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Smart Defense and the Future of NATO: Can the Alliance Meet the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century?

conference report and expert papers

March 28-30, 2012

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Smart Defense and the Future of NATO: Can the Alliance Meet the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century?

March 28-30, 2012 Chicago, Illinois Conference Report and Expert Papers Dr. Lisa Aronsson and Dr. Molly O’Donnell Conference Report Coauthors Presented by The Chicago Council on Global Affairs

This conference and publication were generously supported by: NATO Public Diplomacy Finmeccanica UK Ltd Robert Bosch Stiftung Consulate General of Canada in Chicago Saab Cooper Family Foundation Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung DePaul University The Chicago Council on Global Affairs is a leading independent, nonpartisan organization committed to influenc- ing the discourse on global issues through contributions to opinion and policy formation, leadership dialogue, and public learning.

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This report may not be reproduced in whole or in part, in any form (beyond that copying permitted by sections 107 and 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law and excerpts by reviewers for the public press), without written permission from the publisher. For information, write to The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 332 South Michigan Avenue, Suite 1100, Chicago, IL, 60604. Table of Contents

Foreword ...... v

Conference Report...... 1

NATO’s Inward Outlook: Global Burden Shifting Josef Braml...... 18

Focused Engagement: NATO’s Political Ambitions in a Changing Strategic Context Henning Riecke...... 25

Challenges for the Security Sector in Afghanistan: How to Save Reform Beata Górka-Winter...... 32

NATO and Crisis Management Operations: A Canadian Perspective Elinor Sloan ...... 37

Smart Defense Camille Grand...... 45

NATO-Russia Relations: Toward a “Strategic Partnership”? Isabelle François ...... 50

NATO, Russia, and the Vision of a Euro-Atlantic Security Community Dmitri Trenin...... 55

NATO and the Middle East: A Positive Agenda for Change Jonathan Eyal...... 59

Turkey’s NATO Agenda: What Role in the Middle East? Lieutenant General S¸adi Ergüvenç (Ret .)...... 63

The Transatlantic Bargain after Gates Barry Pavel and Jeff Lightfoot...... 67

Conference Participants ...... 71

Conference Agenda...... 75

Foreword

In June 2011 outgoing U.S. Secretary of Defense goes on. How will NATO choose to invest in col- Robert Gates repeated in public what many had lective security? How can the Chicago summit privately acknowledged: NATO, the lynchpin of promote a more capable alliance? How will the alli- European security and transatlantic relations, ance integrate new partners into operations with- faces “the real possibility [of] a dim, if not dismal out diluting its potency and flexibility? How can future.” The experiences in Afghanistan and Libya NATO devise a strategy in line with its ambitions? have pointed to the consequences of chronically Where should the alliance place its focus in light of underfunding defense establishments, the dif- America’s strategic pivot toward the Asia Pacific? ficulties in getting twenty-eight sovereign states to These questions compelled The Chicago commit resources equitably and predictably, and Council on Global Affairs, in partnership with eight the challenges of responding effectively to new, institutions from NATO member countries, to rapidly emerging threats. The transatlantic alliance bring together leading thinkers and policy practi- must confront a number of fundamental strategic tioners in late March 2012 for a two-and-a-half-day questions about its future. conference, titled “Smart Defense and the Future It is good timing, then, that the 2012 NATO of NATO: Can the Alliance Meet the Challenges of summit—to be held in Chicago on May 20-21—is the Twenty-First Century?” Participants engaged quickly approaching. Some fifty heads of state and in a focused examination of the challenges and government from NATO member states and ISAF opportunities confronting the transatlantic alli- partner nations will arrive at Chicago’s McCormick ance in a time of changing threats and constrained Place for two days of deliberations. The most press- resources. This report and the accompanying ing issue will be the war in Afghanistan. Following papers, which the Council commissioned in sup- the May 1 signing in Kabul of the U.S.-Afghan port of the conference, serve as a useful framework Strategic Partnership Agreement by Presidents for understanding and discussing these issues in Obama and Karzai, alliance leaders will give consid- advance of the Chicago summit. erable attention in Chicago to shaping the contours The Chicago Council has a rich history of col- of a wider NATO-Afghan partnership post-2014. laboration with transatlantic research institutions Beyond Afghanistan, leaders will no doubt have and foundations. For more than thirty years, the many notable items for discussion: defense spend- Council hosted the Atlantic Conference, a bien- ing in an age of austerity, NATO’s Smart Defense nial event that brought together North American, initiative, the alliance’s expanding global network European, and Latin American thought leaders and of strategic partnerships, missile defense—the list decision makers. The last one, convened in 2006 in

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o v partnership with Real Instituto Elcano in Madrid, strong execution is thanks to the Council’s special focused on migration and migrant integration. events team, which includes January Zell, Elizabeth The Council cosponsored a conference on home- Lulla, and Carrie McAlpin. Elisa Miller and Anna land security in 2007 with London’s Royal United Edwards were instrumental in securing sponsor- Services Institute. And last year, the Council pub- ship and funding support. Samantha Skinner and lished The Transatlantic Alliance in a Multipolar Nadine Apelian Dobbs managed the communi- World, a report that bundled five working papers cations strategy and media outreach. Jon Macha, on topics such as “NATO’s Nonproliferation Craig Kafura, and Rick Dembinski coordinated Challenges” and “NATO and the Protection of the the Council’s social media platforms and online Commons.” content. Program consultant Jillian Ridderbos and This year’s conference brought together part- interns Abhit Bhandari and Janice Shon provided ners both old and new. We are grateful to the valuable project support. Catherine Hug was the following institutions for their support, collabo- editor for the report and commissioned papers. ration, and camaraderie: The Atlantic Council of This conference report and expert papers serve the United States, Canadian International Council as a fitting “scene setter” for the NATO summit in (CIC), Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Chicago. Institute (CDFAI), Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), the German Council on Foreign Marshall M. Bouton Relations (DGAP), Global Political Trends Center President (GPoT) of Istanbul Kültür University, the Polish The Chicago Council on Global Affairs Institute of International Affairs (PISM), and the May 2012 Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). The Chicago Council and its partners are sin- cerely grateful to the following organizations for their generous support of our March conference and this accompanying publication: NATO Public Diplomacy, Finmeccanica UK Ltd, the Robert Bosch Stiftung, the Consulate General of Canada in Chicago, Saab, the Cooper Family Foundation, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, and DePaul University. Lastly, I would like to extend my appreciation to the members of The Chicago Council staff and its advisors who made this conference and publication possible. The Council’s vice president of studies, Dr. Rachel Bronson, oversaw the conference’s plan- ning and execution. Ambassador Fay Hartog Levin, senior advisor on European affairs to the Council, provided invaluable guidance and was instrumen- tal in securing the participation of key participants. Chris Moffo, assistant director of studies, managed the project and served as primary point of contact with our partners. Dr. Molly O’Donnell served as conference rapporteur and coauthored the report with Dr. Lisa Aronsson of RUSI. As always, Senior Fellow Richard Longworth turned his expert pen onto portions of the report. The conference’s

vi the chicago council on global affair s Conference Report

On March 28-30, The Chicago Council on Global falling, just as the United States is urging its allies Affairs, in partnership with eight institutions from to spend more. The American military budget is NATO member countries, hosted a conference on also likely to contract. Allied defense spending “Smart Defense and the Future of NATO: Can the may be declining in real terms. Alliance Meet the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century?” The conference, which took place less • The Obama administration has announced its than two months before the 2012 NATO summit in “pivot” to Asia. For the first time since World Chicago, brought together diplomats, policy prac- War II, Europe may no longer be the focus of titioners, experts, and journalists from ten NATO American strategic planning. countries as well as Australia, Pakistan, and Russia. The conference focused on the ongoing cam- • NATO forces will withdraw from Afghanistan by paign by NATO Secretary General the end of 2014—maybe sooner. Anders Fogh Rasmussen to make At best, NATO will leave behind NATO more efficient and coop- a secure nation, bolstered by bil- erative through “Smart Defense.” lions of dollars in Western aid. The conference also addressed Alternatively, it could leave behind important underlying themes— a security vacuum with promises transition in Afghanistan, defense of aid that may never be fulfilled. spending in an age of austerity, • NATO’s Libyan intervention ulti- stalled progress in the NATO- mately succeeded in spite of Russia relationship, new partners complications that exposed the for twenty-first century challenges, alliance’s interoperability gaps and the future of U.S. leadership and lopsided contributions. within the alliance—all of which The Europeans—the French illustrate how much has changed and British, in particular—led in the two years since the NATO the campaign, with the United summit in Lisbon, Portugal: States in support. This was a first • The global financial crisis has Ambassador R. Nicholas Burns, former in such a major mission. Still, U.S. under secretary of state for political only eight of NATO’s twenty- taken root, especially in Europe. affairs, speaks to an audience of more European defense spending is than 350 Council members. eight members flew sorties

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 1 over Libya. Germany—by far Europe’s strongest Economic realities: Scope and depth nation—remained on the sidelines. of austerity • Europe is peaceful, which means that any future The decline of defense budgets among alliance NATO missions will be “out of area,” as were members is one of the most important challenges Afghanistan and Libya. Is NATO going global? NATO faces ahead of the Chicago summit. Strong NATO leaders are talking now about future mis- and stable public finances are essential underpin- sions around the world carried out by groups of nings for national security, and allies must reduce NATO members—a sort of “defense by break- their public deficits to help build out sessions.” Are there limits to and sustain their armed forces and these out-of-area ambitions? defend themselves against exter- nal threats. Reductions in defense Today, NATO faces a critical junc- spending across the alliance, how- ture. To remain relevant, it must ever, are driving a wedge between continue to evolve and make major the United States and its European changes—to its structure, mis- allies. Twenty-four allies failed to sions, and temptations. To remain meet the agreed 2 percent bench- in power, political leaders in the mark for defense spending. In most member countries must manage countries, personnel costs—rather significant financial challenges. than investments in new technolo- The issues and questions dis- gies and capabilities—continue cussed at The Chicago Council’s to account for most of national conference in late March will be on defense budgets. the table at the 2012 NATO summit The conference discussion and may make the Chicago meet- began with a reference to Secretary ing a true watershed summit. Gates’ farewell speech in Brussels This report begins with a sum- Council President Marshall M. Bouton welcomes conference participants. in June 2011. Gates warned that mary of the conference sessions, the United States could soon grow tired of cover- followed by commissioned papers by conference ing 75 percent of NATO’s bill and subsidizing NATO attendees, the conference agenda, and a list of par- by spending three times the European average. ticipants. The report is a guide to the key questions Increasingly, American leaders will look for a genu- being addressed at the 2012 NATO summit and to ine security partnership across the Atlantic as well the questions that will likely confront the alliance as partners who take security seriously and make in the coming years. substantial contributions to their own defense. In The report and papers that follow would not this context, panelists focused their remarks on have been possible without the support of the the interdependence of the European economies key partner organizations, including the Atlantic and North America, explanations and implications Council, Canadian International Council (CIC), of uncoordinated cuts across Europe, the difficul- Canadian Defense and Foreign Affairs Institute ties European politicians face in generating public (CDFAI), Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique support for defense, and the relative importance of (FRS), the German Council on Foreign Relations the transatlantic political link in difficult economic (DGAP), Global Political Trends Center (GPoT) circumstances. at Istanbul Kültür University, Polish Institute of The Rt Hon James Arbuthnot highlighted the International Affairs (PISM), the Royal United close relationship between the United Kingdom Services Institute (RUSI), and the Chicago NATO and Eurozone currencies and the challenges both Host Committee. face. He argued not only that the concept of a com-

2 the chicago council on global affair s mon currency was flawed, but that some nations and NATO, as leaders across Europe are prioritizing had failed to play by their own rules. Fiscal union, debt reduction and economic growth over defense he argued, ultimately depended on a preexisting and security investments. As a first step they need political union: The EU cannot create such a union to approve the European stability mechanism if its people do not want it. In this context, the to avoid more of the contagion and destabiliza- Euro cannot survive. If it does, the political price tion that they have experienced in the past year. for Europe may be too much to pay. The role of This must be done in difficult circumstances, with the European Central Bank is increasingly impor- uncertain oil prices and crises flaring in the Middle tant, but it struggles to implement its mandate and East. Mr. Kendry argued that NATO should remain support the troubled European banking institu- confident as Europe tackles these challenges, but tions. Meanwhile, challenges related to unemploy- that it must also remain realistic. He reminded con- ment and slow growth—or no growth at all—are ference attendees that, in addition to the explicit not expected to let up. Europe’s institutional prob- problems of debt and deficits facing Europe, the lems and declining defense budgets might leave continent also faces demographic problems and its armed forces with outdated equipment and a looming increases in the cost of medical care and reduced ability to project power. pensions as the population ages. Panelists agreed that NATO has, in some ways, Mr. Arbuthnot and Mr. Kendry argued that become a victim of its own success. The alliance interdependence among the NATO allies is also kept the peace in Europe for seven decades. During an important aspect of the debate about austerity the Cold War NATO relied on nuclear deterrence, and defense. It is vitally important that both North which was much more affordable than conven- America and Europe continue to foster and support tional armies. Mr. Arbuthnot argued that the right transatlantic trade links by reducing barriers and thing to do after the Cold War, with nuclear deter- nontariff barriers to trade and by prudently man- rence less effective, would have been to increase aging their economic interdependence. The United defense spending. Europeans, however, decided to States is vulnerable to future shocks and instabil- take advantage of the “peace dividend” and reduce ity in Europe, with roughly 20 percent of American spending in the 1990s and 2000s, which has led exports and 30 percent of its deposits finding their to a European “crisis of understanding” around way to the European continent. All of the allies are defense and security. Armed forces were drastically exposed to Greece, Italy, Spain, and others, and all reduced, and the power of modern weapons meant of this is happening at a time of significant geo- fewer and fewer people were required to operate political shifts as well as changes within NATO them. As a result, the percentage of people with experience in the services declined, and politicians grew less able to explain to their publics the impor- tance of defense investment. It is now very difficult for political leaders to build support for defense. In emergencies, of course, military intervention can be necessary to uphold national interests, keep sea lanes free and open, and protect jobs. Reductions in defense spending across NATO, coupled with operational fatigue from Afghanistan and a declining appetite for interventions, have proved challenging enough. NATO Senior Defense Economist Adrian Kendry argued, though, that The Rt Hon James Arbuthnot MP, chairman of the UK Defence further economic contraction could pose an even Select Committee, explores the challenges facing NATO in the more dangerous threat to transatlantic relations midst of the global economic crisis.

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 3 headquarters, where reform of the Middle East, he said, may not lead agencies and command structure to a trend away from Europe, but it is under way. will have important consequences The panelists concluded that for NATO, particularly on decisions when analysts look at the current related to resource allocation and economic crisis in the rear view political attention. It is in Europe’s mirror, the most important ques- interests to keep the United tion will concern the relative impor- States engaged and to ensure that tance of the transatlantic political NATO remains relevant for North link in global affairs. The United American security. The immi- States will continue to be one of nent downsizing of the American the most important economies in military, which follows almost the world—one characterized by twenty-two years of persistent war dynamism, technological develop- fighting and massive increases in ment, and innovation. Europe, on the American defense budget since the other hand, will be relatively the late 1990s, will also challenge less powerful in the world, even if U.S. Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder NATO. Europe, on the other hand, it manages to chart a path toward delivers a keynote address to confer- faces continuing economic crises ence attendees. a quick and stunning recovery. and social instability, which could North Americans and Europeans lead to explosions of violence in will need to think of an imaginative solution if their Greece or elsewhere. It might also lead to increas- political link is to remain as central for global secu- ingly xenophobic policies, an inward focus, or even rity as it has been in this new economic context. the balkanization of parts of Europe. Meanwhile, NATO-Russia relations are in the midst of a pro- NATO’s political ambition in a found change: Allies feared a resurgent Russia in 2008, but challenges now stem increasingly from changing strategic context Russia’s weakness rather than its strength. Equally important shifts are taking place in The global strategic context is changing rapidly other parts of the world. The Arab uprisings, revo- just as NATO is attempting to redefine its ambition, lutions, sectarian conflict, and civil wars across the renew solidarity, and demonstrate its relevance for Middle East and North Africa increase the likeli- Europe and North America. In his keynote address hood that the region will remain unstable for years to conference attendees, U.S. ambassador to NATO to come. The al Qaeda threat, though crippled in Ivo Daalder argued that globalization is the main Afghanistan, will remain diffuse and unpredictable. driver for these changes in the strategic environ- Whatever the outcome of the crisis over Iran, the ment and that the accelerating flow of commu- region will be transformed yet again. Deterrence nications, commerce, and capital across borders will be brought back into defense planning debates presented the most difficult challenges for NATO if a nuclear Iran emerges. Whatever the outcome, policy. As a consequence, allies face challenges NATO will be affected. It is not clear, though, what concerning migration, trafficking, economic dis- kind of a role—if any—NATO would be willing and location, the diffusion of power to nonstate actors, able to play in such a contingency. A conflict on global terrorism, accelerating climate change, and the Korean peninsula could draw NATO allies with natural disasters. commitments to South Korea into a conflict that Dr. Karl-Heinz Kamp of the NATO Defense NATO might not otherwise be prepared to fight. College argued that strategic change within the Equally, a miscalculation between the Chinese and West would also affect NATO’s choices. The U.S. one of its neighbors in the South China Sea would strategic rebalancing toward Asia and the Greater

4 the chicago council on global affair s challenge important trade routes for Europe. and civil society. As Dr. Shea pointed out, the “cyber Uncertainties about China’s military moderniza- czars” at NATO headquarters are an instructive tion and its underlying intentions are also leading example. The majority of them had never been to to a quasi-arms race in what is already an region. NATO headquarters, but their efforts have helped Participants discussed NATO’s 2010 Strategic improve NATO’s understanding of the extent to Concept in the context of a changing environ- which it can work with Eupol and Interpol in shar- ment. The Strategic Concept defined NATO’s core ing information. Improved engagement with mul- tasks as collective defense, cooperative security, tilateral organizations such as the United Nations and crisis management. The document outlined a and the EU can also lead to smarter defense “flexible, adaptable approach,” though it did not diplomacy. The UN works with parliaments, gov- update alliance ambition. Participants argued that ernments, and civil society when involved in oper- the flexible, adaptable approach adopted at Lisbon ations, and NATO should be able to engage with is widely accepted as the right way to position the those actors as well. The formal partnership frame- alliance. But Damon Wilson of the Atlantic Council works should also be updated, and NATO’s geo- suggested that it had not given NATO the renewed graphic focus should expand to include the Middle self-confidence it needs. Political divisions con- East, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean (with tinue to reinforce gaps between NATO’s ambition its critical sea-lanes). Meanwhile, emerging econo- and its capabilities. Allies are reluctant to trim their mies are building their own institutions and invest- ambition, but, without at least redefining it, they ing heavily in NATO economies. It would be wise for may be forced into a strategy of simply defending NATO to build a strategy to engage these nations— borders without any capability to project European even with those that do not share NATO’s values. power. NATO reform has attracted attention, but it Partnerships are a growth area for NATO—they is focused on slimming down the organization and bring capability, knowledge, and opportunities for streamlining the command structure. NATO isn’t consultations to Brussels. NATO must consider asking itself the most basic ques- what it can offer those partners in tions about what it wants to deliver exchange. in this rapidly changing context. Finally, Polish Under-Secretary Dr. Jamie Shea, NATO’s dep- of State for Security Policy uty assistant secretary for emerg- Ambassador Bogusław Winid ing security challenges, believes argued that allies must (re)com- the alliance must get better at mit their political attention to anticipating and preventing con- Article 5 and to European secu- tingencies, deterring threats, and rity. Europeans expect the United preparing for unexpected opera- States will continue to demon- tions. This means doing a better strate leadership in NATO, even job of modelling hybrid threats as it rebalances its global strat- at NATO headquarters—identify- egy. NATO must also continue to ing tipping points, triggers, and invest in building interoperability key vulnerabilities. It also means with allies and planning for Article improving strategic consultations 5 contingencies. Damon Wilson and assessments within NATO and added, though, that the United with partners. States expects European allies to In his keynote address, NATO Deputy In adjusting to the new context, Assistant Secretary General for Emerging continue to aspire to shape global NATO must improve its relation- Security Challenges Jamie Shea under- affairs in spite of austerity. The scores the alliance’s need to effectively ships with other ministries, part- manage new types of crises, including United States expects Germany ners, multilateral organizations, cyber attacks. to take responsibility for Europe’s

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 5 In reflecting on the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Lieutenant-General Marc Lessard (Ret.) identified areas where NATO had excelled and areas in which improvement is needed. NATO proved impressive in its ability to maintain cohesion despite challenges on the bat- tlefield, political divisions, lack of public support, and changes in strategy. NATO was also success- ful in integrating more than fifty allies and part- ners into the mission and galvanizing support for a common purpose. This was done in spite of the Damon Wilson, executive vice president of the Atlantic Council, fact that some brought difficult caveats into the responds to a question, while Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer, direc- tor of the Paris office of the German Marshall Fund of the United theater, while others had niche roles, varied inter- States, looks on. ests and different reasons for contributing to ISAF. Diverse partners lent legitimacy to the operation. defense, the United Kingdom to hold onto its ambi- At the same time, Lieutenant-General Lessard and tion to play a global role, France to remain commit- another speaker, Pakistani author and journal- ted to Atlanticism as a default setting, and Turkey ist Ahmed Rashid, argued that the caveats proved to take its place as a major strategic ally within the a serious obstacle for NATO to overcome. When alliance. Other allies such as Norway, Denmark, countries refused to go on the offensive against the Poland, Canada, and Italy must do more to provide Taliban, it was demoralizing for the Afghans and enablers for deployable and sustainable forces. created confusion among them, while allowing the NATO can remain useful to Europe if it can facili- Taliban to penetrate the north and western regions. tate European military action where individual Meanwhile, relations between multinational nations would not be able to act alone. NATO will commanders and national representatives were reaffirm its relevance if it can come to terms with strained, and Lieutenant-General Marc Lessard austerity, reach out successfully to partners, and felt NATO struggled to share appropriate intel- facilitate European military leadership. ligence, resources, and critical enablers. Lessons should also be drawn from the length of time it Afghanistan: Learning the right took to develop and implement counterinsurgency lessons and turning to transition (COIN). Years were lost because of the absence of strategic focus during the Iraq war, and it was only The Afghanistan operation has consumed NATO with Generals McChrystal and Petraeus that the for over a decade. It has become the glue that appropriate strategy was defined and funded. It holds the alliance together as well as a driving force also took too much time for the allies to get a basic behind concept and capabilities development understanding of the historical context, political and interoperability. The mission has evolved over sensitivities, and tribal structures in Afghan society. time from the initial operation in Kabul, to expan- NATO then turned its attention to transition. sion across the country, to the surge and transition Beyond timelines and political communiqués, and now withdrawal. There has been no shortage transition was intended to enable Afghans to pro- of commentary about this operation, about what vide adequate security themselves. Central to the success might look like, and about whether it has strategy is NATO’s support for the Afghan National been or will be worth the costs. Allies are beginning Security Forces (ANSF). As Ahmed Rashid pointed to ask themselves what NATO will leave behind in out, the Afghan forces have already been rebuilt Afghanistan, what they will take away, and how the three times. The challenge for NATO is not only to allies have been affected by the experience. generate capacity but to build a sense of national

6 the chicago council on global affair s identity, leadership, and Afghan loyalties to the tinue to challenge NATO with the overlap of elec- state. It took too long for the United States to take tions and the end of the combat mission in 2014. ANSF training seriously, and some argued the Unless the Afghan government can achieve legiti- forces have consistently lacked a core officer group macy and deliver basic justice to its people, inequi- of Pashtuns on which they could rely to help build ties will continue to drive the insurgency. Cohesion up the Afghan National Army (ANA). between Afghan government ministries and the To be sure, the ANA has come a long way. In Afghan armed forces must also be strengthened to 2006 joint ISAF-ANA operations were a real hin- foster a culture of service to the nation and to coun- drance, but Afghan tactical skills have improved, ter the perceptions of corruption and entitlement. and Afghans are now taking the lead in key opera- The economy also needs attention. Many tions. Still, the ANA cannot take much strain, and Afghans will be out of work after 2014, and NATO asking them to take over a government operation must work with others to curb the flight of capi- against an insurgency in 2015 would be setting tal, engage ministries on financial management, them up for failure. Security-sector development and build expertise in online budget execution. will remain critical, and NATO will have to keep up The Tokyo donor conference in July 2012 falls at an the training, mentoring, and apprenticeships. It will important juncture and should ensure stable fund- also have to continue supporting the profession- ing in the short term while plotting a strategy for alization of the forces and the ethnic and regional longer-term sustainability. balance within them. It will also have to continue Finally, the speakers agreed that a political providing enablers and support for ministerial settlement is a prerequisite for transition and with- reform. Beata Górka-Winter of the Polish Institute drawal. NATO cannot leave Afghanistan in a state for International Affairs (PISM) argued that more of civil war. Talks with the Taliban must progress emphasis must be placed on investment in the toward some sort of a power-sharing arrangement Afghan Defense University in Kabul and other mili- with buy-in at the domestic, regional, and interna- tary academies, while ensuring ANA officers enjoy tional levels. The talks are ongoing, but extremely continued access to Western military academies. difficult. Ahmed Rashid felt President Karzai has Transition has also brought a wider civilian failed to build a political consensus around the focus to the operation, argued Dr. Mark Jacobson of talks. Warlords in the north have taken a belligerent the German Marshall Fund. NATO has invested in stance against them. Some in Kabul still think talks building up the rule of law, governance of civil soci- are taking place for Karzai’s interests rather than for ety, and sustainable economic development across Afghans more generally, and talks are galvanizing the country. President Karzai remains “reliably tensions across the nation. challenging,” and the politics of Kabul will con-

Panelists discuss the challenges and opportunities facing the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) as it prepares for transition in Afghanistan.

