The ‘flip-flop’ approach to terrorism An Analysis of the Responses of Successive Nigerian Governments to the ongoing Insurgency of Boko Haram

CRISIS AND SECURITY MANAGEMENT MASTER’S THESIS

AUTHOR BASTIAAN SMEETS STUDENT NUMBER 1044427 SUPERVISOR: PROF. A.P. SCHMID SECOND READER: PROF. DR. E. BAKKER DATE 11 AUGUST 2016

ABSTRACT

Governments may deal with terrorist organizations in numerous ways, depending on numerous circumstances. The options available to governments range from legal reforms to intelligence gathering and from negotiations with terrorists to violent repression. This thesis uses qualitative research methods in order to describe which of these options have been pursued by successive Nigerian governments, in order to deal with Boko Haram, Nigeria’s most radical and violent Islamic sect. To date, the battle is still ongoing. Countless military operations had for a long time not yielded satisfying results. However, recent developments show significant gains due to the involvement of neighboring countries and foreign mercenaries. Other efforts, including the introduction of counterterrorism legislation, negotiations with representatives of the sect, and the consideration of an amnesty programme, have all failed to adequately address the issue of Boko Haram. In the meantime, the government appears to have mostly neglected underlying grievances in society, which in theory may fuel a terrorist campaign. Whether this is the case regarding Nigeria remains unclear, however the government should be aware of the possibility of newly emerging terrorist organizations after Boko Haram, when such grievances remain unaddressed.

1 Table of contents ABSTRACT ...... 1 LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ...... 4 1 INTRODUCTION ...... 5 2 LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 6 3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ...... 10 4 RESEARCH PROPOSITION ...... 11 4.1 Central research question ...... 11 4.2 Hypotheses ...... 11 5 RESEARCH DESIGN ...... 13 5.1 Objectives ...... 13 5.2 Type of Research ...... 13 5.3 Methods ...... 14 5.4 Justification ...... 15 5.5 Limitations ...... 15 6 CASE DESCRIPTION ...... 17 6.1 Brief political history of Nigeria ...... 17 6.2 Demographics ...... 18 6.2.1 Population ...... 18 6.2.2 Religion ...... 18 6.2.3 Ethnic groups ...... 19 6.3 Recent history of domestic conflict ...... 20 6.3.1 Conflict in the Niger Delta ...... 20 6.3.2 Maitatsine uprisings ...... 23 6.4 Religious militant movements in Nigeria ...... 24 6.4.1 Boko Haram ...... 24 6.4.2 Ansaru ...... 28 6.4.3 Maitatsine/Kala Kato ...... 28 6.4.4 Izala ...... 29 7 ANALYSIS ...... 30 7.1 Responses to underlying grievances ...... 30 7.1.1 Context ...... 30 7.1.2 Government responses ...... 34 7.2 Political responses ...... 40 7.2.1 Context ...... 40 7.2.2 Government responses ...... 43

2 7.3 Legal responses ...... 47 7.3.1 Context ...... 47 7.3.2 Government responses ...... 50 7.4 Military responses ...... 53 7.4.1 Government responses ...... 53 7.5 Comprehensive response to Boko Haram– a draft of Nigeria’s National Counter-Terrorism Strategy ...... 59 8 CONCLUSION ...... 60 9 RECOMMENDATION ...... 64 10 DISCUSSION ...... 64 11 REFERENCES ...... 65 Appendix A ...... 74 Appendix B ...... 83

Map of Nigeria. Source: International Organization for Migration (2016).

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

APC All Progressives Congress AQAP Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula AQIM Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb BH Boko Haram GTD Global Terrorism Database IDP Internally Displaced People IMN Islamic Movement in Nigeria INEC Independent National Electoral Commission JTF ORO Joint Task Force Operation Restore Order LGA Local Government Area MEND Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta MNJTF Multi-National Joint Task Force NA National Assembly NACTEST National Counter-Terrorism Strategy PDP People’s Democratic Party START National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

4 1 INTRODUCTION

The issue of how to handle militant religious movements in general and militant jihadist movements in particular, is one of great concern to several countries throughout the world, mainly in Africa and the Middle East. Such movements tend to challenge a country’s government, or ‘the state’, one of its most valuable properties: the sole authority over a demarcated territory, in terms of legislative powers and monopoly of violence. Especially in countries that are inhabited by significant Muslim populations, militant jihadist movements try to gain power at the expense of governments, for the purpose of de-secularizing and Islamizing the country, for instance by means of enforcing a strict Islamic legal system or by prohibiting elements of modern, secular and Western lifestyle. It is primarily up to the government to deal with this challenge, to maintain its authority over a population and to not let jihadist movements achieve their objectives.

The radical Islamic sect known as Boko Haram has plagued Nigeria since 2009. In 2015, Boko Haram surpassed so-called Islamic State (in Syria and Iraq) as the deadliest terrorist organization in the world (Global Terrorism Index 2015, p. 4). The sect is one of many concerns to the Nigerian government, which is also confronted with high unemployment rates, armed struggle in the Niger Delta, corruption, and many other issues. Is it possible for one country to cope with so many issues simultaneously? This thesis addresses just one, the Boko Haram insurgency, and will focus on how successive Nigerian governments have dealt with the issue.

