortable cooperating with the government ible, in large part, by the support of Smith Richardson against the insurgents. According to former U.S. Foundation, with our particular thanks to Dr. Nadia Schad- military officer and later senior CORDS adminis- low and Dr. Marin Strmecki. trator John Paul Venn, ―Whether security is ten percent of the total problem or ninety percent, it is military-civilian coordination was weak.5 Poor in- inescapably the first ten percent or the first ninety tegration also prevailed among the programs run percent.‖4 by the various civilian agencies, which differed in Although many U.S. and RVN agencies par- mission approaches, goals, and chains of command ticipated in pacification, their efforts were initially but continued to grow in size and complexity. For poorly integrated. The U.S. Military Assistance example, the State Department, Department of Command Vietnam (MACV) provided military Agriculture, U.S. Agency for International Devel- training to the RVN Army, but the command‘s as- opment (USAID), U.S. Information Service (USIS), sets were outside the control of the U.S. embassy in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and other Saigon. Despite regular meetings between the U.S. government agencies pursued separate and MACV Commander and the American ambassador, conflicting pacification initiatives without an inte- grated strategy.6 The American and RVN pacifica- 5 Robert W. Komer, Bureaucracy at War: US Performance in 2 David L. Anderson, The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War the Vietnam Conflict (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), pp. 150-151. 1986), p. 90. 3 Andrew F. Krepinvich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, 6 William Colby, with James McCargar, Lost Victory: A Firs- Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 12. thand Account of America’s Sixteen-Year Involvement in Viet- 4 Cited in Ronald H. Spector, After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in nam (Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1989), pp. 82, 191; and Vietnam (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1993), p. Robert Shaplen, The Road From War: Vietnam, 1965-1970 283. (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 158. 2 smallwarsjournal.com SMALL WARS JOURNAL VOL. 6, NO. 1 - FEB 4, 2010 tion programs were also poorly coordinated.7 The The practice of centralizing command of ci- lack of a single major agency or directing body vilian and military resources in a single central meant that pacification ―was everybody‘s business headquarters was replicated at each level of the and nobody‘s.‖8 GVN. CORDS established a unified American civil- military advisory team structure that worked with Despite the evident confusion and ineffi- the RVN agencies involved in pacification in all ciency, repeated efforts to integrate pacification areas of the country‘s administrative hierarchy: the activities better before 1967 failed. Reform pro- 4 military regions; the 44 provinces; and the 242 posals sought only improved coordination, not uni- districts. CORDS coordinated most U.S. in-country fied command or direction. They also addressed personnel, including almost all USIA, USAID, and only civilian program efforts, leaving the military State Department employees deployed in the field, to conduct its own war.9 Representatives of the as well as those CIA employees involved in intelli- State Department and the CIA resisted consolidat- gence and area security and those American mili- ing U.S. pacification efforts under the military.10 tary advisors not directly involved in conventional Past experience had persuaded the civilian agen- combat operations (such as those in support of ru- cies that the military would pay insufficient atten- ral local security forces).
Load more

Recommended publications
  • From Kinshasa to Kandahar: Canada and Fragile States in Historical Perspective
    University of Calgary PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository University of Calgary Press University of Calgary Press Open Access Books 2016-05 From Kinshasa to Kandahar: Canada and Fragile States in Historical Perspective Carroll, Michael K; Donaghy, Greg University of Calgary Press Carroll, M.K. & Donaghy, G. (2016). "From Kinshasa to Kandahar: Canada and Fragile States in Historical Perspective." Beyond Boundaries: Canadian Defence and Strategic Studies Series; no. 6. University of Calgary Press, Calgary, Alberta. http://hdl.handle.net/1880/51199 book http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Attribution Non-Commercial No Derivatives 4.0 International Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca FROM KINSHASA TO KANDAHAR: Canada and Fragile States in Historical Perspective Edited by Michael K. Carroll and Greg Donaghy ISBN 978-1-55238-845-7 THIS BOOK IS AN OPEN ACCESS E-BOOK. It is an electronic version of a book that can be purchased in physical form through any bookseller or on-line retailer, or from our distributors. Please support this open access publication by requesting that your university purchase a print copy of this book, or by purchasing a copy yourself. If you have any questions, please contact us at [email protected] Cover Art: The artwork on the cover of this book is not open access and falls under traditional copyright provisions; it cannot be reproduced in any way without written permission of the artists and their agents. The cover can be displayed as a complete cover image for the purposes of publicizing this work, but the artwork cannot be extracted from the context of the cover of this specific work without breaching the artist’s copyright.