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 7 Meanwhile, prospects for a Conference in 2011 and calls for regional settlement are worse than the development of prioritization, they were four years ago. All of specialization, and multinational Afghanistan’s neighbors are prob- cooperation. Smart Defense will lematic. Trust has bottomed out be one of the Chicago summit’s between the United States and key agenda items, and allies will Pakistan, and the crisis over Iran’s be under considerable pressure to nuclear ambition means it is impos- demonstrate concrete deliverables sible to engage Iran on the subject. in this area. None of the neighbors want to see Some see Smart Defense as a ISAF in Afghanistan after 2014, but new label for the old approach to a rush to the exit might prove more capability development in the alli- problematic. ance or as a NATO rebranding of Panelists concluded that transi- the EU’s concept of pooling and tion in Afghanistan is likely to dom- sharing. NATO officials, however, inate the Chicago summit agenda. like to think of it as a new mind- Heads of state will announce that NATO Supreme Allied Commander set. This mind-set aims to encour- the process is on track and that Transformation General Stéphane age members to work with others Abrial opens the conference with a the Afghans will be in a position to keynote address on NATO’s Smart wherever possible; to set the right provide “good enough” security for Defense initiative. priorities at home and together their people beyond 2014. It is not in Brussels; and to encourage yet clear, however, whether the statement will go nations, especially the smaller nations, to special- far enough toward planting the seeds for a genuine ize in what they do best. The concept—as General political settlement. Nor is it clear that the NATO Abrial outlined—envisages NATO’s role as evolv- allies will be able to demonstrate that they can ing into a facilitator, or “clearing house,” tailoring help put Afghanistan on a road toward a sustain- funding mechanisms for multinational projects, able economy. They are unlikely to make concrete bringing industry into discussions from the earli- pledges for financing transition after 2014, and est stages, and enhancing bilateral cooperation questions remain about their ability and willing- and “islands of cooperation.” After appointing spe- ness to support funding mechanisms in place for cial envoys for Smart Defense, NATO socialized the the ANSF. The messaging in Chicago will revolve concept around the twenty-eight capitals and iden- around the recently signed U.S.-Afghan Strategic tified a series of “flagship projects” that would dem- Partnership agreement and the contours of a wider onstrate how NATO can help achieve economies NATO-Afghan partnership. of scale across the alliance. The hope is that allies will agree to more than twenty “Tier 1” projects Implementing Smart Defense ahead of the Chicago summit, including maritime patrol aircraft, mine counter measures, unmanned In the conference’s opening keynote address, aerial vehicle (UAVs), and support arrangements General Stéphane Abrial, NATO’s Supreme Allied for deployed helicopters. For each project, a lead Commander Transformation (SACT), outlined nation or a lead NATO body has taken responsibil- “Smart Defense” as NATO’s strategy to ensure that ity for the project’s scope. Partner nations are coor- the development of capabilities remains commen- dinating with one another and with EU staff, where surate with the alliance’s strategic and political necessary. ambitions and the evolving security environment. Panelists agreed that much work has been The strategy was launched by Secretary General done to develop the concept of Smart Defense. Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the Munch Security Still, Dr. Hans Binnendijk of the National Defense

8 the chicago council on global affair s University in Washington, D.C., argued that it has ference attendee feared that Smart Defense could not yet delivered a conceptual breakthrough. First become an Achilles’ heel. By encouraging coopera- and foremost, NATO must persuade nations to tion in small groups, Smart Defense might erode make bold decisions about sensitive issues—not in alliance solidarity, lead to fragmentation, and isolation, but in relation to one another. It needs to legitimize coalitions of the willing. Multinational find a way to penetrate the national defense plan- funding mechanisms also carry risks. At present, ning processes in the capitals, and it cannot work when nations sign up for a mission, costs lie where unless it can remove obstacles to cooperation they fall. This presents a major challenge for Smart whilst building trust between nations. It must also Defense, and it explains why the NATO Response find a way to guarantee the availability of capabili- Force (NRF) has not delivered the results many ties that are shared, pooled, or developed jointly had hoped. There are also risks associated with and offset the costs of perceived intrusion on sov- “overselling” Smart Defense. Smart Defense can- ereignty that will invariably accompany Smart not be allowed to become a political tool to cele- Defense. Low levels of threat perceptions, varying brate hollow cooperation or justify deeper cuts to priorities, and pressures on defense budgets not national defense budgets. Finally, Smart Defense only make this kind of penetration unlikely, they must deliver real financial gains for nations with also make it unattractive. “Shopping together” for different priorities. Some member states are seek- capabilities off the shelf is hard enough because ing military capability, but others have little will to of changing governments, national requirements engage in operations. They are more interested in for electoral budget cycles, bureaucratic oversight, finding savings in their defense budgets than gain- and industrial sensitivities. It took almost nineteen ing capability. years for allies to buy five aircraft (off the shelf) Dr. Binnendijk argued that work on Smart for Allied Ground Surveillance (AGS). This also Defense should be focused in three areas: explains why the United Kingdom dropped out of the French-Italian project on Horizon Frigates and • NATO must imagine the “residual force” it will why the French dropped out of the Eurofighter end up with if current spending trends continue. project to pursue the Dassault Rafale. More than fifteen allies spend less than 1.5 per- NATO will attempt to implement Smart cent of GDP on defense, and deeper cuts are Defense through a mix of means, ranging from expected. If this happens, horizontal cuts will confidence building among the nations to con- lead to problems with readiness and sustainabil- crete incentives. The strategy is likely to produce ity. Vertical cuts, such as those that have already savings for Europe, but it does carry risk. Alliance been made in the Netherlands and in the United capabilities are already deteriorating, and one con- Kingdom, will leave few nations with a real, full- spectrum force. Others already have gaping holes in their capabilities and are moving toward “spe- cialization by default” in niche areas.

• NATO should consider the “core force.” This has attracted attention at Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and at the National Defense University (NDU) in Washington, D.C. Work is under way to identify the minimum level of capabilities required for NATO to be able to deliver on its core tasks of collective defense, cooperative security, and crisis management. Once the minimum requirements have been set The panelists for the session on “Implementing Smart Defense” prepare to answer questions from the audience. at the NATO level, the Chicago summit could

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 9 provide an opportunity for nations to pledge that they will not make any cuts in their national armed forces that might jeopardize the core force or undermine capabilities they have pledged.

• NATO needs to think conceptually about “Force 2020.” Allies should start imagining and defining an aspirational force that goes beyond the core force and enables NATO to deliver on its core missions and maintain its current levels of strate- gic and political ambition. Hans Binnendijk, vice president for research and applied learn- NATO’s operational agenda will also mat- ing at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., dis- cusses NATO’s Smart Defense agenda alongside Camille Grand, ter for Smart Defense. As Sir Brian Burridge of director of Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS). Finmeccanica UK argued, the capability require- ments of the extended Afghanistan campaign and The international context will tell NATO what is the short-notice Libya operation have served to required in its next operations. If NATO is able to heighten awareness of both NATO’s collective capa- safeguard its knowledge, it will be able to respond bility shortfalls and those of individual nations. quickly and appropriately rather than relying on Smart Defense will need this stimulus if nations are nations, which is how responses have been formu- to see the concept as anything more than simply lated until now. “shopping together.” Without the stimulus of oper- Smart Defense needs to pursue a new collab- ations, he argued, collective alliance capabilities orative model that brings member states, NATO, and the interoperability between them are likely to and industry closer together at the earliest stages of wither on the vine. Sustaining them requires both capability development. Sir Brian highlighted that, proactive acquisitions and the preservation of cor- increasingly, the defense industry has no choice porate operational memory, which is likely to evap- but to follow the market. In essence, this requires orate as NATO winds down its operations and ISAF individual companies to form alliances so as to is drawn to a close. maximize investments, available technologies, and In the context of Smart Defense, Burridge access to markets to provide viable and cost-effec- argued that NATO must ensure that a system is in tive solutions to capability requirements. Supply place to institutionalize lessons learned and guard chains should be configured on the basis of “best NATO’s intellectual infrastructure. Industrial rep- athlete” rather than in response to the iron grip of resentatives agreed that NATO must now accept “work share.” Industry already understands that a more strategic role in maintaining the body capturing knowledge, harnessing innovation, and of knowledge developed through collaboration meeting market requirements is essential and that, between industry and nations’ armed forces to in the future, unfettered access to intellectual prop- address the capability requirements of operations. erty will be paramount. Future capabilities will This knowledge must be maintained in order to require assurance that intellectual property can be make role specialization or mission focus groups easily adapted, modified, enhanced, and shared, feasible and to ensure that NATO can continue to depending on the user’s requirements. operate across the spectrum. It is this knowledge If Smart Defense does not push nations beyond and experience that allows militaries to expand “shopping together,” the strategy will not be able their capabilities to meet the challenges of indi- to guarantee nations access to NATO’s collective vidual operations, thus getting every ounce of body of knowledge. NATO officials need to simplify functionality out of both equipment and people. their own acquisition processes, develop a better understanding of the industrial landscape, and

10 the chicago council on global affair s find a way to engage with what is now a globalized • It is only through a strategic project that the rela- defense industry. The NATO body of knowledge tionship can be transformed. The missile defense already exists, but it needs to be optimized, joined issue will either constructively contribute to up, institutionalized, and made accessible so that transforming the strategic relationship or will NATO can remain a smart organization in an age lead to further deterioration of the U.S./NATO- of austerity. Russia relationship.

NATO-Russia relations: Achieving Despite one panelist characterizing NATO, the EU, and Russia as “natural allies,” there was fairly meaningful dialogue broad consensus that much of NATO’s relationship with Russia will need to be managed by the United Russia was, as one panelist said, “the elephant in States or through other bilateral relationships and the room” throughout the conference. Following not through NATO as a whole. At the same time, the cancellation of the Russia-NATO Council sum- one conference attendee suggested that, particu- mit meeting in May, Putin’s recent reelection, larly for “smaller” countries that are not “natural” and Russia’s stance on Syria at the UN Security partners for Russia, NATO may be a useful forum Council, there is great uncertainty about the for discussion. In the end, participants suggested future of NATO’s relationship with Russia. NATO’s several ways in which NATO can work to soften the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR) is edges of discord that currently exist. inevitably linked with U.S./NATO–Russia relations NATO will have a missile defense program, and and discussions relating to core security issues, it would be best for alliance to address it in collabo- including missile defense, nuclear arms, and con- ration with Russia and with respect for its concerns. ventional forces in Europe. None of these discus- One participant commented that U.S. engagement sions are moving forward. with Russia on missile defense will ensure that The U.S.-Russia “reset” has not borne fruit Russia remains on the right side of history moving and does not go far enough. How can NATO man- forward and may lead to the creation of a strategic age this relationship in a more strategic way? What bond between Russia, the United States, and NATO. expectations are realistic? This is essential: Without more confidence on Throughout the session, panelists provided both sides, NATO will not be able to discuss Smart useful context to these questions: Defense with Russia. • There is no inclusive security community in the A fundamental aspect of the EU-NATO rela- Euro-Atlantic region twenty years after the Cold tionship is a shared EU-NATO mental framework. War. This prevents us from working closely on issues.

• There is a deep-seated mistrust between the par- ties that will not be diffused easily.

• There is a lack of common ground between Russia and NATO.

• There are large cultural differences in how Russia and NATO negotiate.

• The “vicious cycle” of threats followed by coop- Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, eration is not productive. The “adversarial part- stresses the need for the United States and Russia to move nership” needs a more strategic approach. from residual adversary to strategic collaboration.

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 11 • The Chicago summit should be a place for NATO to adopt a clear strategy for how to change the nuclear status quo relating to tactical nuclear weapons in Europe so that NATO emerges with a safer, more secure, and more credible defense. NATO should adopt a responsible framework that gives the alliance time to work on the issues associated with the removal of these weapons from Europe—including a reasonable approach to Russian reciprocity—over a reasonable period of time (five years). NATO should also issue a Ambassador Rastislav Káˇcer, president of the Slovak Atlantic declaratory policy, making clear that the funda- Commission, recalls his diplomatic interactions with senior Russian officials while serving as ambassador of the Slovak mental purpose of its nuclear weapons is to deter Republic to the United States. the use of nuclear weapons by others.

The same cannot be said of the NATO-Russia rela- • A path to a more trusting and stable relationship tionship. Russia sees missile defense systems in must start with the search for common ground Europe not as a deterrent to Iranian or other out- and purpose. Joint military exercises are one pos- side missile attacks—of which both sides should sible starting point. Military-to-military exercises be concerned—but as a threat to Russia. Russia’s can help build trust and hopefully reduce the viewpoint that any missile defense system in one of Russian perception that NATO sees it as an enemy. their former states is an aggressive act against them must be addressed before any conversations can As one conference attendee noted, the NATO- move forward. Russia Council has done some good work. Still, Russia will never see itself as equal to less pow- the relationship is far from strategic. The United erful nations like the Baltic or Scandinavian coun- States will need to be a leader on many of the issues tries and therefore is less open to sitting at a table at hand, but Russia will also need to do its part by of twenty-eight equal partners in negotiations. As it repairing relationships with countries in the former is virtually impossible to have any sort of treaty or Soviet Union. Maintaining the status quo is not a agreement between all NATO member states and viable option. With elections this year in both the Russia, any demand on Russia’s side for a legally United States and Russia, there is not likely to be binding, written agreement on missile defense that any breakthrough in relations. However, this allows would require the approval of all NATO govern- for time to think seriously about the relationship so ments—including U.S. Senate approval—is a non- that we are better prepared next year when discus- starter. This prevents even modest advances in the sions and negotiations begin anew. negotiations between NATO and Russia. Any real progress will have to be made in bilateral negotia- tions between the United States and Russia. Strategic partnerships: New partners Panelists proposed the following recommen- for new challenges dations to enhance the relationship: NATO has developed a wide array of international • Tactical nuclear weapons in Europe do not con- partners since the end of the Cold War to help man- tribute significantly to its security. More consul- age increasingly complex and interconnecting tations with Russia on transparency, confidence security threats. Partnership programs now exist building, and reduction in these as well as con- with about forty countries: ventional weapons would be an important part of a renewed dialogue.

12 the chicago council on global affair s • The Partnership for Peace (PfP), which is a frame- During the discussion, conference participants work for countries in the Euro-Atlantic region; focused on three key questions:

• The Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and the • Can NATO develop a more robust regional strat- Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), which are egy in Afghanistan? frameworks for engaging the broader Middle East; • Is there a NATO role for reducing the continued political and military turmoil in the Middle East? • Partners across the Globe (PAG), which is a more informal, less regionally specific framework that • Given the rising importance of Asia, should NATO works with countries on a bilateral basis. consider reaching out and engaging new Asian, non-NATO partners? Each of these platforms works in different ways and under different conditions. Until recently, NATO Afghanistan did not have a cohesive partnership management strategy. At the Lisbon summit in 2010, NATO The NATO/ISAF mission in Afghanistan opened began to redefine its partnership policy. NATO acti- new avenues of cooperation with non–NATO states. vated a new management structure for all partner- The increases in interoperability have created better ship programs in 2011, seeking greater openness capability and cooperation with many nonalliance and flexibility. members. However, participants raised concerns Against this background, General Vincenzo that after 2014 there is no clear mechanism for how Camporini (Ret.) began the discussion on strate- NATO and ISAF countries will continue to discuss gic partnerships with a very revealing anecdote: the challenges confronting Afghanistan. Partners Some key ISAF partners were not invited to NATO’s such as Australia have contributed significantly in 2009 Strasbourg-Kehl summit, notwithstanding the Afghanistan and developed a strong connection to fact that NATO’s role in Afghanistan was an impor- NATO and other partner countries. There is a desire tant agenda item. As NATO continues to rely on to continue these relationships in some forum, but non-alliance forces, it is crucial to develop insti- nothing has been formally established. tutions and arrangements that routinely involve Participants also agreed that there will be no partners in decision-making processes. The story solution in Afghanistan without a regional solution. of Strasbourg-Kehl suggests a lack of cohesive net- To date, NATO does not have a regional approach or works between NATO and the nonmember part- a regional strategy. To this end, additional partner ners that could hamper operations and strategy in countries in the region should be engaged to help the years ahead. create and implement this strategy, and not just on a bilateral basis. Ad hoc groups like the Friends of Syria have shown this can work. The lack of a proper platform for continued cooperation is particularly dangerous because ISAF nations will continue to support troops in Afghanistan after 2014. Who they will interact with after 2014 depends on the discussions that will take place over the next several months. Panelists offered the following recommen- dations:

Jonathan Eyal of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) responds to a fellow panelist’s remarks.

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 13 • NATO should consider developing a strategic overseas development agendas and the responsi- consultative group that draws in regional players bility to protect (R2P) framework. Unfortunately, in Afghanistan. as one panelist noted, NATO does not feel comfort- able in its capabilities outside a military role. “We • Prior to 2014, NATO leaders should establish some allow our institutions to disable us from things we mechanism for ensuring continued inter–NATO/ are capable of.” ISAF dialogue on Afghanistan to ensure a smooth Several panelists recommended that NATO transition after the official withdrawal date. explore new ways to reach out to MENA countries undergoing civil-military transformations, recog- Middle East nizing that each country has unique challenges and histories. Instability in the Middle East will continue for the foreseeable future. NATO has considerable exper- Asia Pacific tise on civil-military relations that could be very useful to Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) The ISAF mission in Afghanistan has significantly states as they transition. However, there is no insti- increased engagement between Europe and Asia. tutional mechanism with which to engage. This is When NATO was created, the United States was where a consultative group with countries outside building a system of extended deterrence across of NATO might make a major contribution. the globe. There was not a great deal of intersec- Turkey was the focus of much of the regional tion between the system in the Pacific, where the discussion. Turkey has been a strong and reliable regional institutions are built on economic cooper- NATO member and needs to be better integrated ation, and in Europe, where they are more security into the partnership so that NATO can, as General oriented. The war in Afghanistan has changed this. Camporini said, “obtain the added value of them One participant argued that the Asia Pacific as a bridge to the MENA countries and the needed provides NATO with important opportunities. cooperation between NATO and the EU.” Engaging states in the region could help better NATO needs to enhance its image in the region develop regional institutions. Although we often and demonstrate that it is more than a war-making think of China as the rising economic power, machine by using all the tools it has in its toolbox, Indonesia, Vietnam, India, and others are also including training and education. Along this line, expanding. All are emerging as increasingly impor- several participants asked about how NATO could tant trading powers. Many of them share our com- link activities in the Middle East and elsewhere to mitment to democracy and human rights. However, these countries will not reach out to NATO, but NATO could reach out to them. Many non-NATO countries can play a valu- able role in global security in the broader sense and should be invited to the table. Australia and Japan, for example, have made significant military and financial contributions to NATO missions and could be given more input in decision-making pro- cesses. Through exploration of wider partnership possibilities, NATO will have greater opportunities to build capacity and strengthen interoperability. There was a strong consensus among the panel- Ambassador Ümit Pamir, former permanent representative of Turkey to NATO, details the value that Turkey brings to the trans- ists that NATO needs to widen the pool of potential atlantic alliance. partner countries, including some that may not be

14 the chicago council on global affair s atlantic relationship. Will NATO members continue to make sacrifices for the benefit of the greater good in order to maintain the transatlantic bargain? As the Atlantic Council’s Barry Pavel and Jeff Lightfoot put forth in their conference paper, “For this bar- gain to hold and for NATO to remain relevant for both sides of the Atlantic, its member nations will need to modernize and update their capabilities and form more dynamic and innovative regional and global partnerships to best address the array of modern threats likely to face the transatlantic com- Franklin Kramer, former U.S. assistant secretary of defense for munity in the future.” international security affairs, discusses NATO’s future role in the Middle East and North Africa. Panelists agreed that NATO will remain a vital hub for European and North American security. as politically or culturally similar as its members. There also was strong consensus that it is time for Several participants debated whether a regional European member states to increase their capa- or functional approach to partnerships was the bilities and financial contributions to NATO as well right approach. as take more responsibility for security in Europe Despite the changes that have been made in and its backyard. However, participants questioned the revised policy of partnerships, some partici- whether the political will exists to do so, particu- pants felt that the political components to part- larly in difficult economic circumstances and with- nerships are inadequate. NATO must create the out strong public support in NATO countries. means for both political and technical coopera- Tough decisions must be made regarding how tion and understand that not every partner will NATO’s core missions will be achieved. Short- and have the same needs. The political value of the long-term strategies must anticipate the future participation itself is as important as the techni- security risks that we know are on the horizon, and cal cooperation—if not more so—for some non- strategy must adjust to shifts in the global balance member countries. When evaluating potential of power and to the diffusion of power to nonstate partnerships, NATO should consider not only actors. Although threats and NATO’s core missions what others can do for NATO, but also what NATO are outlined in the 2010 Strategic Concept, there can do for others. Multiple participants called for was much discussion in this session about pri- consultative groups of member and nonmember orities among threats, what would constitute an countries to lead the way on the issue of regional Article 5 threat, or what exactly is meant by “coop- strategy for Afghanistan, and for the Chicago sum- erative security.” How are they defined and under- mit to produce a declaration on the importance of stood by the nations, and how are they going to be clear regional strategies along with a call for a plan delivered? While there was general agreement that of action. the more flexible, adaptable approach outlined in the Strategic Concept is the right way forward, The transatlantic bargain after Gates there was a collective sense of frustration, given dif- ferences in national interpretations of those threats One of the Chicago summit’s key themes is the use and core missions. of Smart Defense alongside enhanced partnerships The larger questions and discussion of the ses- in order to keep NATO relevant and capable. Many sion focused on when and how collective resources larger questions remain unanswered, however, and capabilities would be used: regarding cohesion, strategy, and implementation. This is adding stress to an already uncertain trans-

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 15 • If countries are going to pool resources through regional partners to gain a better understanding of the Smart Defense initiative, how are they going regional politics, including areas where NATO may to agree on the use of them? be able to exert leverage. If NATO is to be effective in future missions in the Middle East or North Africa, • How will Article 5 be interpreted and handled for example, it will need stronger partnerships with and by whom? the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab League, other international organizations, and key part- • How would a cyber attack be interpreted under ner states, as the United States is less likely to play Article 5? a significant role. As noted in Pavel and Lighfoot’s paper, “[T]he time for NATO’s political timidity in • Is it time for NATO to “come home” and remain the face of such realities is over.” focused on Europe? Libya provides a potential model for future oper- ations, but there was discontent over the number NATO has strong capabilities and interoperability of countries that participated and those countries’ in some areas, but is weak in others. As panelists contributions. The Libya operation also made clear noted, twenty-first-century threats could come that, although the United States may not be in the from cyber attacks, transnational threats related to lead, major military action cannot happen without climate change, terrorism, or missile threats from a significant U.S. contribution. Germany received the Middle East or Northeast Asia—all of which the brunt of the criticism at this conference for could lead to Article 5 issues. However, member not participating in the Libya campaign and for its states are unprepared for transnational threats and restricted participation in Afghanistan, but several still disagree about what might constitute an Article conference attendees noted that many countries 5 response. If out-of-area operations increase, the either did not participate at all or participated only contribution of European members will also need in a very limited way. Much concern was expressed to increase. The United States may only lend sup- that the splintering of NATO into fighting countries port when interests coincide. versus support countries could be devastating to It is not just the United States that must con- alliance solidarity. However, others noted that hav- tend with security issues beyond Europe. Asia and ing clusters of countries with specific skill sets might the Indian Ocean will play a big role in future secu- be an effective way to implement Smart Defense. rity considerations for Europe, and NATO mem- Something must be done in Europe to keep the bers need to consult with one another and with key alliance strong and secure. The first step, accord- ing to one participant, is to address the capabili- ties shortfalls. Second, Europeans need to tackle the underlying political issues among themselves, including differing threat perceptions and differ- ent thoughts on the relative focus between Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations. Much work remains to be done on NATO-EU relations as well. The EU, however, cannot necessarily cover all its security needs without NATO. One conference attendee claimed that NATO’s significance to the United States is less about security (because of the domi- nance of the U.S. military) and more about political The conference’s closing session opens with remarks by His alliances that provide legitimacy for multinational Excellency Philippe Errera, permanent representative of France to NATO, and His Excellency Martin Erdmann, permanent represen- operations overseas. NATO’s future, according to tative of the Federal Republic of Germany to NATO. one American participant, must “not [be] about the

16 the chicago council on global affair s circumstances, however, and there is no reason to think that it cannot do so again, assuming the vision and requisite political will exists.

Panelists discuss the future of U.S. leadership within NATO and the internal and external challenges the alliance must overcome in the years ahead.

United States in Europe. It’s about the United States with Europe.” This is particularly true in areas such as Asia and in the Middle East, where individual European states do not carry enough weight to help shape the security environment. The United States has complained in the past about the disproportionate burden it has borne for NATO, with its share of NATO’s expenses ris- ing from 50 percent at the end of the Cold War to 75 percent today. Until now, the United States has accepted the bulk of the financial burden as part of a bargain that integrated Europe within the West and gave the United States a position of leadership and influence within Europe. Now that the United States has committed to reducing its military foot- print in Europe and reducing its contributions to NATO operations where its strategic interests are not threatened, European states must take on more responsibility as genuine security providers and partners for the United States. They must also begin to think more strategically about how, when, and where to take the lead in out-of-area operations. NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept has the poten- tial to address many of the strains in the current transatlantic relationship, but more work needs to be done. The allies need to set priorities among the conventional and new threats they face, and they must engage in more strategic discussions on core tasks and burden sharing. For a variety of reasons, some feel that the transatlantic bargain no longer has the solid foundation it had during the Cold War. The bargain has evolved in the past in light of new

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 17 NATO’s Inward Outlook: Global Burden Shifting

Josef Braml Editor-in-Chief, DGAP Yearbook, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)

Abstract: While European NATO partners have their difficulties coping with economic problems, the dire eco- nomic and budgetary situation in the United States matters more for the alliance. We have become familiar with the challenges European members face in fulfilling their obligations. But we should understand that NATO’s lead nation, shouldering three-quarters of the alliance’s operating budget, is in deep economic, bud- getary, and political trouble. Hence the United States will seek ways to share the burden with partners inside and outside NATO. With the instrument of a “global NATO,” the United States continues to assert its values and interests worldwide. In addition to the transatlantic allies, democracies in Asia will be invited to contribute their financial and military share to establish a liberal world order.