5 2 LITERATURE REVIEW

A systematic review conducted by Lum, Kennedy, & Sherley (2003) found that of all reviewed work on counterterrorism, four categories of counterterrorism strategies are discussed the most: preventative, detection-oriented, managerial, and response-oriented. Regarding preventative strategies, Crenshaw (1987) distinguishes two types of counterterrorism: instrumental and organizational. Instrumental counterterrorism aims at lowering the probability of a terrorist attack, by raising the costs of terrorism relative to alternative actions and/or increasing those other actions’ success rates. This type consists of both defence and deterrence policies, the former includes active (i.e. pre-emptive use of force to deny an actual attack) and passive (i.e. reduce probability of succesfull attack) measures, whereas the latter includes measures of denial (i.e. raise the costs of an attack) and retalitation. Organizational counterterrorism, contrary to the instrumental approach that focuses on the terrorists as rational individuals, focuses on efforts that cause terrorist organizations to decline, thus to lose strength. Such efforts are directed towards two different ways in which the organization declines: exit and voice. The former refers to terrorists leaving the organization, for example due to alternative pathways offered by the government, whereas the latter refers to provoking dissent inside the organization, which decreases the level of conformity. Authors who have written about counterterrorism do so in different ways. Frey (2004), for instance, divides responses to terrorism into two basic types: using the ‘stick’ and using the ‘carrot’. The stick refers to coercive interventions, which mainly comes down to the deployment of military and police forces, after an attack has occurred. The main goal is to punish terrorists, by either killing or capturing them. He notes that this type of counterterrorism responses is most often undertaken throughout the world, although evidence shows that this approach is often unsuccessful and sometimes even counterproductive regarding the ultimate goal of defeating terrorism. Using the stick, or in other words the policy of deterrence or the reactive response, locks terrorists inside their organizations, without the opportunity to cease their terrorist activities by choosing alternatives other than terrorism. This approach causes both sides to lose; the government spends a lot of money to maintain their deterring activities, while the terrorists get either killed or captured. On the other side of the counterterrorism dichotomy as described by Frey, is using the ‘carrot’. Contrary to the stick, the ‘carrot-approach’ is a more positive approach to terrorism. It aims at identifying newly emerging conflicts that possibly lead to terrorism, thus making it a

6 proactive response that is predominantly performed before an attack has occurred. Its main goal is to address the root causes of terrorism and focuses on long-term solutions rather than the short-term approach of military retribution. Dealing with those individuals that are already considered to be terrorists, instead of killing them, more favourable and non-violent alternatives are offered. They are given incentives to opt out of their terrorist organization. Contrary to the consequences that follow the approach of the stick, this type of government responses potentially results in both sides to benefit. The government doesn’t rely entirely on costly military interventions, while the terrorists are given the opportunity to stay alive by refraining from terrorism. Terrorists withdrawing from a terrorist organization potentially undermines its cohesiveness, since the loss of members weakens its overall strength. Despite the potential benefits of positive sanctions such as giving terrorists incentives for withdrawing from their organization’s activities, Frey notices that the majority of the literature on (counter)terrorism is devoted to the deterrence response, whereas less attention is paid to positive sanctions. Forest (2007) also roughly divides counterterrorism measures into two categories: hard power and soft power. Hard power refers to the use of military force and law enforcement, whereas soft power refers to efforts related to diplomacy, information, and intelligence. In order to be effective, a country’s approach to terrorism and/or insurgencies should be a comprehensive one that combines different elements of both sides in a concerted fashion. While pursuing efforts related to both these sides, governments should also be responsive to underlying grievances in society, which requires long-term strategies and solutions. Emphasizing hard power or soft power to deal with a terrorist organization, while neglecting structural societal problems such as economic inequity, unemployment, a weak educational system, and internally displaced people, eventually decreases the possibility of effectively dealing with terorrism. Other authors choose to describe the variety of counterterrorism measures in a different fashion. Instead of the dichotomy as described by Forest and Frey, some argue for another categorization. For example, Jarvis (2009) argues that in the field of terrorism and counterterrorism studies, authors mainly recommend one of (or a combination of) three broadly defined approaches to terrorism: militarizing, criminalizing, and liberal. Which approach is advocated and preferred over another, depends on how the issue of terrorism is understood and framed. In the case of militarizing and criminalizing approaches, terrorism is understood as a technical problem that predominantly requires short-term solutions. On the other hand, liberal approaches consider terrorism as a symptom of underlying dynamics in society, to which long-term solutions should be offered. Militarizing approaches naturally rely

