The Social Cost of Resettlement: the Case of Halfawiyyin at Suburban Khartoum

The Social Cost of Resettlement: The Case of Halfawiyyin at Suburban Khartoum

By: Haydar Mohamed Ali Hassan

Bsc. (Sociology and Social Anthropology 1992) Msc.( Environmental Studies 1998)

A Thesis submitted for the requirement of Ph.D. in Social Anthropology

Supervisor: Dr. Fahima Zahir

Faculty of Economic and Social Studies-Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology

December 2008

For Rasheed, again, always

Table of Contents

List of tables and figures:………………………………………………………. iv (b)List of figures:…………………………………………………………… iv (c) list of Photos ...... iv v ..…………………………………………………………………… اﻟﺨﻼﺻﺔ Abstract…………………………………………………………………….. vii Acknowledgments ………………………………………………… ix Chapter One:Back ground to the research problem…………………… 2 Biases for irrigation ………………………………………………………….. 6 The New Halfa Scheme: ………………………………………………… 9 The problem ………………………………………………………………. 15 Research objectives and research assumption ……………………………. 20 Justification for choosing the topic: ……………………………………… 21 Methods of data collection: ……………………………………………….. 23 Notes: ……………………………………………………………………. 30 Chapter Two: Literature Review ……………………………………….. 32 Stresses associated with resettlement …………………………………….. 33 Types of land settlement……………………………………………………. 33 Irrigation and dams: ………………………………………………………… 37 Types and sources of irrigation: …………………………………………….. 38 Irrigation and land degradation: Error! Bookmark not 40 defined.…………………………………………….. 42 The technical and economic failure of large-scale irrigation ………………... 43 Modern Irrigation: ...... 46 Resettlement policies ………………………………………………………. 48 Land acquisition ……………………………………………………………. 51 The problem of sedimentation ……………………………………………… 57 Notes: ………………………………………………………………………. 59 Chapter Three: Historical Background …………………………………. 59 Nubia and the Nubians …………………………………………………… 62 The economy and community: ……………………………………………. 66 The effects of the dams ……………………………………………………. 69 Cultural implication and coping strategies: ………………………………. 72 The Social costs ……………………………………………………………. 76 Notes: ……………………………………………………………………… 77 Chapter Four: Conceptual and Theoretical Framework 78 1- Conceptual framework ………………………………………………….. 84 Theories of the resettlement process ………………………………………. 84 (1) Cost-benefit analysis …………………………………………………… 88 (2) The four-stage framework ……………………………………………… 89 The first stage: ………………………………………………………………….. 90 The second stage: ……………………………………………………………… 91 The third stage: ………………………………………………………………… 93 The fourth stage: …………………………………………………………… 96 (3) Impoverishment risks and reconstruction model ………………………….. 100 (4) The Inherent Complexities Approach: …………………………………….. 107 Notes: ...... Chapter Five: Agricultural Production and the Present Situation………… 109

i The New Halfa Agricultural Scheme: ………………………………………. 110 (1) Introduction ……………………………………………………………….. 110 (2)The Khashm el- Girba dam ………………………………………………… 111 The turbine pumps: …………………………………………………………. 113 Farmers’ use of irrigation water: …………………………………………… 114 (3)The New Halfa Agricultural Corporation: ………………………………. 116 Participation of farmers in the management of the scheme: ……………….. 119 Rehabilitation of the New Halfa Scheme: ………………………………….. 120 (4) Agricultural rotation and crop composition …………………………….. 121 (1) Cotton crop: ……………………………………………………………… 122 (a) Joint account (1964-1980): ………………………………………………… 122 (b) Individual account (1981-1989) …………………………………………… 123 (C) Finance through Banks Portfolio: …………………………………………. 123 (d) Self- reliance system: ………………………………………………………. 124 (2) Groundnuts: …………………………………………………………….. 128 (3) Sorghum: ……………………………………………………………….. 131 (4) Wheat …………………………………………………………………… 133 The high costs of cultivation: ………………………………………………. 137 Major pests of agricultural crops in the NHAC: ……………………………. 137 (5) Freeholds and investment lands: ……………………………………….. 138 Investment lands …………………………………………………………….. 141 (6) Animal in the scheme …………………………………………………… 141 Halfwiyyin farmers and the Animal production: …………………………… 143 Bases of livestock production in the scheme: ………………………………. 145 Integrating animal to the agricultural rotation: ……………………………… 146 (7) Other related agricultural services and organizations: …………………. 148 Agricultural financing through the Banks: …………………………………... 152 Agricultural inputs private stores: ………………………………………….. 153 Transportation and storing: …………………………………………………. 153 (8) Marketing: ………………………………………………………………. 154 (9) Concluding remarks: …………………………………………………….. 155 (10) The problem of Mesquite ………………………………………………. 160 The history of Mesquite in the Sudan: ……………………………………. 161 (11) The future of the NHAC in the light of the present problems: ………… 166 Chapter Six : The Present Halfawiyyin Situation, and the rising Halfawiyyin community at suburban Khartoum………………………. 172 1-Location and characteristics: …………………………………………….. 172 2-Villages sending migrants: ………………………………………………. 182 3-Village.26. ……………………………………………………………….. 184 4-Differences in responses towards agriculture: …………………………… 197 5-Village 5, Argin north……………………………………………………… 203 Rise and Collapse of Cooperative Societies: ………………………………. 210 6- Kilo 14: ………………………………………………………………….. 213 The belly of the stone (Ard- el Hajar) ……………………………………… 217 Concluding remarks:…………………………………………………………. 226 Notes: Error! Bookmark not 236 defined......

Chapter Seven: Changes in Some Aspects of Halfawiyyin Social Life……... 237 Introduction…………………………………………………………………. 238 1- Marriage: ………………………………………………………………… 238 2-Death and religious occasions…………………………………………….. 240 3-Religious occasions: ……………………………………………………… 242 4- Pregnancy and Giving Birth: ……………………………………………. 247 5. Nubian dress: ……………………………………………………………. 249 6. Women ornaments: ……………………………………………………… 251 7. Halfawiyyin art: …………………………………………………………. 252 (1) Songs………………………………………………………………………. 252 (2) Nubian architecture: ………………………………………………………. 256 Concluding remarks: ……………………………………………………….. 261 notes: ………………………………………………………………………… 262 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………. 263 Bibliography……………………………………………………………...Error! 268 Bookmark not defined.

iii List of tables and figures:

(a) List of tables 1- Tenant population of the new Halfa scheme 13 2- Annual siltation and the storage capacity of the Dam 54 3- The declining cultivated area in the new Halfa scheme 113 4- Cultivated areas, production rates, costs and returns of Cotton 127 5- Cultivated areas, production rates, costs and returns of groundnuts 130 6-Cultivated areas, production rates, costs and returns of sorghum 133

7- Cultivated areas, production rates, costs and returns of wheat 136 8- Freehold lands 140

(b)List of figures: 1- possible resettlement locations 5 2- the new Halfa scheme 10 3- Agricultural inspections 12 4- Halfawiyyin new settlements 18 5- Batn el-Hajar 218 6-old Nubian villages 220

(c) List of Photos 1- Diesel pump to raise water from irrigation canal 168 2- Minor irrigation canal after rehabilitation 169 3- Cattle at the fringes of the scheme 169 4- Mesquite trees before and after rehabilitation 170 5- New lands at Batn el –Hajar 228 6- Silts accumulation at Batn el-Hajar 228 7- Food of Farmers at Batn el-Hajar 229 8- Engine boat 229 9- Fishermen at Batn el-Hajar 230 10- Nubian graves 230 11- New house at village 26. new Halfa 231 12- Standard resettlement house 231 13- The Karawoos 232 14- New Karawoos 232 15- Drinking water pipes 233 16- Kilo 14 233 17- Improved latrine at Kilo 14 234 18- Halfawiyyin hut at Kilo 14 234 19- El-Thawra quarter- New Halfa 235

iv v ﻣﺴﺘﺨﻠﺺ أﺷﺎرت ﻣﻌﻈﻢ اﻷدﺑﻴﺎت اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻨﺎوﻟﺖ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع ﻣﺸﺎرﻳﻊ اﻟﺘﻨﻤﻴﺔ اﻟﺰارﻋﻴﺔ اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻤﺔ ﺑﺸﻜﻞ اﺳﺎﺳﻰ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺪﺧﻼت أﺟﻨﺒﻴﺔ وﺗﻌﺘﻤﺪ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺮي اﻻﻧﺴﻴﺎﺑﻲ اﻟﺤﺪﻳﺚ اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻢ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺴﺪود ﻹﺣﺪاث ﻧﻘﻠﺔ ﻧﻮﻋﻴﺔ ﻣﺮﻏﻮﺑﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺣﻴﺎة اﻟﻨﺎس ، أن ﺗﻠﻚ اﻟﻤﺸﺎرﻳﻊ ﻏﺎﻟﺒﺎ ﻣﺎ ﺗﺆدى إﻟﻰ اﻟﻤﺰﻳﺪ ﻣﻦ اﻹﻓﻘﺎر وﺧﻠﻖ اﻟﻤﺰﻳﺪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﺸﺎآﻞ واﻟﺘﻌﻘﻴﺪات، وﻳﻜﻮن ﻣﺮدودهﺎ ﺳﻠﺒﻴﺎ ﺑﻮﺟﻪ ﻋﺎم ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﻤﺪى اﻟﻄﻮﻳﻞ. ﻓﻜﺎن اﻟﺘﺴﺎؤل ﻟﻬﺬﻩ اﻟﺮﺳﺎﻟﺔ ﻟﻤﺎذا اﻷﺛﺮ اﻟﻌﻜﺴﻲ واﻻﻧﺘﻜﺎﺳﺔ اﻟﺘﻨﻤﻮﻳﺔ ﺗﺤﺪث ﻏﺎﻟﺒﺎ رﻏﻢ اﻟﺘﺨﻄﻴﻂ اﻟﺠﻴﺪ واﻹﺷﺮاف اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﻲ اﻟﻜﺎﻣﻞ واﻟﻤﺪﺧﻼت اﻟﻐﺎﻟﻴﺔ؟ ﻓﻲ هﺬﻩ اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﺗﻢ ﺗﻨﺎول ﺣﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﺤﻠﻔﺎوﻳﻴﻦ اﻟﻤﻬﺠﺮﻳﻦ إﻟﻰ ﻣﺸﺮوع ﺣﻠﻔﺎ اﻟﺠﺪﻳﺪة،وﻳﻀﻢ اﻟﻤﺸﺮوع ﺑﺠﺎﻧﺐ اﻟﻤﻬﺠﺮﻳﻦ، ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋﺎت أﺧﺮى ﻣﻦ ﻗﺒﺎﺋﻞ اﻟﻤﻨﻄﻘﺔ، واﻟﻮاﻓﺪﻳﻦ ﻟﻠﻌﻤﻞ واﻻﺳﺘﻔﺎدة ﻣﻦ اﻟﻔﺮص اﻟﺘﻲ وﻓﺮهﺎ اﻟﻤﺸﺮوع. ﺣﻴﺚ ﺗﻼﺣﻆ أن أﻋﺪادا آﺒﻴﺮة وﻣﺘﺰاﻳﺪة ﻣﻦ اﻟﺤﻠﻔﺎوﻳﻴﻦ هﺠﺮوا اﻟﻤﺸﺮوع اﻟﻤﺘﻌﺜﺮ، ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻠﻴﻦ ﺑﺴﻮء اﻷﺣﻮال اﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎدﻳﺔ واﻟﺨﺪﻣﻴﺔ ،وإﺣﺴﺎﺳﻬﻢ ﺑﺎﻟﺨﻮف ﻣﻦ "اﻟﻐﺮﺑﺎء". واﺗﺠﻬﻮا ﺻﻮب اﻟﺨﺮﻃﻮم ﺣﻴﺚ ﺷﻜﻠﻮا ﻓﻲ ﺑﻌﺾ ﺿﻮاﺣﻴﻬﺎ اﻟﺠﻨﻮﺑﻴﺔ ﺗﺤﺪﻳﺪا (ﻣﻨﺎﻃﻖ اﻟﻜﻼآﻼت، أﺑﻮ ادم، واﻟﺸﻘﻴﻼب وأم ﻋﺸﺮ) ﻣﺴﺘﻮﻃﻨﺎت ﺟﺪﻳﺪة ﻓﻲ ﻧﻤﻮ ﻣﻄﺮد، ﺑﻴﻨﻤﺎ اﺗﺠﻬﺖ أﻋﺪاد أﺧﺮى ﻣﻨﻬﻢ ﺗﺠﺎﻩ أوﻃﺎﻧﻬﻢ اﻟﻘﺪﻳﻤﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻨﺎﻃﻖ ﺣﻠﻔﺎ اﻟﻘﺪﻳﻤﺔ، وﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﻗﺮى ﺑﻄﻦ اﻟﺤﺠﺮ، ﻟﺰراﻋﺔ اﻻراﺿﻰ اﻟﻐﺮﻳﻨﻴﺔ ﻋﺎﻟﻴﺔ اﻟﺨﺼﻮﺑﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻜﻮﻧﺖ هﻨﺎﻟﻚ ﻧﺘﻴﺠﺔ اﻻﻃﻤﺎء اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺠﺰء اﻟﺠﻨﻮﺑﻲ ﻟﺒﺤﻴﺮة اﻟﺴﺪ اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻲ. وﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻨﻘﻴﺾ ﻣﻦ ﺣﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﺤﻠﻔﺎوﻳﻴﻦ، ﺗﺘﺰاﻳﺪ داﺧﻞ اﻟﻤﺸﺮوع أﻋﺪاد اﻟﻮاﻓﺪﻳﻦ ﻃﻮﻋﺎ إﻟﻴﻪ ، واﻟﻤﻌﻨﻰ هﻨﺎ "اﻟﻌﻤﺎل اﻟﺰراﻋﻴﻴﻦ" واﻟﺬﻳﻦ ﻳﺤﻘﻘﻮن اﻟﻤﺰﻳﺪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺘﻜﻴﻒ واﻟﺘﺄﻗﻠﻢ واﻻﺳﺘﻔﺎدة ﻣﻦ اﻟﻔﺮص واﻻﻣﻜﺎﻧﺎت اﻟﺘﻲ ﻳﻮﻓﺮهﺎ اﻟﻤﺸﺮوع. وﺗﻤﻜﻨﻮا ﻓﻲ ﻣﻌﻈﻢ اﻟﺤﺎﻻت ﻣﻦ اﻟﺪﻣﺞ اﻟﻜﺎﻣﻞ ﺑﻴﻦ اﻹﻧﺘﺎج اﻟﺰراﻋﻲ واﻟﺤﻴﻮاﻧﻲ. ﻏﻴﺮان اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺔ ﺑﻴﻨﻬﻢ واﻟﺤﻠﻔﺎوﻳﻴﻦ ﻏﺎﻟﺒﺎ ﻻ ﺗﺘﺠﺎوز ﺣﺪود ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻖ اﻟﻤﻨﻔﻌﺔ اﻟﻤﺸﺘﺮآﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻹﻧﺘﺎج اﻟﺰراﻋﻲ. اﻋﺘﻤﺪت اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻤﻨﻬﺞ اﻻﺛﻨﺮوﺑﻮﻟﻮﺟﻰ، ﺑﺎﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ إﻟﻰ اﻟﻤﻨﻬﺞ اﻟﻤﻘﺎرن، آﻤﺎ اﻋﺘﻤﺪت ﻓﻲ ﺟﻤﻊ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﻋﻠﻰ وﺳﺎﺋﻞ ﻣﺘﻌﺪدة، آﺎﻟﻤﻘﺎﺑﻼت اﻟﻔﺮدﻳﺔ واﻟﺠﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔ واﻟﻤﻼﺣﻈﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻤﺸﺎرآﺔ، ﺑﺎﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ إﻟﻰ اﻟﻤﺼﺎدر اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻮﻳﺔ. واﻋﺘﻤﺪت اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺗﺤﻠﻴﻞ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﻋﻠﻰ اﺧﺘﺒﺎر ﻋﺪد ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﺪاﺧﻞ اﻟﻨﻈﺮﻳﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺘﻨﺎول ﻣﺴﺄﻟﺔ إﻋﺎدة اﻟﺘﻮﻃﻴﻦ، ﺣﻴﺚ ﺗﻮﺻﻠﺖ اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ إﻟﻰ أن ﻣﺪﺧﻞ "اﻟﺘﻌﻘﻴﺪات اﻟﻤﺒﻄﻨﺔ" هﻮ اﻷﻧﺴﺐ ﻟﻘﺮاءة وﺗﺤﻠﻴﻞ اﻟﻤﺸﻜﻠﺔ اﻟﺒﺤﺜﻴﺔ. ﺧﻠﺼﺖ اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ أن اﻷﺳﺒﺎب اﻟﺤﻘﻴﻘﻴﺔ اﻟﻜﺎﻣﻨﺔ وراء اﻷداء اﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎدي اﻟﻀﻌﻴﻒ ﻟﻤﺸﺮوع ﺣﻠﻔﺎ اﻟﺠﺪﻳﺪة، وﻋﺪم ﺗﻤﻜﻦ اﻟﻤﺸﺮوع ﻣﻦ اﻟﻮﺻﻮل إﻟﻰ اﻷهﺪاف اﻟﺘﻲ اﻧﺸﺄ ﻣﻦ اﺟﻠﻬﺎ، و هﺠﺮة اﻟﺤﻠﻔﺎوﻳﻴﻦ ﻣﻨﻪ

vi ﺗﺘﻤﺜﻞ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻀﻌﻒ اﻟﻤﺘﺄﺻﻞ واﻟﻤﻼزم ﻟﻔﻜﺮة إﻋﺎدة اﻟﺘﻮﻃﻴﻦ آﺨﻴﺎر ﺗﻨﻤﻮي، ﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺪى اﻟﻄﻮﻳﻞ، ﻓﻤﺎ ﻳﺘﺮﺗﺐ ﻋﻠﻰ إزاﺣﺔ واﺟﺘﺜﺎث اﻟﻤﺠﻤﻮﻋﺎت اﻟﺒﺸﺮﻳﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻨﺎﻃﻘﻬﺎ اﻷﺻﻠﻴﺔ وإﻋﺎدة زرﻋﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺑﻴﺌﺎت ﻃﺒﻴﻌﻴﺔ واﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔ وﺛﻘﺎﻓﻴﺔ ﻣﻐﺎﻳﺮة ﻣﻦ ﺛﻤﻦ ﻻ ﻳﻤﻜﻦ ﺗﻌﻮﻳﻀﻪ ﺑﺄﻳﺔ ﺣﺎل. آﻤﺎ ان اﻟﻘﻀﺎﻳﺎ اﻷﺧﻼﻗﻴﺔ ﺗﺰﻳﺪ ﻣﻦ ﺗﻌﻘﻴﺪات ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺔ إﻋﺎدة اﻟﺘﻮﻃﻴﻦ ﺑﺴﺒﺐ ﺑﻌﺪ "ﺣﻘﻮق اﻹﻧﺴﺎن" اﻟﺬي ﻳﺪﺧﻞ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺿﻮء ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺔ اﻧﻪ ﻓﻲ اﻏﻠﺐ اﻷﺣﻴﺎن ذو ﻃﺒﻴﻌﺔ " إﺟﺒﺎرﻳﺔ"، و اﻟﺘﻲ ﻏﺎﻟﺒﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻳﺘﺮﺗﺐ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻧﺘﺎﺋﺞ ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﺘﻮﻗﻌﺔ، آﻤﺎ ﺣﺪث وﻳﺤﺪث اﻵن ﻟﻠﻤﻬﺠﺮﻳﻦ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺸﺮوع ﺣﻠﻔﺎ اﻟﺠﺪﻳﺪة. ﻋﻠﻴﻪ، ﻳﺠﺐ إﻋﺎدة اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺸﺎرﻳﻊ اﻟﺘﻨﻤﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺘﻄﻠﺐ ﺑﻨﺎء اﻟﺴﺪود وﻣﺎ ﻳﺘﺮﺗﺐ ﻋﻠﻲ ذﻟﻚ ﻣﻦ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺎت إﻋﺎدة ﺗﻮﻃﻴﻦ، ﻓﻜﻤﺎ أﺛﺒﺘﺖ اﻟﺘﺠﺎرب اﻟﻤﺤﻠﻴﺔ ﻓﺸﻞ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺎت ﺗﻮﻃﻴﻦ اﻟﺮﺣﻞ ﻣﻨﺬ زﻣﻦ ﻃﻮﻳﻞ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺴﻮدان؛ ﻟﻴﺲ ﻓﻘﻂ ﻟﻌﺪم ﺟﺪوى اﻟﺴﺪود آﺤﻠﻮل ﺗﻨﻤﻮﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺪى اﻟﻄﻮﻳﻞ آﻤﺎ أﺛﺒﺘﺖ اﻟﺪراﺳﺎت، ﺑﻞ أﻳﻀﺎ ﻟﻤﺎ ﻳﺘﻀﻤﻨﻪ اﻟﻤﻮﺿﻮع ﻣﻦ ﻣﺼﺎدرة ﻹرادة و ﺣﻘﻮق اﻵﺧﺮﻳﻦ ﻓﻲ اﺧﺘﻴﺎر ﻧﻤﻂ ﻋﻴﺸﻬﻢ اﻟﺬي ﻳﺮﻳﺪون، وﻋﺪم هﺪر اﻟﻤﻮارد اﻟﻄﺎﺋﻠﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺎ ﻻ ﻃﺎﺋﻞ ﻣﻦ وراﺋﻪ.

vii Abstract In most developing countries, agricultural development is conceived of in terms of dam- based gravity irrigation, and mainly based on foreign inputs. The assumption is that such development projects will bring some desired changes to the lives of the target population. However, much of the available literature tackling the question of agricultural development suggest that such schemes often lead to more impoverishment and other negative impacts. The main question of this thesis is: what are the causes of the negative impacts and retreat in development despite all the good intentions? This study dealt with the case of resettled Halfawiyyin in the new Halfa scheme. Beside Halfawiyyin, the scheme comprises other groups from the indigenous tribes, and others who came into the area to work and to make use of the new available opportunities. It is observed that an increasing number of Halfawiyyin preferred to leave cultivation and migrated outside the scheme, claiming, in addition to awful economic and health circumstances, lack of security and fear from the “strangers” whose number is ever increasing inside the scheme. Therefore, a considerable number of resettled Halfawiyyin migrate towards Khartoum, especially to its southern suburbs, and concentrated at el- Kalakla, um-usher, and el-Shigailab areas; where they constituted new settlements in these areas. Many other individuals and families from the relocated Halfawiyyin preferred to migrate to their old home, where they began to utilize the new lands emerged there as a result of silt accumulation at the southern rocky edges of Lake Nasir.

Another different, but generally positive response towards irrigated agriculture is shown by a voluntarily settled group in the scheme. That is, the group of “agricultural labourers”, who are mostly from different Darfur tribes. They effectively make use of the opportunities available in the scheme; and were successfully able to combine cultivation with animal rearing. Their number in the scheme is increasing; but their relationship with Halfawiyyin is generally characterized by uneasiness, doubt and avoidance.

viii The study depends on the anthropological approach, beside the comparative method. Different methods of data collection were used such as interviews at the individual and group level, participant observation and secondary sources. In analyzing data, the study depends on a number of theoretical approaches of resettlement. The study revealed that “the inherent complexities approach” is the most suitable to interpret and analyze the research problem. The study concluded that the weak economic performance of the new Halfa scheme, and the failure of the scheme to attain its prescribed goals, hence the migration of resettled Halfawiyyin was mainly caused by the inherent weakness of the package of "resettlement" as a development strategy, especially in the long-run. Uprooting population from their original environments to compel them to live in strange natural and socio-cultural settings often leads to undesirable ends; hence the social cost of such enforcement is certainly, too high, and can never be compensated. Ethical issues add to the complexity of resettlement, because of the human rights involved in resettlement and particularly in light of the fact that it is often of a forced nature and often gives rise to unexpected outcomes. Therefore, development schemes which necessitate construction of dams and relocation should be revised; and as local experiences proved failure of sedentarization of nomads long time ago, resettlement experiments also seems to face the same fate, not only because of the infeasibility of dams as a long-sustaining development solutions, but also due to the fact that the issue contains some aspects of rejecting the others' right to choose what is good for them, and to avoid misuse of valuable resources.

ix Acknowledgments

I would like to thank with gratitude, my supervisor Dr. Fahima Zahir, for her long patience and careful supervision throughout these years, without her help, support and encouragement, this work wouldn’t have come out. I owe a debt of profuse gratitude to Professor Kurt Beck, who kindly invited me to Germany, University of Bayreuth, where the first version of this work was drafted under his direct supervision. In spite of his valuable time, he helped me a lot by his precise comments, reasonable suggestions, and corrections; beside the moral support and personal care. My deep gratitude similarly extended to Valerie Hänsch, her sharp comments, fruitful discussions, genuine collaboration, and pleasant company was indeed, of great value. However, I am also grateful to Mortiz and Sasckia, students of Professor Kurt Beck for their exceptional efforts during my stay in Bayreuth to facilitate all difficulties and hardships there. I owe special thanks to Dr. Munzoul A. M. Assal, who persistently encouraged me during my stay abroad, and did valuable and useful comments on some critical parts of this study. I find it obliging to mention that I owe a debt to Islah Shaban; a successful administrator at Teaching Assistants Administration, University of Khartoum, she advised, directed, and facilitated the use of the opportunity at Bayreuth University. Thanks are due to all colleagues at the department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, notably Hisham el Haj Bilal, who exerted a lot effort in typing the study.

x I am indebted to all those who had enabled me to collect all the required data, from the different villages of new Halfa Scheme, specially people of Atieri, Argin, Kilo 14 “Ard el Hajar”; the family of Saied Mohamed Ahmed Goubara at Wadi Halfa, and the people of el Kalakla, el Shigailab and Um usher. Finally, I am grateful to my family, and special thanks go to my wife who endured my length absence during the course of this research. I am sincerely indebted to all, but all mistakes and shortcomings are my own.

Chapter One Back Ground to the research problem

Chapter one: Back Ground to the research problem

During recent decades, increasing investments in development infrastructure and growing population densities have been the main factors underlying the relocation of populations on a large scale. Since the 1960s, the construction of large hydro-electric dams and the formation of artificial lakes in Africa have been the most frequent causes of the forced displacement of communities. Dams disrupted communities' lives, dramatically forcing people to move. Mostly subsistence farmers, herders, nomadic pastoralists and fishermen were affected; the towns of Bussa and Yelwa in Nigeria, as well as Wadi Halfa in Sudan and part of Kete Krachi in Ghana, had to be moved and rebuilt (Jacob, 1996. p188).

To compensate uprooted rural people, whose primary occupation is farming, governments have usually resettled them in planned agricultural areas. Despite governments' commendable efforts and substantial international aid, the goal of developing new, viable production systems to sustain relocated communities has seldom been achieved. Three observations can be made from the start. First, there is an often massive exodus of settlers from the new settlements. Second, it may take several years before the original level of subsistence is reached. Third, when newcomers do, once again, become self-sustaining, they usually do so thanks to activities other than the farming programmes planned for them. What are the reasons for these disappointing results? Can we draw lessons from these previous resettlement operations? Massive technological development hurts. This is a fact largely ignored by economic planners, technicians and political leaders. In planning drastic alterations in environment that uproot populations or make old adjustments

2 impossible, they count the engineering costs but not the social costs. After all, they do not think of themselves as paying the latter. Some people no doubt like radical change. The majority probably like variety only so long as it is embroidery upon the reassuring familiarity of customary routines, well known paths and scenes, and the ease of accustomed relationships. (Colson, 1971, p1).

This thesis is a study of the impact of forced change upon some of its victims. The Halfawiyyin, a sub-group of the northern Sudanese Nubians, who were subject in 1960 to a massive uprooting and resettlement when a large hydro-electric dam was built across the River Nile at Aswan town in Egypt. Much of what happened as a consequence appears to be common phenomena expectable whenever people are subject to forced migration, in a relocation of old communities.(Colson, 1971.p1); but what is uncommon, and unexpected, is the massive out- migration after more than forty years of resettlement.

The construction of the Aswan High Dam has resulted in the inundation of some 500 km along the Nile between Aswan and the Dal Cataract in the northern Sudan. The construction of the Dam has further caused the displacement of about 100,000 Nubians, the local inhabitants of the area. The Egyptian enclave was resettled on newly reclaimed land near Kom Ombo, some 40 km. north of Aswan; the Sudanese Nubians were settled at Khashm el-Girba -later on the name changed to new Halfa- in the Butana, approximately some 600 km. southeast of their original homes. An area already inhabited by indigenous pastoral groups who were to participate, along with Nubians, in the agricultural production emanating from the

3 erection of a dam at Khashm el-Girba. Sudanese were compensated some fifteen million Egyptian pounds, for the damage resulting to existing property as a result of storage in the reservoir lake up to a reduced level of 182 meters above sea level. Which many now say was not enough. The agreement allowed Sudan only 19.5 milliard cubic meters of water, an increase from 4 milliards cubic. The dam at Aswan was completed in 1970, forming a lake some 500 kilometers long; some fourteen villages in Sudanese Nubia, in addition to the town of Halfa, was inundated and rebuilt in Khashm el-Girba. However, few Nubians chose Khashm el–Girba as a relocation site. The conflict among Nubians as to the most economically and culturally advantageous site ensued, illuminating many aspects of rural and urban conflicts (Hale, 1982. p 396).

Authorities in Khartoum announced early in February 1960, that the Halfawiyyin would be given freedom of choice in the site for relocation. Early in March 1960 authorities considered suggestions for an alternative home for the relocatees. Six sites were selected. The sites were Wadi el Khawi, in Dongola area; North of the Gezira Extension, to the south of Khartoum; El Kadaru area, north of Khartoum; Managil Extension, Gezira West; Wad el Hadad, near Sinnar; and Khashm el Girba, in Kassala Province. But the “freedom of choice” was limited to only three sites and even among those three were strong biases by authorities against a location north of Khartoum and Wadi el-Khawi in the Dongola area. (Fig. 1)

Fig. 1: Possible Resettlement Locations

Source: Hassan Dafalla, 1975.

Already the government was using coercion on behalf of Khashm el-Girba. Originally, in fact, there had been three additional sites under consideration: south of Khartoum, the Managil Extension, and Wad el-Hadad in the Sinnar area.

The south of Khartoum area was eliminated as a possible site for resettlement by the authorities for complex reasons, but one of the main reasons given by the authorities was related to the south of Khartoum site being an extension of the Gezira scheme where the new farmers would automatically come under the jurisdiction of the existing tenant system. Halfawiyyin were thought to be incapable of adapting to a situation in which they would no longer be free peasants as they had always been. Another reason is that authorities feared that there was “the danger that, when resettled near Khartoum, the Halfawiyyin peasants might desert their farms and come to town (Abdalla, 1970.p 65). The fear of the authorities was the hope of the urban Halfawiyyin. Finally, the administration narrowed the choice to two: Khashm el Girba, and the Dongola area of Wadi el-Khawi, the latter because of the cultural similarity of the area.

In 1964, a dam was built at Khashm el-Girba permitting the irrigation of a large area of arable land, where both Nubians and the indigenous pastoral tribes could be settled and new rural communities developed. (Fahim, p.v).

Biases for irrigation The agricultural policy in Sudan has long focused on the irrigation sector, partly because of its importance as a foreign exchange earner, partly because

6 of its reliability and sustainability. Sudan is an ideal country for irrigation. There are large areas with fertile soils such as between the Blue and White Nile, and the terrain in large areas is very flat.

There are two types of irrigation schemes in the Sudan- the Nile flood and pump schemes, and the national irrigation schemes, e.g. Gezira, Rahad, New Halfa, and Suki, which constitute 63% of the total irrigated area. The major crops in these schemes are cotton, groundnuts, sugar cane, sorghum, vegetables and fruit. With the liberalization, other crops are now becoming increasingly important, such as wheat, oil seeds sugar cane and vegetables. Beside the economic significance of the irrigation sector, it is also an important source of employment. (Mason, 2004. p 13).

The aim of the agriculture policy in the irrigation sector is to increase the production by the expansion of irrigated areas and an increase in efficiency. One of the main ways of increasing the efficiency of the irrigation schemes is by removing the silt and weeds from the canals. This should be done on an annual basis, but it is often neglected.

In summary, irrigated agriculture in Sudan has an enormous potential both economically as well as in creating employment. One of the main challenges of the irrigation sector in Sudan is not insufficient water, but upkeep and how to deal with the siltation of the reservoirs and canals. These problems have to be dealt with by the management of these schemes in cooperation with the tenants. One of the most important factors encouraging or discouraging the acceptance of new innovations in the arid lands of Sudan, is the degree to which participants in the process have been able to identify

7 themselves with the proposed development; "development" does not mean the same thing to everyone, thus, the gap of perception of development between the planners and the targeted communities is always there. Peoples reactions can be dependably predicted on the basis of experience elsewhere, especially when a blueprint for irrigation-scheme development has been adopted.

This is typically was the case of the NHAC (New Halfa Agricultural Corporation), irrigation scheme in the eastern Sudan, involved the use of 500,000 feddans of land west of the Atbara River for irrigation by gravity flow from a dam across the Atbara river in 1964. The model of development was analogous to the Gezira irrigation scheme, which covers some two million feddans in a similar general region in plains of central Sudan. Complex modern gravity-irrigated schemes in sparsely settled parts of central Sudan have become a distinguishing feature of contemporary agriculture in the country. These schemes are stereotyped in design and objectives constitute a basic challenge to participant’s perception of development and socioeconomic structure, as both of these are ignored in the planning of the schemes. This neglect results in a serious conflict of interests between the management responsible for the implementation of the planner’s model and the settlers or participants who are to be integrated into the scheme. This conflict of interest is one of the major causes of the continuous decline in productivity displayed by so many major agricultural development schemes in the semi-arid areas of Sudan, consequently such schemes have failed to attain the desired socioeconomic transformation and full involvement of the settlers.

The New Halfa Scheme: Atypical example is the New Halfa Scheme, established in 1964, the second largest irrigation project in the country, occupies the eastern part of the Butana plain, running parallel to the western bank of the Atbara River between Khashm el Girba town, where the dam is, to the Sabaat Hills (Fig.2).

Fig.2. the New Halfa Scheme

Source: NHAC It is 95 km. long and 20-35 km. in width. The average gradient is about 43 cm per kilometer in a northwesterly direction. The annual rainfall ranges

10 between 250 and 300 mm. the population of the scheme about 350,000, of whom 150,000 were tenants and members of their families. About 30 per cent of the tenants are Nubians (table1). Butana nomads constitute over 60 per cent of total tenants and 80 per cent of the nomadic tenants. The Nubians are generally distributed in 25 well- equipped villages with all services. The nomads are concentrated in 51 villages (38 inside the scheme and 13 on its fringe). These villages are poorly equipped with necessary services. Each community is segregated in special villages of its own. Fig.3

Fig.3. agricultural inspections

source: NHPC The scheme area comprises 440,000 feddans (1 feddan=0.42 hectares) of almost flat clay or loamy soils, of which 330.000 feddans each year suppose

12 to be under the three main crops- cotton, wheat/sorghum, and groundnuts- which are grown in an annual rotation with a maximum area of 110.000 feddans each. The average cropping intensity is in the range of 91 per cent for cotton, 88 per cent for wheat, and 48 per cent for groundnuts.(1980 estimates) sorghum has been gradually replacing wheat or groundnuts among the nomad tenants since 1979. Of the rest of the irrigated land, 25,000 feddans are allocated for sugar-cane plantation, 24,000 feddans for freehold land, mainly for the Nubians, and 2,000 feddans for forests. The main limitations to the cropping intensity are water, credit, availability of machinery, the level of tenant interest, and off- scheme interests such as livestock rearing.

Table 1 .Tenant population of New Halfa Scheme Ethnic group Number of tenants % of nomadic tenants % of all tenants Nomadic groups Shukriya 7,089 48 32 Lahawin 2,290 15 10 Beja 2,201 15 10 Ahamda 1,089 7 5 Kawahla 1,003 7 5 Rashaida 685 5 3 Khawalda 443 3 2 Total nomads 14,800 100 Nubians 6,553 29 Others 1,014 4 Total 22,367 100 Source: New Halfa Agricultural Production Corporation estimates

The irrigation system is by gravity flow, taking water from the Khashm el- Girba storage dam through a main canal and a network of subsidiary canals with suitable regulators. In spite of the neat canal system, water losses are great and irrigation efficiency is low. Loss from evaporation and seepage is about 17 per cent, and field – application losses amount to some 14 per cent,

13 leaving less than 70 per cent of the flow for irrigation. These water losses are exacerbated by a decreasing dam capacity resulting from silting. Water deficiencies disturb the cropping system and reduce returns and hence tenants` confidence in the scheme.

The main scheme objectives as set out by the planners were: (1) to resettle 52,000 Nubians and compensate them for their land submerged by the reservoir behind Aswan High Dam, following the 1959 Nile Water Agreement between Sudan and Egypt, and (2) to provide tenancies for Butana nomads whose grazing lands were lost to the scheme. The later objective falls within the general government policy of sedentarizing nomads. Both objectives were to be facet of the national policy for the expansion of modern agriculture. For the planners this strategy amounted to a replication of the Gezira model. In the national context; the scheme must be seen not only as the utilization of the Butana Plains and the Atbara River waters for intensive farming and the future development of agro-industry; but also as contributing to the country’s balance of payments by increasing the production of cotton and groundnuts for export, and of sugar and wheat to avoid importing such strategic food crops.

The scheme is designed to use 1,620 million m3 of water provided by the Khashm el- Girba Dam on a model nearly identical with the Gezira scheme, and included the provision of new agricultural lands for the resettled Nubians and the local inhabitants, as well as technical assistance and agricultural services for its development. The scheme divided into standard 15- feddan (hawashas) tenancies on a lease basis, producing only three crops: cotton, wheat/durra and groundnuts on a planned and supervised

14 rotational cultivation allocating five feddans of each hawasha for each crop, and tenants are not allowed to cultivate other crops on their holdings, nor to feed herds of animals inside the scheme, except one cow and 5 goats/sheep. Nearly all agricultural operations are scheduled on a tight system which every tenant is required to follow closely or else he will lose his rights of tenancy. This stereotyped system of cropping allows no room for tenant’s preferences and initiatives even with in the system it self. The scheme is divided into 6 sections, and the sections into inspection areas of which there are 19 altogether; each headed by an inspector of agriculture and with a number of specialists, junior staff and water guards attached.

The New Halfa Agricultural Production Corporation (NHAC) is the central body responsible for management of the scheme with in the framework of the objectives set in the original plan. Its main function is to provide farm- support services to the tenants. It is responsible for deciding the crops to be planted and the areas to be cultivated, for timing and insuring the execution of the various agricultural operations, for providing water, credits, fertilizer, pesticides, and some agricultural preparations, for keeping joint accounts and setting pricing policy; and for the allocation of tenancies and field supervision.

The problem Irrigation development has a complex interaction on both human and physical environments within and outside the irrigation area. Development of methodology to assess the long- term impacts of irrigation on future generations and on ecosystems, while maintaining an economically viable

15 agriculture is a critical task. It is becoming increasingly clear that environmental sustainability depends upon economically and socially viable projects. Until recently neither planning agencies nor scholars have showed much interest in what happens to people following relocation. The New Halfa scheme, had been initiated since 1960, and has led to forced relocation of more than 52,000 Halfawiyyin, nevertheless, no follow-up studies no follow-up studies were done, except a few scattered MA and PhD theses, in addition to some scanty interested individual studies.

The New Halfa scheme, like all other irrigated agricultural schemes in the Sudan, suffers declining production and productivity and failure to fulfill the general objectives upon which it is based. “The basic similarity (between the Gezira scheme and the New Halfa scheme) lies in the poor economic situation of both tenants groups, with even lower incomes accruing to the Halfa tenants than to their Gezira colleagues…it is the pursuit of off-scheme interests by Halfa tenants which mainly enables the labour upon which the scheme is predicated, to continue to exist” . (Sorbo, 1977, p1)

The long-term results of development do not show very encouraging results. When he described the economic status of the tenants, Sorbo, 30 years ago says, "Since its establishment in 1964, the New Halfa Scheme has proved a disappointment to both government and tenants, and at the present time, the situation may be more serious than ever. Yields have been low and fluctuating, and production costs are steadily rising with no comparable price hikes for Halfa crops. Tenant households, now more than ever, are unable to live off one tenancy only and must either have other sources of

16 income, cultivate several tenancies, put themselves in a situation of indebtedness, or leave the project". (Sorbo, 1977, p13-14) The collapse of the project, despite of rehabilitation programmes, is ever continuing, the resettled people, the Halfawiyyin were not able to maintain the project by themselves. This was due to the character of the scheme, which depended heavily on imported equipment and inputs. This in turn raises the question of the use of appropriate technology in such programmes in order to enable the affected people to maintain and develop the systems by themselves.