Domestic pressure: The power of the from Congress to check spending, would make it necessary for the commander in chief to find a way empty purse to cost-effectively balance the competing demands for resources in his new security strategy. Although It is not a secret. European NATO members, with a President Obama has already markedly reduced few exceptions, fight below their economic weight. America’s military “footprint” by bringing home Only four European countries, namely Great American troops in substantial numbers from Iraq Britain, France, Albania, and Greece, have com- and Afghanistan and “controlling” these impor- mitted the agreed 2 percent of their gross domestic tant geostrategic regions with unmanned aircraft, product (GDP) for defense. Given their economic American resolve—among leaders and the pub- troubles, even NATO’s model students, along with lic—to engage militarily in the world, especially in their less aspiring peers, will have to curtail their the form of peacekeeping missions, will be further defense budgets in the years to come (Keller 2011). weakened by budget constraints. While the Europeans have already been cutting On both ends of the political spectrum—from their defense budgets by 15 percent on average since libertarian Republicans to Democrats with close 2001, the United States has doubled its military ties to unions—arguments against America’s inter- expenditures since 9/11 to about 700 billion dollars national military engagement continue, albeit for annually, the equivalent of 5 percent of GDP (Broder different reasons. Libertarian Republicans, wor- 2011). This trend cannot be sustained. Greeting ried about the “domestic capitalist order” and the the incoming U.S. President Barack Obama, the growing budget deficit, criticize costly military Government Accountability Office (2009) warned engagement. Traditionalist Democrats (so-called that the dire budget situation, along with pressures “Old Liberals”) are defenders of “America’s social

18 the chicago council on global affair s interests” and are suspicious of international or An alliance without solidarity? militarist missions that drain resources for domes- tic social purposes. It will be very interesting to see From an American perspective, Europeans have sequestration in action—an across-the-board cut been straining the solidarity of NATO for a long to all nonexempt budget accounts—beginning in time (Szukala and Jäger 2002, 70-80). The limited January 2013, or to watch the political maneuvers capabilities of most European countries, attributed to avoid some of the impending reductions in the to decreasing military expenses and a lack of coor- U.S. defense budget totaling one trillion(!) dollars dination, have been a constant bone of conten- within the next decade. tion (see, for instance, Carpenter 2009). Eventually To be sure, a liberal, hegemonic worldview a division of labor solidified in which the United according to which the United States seeks to States and a few allies with the political will and shape the world order to advance its values and means led military missions, while the rest were interests still dominates mainstream thinking charged with long-term political and economic in U.S. foreign policy. In response to those “mis- reconstruction (Kissinger 2009, A19; Glenn and guided impulses” that seek to downsize U.S. for- Mains 2009; Patrick 2009). NATO’s mission in Libya eign engagement in favor of pressing domestic may illustrate a pattern likely to be continued in priorities, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (2011) the future. has a compelling answer: “We cannot afford not Despite this functional differentiation, each to.” While the United States intends to maintain alliance member is supposed to shoulder a fair its global hegemony, domestic and fiscal pressure share of the burden. This can be implemented fueled by the ongoing financial and economic cri- through “common funding” or other methods to sis will force a transatlantic debate about “burden split the costs more even-handedly (Hamilton et sharing.” Even as a presidential candidate, Barack al. 2009, 15, 45-48). To this end, more efficient vot- Obama (2008) already warned his European audi- ing mechanisms are necessary. In particular, the ence and his countrymen at home in his Berlin requirement for consensus is considered an obsta- speech that America and Europe should not “turn cle to swift decision making and action (James inward.” Rather, the transatlantic partners should Jones, as quoted in Yost 2008). jointly assume responsibility and shoulder “the burdens of global citizenship.” A change of leader- Improving cooperation ship in Washington, Obama predicted, would not lift this burden. Therefore, the time has come “to Given the difficulties of mobilizing necessary build new bridges across the globe” that should be resources within the alliance, the United States will as strong as the transatlantic bridge. continue to insist that NATO cooperate with will- Articulating the view on Capitol Hill, where the ing and capable partners in and outside the alli- power of the purse resides, Senate Foreign Relations ance. While many European NATO experts hope Committee Chairman John Kerry (2009, A17) has that the partnership issue is “off the table,” U.S. been publicly demanding that European NATO Defense Secretary Leon Panetta (2011) reminded allies “shoulder a bigger burden” and contrib- his colleagues in Brussels that “we should look for ute “more combat troops with fewer restrictions.” innovative ways to enhance and expand our part- Sensing the pressure of the legislature and the nership, both with those countries outside NATO general public, the outgoing Secretary of Defense that are exceptionally capable militarily and those Robert Gates (quoted in Jaffe and Birnbaum 2011) that strive to be more capable.” was even more articulate, hammering Europeans for not even being able to take care of their own security, let alone any global responsibility they might assume.

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 19 The European Union Poland and the Czech Republic will be postponed or coordinated with Russia. In addition, the United In order to more efficiently use limited resources, States will not keep pushing to enlarge NATO east- U.S. security experts have been recommending wards, leaving Georgia and Ukraine somewhat out 2 that European allies coordinate their resources in the cold (Haass and Indyk 2009; Kaiser 2009). (Kaim 2006, 16). The creation of the European According to news reports by the New York Defense Agency (EDA) was welcomed as a first Times (Baker 2009), President Obama at the step in the right direction to optimize EU member time offered a deal to his Russian counterpart to states’ individual defense budgets. “Smart defense” jointly examine missile defense and to figure out is yet another buzzword, but it remains to be seen ways to supply American and coalition forces in if Europeans will be able to “pool” and “share” Afghanistan. The NATO meeting of foreign minis- this time. ters on March 5, 2009, in Brussels resulted in more Even expectations that European governments points of contact. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary improve the development of civil capacities within Clinton pushed for resuming talks with Moscow, NATO are low. Therefore, the United States has been which were suspended by the George W. Bush gov- suggesting that NATO use the civilian capacities EU ernment after the war in Georgia (Burns 2009). member states have already been creating within Hence the foreign ministers of the twenty-six NATO the EU framework (Dobbins 2005). This pragmatic countries decided to recommence the formal con- recommendation turns the “Berlin plus” debate in sultations of the NATO-Russia Council. For U.S. the opposite direction by asking what assistance Secretary of State Clinton (2009b) this mechanism the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) for dialogue could serve as a “platform for coopera- can provide NATO, thus improving cooperation tion” on issues that are in NATO members’ interest (Haftendorn 2007, 153). such as transit to Afghanistan or nonproliferation.

Russia Countries outside NATO

Scarce resources may also lead former Cold War In order to institutionalize links with states outside antagonists to cooperate. U.S. Vice President NATO willing and capable of contributing substan- Biden’s (2009) announcement to examine—in tially to single missions, the United States already coordination with NATO allies and Russia—the began advocating for a Security Provider Forum Bush government’s missile defense plans by means under Bush’s leadership. In 2004 then U.S. ambassa- of technological and financial criteria was a first dor to NATO Nicholas Burns put the issue of enlarge- indicator that the United States is ready to “reset” ment through an alliance of democracies on the its relations with Russia. agenda (Kamp 2006, 3). Hence through close links To be sure, the North Atlantic alliance will rhe- (via “a global network,” yet short of membership) torically cling to its credo, according to which coun- with like-minded democracies—in particular Japan, tries of the Euro-Atlantic area are free (i.e., without South Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand— Russian veto power) to choose their allegiances and the transatlantic alliance should be interlaced with memberships.1 However, for important issues such “strategic partners” in the Pacific area. as the stabilization of Afghanistan and countering Iran’s nuclear ambitions, which require Russia’s cooperation, the United States needs to pay a 2. From a “realists”’ perspective, the Council on Foreign double price. For the time being, plans for station- Relations’ Richard Betts (2009) also recommended not to con- tinue to provoke Russia and make it clear to Georgia and the ing components of the missile defense system in Ukraine that they will not be admitted to NATO in the near future. See also the bipartisan recommendations of the Commission on U.S. Policy toward Russia (2009, 8-10), which was directed by 1. This has been stressed by Asmus (2009). Senator Chuck Hagel and former Senator Gary Hart.

20 the chicago council on global affair s NATO has already been considering bilateral Democrats, and, in particular, by experts in the cooperation partnerships, diverse approaches think tanks with close links to Barack Obama. An that need to be formalized. Since 2005 and 2006 “alliance of democracies,” which already exists the alliance has exchanged classified informa- in the eyes of some of its advocates (Daalder and tion with Australia and New Zealand, respectively Lindsay 2004) in the form of a “global NATO,” could (Dembinski 2006). Both countries have also con- compete with the United Nations or serve as an tributed to NATO missions in Afghanistan. NATO alternative when efficiency, legitimacy, and burden has developed a strategic dialogue with Japan and sharing are called for. The most prominent advo- India. Some of the most cooperative countries such cate of this idea, Ivo Daalder, is U.S. ambassador as Australia, Japan, and South Korea, have already to NATO. contributed military (in the case of Australia) or logistic support in the fight against terrorism. Conclusion and outlook: Instrumental U.S. Secretary of State Clinton (2009a) also looks multi-multilateralism forward to “strengthening the alliances that have stood the test of time,” thinking above all of NATO Following the Bush government’s unilateralist partners and allies in Asia. In particular, America’s actions, the United States under President Obama alliance with Japan—based on “shared values and has made efforts to return to the path of multilater- mutual interests”—“is a cornerstone of American alism. Whereas the Bush government, especially in policy in Asia,” key to maintaining peace and pros- its first term, still operated according to the motto perity in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States “unilateral as far as possible, multilateral when also cultivates “crucial economic and security part- necessary,” Obama’s government has announced nerships” with South Korea and Australia. In addi- a reverse operational logic: “We’ll work in a part- tion, it seeks to build on its economic and political nership whenever we can, and alone only when partnership with India, “the world’s most populous we must.” Clearly, the new government does not democracy and a nation with growing influence in fear that international alliances and organizations the world.” will lead to a reduction in the power of the United The blueprints of Anne-Marie Slaughter, States, but believes quite the opposite. According to former director of policy planning for the State the U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden (2009), “They Department, explain how Europe and Asia can help advance our collective security, economic be linked. According to Slaughter’s collection of interests, and our values.” ideas, NATO should reinforce partnerships with Nonetheless, Europeans should be aware that liberal democracies in Asia to create one of several “multilateral” has always been understood differ- formal and informal multilateral forums, help- ently in the United States, namely instrumentally ing to create a new, networked liberal world order (Krause 2005, 219-238). Multilateral organizations (Ikenberry and Slaughter 2006, 27-28). Accordingly, such as the United Nations and NATO were created in his memo to the new Democratic president, Will to assert American interests and enforce its con- Marshall (2009) from the Democratic Leadership ception of world order, while sharing the burden Council advised him to transform NATO from a with the beneficiaries and preventing free riders. North American–European pact into a “global alli- Domestic and fiscal policy pressure in the ance of free nations.” Integrating democracies such United States in the course of the economic and as Japan, Australia, and India into NATO would financial crisis is likely to intensify an already not only raise the legitimacy of global missions, it heated transatlantic debate on the issue of burden would also increase the alliance’s available man- sharing. The European allies will soon have the power and financial resources. opportunity to demonstrate their “effective” multi- This idea, in its basic features inspired by the lateral engagement, be it by training and mentoring Clinton government, has long been advocated by Afghan forces for a longer time in Afghanistan or by

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 21 contributing more financial resources to the stabi- America wants to be able to select the most suit- lization and reconstruction of Iraq, Afghanistan, or able instrument for the respective task from a Libya and the development of Pakistan. The U.S. broad range of multilateral service providers, and government under Obama will pursue diplomatic if required, create new multilateral instruments to efforts to forge George W. Bush’s much maligned secure its interests and enforce its conception of a “coalition of the willing” into a coalition of the liberal world order. financially willing. Should the Europeans prove unwilling or inca- References: pable, they would have fewer effective arguments against a “globalization” of NATO. However, even Asmus, R. 2009. “A New NATO Bargain. Before without the instrument of NATO, the United States Engaging Russia, the U.S. has to Convince Allies will attempt to find new ways to ensure that the That They’re Safe.” Wall Street Journal, March 6. democracies in Asia, along with the transatlantic allies, fulfill their financial and military obligations Baker, P. 2009. “Obama Offered Deal to Russia in for a liberal world order. Secret Letter.” New York Times, March 3. In order to strengthen the United States as a Pacific power, President Obama attended the Betts, R. K. 2009. “The Three Faces of NATO.” summit meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic National Interest Online, February 3. Accessed Cooperation (APEC) during his visit to Asia in March 9, 2012. http://www.nationalinterest.org/ November 2009, where he also had the opportu- Article.aspx?id=20944. nity to talk with the ten heads of government of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Biden, J. 2009. Remarks by Vice President Biden at In addition to the APEC agenda, dominated by the 45th Munich Security Conference on 7 February Washington, the intensification of relations between 2009. the United States and the ASEAN was also discussed. For America the ASEAN integration is extremely Broder, J. 2011. “Bearing the Burden of NATO.” CQ interesting. There are plans to establish a com- Weekly, June 18. mon free-trade zone and a security, economic, and sociocultural community by 2015. Since Obama Burns, R. 2009. “Allies Find Agreement on Ties with took office, the United States has made increased Russians.” Associated Press, March 5. diplomatic efforts to accede, culminating with Secretary of State Clinton’s signing of the Treaty Carpenter, T.G. 2009. “NATO’s Welfare Bums.” of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) one of the main National Interest Online, February 19. Accessed documents of the ASEAN, on July 22, 2009. This has March 3, 2012. http://www.nationalinterest.org/ also laid the foundation for America’s accession Article.aspx?id=20880. to the East Asia Summit (EAS). In November 2011 Obama was the first U.S. president to participate Clinton, H. 2009a. Statement of Senator Hillary in the summit. America’s engagement in the region Rodham Clinton, Nominee for Secretary of State, has been welcomed by the ASEAN states, precisely Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, because America’s interests also extend their scope January 13. for action, not least against China. In the future, in the spirit of a competitive ———. 2009b. Press Availability after NATO multi-multilateralism, the various multilateral Meeting, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, organizations and institutions will be required to Brussels, Belgium, March 5. compete for the attention of the United States— if Washington’s plans materialize. Consequently,

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24 the chicago council on global affair s Focused Engagement: NATO’s Political Ambitions in a Changing Strategic Context

Henning Riecke Head of the Transatlantic Relations Program, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)

Abstract: NATO is the strongest military alliance in the world, but it faces a strategic dilemma. Should it focus on a limited set of tasks, or should it broaden its mandate and expand its geographic focus? How can NATO renew the consensus about its purpose as it faces new challenges and smaller means? Existing strategic chal- lenges remain such as Russia’s drive for dominance, developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and trans- national risks like terrorism. Other challenging developments are gaining in strategic importance. The Arab Spring might shift power structures along the southern brim of the Mediterranean. The growing importance of China and other emerging states as global players—active also in Europe’s neighborhood—must be of concern for the alliance, together with the turn of U.S. foreign policy toward the Asia-Pacific region. A focused engage- ment on the regions closer to NATO territory, a clear strategic view of cross-border risks, innovative efforts for better partnerships, and limited missions if necessary might provide a pragmatic mix of solutions that serve the interests of all allies, even the most powerful.

The strategic dilemma Anglo-American partners lobbying for a geographi- cal and functional expansion of NATO quarrel with NATO has shown the ability to adapt to new con- status quo countries like Germany who wish to ditions quickly, reinventing itself more than once focus on projecting stability (in situations perhaps while retaining its traditional functions. Perhaps not as difficult as Afghanistan). Members in Eastern because of these shifts, there is a lack of unity Europe demand a more traditional defense alliance among its members and therefore a lack of political with a stronger stance against Russia. will to equip NATO with the capabilities needed for For an alliance, such differences do not need to an ambitious agenda. The feeble consensus about be fatal as long as mutual respect for each other’s the purpose of the alliance would imply a focus on concerns is reflected both in strategic discussions a limited set of tasks, yet the shifting global strate- and factual preparedness. Unfortunately, the allies gic landscape demands more openness and adapt- do not meet these conditions sufficiently. Strategic ability. This dilemma is all the more acute since the global financial and economic crises has led rapprochement in NATO does not yet convey a to an uncoordinated dwindling of defense budgets sense of true solidarity. And the long-standing among most NATO members. capability gap between the United States and the The conflict about competing visions for Europeans has been undermining NATO’s cohesion NATO’s future is not over (Nötzel/Scheer 2009). and American support for the alliance decades.

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 25 The warning of the outgoing Secretary of ects of strategic relevance between the two sides Defense Robert Gates (Gates 2011) that the United (Monaghan 2011), maybe because of Russia’s inter- States might find it difficult to pay for an alliance est to maintain a harsher tone from time to time that the European allies don’t want to invest in and to prevent the resolution of conflicts in Eastern was an alarm to the Europeans. Cuts also affect Europe. Relations with Russia can always deterio- U.S. defense spending. As Gates’ successor Leon rate and move up on the agenda. Panetta outlined in Brussels, “We are facing dra- Afghanistan will also remain a challenge. Even matic cuts with real implications for alliance capa- if the Afghanistan mission is drawing to a close, bility” (Panetta 2011). Any ambitions for NATO’s NATO will play a role in this weak state until 2014 future must carry enough political momentum to and most likely in the transformation phase until raise the political will to allocate resources to the 2024. Afghanistan has been labeled a test case for alliance. “Smart Defense,” one of the mottos of the several new profiles of NATO. While starting from Chicago NATO summit, will be cheaper only in the the protection of the political transformation in long run. In that situation, defining a focus for alli- Kabul, the Afghanistan mission adopted challeng- ance activities might be helpful to regain political ing tasks of regional development and state build- momentum behind the build-up of capabilities. ing in a society not used to central government. Strategic decision making in NATO is a diffi- The alliance, with hitherto limited experience in cult issue, not just when facing new challenges and war fighting, decided to operate against -terror smaller means. The conflicts among members over ists and drug traffickers and ended in a full blown the alliance’s ambitions have foreseeable fault lines. counterinsurgency operation with frequent high- Is a risky development dangerous enough to one or level combat. After the withdrawal of combat forces more allies to trigger NATO involvement? Does the by 2014, protecting NATO’s achievements with- situation have a military character, and is the alli- out combat troops and keeping the weak Afghan ance the right organization to handle it, or is there National Security Forces from dissolving into civil the risk of a militarization of a political issue? Is the war parties will be a difficult task. problem close enough to allied territory to make Transborder risks like the drug economy or ref- NATO a legitimate actor? What follow-up respon- ugees will also be on NATO’s agenda. The situation sibilities will NATO’s strategic commitment entail, inside Pakistan, its stability as a state, and the exist- and who will pay for it? Because these questions are ing command structures of radical insurgents on so difficult to answer, the most effective drivers for Pakistan’s soil will remain a security concern NATO. strategic innovation in NATO are external crises, The Afghanistan experience works as a deter- which are, in most cases, unpredictable. rent for military engagement. Military engagement entails civilian responsibility. A legitimate opera- A larger agenda tion and a set of rational decisions to expand it have driven NATO into an unwanted role as guard- In the run-up to Chicago, the alliance is facing a ian of a difficult state-building process. Member number of potentially challenging developments— states react differently, shy away from missions, some of them old, some of them new—which will or focus on deployments with a smaller foot- occupy the delegations at the summit. print, relying more on unmanned warfare and Russia’s drive for dominance has emerged special operations. as a persistent challenge for NATO. Balancing its Cross-border risks such as terrorism, cyber two objectives of collective defense and coopera- war, or aggressive energy disruptions are in NATO’s tive security, the alliance has to find ways to tie in portfolio, although they do not tie down numerous Russia while making clear that Article 5 is valid for forces. NATO’s role as coordinator and political link the members of Eastern Europe. The difficult part- is important, but its operational role should not be nership with Russia has not brought about proj- overestimated. As a military alliance, NATO has dif-

26 the chicago council on global affair s ficulties cooperating institutionally with nonmili- shifting interests of the strongest ally need to raise tary actors, although this ability would be crucial attention in Europe. in playing an operational role in the fight against Some argue that NATO should become an these threats (Keller 2012, 7). instrument to help the United States project The Arab Spring has brought about changes, power into the Asia Pacific. Certainly, there is rea- but it is yet unclear what strategic consequences son to consider a stronger political presence in the reformist uprisings in the Arab world will have. Asia. NATO has been active for a long time in Asia. It is good to see that autocracies can tumble, but the It has Partnership for Peace partners in Central development is risky. Elections can result in diffuse Asia, operates in the direct neighborhood of China outcomes. Networks between NATO members and and India in Afghanistan, and has International their Mediterranean partners might break up—not Security Assistance Force (ISAF) contributors from least because the alliance has been partners with Asia. Closer partnerships are a natural demand the old elites and is seen as a vehicle of U.S. foreign (Weinrod 2008). And certainly, closer dialogue and policy. In other words, the security and interests of confidence building with China and India are over- NATO and its members might be affected by tran- due. This would entail the addition of NATO troops sitions that are generally desirable but that under- to the military presence in the Asia Pacific. Yet, mine the partnership with NATO since NATO is not there are also arguments for NATO to refocus on the partner the new leaders might seek. European security (Coker 2008). Would that move The great power competition in Asia is also a NATO away from core U.S. interests? major challenge. The United States as a Pacific coastal state has been shifting its focus more and Risks within reach more toward the Asia-Pacific region because of the enormous economic dynamics, bilateral alliances, The answer, and not a bad compromise, might be and, of course, the rise of China as a new global that NATO’s ambition should be simply to do well player. The growing importance of China and other what it can do in its own neighborhood. NATO emerging global actors is a development that needs must find a balance between global availability and to be placed on NATO’s strategic map. China, espe- more regional involvement. The alliance has seen cially, is investing globally and has economic and its outreach as global at least since 2002 when the energy interests to defend in Northern Africa and fight against international terrorism was put on its the Middle East as well as in Central Asia. NATO agenda. When looking at threats to the security of is operating in China’s neighborhood. Secretary its members in a globalized world, the sources of of State Hillary Clinton, when rolling out the most risk might demand long-distance power projection recent regional strategy of the United States, talked from time to time. Taking out terrorist networks, about cooperative initiatives, but also about “forg- patrolling sea-lanes against pirates, or controlling ing a broad-based military presence” (Clinton cargo ships containing sensitive technology are 2011, 57; U.S. Department of Defense 2012). Some conceivable tasks for NATO that might take allied have read this as evidence of the United States forces far away from its territory. The question is no turning away from Europe. The situation might be longer “home or away” (Hamilton 2009), but how even bleaker. In a post-American world, the United far away from home should NATO operate? States might be “number one,” but it has lost “cen- When defining NATO’s purpose and why pay- trality and command” (Jentleson 2009, 68) and ing for more capabilities is worth it, defining it in cannot play a decisive role in international crises or terms of global engagement might be less attractive sustain order. That would also imply that no other than concentrating on challenges in the vicinity of player can do that, so some disorderly times might Europe—especially for the thrifty European allies. lie ahead. U.S. diplomats have been traveling many Yet, a number of regions closer to NATO’s territory miles to reassure their traditional allies, but the are highly volatile. While most allies have strong

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 27 interests in stability in those areas, NATO has not Review (Kamp 2012, 5f) should make clear the yet found a clear framework for being a security goal of extended NATO deterrence against Iranian provider in those areas and has not applied the nuclear threats. resources needed to really work toward conflict NATO could find ways to be more helpful prevention and stability. in stabilizing transition countries in the Arab In Eastern Europe NATO first and foremost world and the Maghreb. In NATO’s 2010 Strategic has to protect its members’ security, and not just Concept there was no special focus on the against military intervention. Russia has the ability Mediterranean as a possible theater of operations. to make life difficult for NATO states and its part- Yet, it was in Libya that NATO engaged in a com- ners in Eastern Europe. Cyber attacks, infiltration of plex operation only four months after the sum- Russian expatriate communities, or cuts in energy mit in Lisbon. Developments in Libya might turn supplies are possible future tactics that might chal- into civil conflicts that would threaten the whole lenge the allies and partners there. NATO needs region. Even now, arms trafficking from Libya in to collect knowledge and expertise to respond to the aftermath of the fall of Gaddafi has spurred such infringements, as it already does in the case civil strife in Mali and might have facilitated the of cyber war. In addition, there are a number of arming of al Qaeda in the Maghreb. NATO did a open conflicts, mislabeled as “frozen,” resulting good job of allowing for political change in the from Russia’s interests in increasing its influence country, but seems to have lost interest in the and keeping NATO from moving further east. These aftermath. It would be hard to argue that NATO conflicts jeopardize security and economic devel- must play a central role in the creation of a new opment in Eastern Europe. Western states and Libyan state and the disengagement of the oppos- Russia must do more to move the conflict negotia- ing factions in the country. NATO cannot be seen tions toward pragmatic compromise and to imple- as contemplating operations like in Libya for ment agreed solutions. To work against escalation similar atrocities—Syria being a case in point. Every crisis, however, will generate options for between Russia and the eastern NATO members limited crisis reaction, be it for creating a sanc- and to address the open conflicts in Europe, the tuary for opponents, delivering humanitarian alliance has the NATO-Russia Council. The body goods, assisting in security sector reform, or send- can sustain dialogue but needs mutual trust to ing military experts for training and consulting. cooperate on projects of more substance. Afghanistan being a sobering experience, the Iran has already become the source of growing allies will be careful not to be drawn into year- tension. The risks of military attacks to its nuclear long responsibilities for state building. Yet NATO installations, of proxy wars against Israel and U.S. can make a difference in smaller ways, even in the troops in the region, and of further proliferation form of fact finding and monitoring, to allow for have never been as acute as today. The ensuing early action in times escalation. regional power struggles might keep NATO busy for The alliance must adopt regional strategies some time to come. The alliance must prepare itself that address specific crisis situations, but tie in for crises that might emerge from aggressive med- various bilateral relations to take on cross-border dling by Iran in Palestine, Iraq, or Afghanistan and problems. Deeper regional cooperation of NATO that would involve deeper cooperation with Israel. with its neighbors based on an improved network NATO should consider its role in helping the United of partnerships could address the following issues: States guard the Strait of Hormuz. Two strategies need more resolve. First, NATO is already devel- • Energy security, in terms of physical security of oping a missile defense program against Iranian chokepoints, refineries, and pipelines; intermediate range missiles, yet the Europeans are failing to pay their share for the system. Secondly, • Terrorism, with an outlook at least as transna- the ongoing Deterrence and Defense Posture tional as its al Qaeda opponents;