7 on the use of force, negotiations are considered to be fruitless. Criminalizing approaches move away from the military idea of war on terrorism and consider terrorism as a criminal issue, to which efforts such as intelligence-gathering are advocated. Authors who advocate liberal approaches, without entirely rejecting military interventions, favor efforts that are aimed at the extension of democratic and human rights for a country’s population. Wilkinson (2011) also categorizes responses to terrorism, in particular those of liberal states, into three different aspects or dimensions: the use of politics and diplomacy, the use of both the law enforcement and the criminal justice systems, and the deployment of the military. The use of politics and diplomacy refers to, inter alia, so-called peace processes that require sufficient political will to develop and maintain a peaceful solution to a conflict situation. Both individual leaders and external mediators play a crucial role in these processes. They must be capable to deal with the complexity of peace processes, while efforts such as disarmament and demobilization of armed forces are to be pursued as well, in order to address security concerns that one or more participating parties may have. The use of the law enforcement and the criminal justice systems refers to what Wilkinson calls the ‘hardline approach’ of the liberal state to deal with terrorism. The approach prescribes liberal states to avoid both over- and underreaction, since they both endanger a country’s democratic values, and to always act within the rule of law, especially during states of emergency. Intelligence efforts are crucial in this approach to win against terrorists, though they should always be under close scrutiny of and accountable to the democratically elected government. Wilkinson concludes his description of this approach by warning against granting (too many) concessions to terrorists, since that might signal the government’s weakness and support the capabilities of a terrorist campaign. Simultaneously, addressing underlying grievances in society may decrease support for the terrorist cause, it essentially diminishes whatever legitimacy terrorist claims have. The deployment of the military refers to the obvious approach in which the armed forces engage terrorists. Of greater importance is Wilkinson’s assertion that this approach is often proven to have been counterproductive. He further argues that the three dimensions should not be regarded as mutually exclusive. Instead, carefully selected elements from all three dimensions should be combined in order to create a comprehensive approach to terrorism, one that is able to effectively deal with a variety of terrorist activities. Oyewole (2013) divides counterterrorism measures in a similar fashion, into three dominant categories: military-based, justice-based, and political-based. Military-based counterterrorism is based on the idea of a ‘war on terrorism’ against terrorists who are

8 portrayed as nihilists, in which the military is in charge of confronting them, predominantly by the massive deployment of both covert and overt operations. Alternatively, justice-based counterterrorism views terrorism as a crime, to which legal responses are needed. Terrorists and their acts are criminalized, after which they are put through a country’s legal system, which includes the detection, investigation, and prosecution of suspected individuals. Because (counter)terrorism is highly politicized, the third category as described by Oyewole comprises political-based counterterrorism measures, divided into ‘hard politics’ and ‘soft politics’. The former relates to the two aforementioned categories and consists of capturing or killing terrorists, while strict counterterrorism laws and counterterrorism forces are put in place. The latter, on the contrary, refers to a softer and more diplomatic approach to terrorism. Efforts such as capacity building, encouragement of democratic values, economic development, and counter-radicalization policies are considered preferable to either military-based or justice- based measures. Instead of the dichotomous or tripartite categorizations that are described so far, yet another model that describes counterterrorism measures is proposed by Miller (2007). According to Miller, the traditional categorizations fail to adequately represent the variety of potential counterterrorism measures. He argues for the use of five categories, which lie along a continuum, ranging from ‘doing nothing’ to ‘violence’. Firstly, doing nothing, refers to ignoring terrorism and refusing to apprehend terrorists. This category may be considered only theoretical, since in practice governments have to respond in some way to terrorist organizations that contest the government’s authority and terrorize the population. Secondly, conciliation refers to negotiating with and making concessions to terrorists, which includes the promise of change in their favour and the release of prisoners. Thirdly, legal reform refers to the strengthening of government capacity to deal with terrorism, for example through the creation of counter-terrorism specific legislation. Fourthly, restriction refers to measures and policies that limit terrorist activities, through hardening targets and increasing expanding intelligence-gathering capabilities. Fifthly, violence refers to the government applying force in order to eliminate or capture suspected terrorists.

9 3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The thesis does not make use of a grand theory to analyse government responses. Instead, for the purpose of answering the central research question, the thesis builds on several categories of counterterrorism responses, which are derived from the literature review. This section defines the theoretical boundaries of the thesis by highlighting which elements of counterterrorism are included in the analysis of the case that is under study: the responses of successive Nigerian governments to Boko Haram. The literature review has given a concise, thus limited, overview of existing counterterrorism measures. It shows that the included authors choose to describe the variety of counterterrorism measures in their own fashion, by using different wordings, categorizations, and approaches. For the sake of oversight and feasibility, the theoretical framework of this thesis consists of categories that are somehow described by one or more authors, but then pieced together as simplified categories: (i) responses to underlying grievances, (ii) political responses, (iii) legal responses, and (iv) military responses. Each of these categories may, theoretically, consist of numerous responses. Responses to underlying grievances may include efforts to strengthen the economic positions of certain communities, efforts to adequately deal with internally displaced people, and efforts to combat the issue of (youth) unemployment. Political responses to terrorism may include negotiations and talks with terrorists, amnesty and political incorporation. Legal responses to terrorism may include the introduction of counterterrorism legislation and the strengthening of a country’s law enforcement capacities. Military responses to terrorism obviously include the deployment of armed forces in order to fight terrorists on the battlefield, trying to kill or capture as many as possible.

10 4 RESEARCH PROPOSITION

4.1 Central research question

The aim of this particular thesis, is to describe the campaign of successive Nigerian governments against Boko Haram.

The central research question is therefore formulated: How have successive Nigerian governments dealt with Boko Haram between 2009 and 2016?

4.2 Hypotheses

Since this thesis is based on a descriptive research, including hypotheses may not seem the most logical thing to do. However, two relevant issues related to the overall topic of government responses, might be interesting enough to discuss on the basis of a hypothesis. Including these two hypotheses doesn’t exactly serve to answer the central research question of how successive Nigerian governments have dealt with Boko Haram, it rather offers interesting insights regarding perceived or observed consequences of the responses undertaken by Nigerian governments. Underlying grievances in society are often described as the root causes of terrorism. Feelings of injustice within society, for example when the government fails to respond to an attack on a religious community, economic disparities between different communities in the country, the issue of internally displaced people, a weak educational system; all and more of these potentially contribute to the persistence of terrorism. As Forest (2007) argues that in order to effectively deal with and ultimately defeat a terrorist organization, governments need to address issues that are not directly linked to the organization itself (2007, p. 102). Likewise, Wilkinson (2011) argues that addressing underlying grievances in society may decrease the terrorists’ ideological operating space, or, their ‘water in which they swim’ (2011, p. 199). Thus, the first hypothesis is formulated:

Hypothesis 1: The persistence of the Boko Haram sect is caused by Nigerian governments’ neglect for underlying grievances in society; this neglect decreases the effectiveness of the governments’ overall response to Boko Haram.