    [Show full text]
  • National Defence and the Canadian Forces
    Skip to content | Skip to institutional links National Defence and the Canadian Forces www.forces.gc.ca Français Home Contact Us Help Search canada.gc.ca CEFCOM Home > Current Operations > Fact Sheets > Joint Task Force Afghanistan Operations Joint Task Force Afghanistan: Current Operations Current Operations Composition during Rotation 7 of Operation ATHENA Map Fact Sheets Joint Task Force Afghanistan comprises all Canadian Forces assets deployed in southwest Past Operations Asia on Operation ACCIUS , Operation ARCHER and Operation ATHENA . Its established CEFCOM strength is 2,830 personnel, of whom all but about 15 are deployed on Operation ATHENA. About Us Joint Task Force Afghanistan is made up of the following units: Newsroom Operations l At Kandahar Airfield: Media Embedding ¡ Joint Task Force Afghanistan Headquarters, which is also the headquarters of Program Task Force Kandahar ¡ the Canadian contingent at COMKAF (Commander, Kandahar Airfield) Feature Story ¡ the Canadian contingent at ISAF Regional Command (South) Headquarters Archive ¡ Task Force Kandahar, part of ISAF RC(South) Tell Us Your Stories ¡ the Joint Task Force Afghanistan Air Wing ¡ the National Support Element (NSE) l In Kabul: ¡ the Canadian contingent at ISAF Headquarters ¡ the Canadian members of the Military Advisory Unit of the United Nations Advisory Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA, see Operation ACCIUS ) ¡ the Canadian contingent of Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC­A, see Operation ARCHER) ¡ the military liaison staff at the Canadian Embassy
    [Show full text]
  • Canadian Coin in Afghanistan – Did We Get It Right?
    CANADIAN COIN IN AFGHANISTAN – DID WE GET IT RIGHT? LCol S.P. Moran JCSP 39 PCEMI 39 Master of Defence Studies Maîtrise en études de la défense Disclaimer Avertissement Opinions expressed remain those of the author and Les opinons exprimées n’engagent que leurs auteurs do not represent Department of National Defence or et ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used Ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces without written permission. canadiennes. Ce papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite. © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as © Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2015. le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2015. CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES JCSP 39 – PCEMI 39 MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES – MAÎTRISE EN ÉTUDES DE LA DÉFENSE CANADIAN COIN IN AFGHANISTAN – DID WE GET IT RIGHT? LCol S.P. Moran “This paper was written by a student “La présente étude a été rédigée par un attending the Canadian Forces College stagiaire du Collège des Forces in fulfilment of one of the requirements canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des of the Course of Studies. The paper is a exigences du cours. L'étude est un scholastic document, and thus contains document qui se rapporte au cours et facts and opinions, which the author contient donc des faits et des opinions alone considered appropriate and que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et correct for the subject. It does not convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas necessarily reflect the policy or the nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion opinion of any agency, including the d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le Government of Canada and the gouvernement du Canada et le ministère Canadian Department of National de la Défense nationale du Canada.
    [Show full text]
  • Mobilizing Nato for Afghanistan and Pakistan an Assessment of Alliance Capabilities
    !"#$%$&$'()'*+"),"-) *,(.*'$/+*')0)1*2$/+*' /#1/))"))2"#$1'& /33./#!"1!/-/4.3.$.") !"#$"% &'% $(" )$*+, '& $(" -%").+"#!, /#+ !'#0%")) MOBILIZING NATO FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN AN ASSESSMENT OF ALLIANCE CAPABILITIES Mobilizing NATO for Afghanistan and Pakistan: Ensuring the Alliance’s Future A Project of the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress Co-Directors David M. Abshire W. Bruce Weinrod Project Senior Advisor General John Craddock, U.S. Army (Ret.) CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE PRESIDENCY AND CONGRESS THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE PRESIDENCY AND CONGRESS The Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress, founded in 1965, is a nonprofit, nonpartisan 501(c)(3) organization. The Center’s mission is to: promote leadership in the Presidency and the Congress to generate innovative solutions to current national challenges; preserve the historic memory of the Presidency by identifying lessons from the successes and failures of such leadership; draw on a wide range of talent to offer ways to better organize an increasingly compartmentalized federal government; and educate and inspire the next generation of America’s leaders to incorporate civility, inclusiveness, and character into their public and private lives and discourse. MOBILIZING NATO FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN: AN ASSESSMENT OF ALLIANCE CAPABILITIES Copyright © 2010 CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE PRESIDENCY AND CONGRESS All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Published in the United States of America. Cover photos from NATO and ISAF. The use of international organization symbols and national flags is purely illustrative, and does not indicate any official endorsement of this report or its findings by those organizations, their member nations, or national governments.