28 the chicago council on global affair s • Piracy, with a more active stance, together with important for Washington’s strategic outreach partners along the African coast, toward fighting there. The United States has campaigned for spe- the home bases of pirates on shore; cial status of their allies Japan, Korea, Australia, and others. The idea was that NATO was limited by • Small and light arms proliferation as well as arms its geographical membership (Daalder/Goldgeier control on the local level; 2006). Many Europeans were anxious to prevent too deep an integration of these countries so as not • Refugees and migration, also with a view to deliv- to alter NATO’s geographic focus. Labeled “Contact ering humanitarian aid. Countries” until recently, now “Partners around the Globe” (PAG), this class of partners now includes By improving its abilities to cope with these problems Pakistan and might be open to Mongolia or and to play a role in its wider neighborhood, NATO Afghanistan in the future (Reisinger 2012, 2). These would serve some of the core interests of its strongest countries strengthen NATO and have a role in ally, the United States—next to regional stability. operational planning when they contribute. There could be other criteria for individual partnerships Political entrepreneurs as partners such as regional political clout. More attention needs to be given to the coop- NATO’s partnerships are an important topic of the eration with regional organizations such as the Chicago summit. They are an underused tool, and African Union or others (Riecke/Koschut 2008). many believe that NATO could multiply its capa- There are many reasons to be doubtful about the bilities through new and improved partnerships, prospect of organizational partnerships, but the even with smaller budgets. Zbigniew Brzezinski benefits of working support for their missions sketched out his vision of NATO as “the hub of a would be considerable. The Arab Spring experi- globe-spanning web of various regional coopera- ences as well as the crisis in the Ivory Coast have tive security undertakings among states with the shown how important regional organizations are growing power to act” (Brzezinski 2009, 20). In 2010 for ownership and legitimacy of international NATO began a reform of its partnership programs, engagement—and how hard it is to come to a con- creating the Political and Partnership Committee sensus regarding a crisis. The Arab League in the as a unifying forum and streamlining the diverse cases of Libya and Syria is a welcome exception. programs (Reisinger 2012). In doing so, the alliance Regional organizations that convene developing is looking at a multiplication of forces in times of countries with authoritarian rule are usually ill- scarcity. It should look, first of all, at what NATO suited to take a stand for democratization. Regional can offer to the partners. organizations find it hard to equip complex mis- The partnership programs with aspiring mem- sions beyond simple peacekeeping. NATO has had bers, with Eastern European and Central Asian mixed experiences with the African Union (AU), countries, are important for networking between which the alliance assisted with strategic airlifts for the militaries of these countries as well as between peacekeeping missions in Sudan and Somalia. The them and NATO, a critical function in times of crisis AU missions were underfunded and did not have and transition. NATO needs to revise especially the the intended success. Nevertheless, the partner- programs with the Arab world and include more ship has evolved; NATO now supports an African material assistance and advice, but the current Standby Force. transitions there might impede this. NATO could reach out to other organizations, Many non-NATO countries contribute to alli- but the choice is small. The Shanghai Cooperation ance missions—to strengthen those ties is an ele- Organization (SCO) might have a role in ment of American policy (Panetta 2011). For some Afghanistan. This organization, in which Russia and time, countries in the Asia-Pacific region have been China play dominant roles, seeks an intervention

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 29 capability. The SCO might play a role as arbiter in Daalder, Ivo and James Goldgeier. 2006. “Global Afghanistan, but has an anti-American bias, being NATO.” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 5 (September- directed among many other things against the U.S. October 2006), 105-113. presence in Central Asia. Some countries are, by the way, members of the SCO and Partnership for Gates, Robert M. 2011. “The Security and Defense Peace. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has a Agenda (Future of NATO).” Speech by Secretary of small nucleus intervention unit that could be built Defense Robert M. Gates, Brussels, Belgium, Friday, upon. The GCC, unfortunately, has been a conser- June 10, 2011. vative, status quo force in the Arab Spring. Even if the current outlook is not promising, Hamilton, Dan et al. 2009. “Alliance Reborn. An NATO should pursue its partnerships with regional Atlantic Compact for the 21st Century.” Atlantic organizations. It could develop new patterns of Council of the United States et al. The Washington individual partnerships or closer ties with coun- NATO Project. Washington, DC (February). http:// tries that act as political entrepreneurs in these transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/sebin/i/y/nato_report_ organizations. South Africa or Qatar might be help- final.pdf. ful allies in the fight for stability. Jentleson, Bruce W. 2009. “The Atlantic alliance in Conclusion a post-American world.” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 7, no. 1, 61-72. NATO could do well with what it already has on the agenda. Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Middle Kamp, Karl-Heinz. 2011. “NATO’s Chicago Summit: East (and the Indian Ocean), and the Maghreb A Thorny Agenda.” Research Paper no. 70. (Rome: could be the area of activity for NATO. A focused NATO Defense College, November). engagement in these regions based on regional strategies will improve NATO’s cohesion and help Keller, Patrick. 2012. “Nach den Operationen: to create stability in the neighborhood—with lim- Ausblick auf den NATO-Gipfel in Chicago.” Analysen ited missions. With enough resources and networks & Argumente 100, Konrad Adenauer Foundation to cope with cross-border risks, such an approach (February). http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_30100- would also serve American interests directly and 544-1-30.pdf?120216160826. relieve the United States for operations elsewhere. To support this and to help NATO gain influence, Monaghan, Andrew. 2011. “Limited Partnership: innovative efforts for better partnerships based on Despite Fundamental Disagreements, NATO Seeks the needs of the partners are a prudent strategy. to Pull Russia Closer.” Internationale Politik–Global Edition 12 (May-June), 22-26. List of References: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Active Brzezinski, Zbigniew. 2009. “An agenda for NATO: Engagement, Modern Defense. 2010. Strategic Toward a Global Security Web.” Foreign Affairs 88, Concept for the Defense and Security of the no. 5 (September-October 2009), 2-20. Members of the NATO. Adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, Clinton, Hillary. 2011. “America’s Pacific Century.” November 19-20. Foreign Policy 189 (November), 56-63. Panetta, Leon. 2011. “From Tripoli to Chicago: Coker, Christopher. 2008. “Why NATO Should Charting NATO’s Future on the Way to the Return Home: The Case for a Twenty-First Century 2012 Summit.” Speech in Brussels, October 5. Alliance.” RUSI Journal 153, no. 4 (August), 6-11.

30 the chicago council on global affair s http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript. aspx?transcriptid=4895.

Reisinger, Heidi. 2012. “Rearranging Family Life and a Large Circle of Friends: Reforming NATO’s Partnership Programmes.” Research Paper no. 72. (Rome: NATO Defense College, January).

Riecke, Henning and Simon Koschut. 2008. “NATO’s Global Aspirations. Frictions over NATO’s Outreach.” Internationale Politik–Global Edition 9, no. 2, 31-37.

Noetzel, Timo and Benjamin Schreer. 2009. “Does a multi-tier NATO matter? The Atlantic alliance and the process of strategic change.” International Affairs 85, no. 2 (March), 211-226.

U.S. Department of Defense. 2012. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense. Washington, DC.

Weinrod, W. Bruce. 2008. “NATO and Asia’s Changing Relationship.” Global Asia 3, no. 3 (Fall).

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 31 Challenges for the Security Sector in Afghanistan: How to Save Reform

Beata Górka-Winter Program Coordinator on International Security, Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)

Abstract: Recent dramatic events in Afghanistan expose the lack of trust between the parties involved in the state-building process and the resultant difficulties to be faced in the future. Despite the “ISAF fatigue” felt by most NATO countries, the alliance must be willing and able to engage substantially with its Afghan partners to overcome these difficulties. Local ownership of state-building efforts in Afghanistan is lacking. Challenges for the security sector include the possible decomposition of the Afghan National Army (ANA), the mounting security threats to the population stemming from the presence of armed groups of different origins, and the vast amount of time and resources it will take to sustain the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Consequently, continued support from the international community is necessary. NATO should deliver the message to the Afghan people that it will remain committed to ensuring their security.

Introduction ment will remain strained for months to come. During the upcoming Chicago NATO summit, the Recent dramatic events in Afghanistan—the burn- question of whether NATO and its allies are still ing of the Koran at a NATO military base, the mas- “willing and able” to engage substantially with sacre of civilians in a district of Kandahar by a U.S. their Afghan partner will be extremely difficult to soldier, and the assassination of American officers answer, as two totally divergent attitudes have now in the Interior Ministry in Kabul—confirm that the emerged in Western capitals. process of transition may be even more challenging On the one hand, “ISAF fatigue” is an obvious than assumed by most politicians and experts. Not and predominant feeling among most NATO coun- only have these events ruthlessly exposed the prob- tries that are wrestling with their own economic and lem of almost complete lack of trust and positive social problems. It is not surprising, then, that most energy between the parties involved in the state- governments are already waiting for the closing building process, but also point out the difficulties bell and for the opportunity to welcome their sol- of establishing relations in a post-2014 Afghanistan. diers back home. The politicians and experts who Just after the Kandahar carnage, President Karzai back this stance stress that the state-building exer- demanded (not for the first time) that NATO troops cise in Afghanistan lacks “local ownership,” putting withdraw from the country. Even if this declaration too much emphasis on what external stakeholders was issued to mollify the public in Afghanistan, and donors have to offer rather than on what can relations between NATO/International Security be done by the Afghans themselves. As many peo- Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Afghan govern- ple personally involved in this effort admit more or

32 the chicago council on global affair s less openly, for too long Western forces and organi- challenges.2 Not all of these challenges may be zations were fighting this war (in a much broader addressed by NATO as de facto external actors, even sense than wiping out the insurgency) instead of if NATO decides to provide serious further support Afghans, who were at best supporting this prohibi- for reform. However, the alliance and its members tively exhaustive campaign. have manifold instruments at their disposal to alle- On the other hand, an equal number of com- viate some of the negative influences, even if this mentators argue that too much has been done requires substantial political and material support already to risk spoiling the positive effects of in the years to come. NATO’s almost decade-long engagement. There is a deep conviction, backed by historical record, that Challenge 1: Possible decomposition of the some areas of the state apparatus, including the Afghan National Army crucial institutions of the security sector, would not last long without further backing from the inter- Since the adoption of the Petersberg Decree by national community. Even if such a situation is to Hamid Karzai in December 2002,3 which created some degree caused by the mistakes made by the the Afghan National Army (ANA), a lot has been United States and NATO as the main architects of done—at least officially—to assure the respon- security sector reform (SSR), the Chicago summit siveness, effectiveness, accountability, and proper should be used to demonstrate the political will for ethnic participation of these forces. Since the some necessary corrections to this process. beginning, however, this last factor was seriously This paper outlines the desirable shape of neglected for political reasons, despite the his- future NATO commitments in the area of SSR, torically proven necessity of building an ethni- which are crucial to achieving a durable peace in cally balanced force to avoid political polarization Afghanistan. As epitomized by the Declaration among factions. The takeover of power in 2001 by on Enduring Partnership between NATO and the leaders of the North alliance after the Taliban Afghanistan signed at the 2010 Lisbon NATO sum- government was overthrown led to an obvious mit, “NATO intends to provide sustained practical overrepresentation of Tajiks in the subsequently support to Afghan security institutions aimed at formed Afghan Military Forces (AMF) and, after sustaining and improving their capacity and capa- their dissolution, in the ANA. Tajiks were overrepre- bility to counter threats to the security, stability, sented both in high-level positions in the Ministry 1 and integrity of Afghanistan effectively.” There are, of Defense as well as in the officer corps. This led however, many ways of interpreting such a com- to many difficulties, starting with problems recruit- mitment based on different assessments and sce- ing rank and file in the Pashtun-populated south. It narios for the future development of this sector also impacted the image of the ANA as a formation once ISAF forces will have withdrawn. with which most of the Afghan populace could not identify (even though there has been, reportedly, Challenges to the Afghan security small progress in improving the ANA image in the sector after 2014 southern provinces). Recent data show that the situation has Afghanistan’s security sector apparatus (in its broad become more balanced (including among elite meaning as proposed by modern SSR approaches) Afghan Commando Brigades or Special Forces), will certainly face both internal and external 2. See, for example, D. Hendrickson and A. Karkoszka, “The Challenges of Security Sector Reform,” SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: 1. See “Declaration by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Oxford University Press, 2002), 179. (NATO) and the Government of the Islamic Republic of 3. See “Decree of the President of the Islamic Transitional Afghanistan on an Enduring Partnership,” signed at the NATO State of Afghanistan on the Afghan National Army” (Petersberg summit in Lisbon, Portugal, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/ Decree), Petersberg 2002, http://www.unric.org/html/german/ natolive/official_texts_68724.htm. afghanistan/talks2002/decree.pdf.

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 33 but the situation remains volatile and may have well as legal Afghan Local Police4 who were armed serious consequences if a political arrangement by the coalition forces to face insurgency and ter- with the Taliban is concluded and Taliban rep- rorist networks locally. An end to hostilities follow- resentatives are co-opted by the government. ing a political agreement would deprive many of One cannot exclude a scenario in which some of these groups (which are now fighting on opposite the former commanders from the North alliance sides) of their income and leave them searching mobilize their supporters (both within and out- for new possibilities. In addition to this militarized side the Afghan National Security Forces, as the landscape, there are numerous private military informal ties between former mujahedeen militia companies (PMCs). Their activities may soon cease commanders still exist) and protest this arrange- due to President Karzai’s 2010 decree abolishing their activity. Or, they may simply lose their raison ment. Such opposition might be fueled by mere d’être if various international donors or businesses political motives (fear of weakening their posi- decide to terminate their activities in Afghanistan. tion in the state apparatus), but also by resent- Estimates show that roughly 11,000 Afghan guards ment, as official propaganda in the last decade are currently working for PMCs.5 aggressively mobilized Afghan society against the Such abandoned “warlord armies,” mere vigi- Taliban. Therefore, a situation in which the ANA lantes coming from the ranks of Taliban-associated becomes partially or totally fragmented cannot mercenaries or dismissed PMC personnel, may be excluded. create a serious threat to Afghan society. This was seen after 1992 when the collapse of the Najibullah Challenge 2: Mounting security threats to the government and frequent clashes between war- population stemming from various armed lord militias led to grave human rights violations, groups including enforcing tributes, illegal taxes, and abuses of women. ISAF’s withdrawal from Afghanistan may bring multiple direct and indirect consequences for the Challenge 3: Sustaining the Afghan National Afghan populace. First, as mentioned above, the Security Forces possible return of the Taliban to power may lead both to increased stability, as the rebellion will grad- The official data bear out the popular belief that, ually peter out, and the eruption of new tensions, at least since the beginning of 2010 when the secu- including a resumption of fighting between differ- rity sector reform project was given new impetus ent political fractions and the military groups back- both by the U.S. administration and the ISAF com- ing them. Even if such a situation can be averted by mand, the condition of the ANSF and the ANA in skillful management of these negotiations (assum- particular has been improving markedly. The cur- ing they will be continued in spite of recent inci- rent size of the ANA already exceeds the figure pro- dents), the Taliban movement is itself a very diverse jected in the schedules and by the summer of 2012 phenomenon that could create further tensions. the Afghan government should have more than Apart from the ideologically driven militants, the 350,000 Afghan soldiers and police on the ground. movement embraces groups with purely economic Moreover, as stated in the latest U.S. Defense motivations (including mercenaries). These groups Department progress report on Afghanistan, the work for NATO as their “employer” because of tan- gible profits, providing security coverage for road 4. Some reports of human rights watchdogs have already transportation, and then share their income with been dismissive about the role of the Afghan Local Police (ALP), which was created to revitalize local Afghan societies’ potential the Taliban. On the other side, there are also thou- to face insurgency. sands of paramilitary groupings of different ori- 5. See, for example, Matthew Rosenberg and Graham Bowley, “Security Fears Lead Groups to Rethink Work in Afghanistan,” gins, including militias of still powerful warlords as The New York Times, March 10, 2012, A1.

34 the chicago council on global affair s ANSF has continued to “increase not only in quan- 8 billion per year (including salaries, equipment tity, but also quality and capability and have taken upkeep, and logistics). The Afghan government will an ever-increasing role in security operations.”6 by no means be able to generate sufficient income Also, the number of operations the Afghan army to cover such expenses. On the contrary, most successfully led doubled in the course of the last financial predictions show Afghan budget revenues year. The ANSF has already assumed responsibility falling after the ISAF withdrawal. Consequently, for some areas of the country and are performing there is a serious risk of many soldiers and police- operations with little ISAF support. men abandoning their duties if their salaries are There are, however, legitimate concerns about scaled down substantially and saturating the ranks the ability of the ANA to be self-sufficient if the of illegal paramilitary groups. Even if such a gloomy U.S./ISAF role in mentoring, training, and equip- scenario could be prevented, there is the open issue ment procurement were to become seriously lim- of whether sufficient equipment for these forces ited. The strategy behind the creation of the Afghan can be assured for intervening even in the rough- army was incoherent for many years. Official state- est and most demanding terrain (such as in high ments, including UN Security Council resolutions, mountains or provinces without a road network). underlined the primary role these forces should Many experts also stress that most of the Afghan air play as a main security provider for the Afghan fleet (mostly Soviet-origin fighters and helicopters) populace. Contrary to these declarations, both U.S. will become obsolete no sooner than 2013. and ISAF forces treated newly created ANA battal- ions as “supplemental forces” and deprived them of the right to play the role of frontmen in com- Challenges to NATO before 2014 bat and in operational planning.7 This was mostly Assuming that ISAF forces will not be forced to the consequence of both a lack of necessary skills immediately pull out of Afghanistan as a conse- and experience among ANA soldiers (at least in quence of recent dramatic events, the 2014 time- the opinion of foreign mentors) and the desire of frame for implementing a sensible strategy of U.S. commanders to achieve quick victories. It has averting the challenges outlined above should be always been an open secret that Afghan counter- treated with utmost seriousness. In the months to parts were never treated—especially those com- come, the signing of any NATO/U.S.–Afghanistan ing from police forces—with trust and confidence. agreement on the post-2014 presence may simply There were cases of some ANA battalions deployed be dangerous or at best awkward for the Karzai gov- in the southern provinces simply refusing to engage ernment, whose mandate is already being called in kinetic operations and whole units deserting the into question following the “irregularities” that sur- battlefield. This caused a vicious circle and resulted rounded the last elections. Therefore, the possibil- in quite a poor rating of most of the ANA battalions, ity of postponing such agreements until after the which are still considered not ready to effectively Chicago summit should be seriously considered. secure most of the Afghan territory. If, however, against all evidence to the contrary, Additional problems stem from financial con- straints. Current estimates show that sustain- the talks with the Taliban were to be revitalized, ing such a large army—expected to be 400,000 in any political solution that includes power sharing 2014—will demand somewhere between $US6 to must be preceded by serious consideration of how to integrate the Taliban militias into the Afghan

6. Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward National Security Forces. This would be critical to Security and Stability in Afghanistan, October 2011, http://www. ensuring that the possibly destructive potential of defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/October_2011_Section_1230_Report. pdf. these militias would not adversely affect the secu- 7. See, for example, Anthony Hoh, “The Problems with rity situation in the country. There are basically Afghan Army Doctrine,” Small Wars Journal, blog post, June 17, two choices in this case: (1) the standard disarma- 2008, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-problems-with- afghan-army-doctrine. ment, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR)

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 35 process or (2) direct integration of some of these Army. International donors, including the NTM-A groups into the ANSF. The former would demand, mission, should also assure that Afghanistan will be for example, close monitoring by the international able to (re)create military elites on its own. While community and financial schemes for reintegrat- ANA officers should continue to have access to ing people into civilian life. Western military academies, more emphasis must As outlined above, even a successful conclusion be placed on investment in the Afghan Defense of talks with the Taliban may not result in stabiliza- University in Kabul and other military academies. tion of the country, as many rank-and-file mem- Apart from professional training, such institutions bers may decide to take advantage of the volatile create a sense of national identity among cadets environment. Some Taliban fractions may boycott from different ethnic groups, which is of utmost the agreement and carry on fighting. Consequently, importance in such a factionalized society. both the U.S. administration and NATO have to Additionally, meticulous consideration of how decide how large a presence they would be willing to sustain the ANSF financially must be undertaken, to maintain in Afghanistan, especially if humani- taking into account not only the possibility of rais- tarian crises become evident. This would include ing funds among NATO countries, but also engag- predictions for the generation of new forces and ing regional partners such as India and Russia who proper budget allocations. As most NATO countries are already, though for different reasons, showing would be extremely reluctant to play any military some eagerness to participate in the SSR process. role after 2014, post-ISAF engagement would likely The ANSF are not only a key to assuring the secu- materialize in the form of the U.S.-led “coalition rity of the Afghans, but also to providing a secure of the willing,” most probably with the permanent environment for future investments (such as in the presence of (mostly) U.S. special forces in the most promising extraction industry), which are com- volatile regions. ing mostly from Afghanistan’s neighborhood. It is Moreover, it is not too late to rethink the shape therefore in the best interest of Afghanistan’s neigh- of some of the Afghan security sector institutions bors to support the ANSF substantially. and the actual need to invest in developing their Last but not least, one of the main deliver- capabilities. Not only would financial constraints ables of the Chicago summit should be issuing a not allow a robust force to be sustained (the pro- clear message to the Afghan population that NATO posal of cutting the size of the ANSF by one-third remains committed—on military, political, finan- has been already put on the table), but there are cial levels—to assuring Afghanistan’s security and doubts if some of the forces are true “security pro- would not waste the positive effects of its pro- viders.” For example, units of the Afghan National longed presence in this country. Presenting such and Local Police in some districts have a bad repu- a message is important not only for the Afghan tation due to corruption and human rights abuses. people, but also, paradoxically, for Western soci- Therefore, the decision to support specific forces eties, which want to see this mission ended, but must be made not only on their ability to use force also want assurance that their efforts—human and effectively, but also on their attitude toward the financial—were not in vain. local populace and their willingness to accept rule of law. As for mentoring, more intensive train- ing should be provided to regular ANA battal- ions immediately. Consequently, NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A) should solicit con- tributions for further multiplying the number of Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) to cover the needs of the rapidly growing Afghan

36 the chicago council on global affair s NATO and Crisis Management Operations: A Canadian Perspective

Elinor Sloan Associate Professor of International Relations, Carleton University (Ottawa, ON, Canada)

Abstract: This paper looks at NATO’s ability to conduct out-of-area crisis management operations, focusing specifically on Canada’s engagement in Kandahar in the period 2006 to 2011. It brings to light the manner in which the Canadian experience changed over time as its troops moved from being under U.S. command, to under NATO command with a distracted America, to under NATO command with an engaged U.S. core. The paper assesses five layers of relationships Canada has in the security/defense arena. All layers are important in different ways, and the ideal for Canada to fight with its “four eyes” partners. But the bottom line, as drawn out clearly in this case, is strong U.S. leadership: Canada should say “yes” to operations pre.ponderantly led by the United States. This finding may have relevance to other countries. The Pentagon’s 2012 strategic guidance calls for high technology and small footprint approaches to main- taining global leadership. Canada must ensure from the outset that any future NATO non-Article 5 operation in which it participates enjoys core U.S. support and direction. When the United States leads, it will still need dependable and capable allies to contribute a robust combat capability. Canada and others must decide how to respond to this opportunity.

Introduction it would excel. But what about the alliance’s other core task, crisis management? At its 2010 summit in Lisbon, NATO released its This paper discusses NATO’s ability to con- most recent Strategic Concept. Active Engagement, duct out-of-area operations. It focuses specifi- Modern Defence identifies three core tasks of the cally on Canada’s experience in Afghanistan in the alliance: (1) collective defense of alliance territory period 2006 to 2011, assessing what this particular in accordance with Article 5, (2) crisis manage- mission reveals about when and whether Canada ment of conflicts that impact or have the potential should contribute military forces to future NATO to impact alliance security, and (3) cooperative crisis management missions. Any firm conclusions security by actively engaging with other countries about NATO’s out-of-area capability would require and international organizations to enhance inter- a broader study involving additional countries and national security. Few would dispute the political cases. This is the picture from a Canadian perspec- and security value of NATO engaging with other tive, with regard to one operation. countries and international organizations. And, although as yet not tested, we can surmise that NATO’s collective defense mission is one at which

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 37 The early years: NATO in Afghanistan Mandate expansion: NATO in 2003 to 2005 Regional Command (South), 2006

The Canadian and NATO experience in Preoccupied with Iraq, the United States increas- Afghanistan is closely tied to the preoccupa- ingly wanted some of OEF’s counterinsurgency tions of the United States in the decade follow- activity in the south also to be undertaken by ISAF. ing September 11, 2001. In the fall of 2001 the As a means of “easing in” such a transition, the United States launched Operation Enduring decision was made to establish a multinational Freedom (OEF), an almost entirely U.S. opera- brigade in the south reporting to OEF and then to tion. Within months it toppled the Taliban switch command after five months to ISAF. Canada regime, enabling the international community agreed to take the lead, not only assuming respon- to establish the International Security Assistance sibility for the PRT in Kandahar, but committing a Force (ISAF) under UN auspices to carry out sta- brigade headquarters and an infantry battle group bilization and reconstruction activities in and for counterinsurgency work. Canadian Brigadier around Kabul. OEF continued operating under General David Fraser took command of this new U.S. command, conducting counterinsurgency multinational brigade, which also included large operations in the more volatile southern and British and Dutch contingents and smaller forces eastern areas of the country and establish- from other countries. Canada took responsibil- ing Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in ity for the volatile Kandahar province, Britain for various locations. the equally restive Helmand province, and the With ISAF hard pressed to secure a new Dutch for the somewhat more peaceful province of lead nation every six months, NATO took com- Uruzgan. The multinational brigade shifted from mand in the summer of 2003. In the months OEF to ISAF command at the end of July 2006, leading up to this, the UN and others had recom- when NATO took command of Regional Command mended ISAF expand beyond Kabul to cover the (RC) (South). entire country. But the alliance was in no mood for expansion, and America, too, was not in Before and after the change of favor because it felt an insufficient number of troops would be available. In the second half of command 2003, however, the United States became involved The fact and timing of the change in command in in a resource-intensive counterinsurgency mis- RC (South) had a significant impact on Canada’s sion in Iraq, much different from the Iraq war of early experience in Kandahar. The first half of 2006 earlier that year. As OEF became an economy- ended up being far from peaceful. An early indica- of-force mission, over the next several months tor of things to come was the car bomb that killed America encouraged in ever-stronger terms Canadian diplomat Glyn Berry in January 2006. that NATO expand its ISAF footprint by taking Over the next several months it became clear that command of the PRTs now dotted throughout the Taliban were building up forces in the area the country. The North Atlantic Council autho- around Kandahar City. Charged with the general rized the expansion of ISAF to the north in mission of disrupting Taliban activity, the Canadian 2003-04, to the west in 2005, to the south in battle group known as Task Force Orion adopted a the summer of 2006, and to the east in the fall strategy of sending platoon-sized patrols to area of 2006. By this time, all previously OEF-owned villages to detect such activity and, if found, sweep- PRTs in the east were shifted to ISAF command. ing the area clear of Taliban.