11 In 2009, Mahmud noticed that the Nigerian government’s approach to what was then called the ‘Nigerian Taliban’ – now Boko Haram – predominantly relied on the use of military force, engaging in acts of violence and performing harsh crackdowns (Mahmud, 2009, p. 121). However, for instance according to Forest (2012), for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts to be effective, strategies should not only involve hard power (the threat and use of force, especially by the military), they should also incorporate soft power efforts including intelligence gathering and efforts aimed at limiting the potential resonance of terrorist ideologies in the ordinary people’s perspectives and beliefs (2012, pp. 108-109). An overreliance on the military dimension of government responses to terrorism might even be counterproductive, as argued by Frey (2004) and Wilkinson (2011). In the end of July 2009, the Nigerian armed forces launched a large military operation against Boko Haram, especially against their headquarters in Maiduguri. Until around April and May 2010, this battle appeared to have resulted in the destruction of the sect. However, the developments since then prove the contrary; Boko Haram resurfaced stronger and more violent than ever before, it even exceeded so-called Islamic State regarding the number of fatalities. This development, especially when bearing in mind the presumed destruction of the sect in July 2009, raises questions about what happened in the period July 2009 to April/May 2010. This specific topic of interest combined with the notion regarding the overreliance on military force as being counterproductive, results in the second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: The large and brutal military operations performed by the Nigerian armed forces, especially in Maiduguri, in July 2009 have been counterproductive; they contributed to Boko Haram resurfacing stronger and more violent than ever before in April/May 2010.

12 5 RESEARCH DESIGN

5.1 Objectives

The primary objective of this research, is to find out how successive Nigerian governments have dealt with the Boko Haram challenge since it evolved into a wider insurgency in the period 2009 to 2016. The primary objective is achieved when a clear understanding of the prevalent government approaches to the Boko Haram issue is obtained Furthermore, the two secondary objectives are: (i) Firstly, after having analysed the Nigerian case, it would be satisfying to be able to offer a recommendation for peaceful co-existence for the country’s (near) future; (ii) Secondly, in case effective government responses are observed, they might offer guidelines for other governments dealing with comparable religious militancy issues. Determining the achievement of these secondary objectives is somewhat more ambitious than determining whether or not a clear understanding of government responses is obtained. Firstly, due to the complex nature of the case and, secondly, the production of generalizable results is hampered by the type of research conducted, which will be discussed in the next section.

5.2 Type of Research

This thesis is based on a descriptive research, which best fits a type of research that attempts to systematically describe government responses (Kumar, 2011, p. 9). Since the research focuses on a variety of aspects related to just one case, it is classified as a holistic single-n case study. The selection of just one case enables the researcher to take multiple relevant aspects regarding the phenomenon under study into account, instead of selecting a limited number of aspects pertaining to multiple cases. This enhances the understanding of the particular topic under study even when resources are relatively limited, which is the case when one has to rely mainly on secondary sources (Lijphart, 1971, p. 691). Furthermore, this type of research fits the researcher’s desire to monitor a phenomenon over time, by repeatedly measuring the same phenomenon at various points in time. Thus, the intensive approach of a single-n case study enables this research to acquire in-depth knowledge concerning a particular phenomenon over a demarcated period of time (Swanborn, 2010, p. 2).

13 The theoretical framework has outlined which theoretical categories of counterterrorism measures are applied to the case of Nigeria’s struggle with Boko Haram. Since the thesis is based on a descriptive research, the purpose of this thesis is to describe whether or which of these categories are observed in the particular case. Thus, the analysis includes sections that describe the observed measures, placed within their respective categories. Some categories of government responses are preceded by additional information about the case, in order to place the responses of that category in a relevant context. By following this design, this thesis aims to have offered a clear oversight of all relevant approaches, measures, and initiatives as undertaken by successive Nigerian governments between 2009 and 2016.

5.3 Methods

This thesis exclusively makes use of qualitative research methods. In order to answer the central research question, actual government responses have to be analysed. The theoretical framework outlines the categories of government responses that will be looked for in the case of Nigeria. The conclusion of the research then contains a clear understanding of the applied government responses. In order to strengthen the internal validity of the research, triangulation of methods is a profitable research strategy. By using multiple methods to acquire data from various kinds of data sources, rather than relying on just one method, more accurate and complete results can be expected (Swanborn, 2010, p. 160). Therefore, this thesis project makes use of this triangulation method; it contains the following: reviewing existing literature, content analysis, and two semi-structured interviews. Through these different approaches, both secondary and primary data are obtained. Firstly, a part of the research is devoted to the interpretation of secondary data sources such as encyclopaedias, academic articles, and books, written by scholars in the field of Nigeria, Boko Haram, counter-terrorism, religion, and the Sharia law system. In addition, several governmental and organizational reports are used as well, including the US Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism, International Religious Freedom Reports, Human Rights Watch reports, and International Crisis Group reports. Secondly, parts of the research are devoted to content analysis of primary data, such as the Nigerian Constitution, Nigeria’s terrorism- related legislative acts, speech acts by key government figures, and online newspaper articles from both the Nigerian and the international press. Thirdly, two semi-structured interviews will be conducted, producing primary data, in order to gather insights and opinions of experts

14 regarding the subject. The African Studies Centre in Leiden, a multidisciplinary academic knowledge institute solely devoted to the study of Africa, will be contacted and asked if two of their experts are willing to talk about the topic of this thesis.