The deteriorating situation of the scheme, which started gradually since the mid of 1970s, and aggravated by the second half of the 1990s, due to many factors (Mohamed A. Haydar.1997, p51), led to an increasing lack of attachment of the settlers to the scheme, specially the Nubians, whom, as a result, compelled to migrate outside the deteriorating scheme; that is no longer compatible with their desires and expectation of decent life. The movement involves entire family and/or able-bodied men. The majority of migrants flee towards urban centers in the country, specially the capital Khartoum in which they concentrated their residence at Jebal-awliya province- the area stretched along the White Nile from Azozab in the north up to Jebal-awlia town south (Fig.4).

Fig.4. Halfawiyyin new settlements

source: author

However, Halfawiyyin immigration to Khartoum is not a new phenomenon, as Sondra Hale stated it very clear in1983 "Halfawiyyin managed to form new neighborhood units and expand the ones where there were already clusters of Nubians. Khartoum three became more crowded with the influx of new migrants and families joining their household heads. The overflow built up areas such as El-Kalakla and El-Ozozab in Khartoum south and huge pockets in many other areas". Although reasons behind such migration might change, nevertheless, the trend accelerated over time, and the southward preferential concentration of Halfawiyyin in Khartoum seems as taking a constant pattern. i.e. Khartoum three, El- Ozozab, El- Kalakla, el- Shigailab, Um-usher, and Jebal-awliya.

This flow is still continuing, depending on some certain factors; in addition to that mentioned previously, the expatriates remittances which has a major effects in this respect is mostly transferred to find a home, whether through rent or ownership in Khartoum. Few families and individuals retuned to their original home, Wadi Halfa, and joined their relatives there. However, others are still persisting to cope with such deteriorating situation in the scheme, especially those who have no other alternative, mainly the poor and less fortunate, or, in contrast, those who engaged in flourishing business from the early days of the scheme, and generally have had some other sources of income. What is more interesting here is the fact that those who flee towards the capital Khartoum, now gradually forming an ever growing communities with its distinguished features and culture especially at el-Shigailab and um- usher villages. However, Nubians never formed shantytowns and rarely lived in forth-class housing. In many cases, Nubian houses can be seen as a checkerboard pattern in the area, i.e. an attempt to locate near each other, but

19 not form exclusive quarters (Hale, 1982, p329). It worth mentioning, that Nubians opt to rent to one another; albeit; those non-Nubian who live among Nubian are cordially received. It seems that the government's plans to incorporate the Nubians, and the Butana regional economy into the economic mainstream of the country, was not a successful experiment. Unless taking some urgent corrective measures, to stop or to slow down the Halfawiyyin migration out of the new Halfa; the demographic, social, and economic situations inside the scheme, especially of the resettled Halfawiyyin, is going to become worse; and the resettled Halfawiyyin predictably being gradually replaced by other inhabitants, who are motivated and capable to well adapt to such situations better than Halfawiyyin.

The study has the following main objectives: - To investigate the present performance of the New Halfa Scheme in the light of the present economic liberalization policies. - To investigate the real causes behind the Nubians migration off the New Halfa Scheme. - To examine the adaptive responses of the migrated Nubians in their new home at suburban Khartoum - To investigate the possibility of restructuring the scheme according to the settler’s perception in order to redirect the scheme to fulfill some of its initial objectives. - To shed light on some of the real social cost of resettlement. Research assumptions 1- With the present performance of the scheme, out migration of Halfawiyyin from the New Halfa Scheme is an unavoidable process.

2- Halfawiyyin lack feeling of attachment to the scheme is increasing through time, and this in turn leads to more deterioration of agricultural production in the scheme, and partially explains its unsuccessful story. 3- The overall decline in living standards and public services, in addition to the increasing numbers of "strangers" are the major reasons behind Halfawiyyin migration outside the New Halfa scheme. 4- The urban outlook of Halfawiyyin and the innate weakness of resettlement as a development package lie behind the failure of the new Halfa scheme. 5- The recognizable undesirable socioeconomic and political transformations among the resettled Halfawiyyin is the natural outcome of such state of affairs.

Justification for choosing the topic: Despite the well- documented financial, ecological, and human costs associated with the formation of large-scale man-made lakes; the construction of dams in Sudan is continuing; consequently more populations are going to be displaced (i.e. Elhamdab, Kajbar, Dal and Siteit). Dams have always been justified in terms of their development potentialities, and dam- related population resettlement schemes have been viewed as an opportunity to induce rapid socioeconomic change among the affected groups through the intensification of agriculture at the new sites and the provision of education, health care, and other community services. Nevertheless, resettlement has proven to be a difficult and complex operation, as it is apparent in the Nubian case. The present far-reaching problems at the New

Halfa scheme can find their roots in the very early stages of the Nubian resettlement scheme. Resettlement schemes represent unique opportunities for research on human behaviour under conditions of increased stress and accelerated planned change (Cernea, 2000). Though, resettlement studies should be carried out in both long-term and comparative perspectives, documentation of related material and follow-up studies are necessary, After a careful reviewing of the literature on resettlement and involuntary migration, I recognized that Sudanese Nubians, who constitute a sizeable figure, and represents a typical case for study, were, and still endure an almost negligence by those who undertaking such studies, whether on an individual initiative or as part of an international concerning institutes.

This study will be along the same line, where more than forty two years have passed since the great Nubian exodus, and the existence of similar cases and experiences in the Sudan (The Gezira and Rahad schemes, and the newly developed Elhamdab project). All previous writings about the issues of Nubian were either tackling the economic performance of the New Halfa scheme, the sociocultural aspects of the new community in the scheme area, or restricted to some descriptive ethnological studies, however, no study was done about the new wave of Halfawiyyin movement off the New Halfa scheme, and the newly emerging community of Halfawiyyin at suburban Khartoum. Such mass movement indicates that the situation inside the scheme is reaching its alarming threshold.

Methods of data collection: Field work was conducted at the three sites; New Halfa Scheme, Ard el Hajar area South of Old Halfa town, and el-Kalakla, um-usher and el- Shigailab south of Khartoum. Field method consisted of longer interviews (life histories) with some community leaders, and other selected Halfawiyyin and non Halfawiyyin respondents at the two sites, in addition to participant observation and shorter interviews with some specialists. The sources of information for this study also included both published and unpublished materials on the issue as well as unstructured interviews with a number of administrators at the new Halfa Scheme. The fieldwork of the study was carried out during the second half of the year 2006. It is a continuation of my previous M.Sc. work.

The primary method used in this study is the anthropological approach; key informants interviews will be of valuable importance especially with those who witnessed the first Nubian migration and experienced the “assumed” second migration. Initially, all community residents are viewed as potential key informants. These, in addition to the available documents from the different offices in the new Halfa scheme.

Sudan irrigated agriculture Sudan had a large modern irrigated agriculture sector totaling more than 2 million hectares out of about 84 million hectares that are potentially arable. About 93 percent of the irrigated area was in government projects; the remaining 7 percent belonged to private operations. The Nile and its tributaries were the source of water for 93 percent of irrigated agriculture, and of this, the Blue Nile accounted for about 67 percent. Gravity flow was

23 the main form of irrigation, but about one-third of the irrigated area was served by pumps.

The waters of the Nile in Sudan have been used for centuries for traditional irrigation, taking advantage of the annual Nile flood. The traditional shaduf (a water-lifting device) and sa’agia, (waterwheel) were used to lift water to fields in local irrigation projects but were rapidly being replaced by more efficient mechanized pump systems. Among the first efforts to employ irrigation for modern commercial cropping was the use of the floodwaters of the Qash River and the Baraka River (both of which originate in Ethiopia) in eastern Sudan to grow cotton on their deltas. This project was started in the late 1860s by the Egyptian governor and continued until interrupted by the turbulent period of the 1880s, leading to the reconquest of the country by the British in 1899. Cultivation was resumed in 1896 in the Baraka Delta in the Tawkar area, but in the Qash Delta it only resumed after World War I. Between 1924 and 1926, canals were built in the latter delta to control the flood; sandstorms made canals unfeasible in the Baraka. Between the 1940s and the 1970s, various projects were developed to irrigate land. Adequate groundwater, however, offered the eventual possibility of using pump irrigation from local wells for additional cropping or for supplementing any flood shortages (CIA World Factbook. June 1991).

The country's largest irrigation project had been developed on land between the Blue and White Nile rivers south of their confluence at Khartoum. This area is generally flat with a gentle slope to the north and west, permitting natural gravity irrigation, and its soils are fertile cracking clays well suited to irrigation. The project originated in 1911, when a private British enterprise,

Sudan Plantations Syndicate, found cotton suited to the area and embarked on what in the 1920s became the Gezira Scheme, intended principally to furnish cotton to the British textile industry. Backed by a loan from the British government, the syndicate began a dam on the Blue Nile at Sinnar in 1913. World War I interrupted work, and the dam was not completed until 1925. The project was limited by a 1929 agreement between Sudan and Egypt that restricted the amount of water Anglo-Egyptian Sudan could use during the dry season. By 1931, the project had expanded to 450,000 hectares, the maximum that then could be irrigated by the available water, although 10,000 more hectares were added in the 1950s. The project was nationalized in 1950, and was operated by the Sudan Gezira Board as a government enterprise. In 1959, a new agreement with Egypt greatly increased the allotment of water to Sudan, as did the completion in the early 1960s of the Manaqil Extension on the western side of the Gezira Scheme. By 1990, the Manaqil Extension had an irrigated area of nearly 400,000 hectares, and with the 460,000 hectares eventually attained by the original Gezira Scheme, the combined projects accounted for half the country's total land under irrigation.

In the early 1960s, the government set up a program to resettle Nubians displaced by Lake Nubia (called Lake Nasser in Egypt), which was formed by the construction of the Aswan High Dam in Egypt. To provide farmland for the Nubians, the government constructed the Khashm el Girba Dam on the Atbara River and established the Halfa al Jadidah (New Halfa) irrigation project. It was the only large irrigation project in the country that did not use the waters of the Blue Nile or White Nile. The resettlement was effected mainly after completion of the Khashm al Girba Dam in 1964. Part of the

25 irrigated area was also assigned to local inhabitants. The main commercial crops initially introduced included cotton, peanuts, and wheat. In 1965, sugarcane was added, and a sugar factory having a design capacity of 60,000 tons was built to process it. The project enabled 200,000 hectares of land to be irrigated for the first time. Heavy silting as well as serious problems of drainage and salinity occurred. As a result, by the late 1970s the reservoir had lost more than 40 percent of its original storage capacity and was unable to meet the project water requirements. These problems persisted in the early 2000s.

The multipurpose Roseires Dam was built in 1966 and power- generating facilities were installed in 1971. Both the water and the power were needed to implement the Rahad River irrigation project located east of the Rahad River, a tributary of the Blue Nile. The Rahad entered the Blue Nile downstream from the dam and during the dry season had an insufficient flow for irrigation purposes. Work on the initial 63,000 hectares of the project began in the early 1970s, the first irrigation water was received in 1977, and by 1981 about 80 percent of the prepared area was reported to be irrigated. (In May 1988, the World Bank agreed to provide additional funding for this and other irrigation projects). Water for the project was pumped from the Blue Nile, using electric power from the Roseires plant, and was transported by an eighty-kilometer-long canal to the Rahad River (en route underpassing the Dindir River, another Blue Nile tributary). The canal then emptied into the Rahad above a new barrage that diverted the combined flow from the two sources into the project's main irrigation canal. Irrigation was by gravity flow, but instead of flat field flooding, furrow irrigation was used, because it permitted more effective use of machinery.

In the 1920s, private irrigation projects using diesel pumps also had begun to appear in Al Khartoum Province, mainly along the White Nile, to provide vegetables, fruit, and other foods to the capital area. In 1937 a dam was built by the Anglo-Egyptian condominium upstream from Khartoum on the White Nile at Jabal al Awliya to regulate the supply of water to Egypt during the August to April period of declining flow. Grazing and cultivated land along the river was flooded for almost 300 kilometers. The government thereupon established seven pump irrigation projects, partially financed by Egypt, to provide the area's inhabitants with an alternative to transhumance.

This irrigation project eventually proved successful, making possible large surpluses of cotton and sorghum and encouraging private entrepreneurs to undertake new projects. High cotton profits during the Korean War (1950- 53) increased private interest along the Blue Nile as well, and by 1958 almost half the country's irrigated cotton was grown under pump irrigation. During the 1960s, however, downward fluctuations in world cotton prices and disputes between entrepreneurs and tenants led to numerous failures of pump irrigation projects. In 1968 the government assumed ownership and operation of the projects. The government established the Agricultural Reform Corporation for this purpose, and the takeover began that year with the larger estates. Subsequently, as leases expired, the corporation acquired smaller projects, until May 1970 when all outstanding leases were revoked. A considerable number of small pump operations that developed on privately owned land, chiefly along the main Nile but also on the Blue Nile, continued to operate.

Since the 1950s, the government has constructed a number of large pump projects, mostly on the Blue Nile. These have included the Junayd project on the right bank of the Blue Nile east of the Gezira Scheme. This project, with an irrigated area of about 36,000 hectares, went into operation in 1955 to provide an alternative livelihood for nomadic pastoralists in the area. It produced cotton until 1960, when about 8,400 hectares were converted to sugarcane. A sugar factory built to process the crop opened in 1962. In the early 1970s, the Japanese-assisted Al- Suki project, also of 36,000 hectares, was established upstream from Sinnar to grow cotton, sorghum, and oilseeds. In the mid-1970s, the government constructed a second project near Sinnar of about 20,000 hectares. In addition to cotton and other crops such as peanuts, about 8,400 hectares of the area were devoted to raising sugarcane. The cane-processing factory, with a design capacity of 110,000 tons of sugar a year, opened in 1976. Several smaller Blue Nile projects added more than 80,000 additional hectares to Sudan's overall irrigated area during this time.

In the 1970s, when the consumption and import of sugar grew rapidly, domestic production became a priority, and two major pump-irrigated sugar plantations were established on the White Nile in the Kusti area. The Hajar Asalaya Sugar Project, begun in 1975, had an irrigated area of about 7,600 hectares. The sugar factory was completed in 1977. The Kinanah Sugar Project, which had almost 16,200 hectares under irrigation in 1981, was one of the world's largest sugar factories. This project, first proposed in 1971, and the plant was opened officially in early 1981. The Kinanah Sugar Project, unlike the country's four other government-owned sugar projects, was a joint venture-among the governments of Sudan, Kuwait, and Saudi

Arabia, and the Arab Investment Company. Government biases towards irrigation continue during the 1990s, and even escalated in the recent years, attracted by the international food crises, and fearing of political pressures, the present government of Sudan planning and started to execute more irrigated, dam-based agricultural schemes; especially in the Northern part of the country.

Notes: 1. Abdalla, I. H. 1970. The choice of Khashm Al-Girba Area for Resettlement of Halfawis. In: Sudan Notes and Records,51, 1970,S. 56-47. 2. Cernea, Michael M. 2000. Risks, safeguard and reconstruction: A model for population displacement and resettlement. In: Risks and reconstruction: Experiences of resettlers and refugees. M. M Cernea and C. McDowell, eds. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 3. Colson, Elizabeth. 1971.The Social Consequences of Resettlement: The Impact of The Kariba Resettlement upon The Gwembe Tonga. Manchester University Press. 4. Fahim, M Hussein. 1973. Nubian settlement in the Sudan. The American university in Cairo, Social research center reprint series no.13. 5. Lassailly -Jacob, Veronique. 1996. Land-based strategies in dam- related resettlement programmes in Africa. In Understanding impoverishment, The consequences of development-induced displacement. C. McDowell, eds. Berghahn books. 6. Mohamed Ali, Haydar. 1997. Agricultural development and sociocultural change: The case of Nubians at New Halfa scheme. Unpublished MS.C. thesis. IES, University of Khartoum. 7. Simon, A Mason. 2004. From conflict to cooperation in the Nile Basin. Zurich, Switzerland. 8. Sondra, D Hale. 1982. The Changing Ethnic Identity of Nubians in Urban Milieu: Khartoum, Sudan. Unpublished PhD. University of California, los Angeles.

9. Sorbo, Gunnar M. 1977. How to Survive Development: The Story of New Halfa. DSRC monograph series No.6. Khartoum University Press. 10. The Library of Congress Country Studies; CIA World Factbook. June 1991)

Chapter Two Literature Review

Chapter Two: Literature Review

Stresses associated with resettlement Multidimensional stress is especially prevalent during the years that precede resettlement, during the removal and during the years immediately after resettlement, although in the case of an unsatisfactory outcome, stress can continue for a much longer period.

Physical removal to a new habitat is especially stressful. "Even after 45 years, I can not grasp how, for example, 50,000 Sudanese Nubians- relocated in connection with Egypt’s Aswan High Dam- perceived and coped with leaving their desert environment around and immediately south of Wadi Halfa for a resettlement area over 700 km away. On relocation, their formerly isolated communities would be integrated into a single resettlement area with a previously unknown ethnic group. There they would find new diseases such as leishmaniasis and malaria and would be incorporated within a large-scale irrigation project, whereas in their former homes they had practiced flood recession and small pump agriculture along the banks of the Nile. In their new environment, they would be subjected annually to several months of rainfall as opposed to the almost rainless climate of their former Saharan habitat" (Scudder, 2006, p29).

Types of land settlement New land settlement is generally defined as the spontaneous and sponsored settlement of areas which are largely uncultivated at the time of their occupation. It includes what is referred to in the literature as "colonization",

"resettlement", and "transmigration". All these terms emphasize the settlement of land by people rather than the reclamation or initial preparation of land. The distinction between spontaneous and forced settlers refers to whether the settlers are self-recruited or respond to the recruitment initiative of a sponsoring agency. It has nothing to do with the reasons or motivation for leaving the original residence for a new settlement area. Though government administrators with settlement experience often remain skeptical, evidence from different parts of the world suggests that spontaneous settlers usually make better farmers in less time and at a lower financial cost than do government-sponsored settlers. The comparison here is with pioneer settlers, that is, those arrive during the first phase of the settlement process.

A range of explanatory factors appears to account for this. There is considerable evidence, for example, that spontaneous settlers have access to more resources than do the majority of government-sponsored settlers, most of whom are poor and likely to be landless labourers or sharecroppers. Spontaneous settlers, however, often have resources that place them above the lowest 20 percent of the sending population in terms of income. The evidence also suggests, however, that without government or other external assistance spontaneous settlement alone can hardly generate a process of integrated development. Under such circumstances, it makes sense to combine both types of settlers in the settlement process rather than to favour one type to the exclusion of the other.

In the definition of new land settlement, the wording "largely uncultivated" is important since most new lands are in fact occupied by others- the hosts-

34 at the time of settlement or, if currently unused, are almost always subject to rights of customary use and tenure by the hosts. Because population densities tend to be relatively low and the hosts tend to have relatively low social status and little regional (let alone national) power, their lands are frequently taken away without the provision of compensatory land, or adequate cash compensation. Even if they do not lose land, rarely is a systematic attempt made to incorporate the hosts within the settlement design (New Halfa being an exception), and this omission increases the chances of conflict between hosts and settlers.

While the World Bank defines settlement success in terms of economic rates of return, "which in turn emphasize increases in agricultural production, the nature of land settlement schemes suggests that in the future the Bank should pay more attention to benefits accruing to a majority of the settlers households and to the potential of projects to catalyze a process of integrated area development"(operations evaluation dept. WB, 1985).

In classifying settlements it is necessary to distinguish both the type of settler and the nature of the involvement of the sponsoring agency or agencies. Four types are distinguished for the purpose of analysis, although several may in fact be represented in a single settlement: - Spontaneous settlement with very little government or other assistance - Spontaneous settlement facilitated by government and other agencies - Voluntary settlement sponsored by government and other agencies - Compulsory resettlement sponsored primarily by government agencies.

The inhabited portions of the world have been largely populated by spontaneous settlement with very little or no government support. Government and other agencies have rarely facilitated spontaneous settlement, however, despite impressive evidence that spontaneous settlers time and again make better farmers. As with poorly planned and implemented government-sponsored settlement, the major disadvantages of spontaneous settlement are the lack of legal access to land and secure land tenure, a tendency of spontaneous settlers to displace the host population, and relatively low levels of productivity with few multiplier effects.

Settlement sponsored by governments or other agencies takes two main forms: voluntary and involuntary. The importance of government-sponsored voluntary settlement has been proportionately increasing in recent decades and has opened up the opportunity for substantial use of social science knowledge in designing and implementing settlement policies. Involuntary resettlement, on the contrary, is generally a by-product of events such as the construction of highways and major hydroelectric and irrigation systems. Because it represents such an extreme example, settlements resulting from involuntary relocation spotlight a number of problems, which, to a less extent, characterize all types of new land settlements. These have been studied sociologically in considerable detail, particularly in connection with relocation in the tropics and subtropics. The result of such studies have improved understanding of settler responses to settlement, of settlement stages, and of a wide range of issues associated with each stage.

Irrigation and dams: The area irrigated worldwide by modern methods and the more complex traditional techniques began to increase rapidly in the early nineteenth century. Between 1800 and 1900, the extent of irrigation increased fivefold to an estimated 40 million hectares. Over the next fifty years they doubled again. After 1950, the rate of expansion accelerated with the spread of large dam technology across the developing world and the availability of cheap energy and new technologies for pumping ground water. In the 1960s, the development of new "green revolution" varieties of rice and wheat, which required high and dependable application of water, provided a further impetus for the spread of irrigation, especially in the most fertile parts of Asia. Since the late 1970s, however, the spread of irrigation has slowed dramatically. According to projections made for the International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage in 1981, the world's irrigated area was supposed to reach 310 million hectares in 1985 and 420 million hectares by the year 2000. Yet by 1992 irrigation covered only 249 million hectares and it is likely to have fallen since then (McCully, 1998, p165).

The expansion of irrigation has stagnated largely because the most fertile lands, the most accessible sources of water and the best dam sites have already been developed, substantially raising the per hectare cost of new irrigation projects. Governments can no longer (or are no longer willing to pay) the massive subsidies they pumped into large-scale irrigation in the past, world agricultural prices have been falling in real terms since the early 1970s, and many existing schemes are ageing and in need of expensive repairs. Furthermore, the green revolution and its associated technologies have proven themselves inherently unsustainable. After only decades of

37 modern perennial irrigation, soils which in many cases had supported traditional farming for hundreds or even thousands of years, have become so degraded that they are now unsuitable for agriculture. Huge areas of irrigated land are now waterlogged and clogged with salts. Global statistics suggest that more irrigated land may be abandoned each year due to salinity than is being brought into production in new schemes. The amount of formally irrigated land being paved over to make way for urban expansion may be even greater than that lost to salt. Salt and cities combined mean that total global irrigated area is now probably contracting at a significant rate (McCully, 1998, p165).

Types and sources of irrigation: Irrigation is an ancient technology which allows crops to be grown in areas with limited or no rainfall, and ensures against drought in areas where rainfall is unreliable. Where the rainy season is short, irrigation can extent the period in which crops can be grown. There are many different forms of irrigation, with no clear defining line between rainfed and irrigated farming. While it is conventionally defined by agronomists along the lines of "the controlled application of water to crops in a timely manner", irrigation can also be used in a much wider sense to include adaptations to natural flood and rainfall patterns. These methods include flood recession agriculture- where crops are planted on floodplains at the end of the wet season to exploit the moisture left behind by retreating floods- and "rainwater harvesting"- where rainwater is collected behind earth bunds or in small basins.

Modern irrigation methods are generally divided into two types-canal and lift. The categories overlap because lift irrigation, while mainly referring to irrigation with groundwater, can include water pumped from canals and reservoirs- whereas water lifted from wells can sometimes have seeped from canals and drains. Dams built for irrigation store water from the rainy season for the rest of the year, divert water into canals, and regulate the rise and fall of the river downstream to facilitate pumping schemes (McCully, 1998, p166).

Although International Commission Of Large Dams(ICOLD) lobbyists sometimes imply that irrigation is largely dependent on large dams, much of the world's irrigated land receives water from the wide variety of traditional irrigation techniques, from modern schemes using water pumped from underground, and from unregulated rivers. When the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) decided in 1986 to account for traditional African irrigation methods; their estimate for the area of irrigated land in sub-Saharan Africa jumped by 37 per cent. FAO researchers concluded that almost half of the 5 million hectares in Africa they considered irrigated received water from "small-scale and traditional systems ". Small –scale and traditional systems not only water more land than large dam and canal schemes but also tend to be far more productive and sustainable.

In some cases modern irrigation can increase yields compared to traditional systems by allowing an extra cropping season ( although almost invariably at the cost of the soil's long-term fertility); in other cases, the poor operation and maintenance of modern large-scale schemes may produce less than traditional systems even in the short term (McCully, 1998,p166).

Irrigation and land degradation: All irrigation waters, whether from rivers or groundwater, contain dissolved salts washed out of rocks and soils. Evaporation from reservoirs, canals and fields increases the concentration of salts in irrigation water. When the water reaches crops, the roots absorb water but leave in the soil most of the toxic salts. Compounding irrigated agriculture's salt problem is that soils in arid and semi-arid areas tend naturally to have high salt levels. (An eye observation revealed huge areas in the New Halfa scheme just covered with a white spots layer of salt).

To prevent the salinity of irrigated soils from reaching levels which would stunt plant growth, farmers apply more water to wash salts from the root zone. Flushing out the salts, however, increases the salinity of the groundwater below and, in the absence of good drainage, causes the water table to rise. Eventually, when the water table reaches to within a metre or two of the soil surface, the saline groundwater is drawn upwards by capillary action. When it reaches the surface, the water evaporates leaving behind its salt content as a crust of deadly white crystals. Thus in trying to flush out the salts, the irrigator is not only accelerating Salinization, but also the waterlogging of the root zone (McCully, 1998, p168).

A problem related to Salinization and waterlogging is alkalinity (also known as "sodicity", which occurs when irrigation waters or soils have a high sodium content. The sodium salts are absorbed by clay particles in the soil which swell, rendering the soil impermeable to water and oxygen, and

40 ultimately barren. Heavily alkaline soils also impede plant uptake of essential micronutrients like calcium (McCully, 1998, p168). Irrigation- induced soil degradation is nothing new, the decline of several ancient societies, has been ascribed, with varying degrees of persuasiveness, to falling crop yields due to the salinization of irrigated fields. The massive expansion of poorly managed dam and canal irrigation systems in recent decades, however, has resulted in Salinization and water logging on an unprecedented scale. The salinization and water logging of irrigated lands not only cause problems for those whose lands are directly affected. Saline wastewater draining back into the river progressively reduces downstream water quality for other irrigator and water users, and for wildlife.

The key to preventing, or at least to slowing down, the onset of salinization is to provide good drainage. Although it seems simple thing to do, there are several related reasons why the irrigation engineers frequently fail to build adequate drains. First, the urge to exaggerate project benefits means that the presence of soils vulnerable to salinization is rarely recognized in project documents. Second, drains have none of the high- tech, shiny-white glamour of dams and huge new canals, so alluring to politicians and development bureaucrats. Governments, irrigation agencies and donors consistently show that they prefer to start new projects rather than invest in the sustainability of old ones. For related reasons, in those cases where drains are provided, they tend to be badly built and poorly maintained, and so rapidly fill with sediment and deteriorate. Third, installing drains is exorbitantly expensive, especially in areas which are already suffering from salinization (McCully, 1998, p170).

The technical and economic failure of large-scale irrigation Modern canal irrigation has a woeful record of poor design and construction, mismanagement and corruption. Water supplies to farmers are frequently erratic and unreliable- the main reason why crop yields from groundwater irrigation is far superior to those from canal irrigation. In those areas which do receive canal water, its distribution is invariably skewed: those near the head of the canal usually receive more water than needed-often resulted in water logging- while those at the tail do not get enough. Chambers believe that 'between a quarter and two-fifth of the potential declared utilized in India, roughly between 6 and 10 million hectares, suffers from recognizable and damaging tailend deprivation.(Chambers,1988, p.24).

Another reason why tailenders do not get sufficient water is that planners roughly overestimate the amount of water available to a canal system, and underestimate the system losses to leakes, evaporation and overwatering. Reservoir sedimentation also progressively reduces water supply to irrigation canals, as does the construction of dams and other irrigation projects upstream. (Chambers, 1988, p.112). Irrigation efficiency (measured as the percentage of water actually used for crop growth relative to the total amount of water delivered by the irrigation system) average only around 40 per cent worldwide. Between 1950 and 1993 the World Bank loaned some $20 billion for irrigation, 7 per cent of its total lending (McCully, 1998, p180).

Given the morass of environmental and technical problems in which surface irrigation is embroiled, it is not surprising that the returns from irrigation can not pay back this massive investment. In Africa, difficult soils, terrain and

42 hydrology coupled with poor communications, corruption and lack of suitable skills make surface irrigation even more difficult and expensive than in other areas. With the best sites for surface irrigation already used up, the cost of new irrigation development is soaring., with few exceptions the only investments in large irrigation schemes which currently make any sense in economic, environmental or social justice terms are those which attempt to improve existing systems and stop more land being ruined by bad drainage and overwatering (McCully, 1998, p182).

Modern Irrigation: Most recent projections from academics and international agencies concerned with world agriculture agree that increased irrigation development costs and growing competition for water from cities and industries mean that future increases in crop production will have to come from rainfed farming, small-scale irrigation and improving management and infrastructure of existing large schemes. 'Given the dwindling sources of new water and decreasing returns to new irrigation', said a 1995 internal evaluation of 50 years of World Bank lending for irrigation, 'the Bank should shift emphasis – from financing new irrigation to upgrading existing irrigation.' The evaluation concluded that irrigation management bodies needed to be more financially and ecologically accountable to the irrigators; that large projects should be subdivided into small units managed by groups of water users; that the users should be free from government interference and should be able to set their own punishments for rule breakers; and that the Bank should "promote community involvement in all aspects of irrigation". The measures recommended in the evaluation are basically those

43 developed on indigenous systems many centuries ago (McCully, 1996, p205).

While certainly they are on the decline, it is still premature to ring the death knell for big dam and irrigation schemes. A vital element in the success of traditional systems is that they are based upon common property ownership – a concept which is diametrically opposed to the ideology of privatization dominant within the World Bank and many other development institutions and governments (McCully, 1996, p206).

With indigenous systems, water – and often other resources too – is held in common and managed for the greater good of the community rather than any individuals within it. The privatization and enclosure of common resources are a major force behind environmental degradation all over the world. If the 'new thinking' on irrigation promotes the privatization of indigenous systems, it will lead to their destruction just as surely as would continuing to replace them with government-run schemes (McCully1996, p206). Because irrigation uses such a large proportion of total water withdrawals, even small percentage reduction in the amount of water used by agriculture can make huge amounts of water available for drinking and other uses (as well as for rivers and wetlands) (McCully,1996, p206).

Huge increases in crop productivity per unit of water could potentially be gained through better management of canal irrigation: Robert Chambers calculates that increasing the reliability of water supplies to farmers could triple crop production from Indian canal schemes. Better management and modest infrastructure improvements in Pakistan, says Chambers, could save

44 an amount of water equivalent to that supplied by the three Tarbela Dams (McCully,1996, p206).

The most efficient method of delivering water to crops is 'drip irrigation', where water is delivered as directly as possible to the roots of each plant through perforated or porous pipes. With drip irrigation, evaporation and seepage losses are extremely low (McCully, 1996, p207). Commercial 'micro-irrigation' – drip irrigation and the use of super-efficient sprinklers- has spread rapidly since the 1960s. In 1991, nearly 1.6 million hectares were watered with these methods, including 70 per cent of irrigated land in Cyprus, and half of irrigated land in Israel. The US had the largest area under micro-irrigation, 606,000 hectares, some 3 per cent of its irrigated land (McCully, 1996, p207). The main drawback to modern micro-irrigation is that it is very expensive to install and maintain, so that it is mainly suitable for farmers with access both to reasonable amounts of capital and to markets for high-value fruit and vegetables. Thus although drip irrigation is water efficient, it is an in appropriate technology for many parts of the world where the growing of affordable food should be the priority of agricultural policies (McCully, 1996, p207).

A large untapped source of water for irrigation and groundwater recharge is municipal wastewater. Reusing wastewater for irrigation is doubly beneficial as the nutrients in sewage are then used to feed crops rather than pollute waterways. Using reclaimed sewage from towns on farmlands was common in many industrialized countries until the early part of this century, when it fell out of favour, partly because of concerns over the transmission of disease. The reuse of water is most advanced in Israel, where 70 per cent of

45 sewage is treated and then used on 19.000 hectares of cropland (McCully, 1996, p208).

Resettlement policies Planners have implemented two sorts of resettlement policies, each with a different impact on the viability of resettled communities: The first sort of policy takes into consideration where people want to move. When resettlers are involved in choosing new locations, they always prefer to resettle as close to their former habitat as possible. (However, this is not always the case). In Kossou Project, for example, evacuees were induced to move toward the forest area over six hundred kilometers away. However, only three thousand out of eighty thousand people agreed to migrate to this place. They preferred settling in familiar surroundings on the lakeshore among their own ethnic subgroup. Moving to such a close relocation site is less painful. Furthermore, people adjust better to the new social, cultural and ecological environment when it is closer to the previous habitat. But two problems can arise. First of all, unplanned soils may have less agricultural potential than the rich alluvial soils of the inundated floodplains. Secondly, there may be land problems because resettlement sites are located on vacant land owned by other people. If relocatees and their hosts come from the same ethnic group, relations may be cordial, at last at the start (as in the Kossou Project). If they do not belong to the same ethnic group, relations may be strained straightaway (as in the Volta Project). In any case, tensions mount as time passes. Resettling people on unflooded ancestral lands or government reserved lands (such as forest reserves) is the most fitting

46 solution when feasible, as in the Kpong and Manantali projects. (Jacob, 1996, pp190-191).

The second sort of policy forces people to settle in a new area, far from their former habitat. The Nubian Sudanese had to move more than 600 kilometers to settle in the Khashm el-Girba area. Similarly, six thousand Gwembe evacuated from Kariba were required to move one hundred kilometers downstream to the Lusitu region. In Egypt, the people of Lower Nubia were given the choice of either resettling individually on a site of their choice or being resettled collectively a few hundred kilometers northwards in the Kom-Ombo area. As the Nubians wanted to avoid the dispersion of their community, the second option prevailed despite the distance. Far- distant resettlement means moving to an unfamiliar environment and entails increased hardship. The further people are moved, the greater the resistance and trauma even though resettlers may receive relatively large tracts of arable land at the new sites (fifteen acre plots in the New Halfa Project). In New Nubia, Egypt, and New Halfa, Sudan, many Nubian families left the resettlement area to go back to their homeland and settle on the lakeshore. Furthermore, tensions with hosts in resettlement areas are exacerbated, partly because of different ethnic origins. Talking about the relationship between Gwembe resettlers and their Goba hosts in the Lusitu area (Kariba case), Scudder (1993), mentioned that conflicts over boundaries and sorcery accusations have increased over the years, and land initially lent to the newcomers was taken back. (Jacob, 1996, p191).

Land acquisition In Africa, two systems of imbricated land tenure operate on the same territory: national law and customary laws. There is no piece of land, even vacant land, without a customary owner, i.e., an ethnic group, a clan, a lineage or a family. Informal customary rights to the land still prevail in many rural areas. Furthermore, lands in many rural savanna areas have no market value and no registered deeds. Finally, while States are equipped with the legal means to take away land needed for the public good and to compensate the expropriated, they lack legislation for carrying out legally workable resettlement operations, which involve purchasing replacement land for the evicted communities and compensating the hosts. Given this legal vacuum, acquiring, distributing and developing new land is an almost insurmountable task for planners (Jacob, 1996, 191).

Two major policies have been pursued in acquiring land for resettlement schemes: the first calls for governmental intervention. In New Halfa, the Government acquired fifty thousand feddans (1 feddan =1.04 acres; 0.42 hectares), i.e., 2,000 sq. kms, and provided settlers and their hosts with large holdings in tenancy. In New Nubia, Egypt, 200 sq. kms were reclaimed from the desert. However, even when authorities do acquire enough arable land for relocatees, the allocated land may not be ready to farm by the time of resettlement. Too often, planning starts too late and leads to a 'crash' programme. In New Nubia, at the time of relocation, less than 10 per cent of the new land had been reclaimed. As a result, settlers received only one feddan and depended on food relief for several years after 1965, not until 1980 did each eligible person acquire his full allotment of land. In Ghana, the agency in charge of acquiring land for the relocatees encountered

48 customary landowners' refusal. Four years after resettlement, only sixteen out of fifty two settlements had received cleared land. A few years later, relocatees were back on relief from the World Food Programme, and some new settlements had become ghost towns (Jacob, 1996, 191).

A second land acquisition policy is based on friendly agreements. At Kossou, for example, the resettlement agency acquired tracts of arable land in the savanna area for the forty new settlements, under friendly agreements with host populations who belonged to the same ethnic group. The resettlement agency assumed that the host population would agree to share land with the other newcomers out of generosity or brothers and sisters in need. Having no land rights, these newcomers became indebted to their hosts, and their survival still depends on maintaining friendly relations with them (Jacob, 1996, 192).

Too often, friendly agreements are worked out with very little compensation. In the Kossou Project, the uncompensated hosts often refused to allocate farmland to newcomers. Or, in order to prevent relocatees from cultivating already-rented land, they places fetishes there and held never-ending palavers. Regarding the New Halfa Project, Salem-Murdock (1989) has pointed out that “result of the government's differential treatment of relocated Nubians and host Arabs was the intensification of ethnic tensions between the two groups”. However, my field work and observation deny that statement, instead, such tensions is increasing between the resettled Halfawiyyin and the agricultural labourers for reasons we will discuss at the next chapters.

Land may be distributed to resettlers in one of three ways. First of all, anyone who owned non-flooded land may receive new land as a function of the size of his previous farm. In New Nubia, the size of the holding as based on what each head of household owned in Old Nubia. Those who had les than three feddan or those who had no land received two feddan. The largest land owners were given five feddan. However, most landholders received only two feddan, because the size of their previous holdings had usually been small (Jacob, 1996, 193).

Secondly, every head of household may receive the same acreage. In New Halfa, each head of household received a fifteen-feddan farm, in addition to the freeholds (1 feddan at the old home was compensated by 2 feddans in the new scheme). Initially, lands as well as other resources (seeds, fertilizers, etc) were equally distributed by the resettlement agency among relocatees; but over the years, these resources have become concentrated in the hands of a few. Hence, differences in living standards among tenants have increased between those who, capable of profiting from new opportunities, now form elite supervising huge domains, and the others who, excluded, only dispose of the labour their families can provide. This is one of the Project’s major consequences (Salem-Murdock 1989). In the Volta Project, each household was entitled to a three-acre farm. Since this was too small, the fields could not lie fallow, and the soil was impoverished. Thirdly, only a selected number of resettlers may be given arable land. This happened in the Kossou Project, where ‘volunteers’ received 5-ha.farms in the savanna area. In all three cases, relocatees receive only land for fields. No land is set aside for other activities.

The problem of sedimentation All rivers contain sediments: a river, in effect, can be considered a body of flowing sediments as much as one of flowing water. When a river is stilled behind a dam, the sediments it contains sink to the bottom of the reservoir. The proportion of a river's total sediments load captured by a dam- known as its "trap efficiency"- approaches 100 per cent for many projects, especially those with large reservoirs. As the sediments accumulate in the reservoir, so the dam gradually loses its ability to store water for the purposes for which it was built. Every reservoir loses storage to sedimentation, although the rate at which this happens varies widely. Despite more than six decades of research, sedimentation is still probably the most serious technical problem faced by dam industry (McCully, 1998, p107).

The rate of reservoir sedimentation depends on the size of a reservoir relative to the amount of sediment flowing into it; a small reservoir on an extremely muddy river will rapidly lose capacity; (the case of Khashm el- Girba Dam), a large reservoir on a very clean river may take centuries to lose an appreciable amount of storage. A part from rapidly filling their reservoirs, sediment- filled rivers also cause headaches for dam operators due to the abrasion of turbines and other dam components. The erosion and cracking of the tips of turbine blades by water-borne sand and silt considerably reduce their generating efficiency and can require expensive repairs.

To make a meaningful economic forecast for a planned dam, it is necessary to be able to predict its sedimentation rate with reasonable accuracy. However, it is extremely difficult to estimate how much sedimentation will

51 be trapped by a reservoir. Sediment flow vary widely both annually and seasonally over time-far more than water flows-and so calculating an annual average needs a long run data. As with river flows; the variability of sediment yield is greatest in arid and semi-arid climates-where the data tend to be sparsest (McCully, 1998, p109).

The amount of sediment carried into a reservoir is at its highest during floods. However, despite all the uncertainties over reservoir sedimentation, it is extremely rare for a planned project to be stopped because of a lack of adequate sediment data, and most modern dams are designed so that they can afford to lose some storage capacity without their performance being impaired-the part of a reservoir known as "dead storage" which lies beneath the elevation of the dam's lowest outlet. However, sediments do not build up evenly along a horizontal plane; so that "live storage" is usually lost long before the dead storage is filled.