38 the chicago council on global affair s The growing Taliban presence—at first not fully Medusa and caveats acknowledged by OEF because of the U.S. desire that nothing disrupt its handoff to NATO—meant The suddenly new circumstances within which that Canadian troops fought numerous skirmishes Canada found itself became even more appar- and a few all-out battles in the period before the ent as it prepared for what was billed by the com- change of command. During this time U.S. sup- mander of ISAF and the NATO secretary general as port for Task Force Orion and the multinational NATO’s “main, main fight” of the season: Operation brigade was significant. “The Americans always Medusa.4 Conducted by Canada’s Task Force 3-06, arrived when the Canadians were in trouble,” the which replaced Task Force Orion in mid-August, task force’s commander recalls. “There was one the operation also involved a British combat sup- radio network [and] when there was a call for sup- port element, a Dutch support element, and U.S. 1 port, everyone could hear it.” Within minutes special operations troops. Over the course of about of a call, U.S. air support would arrive en masse, three weeks in September 2006, the combat forces including, depending on the requirement, Predator engaged what turned out to be a conventionally unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), Predators armed dug-in army of Taliban in the Panjwayi district not with precision munitions, Apache attack helicop- far from Kandahar City, ultimately succeeding in ters, fighter aircraft, B1 bombers and/or Black clearing the area of Taliban forces. Hawk helicopters for medical evacuation. With General Fraser began plans for the operation some eighty helicopters in RC (South), OEF was in August, crafting a four-phase operation that readily able to respond to Canadian requests for was coherent except for one key component: suf- assistance—as long as they were part of the OEF ficiently large combat forces. The British were chain of command. engaged in combat in the Helmand province and Such support “died the moment NATO took thus were unable to contribute forces. The Dutch 2 over.” The operational impact of the change declined to participate in the actual combat, but of command was felt almost immediately by did take over responsibility for a forward-operating Canadian troops on the ground. In the middle of base, thus freeing up more Canadian resources for a battle to clear a large number of Taliban occupy- combat.5 Unofficially, the United States provided ing an abandoned school, Task Force Orion called Canada with significant forces and enablers.6 That in air support. Rather than receiving immediate, said, America was intent that other NATO countries low-flying assistance from U.S. Apaches, as had step up to the plate. The key reason U.S. Secretary been the case in the past, they were supported by of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had sought to increase Dutch Apaches that, due to national caveats, were NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan over the previ- barred from flying below a certain altitude. Because ous three years was to lessen the burden on U.S. requests for fire did not comply with new rules of troops.7 engagement brought in when NATO took com- But military and geographic caveats placed mand, the Apaches refused orders to engage the by national governments on their contingents in Taliban around the school, and the Brigade Tactical Afghanistan meant that other NATO countries were Operations Centre at Kandahar airfield denied unwilling or unable to step up to the plate. Tactical desperate requests for the use of artillery fire on caveats involved restrictions on how or when 3 Taliban positions. NATO commanders might deploy the troops, while

4. British Lieutenant General David Richards, as quoted in Bernd Horn, No Lack of Courage: Operation Medusa, Afghanistan 1. Author interview with Lieutenant Colonel Ian Hope, (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2010), 35, 44. Ottawa, November 8, 2011. 5. Horn, 38-39, 45. 2. Ibid. 6. E-mail from Major General (retired) David Fraser to 3. Chris Wattie, Contact Charlie: The Canadian Army, the author, February 13, 2012. Taliban, and the Battle for Afghanistan (Toronto: Key Porter 7. Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New Books, 2008), 265. York: Sentinel, 2011), 689.

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 39 geographic caveats involved restrictions on where ters that were available in their home countries.8 troops could be deployed. The combined effect was NATO was forced into the short fix of chartering that as Fraser drew up plans for and carried out civilian aircraft to conduct routine supply missions Operation Medusa, he had only a relatively small to free up British, Dutch, and U.S. helicopters to number of combat troops with which to work in help maintain the more dangerous supply lines. the south, and many of the troops he did have were A second negative impact involved consolidat- operating with restrictions. ing the gains. Effective counterinsurgency doctrine called for areas to be cleared of Taliban insurgents After Medusa: NATO in southern and then for an ISAF presence to remain to ensure they did not return—a basic “ink-blot” strategy of Afghanistan, 2007 to 2008 slowly spreading stability outward. Yet with insuffi- cient troops, this was not possible. Even if the initial Operation Medusa was successful in its immediate “rooting out” could be accomplished, an insuffi- goals of disrupting Taliban forces and clearing the cient number of forces meant that insurgents were enemy out of the Panjwayi district. But long-term able to regain ground. success—phases three and four of the operation’s These two factors figured centrally in a com- plan—called for creating a secure zone to pave the mission established by the Canadian government way for stabilization and reconstruction operations in 2007 to provide advice on whether Canada that would enable the population to return. This should commit to ISAF past 2009. In its January task, even more so than the actual combat opera- 2008 report, the Independent Panel on Canada’s tion, required additional forces to operate in the Future Role in Afghanistan recommended Canada’s more dangerous south. Over the next two years, continued involvement be contingent on secur- repeated requests by the United States, Britain, ing, by early 2009, the assignment of an additional Canada, and the Netherlands that other NATO ISAF battle group of about 1,000 troops; heavy lift countries send forces to help combat Taliban activ- helicopters for troop transport; and UAVs for intel- ity were consistently rejected. ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.9 For Canada, allied refusals to send forces All three factors were ultimately met—two of and equipment south had two notable negative the three by the United States—paving the way for a impacts. The first centered on helicopters. Canada mandate extension. The government leased Israeli- did not have its own troop lift helicopters, the result built Heron UAVs from a Canadian firm; Canada of an early post-Cold War decision, and supply was able to buy a half dozen second-hand Chinook chain bottlenecks meant it could not quickly rem- helicopters from the U.S. Army; and America ful- edy this situation through acquisitions. Thus, while filled Canada’s requirement for additional troop Britain and the United States did most of their support. For the latter, France sent 700 soldiers to resupply of forward-deployed forces with heavy RC (East), enabling the United States to redeploy lift battlefield helicopters, Canada was forced to the necessary forces to RC (South). send convoys that were regularly exposed to impro- vised explosive devices. From the summer of 2006 onward it was clear that Canadian troops were at America changes tack a higher risk of injury and death than those of our In fact, as reported at the time, well before the allies because of the lack of transport helicopters. commission issued its report, the United States With British, Dutch, and U.S. helicopters stretched to support their own troops, NATO’s sec- 8. Paul Koring, “Beleaguered NATO Set to Charter retary general appealed to other allies for military Helicopters,” Toronto Globe and Mail, October 24, 2007; Omar transport helicopters. But several NATO countries El Akkad, “Hillier Calls for Allies to Share Load in Afghanistan,” Toronto Globe and Mail, October 25, 2007. turned down requests to redeploy existing aircraft 9. Report of the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in in the theater to the south and/or to send helicop- Afghanistan (Ottawa, 2008), 38.

40 the chicago council on global affair s had given private assurances that it would answer General Stanley McChrystal, who took command Canada’s call for troops if no other country came of both OEF and ISAF in the summer of 2009 that forward.10 This was part of a change in approach proved the decisive factor. The report concluded to Afghanistan by the Bush administration that the situation in Afghanistan was deteriorating in dated back over a year, coinciding with the resig- the face of a resilient insurgency. The requirement nation of Secretary Rumsfeld in November 2006. was for tens of thousands of additional troops to In the fall of 2006, as recounted by Canada’s dep- implement a refocused counterinsurgency cam- uty military representative to the NATO Military paign involving targeting terrorist networks, stabi- Committee at the time, “Every time Canada said it lizing urban areas, and training domestic security needed more troops it got blank stares. Then, one forces. In late 2009 Obama authorized an additional day, a few weeks after Rumsfeld’s resignation and U.S. troop deployment of 30,000 soldiers, raising [General James] Jones’ subsequent departure as America’s total troop strength in Afghanistan to SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe], 100,000 by the summer of 2010. [American ambassador to NATO] Victoria Nuland announced at a meeting of the North Atlantic NATO in Afghanistan, 2009 to 2011 Council the United States wanted to put the issue 11 of more troops on the table.” This represented a It is difficult to overstate the operational impact complete reversal of the U.S. position under the on ISAF of receiving core U.S. strategic leader- new Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. ship in 2009. “We need to enter into any crisis with The change in the U.S. priority of Afghanistan is a conceptual framework that demonstrates unity central to understanding the NATO and Canadian of thought, unity of purpose, and unity of action,” experience in Afghanistan. Following a White House argues Canada’s Lieutenant-General Stuart Beare, review of U.S. policy in Afghanistan completed in deputy commander of police for the NATO Training early 2007, America’s troop strength began a slow Mission Afghanistan in 2010 and 2011. According to upward trend under the Bush administration. First Beare, McChrystal’s perspective was that we “change was the addition of 3,500 U.S. Army soldiers in the or fail.” As Beare says, “Not until the McChrystal spring of 2007, then the deployment of 3,200 U.S. plan did we have unity of thought, and the alliance Marines in the spring of 2008, and finally a decision was able to reorient around that vision.”13 Canada’s in the fall of 2008 to send an additional 20,000 U.S. Major General Jon Vance, commander of Task Force soldiers to Afghanistan in 2009. Kandahar in 2009 and 2010, similarly points to the These trends continued and accelerated after importance of the McChrystal report. Canada and Obama came into office. The new president had the alliance in general, he argues, initially “shied campaigned on the importance of the Afghan mis- away from the truth of the conflict [as counterin- sion. Also, by this time the “surge” of U.S. forces surgency].” According to Vance, not until Obama begun in Iraq in 2007 had achieved real results, and the McChrystal report did things truly change. enabling a drawdown of U.S. forces there and The impact was powerful. As Vance states, “Whereas freeing them up for other potential missions. Yet the commission asked for one battalion, the United although he authorized the additional 20,000 sol- States sent twelve.”14 diers, the new president still questioned whether The McChrystal approach established another “piling on more and more troops” was the cor- important element of any effective military opera- 12 rect approach in Afghanistan. It was a report by tion: unity of command. Having two military com- mands in Afghanistan—OEF and ISAF—with two 10. Matthew Fisher, “Political ‘Hot Potatoes’ on NATO Agenda,” Ottawa Citizen, March 31, 2008. 13. Author interview with Lieutenant-General Stuart Beare, 11. Author interview with Brigadier General (retired) Serge Commander of Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command, Labbé, Kingston, Ontario, November 29, 2011. Ottawa, December 6, 2011. 12. As quoted in Rajiv Chandraseharan, “In Afghanistan, U.S. 14. Author interview with Major General Jon Vance, Director May Shift Strategy,” Washington Post, July 31, 2009. of Staff, Strategic Joint Staff, Ottawa, December 6, 2011.

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 41 separate staffs created coordination problems, not ter understood in the context of five different layers least of which was increased potential for collateral of relationships in the security and defense arena. damage to the civilian population. Although OEF At the very center, Canada’s first and most usually operated at the eastern fringe of Kandahar important relationship is the bilateral one with the province, there were frequent requirements to United States. The next layer comprises the “four deconflict operations. McChrystal resolved this eyes” partners, sometimes shortened as ABCA, problem by creating a dual-hatted commander meaning America, Britain, Canada, and Australia. position, a four-star U.S. general that is both The third involves those allies “who are willing to commander of U.S. Forces Afghanistan and com- play hardball” such as the Dutch, the Danes, and mander of ISAF. sometimes the French. The fourth layer includes At the tactical level, the increased U.S. commit- countries that make a small but tangible contribu- ment to Afghanistan had a significant impact on tion to military operations such as newer NATO Canadian operations. The stretched resources and countries from Central and Eastern Europe.18 ongoing pressure on Canadian troops in Kandahar Finally, the fifth and outermost layer comprises in 2006 and 2007 were eased by U.S. Marine Corps the “nonswimmers,” that is, countries that are operations in the neighboring Helmand province NATO allies but are unwilling or unable to make in the spring and summer of 2008.15 Whereas Task a significant combat contribution to an out-of- Force Kandahar was the only brigade in Kandahar area mission. in 2008 and 2009, in 2010 and early 2011 it shared The nonswimmers are important for NATO Kandahar with three-and-a-half U.S. brigades. operations because of the intangible but critical Instead of experiencing challenges with respect component of legitimacy. Canada’s Major General to allied caveats and heavy lift helicopters, later David Neasmith, who worked in the NATO Training Canadian commanders could report that “German Mission Afghanistan in 2010 and 2011, has pointed and Italian caveats had no bearing” on Task Force out that there can be a stigma attached to a U.S.- Kandahar and that the Task Force “had no problem only operation. “NATO brings legitimacy both for at all with air support.”16 Before Canada switched the United States and for the Afghans. Legitimacy is to a training role in the summer of 2011, there was worth the existence of a club, and [the club] has to a belief that NATO “worked well” and “while there have international recognition—we can’t just label were some restrictions on troops, this did not pres- everything ‘coalition of the willing.’” Moreover, the ent a big problem.”17 United States “cannot do everything on its own.” Allies can provide very important contributions, 19 Layers of relationships even if these are not in a combat role. For Vance, “The value of having nonswimmers is that you can The key factor in discussions about a “NATO opera- add to the number of flags” involved, thereby add- tion” is what is meant by the reference to NATO. ing to legitimacy and covering secondary but nec- 20 The discussion above reveals that when an opera- essary jobs. tion includes a large U.S. combat element, then The legitimacy the NATO name conveys also Canada’s experience is a relatively much better one makes it easier to attract participants in the fourth than when the operation is not built on a strongly layer. While ISAF is a NATO operation, almost half of engaged U.S. core. What this means for Canada’s those involved are non-NATO countries. Legitimacy future participation in NATO missions can be bet- makes this possible. “If an alliance is seen as cred- ible,” notes Beare, “[non-NATO countries] don’t

15. Murray Brewster, “U.S. Offensive Taking Pressure Off 18. Author interview with Major General David Neasmith, Canadians in Kandahar,” Canadian Press, June 1, 2008. chief of staff, assistant deputy minister information manage- 16. Author interview with Vance. ment, Ottawa, November 18, 2011. 17. Seminar presentation in Ottawa, Fall 2011, under 19. Ibid. Chatham House (nonattributable) rules. 20. Author interview with Vance.

42 the chicago council on global affair s question the mission, they just fit in. There is no eral relationship with the United States. A 2010 other military organization in the world that can do snapshot of a sea of U.S. trucks and armored vehi- this. . . . Without NATO the international commu- cles lined up in compounds outside Kabul is an nity could not have rallied in Afghanistan.”21 Under overwhelming reminder of the degree to which this the multinational surface, however, the practical “NATO” operation depended on America’s active mechanism by which these contributions are actu- involvement. Notes Neasmith, “The vast major- ally made is through bilateral agreement with the ity of theater support and logistics was done by United States. If a country wants to contribute mili- the United States. The command structure was tary forces to ISAF but is unable to get its soldiers to dominated by the United States, the facilities, the the theater and/or sustain them, then an arrange- trucks … the sustainment of the Afghan National ment is usually struck with the United States for Army, the resources for building the force. . . . The assistance in one or both areas.22 lion’s share was provided and paid for by the United In the third layer, NATO is important because it States.”24 All of the fourth-layer participations, and acts as an effective mechanism for standardization no doubt many of the third, were made possible by and interoperability. A long history of exercises and the United States. A key second layer participant, implementing NATO Standardization Agreements Australia, was there primarily because of America. has promoted interoperability, that is, the compat- And Canada’s own experience in Afghanistan, the ibility of communications, information technology, highs and lows at the tactical level, in the final anal- doctrine, and logistics. “The benefit of having an ysis reflected and depended on the commitment alliance,” states one former Task Force Kandahar and support of the United States. commander, “is the standardization of everything from staff and operation order procedures to train- Conclusion ing, map symbols, bullets, and fuel. . . . When you conduct an operation, we all talk the same lan- An assessment of the NATO mission in Afghanistan guage. . . . The military value of NATO is that you in the period from 2006 to 2011 yields some impor- 23 don’t have to rediscover these things every time.” tant lessons about its ability to conduct crisis man- Canada’s second layer of defense relationships, agement operations and about Canada’s future ABCA, comprises the core group of countries with participation. Given the experience of conducting which Canada is most likely to fight in the future. tactical operations under NATO command, Canada This conclusion is supported by Canada’s experi- should only take part in such missions if it is sup- ence in Afghanistan, which involved close opera- ported by U.S. assets. “Canada can fight as long as tions with the United States and Britain throughout, the U.S. is there to fill the gaps.”25 For those who and included a key Australian presence. The Dutch worked at the operational/strategic level within were also in the theater, but they did not always ISAF, the ideal is that there be “four eyes” involve- take part in combat operations. France provided ment, but the bottom line is core American involve- close air support to Canadian troops from 2007 ment. Canada should say “yes” to NATO operations onward, and although not covered in this paper, “preponderantly led by the United States.”26 Canada’s more recent experience in the Libya This conclusion has important implica- operation indicates France is a country with which tions in light of the strategic guidance for the U.S. Canada will fight in the future. Department of Defense released by the Pentagon The experience in Afghanistan most clearly in January 2012. The new strategy stresses America highlighted the importance to Canada of its bilat- will sustain its global leadership by focusing on a combination of high technology and small foot- 21. Author interview with Beare. 22. Ibid. 23. Author interview with Brigadier General Denis 24. Author interview with Neasmith. Thompson, Commander of Canadian Special Operations 25. Author interview with Hope. Command, Ottawa, November 30, 2011. 26. Author interview with Neasmith.

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 43 print approaches. Central to the strategy, to com- pensate for a reduced force size, is that “U.S. forces will plan to operate whenever possible with allied and coalition forces.”27 For Canada the new strategy points to both caution and opportunity. The caution involves ensuring from the outset that any future NATO cri- sis management operation it participates in enjoys the core support and direction of the U.S. govern- ment and military. The case examined here reveals there is no substitute for U.S. leadership, vision, and engagement. The opportunity lies in the fact that while America will still act in a leadership capacity, it will want and need dependable, capable allies that can contribute a robust combat capabil- ity. Canada—and others—will need to decide how to respond to this opportunity. “NATO is an us not a them,” Beare has underscored.28 It is easy to fall into the mind-set of looking for “NATO” to provide capabilities when what we need to do is look at our own individual, national capabilities. As we look to the future of NATO’s crisis management task it is this sort of thinking that should be the conceptual and concrete starting point.

27. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (Washington, D.C., January 2012), 4. 28. Author interview with Beare.

44 the chicago council on global affair s Smart Defense

Camille Grand Director, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS)

Abstract: Austerity measures spurred by the global financial crisis have led to decreases in defense spending in almost all allied countries, especially in Europe. Indeed, these cuts are the most visible marker of the chal- lenges to Western leadership in international security affairs. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates cautioned in his famous farewell speech in Brussels, there is serious risk of the “demilitarization” of Europe as more and more nations are unable to provide militarily relevant forces to NATO (or EU) operations. In this context, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen launched the “Smart Defense” concept in February 2010, which aims to transform the approach to defense acquisition in order to deliver capabilities in a more efficient and cost-effective manner. A multifaceted concept, Smart Defense promotes new ideas and manage- ment, facilitates better coordination within NATO, and provides strategic responses to capability shortfalls. It will require significant political will and cooperation among allied countries, but is critical in combatting the current challenges of the defense sector.

Facing the budget and capability abandoning support for critical capabilities. The largest European NATO countries are no exception, challenge with deep cuts in Germany and Italy (10 percent), plans for severe reductions in the UK (at least 7.5 In the context of the global financial crisis, fiscal percent over the next four years), and expectations austerity has been leading to severe cuts in defense of further cuts in France after an already significant spending in almost all allied countries in the last few slowdown. Altogether, twenty out of twenty-eight years, primarily in Europe but also in North America. allies reduced their defense budgets last year. The The eurozone crisis has led to sharp declines in vast majority of NATO countries already dipped defense spending in the short term (often up to 10 below the threshold of 2 percent of GDP for defense percent over a single year, with some extreme cases spending years ago and are heading for 1 percent. of cuts up to 28 percent) and plans for further reduc- The decline in European defense spending tions in the future. In Europe many countries are contrasts sharply with developments in the rest of under extreme budgetary constraints as they try to the world. Globally, defense spending increased address the economic and fiscal challenges associ- 50 percent in the last decade. From 2001 to 2010, ated with massive public debts. according to data from the Stockholm International In this context many “small” European allies Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), defense spending refuse to contribute even modestly to operations. in Europe only increased by a meager 4.1 percent. Other traditionally important contributors to NATO Most of the increase came from Britain and France, engagements—such as the Netherlands—are while spending in most other European countries

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 45 was decreasing or stagnating. During the same ity development and defense planning no longer period, China increased its budget by 189 percent, suffices to address the organization’s challenges. Russia by 82 percent, the United States by 81 per- In February 2010 the secretary general of NATO cent, India by 54 percent, and Saudi Arabia by 63 launched the “Smart Defense” concept at the secu- percent.1 In 2011, for the first time, Asia spent more rity conference in Munich. The concept aims to than Europe on defense. transform the approach to defense acquisition to Even if NATO still accounts for two-thirds of deliver capabilities in a more efficient and cost- world military expenditures, this rapid decline in effective manner. relative terms—which could be amplified by the While the plan for Smart Defense is a major announced U.S. cuts—is the most visible marker “deliverable” for the 2012 Chicago NATO sum- of the challenge to Western leadership in interna- mit, the substance of the initiative still needs to tional security affairs. In Europe it is all the more be more accurately defined in the longer term. worrying because the money spent is often not mil- Concrete projects need to be developed and itarily effective. Many European armies continue to endorsed by all allies. In recent months, work sustain large conscription forces mostly unemploy- conducted jointly under the leadership of the able for crisis management outside their respective Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation territories. In addition, procurement policies are (SACT) and the deputy secretary general of the not harmonized, and many competing programs alliance defined both a conceptual framework and continue to be developed at the expense of a more a first set of projects. This first step was critical to integrated and cost-efficient acquisition policy. getting beyond the political slogan and develop- As former U.S. Defense Secretary Gates pointed ing a shared vision of Smart Defense to be submit- out in his famous farewell speech in Brussels, there ted in Chicago. is a serious risk of “demilitarization” in Europe as more and more nations are simply no longer able A multifaceted concept to provide militarily relevant forces to NATO (or EU) operations. This trend is undermining the credibil- At this stage, several key policy objectives underlie ity of the alliance in the mid-to-long term and could the Smart Defense initiative: weaken the transatlantic relationship if Americans are no longer willing or able to compensate for • Organizing and mitigating the effects of the European shortfalls. These shortfalls were clearly announced reduction in defense budgets of identified during the recent Libyan operation. The NATO countries by making better use of the U.S. decision to “lead from behind” left only a hand- available resources; ful of European allies able and willing to conduct the bulk of combat operations, with the United States • Reviving the old theme of “burden sharing” providing indispensible enablers such as most of the between Americans and Europeans by highlight- intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) ing the need for closer coordination of defense systems, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) policies of the allies in a context of fiscal auster- and air-to-air refueling. ity in Europe and cuts in U.S. spending in the Confronted with this combination of growing decade to come; capability shortfalls and declining defense budgets, many experts and leaders have come to acknowl- • Providing responses to the capability shortfalls edge that “business as usual” is no longer possible identified during the engagements in Afghanistan and that the traditional NATO approach to capabil- and Libya;

• Promoting new ideas and management methods

1. All data extracted from SIPRI Military Expenditure such as coordinated acquisitions and integrated Database 2011, http://milexdata.sipri.org. management of common capabilities;

46 the chicago council on global affair s • Coordinating better NATO capability initiatives would specialize in specific assigned roles in with the recent efforts of the European Union future alliance missions at the expense of their through the European Defense Agency and sovereignty in matters of defense and their ability European projects under the “pooling and shar- to act without the Americans. ing” label that pursue similar objectives; • Ending up as another bumper sticker for a sum- • Finding innovative ways to cooperate on some mit—Without a radical change in mind-set, flagship projects such as alliance Ground Smart Defense risks being a simple rebranding Surveillance (AGS) or missile defense, identified of existing projects without responding to the as major “deliverables” for the Chicago summit. necessities of the coming decade or addressing the capabilities shortfalls. The secretary general intends to achieve the adop- tion of a Smart Defense “package” at the Chicago summit, responding to the three pillars already Some elements for a successful identified by Allied Command Transformation Smart Defense (ACT)—cooperation, prioritization, and specializa- In the light of past successful cooperation in tion—and combining the launch of new initiatives labeled Smart Defense and the funding of projects defense matters, several lessons can be drawn: already identified. 1. Successful cooperation combines strong politi- Faced with this ambitious agenda, nations cal will, a clear vision of job sharing, and signifi- have adopted a supportive but prudent approach. cant financial or industrial gains. If they acknowledge that “business as usual” is not an option in the current budgetary context, they 2. Cooperation between a limited number of simi- also emphasize the cost of past and ongoing multi- lar countries (e.g., France/UK, Visegrad coun- national projects (the A400M military transport air- tries, Nordic countries) tends to be generally craft, the NH90 helicopter, and the JSF/F35 fighter) more successful and efficient than vast mul- and express legitimate concerns about the impact tinational projects run by NATO involving too of Smart Defense on their sovereignty, their indus- many partners. try, and their budgets. Some of them fear that Smart Defense will be reduced to the multiplication of 3. The pooling of capabilities becomes more com- common funding, leading nations that maintain a plicated as combat approaches. It is easier to reasonable defense effort to also pay for those who share maintenance facilities, training facilities, behave as free riders. and strategic enablers than to create dependen- In order to better understand the potential of cies on critical capabilities required for combat Smart Defense and submit for consideration proj- operations. Many remember that recent NATO ects that could fall under this initiative, it is neces- engagements were marked by caveats or by the sary to identify the risks beforehand. abstention of allies refusing to take part in a par- • The lack of accountability—An initial paradoxi- ticular mission. cal pitfall would be to increase the disempow- erment of Europeans who would be tempted to If Smart Defense is only used to disguise cuts, the fulfill their role in the alliance by getting involved support and ownership of the ministries of defense in a couple of flagship projects without maintain- is unlikely. It thus appears desirable that savings ing a minimum defense capability. generated by Smart Defense should be reinvested in capability development. • The limits of the niche approach—Many are Finally, from a European perspective, estab- likely to resist the logic under which Europeans lishing transparency with ongoing projects within