5.4 Justification

Terrorism is all but a new phenomenon; Rapoport (2004) distinguished four waves of terrorism of which the first ‘anarchist wave’ started around 1880. The terror attacks that struck the United States on 11 September 2001 have dramatically increased the amount of attention devoted to the phenomenon within the fields of academics, politics, and society as a whole. However, despite this increased attention, some aspects of the phenomenon are still under researched. Counterterrorism policies are amongst these under researched topics and are in need of further research (Schmid, 2011, p. 76). Furthermore, a Campbell systematic review on counter-terrorism research found that the vast majority of all research are so-called ‘thought pieces’, theoretical discussions, or opinions. Only 1 per cent of the reviewed articles were case studies that offered in-depth analyses of a particular case. Besides, of all reviewed articles, just a small fraction dealt with a variety of responses to terrorism, or counterterrorism, whereas a significant larger amount was devoted to weapons of mass destruction (Lum, Kennedy, & Sherley, 2006, pp. 492-493). The scientific relevance of this thesis stems from the aforementioned shortcomings. This thesis aims to contribute to tackling these in two ways. Firstly, it deals with the under researched topic of counterterrorism and, secondly, it is a case study that provides a more in- depth analysis of a particular topic than a thought piece would do. The societal relevance of this thesis stems from the fact that nowadays, terrorism, and thus also counterterrorism, is considered a highly topical issue. Especially in the immediate aftermath of terrorist attacks, members of society ranging from academics to politicians to the ordinary citizen engage in an open debate, asking themselves and others what should be done against terrorism. A substantial part of the answer to this question may lie in the analysis of government responses to terrorism. With the eventual goal of assessing the effectiveness of government responses, a description of what actually has been done appears to be a good starting point. This thesis does exactly that; it illustrates in which ways subsequent Nigerian governments have responded to Boko Haram.

5.5 Limitations

15 The first limitation that should be addressed logically stems from the chosen research type, which is the single-n case study. After having researched just one case, the produced results are unlikely to be generalizable to contexts other than the Nigerian case (Lijphart, 1971, p. 691). Another limitation stems from the case of Nigeria itself. Data obtained from Nigerian news websites are not always trustworthy, since reporters sometimes tend to write according to their own opinion or even to the opinion of the incumbent president. This potentially damages both the reliability and validity of the facts concerning, for instance, a major military operation or terrorist attack. Furthermore, both governmental and parliamentary online sources are messy to say the least. There is no such thing as an archive in which legislation or communication documents are stored orderly, the websites themselves are from time to time inaccessible altogether. Due to these difficulties, an analysis of data obtained from these sources may lack accuracy.

16 6 CASE DESCRIPTION

Nigeria is a highly complex country, historically divided along the lines of ethnicity, religion, and language. Before this thesis elaborates on the pivotal part in this research, the analysis, it is helpful to first get accustomed with the country to which the analysis relates. This chapter serves this purpose, although it describes far from every imaginable aspect of Nigeria. Instead, it focuses on those aspects deemed relevant for the following chapters. Firstly, a brief political history of Nigeria will be discussed. Secondly, the country’s demographics is outlined. Thirdly, the history of the domestic conflict is addressed. Fourthly and lastly, a collection of five religious militant movements is discussed, which, to varying degrees, pose a threat to present-day Nigeria.

6.1 Brief political history of Nigeria

From the beginning of the 19th century, the creation of several protectorates in what is now known as Nigeria, had served British interests in trade and in the ending of slavery. It eventually led to the establishment of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. On 1 January 1914, the two protectorates were amalgamated into the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, however they remained administrated separately. The British chose to administer Nigeria through indirect rule, leaving local government in the hands of traditional rulers, who were subjugated to British oversight. These rulers, before the British arrived, had governed a variety of kingdoms and empires, such as the Hausa states of Kano, Katsina, and Zaria and the Kanem-Borno empire in the North, as well as the Yoruba states of Ife and Oyo in the South. The administrative system of indirect rule was designed to prevent all these separate states and populations to join forces and revolt against the colonial rulers. By leaving Muslim leaders in charge, the British accepted that the spread of Western education by Christian missionaries was resisted in the North (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2016). This prevented different populations to unite. However it also led to the asymmetrical development of Nigeria that has resulted in various problematic issues, some of which are still present today. Besides, because of earlier colonial experiences, the British were wary of removing traditional Muslim rulers in the North, since that might evoke popular protest. They therefore left the Fulani aristocracy in charge, along with their legal system of Sharia, thereby isolating North from South. These intentional ethnic and religious divisions have been at the

17 root of much of the inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts that followed after the country’s independence on 1 October 1960 (Mahmud, 2009, p. 118) (Comolli, 2015, pp. 17-18). Nigeria’s road after independence in 1960 has been full of troubles. The British division of the country in three regions (North, South-East, and South-West) that all had significant influence, inhabited by the largest ethnic groups (respectively Hausa-Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba), largely contributed to the secession attempt of Biafra, which started the Nigerian Civil War in 1967. At the start of the war, the First Republic had already been replaced by Nigeria’s first military junta, which lasted until 1979. The Second Republic, like its predecessor, was short-lived. It began in 1979 and already ended in 1983. It was succeeded by the second military junta, which ended in 1999, when Nigeria returned to civilian rule, and started the Fourth Republic of Nigeria, which as of today remains the country’s form of government (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2016).