There are three categories of methods to prolong the life of a reservoir: reduce the amount of sediment flowing into it; flush through the dam the sediment that has already accumulated; or dredge the sediment. All have severed limitations, either because they simply do not work, they are prohibitively expensive, or because they conflict with the dam's ability to supply water and power (McCully, 1998, p110). Sediment flushing (the method used in Khashm el-Girba Dam) is a method of washing out deposits which have already accumulated in a reservoir. it depends on the reservoir being drawn down, with the aim that fast-flowing water will erode the sediments on the reservoir bed and flush them through the dam. Flushing a long reservoir will require several months of drawdown to a level where the

52 flow of water through the reservoir is close to that of the original river. While flushing can be effective at removing fine, silty deposits near the outlets, it usually has little impact upon the coarser deposits further upstream or cohesive sediments such as compacted clays. In general, flushing has little impact on a seriously sediment reservoir as that of Khashm el-Girba dam, as it is shown below:

Table (2) illustrates the annual siltation and the storage capacity of the dam Year Estimated volume of precipitation Storage capacity (million cubic meters) (million cubic meters) 1979 590 710 1980 610 690 1981 625 675 1982 640 660 1983 655 645 1984 670 630 1985 680 620 1986 690 610 1987 700 600 1988 710 590 1989 720 580 1990 730 570 1991 740 560 1992 750 550 1993 760 540 1994 770 530 1995 780 520 1996 790 510 1997 800 500 1998 805 495 1999 810 490 2000 815 485 2001 820 480 2002 825 475 2003 830 470 Source: NHAC

Irrigation and diseases In spite of a strenuous worldwide eradication effort, malaria is one of the world's most widespread and lethal diseases, and is becoming ever more dangerous. In 1990, malaria parasites infected over 300 million people, and probably killed well over 1 million. The great majority of malaria infections and deaths occur among children in Africa. The ecological changes caused by dams and perennial irrigation schemes in arid and semi-arid areas tend to boost anopheles populations by increasing the area of stagnant water in which they breed, and by extending the period during which standing water is present (McCully,1996,p90).

The main reason why irrigation systems spread disease is that they create habitats in which insects, snails and other animals that serve as vectors for water-borne disease parasites can thrive. Irrigation schemes can also decrease the availability of clean water; when water for domestic use comes from irrigation canals, it may be polluted with pesticide run-off and other agricultural wastes, heavily saline and contaminated with human sewage. The observable increases in the kidney-failure disease among the inhabitants of the New Halfa scheme, who directly make use of the canal waters for drinking and other domestic uses, is a case in point. Cases of malaria infection were reported almost every month of the year, with a general pattern of a bimodal annual increase in the slide positive rate (SPR)of malaria (the number of parasitologically confirmed clinical cases of malaria/100 persons attending/month) in the autumn and cool dry season.. it was found that the pattern of malaria transmission is completely different from that in the other parts of eastern Sudan, where transmission of the disease is restricted to the rainy season. The bimodal annual rate of malaria

55 transmission could be explained by the presence of the agriculture scheme (Himeidan, 2007, 22). Irrigated agriculture has influenced malaria incidence in this area and extended the transmission season beyond the rainy season. The introduction of irrigated schemes in areas with seasonal rainfall has been reported to increase the incidence of malaria significantly (Himeidan, 2007, p22). Almost all those recently migrate to el-Shigailab and um-usher areas when asked about reasons behind their migration, they indicated to illnesses, especially malaria, as one of the major cause behind migration.

Notes: 1. Chambers, Robert. 1988. Managing canal irrigation: Practical analysis from South Asia. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 2. Himeidan, Yousif E. etal. 2007. Climatic variables and transmission of falciparum malaria in New Halfa, Eastern Sudan, In: Eastern Mediterranean Journal, vol. 13. No.1. 3. Lassailly-Jacob, Veronique. 1996. Land-based strategies in dam- related resettlement programmes in Africa. In Understanding impoverishment, The consequences of development-induced displacement. C. McDowell, eds. Berghahn books. 4. McCully, Patrick. 1998. Silenced Rivers: the ecology and politics of large dams, Zed books, London. 5. Salem-Murdock, Muneera. 1989. Arabs and Nubians in New Halfa: A study of settlement and irrigation. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press. 6. Scudder, Thayer. 2006. The future of large dams. Dealing with Social, Environmental and political costs, London. Sterling ,VA. 7. ______1993. 37 years of change and continuity among Zambian’s Gwembe Tonga. In: Development-induced relocation, Journal of Refugee Studies, vol.6. No.2. 8. World Bank. 1985. Report on the experience of the World Bank with government-sponsored land settlement. Operations Evaluation Department. Washington DC. The World Bank.

Chapter Three Historical Background

Chapter Three: Historical Background

Nubia and the Nubians Until the period of relocation (displacement), Nubians had not conceived of themselves as an ethnic group and had manifested little group awareness. However, with the flooding of much of their homeland, many Nubians in the Diaspora developed an intensified sense of ethnicity and unity (Hale 1982, p75).

One of the predominant features of Nubia is its isolation. The region is remote, separated from the rest of the country by natural barriers. To the east, west and the south it is cut off from the world by the Sahara. The river course south to Dongola is blocked by three cataracts, the Second, Third and Fourth. Thus Nubia is a detached country, and the Nubians remained tied to their region, living in a world of their own (Dafalla, 1975, p45). It was the corridor through which all civilizations, religions and wars entered the Sudan (Dafalla, 1975, p45). Until the colonization of Egypt and Sudan by Britain (beginning around 1880), Nubian communities were not ethnically integrated. There was a constant flux of invasions, intrusions, and absorption. (Hale, 1982, p91).

Nubians speak a Nubiyyin language, which is composed of a few hundred old Nubian words, sandwiched between many corrupt Arabic words, and in Nubia Arabic is the second language of almost all males and some females. And they are Sunni Muslims. Hassan Dafalla, nearly 35 years ago, described the individual Nubian and Nubian community in the following words:

"In spite of the hardship and poverty of their area, the Nubians are among the mot friendly groups in the Sudan, they are generous and courteous to aliens and foreigners; it is also a characteristic of Nubians that they are clean; they are also famous for their honesty and love of peace. They respect the right of property, and do not trespass or enter the property of others, and they do not resort to violence in fighting for what they consider their right, they had never been known as a warlike tribe. Being peaceful and non- violent, the Nubians depend for almost everything on the government. But on the other hand, they litigate, they petition and they complain. Perhaps they are the most litigious and cantankerous people in the whole Sudan".(Dafalla, 1975, p.145).

This situation, and the general features and characteristics of the ordinary Nubians at their old home, can be partly explained by the fact that they are all related to each other, and no foreign element settled among them; however, at the new home, new Halfa, the presence of 'strangers' is an inevitable reality, consequently, the fear of 'strangers' who are generally conceived by Halfawiyyin as alien and more violent, among other reasons, stands as one of the main reasons behind the on-going process of Halfawiyyin migration from the scheme, as the interviews explained.

Most of the literature presents Nubians as an ethnic category further subdivided into various groups, i.e. Fadija, Kenuz, Danagla, and Mahas. However, the bulk of that information comes from those who studied Egyptian Nubians. Sondra Hale (1982) showed that for Sudan the categories of Nubian self-identification are different. She further proposed that, under threat (the relocation), a new urban “Nubian” category emerged, with a flow

60 of personnel across the boundaries. Before the period of relocation Nubians had not conceived of themselves as one ethnic group, i.e. Nubians. Even more revealing, before the threat of displacement, no Nubian referred to himself as a “Halfawi.” The term was not an ethnic group designation before the inundation of Wadi Halfa and the area around. “Halfawiyyin” emerged as the dominant sub-group designation among Khartoum Nubians. “Nubian” as an all-inclusive term now has meaning for Halfawiyyin only. Mahas/Sukkot, Kenuz, and Danagla use that self-designation only when it is in relationship to “others”, i.e. non-Nubians (Hale, 1982, p261).

Although the people of Nubia usually identify themselves as Nubians, there are basic linguistic and ethnic differences. In Nubia there were three linguistic groups, each inhabiting a separate part of the region: the Kenuze group, who occupied the territory from Aswan south along the Nile for a distance of nearly 150 kilometers and speak a dialect called Metouki; The Arabs, who previously settled in communities along the next 40 kilometers to the south and speak Arabic; and the Fedija, who lived along 130 kilometers of the Nile in the southern extremity of Egyptian Nubia and speak Mahas.

The Sudanese Nubians, especially the Halfawiyyin, originally resided in Wadi Halfa district, a region extending from about 170 kilometers along the Nile between the Egyptian border in the North and the Dal Cataracts, Sudan, in the south. The Halfawiyyin have their own language, known as Sukkot, and Arabic is used as a second language, mainly for communication with non-Halfawiyyin/Mahas/Sukkot groups. The Halfawiyyin previously inhabited a very narrow valley with desert on both sides that sometimes

61 extended to the edge of the river. The climate was dry with no rainfall, but the Nile, date trees, gracious mud houses, and sand were all physical elements that were unique and desirable to the Halfawiyyin. Furthermore, ancient civilizations had made this area one the most important communities in the Sudan. The visitor to this area "was often overwhelmed by its archeological wealth in ancient temples, forts, vaults, churches and mosques. (Fahim, 1983, p10).

The difference in the relationship of the British colonialists to Sudanese and Egyptian Nubians contributed to differences in status of Nubians in the two countries. Nubians in Egypt remained a minority group of a lowly status, forming a racially conspicuous urban proletariat in the towns of Egypt. In contrast, Sudanese Nubians, although also occupying many of the same types of urban jobs as Egyptian Nubians, rose in the economic and status hierarchy of Sudan, (Hale, 1982, p92).

The economy and community: Nubia was poor country in the economic sense and in terms of resources. Nubia lived basically on what this portion of the Nile, namely the Nubian valley, could provide. The rise and fall of the water level regulated the annual cycle of subsistence economy. (Fahim, 1983, p12). Historically, these Nubians had been sedentary agriculturalists along a narrow strip of Nile littoral, cultivating dates, wheat, vegetables, and legumes, but not fishing. Commerce was an early thriving activity, with Nubians offering many services connected with trade, as well as entering into many forms of trade themselves, including the slave trade (Hale, 1982, p125).

Realizing the narrow limits of their land, the Nubian had to apply a straight agricultural economy-i.e. cultivating rotations without leaving any fallow-to get the best and biggest crops. They tapped and laboured the productivity of the soil so carefully that they never left an inch of fallow land in their three successive rotations (they used to use duraa (arm) in measuring the agricultural lands). Their agricultural cycle involved three working seasons; the winter crop (shitwi), the summer crop (seifi), and the flood cultivation (dameira), of these, the winter rotation was the most important in the agricultural life of the Nubians, in which the main subsistence crops were sown (wheat) in addition to some cash crops, such as peas and lentils. Paradoxically, winter rotation, mainly wheat was completely lost as a result of irrigation water shortage in the new Halfa scheme.

An outstanding aspect of the old Nubian society was the effect of the individual and group emigration of the middle-aged and able-bodied men from the country (Dafalla, 1975, p53). As a result of limited arable lands and dependency on the water level in this part of the Nile Valley, labour migration became a means of coping with the finite economic resources in Nubia. Agriculture was then the basis of the indigenous economy. Vegetables were cultivated on a very small scale and fruits were scarce. Domesticated animals such as sheep, goats and cattle were reared as a source of meat, milk and hides, and also as a major local source of cash income, date palms were the backbone of their local economy, the only reliable source of cash return, and indeed the only sign of wealth.

Labour migration had several effects on the structure and function of Nubian society and particularly on its demographic composition. It resulted in a population that was made up mostly of women, old men, and children. The migration of the able-bodied men resulted in a high proportion of working women in Nubia. Nubian woman had to shoulder all the domestic responsibilities, so women cultivated the small plots of land and supervised the harvest. They pollinated the date trees in season, and harvesting and marketing the produce. Moreover, they maintained and repaired their houses and looked after the livestock (Dafalla, 1975, p54), Labour migration had split families and created communities where females outnumbered males. The outcome was quite Nubian villages dependent on cash remittances and patiently awaiting the return of absent men.

However, at the new Halfa scheme, Nubian women are more active in the field of agriculture compared to men, but their presence in the fields is highly restricted to the near by farms, partially as a result of the presence of strangers. In case where women could not farm, the land was usually left under the care of a relative or a friend. The matter lately-at the New Halfa scheme developed to "wakil" institution and sharecropping arrangements. Sharecropping developed as a result of labour migration and constituted a basic element in the agrarian structure of the Nubian community. Nubians have drawn upon the old system of sharecropping to solve the problems of maintaining the land while continuing to pursue their jobs and professions in the cities. Now it is primarily the economic interest that binds the relationship and affects the Nubian motivation to maintain the land. This factor demonstrates a Nubian out-migration from the resettlement area and it

64 indicates that the Nubians, mostly from the northern villages, Argin and Dibera for example, have not adjusted to the role of settled farmers.

The general lack of motivation to farm did not mean that Nubians lost interest in land ownership; they were interested in owing land as investment and as an access to status. But agricultural work has never appealed to them. City life appealed to Nubians so much so that some families sent their boys to the cities regardless of economic difficulties because they considered it the proper training for better future work (i.e. the case of Halfawiyyin at al- Kalakla al-lafa market).

The Nubians' love of homeland and pride in their character and community make them, when away from their home villages, stick together and help each others. In cities, several Nubian associations have been established on both regional and ethnic basis, (Nubian club in Khartoum, and several others). Membership is open and encouraged for all Nubians regardless of their linguistic or ethnic background. While the Nubian associations have traditionally provided a place for gathering and entertainment, they also performed social, cultural and economic duties, such in cases of death and marriage, provision and construction of schools, health centers, water tanks and so forth. These associations and clubs serve as channels of communication between Nubians at home and those at work in cities. Nubians who chose to settle permanently in cities continue to be concerned about news of their original homeland in general and their villages in particular, they also render services for newcomers to the city and help them to find jobs and settle down.

In addition to this cohesive community spirit, Nubians have an unmistakable sense of history and originality. They also say that the word Nubia, which means" the land of gold", reflects the richness of their land and the role it played in the formation of ancient lavish civilization.

The effects of the dams Two dams were erected across the River Nile south of Aswan, the people who were most affected had always been the Nubians; in 1898 the dam was under construction and was finished in 1902.elevated in 1912 and again in 1933. Slowly Nubia was eaten away, at first only Egyptian Nubia. For Sudanese Nubia, especially in the area around Wadi Halfa, the climax was the building of the High Dam at Aswan, based on the 1959 Nile water agreement between Egypt and Sudan. Yet the effects of the last dam, i.e., the Aswan High Dam, can not be compared to those of the old one, known as the Aswan Dam or Reservoir, while the impact of the first dam was relatively limited in terms of the amount of land inundated, the second dam's effect was total, flooding all Nubian lands within the Egyptian territory and nearly one-third of the Sudanese Nubian valley. All Egyptian Nubians and those Sudanese affected by the new lake (fifty thousand people on each side) had no alternative but to leave their homeland. (Fahim, 1983, p30).

The two Nubian groups, in Egypt and Sudan, to whom the border dividing the Nubian Valley into two halves was a political line rather than a cultural boundary became separated and experienced totally new lives under different resettlement schemes. Egyptian Nubians were relocated in the Kom Ombo region, a new site still in the Aswan region, while the Sudanese

Nubians, namely the Halfawiyyin, were taken to an area about eight hundred kilometers away from their homeland and situated in a rather unfamiliar climatic, ecological, and cultural environment. This is the Khashm el-Girba area, in Kassala province (now Kassala State) near the Sudanese –Ethiopian border.

The Nubians have always felt that the two Aswan dams drastically upset their traditional life and placed them, against their will, in an unfamiliar and uncertain existence. Following the construction of the first dam and its subsequent raisings, Nubians, especially those whose lands were inundated- perceived themselves as victims of the dam and eventually became inflicted people, or mankoubeen, in their own term. (Fahim, 1983, p31). The Aswan High Dam intensified that perception and extended it to other Nubian groups. It caused them suffer from depression and grief, especially experienced among the elderly. As an educated Egyptian Nubian provided a diagnosis for such common feelings when he stated that his fellow Nubians suffered from what he termed "a dam complex." According to him, the first dam forced Egyptian Nubians to leave their "beloved" land and seek work in the "unfriendly" cities where they never felt at home; but the second dam was a total curse which ended a life-style that satisfied their basic needs and gave them peace and happiness.(Fahim,1983,p31). However, some sociologists, frees the dam from the responsibility placed on it by the Nubians and suggests that they have built what he calls" the myth of a dam," which functioned as an adaptive mechanism for the conflicting feelings of their love and attachment to their native land and the necessity throughout their history to seek work in the cities. Geiser( in Fahim,1983,p29) argues that there is historical evidence indicating that labour migration, as a

67 mechanism to cope with limited resources, had existed among the Nubians long before the construction of the first Aswan dam. The first dam, however, increased its scale and forced many Nubian families to settle permanently in cities or leave Nubia in groups and establish new communities in the rural areas of the Aswan region. In addition, writers are skeptical regarding the amount of truth in the feelings expressed by the Nubians relative to their native land, and believe they are presenting an exaggerated form of grief over their loss. (Fahim., 1983, p31).

The archeologist Rex Keating is one of those who feel that attachment to a native land is natural, but find it difficult to explain why it is particularly strong among the Nubians. Their land, he writes," offers nothing of wealth, little comfort, so poor was it in economic resources, in particular , arable land, that they were compelled to pass a large part of their working life in cities in order to support their families at home in Nubia," yet, he also writes, " always with advancing years, they would abandon the attraction of the big cities, Cairo, Alexandria, and Khartoum, where most of them work, to seek the simplicity of their homeland (Fahim, 1983,p32). However, the proposed new dam at Kajbar area, in the heart of the Nubian land- the Mahas- irrespective of its developmental feasibility, is going to deepen such "a complex", and eventually, inundating the remaining part of Nubia and the other still standing sites of archaeological symbols of the ancient Nubian civilization, raising serious questions about the political conspiracy against the Nubians.

Cultural implication and coping strategies: Externally imposed, sudden and pervasive changes, as in relocation projects, produce considerable disruptions; and the social impact is usually enormous due to the large number of people who are relocated and the accompanying scope of the change. With resettlement, the centuries- long-life style of the Nubians changed drastically. The shift from isolated and dispersed communities threatened numerous traditions, especially those related to village and family life. There were also significant changes in land use and farming practices, problems of food supply and distribution, consolidation of people into larger and denser villages, and greater accessibility to social services and education- all of which paved the way for cultural upheaval (Fahim 1983:49).

Scudder found that relocatees tend to cling to the familiar, changing no more than is necessary (scudder 1973). This rather tradition-based behavioural response often occurs during a transitional period of multidimensional stress, which Scudder described as including physiological, psychological, and sociocultural aspects. This state of inevitable stress can be expected to diminish only when the displaced people "regain their former self- sufficiency and develop a satisfactory relationship with their environment"(Scudder 1973).

Accordingly, many Nubians at the New Halfa Scheme for historical and cultural reasons are neither eager nor willing to work their land, Nubians prefer to be landlords rather than tenants and others have to cultivate their lands, while a resident family members or relative managed the land for the absent owner. Their attitude is generally far away form agriculture, and their

69 future dreams for their children also linked to high salary-jobs in cities and even abroad. Hence, such attitude toward land cultivation has greatly hindered agricultural policy because many Nubians are not doing their own farming or are unable to produce as much as anticipated. Thus, this in part explains the phenomena of high absentee rate among Nubian tenants in the scheme, and the weak and steady decline of production and productivity in the scheme.

The Nubians have not been able to conform to the agricultural structure that involved total intervention on the part of the government. The changes have come too quickly and without adequate consideration for the Nubians' aspirations or their motivations for achievement, as the interviews revealed that nearly most of them wanted their children to have the opportunities for a better education and to aspire to the higher professions. One of the factors, and consequences, strengthening this attitude is the disappointing agricultural situation at the New Halfa scheme. They do not feel, since the beginning, the sense of belonging, attachment, and commitment to the scheme. And no longer do they desire to rise socially or economically through agriculture, and the consequences have been extremely costly, not only to the Nubians, but to the government as well. Nubians, however, had previously managed their lives in away that provided for the cultivation of land but did not specify that the owners have to cultivate it themselves.

Related to the effects of differing attitudes to wards agricultural development is the problem of ineffective communication and misunderstanding, in the part of both, NHAC officials and the Nubians farmers, government officials, their numbers was seriously reduced due to

70 the last detachment for the general good and liberalization policies, in addition to the on-going lack of machines, vehicle and technical problems, where as, on the other hands, the still settled Nubians are generally lack interest in cultivation under such generally deteriorating situations in the scheme.

Differing assumptions and expectations have also contributed to the complexity of confrontation between administrators and Nubian settlers. One important administrative assumption implicitly underlying development plans was that the Nubians would do what any other farmers would have done in a similar situation, while the Nubians have a different experience of and attitude toward farming. At the one end, the administrators have national objectives in mind; and at the other, settlers are more locally oriented in their outlook.

The basic problem, however, is neither the amount of cultivable land nor its productivity, but rather the Nubians' traditional orientation toward city work. Emigration would be expected to continue from the New Halfa scheme, this conclusion was perceived from what many Nubians stated, especially in the village No. 5, Argin, during the interviews.." we lost the hope for this land, we have the money, but we are psychologically get tired, we lost security among those strangers ". By the word “strangers” they mainly denote to the agricultural labourers, the people of western Sudan origins. . The continuing migration from the New Halfa scheme extends beyond Khartoum, into the oil-producing countries of Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Europe and the United Estates. The trend toward work abroad is

71 growing also due to the increased tendency among the Nubians to educate their sons (as the interviews revealed). This has proven to be an investment in the future. Hence, we can assure that Nubians at the New Halfa have not yet adjusted; they lost feeling of security in the presence of considerable numbers of "strangers", mainly the "Gharraba".

If after four decades or more since resettlement, Nubians have not felt "at home", secure, and settled in the scheme, and want to move out; this indicates examples of unsuccessful adaptation in the new environment, they are most likely to feel as "strangers in a foreign land" or "temporary settlers."

The Social costs “Good intentions are not enough to ease the suffering of people, and big promises cannot help toward making a decent living; resettlement is not only a complex technical endeavor, but also a serious human issue and a challenging task”(Fahim,1983,p5).

Whatever the reasons for and the extent of community displacement may be, uprooting or resettling people is a dramatic human event that creates stress, produces stress reaction, and requires the use of strategies to cope with a wide range of pressures. While all changes require use of coping strategies, forced migration or resettlement constitutes an abrupt form of social change. It is disruptive, occasionally tragic, and in many cases generates irreversible problems.

The most recent and perhaps most striking case of uprooting and resettlement of entire communities involving large numbers of people are those associated with the construction of hydroelectric projects for water and land development purposes. A case in point is the displacement of approximately one hundred thousands Nubians in Egypt and the Sudan in connection with the construction of the Aswan High Dam (Fahim, 1983, p viii).

Nubian relocation may be looked upon as a social cost of the Aswan High Dam; the Sudanese Nubians view their relocation as a setback, both socially and culturally. One of the negative aspects for the Halfawiyyin, who were resettled at the New Halfa, is generally the deteriorating economic, educational and health situation; according to Hassan Dafalla, the Nubians at Wadi Halfa district was enjoying a high wealth position compared to their Sudanese counterparts, he continued, "the table dealing with literacy revealed that the area enjoyed a higher level than any other part of the whole Sudan"(Dafalla, 1975, p99).

The fact that resettlement usually implies a social cost to the relocatees has been well perceived by planners, and provisions have been included for a fair compensation. Social cost in resettlement a scheme is not, however, an absolute; its magnitude varies with each scheme, depending on the degree of behaviour modification and adaptation required in a new environment. In these terms, the social cost among the Sudanese Nubians has been much greater than that among Egyptian Nubians. In some cases, resettlement should cause a relatively small amount of stress and, by extension, should incur less social cost than other schemes that necessitate a move to an

73 entirely different habitat and a life under completely different social and economic conditions.

Fahim suggested that the notion of social cost be toned down and, instead, that the resettlement administration emphasizes the social benefits resettlement has brought about. Otherwise, the implementation of the resettlement plan may be hindered by further demands by the relocatees, who present their agreement to relocate as an act of sacrifice and patriotism. It is important that resettlement administrations and agencies have to make it quite clear to the relocatees that compensation for their social cost is not an endless matter. Of course displacement causes a lot suffering, but the point is that people differ in their attitude and responses to relocation, and there are also variations regarding the intensity and duration of stress and suffering which in any case happen (Scudder, 2006). Compensation policies are relative and situational and should not be viewed as standard measure in all cases. Fahim recommended that the resettlement administration might better stress at what stage the plan has paid its dues and try to orient the relocatees toward a more participatory role in coping with displacement and autonomously developing viable communities. One condition, though, would have to be that resettlement plan is implemented as designed and on schedule; otherwise, the relocatees may never feel compensated and could possibly become dependent on the government.

Whatever the extent of social cost may be, they are likely to cause enormous suffering to the people who have to move. These people may benefit in the long run if they survived, but it is essential to be aware what the impact will be along different stages in the process of relocation. Whatever the extent of

74 social cost may be, they are likely to cause enormous suffering to the people who have to move. These people may benefit in the long run if they survived, but it is essential to be aware what the impact will be along different stages in the process of relocation, as in the case of Halfawiyyin.

Notes:

1. Dafalla, Hassan. 1975. The Nubian exodus. Khartoum university press 2. Fahim, M Hussein. 1983. Egyptian Nubians: Resettlement and years of coping. University of Utah press. Salt Lake City. 3. Scudder, Thayer. 1973. The Human Ecology of Big Projects: River Basin Development, In Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol.2. 4. Scudder, Thayer. 2006. The future of large dams. Dealing with Social, Environmental and political costs, London. Sterling ,VA. 5. Sondra, D Hale. 1982. The Changing Ethnic Identity of Nubians in Urban Milieu: Khartoum, Sudan. Unpublished PhD. University of California, los Angeles

Chapter Four Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

Chapter Four: Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

1- Conceptual framework Like many other schemes in the Sudan, the New Halfa Agricultural Scheme has not had a very successful record (Sorbo, 1977, Fahim1983, and Murdock, 1989). Production and income are low; absenteeism is high; there are repeated shortages of vehicles and fuel; lack of agricultural credit, pests and weeds problems, needed seeds, fertilizers and pesticides rarely arrive on time; and, over time sedimentation in the reservoir has resulted in reduced capacity to store water.

The poor economic performance of the scheme and of many similar schemes in the Sudan is at least in part attributable to the exclusion of local participation and the denial of considerable talent and expertise found among the farmers. However, in view of the fact that farmers in these schemes have to produce such crops (cotton, wheat and groundnuts) as cash crops, it is then natural to expect losses in the long-run, due to the fact that these crops are subject to the international market prices, especially after the last economic liberalization policies, and the subsequent withdrawal of government subsidies, Farmers who use to produce crops under such low level of production technology (compared to abroad, for example) and expensive foreign inputs (agricultural machineries, pesticides, fertilizers, herbicides, etc), can not avoid the international terms of trade which will ever bee working against them, even for other crops, wheat, sorghum and whatever planned to be produced in the future, definitely, will face the same fate, due to the simple fact that the prices of the locally produced crops and commodities exceeds the prices of the same commodities when imported;

78 the experience of wheat production in Sudan during the last decade is a case in point.

The whole “package” of the large-scale irrigation, which is a capital intensive technology, completely dependent on foreign components that have to be, and conceived to be easily been “Domesticated” to suit to local systems of organizations and production; unfortunately, such imposed “package” often supposed to be more advanced, and hence, a highly efficient mean of production that will eventually alter life of targeted people to something better than before; however, the New Halfa scheme experience; and the other similar examples from Sudan and other parts of the developing world; deny such superficial proposition. Such "package" does not work effectively when applied partially, i.e. selectively and only in certain aspects. It should be applied as whole, with all of is components, (political, cultural and economic), or otherwise it yields a distorted pattern of outputs.

The present situation at the New Halfa Scheme can not be evaluated and understood in isolation from the general socioeconomic and political situations of the country as a whole, the disappointing economic records of the scheme and the ever deteriorating social services (health, education, drinking water, security, etc) partially explaining the present migration of Nubians off the scheme area. Rural-urban migration from other cities, villages and regions of the Sudan towards the capital, Khartoum, becomes a basic and recognizable trend especially during the last few decades, due to the concentration of services and other modern means of living in the Capital, on the one hand, and the nonexistence and generally deteriorating situation of such services at the other parts of the country, and its high cost,

79 if any exists, on the other hand. Which in some cases, led to rebel movements and direct military actions (Darfur, Eastern Sudan); this is mainly because of the growing feeling of marginalization and disappointment by the people of the peripheries. This does not mean the lack of political will or economic plans to improve the lives of people of the peripheries by the successive national governments of the Sudan, the scattered and limited efforts were and do exist, however, normally and so often seems as if regenerating, recycling and even intensifying the same models used to be adopted since the colonial time, more incorporation into the international capitalist economy, and the resultant distorted economies at the peripheries.

The outcome of such models is the creation of dependent pockets of fallacious economically developed areas, whether in the industrial, agricultural or civic sectors of the economy; or how can we be able to describe the situation of the Halfawiyyin people at the New Halfa scheme, for example, who are now experiencing a new migration after 40 years of resettlement, who resorted to remember the 'glorious past days of the scheme', when production was abundant, their stores were filled with sacks of wheat and groundnuts, and their pockets full with money. This situation, about which people narrated, is the very early days of the scheme, when the land of the scheme was virgin and highly productive, around the full agricultural rotation was cropped, government subsidizes the farmers, and above all, services were far better compared to what they accustomed to in their old home.

Khartoum remained the main refuge for Nubians in general and Halfawiyyin from Khashm el- Girba in particular, at which, Halfawiyyin never felt at home; and often recognize their settlement there as temporary. There is a gap between two rationales or two perceptions of the land. The planners’ land perception focuses on productivity and profitability, whereas the settlers’ land perception encompasses a wide range of social, cultural and religious elements as well as the productive factor. As long as this gap persists, ‘the challenge of “solving” the resettlement dilemma can only grow’. Under these conditions, land-based development programmes will never satisfy the resettled population’s need and wants. Impoverishment and marginalization will ensue (Sorbo, 1977, Fahim1983, and Murdock, 1989). Nubians have been known for their “absenteeism” earnings, historically, for example, they have been owners of the land in pursuit of incomes from elsewhere, which had made them absentee landlords of agricultural land of the New Halfa.

The rate of out-migration from their old home-Wadi Halfa- is one of the highest in the world, and perhaps one of the earliest (Hale, 1982, p277), even before the building of the Aswan dam Nubian males left Nubia in large numbers, however, such migration should be looked upon as a separate force in their life, not necessary related to merely economic reasons. The dynamics of such migration can partially be explained as natural expression of the Halfawiyyin urban culture, something quite different from the conceived stereotyped picture of rural cultivators by the planners and administrators of the scheme, who expected that the resettled Halfawiyyin will react as rural producers, not nearly urban consumers as was revealed later.

Being among the first educated in a western mode, Nubians, particularly Halfawiyyin, were equipped to move into many middle and higher range positions in education and government. Nubians moved into these positions as teachers and other civil servants in education, for example- by being the best trained when the British began to recruit "locals" for such posts, They are the better educated, hold the largest number of white-collar jobs, and are “cosmopolitan” and urban in their outlook, on the average, they are better off in their old home than the rest of the country, whose area was richer than most of the Sudan, also the level of literacy is, indeed the highest in the Sudan, ironically, what is strange enough is the fact that some of those who are born at the new scheme, despite the supposed advanced level of services, are illiterate, and the school-dropout rates, is high as the fieldwork revealed. Such state of affairs inside the scheme, i.e. economic hardships, accumulation of debts on both tenants and the Corporation, collapse of services especially at the villages of Halfawiyyin resettlement, accompanied by an ongoing process of social differentiation among the Nubian inhabitants, where some well-off individuals and families with other sources of income, generated from outside the agricultural activity, only able to persist and even to reinvest part of their wealth in cultivating an unlimited number of tenancies and freehold lands via rent; this investment is not regular and highly subject to the availability of good, well-watered plot of lands, and mainly cultivates either sorghum or groundnuts or both, therefore, they preserve, and even able to farther improve their livelihood. On the other hand, a large number of poor families can not even be able to cultivate their hawasha for different reasons such as financial inability, land cancellation by the Corporation, or simply the unwillingness to cultivate. Unfortunately,

82 it is those who are engaged in agriculture from the beginning of the scheme, and are more or less depending on cultivation since the time at Old Halfa, are now subject to further impoverishment inside the scheme, hence making all the effort to escape suffering. The gap between these two categories seems persisting, and ever growing over time.

Therefore, the migration of Nubians off the New Halfa scheme seems to be a natural process, taking into account the urbanite nature of the Nubians, the present economic misfortune of the scheme, and the dichotomized character of the Butana regional economy, these, in addition to the oil-exploration national economic plans, political unrest, and the increasing political and economic pressures imposed by the international community upon the present regime in power to enforce serious steps towards peace realization. The observation made by Sondra Hale, 25 years ago, seems still valid: "the presence of Nubians in towns is a result of rational economic choice and in that sense the decision to remain settled there may be viewed as inevitable. But, as it is expected, they have distributed themselves disproportionately among towns throughout the country. Their migration has been spatially selective, favoring nearer rather than farther towns and multifunctional rather than agriculturally- dominated towns. The Nubian urban presence is impressive when attention is directed to those urban centers which are large, easily accessible from Nubia…and then (Khashm el-Girba), and rich in urban functions" (Hale, 1982, p184); with the only exception that the recent migration is mainly from the New Halfa Scheme, directly towards the Capital, Khartoum, and involved migration of individuals as well as whole families seeking final residence at the fringes of the southeastern neighborhoods of Khartoum.

To break through such "poverty- trap" generating model of modernization, the scheme should be either fully privatized, otherwise the government must highly subsidize farmers and agricultural production in the scheme. The two alternatives, however, seem to be unworkable under the present economic and political situation of the country, taking into consideration the other external factors at the regional and the international levels, nevertheless, the solution of the problems of the new Halfa scheme can only be seen as part in the general framework of Sudan agriculture in general, and the other similar irrigated schemes of the country in particular.

Theories of the resettlement process

(1) Cost-benefit analysis The primary goal of any involuntary resettlement process is to prevent impoverishment and to improve the livelihood of resettlers. (Cernea, 1999, p6). Involuntary resettlers are those uprooted by development- inducing programmes, such as infrastructure construction for industrial estates, dams and reservoirs, highways, ports and airports, and urban transportation networks. They typically remain inside national borders (Cernea, 2000, p1).such programmes are indisputably needed. They improve many people’s lives, provide employment and supply better services. But the involuntary displacements caused by such programmes also create major impositions on some population segments. They restrict the population’s rights by state- power intervention and are often carried out in ways that cause the affected populations to end up worse off. This raises major issues of social justice and equity. The principle of the “greater good for the larger numbers,”

84 routinely invoked to rationalize forced displacements, is, in fact, often abused and turned into an unwarranted justification for tolerating ills that are avoidable. The outcome is an unjustifiable repartition of development’s costs and benefits: some people enjoy the gains of development, while others bear its pains. (Cernea, 2000, p2). The most widespread effect of involuntary displacement is the impoverishment of considerable numbers of people.

The conventional wisdom, still strong among settlement planners and administrators, is that settlers are drawn primarily from traditional-rural agrarian societies that are conservative and therefore must be carefully supervised and led. Involuntary resettlement components are included in certain development projects not by choice but by necessity. They are supposed to be included only after all possible alternatives to avoid and minimize displacement that have been examined. Since the projects that involve displacement are a special category of complex projects, they should undertake a special economic and financial analysis for the displacement, an analysis distinct from the outdated cost-benefit analysis.

Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) estimates and totals up the equivalent money value of the benefits and costs to the community of projects to establish whether they are worthwhile. These projects may be dams and highways or can be training programs and health care systems. One of the problems of CBA is that the computation of many components of benefits and costs is intuitively obvious but that there are others for which intuition fails to suggest methods of measurement. Therefore, some basic principles are needed as a guide.

In order to reach a conclusion as to the desirability of a project all aspects of the project, positive and negative, must be expressed in terms of a common unit; i.e., there must be a "bottom line." The most convenient common unit is money. This means that all benefits and costs of a project should be measured in terms of their equivalent money value. A program may provide benefits which are not directly expressed in terms of money, but there is some amount of money the recipients of the benefits would consider just as good as the project's benefits.

A project may also have external benefits and costs. These are the good things and the bad things that result from the project and are imposed upon society rather than resulting from market transactions. Cost and benefits must be calculated distinctly for each vulnerable group and beneficiary group, not across all population on the whole project (Cernea 1999.p.20). Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) justifies a project economically when the sum of projects benefits outweighs the sum of project costs. But CBA overlooks distribution patterns- distribution of both costs and benefits. It does not ask who is paying the costs, who specifically is getting the benefits, or who is losing. It only assesses the “total” effect of the project design to determine how it stacks up relative to other investment alternatives (Cernea, 1999.p20). The concept of “social costs", is often misunderstood as referring only to the nonmeasurable costs. In fact, “social” costs define the project costs that are left to accrue to the society outside the project, as opposed to the projects direct internal costs (labour, materials, equipment, and so forth). But social costs are fully project costs in that they would not accrue without the project. Many of them are measurable. These “external” or “societal” costs

86 include (but are not limited to) all that is lost by the forcibly displaced: land, houses, trees, crops, jobs, productive time, cultural assets, common property goods, shrines and places of prayer, burial grounds, and access to social services (Cernea, 1999.p20).

However, even at such mere economic level of cost-benefit calculation, the New Halfa Scheme, in the sight of both tenants and administrators is no longer a justifiable enterprise, as debts accumulated on both parties and transferred from year to year, production and productivity seeing clear downward trend, and the overall performance of the scheme is highly unsatisfactory. And if we add the other "Unmeasurable" costs of the scheme, such as the lost land with all of its psychological, cultural, and religious meanings, and the uncertainty under which people, especially Nubians, in the scheme lived now, who have yet to bear many of the hidden social costs, i.e. loss of identity, then such superficial cost-benefit model will be of nil value.

Relying on cost-benefit analysis is also methodologically questionable, not only from a social perspective, but also from a market perspective. A market transaction is based on free exchange between a willing seller and a willing buyer, where resettlement is involuntary; it imposes administrative acquirement of possessions. Nor is resettlement a marginal market voluntary decision for those affected: on the contrary, it imposes a total life change (Cernea, 1999.p21).

Since the early 1960s the study of the resettlement process has become a field with many practitioners, as well as one with substantial body of theory

87 that focuses on two broad theoretical frameworks or models. Both deal with development-induced involuntary resettlement associated with dams as well as with other types of situation (Scudder 2006:31), and both of them trying to answering the question that: why forced resettlement so often goes wrong, and end up leaving the resettled people economically, socially and psychologically worse off than before? The first was Scudder four-stage framework that theorized on how the majority of resettlers can be expected to behave during a successful resettlement process (Scudder &Colson, 1982). Its application was restricted to development-induced involuntary community resettlement and to land settlement schemes involving volunteer households. The second was Cornea’s ‘impoverishment risks and reconstruction model’, followed in the 1990s. It dealt more broadly with the impoverishment risks that accompany involuntary resettlement, and with corrective reconstruction procedures.

(2) The four-stage framework The four-stage framework was developed by Scudder first to deal exclusively with a successful process of involuntary resettlement in connection with dam construction, with success simply defined as development that is environmentally, economically, institutionally and culturally sustainable into the second generation.

The four-stage framework is behavioural. It focuses on how a majority of resettlers can be expected to behave if sufficient opportunities are available for them to become project beneficiaries. It is also predictive. Drawing on case materials, it attempts to explain why resettlers are the key resource for

88 achieving a positive outcome. And that the government policies and the activities of project authorities have been the main factors constraining a successful resettlement process (Scudder, 2006, p32). It is a general theory based on the hypothesis that the majority of resettlers throughout the world respond in the same way to dam resettlement irrespective of differences in geography, culture and the organization of the project authority, and how the majority of resettlers will respond to different phases in the resettlement process when well-planned opportunities are implemented.

The first stage: Planning and Recruitment stage. This stage deals with the pre-resettlement period. Due to emphasis on success, special attention should be paid to the early involvement of affected people in the planning and decision-making process. It is assumed that the anxiety of the majority increases as the time of their removal draws closer, although it is also assumed that increased involvement in the planning process will lessen, but not eliminate, the stress reflected by such concern. Special consideration must also be paid to development opportunities for enabling resettlers and hosts to contribute to the stream of project benefits as beneficiaries (Scudder 2006:34). resettlers recruitment should be linked to considerations such as the type of production system, the type of community, and the type of society desired, so as to acquire both farm and nonfarm families with the necessary capacity and orientation, experience and skills.

