Relearning the Abcs: Terrorists and “Weapons of Mass Destruction”

MORTEN BREMER MAERLI Viewpoint Relearning the ABCs: Terrorists and “Weapons of Mass Destruction” MORTEN BREMER MAERLI Morten Bremer Maerli is a Science Program Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, for the academic year 1999/2000. He is the author of the book Atomic Terrorism (1999, in Norwegian), and he has experience with joint Norwegian-Russian MPC&A projects in northwest Russia.1 oncern continues to mount over potential new weapon types when policymakers and others try to un- “superterrorists” with evil intentions and capaci- derstand and defeat these threats. Official statements cer- Cties. However, there is still uncertainty about the tainly present a frightening picture. For example, in likelihood of future terrorist use of so-called “weapons November 1997, US Defense Secretary William Cohen of mass destruction” (WMD), or more precisely, atomic,2 stated during a TV interview that a supply of anthrax biological, or chemical (ABC) weapons, and also about the size of a five-pound bag of sugar would kill half the how terrorists are most likely to use these materials. The population of Washington, DC. potential consequences of such acts of violence could be In a 1999 article, Tucker and Sands argue that alarm- extremely severe, with projections ranging from thou- ist biological and chemical terror scenarios and their pre- sands to hundreds of thousands of casualties. Such sce- dicted catastrophic consequences have been based on narios, long a favorite plot of both written and cinematic the potential vulnerability of urban centers to such at- fiction, became a reality with the 1995 sarin attack on tacks and the growing availability of relevant technol- the Tokyo subway during the morning rush hour. The ogy and materials, and that these scenarios have not Aum Shinrikyo cult broke a long-standing “taboo” by ap- drawn on a careful assessment of terrorist motivations plying an ABC weapon in a large-scale terrorist attack. and patterns of behavior.3 The authors are, rightfully, Until then, the use of non-conventional means on a larger concerned by the fact that “chemical and biological ter- scale had been reserved for states, and the incident had a rorism has come to occupy such a high position on the tremendous impact on national security concerns and pri- worry list of top US government officials when so little orities (especially in the United States). is known about the actual threats.”4 Unfortunately, current images of emerging terrorist This threat perception could be based partly on cer- threats and imminent doomsday could make it harder to tain inherent advantages of biological weapons over evaluate accurately the relative threats from these weap- other weapons. Biological weapons are cheap and easy ons. Perhaps more disturbingly, such images could lead to produce, and difficult to detect once they are created.5 to a blurring of meaningful distinctions between the The consequences, both in terms of casualties and eco- 108 The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2000 MORTEN BREMER MAERLI nomic damage due to ruined crops or paralyzed city cen- DEFINING THE KEY CONCEPTS ters, could be huge. Moreover, future developments in The problems of understanding terrorism start with biotechnology could create unprecedented opportunities the search for a definition. Several definitions for “ter- 6 for new forms of violence, coercion, or subjugation. rorism” have been proposed, yet without universal ad- But, despite several “advantages,” one should question herence to any. In fact, the giraffe has been introduced whether biological and chemical weapons are the non- as a somewhat exotic metaphor for terrorism: “It is hard conventional weapons of first choice for terrorist groups to describe, but everybody knows it when they see it.” for large-scale violence. Conventional weapons are still As a result, up to 120 different definitions have been the most important terrorist instruments. However, if recorded for the term “terrorism.”9 terrorists choose to pursue ABC weapons, there are important inherent differences among the ABC weapon Given the problems defining conventional terrorism, types that will affect the way terrorists would apply such no wonder there are different opinions about what means. “WMD” terrorism is. In fact, one of the biggest problems in assessing the likelihood or the possible impact In this context, the terrorist potential of nuclear weap- of mass-destructive terrorism within the United States ons does not receive adequate recognition in the current is the very basic, but surprisingly difficult question of debate. It has been claimed that while “chemical, bio- designing a workable definition of weapons of mass logical, or radiological terrorism is likely to occur in the destruction.10 Commonly, WMD are defined and under- United States, nuclear terrorism is unlikely to do so, as 7 stood as weapons capable of causing mass casualties. it is too difficult.” According to such views, both the However, while today’s powerful conventional fire- acquisition of fissile materials and the construction of a