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 47 the EU is essential, including the efforts of the whose use would be conditioned on the authori- European Defense Agency and the various initia- zation of one partner of a particular project would tives under pooling and sharing. A true first goal for be counterproductive and almost absurd. The Smart Defense would be to better coordinate the difficult experience of Libya and the difficulties work of the alliance with the modest but real role involving collective capabilities (AWACS planes), of the EU, while respecting the independence and when nations not involved in Operation Unified respective roles of the two organizations. Protector did not authorize their crews to fly the Indeed, behind the displayed role of clearing mission, set a worrying precedent. Clear rules house, NATO plans to use this project to mobilize establishing the availability at all times of capabili- allies around priority capabilities today with little ties procured jointly need to be set and endorsed or no additional funding. Such an approach has the by all participants. merit of helping fill capability gaps and of providing a partial solution to the low investment in defense The reality of the financial gains needs to be dem- of the vast majority of the allies. NATO should also onstrated on a case-by-case basis. Cooperation take into account the views of the European allies sometimes has a high cost, and NATO does not who seek to preserve a coherent defense capability have the best track record for managing multina- and a technological and industrial base. tional programs. The NH90 program is often cited as a negative example both in industry and in the Conclusion: Some final policy armed forces due to its length, cost overruns, and recommendations bureaucratic management. With regard to indus- trial cooperation, a project can hardly be described Smart Defense cannot be a substitute or an alibi as “smart” if it falls victim to all the usual problems to justify future budget cuts and capability. While of past multinational cooperation (e.g., ensuring many of the European armies have already reached fair industrial returns for all partners and accumu- or are about to reach critical thresholds of military lation of national specifications). Smart Defense readiness that affect their ability to fulfill missions, must be accompanied by the acceleration of reform whether the defense of their territory or the abil- of alliance agencies. ity to contribute to militarily significant operations of the alliance, it is necessary to recall that Smart Dialogue with the defense industry should not Defense must preserve and strengthen the over- be neglected. NATO should establish a dialogue/ all defense posture of the alliance and not simply partnership with the defense industry of all allies mask cuts or facilitate the behavior of free-riders. in order to be able to meet the two objectives of responding to capability requirements and reduc- The priority given to the reduction of capability ing costs and acquisition times. It is particularly gaps must be affirmed. Smart Defense is not a tool necessary to better organize the debate with of industrial policy, but must focus on building capa- European industry, which faces fiscal austerity, but bilities that Europeans are not all able to acquire could become a major player in Smart Defense if it only through national budgets. Particular emphasis fits into ambitious projects. should be given to critical enablers to prevent the undermining of NATO’s ability to act. Amongst the The choice of flagship projects will be an interest- projects that deserve to be given priority, ISR capa- ing marker. In his public statements the secretary bilities and air-to-air refueling stand out. general often associates Smart Defense and con- solidation of large projects such as AGS or missile The availability of capabilities developed jointly defense without explaining the link further. An as part of Smart Defense through a multinational emerging consensus exists on the major projects project is a critical principle. Pooled capabilities that could be endorsed at the Chicago summit: a

48 the chicago council on global affair s broader ISR initiative going beyond AGS, air-to-air Closer coordination with the EU should be an refueling planes, missile defense, and precision- integral part of the Smart Defense package. If the guided munitions (PGMs). Europeans (or the EU as such) were able to put for- ward joint capability initiatives, such an approach The role of NATO still needs to be fully defined. should be labeled Smart Defense and should be Is this role as a useful facilitator promoting coop- hailed as such in Chicago, even if NATO is not eration among nations and offering a forum to involved in the development of a project. A truly enable pooling and specialization fully in line European approach requires close coordination with the defense-planning process, or is it a more with the pooling and sharing of the EU through global and more questionable ambition under the development of proper European projects. It which NATO would define and manage a multi- should be clear that ownership by European gov- tude of projects labeled Smart Defense without ernments will be increased by projects involving clear added value? Debates have already taken European industry. The fact that these projects were originally developed and launched under place and a number of points stand out on the the European Defense Agency project or pooling possible role of NATO in regard to the three pillars and sharing could also promote opportunities for (cooperation, prioritzation, and specialization) European industry. The fact that such projects are identified by ACT. endorsed by NATO under the Smart Defense label 1. Regarding cooperation, if the ambition goes is not a risk but an opportunity to see them succeed and bring together more partners. A good example beyond the role of clearing house, it is neces- is the case for any initiative around the acquisition sary to consider Smart Defense within the NATO of in-flight refueling capabilities (MRTT). Defense Planning Process (NDPP). But NATO A failure of Smart Defense in Chicago is recognizes it will essentially be the facilitator of unlikely from the strict view of the political dynam- cooperation by allowing the partners to identify ics of the summit itself. (Who would support joint projects. “dumb defense?”) The summit is likely to ensure both the adoption of the initiative by the alliance 2. Prioritization is not new to NATO, as previ- and endorsement of a handful of visible proj- ous capability initiatives (e.g., Prague, Lisbon) ects. The real issue remains the ability of the ini- remind us. However, as the identification of pri- tiative to develop over time and to produce the orities has not yielded the expected results of required change in mind-set. In this regard, the delivering enhanced capabilities, the question ACT approach that sees Smart Defense as a project is how NATO can articulate common, realistic developed “with nations, by nations, for nations” priorities consistent with the mission and level is probably the way to secure an appropriate level of ambition of the alliance. The main difficulty of allied endorsement and a commitment to go is the relationship between the priorities of each beyond a good slogan for the summit. ally and the priorities of the alliance, which do not always overlap (to put it mildly).

3. Specialization is the most difficult because the smallest allies are sometimes reluctant to position themselves in niches and the “big” Europeans have not given up maintaining a coherent defense apparatus. What is most important for NATO is to promote specializa- tion by design rather than see the specialization by default.

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 49 NATO-Russia Relations: Toward a “Strategic Partnership”?

Isabelle François Distinguished Visiting Research Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Security Studies, National Defense University (NDU)

Abstract: The formal launch of the NATO-Russia relationship in 1997 has resulted in fifteen years of progress, but also disappointment and frustration on both sides, raising questions about the effectiveness of the relationship and its precarious future. Russian and NATO goals and expectations are often at odds, and dialogue over issues of European security has been shaky. The Russo-Georgian conflict in 2008 typified these opposing interests and reinforced differences within the alliance on how best to engage with Russia. Does the necessary political will exist with which to develop consensus for joint action? Can a “strategic partnership” between NATO and Russia truly exist when the parties’ interests diverge as fundamentally as they do? The NATO-Russia Council has for the most part failed in its overarching goal of developing an inclusive security community within Europe. That said, at practical level there have been significant milestones in the relationship—notably with regard to Afghanistan— but the road ahead appears bumpy. In addition to a broad security dialogue involving high-level political and military engagement, an enduring foundation of confidence and trust between the two partners must be built for there to be any hope of sustainable cooperation leading to a new quality of relations in the future.

Shaky premises Putin met in October 2001 to reassess the potential for NATO-Russia relations after the Kosovo epi- The NATO-Russia relationship was formally sode, they embarked on a new approach with a far- launched in 1997 when the alliance and the Russian reaching multilateral process that would transform the NATO-Russia relationship and serve as a key Federation decided to create a forum for regular instrument in anchoring Russia in a cooperative consultation on security issues—the Permanent agenda with the West. At the Rome NATO summit Joint Council (PJC). The two sides seemed, at in 2002, the alliance and the Russian Federation the time, to have decided to trade an adversarial created the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) to replace relationship based on escalating rhetoric, intim- the PJC and stressed that the new council would idation, and confrontation for dialogue and coop- function as a forum of twenty equal members. eration. Over the past fifteen years, however, the NRC was designed to avoid the pitfalls of the pre- relationship has generated significant waves of dis- vious forum, which had become essentially a con- appointment and frustration. The first major blow frontation between nineteen NATO allies and one came in the wake of the Kosovo war in 1999, which Russian partner. And yet, in the summer of 2008, prompted the Russians to suspend their ties with the Russo-Georgian conflict dealt a second major NATO. Nonetheless, when Lord Robertson, acting blow to the NATO-Russia construct. This time, the as NATO secretary general, and President Vladimir allies suspended the NRC and its activities, decid-

50 the chicago council on global affairs ing that it could no longer be “business as usual” Russia, would be in a position to influence each between NATO and Russia. For about a year, the other’s decision-making processes and to pursue a NRC stopped meeting and cooperative activities cooperative agenda in addressing common threats came to a halt. and challenges jointly. The first question one might Russian actions in Georgia met with disap- ask is whether cooperation between NATO and pointment and disbelief on the part of the most Russia could develop on the basis of mutual respect moderate allies—long supporters of NATO-Russia without an expectation on either side to win over cooperation—but it served as justification for the the other on the merit of its own position. Is there “cold warriors,” who called for punishment for political will to seek compromises towards devel- what they perceived as an aggressive and anachro- oping consensus for joint action? nistic policy towards Russia’s weak southern neigh- bour. Diverging interpretations of Russian actions Toward a strategic partnership? in the summer of 2008 reinforced differences within the alliance on how to best engage with Over the past decade, the ambitious agenda of Russia. The suspension of political dialogue and the NRC set forth in 2002, building on the 1997 military cooperation between NATO and Russia NATO-Russia Founding Act—essentially seeking resulted in polarized positions within the alliance cooperation to jointly face common security chal- that have persisted to this day, have affected the lenges—has evolved towards defining cooperation normal functioning of the NATO-Russia Council, in terms of limited “areas of common interest.” It and still hamper the potential development of an has become commonplace in relations between inclusive security community in Europe. For its NATO and Russia to “agree to disagree,” recogniz- part, Russia had felt for some time—and President ing that cooperation will be limited to areas where Putin made it clear at the Munich security confer- the parties can agree to work together, while on ence in February 2007—that it could no longer be other matters they will work at cross-purposes. the object of derision and accept the post-Cold One might argue that this has tacitly led to revis- War settlement. It saw this settlement as incom- iting the very concept of cooperative security and patible with its core national interests, but had partnership. Russian authorities have clearly stated not opposed it in the early nineties because of the that the prospect of NATO enlargement to Georgia country’s own weaknesses at the time. and Ukraine presented a challenge to Russia’s This polarization of positions may have core national interests. On the one hand, Russian been rooted in a fundamental misunderstanding national documents from military doctrine to for- between NATO and Russia about their respective eign policy statements have been unequivocal in expectations, probably dating back to the onset this regard. On the other hand, NATO’s position on of the relationship. NATO-Russia relations devel- enlargement has been just as clear and unwavering oped on the false premise that, on the one hand, in reaffirming its open-door policy over the years. Russia was embarking on a path towards sharing One may wonder whether a “strategic partnership” and integrating Western values fundamental to can truly be envisaged when parties agree from the the post-Cold War alliance transformation. Russia onset that, in certain areas, positions among them was thereby perceived by Western observers to be will remain antagonistic. reconciled with NATO’s “open door” policy. On the The resumption of NRC meetings and coopera- other hand, Russia expected that it would be given tion in the spring of 2009 proceeded on the same a voice around the table in Euro-Atlantic security basis of partnership and cooperation developed in affairs, where it could influence alliance thinking 1997 and 2002 in then-agreed-upon documents. from within. The creation of the NRC and the 2002 In reality, the alliance could not find the neces- Rome Declaration were thus developed under the sary consensus from within to refine the basis for dubious assumption that both parties, NATO and its relationship with Russia, and it papered over

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 51 the fact that various parties came out of the 2008- ative agenda of the 1997 Founding Act and the 2002 09 period with different outlooks on the poten- Rome Declaration, highlighting a more competi- tial for the NATO-Russia relationship. It is widely tive and at times even confrontational relationship. acknowledged, however, that the Russo-Georgian In fact, twenty years of NATO-Russia coopera- war was an attempt to put an end to any prospect tion have evolved to the point where the so-called of Georgian membership in NATO. On the Russian “strategic partnership” seems of limited impact in side, the conflict certainly marked a turning point. addressing today’s strategic issues in Europe and Moscow felt the need to draw “a line in the sand,” beyond. One may wonder indeed to what extent using military force to delineate Russian core the NATO-Russia relationship has improved the national interests. It had been unable to achieve ability of the parties to deal with strategic security this outcome diplomatically, making use of its stra- issues within Europe, let alone to face challenges tegic partnership with the alliance alone. Having from Central Asia to the Middle East. resumed cooperation on the basis of the same principles of cooperative security, one may wonder Acknowledging serious efforts and whether Russia and NATO allies have fully consid- projects ered the impact of the Russo-Georgian war on the NATO-Russia relationship. That said, the limits of the NATO-Russia relation- By the end of 2009 the NRC was back in busi- ship should not overshadow some genuine efforts ness, at least on the surface. The official docu- on the part of practitioners to develop useful proj- ments issued at the last NATO summit in Lisbon ects in various areas of cooperation and concrete in November 2010 state the importance the allies results emanating from such projects. From its attach to “developing a true strategic partnership inception, the work of the NRC had been divided between NATO and Russia” and show the twenty- between what was commonly labelled “political nine NRC leaders pledging to “work towards dialogue” on the one hand and “practical coop- achieving a true strategic and modernized part- eration” on the other—both elements of the coop- nership based on the principles of reciprocal con- erative agenda set out in 2002. While the “political fidence, transparency, and predictability, with the dialogue” did not yield much commonality of views aim of contributing to the creation of a common and generally failed (with a few exceptions) to pro- space of peace, security, and stability.” Perhaps of vide consensus that would enable “joint actions” in most significance, at least most visibly, the Lisbon the face of common strategic challenges, specific summit marked a renewed commitment to cooper- projects have led to some joint training exercises ation in the area of missile defense. One should ask and continue to offer interesting prospects. whether Russian statements of the past six months Two examples are worth mentioning. In June regarding missile defense are, as often interpreted, 2011 NATO and Russian fighter aircraft took part in essentially electoral rhetoric or whether they reflect the counterterrorism exercise “Vigilant Skies 2011,” something much more fundamental. a joint demonstration of the NATO-Russia Council In reality, behind the Lisbon rhetoric and just Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI). This initia- below the surface lies a very uneasy partnership tive was designed to prevent terrorist attacks using between NATO and Russia, one still suffering from civilian aircraft, as in September 2001, by sharing what led to the Russo-Georgian war and its ulti- information on movements in NATO and Russian mate impact. This conflict called into question the airspace and by coordinating interceptions of ren- core assumption binding NATO and Russia into a egade aircraft. This new airspace security system partnership, namely that Russia would become provides a shared NATO-Russia radar picture of air progressively more integrated into the Western traffic and allows for early warning of suspicious air community of states. Events and declarations in the activities through commonly agreed procedures. last five years have often diverged from the cooper- The new system has two coordination centers—

52 the chicago council on global affair s in Warsaw and Moscow—and local coordination essentially failed in developing an inclusive security sites in Russia (Kaliningrad, Rostov-on-Don, and community within Europe. Because of “unfinished Murmansk), Poland (Warsaw), Norway (Bodø), and business,” a different approach may be required to Turkey (Ankara). This was the first counterterror- ensure that the NATO-Russia relationship remains ism exercise held between NATO and the Russian on the cooperative security track and to avoid a Federation and was a major milestone in develop- bifurcation in European security that divides East ing the capability of a CAI system now declared and West. operational. This exercise could probably serve as a solid basis for cooperation in other areas in the Refocusing on confidence building future (including missile defense). and trust Cooperation with Russia on Afghanistan has also yielded three projects. The first is focused on It is safe to say that the NATO-Russia strategic counternarcotic efforts and the second on cargo partnership never fully materialized despite the shipments through the Northern Sea Route in fact that both NATO and Russia are strategic play- support of the NATO-led International Security ers and cannot ignore each other in defining and Assistance Force (ISAF) to and from Afghanistan. addressing today’s security challenges. The part- The third project is the establishment of a trust nership was conceived as a cooperative frame- fund in support of helicopter maintenance, essen- work in which to deliver win-win solutions. It led tially helping to build the capacity of the Afghan instead to a crisis of confidence about each other’s army. These projects have been punctual and lim- intentions. Declaratory policy has hardly matched ited to specific areas of cooperation, often ona the facts on the ground, and the rules of the game commercial basis. Political discussion with Russia, remain blurred, with actors cooperating at times however, (or other countries in the region) on pos- yet resorting to adversarial negotiating tactics and sible regional cooperation beyond the 2014 tran- confrontational rhetoric at other times. sition to Afghan security forces and withdrawal of While the ultimate goal may still be a strate- ISAF troops remains limited. Talks about NATO’s gic partnership based on broad cooperation and Enduring Partnership with Afghanistan beyond win-win proposals, it is likely to remain a long and 2014 and with countries of the region, including bumpy road ahead. While the result is not assured, Russia, could be further developed. the rules of the game between NATO and Russia Beyond these specific examples, a significant have to be refined. The game should be one of build- number of other cooperative projects between ing confidence if there is any hope to get back to a NATO and Russia have been undertaken in the past broad cooperation agenda. Acknowledging a crisis fifteen years. The question, however, is whether of confidence between Russia and its European and these projects can ultimately lead to the develop- North Atlantic partners will be necessary in order ment of a strategic partnership. To date it could to refocus on building confidence in the short term easily be argued that cooperative efforts within the and undertaking cooperative projects that can yield NATO-Russia framework are yet to translate into meaningful results in the long term. the strategic partnership envisaged in the founding Assuming that confidence building becomes documents of the NATO-Russia relationship. Yet the name of the game, the process will have to abide could the sum of positive developments and coop- by key principles of the 1997 Founding Act such as erative projects ultimately trigger a snowball effect increased transparency, reciprocity, and predict- and eventually amount to a strategic partnership? ability. Borrowing from the rules that prevailed in This paper argues that the NRC has actually East-West arms control negotiations during the been unable to develop a European security frame- Cold War might assist in refocusing the relation- work in which all twenty-nine members feel their ship on the long-standing and thorny issues upon respective interests are equally addressed and has which NATO and Russia have agreed to disagree,

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 53 notably Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), mis- against NATO’s expansion and its global projection sile defense, tactical nuclear weapons, and NATO capability as threats to the Russian Federation. How enlargement. Progress on contentious issues will be can this vicious circle be broken? required to build the genuine trust that underlies a In today’s European security context, trust and true strategic partnership. The obvious question, confidence are elusive in most partnerships with however, is whether a cooperative relationship can Russia. In addition to a broad security dialogue be developed on the basis of old arms control (i.e., involving high-level political and military engage- adversarial) negotiation techniques. ment, a specific set of measures to build confidence In the aftermath of the Russo-Georgia war, with a broad cooperative program needs to be NATO has responded to its difficult relationship developed on the basis of today’s security agenda with Russia by essentially reassuring Central and in order to reassure Russia (while also expecting Eastern European allies, while reaching out to Moscow to respond accordingly). Tangible results Russia through cooperative activities. The chal- on concrete measures to reassure Russia will take lenge of this approach is that NATO reassurances time and must proceed through incremental con- to its Central and Eastern European allies have fidence-building efforts. This is, however, the price usually been interpreted by Russia as antagonistic. for a genuine strategic partnership between NATO This has triggered Russian rhetorical and military and Russia, a partnership that is key to an inclusive responses, including military exercises and the European security community. maintenance of nonstrategic nuclear weapons to offset the inferiority of Russia’s conventional forces. Similarly, measures to build confidence with Russia and any mutual attempts to reduce nonstrategic nuclear weapons systems have often been per- ceived in Central and Eastern Europe (although the views in Central and Eastern Europe are not mono- lithic) as a weakening resolve on the part of NATO to use its capabilities and ultimately as a weaken- ing of the NATO Article 5 commitment. For its part, Russia reacted on numerous occa- sions to what Moscow has consistently perceived as threatening moves towards Russia. The Russian mil- itary conducted the military exercises Ladoga and Zapad in 2009 near the Baltic States based on a sim- ulated nuclear attack on Poland. Moreover, when Warsaw decided to host U.S. ground-based inter- ceptors as part of the Bush administration’s Third Site missile defense program, Moscow threatened to target some allied territory with Russian nuclear sys- tems based in Kaliningrad. This threat was reiterated at the end of 2011, presumably a result of the lack of progress on potential cooperation with Russia in the area of missile defense. Moreover, the weakness of Russian conventional forces has led to Russian promulgation of a “first use” nuclear doctrine. In 2010 the Russian military doctrine reiterated lan- guage previously used by the Russian military

54 the chicago council on global affair s NATO, Russia, and the Vision of a Euro-Atlantic Security Community

Dmitri Trenin Director, Carnegie Moscow Center

Abstract: While there have been improvements in the U.S.-Russia relationship, relations are still stuck halfway between former enmity and aspired strategic partnership. Emphasis should be placed on transforming relations to make an inclusive security community in the region more likely. In addition to transforming strategic rela- tions between the United States and Russia, historical reconciliation must be achieved between Russia and several NATO member countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Without either of these, there will be no inclusive security community in the Euro-Atlantic and thus no stable peace in this part of the world. The challenges are tremen- dous, but returning to the status quo is not a sustainable, longer-term option. Missile defense can act as a catalyst in improving relations.

The absence of an inclusive security community in ship and no amount of practical but limited cooper- the Euro-Atlantic twenty years after the end of the ation has been sufficient to dispel that dual mistrust. Cold War is something that ought not to be over- This is not to say that dialogue and joint activi- looked. It prevents NATO member states, Russia, ties are meaningless. They have improved mutual and other countries in Europe from cooperating understanding on particular issues and helped more fully to solve the existing security issues on achieve useful results. Russia, for example, has the continent and to address common challenges materially assisted NATO in transiting troops, goods, and material to and from Afghanistan. Yet and threats from outside the region. Moreover, plain the current pattern of NATO-Russia cooperation, dangers are not to be ruled out. The 1999 Kosovo as it has evolved over the past fifteen years, does conflict and the 2008 Russo-Georgian war should not allow the sources of mutual mistrust to be serve as clear warnings. In both cases, direct Russo- addressed. Rather, it helps perpetuate a relation- NATO/U.S. collisions were only narrowly avoided. ship that is stuck halfway between former enmity There are many reasons for this unsatisfactory and the aspired strategic partnership. state of affairs. The principal cause, however, is the To break out of the present mold, serious steps deep-seated suspicion within Russia’s ruling circles that squarely address the sources of continuing mis- about the strategic intentions of the United States trust are necessary. To deal with Russia’s America and an equally strong, if not stronger, suspicion in problem and the Central Europeans’ Russia-related several NATO countries, mostly in Central Europe, issues, simply waiting for Russia to transform into about the long-term geopolitical designs of Russia. a liberal democracy ready to accept U.S. leadership As the past two decades have demonstrated, no is not a credible option. Russia is certainly chang- amount of diplomatic communiqués about partner- ing, with the social dynamic impacting the politi-

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 55 cal landscape, as events in recent months have as unfounded and inordinate. Yet, a Russia that demonstrated. Still, the process of its evolution once again feels spurned by Washington is not in toward a recognizable democracy will take a fairly the larger U.S. interest. The U.S.-Russian reset long period of time. And even a more democratic has allowed the Obama administration to rely on Russia’s acquiescence to America’s leading role Moscow’s valuable support in putting together the should not be taken for granted. Northern Distribution Network with reference to Rather than waiting for Russia to transform Afghanistan. Even in the more distant future, after itself, emphasis should be placed on transforming the United States has completely withdrawn from the two sets of relationships that are currently trou- Afghanistan, Russia’s geopolitical position abutting bled. The issue, then, is how to transform strategic simultaneously Europe, China, and the Muslim relations between the United States and Russia world will remain an important factor in U.S. for- and how to achieve full historical reconciliation eign policy. Engaging Russia in meaningful cooper- between Russia and several countries in Central ation on missile defense with the United States and and Eastern Europe. Without both of these, there its NATO allies will ensure, apart from many other will be no inclusive security community in the things, that whatever else happens in relations Euro-Atlantic, and thus no stable peace in this part among the major strategic players in the world, of the world. Russia will at least not land on the wrong side as far If the above diagnosis is correct and the pro- as the West is concerned. posed treatment credible, the next logical ques- For Russia, a failure to reach agreement with tion is whether such treatment is obtainable. Can the United States and NATO on missile defense the U.S.-Russia relationship really be transformed would pose even greater risks. Moscow would have from adversity to strategic cooperation? Can Russia to commit considerable resources to protect itself and Poland, Russia and the Baltic States, Russia from a threat that is imaginable rather than real. and Georgia become truly reconciled? Even the Its countermeasures against a NATO-only missile questions sound a bit too optimistic. Clearly, the defense system in Europe, announced by President challenges are tremendous on all sides. The inertia Medvedev on November 23, 2011, would lead to a of the Cold War and the postimperial syndrome are revival of tensions in Russia’s relations with a num- still very strong on all sides. The sense of urgency is ber of European countries, not just the United States. largely absent. There are important vested interests A perception of being “isolated” in the West might that are quite comfortable with the status quo— push Russia to seek balance through a closer align- psychologically, politically, and materially. These ment in the East, resulting in Russia becoming more interests want no change. dependent on and eventually subservient to China. What could break that inertia? Above all, a On the issue of historical reconciliation, new assessment of risks and threats and the vision Moscow has already seen the light. It saw, cor- of the unsustainability of the status quo over the rectly, that a continued impasse in its relations with medium term. On the issue of U.S.-Russian strate- Warsaw was turning into a real obstacle in Russia’s gic relations, missile defense acts as a catalyst. This exceedingly important relations with the European issue offers both the prospect of serious deteriora- Union. Having reached this conclusion, Moscow tion of Russian-American relations, complete with then decided to engage Warsaw directly rather than a new crisis in Moscow’s relations with NATO and trying to pressure the Poles with the help of Russia’s the possibility of transforming the entire relation- principal partners in the EU, Germany and France. ship away from its residual adversity toward genu- Early engagement with the Poles revealed the need ine partnership. Continued inertia actually equals for the Russians to do two things: to start treating a choice in favor of the former. Poland with respect and to look into the difficult The United States, of course, may decide to issues of common history. Thus, something that ignore Russian concerns and fears, which it sees began as a purely pragmatic attempt to do away