    [Show full text]
  • Operation Moshtarak
    NEWS RELEASE ISAF Joint Command – Afghanistan 2010-02-CA-059 For Immediate Release Operation Moshtarak KABUL, Afghanistan (Feb. 13) The operation Operation Moshtarak is an Afghan-led initiative to assert government authority in the centre of Helmand province. Afghan and ISAF partners are engaging in this counter- insurgency operation at the request of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Helmand provincial government. Moshtarak is a Dari word for "together". The security forces that make up the combined force are serving side-by-side, representing partnership in strength. Insurgents who do not accept the government’s offer to reintegrate and join the political process will be met with overwhelming force. However, the strongest of measures will be taken to protect the civilian population. Military operations in central Helmand will be followed by the swift establishment of an Afghan government presence in cleared areas. This will be supported by stabilization activity led by the Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team. The participants A combined force of 15,000 is involved in Operation Moshtarak. This combined force includes: Approximately five brigades of Afghan forces, including members of the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, Afghan Border Police and Afghan Gendarmerie (formerly Afghan National Civil Order Police). ISAF Regional Command (South) elements, with forces drawn from the United States, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Estonia and Canada. These elements include: 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines (US)
    [Show full text]
  • The Meritorious Service Medal 1991-2016
    The Meritorious Service Medal 1991-2016 CONTACT US Directorate of Honours and Recognition National Defence Headquarters 101 Colonel By Drive Ottawa, ON K1A 0K2 http://forces.gc.ca/en/honours-history-awards/index.page 1-877-741-8332 © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2016 A-DH-300-000/JD-006 Cat. No D2-364/2016 ISBN 978-0-660-05799-6 Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, Queen of Canada, wearing her insignia of Sovereign of the Order of Canada and of the Order of Military Merit, in the Tent Room at Rideau Hall, Canada Day 2010 Photo: Canadian Heritage, 1 July 2010 iv | The Meritorious Service Medal Dedication To the recipients of the Meritorious Service Medal who have demonstrated military professionalism and brought honour upon themselves and their nation. v | The Meritorious Service Medal Table of Contents Dedication ......................................................................................................................... v Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 Statistical Analysis ........................................................................................................... 7 Meritorious Service Decorations Regulations, 2015 ................................................. 35 Register – Recipients of the Meritorious Service Medal (Military Division), 1991-2016 ...................................................................................... 45 Glossary of Post-nominals .........................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Close Combat Vehicle and Leopard 2 Main Battle Tank: Back in the Heavyweight Fight
    CLOSE COMBAT VEHICLE AND LEOPARD 2 MAIN BATTLE TANK: BACK IN THE HEAVYWEIGHT FIGHT Major Howard Mark Anthony JCSP 38 PCEMI 38 Master of Defence Studies Maîtrise en études de la défense Disclaimer Avertissement Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do Les opinons exprimées n’engagent que leurs auteurs et not represent Department of National Defence or ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Ministère de Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used la Défense nationale ou des Forces canadiennes. Ce without written permission. papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite. © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the © Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par le Minister of National Defence, 2012 ministre de la Défense nationale, 2012. CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE - COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES JCSP 38 - PCEMI 38 MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES - MAITRISE EN ÉTUDES DE LA DÉFENSE CLOSE COMBAT VEHICLE AND LEOPARD 2 MAIN BATTLE TANK: BACK IN THE HEAVYWEIGHT FIGHT By Major Howard Mark Anthony, CD This paper was written by a student attending La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour of the requirements of the Course of Studies. satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude The paper is a scholastic document, and thus est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contains facts and opinions, which the author contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul alone considered appropriate and correct for l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au the subject.