More consideration to the needs of the main risk-takers would help deemphasize agricultural production as an end in itself and focus instead on

89 the income-generating activities and the net income levels needed to encourage both greater settler initiative in agricultural production and employment generation through nonfarm enterprise development. Settlement project design should build in ways for the settlers to adjust the plan: for example, carrying out their own negotiations with the hosts, selecting from a variety of housing options, and so forth.

The second stage: Adjustment and Coping. Begins with the launch of physical removal, and may take several years if large numbers of resettlers are involved or if scheme construction is delayed. For the majority, it can be expected to last at least a year after the completion of physical removal. In reviewing 32 cases of voluntary and involuntary resettlement in the late 1970s, Scudder found only one where the length of Stage 2 was less than three years following removal (and that was two years) while 11 cases were between five and ten years and 15 cases were over ten years. In over half of these cases, for many elderly people, Stage 2 would end only with their death. Stage 2, also labelled as a ‘the transition stage', means the transition from one habitat to another and to emphasize its temporary nature if the next stage is to arrive According to Scudder, Stage 2 has two important identifying characteristics. One is that the living standards of the majority can be expected to drop following the completion of physical removal. The other is the inclination of the majority of resettlers to behave conservatively, i.e. to be risk averse, they favour incremental change over transformation change, the majority in most cases behave as if their way of life was indeed constrained within a closed system. The general approach is to try to recreate the security formerly

90 provided by familiar structures, institutions and symbols. Examples include replicating former house types; transferring crops and productive techniques regardless of their relevance to the new habitat; and relocating in social units of resettlers’ own choice, include extended kin groups, residential units within communities, and entire communities as well as networks of communities linked by marriage, ritual or other ties.

Expenses may also rise at this stage. Agrarian societies cultivating fertile riverine alluvial, for example, frequently are moved to less fertile lands that require such purchased inputs as chemical fertilizers if yields are to replicate pre-resettlement conditions. Extra funds may also be required to purchase formerly available that are not available in new resettlement areas. With such conservative nature of resettlers at this stage, it is unreasonable for policy makers to expect rapid development during Stage 2 (Scudder 1981, p13). Because settler are especially vulnerable during this stage to a wide range of illnesses owing to contact with new diseases, stress, health services are especially important. Schools are equally important because settlers usually invest first in their children's education. Other development activities are also necessary during this stage such as extension services, credit facilities, marketing services and building up of settlers’ participatory action organizations.

The third stage: Community Formation and Economic Development. At its beginning, resettle’s behaviour changes from a risk-averse position to a risk-taking position. At the same time wealth differentials and social stratification

91 increase. Changes associated with Stage 3 are only possible under two sets of conditions. The first requires resettlers to change their behaviour radically. The second requires development opportunities into which settler initiative can be channeled; and appropriate infrastructure, such as roads and service and marketing centers. Opportunities must be sustainable; otherwise, constraints such as environmental degradation, political strife and inappropriate government policies can counter innovative behaviour and, at worst, cause the initial transition into Stage 3 to be followed by increasing impoverishment.

Settlers must first come to feel 'at home' in their new physical and biotic environment and with the host population, and the regaining of household self-sufficiency in foodstuffs, a shift toward risk-taking is the main feature of this stage, resettlers also begin to pay more attention to community formation activities such as forming of farmers' unions, water user associations, cooperatives, and rural and municipal councils.

Growing initiatives to improve community services on a self-help basis. Re- emergence of old political leaders and the rise of new ones who are now able to advance resettler interests with the scheme and government authorities, and with the host population, is another indicator for this stage. However, appropriate development opportunities are essential not just for raising living standards but also for minimizing the dependency syndrome and ‘complaints culture’ of resettlers. But some dependency and complaints are to be expected. After all, resettlers are being uprooted against their will and need assistance with compensation for assets lost and with development opportunities if living standards are to be raised (Scudder 2006, p38).

When opportunities are available, it is interesting that resettlers around the world tend to follow the same development strategies. Once self-reliance is reached in production of food staple, the trend is to diversify economic activities and investment in farming and non-farming activities. As living standards improve, resettlers worldwide also tend to improve their living arrangements and consumption in similar ways. During this stage, careful government monitoring and intervention can help identify and offset difficulties which, if permitted to continue, might cause the project to regress into a subsistence mode of production.

The fourth stage: Handing over and Incorporation involves the second generation of resettlers. It brings the resettlement process to a successful end as project areas and populations are integrated into the political economy of a region or nation. Three conditions must be met،The first condition is a handing over process whereby specialized project agencies hand over assets to settlers institutions; to line ministries dealing with agriculture, education, public health and other routine government responsibilities; to the private sector; and to private voluntary organizations. In this way, successful handing over is the culmination of a planning process which has been directed toward this goal since the inception of the project. However, handing over can be a difficult and complicated process due to authoritarian attitude of officials of settlement administrations who may resist devolution of their authority or restrict it to certain assets.

The next two conditions relate directly to the second generation of resettlers. On the one hand, their living standards must continue to improve, and on the other hand, community members must have the institutional and political strength to compete for their fair share of national resources. In applying his model to evaluate the New Halfa scheme, Scudder consider that the Halfawiyyin successfully made the transition from Stage 2 to stage 3 by the early 1970s, but they failed to proceed through Stage 4, where by the 1979 due to reduction in water for irrigation and some other agricultural prerequisites.

However, in addition to the general weakness of the model which was initially developed to deal only with successful experiments, if any, but unlike what Scudder consider as successful transition from one stage to another in the case of the Nubians, what was conceived as achieved successes at the inception dates of the scheme, can be related only to the fact that the general socioeconomic and political situation of the country as whole at that time-the beginnings of the 1970s- was relatively stable, the international market of cotton and groundnuts was rewarding in the relative absence of modern industrial substitutes of cotton fiber, and oil- squeezing plants, the relative success of the New Halfa scheme at that time was the general feature of the other similar schemes in the Sudan, the Gezira Scheme for example.

The basic hypothesis of the model which is that resettlers throughout the world respond, or expected to behave in the same way to dam resettlement irrespective of differences in geography, culture, and the organization of project authority when well-planned opportunities are implemented, is seems

94 invalid to explain the situation of the resettlers at the New Halfa scheme, for example Nubians and Arabs tenants of the scheme respond differently to such well-planned opportunities. For the nomadic Arab groups of the Butana, who are basically dependent on livestock raising and rainfed cultivation of sorghum on their traditional taras, the scheme provide additional watering grounds and grazing areas for their animals, they made an opportunistic utilization of opportunities provided by the scheme, without adding more to help sustainability of such opportunities. However, the picture is different for the resettled Halfawiyyin who had to sacrifice their homeland for the benefit of the wider nation; their expectation of the scheme seems to be higher than what is actually realized. So the two groups resettled inside the scheme, with two different modes of life and cultural backgrounds, react differently to the newly available opportunities, even among the Nubian group, only few numbers of families and individuals benefited from the scheme, those who are better-off since the early home days , therefore, the model appears to be of 'limited value in the Sudanese context ' simply because there are so few, if any, cases there where dam- induced resettlement has raised, or even restored, the living standards of the majority. The model predictable component that resettlers will react similarly under given well-planned opportunities seems to be questionable. Nevertheless, the model major contribution is that it directs attention to how stressful forced resettlement is for people with strong ties to their home land, and on stressing that settlement and resettlement programmes have been among the least satisfactory type of development interventions. But it holds the same tone of the old fashion "modernization theory", and consequently, the same limitations and shortcomings, especially the insistence to replace all of what is vaguely termed 'local', 'native', and 'indigenous' systems by

95 external, mainly 'Western' modern systems in order to generate growth and development.

(3) Impoverishment risks and reconstruction model This approach, formulated by Cernea during the 1990s, also known as 'inadequate inputs' approach, is largely associated with the initiatives and politics of the World Bank, the model arguing that resettlement goes wrong principally because of a lack of the proper inputs: national legal frameworks and policies, political will, funding, pre-resettlement surveys, planning, consultation, careful implementation and monitoring. Lack of these inputs is what gives rise to what Michael Cernea has conceptualized as eight principal ´impoverishment risks` landlessness; joblessness; homelessness; marginalization; food insecurity; increased morbidity; loss of access to common property resources; and community disarticulation (Cernea 2000:pp20,22). He also defined the ways to counteract –eliminate or mitigate-these risks.

At the core of the model are three fundamental concepts: risk, impoverishment, and reconstruction. The sociological concept of risk is used to indicate the possibility that a certain course of action will trigger future injurious effects-loses and destruction. The concept of risk is posited as a counter-concept to security: the higher the risks, the lower the security of the displaced populations. Risks are often directly perceptible, and also measurable through science, as they are an objective reality.

The model suggests that preventing or overcoming the pattern of impoverishment would require risk reversal. This can be accomplished through targeted strategies, backed up by adequate financing. Turning the model on its head shows which strategies must be adopted and which directions should be taken: from landlessness to land-based resettlement, from joblessness to reemployment, from homelessness to house reconstruction, from marginalization to social inclusion, from increased morbidity to improved health care, from food insecurity to adequate nutrition, from lose of access to restoration of community assets and services, and from social disarticulation to networks and community rebuilding (Cernea 2000, p20).

This approach is, however, basically optimistic in a sense, as Cernea argues that ´the general risk pattern inherent in displacement can be controlled through a policy response that mandates and finances integrated problem resolution. Proper policy, political will and provision (particularly funding) can overcome the problem of inadequacy of inputs, and the impoverishment risks can then be turned into opportunities for reconstruction, such that resettlement becomes resettlement with development, leaving the resettled people better off than before (Cernea 2000:p35).

However, the approach is broadly economic and technical in character. Most of the impoverishment risks relate to economic resources, with Cernea emphasizing the importance of the risk to people’s livelihoods, and the centrality of reconstructing livelihoods. The key problems confronting resettlement are seen as essentially operationalizable- as problems that can be dealt with through the reform of policy and procedures, and the provision

97 of the necessary resources. The complexity of the resettlement process can thus, in principle, be mastered, to good effect (de Wet 2006:182). Yet to apply such a model to evaluate resettlement experiment at the New Halfa scheme, however, the model will only partially fit to depict the situation, and only when not considering these variables-risks- as a system, and without mutual connections, though, for example, joblessness among some Halfawiyyin tenants is not so often connected to landlessness, simply because land is there, but it is either the unwillingness to take the risk of cultivation, then incurring loss, or the inability to face the high cost of cultivation, and above all; agriculture itself is not part of their thoughts of the future and better life, it is just a de-facto in which they found themselves and they have to deal with it.

However, psychological marginalization and its consequences; cultural and behavioural impairments, anxiety, and decline in self-esteem, is an unavoidable trauma in such enforced situation. Halfawiyyin conceived that their cultural status at the New Halfa scheme, is belittled, where they still regarding themselves as "strangers" to the Butana area, and never going to feel it their home, though, even today, their songs and poems, crying the beloved Nubia, and promising the final return to it at one day. In addition to the above stated risks, the deteriorating health facilities in the scheme area led to outbreak of relocation-related illnesses, particularly parasitic and vector-born diseases such as malaria and schistosomiasis, unsafe water supply increase vulnerability to epidemic and chronic diarrhea, dysentery, and lastly appear a kidney failure, however, the last mentioned disease needs further investigation to assure the relation between the spread of it and the polluted canal waters piped to people. However, most people interviewed at

Um-usher and el-Shigailab villages mentioned that fear of diseases is one of the major factors behind their migration.

The other resettlement risk-related stigmas, i.e. landlessness, food insecurity, loss of access to common resources, and social disarticulation, might operate at a very limited and low profile amongst the poor resettled Halfawiyyin families and individuals, especially those without lands, taking into consideration the fact that agricultural lands and houses provided for them 40 years ago, is no longer enough for every body due to natural increase in the numbers of people and the inheritance factor; taking into account the fact that most of them already lack the willingness to being farmers; Halfawiyyin have to secure other sources of livelihood, though migration is the only available alternative in such circumstances. This is being the situation neither the impoverishment risks model; nor the other previously mentioned models tackling the issue of resettlement capable to incorporate into their accounts.

The impoverishment risks and reconstruction model, which was initially designed to help planners to deal with such latent risks, seems as if it is working at a very general level, that is, all relocatees, irrespective of the individual differences, and the different economic, political and cultural settings, will definitely have to face such stated risks in the absence of adequate financial and economic opportunities, which is not always the case. Moreover, the failure of the model to incorporate the effects of external factors, i.e. at the regional, national and international levels, on determining the success or failure of the process of resettlement is another limitation.

(4) The Inherent Complexities Approach: The inherent complexities position argues that there is a complexity in resettlement process, which emerges from the interrelatedness of a range of factors of different orders: cultural, social, environmental, economic, institutional and political- all of which are taking place in the context of imposed spatial change and of local- level responses and initiatives. Interlinked and mutually influencing transformations are taking place simultaneously, as ongoing (preresettlement) processes of change interface, with changes initiated by the imposition from outside of a development project and the resultant resettlement to which it gives rise. Understanding this complexity, attempting to come to terms with it, and utilizing the opportunities it may create seems to require a more comprehensive and open-ended approach than the predominantly economic and operational perspective that characterizes the ´inadequate inputs` approach (de Wet 2006:189).

Forced resettlement involves imposed spatial change, in the sense that it involves people having to move from one settlement and area to another. This has cultural, social, political and economic implications. Social relationships have a strong territorial component, and are in this sense to a considerable degree spatially based. The spatial change thus requires people to develop new sets of relationships. Depending on the scope of the spatial change, and the speed and degree of participation with which it takes place, people may experience serious social disruption, In one of the more extreme cases, the Sudanese Nubians were moved about eight hundred kilometers from their original homes, and away from the banks of the Nile River (de Wet 2006:183).

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Spatial change usually involves a change in the patterns of people’s access to resources. Typically, resettlement and the agricultural plans accompanying it in rural cases involve a change in land use and often also in land tenure. Resettlement involves people in wider structures. They are drawn into the structure of the resettlement scheme and its administration, as well as of the development project of which the resettlement scheme is part. They are also drawn into provincial/regional type of administrative and political structures, and economic marketing network, into which the resettlement scheme becomes incorporated. People are also brought into the domain of national-and international-level structures. This is because resettlement-inducing development projects are usually part of national-level development-cum-political/ideological programmes which bring the affected people under the influence of the relevant government department. Projects are often funded by international banks or aid agencies, which then also exercise their influence upon the resettlement area and its people. In most cases, these various kinds of incorporation involve a lessening of the political and economic autonomy enjoyed by the resettled people (de Wet 2006:184).

Resettlement involves accelerated socio-economic change. Development- induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR), as a planned intervention by an outside agency powerful enough to foist its agenda upon the ´receiving` community, takes place largely in terms of the agenda and timetable of that agency (i.e. the insistence of foreign consultants to abolish wheat cultivation in the New Halfa scheme even at times when it has a successful record). The concern here is that such agendas and timetables will artificially speed up

101 and telescope the ongoing processes of change at the local level. This is because certain physical changes, such as the new land use-plan and the actual relocation, have to take place within the agency’s project cycle. DIDR also speeds up the process of local communities´ increasing involvement with, and often dependence upon, their wider political and economic setting. The fact that DIDR often results in diminished access to agricultural land, or disrupts local means of livelihood, makes resettled people more dependent upon cash resources of income, driving them outwards to the regional or national labour market. The changed balance between subsistence and cash sources of income tends to lead to changes in patterns of consumption, and to more urban oriented focus. The resettlement projects also involve new types of leadership, geared to the new type of community that the outsiders wish to establish via the resettlement scheme, and again speeds up this new community’s involvement in the wider political and administrative structures of which it is seen as part. Such accelerated change usually impacts negatively upon the already disrupted communities’ capacity to control their own socio-economic situation, and the terms of their interaction with their wider context/situation. Their diminished capacity to influence the terms of that wider interaction, in turn, further serves to accelerate the process of social change (de Wet 2006:185).

The combination of the above factors in resettlement tends to reduce people’s material well-being, limit their choices and control over their circumstances, and increase the presence of social tension and conflict within new settlements. The involuntary nature of both the resettlement and the conditions under which they are resettled, the frequent loss of resources, the incorporation into wider, more powerful, more directive and more

102 remote structures, and the dislocation involved, as well as the accelerated manner in which it all happens, all serve to limit the choices open to people and, accordingly, the degree of control they have over, and the degree of harmony in, their day-to-day circumstances. Thus, the goals of the resettlement component of the overall project are not realized, resettlement with development does not happen and people are left socio-economically worse off than before.

Development projects are about infrastructure and about generating revenue from that infrastructure. As a result, in some cases, resettlement is seen as an external cost, as a bother that has to be accommodated if the overall project is to go ahead. Given that resettlement projects in Africa have often been part of wider political agendas and programmes, and have been conducted in the context of critical shortages by officials and technicians who have seen infrastructure provision as a key to economic progress, it is not surprising that many African resettlement projects have been characterized by inadequate consultation and participation. Where there has been participation, inadequate attention has been paid to the complexities and problems that it involves. Although actual participation has varied across schemes, by and large resettlement schemes have been planned and implemented on behalf and for, rather than by and with, the affected people. Following on from this, resettlement is usually not consciously planned as a development exercise, intended to leave the resettled people better off. Once resettlement has taken place, the development of those new areas often goes largely by the board, with the resettled people being left to find ways of generating their own livelihoods in the new context. The predictable result is impoverishment. (de Wet 2006:187).

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Large-scale irrigation schemes are often seen by the authorities as part of national projects. Such schemes have to fit in which essentially political objectives and time frames, regardless of whether these are compatible with sound planning, financing and implementation. Resettlement thus has to adjust to ´national priorities`, with predictably negative results. Competing perceptions of the nature and process of development are involved in DIDR. Outsider government and development agencies usually have a very different view of what constitutes development, local people also tend to see the process of development very differently. Actors, whether the affected people, or those implementing resettlement, respond to the situation in which they find themselves (e.g. by resisting, by taking initiatives, by changing plans, or by changing allocations of resources). These actions feed back into the way things unfold, and often cannot be predicted or planned for. In combination, these factors reinforce each other, making the resettlement process even less amenable to a rational, technical approach. Ethical issues in resettlement are also not readily amenable to strictly rational considerations, in the sense that they cannot be resolved by a direct appeal to reason; they are an issue in their own right, which has central role in any development undertaking.

-Is it acceptable to transpose a culturally specific view of development upon other people? -Can one argue that, if there is no other ways, some should suffer for the greater good? -should the fact that some have to move or suffer disadvantage for the benefit of others give them a kind of ´extra vote`?

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-What should be done when there appears to be a conflict between fairness and equality of treatment of different categories of affected people? - is compulsion ever acceptable? If so, under what conditions?

Ethical issues add to the complexity of resettlement, because of the human rights involved in resettlement and particularly in light of the fact that it is often of a forced nature and often gives rise to unexpected outcomes. Uncertain outcomes in terms of overall project goals and of resettlers’ post resettlement fortunes render problematic a utilitarian approach to deciding whether resettlement is ethically justifiable. The kind of openness that respecting other people and taking ethical issues seriously, is required(de Wet 2006:189).

Although the complexity seems to work against the achieving of successful outcomes, there may also be another alternative, contributing to some more positive, albeit unintended, outcomes. That same complexity limits officials’ ability to control the resettlement process and to implement resettlement as planned. Officials are thus limited in the degree of control that they can exercise over settlers, in the extent to which they can make resettlers conform to externally imposed crop and marketing regimes, keep livestock off irrigation schemes, etc. this leaves room, more in some situations than in others, for resettlers to take initiative to utilize the resources and opportunities provided by the resettlement project and the regional economy in ways perhaps other than intended by the project, for their own benefit. At the New Halfa scheme, pastoralists who had joined the scheme continued to run their livestock off the scheme, as well as having access to cultivable

105 land on the scheme. In a number of cases, their off scheme income enabled them to balance the books (Sorbo 1985:15).

A risk that seems to apply at the levels of individual/household, community and resettlement project is what one might call the risk of loss of flexibility. When people’s social structures, their ´social geometry` and their sources of livelihood are disrupted, this tends to lead to an undermining of tried and trusted ways of doing things, lessening of resources and options, anxiety or stress, and therefore loss of flexibility and adaptability at project level- which will surely impact negatively upon attempts to achieve successful resettlement.

The last approach, seems to be more capable of depicting and evaluating the situation at the New Halfa scheme, since it incorporates all factors operating at the local, regional, national and international levels, and conceives them as a set of inherent complexities working to generate such a state of affairs as that of the New Halfa scheme, where Nubians tenants, in the very limited number of choices available to them, rationally chose to abandon their farms there seeking better life chances elsewhere, hence they move to join their former people at suburban Khartoum, continuing the ever-on going process of Nubian migration toward cities and city life.

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Notes: 1. Cernea, Michael M. 1999. Why Economic Analysis is Essential to Resettlement: A sociologist’s view . in: The economics of involuntary resettlement: Questions and challenges. M. M. Cernea, ed. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 2. ______2000. Risks, safeguard and reconstruction: A model for population displacement and resettlement. In: Risks and reconstruction: Experiences of resettlers and refugees. M. M Cernea and C. McDowell, eds. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 3. De Wet, Chris (ed). 2006. “Development–Induced Displacement, problems, politics and people”. In Studies in Forced Migration. Volume 18.Bergham Book, New York 4. Scudder, Thayer, and Elizabeth Colson. 1982.From Welfare to development: A conceptual framework for the analysis of dislocated people. In: Involuntary Migration and Resettlement: The problems and responses of dislocated people. A. Hansen and A. Oliver-Smith, eds. Boulder, CO: Westview. 5. ______1981. The development potential of new lands settlement in the tropics and subtropics: A global state-of-Art evaluation with specific emphasis on policy implementation, Binghamton, New York, Institute for Development Anthropology. 6. ______2006. The future of large dams. Dealing with Social, Environmental and political costs, London. Sterling ,VA. 7. Sondra, D Hale. 1982. The Changing Ethnic Identity of Nubians in Urban Milieu: Khartoum, Sudan. Unpublished PhD. University of California, los Angeles.

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8. Sorbo, Gunnar M. 1985. Tenants and Nomads in Eastern Sudan: A study of economic adaptation in the New Halfa Scheme. Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala.

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Chapter Five Agricultural Production and the Present Situation

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Chapter Five: Agricultural Production and the Present Situation

The New Halfa Agricultural Scheme:

(1) Introduction The New Halfa Agricultural Corporation (NHAC), is one of the pioneering agricultural schemes in crop production, and the second largest scheme after the Gezira, lies about 400 km east of Khartoum, occupies the eastern part of the Butana flat plain, running parallel to the western bank of the Atbara River between Khashm el Girba town, where the dam is, to the Sabaat Hills, with a heavy deep-crack-clay soil and a dry climate with annual rainfall ranges between 250 and 300 mm. The following governmental institutions contribute to servicing the structures of the scheme:

1-Dams administration (Ministry of irrigation) with the administration of Khashm el-Girba dam, in terms of maintenance, operation, storage and withdrawal. 2- National Electricity Corporation; in terms of providing the scheme with electricity for irrigation and other purposes, in addition to the admission of electricity from Khashm el-Girba dam into the national grid. 3-Irrigation operation department; in terms of supervising major and branch canals and determining water requirements for the scheme, and its distribution to the different parts of the scheme. 4-New Halfa Agricultural Corporation (NHAC); in terms of owning the lands of agricultural rotation, managing cultivation and watering operations. 5- Earth excavation department; in terms of canals and channels cleanup. The new Halfa scheme was established to fulfill the following objectives:

110 a) Resettlement of Nubians who were affected by the construction of the High Dam in Egypt. b) Sedentarization of the nomads of the area c) Increasing the national income by producing cotton and groundnut and utilization of the Sudan’s share of the Nile Water. The scheme cover an area of 500.000 feddan distributed as follows: 345000 feddan New Halfa Agricultural Corporation (three crop rotation) 900 feddan farm of the NHAC 24000 feddan free holds of the Nubians 15000 feddan investment lands 50000 feddan New Halfa Sugar Company 16800 feddan research and irrigated forests. 446700 feddan total The rest contains the areas of villages, canals and drainages. The number of farmers who owned tenancies is 24445 holders; one third of it is the relocated Nubians, while the other two thirds are from the local tribes of the area such as Shukriya, Hadendawa, Lahawiyeen, Bani amer, Khawaldah, and Rashaydah. In addition to agricultural labourers who settled in the scheme, mainly came from Western Sudan, first as hired labourers and then they turned to cultivate with different formulae such as sharecropping and rent, especially for groundnuts, sorghum and vegetables; their number is about 50000; they participate with their families in cultivation.

(2)The Khashm el- Girba dam The New Halfa Scheme irrigated by Khashm- el Girba dam; this dam commands an area of half million feddans of fertile soil stretching along the

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Khashm el Girba plain. Sayed Mirghani Hamza, who was Minister of Irrigation in 1956, initiated this scheme. When President Abboud's regime came to power, the Government decided to put it into practice (Dafalla, 1975, p139). The decision to resettle the Wadi Halfa inhabitants there had made it imperative for the Government to give it top priority. The design envisaged a concrete structure of 466meters long and 55 meters high from riverbed to parapet, an earth embankment of 1830 meter long at the western side and 1500 meters. long at the eastern side. The length of the reservoir lake is about 80 km. The reservoir capacity with these dimensions at the design is an about 1.31 milliard cubic meters, but this capacity was diminishing sharply during the past 40 years to less than 50% due to silt accumulation at the reservoir. The dam equipped with three electric turbines attached to the sluice gates with an output of 7,000 kilowatts of electrical energy and another three turbines with the same capacity built at the head of the main canal. The problem of siltation of reservoirs is an international one, and not only limited to the Sudan, the costs of removing silts from reservoirs is too high and expensive. The solution of silting of Khashm el- Girba dam reservoir; according to the dam administration manager- is only possible with the construction of the upper Atbara dam (Siteit dam); the proposed project for along time, but not implemented due to the lack of finance. It is important to refer to the fact that the decline of Khashm el- Girba dam reservoir capacity to less than 50% of its original size caused shrinking of the cultivated areas in the scheme to less than 60% of the agricultural rotation,( table. No.3.), however, the declining reservoir capacity has no significant effect on the summer cultivation which is irrigated by the flood water that is available in amount more than the intake capacity of reservoir. But winter cropping is highly affected during the past 40 years till

112 it was almost entirely abolished; wheat areas, for example, declined from 110.000 feddan at the first days of the scheme to reach around less than 10.000 feddan now, this is mainly because winter cultivation is completely dependent on the stored water in the dam lake after the river dried up and the flow of water entirely stopped at the beginning of November every year. Certainly, there is no specified date that the Khashm el-Girba reservoir capacity is going to reach zero level. According to the initial plans, it is supposed that this dam will be out of services after 30 years of establishment; then Siteit dam has to replace it, and after another 30 years, Seteit dam has to be replaced by Al-rimeila dam on the river Atbara tributary-basalam. Nevertheless, Siteit dam is not representing the final solution for the numerous problems of new Halfa scheme.

Table No (3). The declining cultivated area in the New Halfa scheme season Cultivated area/feddan % 93/94 200667 55 94/95 218720 60 95/96 214845 59 96/97 225165 61 97/98 202160 55 98/99 189935 52 99/2000 140120 38 2000/2001 157185 42.9 2001/2002 170565 46 2002/2003 124330 34 2003/2004 142725 39

Source: NHAC

The turbine pumps: During the flood period (15 July- 15 September) water flow of Atbara River becomes highly saturated with large amounts of silt; so, the Khashm el- Girba dam administration deliberately lowering the level of the reservoir lake to level lower than the natural flow from the lake to the main canal that

113 feed the scheme, to leave the silt passing; hence, during this period the three turbine pumps is being operated to provide the water needs of the scheme to irrigate the summer loop crops. These pumps were rehabilitated and replaced in the year 2003; however, electricity problems represent the major threat and obstacle facing the operation of these turbine pumps.

Farmers’ use of irrigation water: Unfortunately, despite the fact that irrigation water is one of the most important production components and one of the most important technical packages for crop production in the scheme, farmers deal with it indifferently; in this respect, all farmers are alike; this can be verified by the following facts: a-the farmer usually does not stick to the beginning and the ending dates of the cultivation of each crop in the scheme according to the scheduled agricultural programme, therefore he does not benefit from the available water to irrigate the concerned crop in the appropriate time. b- Farmer usually does not follow the right principles of irrigation, and when he finishes irrigating his tenancy; whatever it is (hawasha, freehold), he just blocks the (abu- seta); and leaving irrigation water to flow through the Abu- eshreen. d- farmer doesn’t care to clean water channels especially the (Abu- eshreen) that irrigates his tenancy, with the passing of time and days; these channels fill with weeds and silt, and blocks the flow of water till the end of the field, the matter that lead to the problem of thirst of tenancies laying at the end of the fields and damage of its crops.

114 e- The farmer usually favours himself over his fellows and neighbours at the concerned field and violates the right of the others to use waters in the concerned channel; especially those whose tenancies laying at the beginning of the field. f- Usually the farmer supervises the first irrigation water of the concerned crop, but the other watering processes proceed without any invigilation and supervision during the process of watering the tenancy. g- In order to irrigate his tenancy, the farmer is ready to violate the law especially in the absence of enough numbers of water guards along the scheme; some farmers use to destroy the water regulators in the transmitting water channels; and practice all types of damages. I. generally, the seepage of water into the drainages, and water flow into the fallow and unused lands, constitutes a significant amount of water that is pumped to the scheme from the dam, despite that, claims of thirst continues from the farmers from all parts of the scheme. Therefore, the issue of rational use of irrigation water needs meetings, seminars and conferences, to lay bases for the optimal use of irrigation water and reducing wastage by water users, where the government spends huge money to provide it. To resolve all problems and obstacles that hinder water to reach tenancies at the appropriate time, that is because of the specialty of New Halfa Scheme whose fate is connected with a seasonal river “Atbara river”, also the NHAC and the farmers union should direct the tenant to the importance of the water source, and putting laws that make tenants to be more careful; and conserve such resource and not waste it as it is being now in the scheme.

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(3)The New Halfa Agricultural Corporation: The Corporation (New Halfa Agricultural Corporation) was established as a considerable entity in the year 1980 by a republican decree to perform the following reforms: 1- To carry out the agricultural reform in the area of the scheme. 2- Develop and improve the natural resources available for investment on scientific and economic bases to attain the highest levels of social and economic benefits. 3- Lay down the general policy on social, economic and technical bases within the framework of the general agricultural policy of the state. 4- To detect by itself or by a direction from the Minister of Irrigation with horizontal expansion to new areas or to introduce new crops for the benefit of the country. 5- To implement any other assignments and roles significant or meaningful to realize the above mentioned objectives.

The Minister of Agriculture appoints the council of administration from the concerned governmental departments, and representatives from the farmers union and workers union, in addition to some other individuals who carry special experience, ability and competence. The Minister of Agriculture also appoints the general manager of the corporation who is also the head of the executive body; and has the authorities of putting and expending the budgets, carryout developmental issues, call for bids, representing the corporation in front of all civilian and juridical bodies, and any other authorities delegated to him by the administrative council.

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The present administration system of the (NHAC) consist the following managements and sections: (1) Agricultural management; which includes: (a) Field management: managing agricultural sections (6 sections) and inspections (19 inspections) (b) Protection section: carryout the duty of combating pests of cotton, groundnuts, sorghum and wheat, and the other national infections in the scheme area. (c) Forests section: supervising investment in the marginal areas which is not allocated farms. (d) Animal production section: sponsoring investment of the corporation farm in fields of milk and poultry. (e) Section of Nursery; it was abolished despite its important role for fruit and vegetable farmers, under the argument that it will not cover its expenses and attaining revenue for the Corporation. (2) Agricultural extension and technology management (3) Agricultural engineering management (4) Managerial and financial management (5) Civil engineering management (6) Ginning management (7) Planning and agricultural economic management (8) Public relations (9) Khartoum office (10) Port Sudan office

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the structure of the corporation was negatively affected by many factors such as privatization policies and

117 reduction of labour as a result of ending service or fire for the so called “public good”. These policies largely restricted and hindered the performance of the Corporation. The question here is that: does the Corporation attain its goals? Throughout four decades, the age of the scheme, irrespective of failures and obstacles, we can say that the following objectives were generally fulfilled: 1- Resettlement of Nubians, sedentrization of nomadic Arabs, and settling of the new comers. 2- Planning the villages and provision of the basic services of drinking water, health, education and security. 3- Economic development of the area by the launching of some factories based on agricultural products .e.g. grain mills, fodder, oil seeds, soap, sweet, dairy and food industries. The above-mentioned successes do not deny the deterioration of the scheme in the following areas: 1- Declining of the cultivated areas, reduction of productivity and the steady increase of the costs of production. 2- Deterioration of irrigation infrastructures. 3- Withdrawal of the government from financing the farmers 4- The farmer, the weakest side of the bargain, left unprotected after economic liberalization policies. 5- Weak managerial supervision of cultivation and irrigation operations. 6- The farmer who passes some crisis, e.g. crop thirst, drowning, and other kinds of damages, for these and other factors, he left the land and flee abroad in search of better living circumstances.

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Participation of farmers in the management of the scheme: Farmers have a union established in the year 1968, now acting according to the 1992 law for farmers and irrigation organizations, to fulfill the following objectives: -Protecting the rights of its members and observing their interests in accordance with the on-going laws and economic requirements. -Improvement of social, cultural, economic, technical and intellectual efficiency of the members and preserving their unity. - Working towards developing the national economy and preserving its stability. -Working to improve the administration and improvement of production within the framework of the national socioeconomic plans. -Working for the initiation of social services fund to be governed by approved law. Finance of the farmers’ trade union consist of annual membership fees, gifts, penalties and revenues from sharing in some economic institutions (Cotton Company and farmers’ bank), in addition to social services fund. (5% of cotton returns). The union participates in the management of the scheme through the following devices: - Council of the management - Specialized committees at the head level. - Section committees at the level of the six sections of the scheme. - Production committee at the level of agricultural inspections. - Branch committee at the village level. Therefore, the relation between the Corporation and the farmers, theoretically, take the following way:

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1- Participation in the management through their union. 2- Supply of irrigation water and collecting the agreed fees. 3- Granting the tenancy and supervising its size and cultivation. 4- Provision of some agricultural services within the limits of its capacity (land preparations, improved seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, agricultural extension ) 5- Protection of crops, especially cotton. 6- Execution of agricultural legislations.

Rehabilitation of the New Halfa Scheme: The first rehabilitation for the scheme was done in the year 1983, after 20 years of its establishment through the World Bank, with a sum of 120.000.000 $. This fund was allocated for the following components: 1- Houses 2- stores 3- fuel lodgings 4- small vehicles 5- Lorries and tankers. 6- Tractors and its attachments. 7- Groundnuts harvesters'. 8- Machines for agricultural routes maintenance. 9- Production inputs (fertilizers and pesticides) 10- wireless communication 11 - workers trainings. These components do not include rehabilitation of the basic infrastructures represented in reservoir siltation, maintenance of the turbine pumps, reclamation of irrigation canals and agricultural lands. Therefore, the World Bank rehabilitation did not help enough to resolve the real agricultural reform problems. Now the houses, stores and lodgings are empty, vehicles and tractors fully depreciated. So in less than ten years after that rehabilitation, the scheme became worst than it was before the year 1985. The on-going rehabilitation programme, which was initiated by a presidential decree at the beginning of 2003, and the work started early in 2004, will cover the following:

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1- Eradication of Mesquite from the whole of the scheme. 2- Rehabilitating and halving canals irrigating fields of lands of more than 90 feddans 3- Rehabilitation of major drainage canals. The above three components are constructional operations which are going to help more in improving production process and improving the utilization of the water of the dam. However, to make the constructional rehabilitation process more integrated, there are some basic constructional reforms that have to be taken into account, which are: - Reduce siltation in the dam basin through other ways different from washing which has some negatives upon the crops watering. -Correcting the inefficiency of the main canal. - Correcting and equalizing the highs of lands and minor channels (Abu- eshreens). - Rehabilitation of the minor drainage canals. However, by the end of the 2006, mesquite was entirely eradicated from the scheme, and some other works was done in rehabilitating the irrigation infrastructure.

(4) Agricultural rotation and crop composition The first agricultural season started at the New Halfa scheme- at that time- in the 1964/65 season with a tripartite agricultural rotation consisted of cotton, wheat and groundnuts; then sorghum was lately introduced in the 1978/80 season as part of wheat rotation according to the request of the indigenous tribes of the scheme area.

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(1) Cotton crop: Government highly concerned with this crop from the beginning as it was in all state-owned agricultural schemes .e.g. The Gezira Scheme. The Corporation was providing finance and some agricultural operation such as land preparations, herbicides, fertilizers, irrigation water, pest control and agricultural loans for the different agricultural activities. The corporation also receives the crop from collecting centers; transporting, ginning and load the crop to Port Sudan. The crop has been marketed in the past through the cotton corporation, which is now replaced by The Sudan Cotton Company. Cotton production relation passed through many stages of finance and marketing; which can be classified into four successive stages:

(a) Joint account (1964-1980): In which the government was carrying operations of cotton finance through the Central Bank with a loan of 9% rate of interest. The accounting method in this system divided into general joint account and individual joint account; where the corporation on behalf of the government discounts the cost of the general joint account and the individual joint account; and the net revenue has to be divided equally between the farmer and the corporation. Disadvantages of this system: -All tenants have to share in repaying the cost of production. - Productive tenants incurred the higher burden. This system was securing unaccountability of unproductive tenants, and reducing revenue for productive tenants. This led to tenants' indifference towards cultivation, and affected the essence of competition among the

122 farmers who lack the essence of seriousness; hence this system collapsed and completely abolished in 1981.

(b) Individual account (1981-1989) The government continues to finance cotton crop, but unhanded its share in the revenue, as each tenant has to incur the cost of cotton production. From the advantages of this system, the return of tenants to cultivation carefully, increase of averages of production, and the revenue became dependent on the tenant’s productivity. The disadvantages of this system is that the cost of cotton production accumulated as loans on the shoulders of unproductive tenants, therefore, loans also has accumulated on the corporation over the years; lastly, the government unhanded the guarantee to finance cotton crop.

(C) Finance through Banks Portfolio: After the government had given-up the direct finance; the banks portfolio was introduced and started to finance the agricultural schemes with the guarantee of the cotton company, with different formulae such as Salam and Murabaha. The disadvantages of this system is that the portfolio banks do not always adhere to pay their specified quotas of finance at the appropriate time, consequently, this adversely affects production operations. Such problems which are usually associated with individual account, lastly led the portfolio to stop finance.

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(d) Self- reliance system: This is a mixed system, where the Ministry of Finance provides part of finance according to the available local and foreign resources; the deficit can be covered through different institutions either by liquidation of the surplus inputs, or by advance selling of cotton and cotton seed, or through other available methods of finance from foreign investors or local banks, with the guarantee of the Cotton Company. The method of finance is determined according to circumstances prevailing in each agricultural season, and the requirements of the international market and the demand for cotton. From the disadvantages of this system, is that the loans of low producing tenants was accumulated on the corporation, consequently, the corporation failed to fulfill its annual commitments, and inevitably it has to repay from the incomes of the producing tenants, whom, to receive their rewards, have to wait for periods extending over a year, and in installments. In the past four decades averages of cotton production (table No.4.) reveal that, the crop is successful in terms of factors that help increasing levels of production. Moreover, from a marketing view, cotton is an export crop subject to international competition, with good tillage; it is possible to raise- up the quality. Accordingly, because of such characteristics, cotton should be an attractive crop, The expellant trait of the cotton is not related to weak levels of production, or low international prices, as it is directly related to other marketing, financial, and production factors, can be summarized as follows: (a) Production factors: 1- Domination of the corporation over supervision aspects and the lack of participation on the part of the tenant in the production processes. 2- Delay of cotton production operations from its optimal dates due to financial problems.

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3- Overlapping cultivation of the three summer crops (groundnuts, sorghum, cotton) usually delay good establishment of the crop and forget the implementation of the required technical packages. 4- Insufficient and unbalanced watering of cotton which needs at least ten waters each 15 days; as a result of water shortages and crops overlapping. 5- The delay and bad cotton-picking operations, the dependence upon one- picking system and the shortage of labours due to the weak and delayed finance. (b) Financial factors: 1- The dependence upon several sources to finance cotton operations, each has its own mode, conditions and guarantees 3- The delay of finance in times of need; or reduction of its sum; affects production operations. (c) Marketing factors: 1- Monopoly of cotton production by the cotton company which own cotton before ginning, and guaranteeing all financial operations; and accordingly monopolizes the selling operations. 2- Deduction of all numerous taxes imposed on the tenant from cotton returns. 3- Tenants are not subject to account according to their cotton grades, and thus receive the same prices in terms of quantity of cotton they produce; irrespective of the quality of their production. 4- Delaying payments of cotton's returns, which usually take more than eight months; and payments in installments. 5- The profits of the cotton company and its different gifts not directly return to tenants who producing cotton, and for social programmes (electricity, drinking water, etc).