power, capable of inflicting large-scale killings, imme- viable weapon supposedly are beyond the capacities of diately challenges this type of definition, a more pressing terrorist groups. problem is the failure to discriminate between non-con- On the contrary, this viewpoint argues that excluding ventional weaponry within the category of “WMD.” nuclear terrorism could be a dangerous and oversimpli- The collective grouping of atomic (nuclear), biologi- fied approach to understanding the low-probability, but cal, and chemical weapons in the category assumes a still potential, non-conventional terror threat. The cur- degree of similarity in the projected death rates from each rent US fixation on biological and chemical terrorism, weapon type. However, the three classes of weapons apparently rooted in both fictional representations and differ greatly in lethality, destructive power, the feasi- factual misinterpretations, is at risk of overshadowing bility of protection and defense, and their potential mis- the persistent proliferation and security risks of the Cold sions.11 The ultimate weapons of mass destruction are War nuclear legacy. By discussing the advantages and nuclear weapons, which have enormous destructive pow- drawbacks of different ABC means from the point of ers. A single nuclear warhead can destroy a large city. view of terrorists, this viewpoint explains why the di- One hundred warheads are estimated to have the capac- version of weapons-usable fissile materials represents a ity to destroy the United States and civilization as we continued and possibly bigger threat to international se- know it. 12 While biological weapons still have to be 8 curity than Cohen’s bag of sugar. proven efficient on a larger scale, these weapons could This viewpoint presents a set of “lessons,” starting possess lethality comparable to a single nuclear weapon. with discussions of the inherent problems of the “WMD” Chemical weapons, however, are clearly far below concept and of the likelihood of large-scale terror attacks. nuclear weapons in their destructive capacity. As the risk of such terror cannot be ruled out, the view- Inclusion of biological and chemical weapons in the point then explains how terrorists could acquire and de- “WMD” group blurs the distinctions between the weap- ploy non-conventional weaponry, in particular crude ons, their effects, and consequently our understanding nuclear weapons. The next sections discuss the probable of the threats they pose and how to meet these. Accord- effects of chemical, biological, and nuclear terrorism. ingly, the phrase “WMD” is generally avoided in this The viewpoint then offers some concluding lessons on text, and the more precise term of the 1950s and 1960s, the overall ABC threat and the importance for future “ABC weapons,” is dusted off and brought back into the threat assessments of understanding the potentials of the limelight.13 respective weapons. The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2000 109 MORTEN BREMER MAERLI USE OF ABC WEAPONS formed by the terrorists themselves prior to any large- Undoubtedly, the possession of non-conventional scale act of violence. weapons leads to new opportunities for terrorists to move If and when terrorists do think about ABC weapons, from basically a physiological level of violence to acts they may perform strategic assessments of such weap- of severe physical impact and large-scale killing. These ons’ impact and the possibilities of massive retaliation changes could be so profound that it has been claimed in response. Consequently, different cost/benefit calcu- that much of what has been thought about terrorism, in- lations and even moral constraints could limit their ac- cluding some of our basic assumptions, must be recon- tions. Large-scale violence could stigmatize the group sidered.14 But whether terrorists would cause mass and hamper possible political aspirations. Committing casualties by using non-conventional weapons remains mass murder may lead to estrangement between the ter- an open question. Neither past nor more recent trends rorists and their supporters. Besides, typically terrorists support such an assumption, despite the serious incident do not perceive themselves as psychotic madmen and in Japan. killers, but merely as political or military units.20 Kill- While the number of casualties caused by terrorism ing many thousands of people might not be consistent has increased, and the violence has become more indis- with the terrorists’ perceptions of themselves as libera- criminate, conventional means are still the instruments tors or freedom fighters. Only the most extreme and least of choice for terrorists. Smaller and more conventional rational groups, or those motivated not by distinct political aims but by apocalyptic visions or by some pan- instruments of destruction are still quite lethal and can 21 have a strong effect on the targeted individual, corpora- destructive beliefs, are likely to employ ABC weapons. tion, government, or what is often the ultimate target: Furthermore, a group’s interest in ABC weaponry is public opinion.

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