6.2 Demographics

6.2.1 Population According to a July 2015 estimate, Nigeria is Africa’s most populous and the world’s eighth most populous country, inhabited by 181,562,056 people - an enormous increase when compared to the 33,000,000 inhabitants in 1950 (Central Intelligence Agency, 2016). The Nigerian population has grown, is growing rapidly, and will continue to do so in the future. A United Nations projection estimates Nigeria’s population to have reached 399 million in 2050 (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2015, p. 4). Consequently, the Nigerian population is relatively young. Slightly less than two-thirds is younger than the age of 25 and the remaining third, apart from seven percent older persons, consists of people between 35 and 54 years old. Regarding the worldwide rankings of median age (18,2 years) and life expectancy at birth (53 years), Nigeria is situated at the bottom of both rankings when compared to other countries in the world. Only a dozen other African countries reveal statistics worse than Nigeria (Central Intelligence Agency, 2016).

6.2.2 Religion In addition to Nigeria being Africa’s most populous country, it also accounts for the largest number of believers in Africa, which logically stems from the fact that almost every Nigerian citizen adheres to at least one religion. Two religions dominate the country’s religious sphere: Islam and Christianity. Exact statistics are hard to come by, but there is a general agreement on a 50/50 division between these two religions. Roughly 90% of Nigerian Muslims are Sunni Muslims, divided among Sufi groups such as Tijaniyah and Qadiriyyah, following the Maliki

18 school of Islamic law. There is also a growing minority of Salafi movements. The remaining 10% are Shia Muslims, who are spread throughout northern Nigeria, especially in Sokoto State. As to the different branches of Christianity, numerous churches can be found in Nigeria, including: Roman Catholics, Anglicans, Baptists, and Presbyterians (American Foreign Policy Council, 2013, p. 6; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2014, p. 2). A minority of Nigerians practices indigenous beliefs, some even combine them with one of the main religions. Before British colonial rule, the majority of Nigerians adhered to indigenous beliefs or to Islam. The British, however, discouraged the indigenous practices to such an extent that once the country became independent, the overwhelming majority of Nigerians adhered to either Islam or Christianity. Together with ethnic divisions, which will be discussed hereafter, the two main religions are generally understood to be divided into two geographical areas. In Northern Nigeria, the majority of the population is Muslim, while in Southern Nigeria, the majority is Christian. Originally, both geographical areas are also inhabited by sizable groups from the minority religion (i.e. Christians in the North, Muslims in the South). However, due to the ongoing Boko Haram violence in Northern Nigeria, especially Christians have fled the region in the last couple of years. This development is further described in the section on internal displacement. As to the Middle Belt, the geographical area situated between North and South, roughly half the population is Muslim, the other half Christian, thereby representing the general picture of religious divisions in Nigeria (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2016).

6.2.3 Ethnic groups Regarding ethnic groups, Nigeria is roughly divided into three regions, which correspond to the three largest ethnic groups: the Hausa and Fulani (29% of the total population) in northern Nigeria, the Yoruba (21%) in southwestern Nigeria, and the Igbo (18%) in south-eastern Nigeria. Beside these, over 250 other ethnic groups inhabit the country, some of those of significant size and political influence: Ijaw (10%), Kunari (4%), Ibibio (3,5%), and Tiv (2,5%) (Central Intelligence Agency, 2016). Roughly two-thirds of these smaller ethnic groups are located in northern states. The smaller ethnic groups tend to cluster around the three largest groups, which gives Nigeria a tripolar ethnic structure (Mustapha, 2006, p. 2). This regional ethnic structure resulted from colonial policies, which were based on divide- and-rule principles and left the three regions with a substantial degree of self-government after the country’s independence in 1960. Not only did this reinforce a feeling of separateness between the three largest ethnic groups, it contributed to a North-South division as well. As

19 mentioned earlier, this division is also given a religious dimension, as the North is mostly populated by Muslims and the South by Christians (Forest, 2012, p. 19; Mohammed, 2014, p. 11).

6.3 Recent history of domestic conflict

Since its independence in 1960, Nigeria has faced multiple domestic conflicts that are driven by varying causes. The Nigerian Civil War, during which the Igbo people declared the independent Republic of Biafra (1967-1970), has been the first major conflict since independence. However, this chapter only highlights those conflicts that have occurred more recently. Two are described, both for different reasons. Firstly, the conflict in the Niger Delta, which started in the early 2000s, is described, because it is relatively recent and shares some similarities with the Boko Haram insurgency regarding government responses (Akpan, Ekanem, & Olofu-Adeoye, 2014, p. 153). Secondly, the Maitatsine uprisings of the 1980s are described, because these events share similarities with the Boko Haram insurgency regarding Islamic fundamentalism (Adesoji, 2011, p. 100). Describing these two previous conflicts sheds a light on how the Nigerian government has dealt with domestic conflict recently as well as how it approached religiously motivated domestic conflict in the past.

