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Security Council Distr.: General 12 January 2021

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Security Council Distr.: General 12 January 2021 United Nations S/2021/33 Security Council Distr.: General 12 January 2021 Original: English Identical letters dated 12 January 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council I write to you with utmost concern regarding the ongoing malign activities of the Iranian regime, which threaten to destabilize the Middle East and pose a great threat to international peace and security. Further, these activities constitute serious breaches of Security Council resolutions. I call upon the Security Council to meet urgently in order to discuss, condemn and craft concrete action against Iranian nuclear, ballistic and proliferation activities. Recently, Iran publicly announced its decision to increase the level of uranium enrichment to 20 per cent and advance its capabilities to enrich uranium underground. This decision, once again, clearly demonstrates that Iran has never renounced its nuclear ambitions, and serves as evidence of Iran’s intention to develop a military nuclear programme. In this regard, I wish to call your attention to a recent bill proposed by the Iranian Parliament calling for the destruction of Israel by the year 2041. If adopted, such legislation, in essence, would commit future Iranian regimes to follow the fanatical ideology of the current Iranian Government, and to continue to spread its radical agenda throughout the region. Such genocidal rhetoric and policies further underline the grave threat that an unchallenged and unrestrained Iranian regime poses. Moreover, ever since the adoption of arms restrictions on Iran by the Security Council 13 years ago, the regime has continued to proliferate advanced weaponry throughout the Middle East and beyond in violation of Security Council resolutions. It is no secret that Iran has become the largest proliferator of ballistic and other missile technologies to Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Gaza, delivering these capabilities into the hands of non-State and terrorist actors and destabilizing the region. We have also witnessed Iran’s proxy in Lebanon, Hezbollah, a designated terrorist organization, acquire more than 150,000 missiles and rockets with the capability to reach the entire State of Israel. The vast majority of these rockets were transferred from Iran in violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions related to the Iranian nuclear programme, as well as resolutions 1701 (2006) and 1559 (2004). The Iranian regime, through its Quds Force, does not stop at the mere illicit transfer of arms to Hezbollah; it also contributes to the development of Hezbollah’s self-production capabilities. Iran provides Hezbollah with advanced technologies and the expertise and know-how to develop upgraded missiles and deadlier rockets of increased range, accuracy and sophistication. 21-00384 (E) 150121 *2100384* S/2021/33 Israel has repeatedly warned of Iran’s unceasing malign activities and highlighted these violations through numerous calls to the international community and letters to the United Nations bodies, providing concrete, verified and documented evidence of the Iranian regime’s reckless and illicit behaviour in the Middle East and beyond. While the Iranian regime has systematically denied all information provided by United Nations Member States regarding its malign activities, in recent public statements Iranian officials and proxies have acknowledged Iran’s far-reaching and large-scale missile proliferation across the Middle East: (a) On 2 January 2021, Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the Air Force Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), admitted on “Al-Manar”, a Hezbollah- operated television channel, that Gaza’s and Lebanon’s missile capabilities are supported by Iran, adding that “they are now in possession of advanced missile technologies … missiles with pinpoint accuracy instead of simple rockets”; 1 (b) On 27 December 2020, Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, boasted in an interview with “Al-Mayadeen”, a pro-Hezbollah television channel, about the contribution of Qasem Soleimani to the proliferation of “Kornet” anti-tank missiles from Iran through Lebanon and into Hamas’ and Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s hands in Gaza;2 (c) On 1 January 2021, Osama Hamdan, a prominent official in the terrorist organization Hamas, in an interview with “Al-Mayadeen”, praised Soleimani’s efforts to supply advanced arms to Hamas and arm the terrorist organization. He further added that Esmail Ghaani, Soleimani’s successor as the commander of the IRGC Quds Force, actively continues to facilitate such efforts. 3 These statements, along with many others, unequivocally confirm what Iran has been trying to conceal for years: its direct involvement in illicit arms proliferation, State terrorism and regional destabilization. In fact, these statements demonstrate a worrying Iranian shift from attempting to mask these activities to brazenly flaunting and boasting about them. This trend poses a strategic threat not only to Israel, but to the entire region. There is a clear and urgent need to ensure that a robust arms and missile technology embargo against Iran is upheld and enforced. I urge the Security Council to condemn the Iranian violations of Security Council resolutions, and hold the Iranian regime responsible for destabilizing the region. I further call on the Security Council to apply maximum pressure and to act with great resolve to respond to the threat to international peace and security posed by the Iranian nuclear programme, its ballistic missiles programme and the regime’s active and Iranian arms proliferation. As stated in previous letters to the Security Council, the State of Israel will take all necessary measures to protect its citizens and its sovereignty. I would be grateful if you would have the present letter distributed as a document of the Security Council. (Signed) Gilad Erdan Ambassador Permanent Representative __________________ 1 www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2021/01/02/2423507/no-difference-between-us-bases-regional- host-states-in-war-irgc-gene and www.almanar.com.lb/7683810. 2 www.alahednews.com.lb/article.php?id=26990&cid=148. 3 www.almayadeen.net//news/politics/1446089. 2/2 21-00384 .
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