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To make cotton an attractive crop for farmers, the following improvements should have to be done: 1- Tenants should be an original part in supervising production operations and effectively participates in correcting mistakes through their union devices. 2- Providing all cotton production requirements and putting of scheduled programme to perform each operation in its specified time. 3- Widening the circle of participation in integrated pest control programmes to include tenants. 4- Necessity of cultivating each crop in its scheduled time and avoiding overlapping cultivating crop with another. 5- Improving the operations of cotton-picking in order to reduce the rate of losses and improving the quality of cotton grades. 6- Payment of production loans immediately after delivery of cotton to the collecting centers with estimation prices; then compromises have to be worked out after final marketing, and accounting has to be done according to cotton grades.

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Table No. (4) Illustrates areas, production rate, cost, and returns of Cotton.

season Area/fedda Average Price/kantar equilibrium Positive Negative remarks n production/k returns returns antar 65 15365 3.5

66 32965 2.5 67 53375 3.6 68 70775 4.9 69 91605 4.68 70 102475 4.8 71 107375 4.53 72 108025 4.61 73 109000 2.62 74 109655 3.88 75 108960 4.02 76 81290 1.77 77 107790 3.69 78 98790 4.11 79 85560 2.01 13.97 2.85 11.59 80 61845 0.91 81 55210 2 82 57735 3.87 83 80000 4.82 84 84000 4.04 85 75000 3.54 86 68345 5.49 16 4 23.83 87 72585 6.33 21 3.4 59.7 87/88 76175 4.23 25 3.1 25.15 88/89 60000 4.23 27 4 4.29 89/90 75000 4.61 65 1.92 174.65 90/91 50000 4.01 75 2.43 118.28 91/92 41055 4.67 143.3 2.72 279.71 92/93 41000 3.5 438.9 4.3 59.29 93/94 50000 3.03 144 1.86 1638 94/95 50000 4.01 3000 2.21 5490 95/96 60150 3.25 7972.9 2.76 3906 96/97 58065 3.2 8500 3.1 850 97/98 45110 3.98 10300 4.38 4120 98/99 37000 3.03 11300 4.03 11300 99/2000 40870 3.6 13600 3.59 136 2000/2001 40015 4 12503 3.45 6876 2001/2002 38250 4.23 15003 3.53 10502 2002/2003 33505 4.18 15341 3.85 5062 2003/2004 45005 3.8 16952 3.52 4746 Source: NHPC

The management would be satisfied only if cotton yields (average production/kantar) reached 6 kantar/feddan. The above table clearly illustrates the generally weak production of cotton in the scheme.

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(2) Groundnuts: especial, self-financed crop for the tenant, who stands to work on it by himself; the corporation sometimes provides improved seeds and some agricultural operations; and collects the loans from tenants; such as water and land fees. The crop has many advantages, from which; 1-Soil fertilizer plant 2- high rewarding cash crop 3- Fodder crop; its remains has high nutritional value for animals. Despite the multiple advantages of the crop, but rates of production and returns is far below the expectations (table No.5.) for the following reasons: Production factors: Lack of suitable land preparation; unavailability of improved seeds, delay of cultivation until the coming of river water, low plant intensity, lack of the green ploughing, these in addition to the late harvest, and the usual harvest losses. Marketing and financial factors: 1- The complexity of financial operations from the banks; and the farmer's reliance on his own abilities, therefore, he forced to leave some elements of the prescribed technical packages. 2-Tenant's exposure to middlemen, hence he compel to sell the crop at the prices fixed by middlemen under the pressure of need and the desire to repay harvest operations loans, water and management fees for the Corporation. To ensure tenants' benefit from the crop; the following solutions must be considered: 1- Finding funds with easy facilities, guarantees and suitable forms from the banks.

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2-Cultivation should start in the mid of May until the end of June; with enough irrigation water supply from the dam. 3- Due to lack of enough water to irrigate the three rotations for the one farmer; it is high time for the corporation to reduce cultivation intensity only to two rotations for the one farmer, i.e. cash crops (groundnuts/ cotton), and food crops (wheat/ sorghum). 4- Improvement of harvest operation to reduce the losses, and use of machines. 5- Guaranteeing good prices; via selling the crop to local manufactories or export through mechanism prohibiting exploitation of individual producers by the mediators. 6- Encouragement of farmers to rear animals and to make use of the remains of the crop, so as to increase the farmers' income by integrating agriculture and livestock rearing.

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Table No. (5) Illustrates cultivated areas, production rates, costs, and returns of groundnuts

Season Area/fe Average Price/kanta Equilibrium/kanta Positive Negativ note ddan prod./kantar r r returns e returns 64/65 700 0.5 Prod./ton 65/66 200 0.2 Prod./ton 66/67 5700 0.96 Prod./ton 67/68 4455 0.46 Prod./ton 68/69 2315 0.34 Prod./ton 69/70 34545 0.46 Prod./ton 70/71 25450 0.51 Prod./ton 71/72 12905 0.52 Prod./ton 72/73 40000 0.57 Prod./ton 73/74 45335 0.67 Prod./ton 74/75 68000 0.8 Prod./ton 75/76 53800 0.32 Prod./ton 76/77 38315 0.75 Prod./ton 77/78 59595 0.95 Prod./ton 78/79 31140 0.51 Prod./ton 79/80 43390 0.82 Prod./ton 80/81 35000 0.9 Prod./ton 81/82 45460 0.84 Prod./ton 82/83 28210 0.7 Prod./ton 83/84 40025 0.6 Prod./ton 84/85 33560 0.3 Prod./ton 85/86 34000 14 2 15.7 3.5 Prod/sack 86/87 23855 15.5 15.5 21 8.95 Prod./sack 87/88 45400 16.9 7.2 8 64 Prod/sack 88/89 29230 11.3 7.5 9.8 11.2 Prod/sack 89/90 26245 22 25 3.86 453.5 Prod/sack 90/91 38605 11 35 4.8 217 Prod/sack 91/92 36690 20 45 7.1 584.5 Prod/sack 92/93 51000 12.3 75 11.4 5 Prod/sack 93/94 36505 25 140 12.3 1777.2 Prod/sack 94/95 45000 28 250 15.4 3152.5 Prod/sack 95/96 46500 25 300 12.5 1260 Prod/sack 96/97 48140 28 800 21.2 5414 Prod/sack 97/98 42625 30 800 24.3 4585 Prod/sack 98/99 33733 30 900 22.2 6982 Prod/sack 99/2000 22777 32 1200 17.5 15623 Prod/sack 2000/2001 43730 25 1000 22.5 2475 Prod/sack 2001/2002 30000 27 1000 24.6 34200 Prod/sack 2002/2003 26120 30 1500 17.5 18200 Prod/sack Source: NHAC

130 according to corporation requirements; yields of Groundnut should have to be 1 ton/feddan.

(3) Sorghum: it has the same merits of groundnuts, the farmer has to bear costs of production and marketing, the Corporation provides improved seeds, fertilizers, and some agricultural operations; then deducts the cost from the farmers after harvest by all possible means. Sorghum was introduced in the scheme as substitute for wheat rotation in the northern sections of the scheme for two reasons, first; diminishing quantity of water of the dam; the matter that not allowing continuing intensification of winter rotation, second; sorghum is main food for farmers in the northern sections of the scheme, their main desire not exceeding few sacks of sorghum just enough to feed the family and a small amount of dry cane for animals.

The unwillingness of sorghum cultivators to apply the basic techniques of cultivation was clear negative since the introduction of sorghum into the scheme in 1979/80 till 1990/91 season. As agricultural policies, water, land and management fees were imposed in addition to the rising costs of cultivation, therefore, the continuation of low traditional production no longer accompanying the new situation, and the farmer fell trapped in loans. The Corporation encouraged farmers to apply the basic techniques such as land preparation, to use improved seeds, pesticides and fertilizers, and the farmers have to repay the cost after harvest. yet, such policies did not encourage farmers to leave their traditional modes. Therefore, the Corporation imposed some pressures upon farmer to cultivate improved

131 seeds and compelled farmers to spread at least half of the prescribed fertilizer dose. This had led to improving productivity and convinced many farmers to improve their cultivation operations.

However, with the improvement of cultivation operations; the use of fertilizers became difficult task for the farmers as a result of dramatical increase in prices of fertilizers, accordingly, farmers started to avoid the use of fertilizers even when provided on credit, and productivity declined; especially such types of improved seeds can not reflects its production abilities except with the use of fertilizers. Production of Sorghum suffers the following problems: 1- Late sowing of sorghum which usually overlaps with cultivation of groundnuts; in addition to the delay of water flow from the Atbara River till July. 2- Lack of implementation of technical packages in matters of plant intensity, and the use of fertilizers due to its high cost. 3- After exit of wheat from the agricultural rotation due to shortage of water; the rotation became cotton/ sorghum/groundnuts. i.e. overlapping cultivation of three summer crops, that means the inability to irrigate the three crops at the same time according to the design of irrigation canals , therefore the three crops suffer thirst. To solve the above stated problems, the following amendments should be done: 1- Providing the needed finance to correctly apply the technical packages. 2- Supply of improved seeds and introducing of machine in cultivation and harvest of sorghum.

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3- Cultivation of sorghum at the prescribed time and providing water for irrigation from the dam. 4- Implementing two rotations system, instead of three; one for cash crops and the other rotation for food crops.

Table No. (6) Illustrates the cultivated areas, rates of production, the cost, and returns of Sorghum Season Area Average Price/kan. Equilibrium Positive Negative note /feddan prods. /kan. returns returns /kan. 79/80 13780 0.4 Prod./ ton 80/81 21903 0.5 Prod./ ton 81/82 50790 0.36 Prod./ ton 82/83 48140 0.3 Prod./ ton 83/84 57075 0.27 Prod./ ton 84/85 60425 0.26 Prod./ ton 85/86 68345 5.49 0.3 6 1655 Prod./ sack 86/87 72587 6.22 4 5.5 2.8 Prod./ sack 87/88 76155 4.23 6 4.1 0.61 Prod./ sack 88/89 60000 2.94 19.5 2.8 2.79 Prod./ sack 89/90 64330 5 35 2.1 101.6 Prod./ sack 90/91 86000 4.5 65 1.68 183 Prod./ sack 91/92 131000 6 70 3.11 202.5 Prod./ sack 92/93 61000 4 90 6.38 0.214 Prod./ sack 93/94 83095 6 400 3.56 960 Prod./ sack 94/95 68000 5.2 450 6.35 521 Prod./ sack 95/96 51015 5 900 3.9 991 Prod./ sack 96/97 65000 6 2500 4.06 4842 Prod./ sack 97/98 60000 8.8 2000 6.4 4735 Prod./ sack 98/99 51880 8 3300 5.2 6375 Prod./ sack 99/2000 40120 6 2500 5.5 894.9 Prod./ sack 2000/2001 47630 8 4000 3.6 17445 Prod./ sack 2001/2002 60000 10 3500 5 18395 Prod./ sack Source: NHAC

(4) Wheat Wheat constituted the basic food and cash crop for the inhabitants of the scheme; especially the resettled Halfawiyyin since the first agricultural season 1964/65 till the 1979/80; when cultivation of sorghum was started at

133 the expense of areas of wheat. What encouraging farmers, especially Halfawiyyin, to cultivate wheat; in addition to the fact that wheat represents their basic diet, is that it is easy to cultivate and harvest wheat mechanically. in the past the union of cooperative societies was taking the preparations and harvest operations on behalf of the tenants on a loan basis, also the New Halfa flour mills was helping in marketing the crop, thus, the overall effect of these establishments was the stabilization of the prices of wheat (table. No.7).

The experience of wheat cultivation in New Halfa passed through the following stages:

1- Stage of Self-dependence (1964-1989); at this stage farmers possessed the means of production and harvest; and self-dependence also in improved seeds, where the Corporation only concerned with conserving wheat types from deterioration. The establishing of flour mills helped stabilization of prices of wheat, despite the fact that productivity was not so high, but possession of means of production and harvest through the cooperative societies helped to reduce the cost of production and solving some economic problems from wheat surplus. 2- Domination of the government over wheat production and marketing (1990-1999): During this period the Corporation, on behalf of the government; as part of national economic policy; sponsored all operations of wheat production, and taking the crop; leaving few sacks to the farmer after deducting the cost. Despite the high production rates at this period, the farmer often felt that he is no longer the owner of the crop, so he gradually

134 became less concerned with wheat which also started to lose its social and economic importance in the lives of farmers. 3- The present stage (1999-2006). This is the stage of entire deterioration of wheat production in the scheme; in which the resettlers lost their basic food and first cash crop. The areas of wheat were sharply cut off after the government stopped to provide improved seeds to the scheme; which was more suitable and less priced in contrast to other sources of seeds; the government also stopped financing fertilizers, so, in the past year -2006- for example, only 5 thousand feddans of wheat had been cultivated at the northern sections of the scheme. The trend of the corporation is to suspend cultivation of winter rotation completely.

There are many problems hindering the cultivation of wheat in the new Halfa scheme, such as:

1- Decreasing levels of dammed water for the winter period, consequently, the lack of enough water to cultivate wheat at a sizable area after deducting the required waters for summer crops which often being late cultivated, and water requirements for sugarcane, freeholds lands, and the drinking water. 2- Discontinuing of wheat researches and innovating of new varieties of wheat capable to resist thirst and increasing temperature. 3- The collapse of cooperative societies at the villages’ level and its inability to provide services for tenants. 4- The collapse of the Union of Cooperative Societies and its symbol the 'flourmills,' and its inability to compete with the other modern companies such as Wheata, Siega, etc.

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5- Weak economic position of the farmers accompanying the general economic situation of the area; the other life requirements, and the difficulty to find easy loans from the government and the commercial banks. Table No. (7) Illustrates areas, rates of production, costs, and returns of Wheat Season Area/ Average Price/sack Equilibrium Positive Negative note feddan prod./ /sack returns returns sack 64/65 15365 3.5 Prod./sack 65/66 32965 2.5 Prod./ sack 66/67 53375 3.6 Prod./ sack 67/68 70755 4.9 Prod./ sack 68/69 91605 4.68 Prod./ sack 69/70 102475 4.8 Prod./ sack 70/71 107375 4.53 Prod./ sack 71/72 108025 4.11 Prod./ sack 72/73 109000 2.26 Prod./ sack 73/74 109655 3.88 Prod./ sack 74/75 108960 4.02 Prod./ sack 75/76 81290 1.77 Prod./ sack 76/77 107790 3.69 Prod./ sack 77/78 98790 4.11 Prod./ sack 78/79 85560 2.01 Prod./ sack 79/80 61845 0.91 Prod./ sack 80/81 55210 2 Prod./ sack 81/82 57735 3.87 Prod./ sack 82/83 80000 4.82 Prod./ sack 83/84 84000 4.04 Prod./ sack 84/85 75000 3.54 Prod./ sack 85/86 30000 4 7 4.2257 1058 Prod./ sack 86/87 34270 4.5 7.65 3.583 Prod./ sack 87/88 35025 0.5 10.1 4.202 92.95 Prod./ sack 88/89 52565 6 23.2 3.043 68.59 Prod./ sack 89/90 37390 6.2 45 6.843 28.95 Prod./ sack 90/91 84000 4.1 82 1.925 176.06 Prod./ sack 91/92 63555 7 180 2.108 880.56 Prod./ sack 92/93 57250 4.3 220 4.2559 9.7 Prod./ sack 93/94 60607 3.7 600 2.1844 909.35 Prod./ sack 94/95 59125 6 800 4.298 1361 Prod./ sack 95/96 52350 6.49 2250 4.2793 4973.1 Prod./ sack 96/97 60800 5.358 4100 5.358 991 Prod./ sack 97/98 57150 7.3 4180 5.637 6948 Prod./ sack 98/99 50000 4.1 5500 4.679 3186 Prod./ sack 99/2000 14710 4.5 6000 3.99 3014.5 Prod./ sack 2000/2001 28035 7 6000 4.058 117650 Prod./ sack 2001/2002 23950 6 5500 6.47 2600 Prod./ sack 2002/2003 14935 4.7 6000 6.8 12600 Prod./ sack Source: NHAC

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The high costs of cultivation: Modern irrigated agriculture requires the implementation of certain high value technical packages (specific amounts of seeds, watering, fertilizer, timing, pesticides); if these packages were implemented correctly, it fulfills the desired objectives; and if not, the results will be the loss of such high cost. This in turn highly depends on the role of agricultural extension, and of course, the role of the farmer is the most important, then the follow-up and execution by the Corporation, and above all, the availability of finance on time, because cultivation is “time schedule matter".

Major pests of agricultural crops in the NHAC: Halfawiyyin were forced to migrate to a new area and new environment, and to cultivate different crops, this led to changes in the types of pests and infections which they know in their indigenous knowledge, whether insects, weed, or pests infections, for example, they were not know in the past the disease of rust in wheat, whiteflies (Hemiptera: Aleyrodidae) and Helicoverpa armigera.

Also they had no acute weed problem as it is being here, though, they compelled to use herbicides. Also they were not accustomed to cultivate single cash crop on a large scale which in turn leads to wide climatic change especially the microclimate, hence, the rise of economic importance for some infections and plant diseases (cotton pests for example). Some of the most important insects in the new Halfa scheme is the African cotton worm, white fly, and Aphids, and some of the major pests are the Powderymidew in tomatos and dust in wheat, an example of some of the major weeds infestation are; sesebenia and pamoea kordofani.

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(5) Freeholds and investment lands: Freeholds are the in-kind compensation for the registered free lands at Wadi Halfa before inundation, it comprise an area of 24,000 feddans; which distributed at 27 locations around the villages of resettlement and the town of new Halfa. The relocatees preferred their freeholds to be separated from the lease-based tenancies to practice free cultivation whenever the scheduled agriculture not coincides to their desires.

The irrigation department agreed since 1964 to irrigate all the freeholds area (24,000 feddan) in the period from June till the end of February every year, and to irrigate one-quarter of the area (6,000 feddan) in the period from March till the end of May. But this agreement was changed in the year 2002, as a result of diminishing reservoir capacity, to be as follows:

-Irrigating 18,000 feddan in the period from first July till the end of October. -Irrigation of 6,000 feddan in the period from the first of November till end of June. This necessitates the cultivation of summer crops that can be harvested in October; otherwise, irrigation will depends on the dammed waters. The present situation of the use of freehold lands Two periods can be distinguished; related to the connection with the Corporation: (a)-The period of legitimate relation with the Corporation (1964-1992) This period witnessed the following services: 1- Establishment of 6 nurseries; at each one of the 6 inspections in the New Halfa, to produce fruit, decoration, and vegetable shoots, and to distribute it with suitable prices.

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2- Planning of ideal gardens inside these nurseries, so as to be a model for those who desire to establish their own fruit gardens. 3- Recruitment of water guards for the freeholds. This period was prosperous in the development of agriculture at the freehold lands, despite the inability of resettlers to make use of these facilities to establish their own fruit gardens due to their involvement in quick-earning production activities

(b)- The period of self-dependence (1992-2006) It is the period during which the policy of self-reliance was initiated in the management of irrigated schemes; one of its main characteristics is the reduction of labourers and cut of budgets in order to make these schemes depends upon itself. It is the period during which the policy of self-reliance was initiated in the management of irrigated schemes; one of its main characteristics is the reduction of labourers and cut of budgets in order to make these schemes depends upon itself. The outcome of such policies was the withdrawal of the Corporation from sponsoring and servicing the freehold lands, therefore, the freeholds became without formal management, added to the lack of informal management, the freeholds became without management; therefore, so many negative consequences resulted from such a situation, for example: 1- Bad land preparation and lack of legitimated agricultural rotations. 2-Personal efforts to cultivate different crops at different times with personal ways of cultivation. 3- Renting lands for long period of times, at least for one agricultural season, and leaving the lands in the hands of leaseholders; to cultivate it whenever and

139 whatever they wants and to irrigate lands with their own ways. This led to anarchy in cultivation and irrigation. 4- Inability of tenants to acquire agricultural inputs, improved seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides from its original sources. 5- Arbitrary use of pesticides without knowledge. 6- Exposure of producers to middlemen and exploitation of their efforts. The following table illustrates the distribution of freehold lands at the resettlement villages.

Table No.(8). freehold lands

Village No. freeholds/feddan 1 1008 2 826 3 867 4 978 5 1323 6 522 7 591 8 570 9 944 10 601 11 611 12 654 13 782 14 720 16 917 18 928 19 1214 20 1736 21 715 22 739 23 655 24 1330 26 1640 33 948 El-Gabal/Dabarosa 1714 total 24098 Source: NHAC

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Investment lands In addition to the freehold lands, the Ministry of Agriculture- Kassla State adopted what is named "green revolution project" in the early 1990, according to that project; individual investors are able to acquire lands inside the scheme at an area of 2 to 25 feddans. The distributed lands according to this project until now reached about 10.000 feddans. These lands, which were distributed all along the scheme, were initially parts of the agricultural rotation, and deducted as a result of either it is located at the ends of agricultural rotations, or because of its unsuitable engineering size, e.g. triangles.

The owners of these lands make use of it according to their own wishes of cultivation. water charges for these lands is not legislated, and the lands has no direct relation with the Corporation, therefore, cultivation and irrigation of these lands is an arbitrary process. Due to its vast spread among the rotations, these lands should be integrated and sponsored by the Corporation, and it should have its own water allotment, and schedule of cultivation.

(6) Animal in the scheme Animal production in the scheme: Agricultural rotation for the New Halfa scheme designed to be a tri- crop rotation, as follows: 5 feddans for cotton, 5 feddans for groundnuts, and 5 feddans for either wheat or sorghum. In a succession rotational system as follows: cotton is being cultivated in the previous groundnuts rotation; and groundnuts being cultivated in the previous wheat or sorghum rotation. In such a rotation, there is no room for green fodder crops; which represent the basic ingredient for animal aliment. The presence of Animal in the scheme

141 represents the main headache for both farmers and the management, mainly those who do not possess animals; where herders used to introduce their herds into the cotton fields at the picking stage; the matter which usually leads to the loss of considerable part of production.

Also cultivators of the northern parts of the scheme use to introduce their animals into cotton fields before the ending of the cotton-picking processes; which causes loss of significant part of production ranging from 0, 5 to 1 kantar per feddan according to the formal estimations. Selling of cotton tenancies for the cattle herders after the completion of the cotton-picking process is a new phenomenon recently appeared, Despite the positive returns for the two parties, some farmers and cattle pastoralists used to introduce their animals into the fields before the full ending of the picking process.

Cotton plant constitutes a green fodder of high nutritional value, and tasty for animals such as cattle, sheep and camels. However, such peculiarity has its negative impacts sometimes; due to the insecticides on cotton plant (the matter needs more laboratory investigation). In most countries of the world, animal production constitutes an integrated part of agricultural production, Except in Sudan, where contradictory policies and improper planning is the general feature of agricultural production. Or how can we explain the separation and exclusion of animal from all government-run agricultural schemes in the country?

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Halfwiyyin farmers and the Animal production: Animal rearing was not known by Halfawiyyin in their previous homelands; it was practice in a very small scale just enough to provide family with milk for daily consumption only from a few goats. However, some Halfawiyyin tenants in the scheme resorted to rearing some animals especially cattle to produce milk for local consumption and selling surplus in the markets of New Halfa town; in addition to fattening of calves to sell in times of need in the local market; especially at the time of groundnuts harvest, to meet the high cost of such process.

But recently such a phenomenon has recognizably disappeared among Halfawiyyin for several reasons, such as increasing costs of animal fodder, specially the oil cake and bran, in addition to the robbery of cattle, and the high cost of labouring from the other side. Nowadays appeared the idea of cultivating green fodder inside the scheme; where a considerable number of investors came on to the new Halfa scheme to cultivate fodders for export purposes.

The closeness of the new Halfa scheme to the country's main port (port Sudan) gives it a comparative advantage for investment in animal production in general, therefore; some top officials in the scheme" heads of agricultural inspections" pointed that there is a necessity of introducing animals into the agricultural rotation to benefit from the facilities available in the scheme the scheme, specially after the rehabilitation and the elimination of Mesquite trees, and the cleaning-up of irrigation canals. Cattle, sheep, goats and camels constitute the animal wealth in the area, all of which are of local varieties; where Butana cattle is the dominant variety

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in the area. Animal wealth administration studies of the year1990 indicated that the number of animals in the Butana area inside and outside the scheme as follows: - 120000 head of cattles - 900000 head of goat and sheep - 70000 head of camels - 1090000 total

Herded animals inside the scheme whether in the villages or entering the scheme from the surrounding areas during the period of harvest or during the dry season. AGRAR study about modernizing and rehabilitating the scheme in 1975 indicated that the numbers of animals inside the New Halfa Scheme were as follows: - 32000 head of cattle - 31000 head of sheep - 5260 head of goats - 7800 head of head of camel - 139060 total.

These numbers is before three decades; probably the increase in the numbers of cattle and small animals will not be less than three times due to the considerable change towards animal husbandry especially in the villages of the Arabs and the agricultural labourers. Also sizeable number of the resettled Nubians involved in such career; however, still far less than the desired due to the above stated difficulties and obstacles.

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Bases of livestock production in the scheme: 1- The existence of pure races of Butana cattle, which accept genetic improvement, to a high degree. 2- The desire on the part of the tenants to possess animals and to improve its productivity especially after the reduction of the areas of agricultural production due to water shortage. 3- The remains of field crops can be used to feed animals after doing some chemical treatments. 4- Availability of concentrated groundnuts fodder and cotton seed-cake in case of existence of modern factories of squeezing cotton seeds in the area 5- The existence of the following byproducts from the New Halfa Sugarcane Factory: - 80.000 tons green fodder of the upper edges of cane. - 25.000 tons of molasses. - 60.000 tons of bagasse 6- The existence of concentrated fodder factory of the Union of Cooperative Societies with capacity of 50 ton per day, and another factory owned by the Ministry of Animal Wealth of 5 tons per day. 7- Availability of fodders for poultry, and the existence of oviparous and zoophagous farms that can help to establish pales of productive families or commercial poultry farms. 8- The fallow lands of agricultural rotation, the lands of the sugar factory, freehold lands, and the edges of canals, with an area of about 84.000 feddans which can provide a considerable amount of fodder, about 124.200 tons.

Animal in the scheme, whether, domestic or coming from outside the scheme for watering or grazing crop remains; has some negative impacts on agricultural production in the scheme generally, with the exception of sugar

145 factory land; where introducing animals prohibited and the domestic animals subject to law controlling pasture. When analyzing the extent of integration of animal into the scheme; trends reveal some disadvantages upon agricultural production and the farmer from the presence of animals, due to the following:

-The remains of cotton crop being forcedly pastured without counseling the farmer who loses the chance to sell it. -Animals attack the cultivated crops due to its movement inside the fields without control except the cotton which protect by the corporation at the picking stage. -Pasturing the fallow lands without permission from its owners, and sometimes breach of waters to allow grow of grass. - Pasturing animals on the bridges of the irrigation canals and the drainages leads to erode the edges; then to breaches and leakages of water into the fields. - One of the main factors behind the spread of mesquite inside the scheme is the animal excreta, which is saturated with ready seeds for fast growing. - Solidification of lands as a result of pasturing on the wet lands.

Integrating animal to the agricultural rotation: It is not possible to introduce animals into the agricultural rotation in an integrated scientific way unless the negative impacts of animals' free movement inside the agricultural fields is well handled. If such movement is not legislated, whether animals belong to the farmer or not, such integration

146 becomes not balanced and the presence of animals in the scheme will negatively affect agriculture and the farmer. Therefore, such legislation necessitates the following steps:

- Counting the number of its type, and owners of animals; where and when pastured; and the places of its existence inside the scheme. - Determining of permanent residence places for each owner. - Prohibiting pasturing animals on the canals' bridges, the water drainages and channels. - Pasturing at agricultural lands should be with the agreement and permission from its owners according to certain regulations to conserve the lands and to prohibit the spread of mesquite. - Prohibiting Butana herders to freely come into the scheme except after agreements about the places of pasture, for limited periods and guaranteeing that its excreta is clean off mesquite seeds from the infected areas outside the scheme .

Therefore, to introduce animals into the agricultural rotation, this requires the following procedures:

- Protecting the farmer who possesses animals to make use of the remains of his crops. - Giving the farmer an animal unit with appropriate finance. - Make use of the remains of groundnuts and cane, and finding places and ways to store it or cultivation of fodder crops apt to storing in the case of unavailability of groundnuts

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- Rehabilitation of the existing fodder concentration factory, cotton cake- seeds, and molasses factories; and providing animal fodders for the villagers at suitable price - Establishing collective animal pales in the villages. - Aggregating and collective marketing for milk and meat products. - Introducing artificial insemination for cattle; and improving sheep and goat breeds.

(7) Other related agricultural services and organizations: Some other governmental, nongovernmental, and cooperative institutions were built to serve agriculture in the scheme, such as:

Agricultural Research Corporation: Its main role rotates around the applied researches in different agricultural activities that suit to the scheme; also it has a role to search the scientific views for the technical agricultural problems. The station has a number of agricultural specializations in cultivation, insects, plant diseases and soil. With the available facilities, and what could be added to it, the Corporation can occupy a distinguished position in innovating agricultural techniques, and laying the scientific foundations for agricultural problems in the scheme. Faculty of Agriculture and Natural Resources, New Halfa: The faculty has specializations in agricultural production, animal production, horticulture, agricultural engineering, rural development, and agricultural extension. The faculty highly concerned with agriculture in the area, where teachers and students conducting many field studies dealing with agricultural problems in the area.

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Agricultural mechanization: Agricultural mechanization represents the cornerstone in the scheme; it is very effective for the performance of many agricultural operations before and during cultivation, and at harvest. Without the availability of machines at a suitable quality and quantity, with the availability of maintenance workshops, spare parts, engineers, and skilled labourers, the agricultural production will become a difficult task. The following agent working in such a field:

Agricultural engineering (NHAC): It was one of the biggest institutions possessing agricultural machines with different types and sizes, with a capable staff of mechanics, agricultural and mechanical engineers, and available workshops. In the past, the unit was fulfilling the following activities: - Cleaning-up and amending of all lateral field channels (Abu-eshreens) - land flattening - Different types of deep- ploughing - All types of land softening. - All types of ploughing operation - Mechanical spraying of fertilizer. - Sowing and harvesting of wheat and groundnuts. - spraying of herbicides. - Wiping of agricultural routes.

During the first rehabilitation project-1983-which was financed by the World Bank, the Corporation was owning 400 tractors with all of its

149 accessories; putting a recognizable effect in the speed and quality of preparation for all crops of the agricultural rotation (cotton, groundnuts, sorghum, wheat), and also servicing the freeholds. With the last privatization policy, and liberalization of agriculture, the Corporation started to get-rid of all of its machines, and depending on the private sector for cotton operations, and completely failed to participate in the mechanical operations for the other crops.

The Corporation should have to entering this field again, for the following reasons: 1- Agricultural engineering is a professional, technical field, and the corporation has to participate in developing agricultural mechanization in the scheme. 2- The corporation should possess heavy machines and its accessories to perform the massive reclamation operations (reclamation of solid lands, clean-up of minor irrigation canals, wiping routes and lands, etc). 3- Necessity of owning some small field machines to maintain the prices balance for the private sector. 4- Rehabilitation of the existing workshops with engineers and skilled labourers to improve agricultural mechanization in the scheme.

Union of cooperative societies: After the arrival of Nubians into the new Halfa scheme; they began to establish a cooperative society at each village; each of which possessed a number of tractors, and a wheat harvester. These cooperative societies realized a recognizable success in self-dependence; in the cultivation, production and grinding of wheat. However, after the government

150 domination over cultivation, production and marketing of wheat, these cooperatives deteriorated and lost its basic abilities and returns.

Agricultural technical institutions: There are some other bureaus, belonging to federal or states Ministries, which suppose to service agriculture in the scheme, such as: Department of Animal wealth: This owns some offices, poultry pales, medical unit, and molasses plant. Pastures and fodder administration: has an office, few personnel, without work prerequisites. Nursery administration: have an office, a nursery and staff, but without work facilities. Unit of agricultural extension and technology: equipped with some staff, but without office and work facilities. Rural waters and land investment administration: a small office, with a limited staff; but with no work facilities. Central prevention unit: small office and few staff, but no work facilities. Administration of national forests: equipped with suitable staff, located in rented offices, administers and possessing eucalyptus belts which concentrated mainly inside the resettlement area; it has relatively good facilities from the fees of forests and eucalyptus products. The Cooperation office: it possesses an office and staff, but without work facilities. The above stated administrations has an important role in serving the different aspects of agriculture in the scheme; unfortunately, it stand completely helpless to perform its tasks, just names, without any recognized effects, also there is no coordination and linkages between these isolated

151 bureaus to contribute positively in the agricultural effort in the New Halfa scheme.

This dual situation of technical service for agriculture has to be amended. So these services have to be fixed either to the Corporation, or to Kasala State Ministry of Agriculture; in order to prohibit the contradiction, and to save the efforts and facilities. Unification of Headships of these services in one agricultural management, under united agricultural complex also would be more useful.

Agricultural financing through the Banks: Most of the banks at the New Halfa, namely, the Agricultural Bank, Farmer's Commercial Bank, Islamic Cooperative Development Bank, and the Sudanese French Bank, beside their dealing with the Corporation, they also provide finance for the farmers of the irrigated sector, however, few farmers are benefiting from these banks due to the complication of procedures, the needed guarantees, and the incompatibility of cultivation, harvest, and marketing schedules. Also claims of repayment even if the crop is not harvested or marketed in the appropriate time.

From the negative aspects in this respect; the weak control by the bank over the loans, and its uses by the beneficiaries who may use such loans in other ends away from agriculture; or payment in one installment with no concerns to grading the loan according to the stages of agricultural operations. For the better use of banks ceilings to finance farmers, procedures for loans must be simplified and not be linked by opening of a current account; also the

152 guarantee could be the produced crop that can be owned by the bank until the time of repayment. The agricultural bank should have to pay these loans on installment basis according to the agricultural operations need of finance; also the bank should assure completion of the financed operation before financing the next operation. Moreover, the loans have to be paid through the unions and cooperatives, and it should be in- kind not in cash (operations, fertilizers, seeds, pesticides, harvest operations and production inputs).

Agricultural inputs private stores: After the Corporation left providing of agricultural inputs as a result of agricultural liberalization policies; merchants started to deal with these inputs, therefore, appeared in the New Halfa a number of private stores commercially dealing in these inputs. No doubt, such shops largely filling the gap by supplying such inputs; however, there must be some sort of control in this respect, through certain rules and regulations. i.e. similar to the rules which organizing the work of human and veterinary pharmacies; and in each input there must be a precaution and prescription manual.

Transportation and storing: Transportation and storing do not constitute an obstacle, according to the available facilities in the scheme. The associations of trucks owners in the scheme possessing 95 trucks capable to transport in a one-way load 2500 ton. This; in addition to other companies and unions; with an additional capacity not less than the above mentioned size. Regarding the storing capacity in the scheme; there is a huge capacity, so, in addition to the stores

153 of the Corporation and the ginning stores; there are other stores belonging to many other institutions, such as stores of the Agricultural bank, the Union of cooperatives, and other agricultural institutions. Whatever the case could be in such respects " transportation and the storing"; the available facilities in the scheme can absorb any agricultural development process, moreover, the New Halfa scheme is connected by paved way to the national roads network.

(8) Marketing: Marketing constitutes one of the most important factors in the production process; it represents the final outcome for this process. As mentioned earlier; the government dominating the production of cotton; and marketing the crop through the cotton company. The government sited other two markets; one for field crops, and another for vegetables; and a pale for animal market. The first market is basically specialized in marketing groundnuts, where marketing facilities, the storing, guarding, and direct contact between producers and representatives of oil-seeds companies in free competition and open prices. Hence, the producers are rarely exploited by intermediaries.

After the application of the republican decree to abolish the fees of agricultural crops, these markets were abolished, as if these markets were established basically to collect fees, and not to provide producers with marketing services. Since then, the farmers carrying their crops in small loads, and facing the middlemen at the squires of the New Halfa market, where they compels, under the pressure of not return home with the crops, to

154 sell at the price which determined by the middlemen. The abandonment of the farmer under the mercy of intermediaries is one of the main causes that led to the collapse of agricultural production in the New Halfa scheme. The revitalization of crop markets in the New Halfa Scheme now is a necessary step towards correction. Also, there should be a concentration price, based on the costs and rates of production. Unions and cooperatives have to protect its members by empowering the bargaining ability of farmers through the storing and aggregation of the crops.

(9) Concluding remarks: (a) Irrigation Siteit dam represents an urgent priority for the survival of 30000 farmers and their families; where the total area they are cultivating, from hawashas and freeholds is about 160000 feddans. The annual loss of water of the Khashm el-Girba dam reservoir is around 10 million cubic meters. This directly affects the area of the agricultural rotation and the freeholds, whereas shortages of irrigation water do not affect the New Halfa sugar company due to its fixed share of water. The annual rate of the affected agricultural area of the Corporation is about 3.5%, around 5600 feddans. If matters gone at such sequence, this means after another 28 years there will be no farms in the scheme except the New Halfa Sugar Company in an area of 26000 feddans, which also is going to reduce the cultivated areas by the same rate. i.e. for only four seasons after the eradication of farmers and their families. This situation necessitates, until the construction of Siteit dam, in the nearest future, the following procedures:

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- Considering the scheme as a livelihood project; because farmer can not cultivate more than two crops in the year; and facing so many difficulties even to irrigate the two crops. - Subsidizing farmers in the prices of agricultural inputs to reduce production costs - The Corporation should stick to the scheduled time (May/June) in the cultivation of the three summer crops so as to finalize early, depending on the river flood, and not on the dam water in order to be ready to cultivate a reasonable area of winter rotation of at least 25.000 feddans - Farmer should not allow cultivating more than two crops in the year; one cash crop (cotton/groundnuts) and another food crop (sorghum/wheat) - The Sugar Company has to introduce other crops to produce sugar such as sugar-beet; or less water-consuming cane. - Tryout of other means, different than dam washing, to reduce the rate of sedimentation, and importation of new machines for this purpose. Mature -Reliance on quick-mature, thirst-resistant type of crops; and raising rates of production. - Introducing crop insurance system, or methods to avoid crises which facing agricultural production. - Issuing new laws to regulate use of irrigation water and organizing withdrawal of water from the canals, and empowering the responsible managerial device. - Studying and remedying the inefficiency of the design capacity of the main canal, and increasing water deliveries by improving distribution infrastructure. - Tryout of other different methods of spraying irrigation. (b)The New Halfa Agricultural Corporation:

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1- Cotton crop: - Farmers should participate in supervising the production processes and amendment of the negative practices via farmers' Union devices. - Providing of all agricultural production requisites and loans on time. - Raising farmers’ participation in cotton pest control operations, and application of integrated pest control programmes. - Improvement of cotton-picking operations. - Devaluating the numerous fees which imposed on cotton crop 2- Groundnuts, Sorghum, and Wheat: - Providing water for early cultivation of groundnuts and sorghum from the dam water (15May till end of June). - Supplying of improved-seeds, and fertilizers through long-term loans. Agricultural engineering: - The Corporation should possess heavy machines with its attachments necessary for lands reclamation - Support of the agricultural engineering department by engineers and skilled labours, and preparing maintenance workshops and providing the needed spare parts. - The corporation should possess some light machines for agricultural operations to maintain price balance for mechanical operations, and fixing the prices. - Training of personnel of the private sector, and of the cooperatives in the use of agricultural machines. Structural management reform: - Reforming the structure of the Corporation; especially the agricultural management with ways that it attracts the graduates, the qualified and professional personnel, in the field of agriculture and the other needed fields;

157 and Support of the agricultural bureaus which execute the agricultural work at the level of the farm with work facilities; and improvement of the technical performance with on-going training. - Establishing of an integrated unit responsible for water management at the level of branch canals, equipped with supervisors, waters guards', and clear regulations to organize withdrawal of irrigation water and best uses of water. -Creating strong relation with farmers through their Union at all levels (headship, intermediate, and lower level). (c) The rehabilitation project: - Mesquite needs close follow-up from all disadvantaged bodies; they should highly assure that mesquite would never return. - concern should be directed to the other components which were not included in the present rehabilitation, such as the problem of land height, and possessing of new machines to flattening land and cleaning of "Abu- eshreens".

(d) Farmers’ union: - The democratic basis in constituting of the farmers' union is required, away from government, or any other regional and ethnic interference. - Giving more consideration for the roles of the devices of the farmers' union at the field level (branch committees and inspection committees). Researches and agricultural education: - Support of agricultural researches corporation in the New Halfa to enable it to take its role in the applied researches about the real problems in the scheme. - Support of the faculty of agriculture and natural resources to qualify agricultural extension personnel, the local leaders and farmers.