6.3.1 Conflict in the Niger Delta The conflict in the Niger Delta can be attributed to what Ibeanu (2000) calls “a contradiction of securities” (2000, p. 24). Put simply, the contradiction in the Niger Delta arises between different perceptions of what security should be. State officials and petro business actors, on the one hand, desire an untroubled crude oil industry, of which they benefit both economically and financially. On the other hand, local communities demand their interests to be recognized and seriously dealt with, including their environmental, economical, and physical suffering as well as their marginal share in the profits from the crude oil industry. Here, the state should interfere as mediator, striving for consensus and proper management of these contradictions. The Nigerian state, however, has not been able to rise above the competing parties. Instead of serving the interests of Nigerian people, the state has been privatized by the rulers with oil revenues as main source of income (Ibeanu, 2000, pp. 24-25). The Niger Delta has seen multiple opposition groups with varying interests and objectives come and go. Some of them used violence, some did not. Some were genuinely concerned about local grievances over oil and gas pollution, infrastructure, poverty, and the

20 region’s marginal share in oil revenues, some were not. The most important militant group involved in the armed struggle with oil companies and the federal government, is the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). Their militant activities, which started in 2006, severely impacted on Nigeria’s main revenue source: export from the oil industry (International Crisis Group, 2015, p. 1).

Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) In January 2006, MEND became publicly known as the group responsible for kidnapping a group of Western oil workers in the Niger Delta (Asuni, 2009, p. 3). The group’s emergence resulted from talks in 2005 between the leaders of various militia groups that were active in the Niger Delta states, who agreed upon using violence by attacking oil installations and illegally bunkering oil. Following the kidnapping, in March 2006 they demanded increased political participation, increased involvement in the oil and gas industry, socioeconomic development, and reduced militarization of the Niger Delta (Asuni, 2009, pp. 17-18). Despite its creation being based on an agreement between several militia leaders, MEND should not be seen as a coherent militant organization. Instead, MEND is better characterized as an overarching entity. Right from its origin, groups joined and left constantly. Some were advancing their own goals rather than the common goals as formulated in March 2006 and only joined temporarily for particular operations. Furthermore, there seemed to be no agreement concerning the modus operandi. While some groups tried to address injustices felt by the population through dialogue, others chose to engage with oil companies and the federal government through armed struggle. Particularly those who chose to take up arms, soon set aside their initial justifiable goals and shifted towards criminal activities in order to enrich themselves (Asuni, 2009, p. 6).

Government responses Back in 2000, over eighty percent of government revenues came from Nigeria’s oil industry. In other words, the survival of government officials and agencies largely depends on oil revenues (Ibeanu, 2000, p. 21). Consequently, the Nigerian government understandably gives high priority to protecting this particular industry against all sorts of disruptions. In analysing government responses to the Niger Delta conflict, a rough distinction can be made between pre-2009 (starting in 2005) and post-2009. Before 2009, the predominantly military approach to protecting the government’s oil interests, has contributed to the violent escalation of justifiable and nonviolent protests and demands, leading to an all-out armed

21 struggle (Akpan, Ekanem, & Olofu-Adeoye, 2014, p. 153). Due to the use of considerable military force against unarmed political activist groups, these groups increasingly felt the need to arm themselves and fight for the survival of their people (Forest J. J., 2012, p. 47). Thus, this approach contributed to the transformation of those groups into armed militia organizations such as MEND. The military was instructed to tackle the opposition groups of the Niger Delta. However contrary to these instructions, the military has aided the militant cause, both directly and indirectly. Directly, in cases where corrupt military personnel participated in criminal endeavours such as oil bunkering. After disagreeing on how the profits of oil bunkering should be divided, militant groups sought additional weaponry to fight off the military. Indirectly, by the overwhelming presence of military personnel in the Delta region combined with their brutal and violent behaviour, which drove ordinary civilians into the hands of militants, leading to an increased popular support for militant groups (Asuni, 2009, p. 14). The 2009 Presidential Amnesty Program has proven to be a key turning point in the Niger Delta conflict. This program aimed at the disarmament of militant groups by offering amnesty to the militants and offering them also both training and reintegration opportunities. Between 2009 and 2011, over 30,000 alleged militants signed up for the program. As a result of this program, the number of kidnappings and attacks on oil installations has decreased drastically (International Crisis Group, 2015, p. 2). However, at least one of several criticisms pertaining to the amnesty program should be mentioned. The program also contains monthly payments of $ 500 per militant, in a country where the minimum wage is around $ 130 (Comolli, 2015, p. 119). Besides the downside of being very expensive, it also gives little incentive to former militants to reintegrate into society, where they will be paid less for a regular job. Such a program could be translated into simply paying former militants to not commit violent offences, every month again, a rather dubious situation. Looking at the program’s primary objective of disarming the Niger Delta’s militants and stabilizing the overall security situation in the region, it has proven to be rather successful. Besides a decrease in numbers of kidnapping and attacks, the oil production tripled in the same time period 2009 – 2011, after it had decreased following the attacks on oil installations. However, as of 2015, kidnappings again seem to have increased gradually, although accurate statistics are missing. Furthermore, although most groups affiliated with MEND have accepted the amnesty program, some shadowy leaders and their followers continued to threaten violence (International Crisis Group, 2015, pp. 1-2). This again points at the unstructured, incoherent, and diverse features that characterize MEND.