56 the chicago council on global affair s with the Polish roadblock on the Moscow-Brussels (2) provide for meaningful and coequal military highway morphed into the issue of basic values, cooperation, and (3) accommodate Russia’s secu- moral responsibility, and reconciliation. rity concerns without prejudice to the sovereignty However, unless the initial progress achieved and security interests of any other party to the between Poland and Russia is not furthered, much cooperative project. An arrangement that pro- of the effort may be wasted. It will also remain vides for joint data and information processing, an isolated, though important case, rather than a close communication, and clearly stated rules of continentwide trend. Thus, Russia’s overwhelm- engagement between the fully autonomous mis- ing interest in having a productive relationship sile defense systems of NATO and Russia in Europe with the European Union, which is its biggest trad- would not only resolve the current missile defense ing partner and most important modernization issue, but lead to deeper transformation. A ver- resource, would be damaged. It is very much in sion of such an arrangement has been recently Russia’s interest, then, to expand its reconciliation drafted by a group of eminent personalities from agenda to include other states in Europe such as the United States, Europe, and Russia known as the the Baltics. Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative Commission. The kind of hard-headed risk assessment Missile defense cooperation between Russia described above is a necessary first step to fun- and the United States/NATO would be strategic damentally revamping the NATO-Russia security enough to promote transformative changes in both relationship. Other steps include devising realis- sides’ defense establishments. Deterrence would tic strategies for transforming the nature of U.S.- remain, as would nuclear weapons arsenals, but Russian relations in the politico-military field and it would be progressively less relevant in Russian- for deepening, sustaining, and expanding histori- Western relations. National security strategies and cal reconciliation between Russia and several of its military doctrines, however, would need to take neighbors in Europe. account of institutionalized strategic collabora- On the U.S.-Russia track, missile defense coop- tion. This cooperation would still be less than an eration has been long identified as a make-or- alliance, but due to its truly strategic nature would break issue and a potential “game changer.” Initial leave less and less room for surviving elements approaches by both sides, however, turned out to of Cold War enmity. As the old culture of mistrust be unrealistic. NATO essentially invited Russia to would be receding, elements of trust would start join its project, which influential voices within forming a new culture. the Russian defense establishment viewed as det- Missile defense, of course, is not the only rimental to the survivability of the Russian deter- salient issue in Russian-Western relations. It would rent. Russia, for its part, tried to turn the NATO be wrong to focus on it to the exclusion of every- project into a joint venture without contributing thing else. There are a number of arms control top- serious assets to it, but with a dual-key provision ics, from conventional weapons to tactical nukes that would have allowed it to block NATO’s deci- to advanced precision systems. Much can be said sion and actions. The Russian “sectoral” approach about enhancing both sides’ confidence by means was designed to exclude NATO missile defense of addressing these weapons categories. Confidence deployments from the areas from which they could building and arms control, however, are of a differ- impact the Russian deterrent—at the price of mak- ent and lower order than building trust. While obvi- ing Poland and other countries located in those ously important and even urgent—some of them at areas dependent on Russian protection. Moscow, least—these measures are not transformative. Only of course, would never accept a similar security cooperation at a strategic level makes a difference. protectorate from NATO or the United States. This year is an election year in the United The objective, then, is to come up with a States. In Russia the parliamentary/presidential method that would (1) address a real missile threat, campaign is over, but a major government reshuf-

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 57 fle is about to begin as Vladimir Putin gets ready for his third inauguration. This is certainly not a good period for negotiating breakthrough agree- ments. Yet, this is a good year for reflection and for thinking strategically in the United States, Europe, and Russia. Then, if the renewed U.S. and Russian administrations prove receptive to bold thinking and their leaders demonstrate leadership, impor- tant national decisions could pave the way to an unprecedented common undertaking. The way the missile defense issue plays out in 2013-14 will have massive consequences. It will provide an answer to the question of whether cru- cial first steps toward mutual rapprochement can be taken. Putin’s forthcoming inauguration does not look like a spoiler. He is on record saying he is willing to walk “very far” to obtain a new qual- ity for the U.S.-Russia relationship. Putin’s grandi- ose plans for rebuilding air and missile defenses would result in Russia acquiring some assets like the S-500 systems, which could make the Russian military a more credible and valuable partner for the Pentagon. The Obama administration, should it remain in power after November 6, 2012, would need to take another look at the U.S.-Russian reset. Actually, the reset is not a policy, but essentially a clearing opera- tion. The operation having been largely successful, the time has come to formulate a new U.S. strat- egy toward Russia—something that has been miss- ing for a decade and a half. The world has changed in that period, and it keeps changing. The global power shift toward Asia demands that the United States seek new resources at home and abroad and formulate new policies with a larger emphasis on cooperation. A smarter U.S. foreign policy needs to bring Russia back from the cold.

58 the chicago council on global affair s NATO and the Middle East: A Positive Agenda for Change

Jonathan Eyal Senior Research Fellow/Director, International Studies, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)

Abstract: NATO has been given an excellent opportunity to refocus itself. For once, its cooperation framework is likely to become important. Indeed, with the recent challenges in the Middle East and North Africa, NATO is virtu- ally guaranteed to have a role to play. And it has a lot to offer—it is the one organization with the most extensive track record in managing military transformation, an area of experience and expertise that will be essential in the region. It has the necessary credibility to engage with military establishments in the region, and the Arab Spring is inviting NATO to do what it does best—engage in discussions and dialogue on core military issues. The negatives pale in comparison to the potential positives if NATO engages as an enduring example that “soft” security mea- sures can still help achieve hard security goals.

It is easy to deride NATO’s efforts in the Middle East • Like any international organization, NATO is best as an exercise in futility. Despite ringing declara- when it implements one partnership policy in a tions, communiqués at various summits, and an consistent manner. But that never applied to either untold number of bilateral and multilateral meet- the MD or the ICI since it was understood from the ings, there is little to show for this effort. NATO did start that a one-size-fits-all policy would not work not predict or foresee the wave of revolutions that for a region as diverse as the Mediterranean basin have swept through the region since January 2011. or the Gulf. As a result, the outcome was a set of It was unable to influence outcomes and is play- bilateral initiatives only loosely connected to the ing catch-up with events. The notable exception broader cooperation frameworks. was the operation last year in Libya, yet even this was undertaken as a result of UN Security Council • NATO never enjoyed a strong level of support for resolutions rather than alliancewide consensus, its MD and ICI efforts. While all member states which remained elusive. Finally, regardless of the agreed that the effort was worthwhile, some “conclusion” of the Iranian nuclear standoff—if countries preferred the emphasis to be directed that’s the right term for a crisis that will endure on the Gulf region, some wanted it to be directed for years, if not decades—it is certain that NATO toward North Africa, and quite a number were as an alliance is likely to play only a marginal role simply indifferent to the entire exercise. on Iran. The fundamental problems with NATO’s • Key players in the region were either excluded Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul from cooperation or shied away from any con- Cooperation Initiative (ICI) are well known: tact. This applied not only to the so-called “pariah

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 59 states” such as Iran, Syria, and Libya before the the outcome—and it is quite likely to be a mixture overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi, but also to of all the scenarios outlined above—NATO is virtu- Saudi Arabia—the most important player in the ally guaranteed to have a role to play for the follow- Gulf—and Iraq and Lebanon, some of the most ing reasons: volatile nations. • All Middle Eastern regimes will require a new • NATO was not the only multilateral actor in the “social contract” with their national armed region. The European Union played a key role— forces. In all of the region’s countries the military often crowding out or negating the alliance’s will have to withdraw from politics and accept efforts—while individual NATO member states a more institutionalized presence, one that is also expressed strong preferences. France, for hemmed in by some predictable, prescriptive instance, remained protective of its primacy in constitutional norms. the formulation of policies towards the Maghreb. The United States was sensitive to the particular • Whether Syrian President Bashar al-Assad sur- security needs of Israel. Turkey frequently blew vives in power or is overthrown, his country will hot and cold over the entire effort as it began to never again be the tightly controlled nation it was assert itself as a key player in the Middle East’s over the past half century. There is a real risk that strategic architecture. Syria will descend into perpetual civil warfare of the kind experienced by Lebanon. The result • While a “modular” approach to cooperation may therefore be an “arc of conflict” spanning with the region was clearly the right—and pos- from the Gulf to the Mediterranean and includ- sibly only—approach, it also meant that the ing Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. This would be a effort lacked strategic direction. In theory, vast expanse, where militias would be confront- NATO was open to any kind of cooperation, but ing each other in a bigger regional proxy war in in practice this usually amounted to a formu- which Iran and Saudi Arabia support and supply laic set of seminars, conferences, and plenty of various protagonists. “military tourism.” • Whether Iran succeeds in acquiring a nuclear And yet, despite this rather patchy record, NATO capability or not, the question of confidence- has now been given an excellent opportunity to building measures in the Middle East will be the refocus itself. For once its cooperation framework key concern for years to come. is likely to become important. • The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is seek- Why now? ing to transform itself into a regional military alliance, largely in order to meet the perceived It would be foolish to predict the outcome of the security gap as Iran’s military clout and ability to wave of revolutions sweeping the region. These destabilize the region increases. It is in everyone’s may end with an “authoritarian restoration” of the interests that a GCC military alliance be based on kind experienced in Europe in 1848 or with the rise objectives countries wish to promote—such as of Islamic-based regimes that succeed in “stealing” regional security—rather than on what countries the popular sentiments of the revolts. It is equally oppose—such as the destabilization of regional possible that the result may be the perpetuation of monarchies. In short, the question is whether a weak governments that owe their intellectual alle- GCC alliance will resemble NATO or whether it giance to no ideology, but merely totter from one will resemble the old Warsaw Pact, an alliance day to the next, sometimes repressing popular dis- that only went into action against in own mem- sent and sometimes buckling under it. Whatever ber states in order to perpetuate a political status

60 the chicago council on global affair s quo. This is now the Gulf’s most pressing ques- • Treating countries as infants in need of learning. tion and one in which the West has a major stake. That may seem a fundamental and well-under- stood point, but it is not. On many occasions Why NATO? NATO put forward its experience as a model, with little practical effect. Touting Turkey, for instance, To all these forthcoming challenges of the Middle as an example of a democratic yet Muslim nation East, NATO has a great deal to offer. It is the one whose path may be followed by Arab countries organization with the most extensive track record is probably counterproductive, largely because in managing military transformation, with a repos- Turkey’s model is not easily copied elsewhere, itory of good practice stretching back decades. It however appealing it may be. also has a long experience with efforts to imple- • Organizing many public conferences and semi- ment and perfect democratic control of the armed nars in the region. Given the greater openness forces, as almost half of the alliance’s member of the Middle East, the temptation and ability to states can attest. It is second-to-none in negotiat- organize such conferences is much larger. The ing confidence-building measures of a military impact of such conferences, however, is dimin- nature and in the implementation of arms con- ishing, as local NGOs—the usual interlocutors trol agreements. And NATO includes all of the key for NATO at such conferences—still do not have actors with relevance to the Middle East. In short, much impact on policymaking. By engaging it has the necessary credibility to engage with too much with NGOs, NATO risks creating the the military establishments in the region and the impression that it wishes to go behind the backs political credibility to engage with the region’s new of national leaders. That is already the view of the leaders. Paradoxically, having spent years trying to military in Egypt, for instance, and it is harmful fathom what it could usefully do in the Middle East, to the alliance’s engagement efforts. the “Arab Spring” is now inviting the alliance to do what it always did best—engage in discussion and • Launching new, grand partnership initiatives. dialogue on core military issues. The MD and ICI frameworks are perfectly ade- quate for all needs, and any new overarching What should and should not be done strategy is likely to be met with public incredulity in the Middle East. As always, it is easier to prescribe what should not be done rather than what should be pushed forward • Taking credit for supporting the wave of revolu- in this dialogue. Nevertheless, a list of the “don’ts” tions in the region. The true heroes are the people remains critically useful since—as the experience of the region, not the alliance, notwithstand- with the MD and ICI indicates—presentation is ing NATO’s huge contribution to the liberation often as important as the message itself. NATO of Libya. should avoid: This list of negatives may seem daunting. But it • Offering one approach to the entire region. While pales in comparison with the positives, with the the problems may be similar, no nation wishes to opportunities that NATO has in the region. These be treated as part of a group. include the following:

• Prioritizing one action over another. While Libya • Engage directly not only with national military may welcome assistance with the reconstruction establishments, but with finance ministries in of its armed forces, Egypt, for instance, may not. Middle Eastern countries. That is the kind of dia- Efforts will have to be calibrated to what is desired logue that often does not exist at the national by nation states rather than what is desirable. level and where NATO can help.

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 61 • Move quickly to bring Libya, Iraq, and Saudi crucial. They will become even more important Arabia into the alliance’s frameworks for dialogue. in tomorrow’s Middle East since they will be com- bined with the formation of new regional alliances, • Use the offer of dialogue as a positive public pol- balance-of-power games, and, potentially, also icy instrument and do so in a clear, declaratory deterrence practices. NATO should be engaged as manner. There is no reason, for instance, why Iran an enduring example that “soft” security measures should not be promised strategic dialogue with can still help achieve hard security goals. And the NATO should it comply with the nuclear verifi- opportunity for doing so has never been greater cation requirements of the International Atomic than now, despite the currently confusing strategic Energy Agency and the UN Security Council. map of the Middle East. There is every reason why a similar offer should be made to Syria well in advance of the collapse of the current dictatorship in that country.

• Allow some of the new members of NATO—those that experienced both dictatorship and a transi- tion to democracy fairly recently—to take the lead in some of these engagement efforts on behalf of NATO. These countries are likely to be more accepted in the initial phase of contact.

• Highlight the fact that NATO is a repository of information on arms control and confidence- building measures.

• Act as a venue for security dialogue between regional countries. These happen far less than desired, and NATO can be the “midwife.”

• Encourage high-profile visits from Middle Eastern military commanders to Brussels, partly to break down negative perceptions of NATO in the region. That is one kind of “military tourism” that should be actively promoted.

• Achieve a division of labor between NATO, the EU, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund in dealing with the region. That, admittedly, has proven to be a difficult course. But the task may be easier now that a division of sorts is already emerging, with the EU coordinating broader eco- nomic and political moves, while international financial organizations are there to provide credits and economic reconstruction expertise.

The practices of dialogue, socialization, and coop- erative security pioneered by NATO will remain

62 the chicago council on global affair s Turkey’s NATO Agenda: What Role in the Middle East?

Lieutenant General S¸adi Ergüvenç (Ret.) Former Turkish Military Representative, NATO Military Committee

Abstract: Turkey relied on the NATO alliance throughout the Cold War years, but, at times, it has come to feel like the “lone wolf” in the alliance. The country still relies on NATO, to be sure, but the extent to which Turkey can count on NATO is contingent upon NATO’s cohesion in how it contends with pressing security concerns. Given Turkey’s strategic geopolitical location, Turkey cannot remain indifferent to the ongoing crises in North Africa and the Middle East. Indeed, Turkey has demonstrated the ability to facilitate intensive dialogue and consultation to promote regional peace and stability.

The NATO stage ing. For this reason, the alliance, having decided on a new strategy, reiterated its determination to At the age of sixty-three, the North Atlantic Treaty undertake yet another transformation so that it Organization (NATO) is the longest living military is prepared to address twenty-first-century secu- alliance in history. This could not have been possible rity challenges. To achieve this in a time of auster- if, through the years, it did not satisfy its members’ ity, the alliance has to seek ways to become leaner expectations and if members had not fulfilled their and more capable with less money. It must engage commitments to achieving its purposes. NATO’s with partners for regional and global security, while longevity also proves that the alliance has been ensuring the fulfillment of its core mission, i.e., col- transforming successfully in response to changes lective defense. in the security environment. Its membership has reached twenty-eight, and several more countries Where does Turkey stand? are aspiring to accede. Over thirty countries from the Southern Mediterranean to Central Asia, plus During the Cold War NATO was the backbone of Russia and Ukraine, are engaged by NATO in dia- Turkey’s defense against the Soviet/Warsaw Pact logue or as partners. This indicates that the alliance threat. NATO membership implied a Western iden- is prestigious and credible, with an extended reach. tity for Turkey and offered an equal say in European It is also true that the alliance is going through defense matters. In return, Turkey shared the bur- difficult times. Difficult issues confront the alli- den of guarding the southern flank, while alienating ance’s solidarity and cohesion, ranging from the itself not only from the Soviet Union but also from diminishing military capabilities of most members all the Soviet satellite states in its immediate neigh- to the shifting of U.S. priorities from Europe to the borhood. Turkey’s reliance on NATO increased as Pacific. Differences in degree amongst members in the Turkish military became totally oriented and their threat perceptions, security concerns, inter- dependent on the United States and NATO. Turkey ests, and preferred responses are also challeng- became aware of the constraints of this depen-

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 63 dence after its “Peace Operation” in Cyprus and the merits of its location and its growing economic in its struggle against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and political power, Turkey gained popularity as a (PKK), when it became subject to arms embargos strategic partner. U.S., EU, and Israeli leadership, imposed by its NATO allies. amongst others, often pronounced Turkey as a As European integration deepened and the strategic partner, apparently to express a high level Western European Union, which ultimately became of desirability for such a relationship in the geo- the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) political context. Turkey needed strategic partners of the European Union (EU), gained prominence, to construct a safe and stable periphery. Recently, Turkey was concerned about being left out, with striking discord amongst Turkey, the United States, a degraded association arrangement that did not and Israel, however, has shown that achieving a assure a firm commitment to collective defense long-lasting strategic partnership requires more that is spared for EU members only. Discussions on than desire and intent. whether Turkey was a security provider or a security Strategic partnership may be defined as a consumer were more confusing. This undermined commitment between two or more states to work Turkey’s confidence in the European allies’ fulfilling together and cooperate closely to achieve a stra- their NATO obligations for its security and defense. tegic objective with a long-term perspective, Hence NATO’s security assurance essentially meant especially where vital interests are concerned.1 It a U.S. assurance for Turkey, and bilateral relations represents a partnership beyond short-term, close with the United States were its special transatlan- cooperation or an alliance. tic link. At times, when its relations with the United A strategic partnership can be realized when States went sour, Turkey felt like a “lone wolf.” achieving the strategic objective is worth the strug- Today, for Turkey, NATO is still the precious alli- gle, when both parties have an equally high stake ance that it was in the past. Turkey shares the val- in getting involved in a balanced and concerted ues that NATO cherishes. It needs the assurance way, and when the strategic objective cannot be and the deterrence that NATO provides against achieved alone. Mutual confidence between part- potential adversaries. Turkey also needs the nuclear ners is a vital ingredient of an enduring partnership. umbrella and the missile defense extended through Most often, the strategic objective is to estab- NATO. The new Strategic Concept and the core lish and deny others control over an area of high tasks assumed by the alliance are basically aligned geostrategic value or to gain the support of a pivotal with Turkey’s security requirements. But how much country. The Shanghai Five and U.S. relationships Turkey can count on NATO is contingent upon with Gulf states are perfect examples of strategic NATO’s capabilities and on its cohesion with regard partnership. alliances of necessity do not always to its pressing security concerns, which are piling mean strategic partnership. up in its vicinity. NATO might not have been a strategic partner- ship, but as it becomes engaged in places such as Strategic partnership Afghanistan and Libya and expands its role to cover “global interests,” it may look more and more like a Once the Cold War was over, Turkey chose to fol- strategic partnership, provided that it acts in union low a multidimensional foreign policy to improve with balanced burden and benefit sharing. Thus far, its security environment in a way parallel and however, NATO resembles more a convenient plat- complementary to NATO enlargement and engage- form for consultation and for organizing coalitions. ment, not necessarily as an alternative to it. In this context, military-to-military contacts with other countries, regional or otherwise, led to more struc- tured relations, including regular exchanges, joint 1. Gültekin Sümer, “A Comparative Survey on the Concept of Strategic Cooperation and Strategic Partnership,” Ege Academic exercises, and industrial cooperation. Based on Review 10, no. 2 (2010), 673-700.

64 the chicago council on global affair s The Middle East and the Turkish with the transatlantic community. With its military strength, Israel could have been a valuable partner dilemma were it not in conflict with the rest of the Middle East, including Turkey, over the issue of Palestine. Turkey, situated on the margins of Europe and This situation creates an obstacle to cooperation the Middle East, is both a European and a Middle with Israel in the Middle East and North Africa Eastern country. As such, Turkey’s perception of (MENA) context and could be a serious impedi- the region often differs from that of its NATO/EU ment to advancing its relations with NATO. partners. Most of the allies’ vision of the region is The Middle East is the hub of potential con- focused on sustaining unopposed influence and flicts and crises such as the following: unhindered access to hydrocarbon resources and on the security of Israel. Their vision is also clouded • Fear about Iran’s nuclear and missile programs by Islamophobia and selfish preferences. Turkey is and its regional challenges constitutes a threat to more interested in regional development, peace, and global peace and stability, even a risk of war, as stability. To be in good relations with its neighbors the United States and Israel send signals of pre- is a fundamental principle of Turkish foreign policy. emption and Iran threatens to close the Strait Naturally, Turkey has to be more sensitive regarding of Hormuz. its relations with Russia and Iran; hence it should be more than reluctant to call them adversaries. • As Iran struggles to expand its influence in the Turkey, in comparison to its NATO/EU part- region, a Sunni-Shia polarization gains momen- ners, is less concerned with the Strait of Hormuz tum and the risk of a sectarian clash rises. The and more concerned with arms buildup, exist- Arab uprisings are already providing fertile ing nuclear weapons, and unresolved conflicts. It ground, exploited by the Taliban where feasible, seems like no other state cares about a peace settle- for such a polarization. This may open the stage ment between the Israelis and the Palestinians as for long-lasting chaos in the region, spurring rad- much as Turkey does. Turkey cannot tolerate reli- icalism and terrorism. gious, ideological, and sectarian fragmentation in the region and encourages interdependence. • The uprisings in Syria and Egypt and the situa- Turkey’s involvement in the Middle East is wel- tion in Iraq generate uncertainty and instability, comed by some countries, but is irritating to oth- inviting external involvement. As a region of criti- ers. Turkey is either doing better than the EU on its cal interest for oil- and gas-dependent countries, Neighborhood Policy or is shifting its axis. Some the Middle East is once again a region where say Turkey is a model for the region, but has a few competition for influence prevails. shortcomings. Some say Turkey must be tightly anchored to Europe, but it has no place in Europe. • Currently somewhat obscured by the above, the These controversial attitudes observed both in issue of Palestine remains the biggest impedi- Europe and in the Middle East compel Turkey to ment to regional peace and security. look more after its own interests. In the regional context, Turkey has tense rela- This “zero sum” setting may be transformed into tions with Greece, Greek Cypriots, Armenia, and an “all win” situation only if the root causes are Israel. While all these countries could have come addressed. Arab-Israeli peace and the settlement together to form a functional group to take up of the Palestine issue are fundamental to engage all regional initiatives, Turkey is being circumvented the countries of the region toward a common goal: by them in what some might see as a strategic part- peace and stability for a better future. This should nership. For instance, Israel stands out amongst the be envisaged together with the denuclearization of Mediterranean Dialogue countries since it already the region. Introducing better governance that is has a well-established dialogue and affiliation more responsive to public demand would be para-

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 65 mount to achieve such a transformation. But above that could be ensured by NATO if the partners agree all, international consensus over such a vision and if there is a UN mandate. is essential. The situation in Syria is the most demanding. The NATO intervention in Libya might have raised What can NATO do? expectations of NATO among the protesters, as indicated by NATO’s regionwide rise in popular- Through the Mediterranean Dialogue and the ity ever since. However, even with a UN mandate, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, NATO has been prospects of NATO involvement in Syria seem in touch with eleven MENA countries to develop dubious. mutual understanding, confidence, and coopera- Turkey is in a position to influence the regional tion. Through this engagement, NATO has partners balance geographically, politically, economically, it can communicate and interoperate with on the and militarily. Turkey cannot remain indifferent same frequency. Although this engagement was towards what is taking place in the Middle East. But designed to be inclusive, countries such as Iran, Iraq, there is not much it can do in forging a democratic Syria, Libya, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia remain out- solution to the ongoing Arab uprisings. Turkey can- side of this initiative. This situation looks divisive for not take sides with any of the parties struggling for the regional cooperation that must be sought. Libya power; it can side only with the people of the coun- and Iraq were engaged in different ways by NATO try. An intervention from the outside for the pur- through wars, which left them in need of recovery pose of stopping the bloodshed would help only to from the ensuing turmoil. Whether or not they will topple the regime at the price of more bloodshed remain intact is still a valid question. and devastation, as past experience has proved. The new command structure that brings the This explains the hesitations Turkey had at the start joint land command to Izmir, Turkey, is a timely of the events in Libya and Syria. response for the likely contingencies in the region, But Turkey can play a role in garnering and as are the deployable air command and control coordinating an international response by medi- and communication elements. NATO’s compre- ating an intensive dialogue and consultation, as is hensive approach that brings military and civilian already being done for finding an acceptable and elements together to bring a failed or war-ridden legitimate way out from the crises of governance in country back to its feet is certainly a step in the the Middle East. Turkey would be ever ready to pro- right direction. vide relief and recovery support. What NATO can actually do in various situ- ations is more intriguing. All the allies can be Summary expected to share a certain amount of concern over already rising oil prices and to be more concerned NATO is settling on a new course to meet twenty- if the Gulf exits were closed. The Gulf Cooperation first-century challenges, all of which demand a Council already has a unified military presence collective and cooperative effort to be dealt with in place to defend the Gulf against an attack from effectively. Turkey stands on the front line, facing Iran, together with the backing of the United States, the security challenges in the Middle East that are as necessary. There, NATO involvement may not at becoming increasingly pressing. all be required or desirable in a wider context. The Syrian uprising and worries about Iran’s NATO members should not and could not nuclear program require immediate action by the condone a preemptive attack on Iran by either the international community. Simply put, the situation United States or Israel. Instead, NATO should insist in the Middle East is unpredictable and explosive. on a political solution and appeal for a nonnuclear As of yet, no formal consultation has taken place in MENA. That appeal should come as part of a vision the NATO Council regarding a NATO response to for the region that is built upon a peace settlement the crises in the Middle East.