    [Show full text]
  • Mp-Hfm-204-05
    Canadian Military-Civilian Relationships within Kandahar Province Adrienne Turnbull Centre for Operational Research and Analysis Defence R&D Canada, CORA Halifax CANADA [email protected] Patrick Ulrich Task Force Kandahar Governance Planner 2008-2009 Humanitarian Aid Worker Ottawa CANADA [email protected] ABSTRACT An understanding of cultural differences and methods with which to mitigate them is important for resolving conflict in Afghanistan and other nations. A lack of understanding of different cultural groups can cause confusion and failed communication. Such misunderstandings do not occur solely between national or ethnic groups; they may also occur within organisational task forces or teams – among groups who are all working together toward the same goal (e.g., of defeating a counter-insurgency), yet who disagree on how specific progress should be achieved. This paper focuses on the authors’ perceptions of cultural differences in relationships between Canadian military and civilian representatives within Kandahar Province based on personal experiences while working as technical and policy advisors within the J5 (Plans and Assessment) of Task Force Kandahar headquarters. The paper provides a description of these cultural differences, outlines specific examples of where these differences have resulted in successes or failures, and identifies current and potential solutions for addressing these differences. 1.0 INTRODUCTION An understanding of cultural differences between groups and an attempt to mitigate them is important in resolving the major problems in Afghanistan and other conflicted nations. Cross-cultural competence is needed to work effectively in intercultural environments [1]. Misunderstandings do not occur solely between nations, as confusion and failed communication can occur within nations or indeed within organisations – such as among groups or elements within a team who are all working together toward the same goal, in this case of defeating a counter-insurgency, yet who cannot agree on how specific progress should be achieved.
    [Show full text]
  • Canadian Military Journal Canadian Military Journal
    CANADIAN MILITARY JOURNAL CANADIAN MILITARY JOURNAL Vol. 13, No. 3, Summer 2013 Vol. 13, No. 3, Summer 2013 3, été 2013 o Vol. 13, N Vol. 3, été 2013 été 3, N 13, Vol. o CANADIENNE E M R I A T LI I REVUE REVUE MILITAIRE CANADIENNE Journal, the Editorial Board or the Department of National Defence. National of Department the or Board Editorial the Journal, lication will be returned to the author, if desired. No copy of unpublished manuscripts will be retained by Canadian Military Military Canadian by retained be will manuscripts unpublished of copy No desired. if author, the to returned be will lication - PRÉSENTATION DES MANUSCRITS pub for accepted not are that Manuscripts author. the to reference without discussion or argument the of integrity the affect The Editor reserves the right to edit manuscripts for style, grammar and length, but will not make editorial changes which which changes editorial make not will but length, and grammar style, for manuscripts edit to right the reserves Editor The La Revue militaire canadienne invite les auteurs à lui soumettre des manuscrits qui traitent d’un large éventail de questions manuscript. a submitting when superior their from d’intérêt pour le milieu de la défense au Canada. Les sujets portent sur les politiques de défense et de sécurité, les questions liées clearance prior obtain to required not are Defence National of Department the of employees civilian and Forces Canadian à la stratégie, la doctrine, les opérations, la structure des forces armées, l’application de la technologie, l’acquisition de matériel, the of members serving so Board, Editorial the of recommendations on acting Editor the to Journal Military Canadian the l’histoire militaire, le leadership, l’instruction et l’éthique militaire, entre autres.