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(e) Freeholds and investment lands: 1- The Corporation has to supervise these lands in an apparent managerial, technical, and legislative relation to organize agriculture and irrigation, through the union of freeholders. 2- Encouragement of investors of rewarding economic projects. 3- Marketing the products of these lands from vegetables and fruits at a market under direct control of the union of freeholders. (f) Agricultural Cooperation’s and Unions: 1- Encouragement of cooperatives to possess light machines for all operations of production and harvest; and to deal with agricultural inputs. (g) Animals in the agricultural rotation: 1- Integrating animals into the agricultural rotation and the freehold lands in a scientific way. 2- Lessening the negative impacts of animal existence inside the scheme in an illegal way. 3- Each farmer has to possess an animal unit. 4- Making use of the scheme available fodder facilities, by supplying farmers with animal fodder. (h) Agricultural financing through banks: 1- Introducing of some improvements, and simplification of procedures to make use from the agricultural loans. (i) Technical agricultural institutes: 1- Removal of dualism, and aggregation of these institutes, unification of headships. (j) Agricultural marketing: 1- Opening of specialized markets for all field and horticulture crops, to provide producers with marketing services.

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2- Protecting farmers from mediators' hegemony. 3- Encouragement of establishing industries based on agricultural production.

(10) The problem of Mesquite Conflict trees: the Mimosoid legume tree genus Prosopis, commonly known as mesquite, which, probably more than any other woody plant group, encapsulates the sometimes extreme dilemmas faced by those concerned with tree planting and management on harsh sites. The paradox is that while Prosopis species are amongst the world's toughest and most useful trees — able to grow, thrive, and produce an impressively diverse array of high quality products that are useful to people on extremely arid, degraded and harsh sites — they are also amongst the world's worst invasive weeds, already infesting huge areas in parts of Africa, Australia, Brazil, Hawaii and elsewhere, in areas where they do not belong. This has led to the apparently absurd situation of some agencies promoting the spread and planting of Prosopis whilst at the same time others are spending large amounts of money attempting to eradicate it through mechanical, chemical or biocontrol measures. Many of the mainstream species used in reforestation have come to be seen as 'conflict trees' carrying risks of uncontrolled spread and invasion alongside the provision of economic and other benefits to society, but few have been the focus of such intense and polarized debate as we have seen in recent years over Prosopis (Hughes, Colin 2001, pp. 111-112).

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The history of Mesquite in the Sudan: With some benefits of Mesquite, the tree was introduced into the Sudan in 1917, then to the new Halfa in 1966, then the false masks of Mesquite started to drop; when it became an enemy invaded huge areas of the scheme and pulled it out of production especially at the southern part; till December 2002 when issued a republican decree to rehabilitate the New Halfa Scheme, declaring war against Mesquite in the scheme. The bid was anchored on “Switch for Trading and Engineering Company”. The contract was signed in February 2004 to combat Mesquite in an area of 250,000 feddan in the NHAC, within 720 days; the whole affected area was cleaned.

Mesquite is a perennial green, thorny tree, of 5 to 6 meter average in length, in the Sudan exists the Prosopis chilensis and Prosopis africana, both of them the Prosopis family which belongs to the family leguminasae. Mesquite was introduced into the country in the year 1917 from Egypt and South Africa, and was planted in Shambat; from where it spread out to some other sites in Khartoum north, then a mesquite forest was planted south of Khartoum Airport, also a green belt was established at al- Shagara area and then planted in some other areas in the Sudan such as the Gezira, Kassala, el- Gash, Suba, Port Sudan, al- Garassa, south of Al- Foung and the Northern Sudan.

Mesquite was introduced to Kassala in the early 1950s and started to spread in 1974, through spraying of seeds in the high areas of East and West Tagog forests', and Al- malawiya area. In 1986 mesquite was introduced into Awwad area in Kassala rural council through the sale of nurslings; and it was spread through seed dispersion by pasture animals till it reached the area

161 of Goz- rajab, then started to invade the nomad areas in west kassala rural council and Hamoushkoreeb, through selling and circulation of mesquite fruits to use it as animal fodders, in addition to the other ways of spreading. Mesquite entered into the New Halfa Scheme in the year 1966, where it was used as a fence for the experimental farm and then vastly spread into the irrigated areas in a manner recognized by the head of forests administration in the scheme at that time, whom he ordered to eradicate mesquite; eradication was done except some trees around villages No (1) and (2), according to the statements of the concerned peoples. These remaining trees, in addition to seeds spread by CARE in the area of refugees near vault (62) constitutes the nucleus from which mesquite spread till it covered the whole of the scheme.

Causes behind introducing Mesquite: The benefits of mesquite, constituted the main causes behind its entry into the different parts of the Sudan, which are: - Fixing sand dunes, combating desert encroachment, and soil erosion. - Source of firewood, charcoal and buildings boles; one feddan of Mesquite produces about 16 cubic meter of Firewood each four years. - Fixing nitrogen and fertilizing the land, if crops were sown after removal of Mesquite. - Permanent source of animal and human fodder; as its fruits contain 31% protein of its weight -Fence for gardens and wind-resistance belts. These, in addition to the peculiar features of Mesquite to preserve its kind and its ability to spread vastly, were regarded as good characteristics which enabling the spread of good plant, and preserving it from extermination.

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However, practical experiments evidenced that such peculiar characteristics of mesquite constitutes the main shortcomings of mesquite which enabling the plant to escape out and invade all lands and obstruct its cultivation; in addition to the prominence of the other disadvantages of mesquite which lastly led to categorizing Mesquite as dangerous pest that necessitates huge and costly campaigns to combat it. Disadvantages of Mesquite: 1-Disadvantages on agricultural field: Mesquite trees grow on irrigation canals and its fruits shed on the water, floating and spread with water. This causes the following: -Derangement of water flow; and increases the water losses through evaporation and absorbability, Mesquite takes its lot of water from these canals before the targeted crops. - Mesquite obstructs canals purging; removal of silt and general maintenances for canals doors, and the other irrigation infrastructures. - Prohibits growing of herbs because it drying the earth outer surface. - Roots of Mesquite increasing solidity of the soils; therefore, increasing the cost of land preparation due to increases cost of fuel and tractors working hours to about 90% of the real prices. - Best hosting ground for some agricultural pests; such as insects, rats, and wild animals -Mesquite occupied some agricultural routes and hindered its uses. -Mesquite thorns obstruct some agricultural machinery through boring its wheels. -Mesquite occupies some agricultural lands, pulls it out of production; and hence transfers owners of these lands to unemployment; and deprived the publics from its production; therefore booming a national resource. This is

163 largely what is happening in the New Halfa Scheme, where a considerable number of inhabitants flee out; seeking living away from the scheme as the interviews revealed -Some of mesquite proteins causes digestion strait for some animals which depends on it as fodder.

2- Disadvantages on the health field: - Mesquite represents an ideal habitat for vermin, snakes, wild dogs and damaging pests. - Density of pollen releases by dense mesquite trees, causing allergy, and el- darees fever. - The existence of mesquite trees on the edges of some bogs creates an ideal environment for mosquitoes’ proliferation. - Some cases of ends abscission due to mesquite injuries were observed (hands, feet). - exhausting shallow wells drinking waters, and increases its salinity because mesquite roots absorbs water and leaving salts. 3- Disadvantages on the security field: Mesquite is used by criminals and law-breakers in the following aspects: - To conceal the stolen and smuggled cars, animals, goods and movables. - Safe refuge from crimes of killing, and hidings of illegal babies' corpse. -Concealment of smuggled weaponry, ammunitions, drugs and wines. - Mesquite forests were used as a veil for robbery and rebellion. -Many reported deaths and permanent disabilities as a result of traffic accidents caused by mesquite.

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Mesquite has many characteristics enabling it to preserve its kind and persist against all types of improper environments and hence, against all combating processes targeting mesquite, some of these characteristics are: - Mesquite use to preserve its kind by abundant production of seeds, despite its blooms are not tasty for animals, the fruits (pods) are desired and tasty where animals feed on it and hence facilitate the spread of mesquite. - Mesquites' mature seeds are unsusceptible to digestion by animals, except the broken and damageable seeds. - Mesquites' mature fruit contains sponges’ vacuums enabling it to float on the running water surface to grow anywhere. -Twin seeds which contained by mesquite fruit don't grow simultaneously under favourable environments; caution for the diversion of such environments after growth to unfavourable ones, that may lead to the death of all growing seeds, therefore, these twin seeds grow on an interval of times that may reach ten years. -The peg root of mesquite rarely exceed 1.5 meters for the trees which growing on edges of irrigation canal, however, the same root may extends to reach 20 meters if the plant do not find a way for water except to reach such depth. Mesquite also bears high saline waters and soils, and shares with some other plants the ability to urge flowering and fruiting in cases of incurrence of circumstances threaten its life such as thirst.

The location of targeted mesquite: Mesquite targeted with the last control campaign, and completely removed from an area of 250.000 feddans infected by it, which constitutes about 61% of the total area of the NHPC (407381) feddan. In addition to other 40000 feddans; the area occupied by the new Halfa Sugar factory. Studies indicates

165 that mesquite is a pest which can not be controlled via one tactic, therefore, the contracted company used an integrated control programme, which contains the mechanical control- manual and excavator methods, besides chemical, agricultural extension, and laws and legislation methods of control.

(11) The future of the NHAC in the light of the present problems: There are many problems that required pressing solutions: The problem of migration is the natural outcome of the other numerous problems that confronting tenants and citizens, such as irrigation problems, high costs of production , weak production and productivity, therefore, great losses to farmers. In addition to national financial and monetary policies, that adversely affects production. In addition to health issues and problems such as malaria, bilharzias, typhoid, and other diseases resulted from health default, weak and fragile environmental health, and other water- related diseases. All that; added to the deteriorating level of education in the area, which resulted from the migration of qualified teachers, and the lack of appropriate environment such as residence, transportation and accommodation for students, who are occupied by such other issues, added to illnesses, consequently, they often get weak results. There are considerable numbers of school drop-outs in villages of resettlement. The future of the NHAC will depend, in addition to constancy of the farmer, on many other factors, mainly:

-Rehabilitation of the corporation and the other infrastructures, the first stage was done, and the second still remaining.

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-Reforming the ways of dealings with farmers, by leaving the door open to accept wide participation, and amending formulae of agricultural financing -Caring about the key role of the farmer in agricultural matters, and jointly working to implement the technical packages in order to increase productivity. -After removal of Mesquite, the follow-up is vital, and the putting of an operational combating programme which will not be affected by shortage of finance.

Before all of the above; the basic problem of the scheme; the irrigation problem must be solved; and this entirely depends on the following:

1) The construction of Siteit dam; and initiation of a plan for replanting the entire area of the agricultural rotation in the scheme, with continuous and annual maintenance to secure the cultivated areas not to decreasing it again. 2) Finding any other solutions to restore the full storage capacity of Khashm el-Girba reservoir; either by bringing modern machines to purge the lake, or alimentation of the lake through different methods and other inventions, to dam rain-water of autumn, and reuse it at the awkward times (December- June). The learned experience from the development of new economic opportunities which were created by the scheme (cultivation, animal husbandry) indicating that for the other future plans of resettlement, if can not be entirely avoided, planning the integration of these new potentials within resettlement programme would be more beneficial. Thereby government capital could be more effectively invested, and the affected people could benefit as well. An integrated and comprehensive regional plan for the development of the whole Butana plain seems to be more effective

167 than the isolated agricultural development plan, which was based on irrigated farming. Photo. No. (1). Diesel pump to raise water from irrigation canals.

Source: fieldwork

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Photo. No. (2). Minor irrigation canal after rehabilitation!

Source: field work Photo. No. (3). Cattle at the fringes of the scheme

Source: field work

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Photo. No. (4). Mesquite trees before and after rehabilitation

Source: NHAC research unit.

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Chapter Six The Present Halfawiyyin Situation

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Chapter Six : The Present Halfawiyyin Situation, and the rising Halfawiyyin community at suburban Khartoum

1-Location and characteristics: The presence of Nubians in Khartoum, especially Halfawiyyin, is not a new phenomenon; Nubians were known since their early history by migration out of their homeland to seek work abroad. Nubians’ distinct ethnic neighbourhoods in Khartoum was noticed and documented by different researchers (Hale. 1982.p351).

However, Nubians who have recently migrated from the New Halfa scheme into Greater Khartoum, especially during the last three decades-since 1980s and onwards- did not attract researchers' interest till now despite the accelerated manner of this migration. New migrant Halfawiyyin confined their residence to Khartoum, in most cases, at the south quarters of the city- generally third to forth class residential areas- along the area extended between Al-Ozozab north to Jebel- awliya south of Khartoum state, at Jebel- awliya province, with a recognizable concentration at el-Kalakla, el- Shigailab, and um-usher respectively, around fifteen to twenty kilometers southwestern of Khartoum downtown. Jebel-awliya town is the southern limit of these residential preferences. Distribution of relatives, kin people and familiarity of the inhabitants beside low rents and comparatively cheap land prices are the main reasons behind such selection of residence. Living among relatives and own people, relative availability of social services (education, health, transports, markets, electricity, water, and so forth) and the nearness to places of work are also stated as important reasons. However, most of Halfawis at these areas, i.e. el-Kalakla, el-Shigailab, and

172 um-usher reside at own houses, or reside at houses of their expatriate relatives; those who reside at rented houses are very few and usually composed of single and unmarried male individuals. The actual number of the newly migrated Halfawis to the mentioned areas is difficult to account, but under any estimation, we talk about hundreds of families, and more than that of single individuals, and the drift of new migrants is an ongoing process.

The social setting within which they live is composed of, beside old timers Halfawiyyin , other Nubian subsets, mainly Mahas, Danagla and kenuz, in addition to Shaygiyya and Ja'alyeen, They usually prefer and practice residence among familiar northern Sudanese groups .i.e. The assumed Arab origins groups; the reason for this tendency, according to those interviewed at the three sites is the cultural similarity, and that they feel more secure of being among one's own people, and can develop long stable mutual relationships. However, elements of imitating other fellows are also there, and it is common to observe a first-class house bordering clay brick house at the three mentioned sites, Halfawis caring more for their ethnic companions rather than for their class peers.

The inhabited area of el-Kalakla, el-Shigailab, and um-usher, was previously an agricultural land (sawagi) irrigated by small pumps due to its proximity to the White Nile, or depends on groundwater, but the natural encroachment of Greater Khartoum to its hinterlands increases the land value, consequently the owners of such lands-mainly from Arab tribes (Halfawiyyin are not concerned by and differentiated between Arab tribes, they categorize all of them as Arabs) of the area-Hassania, Jemoiya- use to

173 sell it for others who seek residence, and land speculators. Therefore, during the last three decades, the whole area extended between Al-Ozozab to Jebel- awliya was transformed into residential area with the exception of some very few pockets of agriculture scattered among these new villages.

By the nature of its emergence, these new settlements suffer unceasing difficulties of supplying and distribution of services, mainly roads, potable water, rainwater drainages and electricity, due to the lack of planning and spontaneous nature of emergence and growth. So, such services even when and wherever provided, it was mainly as a direct result of community self help, and usually be done at high social and monetary costs because some houses and buildings has to be partially or completely removed away to make way for the extension of roads, water network, electricity transmission lines and so forth. Also a lot of land and houses registration problems arise because of the informal nature of the process of selling and buying of lands. Community cooperation is the most notable feature among Nubians in general, and Halfawiyyin in particular; such value remains strong among Nubian urban migrants. Nubian social organizations, customs, and behaviour reflect and encourage concepts and values of cooperation and corporateness which insure intra-group peace and security. Such feature among migrated Halfawiyyin can be clearly observed in their daily contacts, strong social ties, mutual help and cooperation especially in social and economic affairs, where they help each others in seeking jobs, residential lands and houses in the same neighborhoods. Therefore, at Khartoum suburbs, it seems that the strong social ties among Halfawiyyin is more economic than cultural one, that is Halfawiyyin , are associated and linked together on the basis of

174 mutual economic interests and not merely on that of emotional affinity and kin relations.

Migrant Halfawiyyin from different villages of the new Halfa scheme, familiar with urban values; attracted by the features of Greater Khartoum; where the poor economic conditions, and collapse of services essential for pushing people to migrate are quite evident in the new Halfa; found an ideal habitation area at these new sites to reside close to each other, block themselves in a series of neighborhoods, with comparatively few non- Halfawiyyin people among them; such situation provides the newcomers with the needed security, protection, jobs, help and the other requirements they are searching for; However, it is common for Nubians in general to reside beside each others wherever they go, even those who migrated outside the country, especially to the Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, they substituted residence close to each others which is not possible there, by the establishment of charitable associations and clubs at which they can meet each others and keep their strong ties an linkages with each others and with their original home villages, it is estimated that there are more than 500 Nubians’ association only at the Saudi Arabia (http://www.sudaneseonline.com,25.3.2008).

A sample of randomly selected 25 households interviewed at el-Shigailab and 25 households at um-usher, asked to state reasons for coming to Khartoum, their answers can be grouped into push and pull factors; the first set of factors, were stated respectively as; easy life, work circumstances and work opportunities, schools, hospitals, clean drinking water, electricity, medicine, and security, whereas those pushing them out of the scheme were

175 respectively stated as; fear of diseases, especially malaria and kidney failure, seeking more income, contaminated water, lack of security, spread of Mesquite trees, collapse of agriculture, and abolition of wheat cultivation.

Unexpectedly, few respondents said that such unfavourable circumstances at the new Halfa scheme are temporary, and they will return to the New Halfa, to live among their relatives as soon as the economic situation there has improved, and diseases disappear. However, the majority of interviewees at el Shigailab consider that the situation at the new Halfa scheme has completely collapsed, agricultural production failed, and the contaminated water and much diseases compel them to come to Khartoum, quoting their words "we came from Halfa as a result of much diseases and the spread of Mesquite, also agriculture is no longer beneficial, there are wrong agricultural policies, Halfa will not succeed except as an animal husbandry area, here there is no diseases, health and education services, despite of its scarcity and it is provided on self-support, it is far better than that existed at the New Halfa, el-Shigailab is an Arab area, but we share them such limited services".

The average family size of the migrant families at el shigailab and um-usher ranges between 5-10 persons, in addition to more 1-2 other persons living with them, normally relatives, friends or from the same village, giving a total average size of household of 12 members. Participant observation revealed that most of the nonfamily members, who are mainly relatives, staying either unemployed, or claiming work as middlemen, the only work that does not need a fixed place. This indicates a heavy population pressure at the household level, and justifying migration under an economy of deteriorating

176 to an alarming level. Ironically, the relatively low level of education among the majority of the newcomers-mostly school leavers or school dropouts- is another indicator of uncontrollable situation at the area from which they came, i.e. the sociocultural and economic circumstances prevailing at the new Halfa scheme. However, many household heads indicated that they are receiving irregular remittances from their expatriate sons and/or relatives, especially at occasions of Eids, weddings, deaths and tough illnesses. The trend of involvement in migration is strong among young people, mostly school leavers, illiterate (very rare cases), and school dropouts at ages ranged between 40 years to less than 25 years age.

The newcomer Halfawiyyin youth, mostly lacking the capabilities and basic skills to compete for stable jobs which potentially assure for socioeconomic stability, hence, most of them now are either unemployed, or recruited to the informal sector, i.e. middlemen, and/or to other cheaply paid part-time basis jobs, i.e. unskilled labourers jobs (drivers, timekeepers, storekeepers, etc), it is very common to meet tens of those unemployed youths every day agglomerating in front of shops and around women selling tea at al Kalakla el-lafa market, each of them claiming work as a middleman, spending their times, hence, their life wastefully, with no hope and dream. Giving reasons and validating the general impression and accusation held by many Sudanese that Halfawiyyin are religiously uncommitted, and that they are thought to smoke the illegal hasheesh or bango, and usually use to drink alcohol. The only worry for most youth whom were interviewed is to collect petty money just enough to buy cigarette, tea, coffee, liquor, hashish, transports, and after a while returning to new Halfa, then again to Khartoum, with no specific goal and on irregular commute bases, unintentionally

177 paying the cost of incorporation into the wider, unperceivable development models and plans supposed to be designed and implemented to advance their life, nonetheless, it only accelerated the process of pauperizing them.

The increasing influx of Halfawis individuals and families into the greater Khartoum is mainly, but not only restricted to the inhabitants of the southern villages of the scheme, which is the area that was highly infected by mesquite trees, thus mesquite, in part, is a cause and consequence of such migration, that is, people depart their tenancies and migrate away because it was occupied by Mesquite, and Mesquite encroach into such deserted lands which were abandoned by its owners and just ignored by the Corporation. Hence, the recent rehabilitation programme which succeeded to eradicate Mesquite from the scheme seems to be endangered under such lack of follow-up at the farm level, especially at the southern parts of the scheme. However, those who came from the southern villages of the scheme, i.e. north villages of Wadi Halfa; owing to their comparatively higher educational level and good life standard, they were mostly able to preserve and sustaining such privileges, continuing to engage in stable and secure jobs at Khartoum, getting residence at first to two class residential areas, especially the old timers migrants, better mobilizing resources since the early days of resettlement, when they reinvest their cash compensation in low priced land in Khartoum and its suburbs, they support their remaining family members and individuals at the scheme and at the Old Halfa and investing considerable money and efforts in greater Khartoum. Whereas migrants’ influx from the southern villages is increasing overtime, they are, at most cases, joining the informal sector and part-time low jobs, or just stay unemployed at their relatives' homes, and constitute the overwhelming

178 majority of Halfawiyyin youth who are recently witnessed at large groups at al kalakla el-lafa markets, visiting other relatives and friends, or wandering at the streets of Khartoum. Hence, the gap between the two groups of resettled Halfawiyyin is likely to be kept as it was before resettlement, if not be fatherly widened.

Field observation and follow-up revealed that there is a constant southwards shift of Halfawiyyin residential preferences, i.e. from el-Kalakla to el- Shigailab, um-usher, and onwards, along the Eastern bank of the white Nile, which is the area mainly inhabited by the White Nile Arabs, among whom, it seems that Halfawiyyin feel more security and stability; and this may be attributed mainly to cultural similarity between Nubians and Arabs. Although there are some exceptions, Halfawiyyin do not freely mix with Arabs.

Very few numbers of newly comers Halfawiyyin ' families were also recognized at Soba villages, some fifteen kilometers southeastern Khartoum along the Blue Nile, where also many old-timer Nubians reside; signing the beginning of Halfawiyyin migration into that area. One of the possible explanations for such concentration and movement into these areas is that most of those newcomers who are from the north villages of the new Halfa scheme (ex-Ard el Hajar villages), were comparatively poor and of low educational qualifications and generally recruited to low-paid jobs or unemployed, though not able to own a house, usually seeking free residence at other expatriate or well-off relatives houses, otherwise resort to low rent houses at these new areas.

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Such trend of Halfawiyyin movement was early recognized by Sondra Hale (Hale 1982), when she mentioned that southward movement of Nubians, especially Halfawiyyin from downtown Khartoum to Khartoum three, el- Seggana, el-Shajara, al Ozozab and el-Kalakla. However, causes behind such drift were changed, i.e. from investment to mere secure resort away from the scheme. What is important here is that the most significant concentrations of Halfawiyyin recent migrants are in Khartoum, particularly the peripheries of Khartoum South.

The process of family migration from new Halfa into Khartoum usually starts like that: first a single family member, whether married or not, comes to seek job and usually reside with relatives or joining other single male friends, then he starts to mobilize his social ties looking for work, not to mention that Halfawiyyin ' wide social network in greater Khartoum is still a highly effective mechanism in this respect, through which a newcomer, after awhile, succeeds to get work that suits his qualification; thereafter, he managed to move to a separate house to receive his family. That is, when one succeeds, he usually, with a strong feeling of obligation to his people, expected to share such success with kin; for example, by getting jobs for other Halfawiyyin; receiving them at home, and present financial and moral support, such socioeconomic ties are only part of Halfawiyyin network in greater Khartoum, within the wider cultural and ethical domain. It is this strong social commitment which is the main cause of accusation of Nubians, especially Halfawiyyin, as characterized by nepotism and patronage, and even as racist in some cases and contexts. Whatever the case might be, it is clear that Halfawiyyin favours themselves even over the other Nubians in respect of residence, rent, work, and the alike.

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As opposed to the pioneers Halfawiyyin migrants in greater Khartoum, who highly adhere to their homeland and to their kin ties, and well equipped in terms of education or other skills, and who were either white-collar occupants or skilled labourers; the majority of contemporary migrants Halfawiyyin, mainly youth people, regrettably, lacking the required skills to compete for urban jobs, even though, the influx is continuing, as one of Halfawiyyin ' youth stated during an interview with a small group of Halfawiyyin ' youth at al- Kalakla el-lafa market "at the scheme we are doing nothing, and here is the same thing, it is better to stay here at Khartoum at least there is a possibility of work, and away from Halfa diseases". Therefore, such recent influx of Halfawiyyin into suburbs of Khartoum; whom are expected to respond as settled farmers in the new scheme; can be explained in the light of certain push and pull factors, that is, the stagnant situation of agricultural production and the concomitant economic and social problems at the new Halfa scheme, on the one hand, and the attraction of Khartoum as a city in which they can easily find work and better life opportunities.

Astonishingly enough is to find an illiterate youth, or school leaver, whose father at least holds an intermediate school certificate. Such phenomenon is a real indication of the blindness of induced resettlement plans and policies as a development option, which, in our case, instead of generating far- reaching positive changes, it only ended up to more impoverishment for the resettled Halfawiyyin ; and provide another convincing rationale for Halfawiyyin to leave the New Halfa scheme.

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2-Villages sending migrants: A combination of push and pull factors, seems to have long-term impacts on the life of the resettled Halfawiyyin, and may affects the future of the scheme itself; for example, out of 300 houses of village No.1., at the new Halfa scheme, 80 families migrated and now living at el-Shigailab in owned houses, whereas another 100 families from the same village live in rented houses at el-Kalakla, el-Haj yousif, el-shajara and Al-Ozozab. That means around 60% of the village population migrated to Khartoum.

It is commonly observed that the majority of those who recently migrated from the scheme towards Khartoum, i.e. to the three above mentioned sites, were from the southern villages of the scheme, mostly from Argin villages of No. 5, 8 and 11 (far northern limits of Old Halfa district) who are initially not dependent on agriculture even at their old home, and part of Digheim and Faras villages, i.e. villages No.4, 5, and 7. whereas those who are more or less dependent on cultivation in the past are the inhabitants of Ard el- Hajar (the belly stone), the southern villages of Old Halfa district, and now occupy the northern part of the new Halfa scheme, and concentrated mainly at villages No. 10, 15, 19, 26,19,24,16 and kilo 14.

Villages of the highest rate of migrants were villages No.1, 2, beside Argin Villages (5, 8, and 11). Whereas around 30% of Dibeara village inhabitants (6, 3, and 9) migrated out, also the village No. 13 is now semi evacuated except of a few employees. Village No.8 has especial situation, most of its houses collapsed because the contractor who built the village, Ali Dongola- a local Sudanese contractor did not adhere to the required building standards(observation, interviews, and Dafalla 1975), for example, out of the

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250 houses of the village, exactly 80 houses collapsed by July 2006, however, people of this village has strong relation to Khartoum even before resettlement due to their high level of education, a considerable number of them migrated to Khartoum at the early days of the scheme.

An increasing number of resettled Halfawiyyin recently start to migrate to Old Halfa, most of them are from the villages of the past Ard el-Hajar, to make use of the newly alluvial emerging lands along the Nile, where silt accumulated there at their past mostly rocky lands, and create vast areas highly potential for cultivation, contrary to the northern parts of the inundated area where there is no silt accumulation and most of the lands were either of sandy or rocky texture. However, the numbers of those who are involved in such migration is still not large enough to conclude that a reverse migration to old Halfa is on the way, and because they usually return to new Halfa after the end of cultivation season.

What is more interesting in this respect is that each of the two groups (inhabitants of the southern villages of the scheme and those of the northern villages) claiming that they are the best cultivators since the old home and bemock the other group as never seen agriculture before. Whatever the actual situation might be, it is safe to state that the newcomers from the resettled Halfawiyyin into south Khartoum suburbs are from the different villages of the New Halfa scheme.

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3-Village.26. Social services: The largest resettlement village in terms of population density, number of houses, tenancies and freehold lands, located in the northern part of the scheme about eight kilometers north of new Halfa town, inhabited by the last regiment of resettled Nubians in the year 1967. The village composed of four neighborhoods; from north to south: Saras, Samna, Atieri and Culub. It is the same names of the original villages from which the resettlers came, and they were relocated inside the village according to the same order of location before the resettlement. These are some of the people of the far southern limits of the inundated area, 40 kilometers south of Old Halfa town; it is a part of what is named 'Ard el-Hajar'; small villages located at a hard rocky area along the second cataract, though, it was natural to be distinguished by shortage of cultivable lands, low economic production, consequently, poor economic situation and low population size.

The population of village 26 is about 3 thousands, with a family size ranges between 6-9 members. Due to its location at the edge of the resettlement area, the other neighbouring Arab villages depends on it for transport, health, education, shops, and the other services, beside the nearby agricultural labourers camps and squatters. The most urgent problem faced by inhabitants of the village now is potable water; water tank was designed for 175 houses, the standard number of houses in all resettlement villages, whereas, village 26 has 300 houses; at the early years of settlement, potable water and other services was quite satisfactory, but since the beginning of 1980s, such services started to deteriorate due to lack of maintenance and

184 replacement, adding to the natural increase in population size of the village and the other uses of water such as for watering domesticated animals and trees. A field tour inside the village revealed the miserable situation of potable water, water brought directly from the canal into spoiled filter system, which is not rehabilitated since its establishment in the year 1967; the potable water distribution network inside the village is in a very bad condition; where water leakages can be witnessed all around the village, indicating the lack of care on the part of inhabitants and their inability to provide finance to maintain such service. The houses which situated at the ends of the village no longer receive drinking water as a result of shortages and wastage of potable water, and those who still receiving water; it is only for six to eight hours/day.

The Village inhabitants suspect that it is this contaminated water which is directly responsible for the spread of the kidney failure illness, however, during the past 2 year alone, 6 cases of kidney failure were recorded at the village; patients were transferred to Khartoum for medication that is not available at the new Halfa hospital, and sadly they died there. Kidney failure became a real source of obsession and cause of anxiety and strain for many relocatees, and it was indicated by many migrant Halfawiyyin at Khartoum suburbs as one of the major causes behind their migration. However, beside kidney failure, malaria infection can safely be estimated as 100 % of resettled Halfawiyyin . All the interviewees (group discussions and individual interviews) at the village when asked about epidemic diseases, they indicated malaria, at least once every two to three years a person is getting sick by malaria. Unfortunately, the lack of records at the village medical unit and the useless registration system at the new Halfa hospital

185 due to indifference and/or lack of proficiency did not help to produce reliable data upon which to depend.

Halfawiyyin strong social ties and commitments obligates close relatives, friends and neighbours of the sick person to accompanying him during the malady, whatever the time, social and monetary cost of such accompaniment; in doing so, they also add further discomfort upon the other relatives and kin at Khartoum who are too socially obliged to accommodate all of the accompanying group till the patient recovers, otherwise they have to expect a lot of blame and unneeded social sanctions to the extent of social boycott. Most Sudanese have the same habit, especially the rural people, but Halfawiyyin seems to be extra exaggerating such a matter.

Social services in the village were designed in accordance to the number of people who were resettled at the early 1960s, and since then, not expanded to cope with the natural increase in the numbers of people, on the contrary, the already existing ones alarmingly deteriorating, for example, communication and post office services no longer existed; health service which started by small medical unit with one nurse, then it was improved by the effort of the Farmers’ Union in the year 2000 into a medical center with a general physician, a health visitor, a dentist medical assistant, three laboratory technicians, one pharmacist, three nurses and three labourers. The center equipped with 6 beds in two rooms (males, females), and children vaccination unit. However, as a result of deterioration of agricultural production in the scheme, and the declining of cotton cultivated areas, where Farmers' Union used to collect 6000 Sudanese pounds from each cotton hawasha as health services fees, money collection sharply declined,

186 consequently, the Farmers' Union left financing health centers, though, inhabitants, through personal self-support continue to operate the village health centre for another 2 years, till 2003, then they couldn't afford 2 million Sudanese pounds, the monthly needed amount to keep the health center in operation, therefore, they lost services of the physician and the pharmacist, the center now operating only with a general medical assistant, malaria diagnostician, two nurses, and the labourers, the Ministry of Health attaché, and most cases now are transferred to the New Halfa hospital.

There were no schools in the village when the resettlers arrived; the students who are already enrolled at different schooling levels at Old Halfa were distributed to the schools of the nearby villages, mainly villages No.22 and 23. Then a primary school was established and located at a government house with only two classes, first and second, pupils have to go to Argin villages for secondary schooling, however, the situation has changed by the mid of the 1980s, when two primary schools, one for boys and the other for girls were opened, followed by another intermediate school for girls opened in the year 1985, these new schools started to receive students from other ethnic groups beside Halfawiyyin , all of the staff members are from the village itself, however, till now there is no secondary school in the village, and the pupils have to daily commute to the town of new Halfa for schooling. Village school teachers assure that the rates of school leavers and drop-outs, are high especially among the high secondary school boys; they attribute such phenomena to the lack of close observance of those students who are studying away from the village, namely at the New Halfa town; the abolishment of the free accommodation system; the rising cost of education,

187 and the increased rate of poverty, where tenants generally are the poorest category of society. Teachers think that what is happening in this matter, is part of what is generally going on in the Sudan, however, school dropouts among primary school pupils in the village is very low, and it is mainly among non-Halfawiyyin pupils. It seems that Nubians, especially Halfawiyyin, who were previously well known by their love of education and known from the pioneers' educated people in Sudan, have lost their enthusiasm, and now about to lose such a merit, due to changing priority and changing circumstances as a consequence of the involuntary settlement. Considerable numbers of those high secondary school leavers from the village often find their way to Khartoum to join the ever increasing numbers of Halfawiyyin youth there.

The number of bakeries in the village, 5 bakeries, indicating the increasing dependents of the village inhabitants on bread rather than their traditional bread- Gorasa, or Kabieda in their own language and -sala'ab or sheddi- shard, which exclusively made from wheat flour and usually eaten with cooked vegetables, milk derivatives such as curdled milk, sugared butter, or maloha (special type of corned fish). Nubians were not inclining to eat fermentative foods because their basic diet, wheat, is not suited for, though, they might use a mixture of wheat and sorghum to prepare sheddi, they also did not know porridge, that is well known all over the other parts of the country, but sometimes, usually at winter, they might prepare a type of porridge from wheat flour and fenugreek, usually eaten warm after adding fresh milk and butter, they call it madida.

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Therfore, Halfawiyyin changed much of their food habits and food preferences; this is mainly because wheat, the basic diet of Halfawiyyin, is no longer cultivated in the scheme due to many factors stated previously in chapter 4. Halfawiyyin compel to buy wheat from the market to prepare their traditional meals, so they are forced to change their food habits and their preferred food in order to cope with the changing circumstances in the scheme area, and now Halfawiyyin not only sowing sorghum like the Arab tenants, for marketing purpose, but also for consumption ends. This change from wheat to sorghum food is especially recognized among the relatively poor Halfawiyyin tenants; despite Halfawiyyin full confidence that eating sorghum is a sign of cultural retraction and degraded self-esteem, however, food type and the composition of food meal is not much different from the general food type of the average urban dwellers in Sudan, and one can not feel that he eats a rural meal. The result of scheme failure has been the creation of a dependent population and an intolerable situation where the relocated Halfawiyyin very often become consumers much more than producers.

Cultivation: Despite the fact that village No. 26 is the largest village inside the resettlement area, most of its inhabitants ceased cultivating their hawashas since the last 2 decades as a result of the steady high cost of agriculture, and low prices of crops, they generate their incomes from renting their tenancies and freehold lands to others, from the village or outsiders, who are ready to cultivate such hawashas through different forms of partnership. Group interviews with inhabitants from the village revealed that a considerable number of tenants are increasingly involved in cultivation of vegetables,

189 hibiscus, bean, pepper, lentil, cowpea and water melon and muskmelon at their freehold lands amlak, because of low production cost, and the quick return; the only limitation to invest in amlak cultivation, however, is the availability of irrigation water. Tenants, who are involved in amlak cultivation, often express a full concern about it and usually rely on their family labour, with a minimum use of hired labours except the unavoidable hired guard. They are either engaged in different forms of partnership or borrow money from relatives and friends to finance freehold cultivation, however, such concerns about amlak cultivation is not taken on a regular basis, i.e. it is not seasonally undertaken, it is highly dependent, beside the availability of water for irrigation, on the availability of finance, the willingness to cultivate, and the nonexistence of other income generating activities, for example, some inhabitants, especially from the youth, usually make use of the work season from October till May at the new Halfa sugar factory as seasonal labourers, i.e. mechanic, drivers, oil dealers, timekeepers, etc; but they never work at the fields of sugarcane as cane-cutting labourers - katacaw- in their own words, because it is the work of the slaves; however, some of those people, became permanent labourers there.

Therefore, it is hard to find typical Halfawiyyin farmer in the village, the working population of the village are employees, labourers or petty traders, and agriculture doesn't represent their main source of income anyway. However, when asked about the most profitable crop in the present time and under the prevailing circumstances in the scheme, respondents indicated that cultivation of sorghum in the tenancies (due to low production costs and short period of maturity-3 months) and bean in the freeholds if irrigation water is available, even though the prices of sorghum is not too rewarding

190 because sorghum prices determined by Gedarif market, and the types of sorghum cultivated in the scheme is not from the best varieties. Inhabitants started to cultivate bean since the year 2000, but later on it was entirely banned, and the cultivated fields was ploughed out by the Corporation, under the claims of fear of plant disease and water consumption.

There are very few tenants in the village still cultivating cotton in their tenancies; they indicated that they have to cultivate cotton in order to guarantee irrigation water for the succeeding crops, i.e. sorghum and groundnuts. Cotton is completely an unrewarding crop for them, they even think that the Corporation deducts from them fees too high than the actual cost. Tenants also claim prevalent nepotism among the Corporation employees and the Farmers' Union; whereas Corporation employees usually regard farmers, especially the Halfawiyyin, as lazy and too demanding.

There are very few individuals in the village who are, influential in the economic, political, and social affairs; they achieved such statuses either through education, inheritance, or both; in addition to a few wealthy ex- expatriates, heavily involved in cultivation, especially sorghum, groundnuts and animal green fodder. In addition to their own tenancies and freehold lands, they use to hire more good tenancies and freehold lands to cultivate such crops, by a mentality of investors, not a simple tenant. That is, they practice such activity only when they are well acquainted with the necessary information about the market and the prices; they are well equipped for such business, they have the money to finance all the agricultural operations for good land preparation, and, hence, to guarantee high productivity, they also have the other related facilities, i.e. stores, light trucks for transporting crops

191 and labourers, etc. however, they aren’t involved in such investment yearly, and the size of the lands they cultivate varies depending on the availability of good farms, the expectation of good prices; and above al, the interest to reinvest in agriculture.

The above mentioned individuals, certainly they are well-off compared to the rest of the village inhabitants, this is clear from the houses where they live, it is not like the other government constructed houses of two to four rooms, it is comparatively wider in size, and some of which are two floor buildings, well furnished and equipped with the modern life facilities .i.e. TV digital satellites, plastic water tanks, water filters, deep freezers, moquette, etc. Interestingly enough is that those well-off individuals hold some quite different ideas about the scheme and its future, in an interview held with Ahmed Abd el-Latif, a well known Halfawiyyin politician -a DUP member- and ex-top government official, he thought that the scheme is now satisfactorily operating after the last rehabilitation programme, and the difficulties witnessed in the last years of the scheme are only part of what had been going on in the country in general, that can be explained by the political instability, civil war in the South, and the international embargo. But now after the peace agreement, the political consensus, and the discovery of oil, the economic situation of the country is improving, the situation of the scheme has also improved, there is a lot of concern on the part of the government, a lot of finance, what is needed is the Siteit dam to solve the remaining problems of the scheme. He considers that the comprehensive economic prosperity and rehabilitation of the scheme will not only contribute to the stability of Halfawiyyin, but the possibility of return of those who flee to el-Shigailab and other parts of Khartoum, it is far

192 better for tenants to produce here than the misery and depression that existed at el-Shigailab, because the average life standard here is better than that of those who settled at el-Shigailab, and most of the youth who migrated to el- Shigailab engaged in inferior works such as brokerage. Ahmed Abd el-Latif, being aware of his position as a leader, said that he built this beautiful house to encourage the others to stay, and thought that if he migrates, more people will follow him and migrate too. The other respondents who attended the interview agree with Ahmed Abd el-Latif conclusion, and added that the future of their staying at the scheme is entirely dependent on the construction of Seteit dam, provision of services, eradication of diseases, and provision of easy loans.