66 the chicago council on global affair s The Transatlantic Bargain after Gates

Barry Pavel Arnold Kanter Chair and Director-Designate, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security; Director, Program on International Security, Atlantic Council Jeff Lightfoot Deputy Director, Program on International Security, Atlantic Council

Abstract: As the United States reassesses its defense priorities towards the Indo-Pacific region amid cutbacks on defense spending, European partners in NATO must take on a larger responsibility for security within their own region and remain a close partner with the United States in providing security for the Middle East.

Introduction international front, the United States has begun to adjust its international priorities in the aftermath The tough love farewell speech of former U.S. of a decade of draining combat in the Middle East Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in June 2011 and Southwest Asia and the rise of new powers was more than a major policy speech on the state outside the Euro-Atlantic area. The fast emergence of NATO. His remarks were also highly symbolic, of China, India, and other powers in Asia as well coming from a legendary cold warrior whose forty- as Iran’s continued pursuit of a nuclear program year career had been oriented around the transat- in defiance of the international community have lantic relationship. Gates used his final appearance caused the United States to prioritize Asia-Pacific at the bully pulpit not only to warn Europeans that security and focus secondarily on the Persian Gulf declining defense budgets risked undermining the as its top security concern. credibility of the alliance among U.S. policymak- This fundamental reassessment of U.S. defense ers, but also that a new wave of American decision strategy necessitates a similar rethinking of the makers would not necessarily share his genera- transatlantic bargain if it is to remain relevant to the tion’s knowledge of, concern for, or sentimental security of Europe, Canada, and the United States. attachment to the transatlantic alliance. As the United States adjusts to its own challenge of Since Gates’ departure, the United States has austerity and the need to place priority on Indo- announced major revisions to its defense strategy Pacific security, Europe will need to take on more and military posture as a result of its own spend- responsibility for security within its own region and ing constraints and a reassessment of the inter- remain a close partner with the United States in national landscape. After years of growth, current providing security for the Middle East. For this bar- projections show the U.S. defense budget shrink- gain to hold and for NATO to remain relevant for ing by $487 billion in the decade to come, with both sides of the Atlantic, its member nations will another half trillion in cuts possible depending need to modernize and update their capabilities on the outcome of highly partisan negotiations and form more dynamic and innovative regional over future reductions to the federal deficit. On the and global partnerships to best address the array of

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 67 modern threats likely to face the transatlantic com- States only when absolutely needed. In this way, munity in the future. NATO’s Libya operation indeed may be the model for humanitarian interventions along Europe’s A greater burden for Europe as periphery. The United States will do what it must— playing roles and providing surge capabilities that America rotates to Asia only it can provide—and Europe will bear the rest of the burden for operations that are more in its If Gates’ tough words in Brussels failed to win the own interests than those of the United States. attention of U.S. allies in Europe, President Obama A slimmer and smarter U.S. military presence certainly gained their full attention when he in Europe and its periphery will enable Washington announced his administration’s new defense strat- egy in January 2012. The document emphasized to increase its presence in the Pacific in pursuit of that the United States “will of necessity rebalance shared transatlantic objectives of peace and secu- toward the Asia-Pacific region,” while also remain- rity in Asia. China’s rapid accumulation of eco- ing heavily engaged in supporting the security of nomic, political, and military influence has left U.S. Israel, the Persian Gulf, and other partners in the allies and partners in the region uneasy and eager greater Middle East. The document recognizes that for a reinforced American diplomatic and military Europe remains Washington’s “principal partner in presence to balance Beijing. As China and other seeking global security and prosperity,” but that it Asian economies continue their torrid economic will occupy a different place in U.S. defense policy growth, trade and investment flows into the region and strategy in the future. will become an increasingly important, shared Over the last decade, Europe has remained cen- economic interest for both the United States and tral to U.S. strategy as a means of supporting U.S. Europe. But even as the region grows more pros- forces engaged in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. perous, spoilers such as North Korea and linger- With these wars concluded or winding down and ing conflicts such the China-Taiwan rivalry and the the United States focusing the bulk of its defense South China Sea dispute will require a sustained resources on Asia, the United States no longer U.S. presence and attention to preserve the fragile needs—nor can it afford—to maintain its current peace in the region. military presence on a continent that is at peace. Few of America’s NATO allies possess the capa- With the United States forced to take on additional bility or even the interest in taking on a large role security responsibilities in Asia and the Middle in security in the Asia-Pacific region. But all of the East in pursuit of shared transatlantic objectives, allies have an interest in preserving a fragile peace Washington will look to its European allies to take a and stability in a region crucial to Europe’s eco- leading role in managing certain crises and contin- nomic prospects. Moreover, U.S. engagement in gency operations on their own periphery. Asia through its network of alliances also helps to This does not mean that the United States advance shared transatlantic ideals in a region of will not come to the defense of its European allies contested values. when the chips are really down. If Article 5 beck- While the United States may not expect Europe ons, the United States should and will be there. But to follow in its rebalancing toward Asia, it will seek if the types of discretionary operations that have to maintain strong transatlantic support in striving characterized NATO’s post-Cold War history (e.g., for security in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Bosnia, Kosovo, counterpiracy) continue to arise, The region’s rich energy reserves, geostrategic posi- then Europe should expect a relatively reduced tion, and continuing political instability will ensure U.S. role and a relatively greater role for their own that it remains at the top of the security agenda for forces. With Europe at peace and likely to remain the United States and its transatlantic allies and so, it must tend to its neighborhood with greater partners, even in the aftermath of the withdrawal of care and call in the reinforcements of the United U.S. and coalition troops from Iraq and the draw-

68 the chicago council on global affair s down from Afghanistan. The Libya conflict demon- operations. No-fly zones, naval blockades, preci- strated the positive impact that a closer partnership sion air campaigns, and selected ground opera- between the transatlantic community and key Gulf tions will continue to be required for contingencies states can have on the region’s security. Fortunately that unfold in the context of the Arab Awakening for Washington, strong ties between Paris and and by the range of threats posed by Iran. London and key Gulf allies such as the UAE and Of course, just as in previous decades, the Oman can ensure that the United States preserves United States should retain a core role in the alli- critical European support in pursuing shared secu- ance for the full range of such Article 5 operations. rity objectives in the Middle East. This fundamental element of the bargain will not change, for when Europe’s vital interests are threat- NATO’s role in a new transatlantic ened from within Europe or beyond, so too are those of the United States. bargain Second, as stated above, the relative role of Europe in non-Article 5 operations will of necessity A new transatlantic bargain has direct implications increase. However, with austerity afflicting defense for NATO’s vast but critical agenda. First, with the budgets on both sides of the Atlantic, there is no continuing drawdown in Afghanistan, NATO must thought that Europe will all of a sudden increase prepare anew for serious Article 5 threats and chal- its inventories of the types of critical and expensive lenges. This does not mean a return to Reforger military assets that the United States maintains in exercises or Cold War mind-sets, as the current and disproportionate numbers—C4ISR assets, targe- future threats to NATO member states are, for the teers, logistics, and other enabling capabilities.2 most part, very different from those of the past. The United States will need to continue to provide This century’s Article 5 threats will be manifested those capabilities when such assets can be made by ballistic missiles originating from the greater available. But the days when the United States pro- Middle East, coercive Russian energy threats and vided the preponderance of the assets of all types Arctic resource claims, challenges in cyberspace for operations that do not involve Article 5 are over. from a variety of sources, and, in the near future, The United States will support such European-led challenges posed to the alliance’s space capabili- NATO operations when it deems them in its inter- ties, which are increasingly vulnerable and upon ests to do so and when such assets are available, which the alliance’s militaries (and societies) are but this support will no longer be automatic or ever more reliant.1 comprehensive. Thus, the focus of NATO exercises and train- Third, the “plug and play” command and con- ing to strengthen interoperability for contingen- trol structure that has brought NATO through the cies in Europe should emphasize needed defenses Cold War and a range of post-Cold War contingen- against these new types of threats. This means, for cies continues to be highly valuable and very rel- example, increasing NATO’s capability for cyber evant to today’s security challenges. NATO should defenses and planning for contingencies that fea- sustain this core framework at all costs, as its value ture coercive Russian oil and gas supply measures endures and enables new partnerships. and militarized Arctic resource grabs. Fourth, NATO’s approach to partnerships in For Article 5 threats to members’ security origi- recent years has proven prescient, but much more nating from outside of Europe, i.e., from the greater needs to be done, and with some urgency. The Middle East, NATO will need to continue to exercise greater Middle East is in turmoil and will likely its naval, air, and ground forces for expeditionary remain so for a generation as the Arab Awakening 1. One threat that lingers still from the Cold War is the ongo- plays out across the entire region. Surely the alli- ing campaign by Russian covert operatives, which according to published reports is in full throttle again. NATO dealt with this 2. C4ISR stands for command, control, communications, threat in the Cold War and can deal with it again in this century. computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 69 ance should be prepared for demanding contin- to be ready—to be thinking, talking, and at some gencies that affect very important or even vital point, planning—for these geostrategic changes interests of NATO member states. Moreover, the occurring due to the most rapid shift of economic possibility of a crisis or conflict with Iran—either and political power in history. before it acquires nuclear weapons or after—must NATO should begin by initiating a consultative be taken seriously. Such a conflict would from its forum for Asian partners that are interested in a very outset directly affect NATO members, includ- dialogue as well as develop means to enhance their ing Turkey, but also the United States and other interoperability with the alliance through joint NATO members whose national forces are hosted exercises. The most likely initial partners should in significant concentrations in the countries of the include Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Gulf Cooperation Council (particularly Qatar, UAE, Korea, and Singapore. NATO itself should begin to Bahrain, and Kuwait). For example, an Iranian devote a portion of its own deliberations to Asian ballistic missile in flight will be picked up by U.S. security matters. This is not to suggest that NATO and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) radars, and begin Article 5 planning for China-Taiwan scenar- depending on its arc and range, by NATO’s mis- ios or for the Korean peninsula. But NATO should sile defense radars in Turkey and NATO members’ begin talking about Asian security, amongst its own shipborne radars in the Eastern Mediterranean. members and with key Asian partners who share Thus, a single Iranian ballistic missile in a Gulf cri- the values that animated the formation of the alli- sis will lead almost automatically to Article 5 con- ance in 1949. For if the next century features the sultations, if not operations, by the alliance. rise of Asian powers to the apex of global power, it All of this means that the time for NATO’s will be incumbent upon the United States, Canada, political timidity in the face of such realities is over. and Europe to strive to the greatest extent possible With some alacrity NATO should work out a robust to ensure that the new global order reflects transat- partnership arrangement with the newly promi- lantic values. nent GCC as a group and with the countries of the The transatlantic partnership can have a bright Middle East and North Africa (MENA) individually. and robust future, even in the face of a new array There is much to do. The focus should be security of threats and challenges to the security of alliance cooperation with MENA partners and strengthened members. Just as it has done before, the adaptable interoperability with the GCC in air defense; naval Atlantic partnership will need to evolve once more operations; missile defense; coalition air opera- to address a new international landscape. The tions; and command, control, and communica- broad strategic interests of the Atlantic community tions. Where possible, Turkey should play a leading are in greater convergence than ever before, but role in the alliance’s efforts. The key partners at this divergences in capabilities and regional priorities point, if current events and the Libya operation are require an adjustment to the transatlantic bargain any indication, are likely to be Qatar and the UAE, to ensure that the partnership remains as relevant but there will be others. in the future as it has been in the past. Finally, NATO cannot ignore the Indian and Pacific Ocean regions. Our globalized world means that significant economic disruptions in Asia almost instantly affect Europe and North America. The melting Arctic ice cap means that an increas- ing amount of maritime traffic from Asia will tran- sit northern European waters on its way to distant ports. New, critical sea lines of communication will need to be patrolled; new patterns of international maritime activity will begin to form. NATO needs

70 the chicago council on global affair s Conference Participants

*Keynote Speaker Dr. Lisa Aronsson Research Fellow, Transatlantic Security Studies General Stéphane Abrial* Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Supreme Allied Commander Transformation North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) His Excellency Kim Beazley Ambassador of the Commonwealth of Australia to Dr. Mensur Akgün the United States Director, Global Political Trends Center (GPoT), Istanbul Kültür University Dr. Kennette Benedict Executive Director and Publisher Steve Andreasen Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists National Security Consultant Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) Ambassador J.D. Bindenagel Former Director for Defense Policy and Arms Vice President, Community, Government, and Control International Affairs U.S. National Security Council DePaul University Former Deputy Chief of Mission Niels Annen U.S. Embassy in Berlin, East Germany Analyst Friedrich Ebert Foundation, International Policy Dr. Hans Binnendijk Analysis Vice President for Research and Applied Learning Member of the Executive Committee National Defense University (NDU) Social Democratic Party of Germany Director and Roosevelt Chair Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) The Rt Hon James Arbuthnot, MP Chairman Marshall M. Bouton UK Defence Select Committee President The Chicago Council on Global Affairs

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 71 Dr. Josef Braml Dr. Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer Editor-in-Chief, DGAP Yearbook Director German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) German Marshall Fund of the United States – France

Dr. Rachel Bronson His Excellency Martin Erdmann Vice President, Studies Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic The Chicago Council on Global Affairs of Germany to NATO

Ambassador R. Nicholas Burns* Lieutenant General S¸adi Ergüvenç (Ret.) Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and Former Turkish National Military Representative International Politics NATO Military Committee Harvard Kennedy School High Advisory Board Member Former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Global Political Trends Center (GPoT), Istanbul U.S. Department of State Kültür University Former U.S. Ambassador to NATO U.S. Department of State His Excellency Philippe Errera Permanent Representative of France to NATO Sir Brian Burridge Vice President, Strategic Marketing Dr. Jonathan Eyal Finmeccanica UK Ltd. Senior Research Fellow/Director, International Studies Dr. Fran Burwell Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Vice President and Director, Transatlantic Relations Program Kevin Francke Atlantic Council Program Officer, Transatlantic Relations Program German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) General Vincenzo Camporini (Ret.) Personal Assistant, MP Uta Zapf Vice President German Bundestag Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) Former Chief of Defense Staff Dr. Isabelle François Italian Armed Forces Distinguished Research Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Security Studies Professor Michael Clarke National Defense University Director General Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Beata Górka-Winter Programme Coordinator on International Security The Honorable Ivo Daalder* The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) Permanent Representative of the United States to NATO Dr. Jack Granatstein Senior Research Fellow Major General Ian Dale CBE (Ret.) Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute Consultant (CDFAI) Saab Training and Simulation Dr. Camille Grand Director Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS)

72 the chicago council on global affairs Dr. Lars Hänsel Jeff Lightfoot Director Deputy Director, Program on International Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Washington, D.C. Security Atlantic Council Ambassador Fay Hartog Levin Senior Advisor, European Affairs Rachel Martinek The Chicago Council on Global Affairs Head of NATO, Conventional Arms Control, and Former Ambassador of the United States to the Missile Defence Team Kingdom of the Netherlands British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)

Dr. Mark Jacobson Carlo Musso Senior Transatlantic Fellow Head of Research Department German Marshall Fund of the United States Finmeccanica

Ambassador Rastislav Kácˇer Ambassador Ümit Pamir President Former Permanent Representative of Turkey to the Slovak Atlantic Commission North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Former Ambassador of the Slovak Republic to the Member of the High Advisory Board, Global United States Political Trends Center (GPoT) Istanbul Kültür University Dr. Karl-Heinz Kamp Director, Research Division Barry Pavel NATO Defense College Arnold Kanter Chair and Director-Designate Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security Adrian Kendry Director, Program on International Security Senior Defence Economist Atlantic Council NATO Head of Defence and Security Economics Mark Phillips Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, NATO Research Fellow for Military and Intelligence Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) The Honorable Franklin Kramer Senior Fellow Luigi Piantadosi Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) Vice President, Marketing and Business Development for NATO, UN, and EDA Richard Ladd-Jones Finmeccanica UK Ltd. NATO and North American Policy UK Ministry of Defence Ahmed Rashid Author and Journalist Lieutenant-General Marc Lessard CMM MSC CD (Ret.) Dr. John Rielly Mentor/Senior Directing Staff at the Canadian President Emeritus Forces College The Chicago Council on Global Affairs Former Commander Adjunct Professor of Political Science Canadian Expeditionary Force Command Northwestern University (CEFCOM)

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 73 Colin Robertson Vice President Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI)

Dr. Jamie Shea* Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges NATO

Dr. Elinor Sloan Associate Professor of International Relations Carleton University, Ottawa

Marcin Terlikowski Research Fellow, International Security Programme The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)

Dr. Sylvia Tiryaki Deputy Director, Global Political Trends Center (GPoT) Istanbul Kültür University

Dr. Dmitri Trenin Director Carnegie Moscow Center

Hugh Ward MBE Head of Capability Saab Training and Simulation

Damon Wilson Executive Vice President Atlantic Council Former Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European Affairs U.S. National Security Council

Ambassador Bogusław Winid Under-Secretary of State Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland

74 the chicago council on global affair s Conference Agenda

28 March: The Future of NATO 09:00-10:15 “Economic Realities: The Scope and Depth of Austerity” 18:00-19:15 Public Program Economic turmoil on both sides of the Atlantic is leading to a serious reconsideration of spending Ambassador R. Nicholas Burns, Professor of priorities, including defense spending. The manner the Practice of Diplomacy and International in which states respond today will have a profound Politics, Harvard Kennedy School, and Former impact on tomorrow’s capabilities. How are global Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, U.S. economic conditions impacting national security Department of State decision-making processes and domestic budget- ary considerations? What does slow or stagnant 19:30-21:15 growth mean for member states’ defense spending, Private Dinner and Remarks investment, and financial contributions to NATO? What does it mean for the alliance’s ability to carry General Stéphane Abrial, Supreme Allied out current operations? What are the implications Commander Transformation, ACT, NATO for future missions and capabilities?

Introduction Speakers: The Rt Hon James Arbuthnot, MP, Chairman, UK Dr. Rachel Bronson, Vice President, Studies, Defence Select Committee The Chicago Council on Global Affairs Adrian P. Kendry, Senior Defence Economist and 29 March: Collective Defense in the Midst of Head of Defence and Security Economics, Political Economic Turmoil Affairs and Security Policy Division, NATO

08:45-09:00 Chair: Welcome Ambassador J.D. Bindenagel, Vice President for Community, Government, and International Marshall M. Bouton, President, The Chicago Affairs, DePaul University Council on Global Affairs

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 75 Paper writer: Introduction Dr. Josef Braml, Editor-in-Chief, DGAP Yearbook, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) Ambassador Fay Hartog Levin, Senior Advisor, European Affairs, The Chicago Council on Global 10:30-12:00 Affairs; Former Ambassador of the United States to “NATO’s Political Ambitions in a Changing Strategic the Kingdom of the Netherlands Context” 13:45-15:15 Have U.S. and other allied interests diverged? Do “Afghanistan: Learning the Right Lessons and Turning European and Canadian allies have their own vision to Transition” for NATO’s future? How can NATO devise a strategy in line with its ambitions, and where should it place How effective has NATO been in commanding its focus in light of America’s pivot toward Asia? complex military operations? ISAF has taken a What types of stresses might future political ambi- large share of responsibility in Afghanistan. What tions place on NATO’s consensus decision making? lessons can be learned from balancing interests of contributing nations with different levels of Speakers: training, different command structures, rotating Dr. Karl-Heinz Kamp, Director, Research Division, commands, sharing of air resources, and divided NATO Defense College command? Can military effectiveness be improved given NATO’s basic political structure? What are the Damon Wilson, Executive Vice President, Atlantic mid- and long-term obstacles confronting transi- Council; Former Special Assistant to the President tion in 2014 and the enduring partnership with and Senior Director for European Affairs, U.S. Afghanistan? What implications will these chal- National Security Council lenges have on Afghanistan’s economic future?

Ambassador Bogusław W. Winid, Under-Secretary Speakers: of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic Dr. Mark R. Jacobson, Senior Transatlantic of Poland Fellow, The German Marshall Fund of the United States; Former Deputy NATO Senior Civilian Chair: Representative and Director of International Dr. Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer, Director, Affairs, NATO ISAF Headquarters in Kabul The German Marshall Fund of the United States—France Lieutenant-General Marc Lessard (Ret.), Mentor/ Senior Directing Staff, Canadian Forces College; Paper writer: Former Commander, Canadian Expeditionary Dr. Henning Riecke, Head of Program, Force Command (CEFCOM) Transatlantic Relations Program, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) Ahmed Rashid, Journalist and Author of Pakistan on the Brink: The Future of America, Pakistan, and 12:00-13:30 Afghanistan Lunch and Keynote Address Chair: Ambassador Ivo Daalder, Permanent Professor Michael Clarke, Director General, Royal Representative of the United States to NATO United Services Institute (RUSI)

76 the chicago council on global affair s Paper writers: partnership possible if Russia does not see secu- Beata Górka-Winter, Programme Coordinator rity as indivisible? Is there scope for technical and on International Security, The Polish Institute of industrial cooperation short of missile defense International Affairs (PISM) cooperation? Can there be more cooperation on Afghanistan, transnational threats, and issues per- Dr. Elinor Sloan, Associate Professor of taining to the global commons? What are the impli- International Relations, Carleton University, cations of bilateral arrangements with Russia (such Ottawa as in Germany) for the alliance?

15:30-17:00 Speakers: “Implementing Smart Defense” Steve Andreasen, National Security Consultant, Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI); Lecturer, Hubert What are the basic requirements for operational- H. Humphrey School of Public Affairs; Former izing the “Smart Defense” agenda? Can concepts Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, U.S. such as the Mission Focus Groups be helpful? What National Security Council mechanisms exist or should be built to inform and consult on pending national decisions that could Ambassador Rastislav Kácˇer, President, Slovak affect alliance capabilities? How can the NATO Atlantic Commission; Former Ambassador of summit in Chicago promote a more capable alli- Slovakia to the United States ance vis-à-vis Smart Defense? Dr. Dmitri Trenin, Director, Carnegie Moscow Speakers: Center Dr. Hans Binnendijk, Vice President for Research and Applied Learning, National Defense University Chair: (NDU); Director and Roosevelt Chair, Institute for Dr. Kennette Benedict, Executive Director and National Strategic Studies (INSS) Publisher, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Sir Brian Burridge, Vice President, Strategic Paper writers: Marketing, Finmeccanica UK Ltd. Dr. Isabelle François, Distinguished Visiting Research Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Security Paper writer and chair: Studies, National Defense University (NDU) Dr. Camille Grand, Director, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS) Dr. Dmitri Trenin, Director, Carnegie Moscow Center 19:00-20:45 Dinner at Gibsons Bar & Steakhouse 11:00-12:30 “Strategic Partnerships: New Partners for New 30 March: Diplomacy, Partnerships, and Challenges” Cooperative Security Operations in Libya showed that non-NATO part- 09:00-10:30 ners can contribute to NATO operations in positive “NATO-Russia Relations: Achieving Meaningful ways. This trend could continue if NATO is pulled Dialogue” into new areas and new kinds of conflicts, which seems likely. Through the creation of organizations What are the concrete achievements of the U.S.- such as the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) Russia “reset,” and what is the outlook for a step and the NATO Response Force (NRF), NATO has change in NATO-Russia relations? Is genuine

S mart Defense an d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 77 demonstrated a seriousness of purpose through Introduction engagement with nontraditional partners in non- traditional missions. If and how can NATO stream- Dr. Fran Burwell, Vice President and Director, line its command structure to better integrate Transatlantic Relations Program, Atlantic Council non-NATO partners into future operations? Is there the capacity for more training, capabilities, and/or 14:15-15:45 support for democratic, civil-military cooperation “The Transatlantic Bargain after Gates” in times of economic stress? What is Turkey’s vision for the region and where can it exercise leverage? U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ speech Should partners in the Asia Pacific, like Australia, in June 2011 repeated in public what many have be more directly engaged? privately acknowledged: NATO, the lynchpin of European security and transatlantic relations, Speakers: faces “the real possibility [of] a dim, if not dismal His Excellency Kim Beazley, AC, Ambassador of the future.” At the same time, U.S. Secretary of State Commonwealth of Australia to the United States Hillary Clinton has made it clear that the United States intends to pivot from its traditional Western Franklin Kramer, Former Assistant Secretary of focus and look to “lock in a substantially increased Defense for International Security Affairs, U.S. investment—diplomatic, economic, strategic, and Department of Defense otherwise—in the Asia-Pacific region.” Although Secretary Clinton has made clear that Europe is a Ambassador Ümit Pamir, Former Permanent partner of “first resort,” where does NATO fit into a Representative of Turkey to NATO; Member of the broader U.S. security strategy? Is NATO best seen as High Advisory Board, Global Political Trends Center a European security framework rather than a trans- (GPoT) atlantic one? What does the future hold for NATO and for America’s leadership role within alliance? Chair: General Vincenzo Camporini (Ret.), Vice Speakers: President, Istituto Affari Iternazionali (IAI); Former His Excellency Martin Erdmann, Permanent Chief of Defense Staff, Italian Armed Forces Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to NATO Paper writers: Dr. Jonathan Eyal, Senior Research Fellow/ His Excellency Philippe Errera, Permanent Director, International Studies, Royal United Representative of France to NATO Services Institute (RUSI) Barry Pavel, Director-Designate, Brent Scowcroft Lieutenant General S¸adi Ergüvenç (Ret.), Former Center on International Security, Atlantic Council Turkish Military Representative, NATO Military Committee; Member of the High Advisory Board, Chair: Global Political Trends Center (GPoT) Dr. Rachel Bronson, Vice President, Studies, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs 12:30-14:00 Lunch and Keynote Address

Dr. Jamie Shea, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges, NATO Paper writers: Barry Pavel, Director-Designate, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Atlantic Council

Jeff Lightfoot, Deputy Director, Program on International Security, Atlantic Council

18:00-19:00 Reception at the Residence of Robert Chatterton Dickson, British Consul General, Chicago

Smart Defen s e a n d t h e F u t u r e o f n a t o 79 The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, founded in 1922 as The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, is a leading independent, nonpartisan organization committed to infl uencing the discourse on global issues through contributions to opinion and policy formation, leadership dialogue, and public learning.

Smart Defense and the Future of NATO: Can the Alliance Meet the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century?

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March 28-30, 2012

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