    [Show full text]
  • Canada in Afghanistan: 2001-2010 a Military Chronology
    Canada in Afghanistan: 2001-2010 A Military Chronology Nancy Teeple Royal Military College of Canada DRDC CORA CR 2010-282 December 2010 Defence R&D Canada Centre for Operational Research & Analysis Strategic Analysis Section Canada in Afghanistan: 2001 to 2010 A Military Chronology Prepared By: Nancy Teeple Royal Military College of Canada P.O. Box 17000 Stn Forces Kingston Ontario K7K 7B4 Royal Military College of Canada Contract Project Manager: Mr. Neil Chuka, (613) 998-2332 PWGSC Contract Number: Service-Level Agreement with RMC CSA: Mr. Neil Chuka, Defence Scientist, (613) 998-2332 The scientific or technical validity of this Contract Report is entirely the responsibility of the Contractor and the contents do not necessarily have the approval or endorsement of Defence R&D Canada. Defence R&D Canada – CORA Contract Report DRDC CORA CR 2010-282 December 2010 Principal Author Original signed by Nancy Teeple Nancy Teeple Approved by Original signed by Stephane Lefebvre Stephane Lefebvre Section Head Strategic Analysis Approved for release by Original signed by Paul Comeau Paul Comeau Chief Scientist This work was conducted as part of Applied Research Project 12qr "Influence Activities Capability Assessment". Defence R&D Canada – Centre for Operational Research and Analysis (CORA) © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2010 © Sa Majesté la Reine (en droit du Canada), telle que représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2010 Abstract …….. The following is a chronology of political and military events relating to Canada’s military involvement in Afghanistan between September 2001 and March 2010.
    [Show full text]
  • Observations on the Need for a Comprehensive Approach
    Observations on the Need for a Comprehensive Approach Colonel Dwayne K. Hobbs Defence Research & Development Canada - Toronto 1133 Sheppard Avenue West Toronto, Ontario M3M 3B9 CANADA [email protected] ABSTRACT NATO countries have made enormous resource investments into Afghanistan, not the least of which is Canada. Over several years, the Government of Canada has taken extraordinary steps to ensure that the policy conditions were set to allow the instruments of Canadian national power to work in an integrated and synchronized manner across security, development and governance lines of operation in order to achieve the desired effects in Kandahar Province. The establishment of parliamentary committees, interdepartmental task forces and the deployment of Foreign Service officers and Public Servants alongside Canadian Forces personnel have had important implications. The presence of Canada’s whole of government partners, while obviously critical to mission-success, undoubtedly creates a new level of complexity for NATO. As an officer deployed to the Operations Coordination Centre (Province) (OCC-P) in Kandahar City from May 2008 until February 2009, I have a unique perspective of that complexity. This paper is autobiographical in nature. My observations of the joint, interagency, multinational and public (JIMP) operating environment can, it is hoped, inform future discussions about the need for a comprehensive approach. 1.0 CONTEXT From May 2008 until January 2009, I was deployed as then a lieutenant-colonel to the Operations Coordination Centre – Province (OCC-P) in Kandahar City. The OCC-P was co-located with the Governor’s Palace in the centre of the province’s capital.
    [Show full text]
  • Smart Defense and the Future of NATO: Can the Alliance Meet the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century?
    The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, founded in 1922 as The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, is a leading independent, nonpartisan organization committed to infl uencing the discourse on global issues through contributions to opinion and policy formation, leadership dialogue, and public learning. Smart Defense and the Future of NATO: Can the Alliance Meet the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century? conference report and expert papers March 28-30, 2012 Presented by In Partnership With 332.South.Michigan.Avenue. Suite.1100.. .Chicago,.Illinois.60604 thechicagocouncil .org Smart Defense and the Future of NATO: Can the Alliance Meet the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century? March 28-30, 2012 Chicago, Illinois Conference Report and Expert Papers Dr. Lisa Aronsson and Dr. Molly O’Donnell Conference Report Coauthors Presented by The Chicago Council on Global Affairs This conference and publication were generously supported by: NATO Public Diplomacy Finmeccanica UK Ltd Robert Bosch Stiftung Consulate General of Canada in Chicago Saab Cooper Family Foundation Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung DePaul University The Chicago Council on Global Affairs is a leading independent, nonpartisan organization committed to influenc- ing the discourse on global issues through contributions to opinion and policy formation, leadership dialogue, and public learning. The Chicago Council provides members, specialized groups, and the general public with a forum for the consideration of significant international issues and their bearing on American foreign policy. In addition to remaining the premier platform in the Midwest for international leaders in foreign policy, The Chicago Council strives to take the lead in gaining recognition for Chicago as an international business center for the corporate community and to broaden and deepen The Chicago Council’s role in the community.
    [Show full text]