It is clear that the inhabitants of the village hold different, and even contradictory perceptions about what is good for them; almost all of tenants combine cultivation with other off-farm activities, and the majority of inhabitants are of low income and limited alternatives, nevertheless, highly ambitious and believe that they live an abnormal circumstances, degraded and unstable life, mostly pessimistic about the future life in the scheme; whereas a few number of inhabitants, a prosperous minority, who succeeded to make use of the limited opportunities available in the scheme, holds a somewhat different conception about the scheme and their future life there, which generally coincide with the successful life they enjoyed inside the boundaries of the scheme. Thus, such differences in views, life style, and living standard reassure and perpetuate and even more widening the gap between the few rich and the bulk of poor inhabitants. long-term follow-up and observation clearly indicates that an increasing number of resettlers were gradually becoming impoverished, for example, till the late of the

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1980s it is rare and unusual to find a house of resettlers empty from stored sacks of wheat, groundnuts, sorghum and so forth, also the view of cotton sticks above the roofs and as shelters for animal enclosures was a common sight, to see tractors, light trucks and lorries owned by tenants is a very common all around the villages of resettlement area. However, such scenes have now become part of the glorious past for tenants who are now paying for their food from the market in stead of sowing it. Therefore, resettlement as an option for change and development seems to be not sustainable in the long run. The New Halfa scheme appears to be running, at least in part, beside the off farm activities of the Halfawiyyin inhabitants, as a result of the existence and the efforts of those 'entrepreneurs' Halfawiyyin, whose mere staying there is one of the most important factors that encourage some others to stay at the scheme. And the recognizable success achieved by the scheme in its early days could be largely attributable to the efforts of village cooperative societies.

The different views held by the village inhabitants give the impression of being correspondent to the life styles in the village, where few new houses scattered around the southern and the western edges of the village explains the situation, most of which were a mud-brick houses containing two to three straw huts inside, stands beside a few modern buildings. A tour revealed that most of these houses are empty; the owners usually migrated to Khartoum and most often reside at el-Kalakla, el-Shigailab, um-usher, or even Jebel awliya. The construction of these houses is a real indicator of social and psychological instability of the migrant Halfawiyyin, or how can we explain such behaviour of those persons who constructed these houses

194 and then migrated to reside there at Khartoum suburbs. Nevertheless, village 26 is considered one of the most Halfawiyyin stable villages, especially in comparison with the other southern villages of the scheme, for example villages No.1, 5, and 8. But also it is the biggest village which "exporting" youth and individuals to suburban Khartoum. When asked about the high rate of youth migration, they attribute such migration to the availability of more work opportunities, and that the migrant individuals are there simply because of their jobs, and added that there are other individuals from the village working abroad; and at Port Sudan, Gedarif, and Kassala respectively.

Quoting Cornea's description of resettlement as "the single most serious counter developmental social consequence of water resource development",(Cernea,2000, p.5) the sight of the village 26 at evenings, and likely the other Halfawiyyin resettlement villages, tells us the story. All typical features of an stagnant agrarian society; when every evening most of the village youths congregate in small groups at the center of the village; where some scattered rusty small Zinc stores and woody coffee shops are located, and start chatting, smoking hookah, and tells their adventures and dreams at Khartoum till late night; the sight of drunken individuals and hashish smokers is not uncommon, as if such habits and practices now become an accepted social norms by the generally conservative Halfawiyyin community. The number of those drunkards and hashish smokers is increasing through time, while the elders spending the whole day outside their homes at al- karawoos (a wide wood and straw construct of multiple uses, but most often is for death and other social ceremonies, exclusively attended by men) spending time in chatting, playing

195 cards, sleeping, etc, till the sunset. Inside the village there are four big such Karawoos, beside other small ones, distributed at the village yards according to the four quarters of the village, i.e. Saras, Samna, Atieri and Culub.

Teachers and local leaders (educated and highly respectable and influential persons) when asked to give explanations for such high and recognizable numbers of drinkers and hashish smokers, and the likely effects upon the youngest who might imitate them in the future; they expresses their sorrow for it, but fail to agree with common answers, and regard such habits as not reaching an alarming limit, and its due to joblessness and the spread of kanabi (slums of agricultural labourers, where liquor producers reside) close to the village, they think that such habits will disappear by the removal of these Kanabi. They attempt to put the blame on these kanabi; however, there are no plans or even ideas to remove such kanabi. It is clear that they don't yet appreciate the scale and magnitude of such habits and practices, from their position as biased observers, a continuation of the same habits is observed among many Halfawiyyin youth at Khartoum suburbs.

The case of Karawoos and the hopeless youths can be seen within the context of failure of the whole approach of resettlement, that is, it is unwise to expect success and positive reaction of people in accordance to the plans designed and implemented by engineers without taking into account the desires and expectations, besides the potentialities of those who are targeted by such plans, which aimed to overnight ever radically change the way of life they accustomed to through long centuries, especially in our case where the affected people, the Halfawiyyin, viewing their distinctiveness, a highly chauvinistic group of Nubians, who still perpetuating their myths of origin

196 and claims of superiority, and point to their “otherness”, i.e. neither Arab nor African. Some claimed Hamitic descent; others dynastic Egyptian origins; Arabs; Hungarians (Magyars); Yugoslavians (Bosnians); Turks; and the ubiquitous Kushaf. And still somehow live obsessed and captives to their past glory of the ancient Nubian civilization.

4-Differences in responses towards agriculture: What is distinguishing Halfawiyyin tenants and inhabitants at the New Halfa scheme now is their continuous petitions, claims, reluctance, maladjustment, lack of hope among most of their youth, closed horizon, least attachment to the scheme and to the land, landlordism, and enthusiasm to leave the scheme seeking better life as they conceive and expect in Khartoum or elsewhere away from the Butana land to which they never feel belongingness and be proud of.

During the field work inside the scheme, it was very rare to encounter a Halfawiyyin tenant on his land, only the Westerners and some Hadendawa who worked as guards, hired labourers or sharecroppers. That is, as it was stated previously, Nubians at the New Halfa Scheme prefer to be landlords rather than tenants and others have to cultivate their lands, while a resident family members or a relative have to manage the land for the absent owner, however, it is common to see some Halfawiyyin women on the nearby fields collecting herbage for their goats, herding it, or working and watching hired labourers especially in groundnut fields.

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Those agricultural labourers, mainly coming from Darfur region, the Corporation estimates their numbers as around 50.000 (Mohamed Suleiman 2004), yet, they are not recognized by the scheme administration and ignored by the government since the beginning of the scheme, and neglected even by researchers who usually often focusing their studies either on the Halfawiyyin , the Arab, or on the two groups, despite the decisive role they play in keeping the scheme functioning especially at the resettlement area of the 125.000 feddan inhabited by the Halfawiyyin . Though, despite their recognizable and ever increasing number inside the scheme, and the vital role they play in performing the different agricultural operations, they are truly marginalized group in the scheme.

Agricultural labourers (cautiously quoting the term; it is a general term used by the Corporation and the researchers to describe all those who reside at the squatters kanabi, who are mainly from western Sudan, irrespective of their work) are concentrated at highly dense squatters around the New Halfa town and the other Halfawiyyin resettlement villages, lacking all social services at their kanabi, they have to depend on health, schooling, transport and the other social services available at the new Halfa town and at Halfawiyyin resettlement villages, although such services were limited in size and quality. Such unfavourable living circumstances of agricultural labourers, though they are not claiming and demanding like Halfawiyyin ; usually lead to a growing feeling of marginalization and irritation; they are Sudanese citizens and have the same rights of housing, schools, electricity, and the other services like the others, instead of residing at these miserable Kanabi and walking long distances to reach the schools, medical centers, etc, these in addition to the inferior sight and the value-loaded and even racially-toned

198 words they might hear, caused those people to become more hostile and violent in their dealings and in claiming and taking their rights, unlike Halfawiyyin who were accustomed to resort usually to legal ways and peaceful methods in cases of complaints and disputes. However, despite the hardships, observation and few interviews showed that a considerable number of those agricultural labourers were able to achieve a better standard of living, some of them possess houses at the new Halfa town; and some others even owned hawashas, a matter about which they don’t speak, seemingly they know it is legally prohibited.

The unwillingness to cultivate the land and making use of hired farmers, namely, Egyptian Saidi especially for the cultivation of vegetables, and recently those comings from Western Sudan, is noticed even among the other Nubians of the far northern Sudan, for example, Elburgage agricultural scheme, where a considerable number of Mahas, Danagla and few Halfawiyyin inhabitants making use of such hired farmers as a sign of social notability, show-off, blind imitation and ostentation, much more than on rational economic decision, or mere confidence on the distinguished capabilities of those farmers. Ironically enough, such pattern mainly recognized among poor Nubian tenants.

Unlike Halfawiyyin , the agricultural labourers-Gharraba- at the new Halfa scheme, generally show a different response towards the scheme and the available opportunities inside the area, that is, they successfully make use of such economic opportunities in the scheme, heavily engaged in agricultural activities as hired labourers, sharecroppers and even full owners at some cases, in addition to their involvement in the other nonagricultural works, i.e.

199 employees, labourers, craftsmen, guards, policemen, petty traders, etc. they also show a considerable concern towards animal rearing especially cattle, it is so familiar to see small herds kept inside and around their settlements. They are skillfully able to integrate animal into their fields as part of agricultural production, and use to sell animals and animal products. Such successful adoption of animals can partly be explained by cultural factors, that is, animal husbandry is part of their culture; a way of life, and part of the mixed economy they practiced at their home areas.

This successful adaptation of agricultural labourers can be traced, in part, to the fact that they were not resettled or forced to adopt such way of life like Halfawiyyin , they were voluntarily and willingly came into the scheme, attracted by the available work opportunities there, their rural backgrounds helps them to adapt easily, Hence, contrary to the Halfawiyyin , their number in the scheme area is in increasing as a result of social and economic stability they achieved there; and the influx of newcomers from the same ethnic groups and the same areas of origin is on steady increase. Taking in consideration the present political unrest and conflict in Darfur region, we can safely assume and expect an ever increase in the numbers of this category, and accordingly, a declining number of Halfawiyyin, who states their fear from those Gharraba- a general term used to denote those who came from West Sudan- as one of the reasons behind their migration out the scheme. However, the term Gharraba, is a contextual-Geographical connotation- but mainly a value-loaded and containing a racial trait.

Thus, despite the fact that the two groups, i.e. Halfawiyyin and Westerners, are strangers to the Butana area and to the new Halfa scheme, we find that

200 the latter group successfully adapted to the area despite that they are not initially targeted by such partial development programme; although lacking all the prerequisites for durable settlement, while the first group, the Halfawiyyin , mostly failed to adapt to the area and to the scheme and the planned way of life, notwithstanding that the first priority of the scheme was to resettle them and to provide them a decent life, hence they were afforded huge facilities from the beginning, i.e. plenty lands, standard housing, services, and so forth, yet they are reluctant, think marginalized, claiming more and more.

However, marginalization is a relative concept, that is, in our case for example, Gharraba group at the scheme feel marginalized, due to the long deprivation and negligence by the scheme administration, which for them is synonymous to the government, while Halfawiyyin feel marginalized as a result of their disappointment of gains despite all sacrifice which they had presented; Butana Arabs, who accepted to host the scheme and the resettled Halfawiyyin , were also marginalized when comparing advantages they had achieved with those of Halfawiyyin .

The New Halfa scheme failed to achieve one of its basic latent political objectives, that is, to act as a melting pot for the different groups that was brought together under a well- designed and carefully planned project geared to fulfill certain national political goals; after more than forty years, each of the three main groups in the scheme, i.e. The Butana Arabs, Halfawiyyin , and the Westerners; live in a semi-like isolation from the others; each preserve and regenerates its own culture, economy, and politics; with growing fear and suspicion instead of integration, pacification and

201 consolidation; hence, an ongoing rivalry relation rather than reciprocity one is underway; especially between Halfawiyyin and Gharraba, whom Halfawiyyin consider as a truly competing with them in sharing with the scarce resources and services available in the scheme; such relation seems to be developed due to the coexistence of Halfawiyyin resettlement sites and Gharraba settlements close to each other, while the Butana Arab settlement and tenancies is relatively far, so incidence of contacts and friction with Halfawiyyin or Gharraba is nearly lacking, and hence they keep normal relations with the two groups.

Cases of amalgamation through marriage ties, if existed, it is very uncommon and would be no more than isolated personal cases that is not in anyway constitute a manifestation of a new trend, and usually existed between Halfawiyyin and settled Butana, for example, only two marriage cases between Halfawiyyin and Butana Arabs were recorded in the village No.26 throughout recent years. A matter reflects the inability to coexist even at the national level as a result of accumulated bitterness due to economic, political and cultural favouritism. Where Nubians and Arabs, for historical advantages and cultural similarity form the dominant, so-called, "core culture" of Sudan, commonly referred to as "the central riverian culture"; though, the central governmental and legal apparatuses can validly be considered central riverian "Arab-Nubian" (Hale1982.p119). Such "core culture" domination which is responsible for the uneven distribution of the country's wealth and resources, and the concomitant growing feelings of oppression and marginalization, particularly by the other non-Arab/Nubian groups, hence, the resultant political strife, civil wars autonomist and separatism movements, which mainly based on regional and/or ethnic

202 backgrounds, and gradually changing to war for dignity and identity; indicating a gloomy picture for the future of the whole country to continue as a unified nation.

5-Village 5, Argin north A good example of the south villages of the scheme, located about 9 kilometers south of New Halfa town, it is inhabited by the northern people of Wadi Halfa district; who were advantaged from their geographical location near the Egyptian border in many respects compared to the inhabitants of the south villages of the Wadi Halfa district. Old Argin was the biggest village west of the Nile, and the second biggest village northern Wadi Halfa after Dibeira, and it was one of the most three important villages at the whole of Wadi Halfa area beside Dibeira and Digheim. Argin was well-known by its dense gardens of palm trees; it was also modern village in terms of services and architecture; its houses, for example, especially that had been constructed after the 1946 flood, was different of the traditional houses in its position and planning, the use of paintings and drawings, and the use of latrines inside the houses.

The inhabitants of old Argin village was around 3 thousands, it was situated at the western bank of the Nile facing Halfa town; the majority of its settlers had been either migrants in Egypt, or working at the Halfa city as employees and labourers at the post office, railway, government institutions, and the like, others held private jobs as traders, restaurants owners, iced venders, etc. this means agriculture was not constituting any significance in their life, only palm trees inherited from their ancestors. That is, when they had

203 relocated to New Halfa, people of Argin took compensation of their grandfathers' properties. Their relation with the rest of the country is also determined through some labourers and employees mainly at Atbara and Khartoum. However, their early awareness and concern with education was paramount, that is, since the early 1930s Argin people knew education when a public primary school for boys was opened at their village, and another school for girls was also opened in 1946; however, some of them were educated earlier at Halfa princely intermediate and Halfa native intermediate schools. Native education is something very new at that time in the area and in the whole of Sudan. Books and stationeries had been delivered from Egypt where the migrant fathers work. The syllabus which was taught at these schools was also Egyptian. That is, their relation with Egypt was stronger than their relation with their country, they knew Egypt much better than their country Sudan, about which they had very scanty information. Therefore, their economic conditions, since Old Halfa, didn't depend on agriculture, but mainly on labour at Egypt. Despite the fact that they were originally village inhabitants, Argin people couldn't be regarded in any way as peasants; they are city dwellers and urban in their outlook, therefore, when the issue of relocation to Khashm el-Girba became a reality; Argin people were among those who refused to relocate to the site, instead, they preferred relocation to other alternative sites near Khartoum. Hence the attempt to ruralize such people through resettlement in agricultural scheme is, certainly, ploughing at the sea.

Thus, being from the first educated Sudanese, some of Argin people found their way to Khartoum early before the issue of relocation, and well established their life there at the first-class residential areas in the city, i.e. el

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Amarat, Khartoum two, and the other inner city neighborhoods and new extensions; also some of them took their compensation for relocation in the form of cash and invested it in low priced land and houses in Khartoum suburbs, with clear tendency to move near the other settled Nubians, especially the kin, Halfawiyyin.

Village 5. is well known, as the other Argin villages No.8 and 11, by its highest rate of absentees since the early days of the scheme, most of its people are either white-collar occupants mainly in Khartoum, or emigrants abroad. The village is smaller in size than the village No.26, it contains 175 standard houses, and certainly, of less density and crowd than Atieri. The village seems clean and its houses look better than those in village 26, reflecting someway the relative prosperity of its inhabitants.

The Corporation considers Argin inspection as the worst inspection in the scheme, due to the highest rate of absenteeism, for example, cotton was not cultivated in that inspection for the last six seasons successively. Their attachment to the scheme and to the cultivation process is the least among all Halfawiyyin , they mostly relying on the "wakil" to manage the land, who usually might be a relative, a sharecropper, or whatever- their lands were from the most infected by Mesquite trees, simply because they are usually not there to watch the lands.

A selected group of respondents at Argin (primary school teacher, university teacher, retired officer, and tenant) when asked about the reason behind the high absentee rate among their people, they attributed the phenomenon to the following reasons according to effectiveness: 1- agriculture is not their

205 basic source of livelihood since the old home, although their grandfathers were tenants, but as a result of the natural acute shortage of cultivable lands, which was further worsened by the construction of Aswan high dam and the successive heightening of the dam, however, with the second heightening of the dam in 1932, the rising water level devastated all of the rest of Guruf and cultivable lands, and it was the announcement of the collective migrations out of the area that had never been seen before; hence, such migrations was the main cause behind the appearance of what later on was named as "kenuz villages" at areas like Khartoum, Atbara, Shendi, the Gezira, and other places in the Sudan, on the other hand, sizeable numbers of Nubians migrated north, and settled at the area between Aswan and Gina, where they melted in the society of Egyptian Saidis. One of the main repercussions of those events was the appearance of expatriation as a social phenomenon, by those seeking new sources of livelihood to support their families and the deprived relatives; the most suitable countries for expatriation was Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Europe. At the other side, the appearance of vast richness upon those expatriates was a strong incentive for every able youth to migrate; therefore, they left the country to women and old men.

2- Mesquite colonized the agricultural lands of the scheme through the past years and compelled some people to leave the area, and "you have to ask the government why we gave up the cultivation?". 3- "there is no security and we fear those strangers"; they mainly referred to the "Gharraba" by strangers. 4- the area is epidemic by diseases, malaria, bilharzias, fevers, dysentery, and recently appeared kidney failure. 5- youth of today's are lazy, and their priorities are different. Moreover; the collapse of cooperative societies; "at time of harvest, prices of crops fall drastically, the government

206 don't protect the farmer, in the past days there were cooperatives at all villages functioning in marketing, when we came here in 1964 we established our own cooperative and it was functioning smoothly till the 1980s". They believe that the collapse of these cooperatives is the main reason behind the collapse of the scheme itself.

They also indicated the weak management of the scheme as one of the causes behind deterioration and collapse, they regard Osman Idris (1975- 1979) was the best manager throughout the history of the scheme, he was accustomed to go around the field and the scheme day and night, investigating and stands beside the farmers, unlike managers of today; according to their words "they are always out of the offices, driving their cars and do nothing".

Another group interviewed at the same village were asked to explain the causes behind Halfawiyyin migration to Khartoum, and their concentration at certain suburbs there, mainly el-Shigailab, el-Kalakla and um-usher; they concluded that all those who recently migrated to Khartoum suburbs are from the scheme and not from Old Halfa, though, familiar enough, out of 7 interviewees, 4 said that they also have their own houses at el-Shigailab, and part of their family members already reside there at these houses. The main reason of such migration, they continued, is that "we lost the hope in this land; and if we remained - the elders - our sons will never stay here due to lack of hope, and loss of security among those strangers." However, when they were informed that those “strangers” are agricultural labourers and that they cannot do without them; they agreed, and added “they have not to reside here, they have to come only during the cultivation season, and have

207 to return to their houses and countries from which they came”. Argin inhabitants, like most other Halfawiyyin, think that the New Halfa scheme was especially made for the Halfawiyyin alone, that is why they feel uneasiness towards the other non-Nubian individuals and groups in the scheme, astonishingly enough, even towards their hosts, the Shukriya Arab, whom the whole of the Butana plain, defined as their home land according to customary laws. However, the resettlement of Halfawiyyin at the Butana area was, of course, a major cause of change of the area; Halfawiyyin introduced with them considerable socioeconomic changes to the area, such as educational, health and the other community services; in addition to a comparatively advanced way of life which they had been accustomed to at their previous home; meanwhile they found themselves gradually subjugated to the prevailing tribal laws and "salif" dominated in the scheme area; hence, they are aware of the negative retreat, and feels increasing "strangeness" and insecurity towards the future in such tribally controlled milieu; they rationally decided to escape; seeking familiar surroundings, which they began to reestablishing at suburban Khartoum, among their ex-migrants, and the generally similar sociocultural setting of the greater Khartoum.

It seems that Argin inhabitants, who are truly landlords in the scheme (highest absentee farmers, with freehold lands of 1323 feddans, in addition to tenancies) wants to find excuse, and rationalization for others about their inability to cultivate the lands by themselves, hence, in addition to stating the general difficulties of the scheme, they resorted to another psychological explanation, that is, to blame the strangers for insecurity feelings they have, so they found the suitable “scapegoat” on those strangers, nevertheless, they fail to state a single criminal event against those whom they called strangers.

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Nevertheless, their endless feeling of insecurity can also partially be explained by their past desert encapsulation and their lacking habituation to accept strangers among their communities.

Though, holds the landlordism view and the mind of businessmen rather than simple tenants; during the interview, they expressed their reluctance to the government plans to activate the integration agreement with Egypt through a joint agricultural programme supposed to be established at Argin plain and on the shore of Nubian lake, as they were informed via some of their influential government officials, and according to the news papers information, they think that they are worthier by such project rather than the Egyptian Saidi tenants who are supposed to be brought as farmers on the project. They built their argument on the ground that the project is going to be established on their land, and they have the experience, competence and the money to run such a project instead of the "strangers"; by the "strangers" here they refer to the Egyptians; and the other companies that are supposed to participate in the proposed project. Hence, again, group awareness, vested interests, and utilitarian trend seem to characterize Halfawiyyin behaviour under normal circumstances, that is to say; away from stress and enforcement, people can make their rational choice according to their interests. This is what is become very clear from the Halfawiyyin experiment at the new Halfa scheme, which despite the huge economic facilities provided there, Halfawiyyin were not able to make use of throughout more than 40 years, and still feeling unrest and unsettled simply because it was not their choice from the beginning, resettlement was involuntary, against their will; the question will be: for how long do such enforcement is going to continue? That is to say: unless enabling people to

209 choose their destiny; uprooting and subjugation of people under coercion will not last forever; whatever stated justifications and inducements is given; as the experiment of Halfawiyyin showed.

Whatever stated, the first missing word from Halfawiyyin lexicon after resettlement, was irik; which means in Nubian language; nation, country, land and belongingness. Nubians never found whatsoever attracting them to the new Halfa; belongingness is so weak and slimsy, whereas feeling of alienation is so prevalent and strong, even among the new generation of resettlers who had never seen old Halfa; but were brought up and socialized in a way that their home is there at Wadi Halfa, and it is far more beautiful than this land. Such socialization and conception is common and very clear even among the long residents Halfawiyyin at Khartoum; for example, when one of them want to travel to his village at the new Halfa, he doesn’t say “I am going to –al balad-(synonymous to countryside, homeland)”, like most Sudanese, especially the Nubians; but instead, he say “I am going to new Halfa”, so, intentionally, and unintentionally stressing the alienation of resettled Halfawiyyin at the new Halfa.

Rise and Collapse of Cooperative Societies: The involvement of politics also stands behind the collapse of cooperative societies and its symbol; tenants' co-operative flour mill. Community cooperation was perhaps the most notable feature among pre-location Nubians, Resettled Halfawiyyin brought with them into the area the idea of cooperative societies, which they well know at their previous home, cooperative societies were created in the new Halfa scheme since the early

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1964 on a village basis; the necessary funds were collected through shares sold to the tenants; most of them had been from the absentees, and then again they dispersed; leaving the work in the hands of some residents. Co- operative societies were smoothly functioning and successfully carried out most of agricultural activities on behalf of the Halfawiyyin tenants, despite the fact that these cooperative societies carried with them the same defects of cooperative agriculture in the Wadi Halfa District, where administrative shortcomings had caused many failures; till the second half of the 1980s, when local differences and political gravitations brought them to collapse. Interviews with some ex-leaders of these cooperative societies, and other top officials of the NHAC revealed that political antagonism between those who counted for the Islamists, and the leftists, where the latter group dominate the administration of the cooperatives through democratic elections since the early date. Political antagonism between the two factions was the major cause behind the failure of cooperatives, such antagonism reached its climax at the beginning of the 1990s .

The tenants' cooperative flour mill was established in 1967, however, after achieving recognizable improvements and successes, it was also brought to a complete standstill in 1989, also due to political interference, when the elected committee was dissolved by the government and replaced by another appointed committee. However, the collapse of cooperative societies and the tenant's flour mill can not be investigated in isolation from the general atmosphere of deterioration which gradually dominated the scheme since the late 1970s, it can be seen in such context as a cause and logical outcome of such state of affairs. Corporation authority also agreed that the cooperative

211 societies experience was highly beneficial especially in reducing cost of production and guaranteeing good prices for the New Halfa crops.

Though, given the overall deteriorating position of the New Halfa scheme as de facto, due to social, historical, economic and cultural similarities between the Halfawiyyin inhabitants of the southern villages of the New Halfa scheme (residents of the northern villages of the past Wadi Halfa district), most likely they show similar responses towards the new Scheme, i.e. high absenteeism, landlordism, and constant drift toward cities and urban centers. Whereas those occupying the northern villages of the scheme (residents of the southern space of Wadi Halfa, mainly inhabitants of the villages of Ard el-Hajar), generally showing somehow slightly different response in comparison to the northern village inhabitants, that is, they do emigrate out the scheme like their northern village inhabitants counterparts, but their migration is comparatively deliberate, and still generally taking the form of commuting between Khartoum suburbs and their villages; and according to their comparatively low educational levels and lack of the necessary skills to compete for urban jobs, hence, to secure enough incomes enabling them to finally reside there, this is, in part, also clear from the works they caught up in Khartoum, i.e. middlemen, labourers, drivers, and the like. Nevertheless, they clearly show the common out-migration trend of Halfawiyyin at the New Halfa scheme.

Contrary to the planners' naïve thought that all rural households are farmers, whom can make sedentary agriculture as their mainstay; resettled communities usually tend to cling to the ordinary way of life that they have been accustomed. What was going wrong in the case of Nubian resettlement

212 experiment; from the beginning, beside the inadequacy of forced resettlement as a developmental approach; is the intentional negligence of their sociocultural and economic distinctiveness; that is, resettlement in their case was just a byproduct of the erection of Aswan dam, without real consideration for the Nubians' aspirations or their motivations for achievement; as the interviews revealed that nearly all of them wants, and endeavor for their children to have the opportunities for a better education and to aspire to the higher professions and different career, far from agriculture, anyway. Therefore, they have not been able to conform to the agricultural structure that necessitates exposure to "strangers" and total intervention on the part of the government.

6- Kilo 14: small Halfawiyyin village (kambo) of around 120 families; located at the south entrance of the scheme, at kilo14 of the main irrigation canal, just a few meters away from the paved road connecting new Halfa town with Khartoum-port Sudan road. The inhabitants are those who were first refused to relocate during the 1960s, or parts of their families, and instead, they took their cash compensation; but later on after the whole issue of resettlement ended up, they changed their mind and asked for relocation to Khashm el- Girba, they are mainly from the southern villages of Wadi Halfa district-Ard el Hajar- whose lands were inundated by the High dam water at a late stage; also some the inhabitants are those absentees during the period of relocation, and when they returned, they failed to prove their rights; most of them came to the scheme during the 1968 and after, during the fourth stage of the scheme, which was, in addition to the fifth stage, completed by the

213 democratic governments who came after the October revolution; part of kilo14 inhabitants got hawashas, but no houses allocated for them, so they built their houses of mud and other moveable materials; the house usually is composed of two to three huts made of mud with straw roof, and a fence of wood or cotton sticks( photo. no.). It is the only Halfawiyyin settlement site inside the scheme where people extensively use huts beside the ordinary design of rooms; just like anywhere at the eastern parts of Sudan, where rains is relatively pluviose, hence, horizontal roofed houses is not suitable, and unlike the other resettled Halfawiyyin, where huts also used within their houses, but very few, and can be seen only in some of the new houses.

Halfawiyyin in kilo14 resided at these temporary houses, with promises from the successive governments to allocate and plan a residential area for them; it was not until the year 2006, when the government allocated for them a planned residential area, at the same kambo area, so they just transferred their simple mud houses to the new sites; but no services were provided. They depend on their own effort to provide drinking water (one tanker, run and maintained by donation, lately from Plan Sudan "NGO", and old pipes net of potable water, directly from the irrigation canal), but no electricity, health, and police services. Simple sanitation service was provided by Plan Sudan organization during the 2000s, composed of some improved latrines; however, field observation revealed that most of these latrines collapsed due to lack of maintenance, misuse and the heavy rains; and the inhabitants accustomed to defecate on the space. There are two primary schools in the village, one for boys and another for girls.

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The simple drinking water facility and the schools are also used by the inhabitants of the neighbouring agricultural labourers’ dense populated squatter kambo. Therefore, because of the lack of services in the village, most inhabitants of kilo14 have either migrated to Khartoum suburbs, or are working at Khartoum or elsewhere; but usually they leave behind them some of family members to take care of hawashas, and to keep their rights in case legitimating their existence there; and in case of provision of social services; those who remain at home, are usually the elders and children; it is the same habit of Halfawiyyin since the previous homeland. It is usual to find some students from kilo14 who reside permanently with their relatives at the other villages in the scheme, mainly at villages 26, 16, and 24, so as to continuing their education. Despite all the misery they live, the inhabitants of kilo14 stick to stay there; either because they have no other alternative to do, i.e. they can not afford to build permanent houses, and waiting for the government to do so; or because they feel that their residence at this place is impermanent. Both cases reveal the state of unrest and the instability most Halfawiyyin at the new Halfa scheme in which they trapped.

The situation of kilo14 represents special case in this respect, where the inhabitants struggling nearly forty years to legalize their settlement on the one hand, and fighting the deteriorating economic and social situation of the scheme to secure livelihood like their other counterparts on the other hand; therefore, they use to combine cultivation with other more stable works, mainly as employees and labourers at the new Halfa town, in addition to some others who run their private work as shopkeepers, drivers, etc, in addition to some expatriates. There is a considerable number of jobless

215 youths as interviews revealed, when a random sample of them were asked about work, they did not give a reliable answer, and only said "free work". Some families from kilo 14 were found at el-Shigailab, el-Kalakla, and um usher; part of them entirely abandoned the scheme; while others are still keeping their tenancies at the scheme, and similar to other migrant Halfawiyyin, who use other relatives and friends to run the tenancies. Observation and group discussion revealed that despite the proximity between the settlement sites of Halfawiyyin and agricultural labourers, i.e. it is one village of two neighborhoods, and they share the same very limited services; water, schools and transportation means; contact and dealings between the two groups is kept to the minimum possible level, if it is not entirely lacking, except for the very necessary matters such as collecting fees of drinking water, and the other common-purpose issues; such contacts between the two groups is characterized by a high degree of caution and avoidance ,especially on the part of Halfawiyyin, who are keeping their feeling of uneasiness and fear of "strangers"; claiming that those strangers are dangerous, violent and dirty.

Kilo 14 represents the most miserable situation of Halfawiyyin at the New Halfa scheme, whose inhabitants bearing the highest socioeconomic stress among all resettled Halfawiyyin; solution of their enduring problems just was ignored by the different governmental concerned departments; as the interviews with some top officials at the Corporation revealed, and one of them stated: "we are responsible only for what concerning agriculture". The inhabitants of kilo14, is the only group of Halfawiyyin inside the new Halfa scheme, and certainly, all over the Sudan, who live in squatter kambo, lacking the basic services. Their situation there clearly reflects the highly

216 differentiating Halfawiyyin society at the New Halfa scheme, especially when the situation of kilo 14 is compared to, for example, Argin people. The outcome is that the resettlement process not only led to impoverishment of the relocated Halfawiyyin, but also widening the gap between the comparatively well-off strata and the poor ones.

The belly of the stone (Ard- el Hajar) 1- Cultivation: Some Halfawiyyin call it Batn el-Hajar, and others call it Ard el-Hajar, the two names are simultaneously used to denote to the vast area extends parallel the two banks of the Nile south of Wadi Halfa town till the northern edges of the Mahas area (Fig.5.).

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Fig.5. Batn el Hajar

Source: Fahim. H, 1983

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The name typically describes the nature of landscape in that area; where a series of arid rocky hills and mountains extends along the banks of the Nile, leaving narrow segment of land bordering the water. At some places, even there is no space between rocks and the water. This is the area where some of Halfawiyyin villages were existed before the 1964 migration, and then devastated by the lake of Aswan High Dam. These villages and settlements, e.g. Saras, Samna, Atieri, Kulub, Dawashat, and Mek el- Nasir; characterized by small size and low population density in comparison to the north villages such as Argin, Deghiem and Dabarosa; also due to the acute shortage of cultivable land, the living standard of its inhabitants was also generally low, therefore they used to migrate abroad, seeking better living (Fig.6).

Short field visit to the area (from Wadi Halfa town to Atieri village in the south) in July 2008, showed that a considerable numbers of Halfawiyyin, mainly from different villages of New Halfa scheme, started since 1982, to cultivate the area from Gemie north till Akasha village to the south; these new agricultural lands created by the accumulation of silt over the years, changing the nature of rocky lands into highly fertile plains of silt (photo.No.5 and 6). According to some eye witnesses’ interviewees, in the past, there were some high mountains that they couldn't climb; now it is under the clay. The west bank of the area contains more plenty lands than the eastern bank; and the farmers assert that the volume of new land is still increasing at the both banks as a result of annual accumulation of silt; nevertheless, accessibility to cultivable land, and the cultivated areas is highly subject to the level of water, which usually characterized by high floods at this part of the Nile- the southern part of the High Dam lake.

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Fig.6. Old Nubian villages

Source: Dafalla. H, 1975

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The flood “al-Dameira” represents the main determinant factor of agriculture in these lands. Agricultural activity is a difficult task and insecure investment for farmers and usually involves the risk of losing the crop at any time as a result of quick and unexpected rising up of flood water that some times continues for more than 5 months, then slowly descending, leaving the entire area under a vast layer of silt clay (Photo. No. 2).

The danger of losing the life itself is also there; farmers tell several stories about some of their colleagues who lost their lives; some were sank in the clay, others by scorpions bites; however, in a very rare cases. Cultivable lands is much more abundant than the actual need of the farmers, and due to the insignificant cost of agriculture on the one hand- e.g. no fees, no need for fertilizers, pesticides, gasoline, machines for land preparations, etc- and the high productivity of land on the other hand; farmers usually choose to incur such risky agricultural activity, and the numbers of new farmers who are mainly comes from New Halfa is in increasing over the years.

Distribution of cultivable lands is traditionally worked out by some elders who take the position of sheikhs informally, and their role is restricted mainly to help in organizing such process. Eligibility to cultivate these new lands mainly rest on ethnic and family bases. i.e. the old system of village and family groupings that Nubians were accustomed to before the 1964 migration. Accordingly, every eligible person is allowed to cultivate a piece of land which seldom exceeds 10 feddans (not restricted by a rule, but determined by other factors such as the high productivity of land, limited finance and labourers, hard accessibility to the land across the mountains, and difficulties to clean the land) at his old village site.

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Due to abundance of land, and the common origin; problems and disputes over rights of cultivation is almost lacking; except at um-bakol and mek el- nasir villages, where there are few permanent settlers who refused to migrate in 1964 and continuing their lives there, they enter in some disputes with newcomers into their area, Halfawiyyin call them Arabs, local farmers call them Ghanamah (goat keepers); who came into the area in the past few decades and started to make use of these new lands by grazing their herds of goats and cultivating some sorghum. However, such disputes are expected to increase by the passage of time as a result of the gradual increase of number in both groups- Halfawiyyin and non-Halfawiyyin in the area.

Two main agricultural seasons are practiced in this area; winter season (shitwi), which usually starts in October, and ends in April, it is the most important season, in which wheat and bean has to be cultivated in addition to some other cash crops; and summer season (saifi) in April till October, sorghum is the main saifi crop, besides watermelon and some vegetables; but farmers do not exerts much effort in it because they fear the early flood. Transporting the crop also represents another problem because of the Dameira. Productivity is usually very high with only one major threat; the unexpected and frequent high floods; for instance; people started to cultivate these lands since 1982, in an irregular and indiscriminate manner; in 1993, a high flood devastated the area and forced people to escape, till 2001 when they returned and started again to cultivate their lands.

Lack of transportation represents another real problem limiting the use of these highly fertile lands; farmers are usually compelled to pay half of the

222 harvested crop for the owners of boats as a transportation cost. These, in addition to the difficulties of cleaning and preparing the lands from grasses and trees, and the inability of machines to enter the area, due to lack of routes. The process of cultivation usually starts by one or two members of a family, friends or neighbours, who comes into the area and starts winter cultivation from October to June, and then returns home; one of them may stay behind till harvest, while the other travel home- new Halfa- and return by the beginning of the summer cultivation. And the process continues at the same manner.

The interviews revealed that in the previous season 2007/2008, nearly about 150 people came from Atieri (village 26) and practiced cultivation at the old village site; however, this season, the number of farmers from Atieri is clearly far less than the past season; a matter reflecting the spontaneous nature of cultivation there, and the new pattern (very slow, but emerging) of Halfawiyyin migration towards their old home.

When farmers were asked why they left the cultivation, and the other virtues in the New Halfa scheme; most of them indicated to the following “push” factors: shortage of irrigation water, numerous fees and, the ever-rising cost of cultivation, contaminated drinking water, deterioration and collapse of social services, unemployment, diseases, and deteriorating crop prices; in contrast to the following "pull" factors: availability of work, abundant fertile lands, healthy environment; no malaria, kidney failure, and bilharzias; security, few strangers, no thefts; beside the nonexistence of the "salif" tradition. Interviewed farmers were left to speak freely about their future plans and for these lands; some resorted to old memories and remembrance

223 of the old home with full emotions, declaring that one day, they must return with families and reestablish their life at this beautiful site again.

The on-going work of the highway which passes near their villages (Halfa- Dongla- Omdurman highway), beside the news about the dams below their region, the huge agricultural investment north of Halfa town; strong rumors about existence of vast mineral resources in the area, specially the gold; and the effective government ideological propaganda, gave some of them full confidence that the reconstruction process is definitely going to cover all aspects of life in their area; hence make their life easier than what they experienced now at the new Halfa scheme. It is very clear that those farmers are highly motivated to work hard enough, despite the hardships of life there in a country nearly lacking all facilities of life. They feel calm, proud, serious, more optimistic, and controlling their own life and destiny, contrary to what they are expressing and actually experiencing at the New Halfa scheme.

2-Fishing: Observation revealed that all Halfawiyyin farmers in the area are heavily engaging in fishing activities, however, they are not truly fishermen; such activity, like cultivation, also witnessed some flourishing since the beginning of 1980s. Halfawiyyin farmers in the area practice fishing as secondary activity beside agriculture to generate income; fishing is a daily routine activity for those farmers also to get their own food; fish is their basic food, but some times they eat fish with Gorasa (photo. No.3 ),when wheat flour is available, or use of fresh fish as a substitute for red meat in their cooking; They usually selling fish of high quality, and separating low quality types for

224 their own meals; fishing practice takes the same specificity of agriculture, i.e. Farmers practice fishing generally in the waters which facing their agricultural lands. Traditional fishing methods are in use, mainly, small wooden or iron boats, beside the hooks; while other few Halfawiyyin who own machine boats, use to collect fish from the farmers across the river down till Akasha village to the south, where they have some small freezing boxes which scattered along the river banks. These machine boat, either private or belong to the fish factory (photo. No.4), equipped with scales to collect fish from the farmers, and deliver it to the fish factory in the Halfa town. It is noticed here that the owners of machine boats exploit the farmers, in the sense that they pay a very low price for farmers, for example, 2 SDP for a kilogram of high quality fish, while selling it for the factory at 8 SDP. The exploitative nature of this trade is also clear if we examine the exchange relation between the two parties, i.e. the farmers and the owners of the machine boats; farmers completely dependent on the machine boats owners to supply them with food stuff, which is mainly composed of wheat flour, okra (waika), cooking oil, and snuff (tombak); farmers request boats owners to provide them these materials on the account of their fish, which means while boats owners easily gain money, farmers have to bear the burden of fishing, and sometimes caught in debt to the boats owners if a farmer consumed more than what he fished. Such unequal exchange relation is expected to be maintained at this level, for an unpredicted time in the lack of roads and other communication facilities from Halfa town, and the rest of the country, to this isolated and hardly accessible area.

It is also observed that some other non Halfawiyyin individuals are involved in fishing activities, mostly, but not exclusively from Barber area;

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Halfawiyyin call them Arabs irrespective of their ethnic backgrounds; in addition to some other people, strangely enough, mostly from Darfur origins (photo. No.5).

Halfawiyyin farmers of Ard el Hagar, despite the fact that they gained excellent experiences of fishing, which represent their basic food at present, and good source of income; when they asked why they do not exert more effort on fishing and modernizes their means of fishing; they responded that fishing is not their profession, and they are compelled to it in the absence of markets to buy other food alternatives, fishing is just a temporary activity under such condition till the area is to be revitalized again; and that they love the land, their fathers and grandfathers' home; somehow reflecting what Scudder named "the home sickness stigma", taking into consideration the fact that all the interviewed farmers came from the New Halfa scheme.

Concluding remarks: It seems that the hope of those farmers regarding the future of exploiting these new lands is too high, especially in the light of the state policy to erect more dams along the Nile cataracts below their area, e.g. at Dal and kajbar; they are heavily supporting such projects, and hoping the urgent completion of Merowe Dam; as they think that such dams are going to control and stabilize the Nile water and hence, prohibit flooding of their lands; however, when they reminded that such dams may possibly destroy the life of the Mahas and the Manasir people; the farmers started to calculate the benefits of dams and the achievements the targeted people can gain; thus,

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Halfawiyyin farmers rationally calculate their interests; they accused and condemned dams and relocation in some situations; as that of their case, and they welcoming construction of dams in other situations, when it appears to satisfy their vested interests.

Apparently, the future of making use of such new lands is highly depending, not only upon the construction of more dams along the Nile to control the water, but on other factors such as the willingness, and the ability of Halfawiyyin to rebuild the area, and the other facilities that have to be provided through the government, such as roads, public services, and other infrastructures; however, the long lasting deterioration of the New Halfa scheme on the one hand, and the mining for new good cultivable lands, especially those suitable for wheat production, beside the national and international circumstances of food shortage and the steadily increase of food price on the other hand, might lead in the foreseeable future to rethink of the huge potentiality of these new lands.

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Photo. No.(5). New lands at Ard el Hajar

Source: fieldwork

Photo No.(6) Silts accumulation at Ard el Hajar

Source: fieldwork

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Photo. No.(7). Food of the farmers at Ard el Hajar

Source: fieldwork

Photo. No.(8). Engine boat

Source: fieldwork

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Photo. No.(9). Fishermen at Ard el Hajar

Source: fieldwork

Photo. No.(10). Nubian grave

Source: fieldwork

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Photo. No. ( 11 ). New house at village 26. New Halfa.

Source: fieldwork

Photo. No. (12). Standard resettlement home at the new Halfa

Source: fieldwork

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Photo No. (13 ). The Karawoos

Source: fieldwork

Photo No. (14). New Karawoos

Source: fieldwork

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Photo No. (15 ). drinking water pipeline at the village 26

Source: fieldwork

Photo. No. (16 ). Kilo 14. (Ard el- Hajar)

Source: fieldwork

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Photo. No. (17 ) improved latrine at Kilo 14.

Source: fieldwork

Photo. No. ( 18 ) Halfawiyyin hut at Kilo 14.

Source: fieldwork

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Photo. No. (19). Al- Thawra quarter at the new Halfa town.

Source: fieldwork

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Notes:

1. Cernea, Michael M. 2000. Risks, safeguard and reconstruction: A model for population displacement and resettlement. In: Risks and reconstruction: Experiences of resettlers and refugees. M. M Cernea and C. McDowell, eds. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 2. Mohamed,S Amen. ed. 2004. The New Halfa Scheme: Reality and Reform (in Arabic). A study presented for the Nubian Study Centre and the Nubian congress in Khartoum. 3. Sondra, D Hale. 1982. The Changing Ethnic Identity of Nubians in Urban Milieu: Khartoum, Sudan. Unpublished PhD. University of California, los Angeles. 4. (http://www.sudaneseonline.com,25.3.2008).

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Chapter Seven Changes in Some Aspects of Halfawiyyin Social Life

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Chapter Seven: Changes in Some Aspects of Halfawiyyin Social Life

Introduction Corresponding with changes that are taking place in field of economics and political setting similar changes are occurring on the level of interpersonal, family and marital relations. Here it is pertinent to note that Halfawiyyin cultural distinctiveness is being questioned under the new situation in new Halfa.

Halfawiyyin, as subset of Nubian group, have their own cultural traits, traditions and customs which distinguish them from the other Sudanese groups, such cultural distinctiveness persisted for long times due to some historical and geographical factors; but relocation of Halfawiyyin in 1964 has led to fragmentation of their cultural world, hence, hastening the process of social change. it is possible to trace such unprecedented changes in some of Halfawiyyin certain basic social institutions.

1- Marriage: In traditional societies, the bride usually has to be selected from the known surroundings, based on kinship, affinity, neighborhood, or common tradition and culture. Nubian, as a traditional society was strongly adhering to these essentials. Geographical isolation and the remoteness of Nubia had further strengthened adherence to such essentials. Selection of the bride usually has to be done at an early age, probably since childhood, at desire of parents, or carrying out a grandfather or grandmothers' commandment. Marriage usually occurs at early age (15-20) for males and (13-16) for females.

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Wedding ceremonies usually take seven days, starts on Wednesday evening or Saturday evening exclusively, with every day slaughters and feasts. Songs of religious trait (Khatmiyya religious sect) was dominating throughout such ceremonies. The end of the seventh day usually mark the end of marriage days; and the new couples has to move either to the house of father of the groom or to the house of the father of the bride; if they have no an independent house.

However, many changes happened regarding marriage and wedding ceremonies among Halfawiyyin at the new scheme. First, despite the fact that endogamy is still representing the most preferential type of marriage; there is a noticeable deviation from such norm, it is now not uncommon for Halfawiyyin to marrying their girls to other ethnic groups, preferably other Nubians, then Arabs, especially northerners Arabs, i.e. Ga'aliyyin, Shaigiyya. such change can be attributed, at least partially, to the increasing numbers of unmarried girls ‘spinsters’, as a result of socioeconomic factors; also the past seven days ceremonies were reduced to only one to two days, while the accompanying religious songs were forgotten. The night feasts were also reduced for one day; and at some villages such as village No.26, night feasts were prohibited many years ago, to be performed during the day, fearing the often disturbances and quarrels committed by drunkards; that is, events like marriage, instead of being a religious occasions, as it was in the past; it lost its religious trait and changed to a real party for drinking youths, in addition to other kinds of behaviour not accepted by the elders, who are more committed to societal traditions and Islamic values, so they think such habits as deviation from the accepted social norms.

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The early age marriages also were abandoned, so, males now usually get married at around 40 years of age, and more, compare to 25 and above for women. Certainly, economic difficulties playing an important role here, but also interacting with other sociocultural aspects, the openness to urban culture, rationalization, awareness, and the ever diminishing effects of traditions and old customs. The other rituals and practices associated with marriage, i.e. presentation and spraying milk on the couples as good omen and to fetch blessing; the bride has to see the blood of the offering before going to the place that especially prepared for her setting; the reciprocal gifts between the two families, and the in kind participation of the other members of society, were also abandoned. However, the depiction is different among Halfawiyyin at suburban Khartoum, who are, with a few exceptions, entirely adopting the dominant city style regarding marriage practices and rituals; with apparent growth of deviations from the norm of endogamy.

2-Death and religious occasions People accustomed since the ancient times to accompanying death with certain rituals associated to their beliefs, with passage of time, they add other things which not constitute a real part of such beliefs; but becomes an integral part of their whole cultural heritage; and the system of beliefs becomes solely habits; although people may not know some of its origins. Nubians, as part of Muslim society, their customs do not differ in this respect from the other societies, however, as a distinctive cultural group within the wider Muslim society, they have had their own customs and rituals that characterizes them, for example, they have had accustomed to keep in their houses the necessities for preparation of deceased; i.e. grave-

240 clothes, perfume, and the other requisites; also they had used to carry the departed on especial beds made of palm trees, not on the traditional Sudanese wooden bed Angareeb. Also fiery crying, wailing, and deep sadness for many days, depending on the status of the deceased, which might be renewed at every occasion and remembrance, was from their characterized customs.

From the preserved Islamic customs in their past, was what Halfawiyyin named Kirundi -the howdah- for the passed away woman, that is, they had to put something similar to the howdah, made of fronds of palms on the funeral, covered by cloth; as an exaggeration to shroud the dead woman. Halfawiyyin also have had especial regard about headstone, on which they write some Koran verses, and the name and date of the deceased in both Hegira and Christ calendars; such custom, which has no Islamic origin; according to archeological discoveries at the area, is very old dating back to the past centuries. Relatives of the dead person had to stay for successive three days to receive consolation, some times for successive seven days, during which men have to do what is known as el-itagah; which is that they had to collect amount of gravels, gathering around it, greaten God 70 thousand times; and gift the blessing for the deceased (to free “itg” the dead person from fire) according to their beliefs; then disperse the gravels on the grave of the dead person. Therefore, the phenomenon of dispersing and covering graves with gravel is a common Nubian custom. Relatives of the dead person do not prepare food through the consolation days, food has to be brought by their neighbours till the seventh day, during which usually they have to slaughter an ox, or some sheep and prepare charity food to distribute it for the poor and needy people, after that, they have to visit the grave to put

241 green palms fronds on it, believing that such act will lessen the pains of the grave; also they place a crockery filled with water at the head of the grave, as a charity for free birds. Such habit is too old among the Nubians, even before Islam, however, a continuation of such ritual, is still somehow continuing, and noticed among some Nubians at the new Halfa scheme and also among those who recently migrated to Khartoum suburbs, but with some modification, for example, slaughtering for charity is not frequently practiced, may be for economic reasons, and only small amount of gravels now are being put on the grave beside the headstone, and some green palm fronds.

Halfawiyyin widow, according to Islamic ٍٍSharia laws, has to stay at home for four months and ten days, but at end of the mourning period, she had to go to the Nile in the evening, accompanied by a number of women, to wash herself, change her clothes, and wear the dresses of widows at that time. It is clear that most of Halfawiyyin traditions, customs and rituals were highly associated with the Nile and palm trees, and with their physical environment, but they were compelled to abandon most of which by the resettlement.

3-Religious occasions: Among the most important of these occasions is Ramadan, Halfawiyyin , like the other Sudanese, accustomed to bring their fasting meal outside the homes at the streets and yards; Nubian women also used to do the same; where neighbours congregate and take the fasting meal within especial groups, Ramadan breakfast table was mainly composed of dates, fresh

242 cowpea or chick-pea, in addition to hilu mur- especial beverage usually prepared for Ramadan- and amylum, at dinner the main meal was Gorasa- Kabieda- with okra, pea or bean leaves; while the last meal sehoor was usually from curdled milk with " sala'ab" or milk tea with cakes.

Eids were the happy occasions all people waiting for, where most of absentees and the travelers returning homes, carrying gifts for their families, relatives and friends. On the morning of the Eid day, people leave homes to pray with their children, while women stay behind organizing, cleaning, painting and decorating homes, and to prepare sweets, cakes and bakes; meanwhile, the neighbours of mosques and places of prayer were presenting breakfast for prayer people, it was usually rice with milk and butter, that is, rice was the dominant food on the Eid day; they have to take it outside homes; immediately after breakfast, Halfawiyyin accustomed to roam houses, congratulating the Eid, visiting relatives, neighbours, and elders; these visits continues through the Eid days and it may extends to the nearby villages. Generally, there is a recognizable continuum in Eid rituals and practices between Halfawiyyin and the other Sudanese groups, with minor differences in matters concerning the dominant food meal of the Eid day; also Nubians usually visiting the graves and renewing its soil, and their sadness, for example.

The Mulid Eid, prophet Mohamed birth, was one of these religious occasions, Halfawiyyin were accustomed to celebrate it; where men congregate at specific places, at which pavilions were erected, reads the course of the prophet life from Khatmiyya sect books, and chanting birth verses, till the last day, at which they organize a procession at the village,

243 drinking tea and sherbet, then dispersing. However, such distinct way of Mulid celebrations, is no longer done in the same way as it was before, even the occasion itself, no longer very important as before, especially among the resettlers at the scheme, even the effect of Khatmiyya religious sect is not clear among the contemporary Halfawiyyin.

Halfawiyyin also have had especial regards to Ashora night, and the night of half Sha'ban, that is, at the Ashora; they have had to light fires since afternoon, erecting pots to cook a type of "balilah" composed of seven types of grains and legumes; eat outside homes, dole for neighbours, and throwing the remainder into the Nile; they Believe that such act is going to heave the grief. While at the second occasion, "the night of half Sha'ban", they had to cook lentil with pottage of date, and eat in groups outside homes. However, nowadays; celebration by these two occasions became an individual matter rather than a community concern.

It is clear that there are some pre-Islamic beliefs and rituals still surviving among Halfawiyyin, as it is also among some other Nubian groups, however, such beliefs and practices are gradually fading, at least partially due to the changed ecological and social setting of Halfawiyyin, and to the accelerated incorporation of Halfawiyyin and the other Nubians into the dominant Sudanese urban culture. A significant change can also be noticed about the names of Halfawiyyin new generation, i.e. those who are born after resettlement, Halfawiyyin left their traditional names that distinguish them from the others, such as Mohamed Salih, Khalil, Tawfique, Diab, Nouri, Farah, Dahab, Oshei, Saleem, Shalabi and Fikkri for males, and

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Dahabiya, Hugla, Nabra, Sufra, Hanim, Sharifa, Jara, and Timaya for females, and changed to adopt familiar urban Sudanese names.

Though, contrary to the image thought by many Sudanese, that Halfawiyyin are not being good religious adherers, pre-resettlement Halfawiyyin were known as highly conservative people, they were mostly Sufi Muslims, where Khatmiyya religious sect was prevalent among them; however, the average Halfawiyyin individuals practices Islam as they conceive it, as a component of their rich cultural heritage; they are the descendants of the great Nubian civilization; though, it is logical to find some pre-Islamic (Christian, and even Pharaoh) cultural elements intermingled within that cultural mosaic; such as their strong belief in the Nile, and the other latent spiritual powers; these practices were considered by orthodox Muslims as myths, hence, bemock Halfawiyyin as "new to Islam". What caused such general impression about Halfawiyyin weak religious devotion may be partially attributed to their reaction, and the state of anger and dissatisfaction about relocation, and the enormous stresses which accompanied their resettlement; since then, they are accused by ignorance and weak religious adherence. Nevertheless, Halfawiyyin new generation, unlike the elders, can not be described as "good" religious adherents; on the contrary, they are affirming such stereotype image about Halfawiyyin in this respect. Khatmiyya sect is no longer the most prevalent among Halfawiyyin, especially youths, who are generally being an ordinary Sunni Muslims, joining the different Sunni Islamic movements and parties.

The most far-reaching change among resettled Halfawiyyin , whether at the new Halfa or at Khartoum suburbs, not to mention the neglect of certain

245 customs, is the perceived declining use of the rotana indigenous language, especially among those who are born or spend long time at Khartoum, however, around two decades ago, it is hard to find a child or a juvenile, in addition to old woman, speaking Arabic at the resettlement area of Halfawiyyin ; even at the primary schools teachers had to use rotana to illustrates lessons; but nowadays, the use of rotana is not so comprehensive as before, even at homes; despite the homogeneity of Halfawiyyin settlements at the scheme, and their semi exclusive neighbourhoods at Khartoum suburbs. The frequency to speak rotana was lessened and restricted to certain settings and occasions, i.e. only when reasonable numbers agglomerates at especial occasion, during visiting, and so forth; such trend is mainly recognized among males, who usually has to contact with other non Nubian-speaking people throughout the day more than women, nevertheless, Halfawiyyin use to speak rotana, and dignified with their own rotana more than the other Nubian groups in Khartoum, to whom Halfawiyyin see themselves as more Nubians.

Halfawiyyin, especially at suburbs of Khartoum are concerned more about teaching Arabic language to their children, beside rotana, to qualify them to better cope and compete in such Arabic dominated cultural milieu, on the one hand, and to preserve cultural continuity and Halfawiyyin ethnic identity on the other side. Whatsoever, as far as the language is a comprehensive container for cultural traits and cultural meanings, rotana, is therefore, can be considered as the last remaining feature of Halfawiyyin cultural identity.

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4- Pregnancy and Giving Birth: Nubians have had their own traditions in respect to pregnancy and birth. Nubian woman do not inform any body by her first pregnancy, except her mother, who undertakes her daughter care in case if the pregnant daughter living at her own home, the mother has to join her; otherwise the daughter has to join the mother. Nubians used different ways to conserve pregnant woman from harm, for example, the pregnant often has to avoid appearance in front of people, but if she did, she shouldn't to unveil her head at all; also Nubians usually stick to incense the house where pregnant woman live, day and night to protect her from the evil eye, according to their believes. Owl was the most fearful bird for the pregnant, it is connected with fatality and pessimism in their believes, so they fear it may fly over the pregnant; for caution, she is not allowed to sleep at an open air, and has only to sleep inside the room.

Nubians did not Know midwifes until the last 1930s, before that date, it was the aged women who undertake such a task, usually they inherit it through mothers, and because they used to use a rope in the delivery operation, the midwife was named as the roper al-habliyya. Delivery operation has had to be done in some secret; no body is allowed to attend it except a few aged women with the midwife, but immediately after delivery they used to announce the event; first for the father, if he is present, otherwise the grandfather. The event preacher would get a valuable gift, whereas the midwife usually takes fixed gifts composed of money, perfumes and sweets, which are the same gifts nowadays.

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The mother was not allowed to breastfeed her child for successive three days, during which he has to feed on a solution of sugar and salt. On the seventh day, the child is given a name, after slaughtering, where relatives and neighbours have to be invited, as it is commonly practiced in Sudan; it is a social obligation for neighbours and relatives to prepare food and tea for the family of the new born.

As it was stated earlier, the Nile has had especial effect on the Halfawiyyin social life, the new couples, for example, at the inception of their life, have had to go to the Nile accompanied by a group of friends, to wash themselves and drink from its water, asking blessing, while the woman who giving birth, after the fortieth day, she has to take her child to the Nile, accompanied by a few women, to wash themselves seeking for the blessing. The new moon, or the crescent, was one of the natural phenomena that also has had a significant effect on the Halfawiyyin social life, for example, they prefer wedding to be at the beginning of the month rather than at its end, and the birth-giving woman was also has to get out carry the child to see the crescent of the new month, then washing her face and her child face with water.

Though, rituals focusing on the Nile and the other natural phenomena were an incorporated element of pre-resettlement Halfawiyyin social life; apparently, it was women who were most often concerned with such rituals and practices, with only limited participation of men. Pre-Islamic (including Christian) beliefs and rituals are incorporated part of such rich cultural mosaic, and seems to be still thriving. Therefore, Halfawiyyin women are the most seriously affected by resettlement, where they lost comforting customs, rituals, institutions and symbols dealing, for example, with giving

248 birth, wedding and death, they were intensely stressed by the loss of such social and cultural resources all at the same time. What make them to bear more suffering rather than men is the fact that the past Nubian society was simple and symbiotic, social life far away from individualism, Nubians used to support each others all the times, beginning from the ordinary daily activities, to the social occasions, and all facets of social life. In such a society; woman serving, and close to the land, she was the pole of life. The nature of Nubian country compel men and able-bodied youths to migrate, leaving women behind, whom, accordingly, has to bear all burdens of the life, to perform the role of the absent husbands, fathers and sons; they have had to take care of children and elders, to undertake land cultivation, dates harvesting, in addition to their responsibilities as housewives. Such enormous responsibilities provide Halfawiyyin woman with experience and early maturity and awareness; though Halfawiyyin women were recognizably organized, efficient, and well handling; despite the very limited educational opportunities been available for them since the past.

5. Nubian dress: One of the most distinguishing features of Halfawiyyin woman was her dress; the famous traditional dress named al-jarjar, Halfawiyyin woman has had three dresses:

1-Young unmarried females' dress; composed of long dress with short or long sleeves, and a veil or mantilla from any colour except the black. 2-Young married females' dress; it was the jarjar, which usually made of black carved or striped cloth, with a black mantilla. Tailoring jarjar was

249 usually done locally by specialized and well-trained women. Jarjar in its simplest form, with long and wide sleeves exceeding hands carpus, whereas its length reaching the anklebone from the front, with increasing length from behind till drag on the earth to 25-30cm. though, the dress took its name from such feature, the "traction". 3- Aging Halfawiyyin women had different clothing, usually made of thick neutral colour cloth, differ in its cutting from the traditional jarjar, it was too wide with big and broad sleeves and closed from the front, it was also characterized by the length, similar to mantle, but with the traction excess like Jarjar, and has to be dressed with a mantilla. While widows had to wearing clothes the jarjar, with a mantilla, but they have to put over it another piece of thick black cotton cloth.

Though, Halfawiyyin women traditional dress seems closer to some other highly conservative Muslim women dresses, with the only exception of the face veil; with no similarity in other parts of Sudan. Some researches trace it back to the effects of their past Christian culture, whereas others trace it to even ancient Pharaohs dresses; whatever its origin, jarjar remains as a unique symbol of Halfawiyyin women; unfortunately, in its way to complete vanishing, like much of the other Halfawiyyin cultural distinctions. Nowadays, it is very rare to observe a woman wearing jarjar at the resettlement site, and if so, it is only restricted to some aging women; however, the sight of women gathering in front of the houses sitting on the ground, with common black dresses, chatting in rotana, is one of the few remaining traits reminding the visitor that he is among Halfawiyyin people. Whereas at Khartoum suburbs where most of immigrant Halfawiyyin reside, jarjar, like many other symbols of Halfawiyyin culture, almost became part

250 of their past memories, and found its way to the museums, like many other symbols of Halfawiyyin culture, left the way for the common Sudanese women garment toub, and the other contemporary dresses.

6. Women ornaments: Nubian women knew different types of ornament since ancient times, tattooing was the most important type of ornamentation of the face, hands and the lips, however, lip tattooing was very common not among Halfawiyyin ' women alone, but also among women of the other Nubian subgroups. Halfawiyyin ' women also used some types of beads, then brazen and silver jewels, and the last development to the use of gold jewelry; beside silver, brass and golden rings to ornamenting their fingers and feet. Halfawiyyin women also used bangles and partridges in their decoration.

Henna, was the best decoration requirement Halfawiyyin ' woman accustomed to keep, however, beautification with henna was usually connected to weddings, but also to other occasions such as Eids, childbirth, and circumcision. Henna also used to colour the hair, especially by aged women, Nubian woman often aspire to beauty, for example, most of them usually use to keep a mirror on the wall at the entrance of the kitchen and on the wall at the jars site, so as to look at themselves and assure their prettiness. What was unlovable among Nubian old women in general was their use of snuff, and some also use to smoke tobacco, which generally conceived as males habits by Sudanese people.

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Unfortunately, female circumcision, is very common among Halfawiyyin, like the other northern Sudanese groups, a phenomenon that highly correlates with the level of literacy, especially among the females in a culturally male- dominated societies; because it is females, more than males, who are supporting and highly responsible for the persistence and perpetuation of such harmful practices and habits; also among which, what is named spirit possession, al-dha'ar. However, the spread and frequency of such habits among Halfawiyyin was recognizably lessened after resettlement and the increasing exposure to other cultures.

7. Halfawiyyin art:

(1) Songs The most distinguishing feature of Halfawiyyin singing art is its group performance and dance accompaniment, individual performance where a singer sings among a group of attendants and listeners, was not known by Nubians, it seems that such group performance was a logical outcome of the nature of the Nubian life, which was characterized by collectivism in almost all aspects of life.

Nubian song also did not knew music instruments except recently, tambour Ta'ar was the only device accompanying the song; however, with the introduction of music, Nubian song lost its particularity, the matter which was reflected in the way of performance, and changed the song; therefore, Halfawiyyin ' song recently, alienated from its originality, with only few rotana words remaining;, most of which were even rapidly Arabicized. At song parties, usually the wedding ceremonies, people had to be divided into

252 either participants or spectators, who has to take their places around the dance floor, each on a separate side for males or females, whereas the singer has to take a side behind which stands the male participants in crowded lines, each line composed of two or more persons with entangled hands, females participants has to take the opposite side of the singer around 4 meters, with the same way as males lines, but the first rows usually been left for younger girls, aged women or for the members of the occasion such as the mother of the groom, sisters and aunts.

First the singer starts by tapping the Ta'ar for awhile, then singing while both males and females repeating only the first verse, the singer has to stay at a fixed place during singing, though he might waggle and move with the rhythms, but did not exceed his place. While males' participants had to move with the rhythms in short balanced steps backwards to a reasonable distance, then again forward with the same style. But not exceeding the singer who stands at the front. Women from the other side also had to do the same role in rows all moving forward in short balanced steps, till a reasonable distance, then moving backward at the same short steps, and so on. During such a collective performance, there was a segregated area between men and women, no body allowed to be in or exceed it except the one whose responsibility is to keep order.

It was this organized group performance which had characterized the Nubian song art at the area from Halfa Deghiem south of Wadi Halfa till Koresco in the Egyptian Nubia, out of this zone, at Ard el- Hajar, Al Sikkot, and the Mahas, the habit was somehow different, which is that men and women had to stand in a circular shape, repeating with the singer, who use the tambour,

253 clapping, and hitting lands by feet, that is, rhythm for them is to hit floor by feet while clapping, they do not know the Ta'ar , whereas female participants had to be in the centre of the dance floor, each dance individually.

Such classical image of Halfawiyyin art of song was also subject to so many changes, after resettlement and the exposure of Halfawiyyin semi-closed culture to the effects of external influences; it is not unusual to hear Arabic songs in wedding occasions at the area of resettlement, even if the singer is a Nubian, he has to execute a number of songs in Arabic language; also the modern dances, dresses, coiffure and other fashions found its way there; in addition to the use of modern music instruments especially the organ, which replaced the traditional Ta'ar as the only music device accompanying the singer, who was, usually, the author and composer at the same time. Whereas migrant Halfawiyyin at Khartoum suburbs accustomed to hear Arabic songs at their happy occasions, ironically, they request few Halfawiyyin rotana songs from the singer, just to remind themselves and the other non-Halfawiyyin attendants by their identity.

The dominant type of Nubian songs was the emotional and sad songs, especially after inundation and resettlement, beside the descriptive, political and national songs, however, songs elegizes and crying the old home were clearly dominant and continuingly in renewal after the Nile Water agreement of 1959. Nubian song was of ternary rhythms, quick, middle, and slow. Legacy songs usually belong to the last category; such songs characterized by its clear composition of Islamic meanings, but why such clear Islamic tone? it is not easy to find an answer; however, till today, Halfawiyyin

254 legacy songs are still full of religious meanings, especially prophet Mohamed laudation. For the rest of the Nubian poetry and literature, there is nothing written, that is, because Nubian language is unwritten, though, it may just be lost as any other unwritten legacy.

The tragedy of resettlement did not equally motivate writers and poets to document such an event, even in Arabic language, despite the fact that the issue of displacement is suitable for poetry, songs, novels and literature works. Related to the same issue, is what was being sung by women at different happy occasions such as wedding, pilgrimage, circumcision and so forth; such type of art, which may metaphorically be classified as songs, was characterized by certain features, such as:

- The words, meanings and essence of these songs are Islamic; - Carrying sad and devout suggestion tunes; - being performed without any type of accompanying rhythm; - being performed at especial times; - have different aims from the traditional songs, it was either for description, commendation, or glory; and - It is hereditary, that is, be transferred from generation to the next without any change in the subject, meaning or rhythms. These songs can be divided into three sections: (i) laudation poems; mainly dealt with parts of the Prophet Mohamed course of life, and other Islamic meanings; such poems usually sing at the beginning of group works in weddings “perfume preparation” or at slaughtering, also at send-off and reception of pilgrims.

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(ii) Reputation poems; it was usually sung during the henna and jertig (jertig is the decoration by beads, which is the oldest known decoration means, beads was also been used as talisman against evil eye, and usually bind around hands and sometimes at the neck) ceremonies. These songs commonly carry meanings of reputation and pride by origin and descent. It also praises the groom ancestors, referring to their ethical characteristics, such as courage and generosity; or describing the purity, glory and chasteness of the bride. (iii) The wedding songs; generally it carries Islamic connotations, women used to sing such songs during the walking of bride and groom at the back of the hymeneal procession.

(2) Nubian architecture: Safety is the most important factor for development, when people safeguard their life, then after, comes stability and development; followed by mastery and creativity. It is clear that the resettled Halfawiyyin at the new Halfa scheme still feel insecure and estrangement, not only according to what they have already expressed, but from the sight of their homes and settlements, where all things appear old and broken-down, it seems that these constructions, with a few exception, were not maintained and renewed since its establishment; and some houses were abandoned and stands as empty ruins. Whereas those newly constructed ones; despite the fact that they are very few, mostly built of mud and moveable substances; anyway, it is no more than cracked abandoned houses. However, the site of abandoned governmental houses, stores, hangars, and workshops chassis, is very

256 common everywhere at the new Halfa scheme, particularly at the new Halfa town and at the agricultural inspections.

Nubia was lacking reasons of stability for more than a century ago particularly before Turkish conquest at 1820, however, despite the state of instability before that date, difficulties and hardships of life at that part of land, Nile banks knew architecture and building of houses, which was simple at the beginning not exceeding two rooms of mud or stones, but the expansion of building of houses was growing after the Turkish conquest, and the attainment of stability and security. While building of houses according to what appeared during relocation-1965- was dating back to the period 1900-1930, the construction of Aswan dam and its successive heightening have had the greatest effect on this matter; where the retreated water from the dam destroyed considerable number of houses, lands and fruit trees, also many islands disappeared. Though, people were forced to change to the high places, fearing of the rising waters; so they built wide houses with dual rooms; supported in this respect by the improvement of material status of some who were compensated for the damages incurred due to the construction of the dam.

At Wadi Halfa, and Nubian land generally, houses were classical with approximate areas of around 400m2 for each, and a semi unified maps, Nubian house has had one entrance usually facing the Nile, the symbol of life; and some times open towards the south, but rarely come across entrance facing to the north. The common map was that of a middle square and surrounding rooms at its edges; whereas the location of some annexes, seems as if it is agreed upon by all people, for example, the kitchen usually

257 was at the left side of the house, and at the entrance door there was a veranda opened on it an extended room for guests; at the opposite side of the veranda there was what is named "diwani"- dewan- which constitute separated part of the house; and specially constructed for weddings, composed of a room for the bride, and an extended hostess, between them there was a small roofless interspace. In addition to that, the house may contain one to two rooms. Also many houses were containing especial places for domestic animals and birds, besides the health annexes, which were not common, but people lately resorted to it.

However, it is normally that houses were constructed from mud and brick stone, it was also not usual for the local people to build the houses by themselves, so they usually used to employ others who come from Manasir and Shaygiyya, and who are specialized in this work. The second step, which was the roofing, it was the usual work of men and boys; roofs of the houses was usually from palm trunks and fronds, which what was available at the local environment; sometimes they may roof the houses from mats of wheat sticks. The last stage of building, which was the finishing, and what is related to it, such as painting, polishing, and sanding the walls and the ground; this stage was the women job, they used to use a mixture of alluvium and soft sands, using their mere hands without any help equipment, they usually used to bedding the ground with especial type of red sand bringing it from the desert edges; they also used to renew the ground from time to time particularly at occasions, like weddings and Eids. Women also used to decorate the walls; especially the entrance of the house with drawings, garnitures, and different pictures, these drawings and pictures has

258 had other function, in addition to decoration, that is, it has a spiritual value to dispossess evil spirits.

Such art, which was started spontaneously by women, and then, it was developed, quickly attracted men, and hence it took new dimensions until it became an independent and peculiar art characterizes Wadi Halfa region. In the beginning, it was simple artless geometrical drawings, or crescent and star, banners and domes restricted only to the two sides of the house main gate, delineated by a white or blue paint; at a later stage, the use porcelain dishes was introduced; the numbers of these dishes were increasing or decreasing according to the financial status of the owner of the house. Then decoration was extended to contain the internal parts of the house like verandas, kitchen and the internal terraces. At a later stage when the economic situation of the area has relatively improved, they changed to use different colour paints to decorate the house main entrance, the dewans, and the verandas. Such work was much improved until it became an independent profession by some famous artisans, who were able to advance it for its own high potential aestheticism. At the later days of Wadi Halfa, people were turned to polish their houses with white and yellow lime, especially after they discovered some sites rich of such substance, though, most villages changed to white; the matter which was of great surprise and excitement for the members of Wadi Halfa resettlement committee when they arrived to start the relocation process.

Unfortunately, such distinguished art was no longer living at the new resettlement area and among those who migrated to Khartoum environs and it is dying even at the remaining part of old home as one of direct impacts

259 and unavoidable costs of the Nubian involuntary settlement experience. However, the deteriorating economic situation of the inhabitants of Wadi Halfa region due to fluctuation of the political relations between Sudan and Egypt at the recent decades, which directly affects the movement of citizens and merchandise at the Halfa port; the main income source of the inhabitants, and the increasing process of social mobility of them towards their mother country, in comparison to the time before the Nubian exodus; all these factors accelerated the process of gradual missing of the features of the traditional Halfawiyyin ' society and culture.

The position, planning and the internal structure of the traditional Nubian house was not taken into consideration at the area of resettlement, at which the planners applied one standard map for all, irrespective of social and cultural significance of the traditional layout of the Nubian house; what was important for planners at that time was to execute modern houses according to their own standards, certainly suit to the climatic conditions prevailing at the area, but not to suit Nubians inclination and cultural norms. Therefore, due to the process of resettlement, a valuable and distinctive cultural heritage was lost; and definitely, could not be compensated. The loss of the rich and distinctive Nubian architectural art, is one of the forgotten aspects of Nubian resettlement; not less than the loss of Nubian archaeological sites under the water of the High dam, which many people regard it as the only material loss of Nubian relocation.

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Concluding remarks: These are some aspects of Halfawiyyin rich and distinctive social life in the past; which undergoing a recognizable and accelerated changes as a result of involuntary settlement, with a general trend towards disappearance because of the change in the social and physical environment, however, despite Halfawiyyin tendency to reside in a semi-detached communities close to each others; they couldn't revitalize their past culture as they wish, on the contrary, the characteristics of the new emerging Halfawiyyin communities at Khartoum suburbs seems to be culturally becoming more and more closer to the dominant central Sudanese societies; that is, cultural assimilation of newly migrant Halfawiyyin into the dominant central Sudanese culture is an ongoing process. Participant observation inside these new Halfawiyyin settlements, revealed that they are easily adapted to the dominant urban culture, i.e. easiness and openness to accept and adopt urban values and norms; taking into consideration their past urban cultural outlooks, experiences and aspirations, e.g. their historical familiarity to migration abroad; their intensive connections to Egypt, and their choice for relocation site. Contrary to the state of tension and uneasiness they are living at the new Halfa; and to their counterparts at the new lands at Ard el Hajar who are still comparatively small in number; suffering, and commuting between the two sites; here they feel more calm and no longer claiming insecurity and fear of strangers, and the frequent demanding nature of Halfawiyyin, seems somehow disappeared; and an observable changes, for example, in views and aspirations, also in the material aspects of their life, e.g. furniture and decoration of houses, types and ingredients of food, the dresses, general appearance, etc.

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As far as migration- whether forced or voluntary- is considered an important mechanism in the process of population integration; which represents one of the central issues of national identity in the Sudan nowadays, Arabicization of immigrant Halfawiyyin, and most probably, all of the Sudanese Nubian, seems to be an unavoidable process in the future, for certain political and economic factors; not to mention the uneven national economic development plans; which over time only impoverishing rural areas; it is also a natural outcome of the politics and policies of the dominant culture "central riverian culture" to regenerate and strengthening its historical domination, hence, defending such historical "rights" and interests. And if there was a single merit for the course of Halfawiyyin resettlement in particular, and relocation of the other Nubians in general "Kajbar and Dal dams", it will certainly, diffuse in this respect.

Notes: 1. Scudder, Thayer. 1973. The Human Ecology of Big Projects: River Basin Development, In Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol.2.

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Conclusion

For long time, it has been clear that those displaced by development-induced displacement and development (DIDR) have usually not benefited. Instead, they are more often impoverished, losing economic, social, and cultural resources. National governments typically have justified DIDR by invoking the larger goals of national growth and development. The belief that the greater good could justify loss has been questioned by development practitioners, human rights advocates, and funders. Some have questioned whether large-scale development projects ever offer just development, while others have argued that impoverishment can be mitigated or avoided by careful planning that includes development initiatives for the affected. Paradoxically, the poor are the most vulnerable to impoverishment by resettlement programmes; though, such programmes often lead to accelerate socioeconomic differentiation instead of narrowing the gaps, as in the case of Halfawiyyin.

In this era of national planning, the big development project is commonplace. Big projects constitute development from above; they are superimposed by national or regional agencies upon a local population which has virtually no say during the stages of feasibility studies, planning, implementation and even running. This generalization is especially applicable to big irrigated agricultural schemes which continue to have a special appeal to planners and politicians alike. Though river basin development and hydroelectric power are usually as the economic justification, an aura frequently surrounds dams which take on intangible but important political and psychological attributes.

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Man’s creation of dams and large irrigation projects constitutes ecosystem modification on a grand scale, though there are no broad-based cost- benefit analyses which take into consideration ecological changes in the nonhuman environment as well as social costs for any of the African dams, their utility would be limited even if they existed (Scudder, 1973.p.46), because river basins are dynamic ecosystems which have been profoundly altered by damming. The modeling of the physical and biotic aspects of altered river basins and man-made lakes is in its infancy, while the inclusion of Sociocultural systems within such models has yet to begin; human systems not only are more dynamic than nonhuman ecosystems, but their persistence is characterized more by changes in the relationships of the components than by return to original patterns.

Although those undergoing resettlement (the relocatees) constitute just one component of these “mega projects”, the study of human resettlement presents the anthropologists with an exceptional opportunity to carry out long term research within a very broad ecological frame of reference which could have major policy and theoretical implications. Even where they fail to meet expected objectives, dams and the related huge irrigation projects incorporate the relocatees within a wider regional and even national entity, that is, by virtue of its very existence, such projects accelerates change in certain areas of human behaviour. Reservoir resettlement facilitates the study not only of the dynamics of change and continuity among specific human populations, but it also can lead to the generalization of hypotheses dealing comparatively with a number of populations. In this sense the anthropologist is provided with a situation in which one can study the extent

264 to which different groups (voluntary and involuntary settlers) respond to compulsory resettlement and to incorporation within new ecological and social settings.

To date, resettlement probably has been the least satisfactory aspect of dam construction - both from the viewpoint of the local people and the government planners. This is especially the case where the numbers of relocatees exceeds 50.000 as at New Halfa. The compulsory resettlement of large numbers of people is an incredible complex process since it requires shifting whole populations. No settler selection is possible since everyone must be moved.

Though resettlement occurred over 40 years ago in the new Halfa scheme, where resettled Halfawiyyin never feel at home in their new habitat; records of economic performance, public services, environmental health, and social stability are far below expectation, even worsening over time. Under such compulsion, stagnation and stress, most of relocated Halfawiyyin did not found any other solution except to escape the unfamiliar and unbearable habitat, to other more dynamic, more secure social and economic setting; suburbs of south Khartoum represented their ideal refuge; while other portion preferred return to old home, and start to reestablish their living there again.

In this respect, the issue of resettlement appears to have two possibilities; 1- adaptation, or,2- Marginalization. Experiences and lessons learned from the Halfawiyyin resettlement suggest that the package itself is questionable; "resettlement" is not effective as a developmental strategy, in fact, the whole

265 package mostly ends up into crisis in the long run, simply because resettlement involves compulsion, subjugation, and negligence of the others’ right to choose for themselves. Different populations can not simply expect to respond positively and in similar ways to compulsory resettlement according to planners’ wishes and predictions. Though unlike natural substances; actions and reactions of human beings can never be subject to engineering calculations.

Compulsory resettlement is a traumatic experience, which precipitates stress and also leads to a crisis of cultural identity. Reduction of cultural inventory is another apparent characteristic associated with compulsory resettlement; Halfawiyyin abandonment of Nile rituals, and some other behaviour patterns that appear to be irrelevant in the relocation site is a case in point. May be so great as to switch attention to other development alternatives; not only are the opportunity costs (financial and social costs) of such projects high, but the construction of large-scale dams can easily lock a country into a particular pattern of subsequent development. Therefore, it is high time to suggest not to reproduce such futile experiments in other parts of the country.

Further research needs: While existing literature is substantial, more still needs to be done to decrease impoverishment and reconstitute livelihood for Halfawiyyin who are still remaining at the new Halfa scheme,; major outstanding research questions include: -How to reconstitute urban economic and social systems, including better strategies for income-generation.

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-The conflicts of interest between different groups in the scheme, and lines of differentiation among resettled populations; - Coping mechanisms of migrant Halfawiyyin in the new host areas, and the future trends and repercussion of migration.

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