22 6.3.2 Maitatsine uprisings In the early 19th century, a teacher following the Maliki school called Sheikh Usman dan Fodio waged a jihad in Northern Nigeria against the ruling Hausa elite, whom he loathed for being corrupt and blamed for being apostate. His jihad culminated in the establishment of the Sharia-governed Sokoto Caliphate in 1809 and started the region’s history of militant religiosity (Hickey, 1984, p. 251). The conquest of the Sokoto Caliphate by the British colonizers in 1903, opened the region up to the influence of a secular political power. The colonisers initiated the process of separating religion and the state, which were tightly interwoven prior to this conquest (Falola, 1998, p. 50). Due to, inter alia, this fundamental change, many Muslim Northerners felt uncomfortable and rejected Westernization in general and Western education in particular, a sentiment that has been at the core of the Maitatsine uprisings in the 1980s.

Muhammed Marwa Usman dan Fodio’s jihad brought a deeply conservative version of Islam to Northern Nigeria. Muhammed Marwa, an Islamic scholar and preacher strongly inspired by Usman dan Fodio’s view on Islam, had migrated from Cameroon to Kano (Kano State) in 1945. He established and became leader of the radical Islamic sect Maitatsine, which also became his personal nickname, meaning ‘the one who curses’. Maitatsine strived for the purification of Islam and was opposed to the corrupting influence of modernization and Western presence (Falola, 1998, p. 146). He opposed modernization to such an extreme extent, that he even cursed those who read any book other than the Quran, as well as those who made use of watches and even bicycles (American Foreign Policy Council, 2013, p. 4). Furthermore, the secularity of the Nigerian state was a significant thorn in the sect’s side. Marwa’s opposition to Western influence, to the affluent elites whom he portrayed as infidels and hypocrites, and to secular authorities, appealed to the urban poor in Kano. Furthermore, his promise to get rid of what he considered ‘detestable entities’ while the promise of bringing God’s redemption and salvation, attracted the urban Muslim poor. Among these poor are the Almajirai, poor and wandering Quranic students who lead a simple lifestyle and beg on the streets for alms (Hickey, 1984, pp. 252-253).

Uprisings and government responses The Maitatsine uprisings consist of a chain of riots throughout Northern Nigeria, the largest of which took place in Kano State (1980), Kaduna State (1982), Adamawa State (1984), and

23 Bauchi State (1985) (Adesoji, 2011, p. 101). Arguably the most significant of these, were the first in this sequence: the December 1980 riots in Kano State, where the Maitatsine sect attempted to take over Kano City’s central mosque. Initially, the local police responded, however soon they received assistance of the Nigerian Army due to their inability to deal with the large amount of involved sect members. The military took over leading position of the operation and engaged in severe clashes with the sect’s followers, which lasted for eleven days. In the end, over 4,000 people were confirmed dead, most of whom were Maitatsine followers. The extensive use of military force against the December 1980 riots also resulted in Marwa himself being killed. The uprisings did not end there, but continued for four more years, until 1985. As in all previous riots during the five-year uprisings, again in 1985, the Nigerian government used its military might to crush the Maitatsine sect. During this last major confrontation, thousands of sect members were killed, which ended the sect’s existence, although some argue that a Maitatsine offspring called ‘Kala Kato’ still commands some level of following (Comolli, 2015, pp. 41-42).

6.4 Religious militant movements in Nigeria

Today, Nigeria faces thousands numerous Islamist groups and movements, varying in size, beliefs, objectives, and so on (American Foreign Policy Council, 2013, p. 2). This paragraph deals with four Islamist movements, three of which are seen as the most prominent of them all, namely: Boko Haram, and Maitatsine/Kala Kato, and Izala. Ansaru is the fourth movement described here, for it is considered the most extreme and violent off-shoot that has emerged from Boko Haram. This paragraph emphasizes Boko Haram, since this particular movement is generally believed to be the most extremist movement in and biggest security threat to Nigeria.

6.4.1 Boko Haram In much of the world, the most notorious and radical Salafist-jihadist sect of Nigeria is known by the name of Boko Haram. However, the current leader has never adopted this name and prefers to call his sect Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad, which means People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad (Comolli, 2015, p. 50).

Origins

24 There is no generally accepted account about the exact origins of Boko Haram. According to Nigerian security forces, the group emerged from a conservative non-violent Islamic youth movement that was established at the University of Maiduguri (Borno State) in 1995, of which a man called Mohamed Yusuf became the leader in 2002. Another version points at a select group of radical youth who isolated themselves from a Maiduguri mosque in 2002, showing its discontent towards both the city’s administration and the local religious establishment. In 2004, Mohamed Yusuf is believed to have become the group’s leader, when its members returned to Maiduguri after their base in Kanama was destroyed by Nigerian security forces. Yet another explanation points to a group of students, who left the University of Maiduguri in 2000 in order to follow the teachings of a foreign preacher, who denounced Western education for being contrary to Islam. Mohamed Yusuf, who was already preaching at a Maiduguri mosque, became influenced by this group’s views and in 2002 set up his own teaching institution, which soon attracted growing numbers of pupils. Finally, a fourth version traces Boko Haram’s origins back to the early 1990s. A student named Mohamed Yusuf disagreed with his teacher on several theological topics, whereupon he dissociated himself and established his own sect. Yusuf’s sect strongly opposed Nigeria’s secular education system as well as modern Islamic teaching, Nigerian institutions, and refused to accept the Sultan of Sokoto to be the head of all Nigerian Muslims. Although these four accounts differ significantly on date of origin and key motives, one element seems to be ever-present and agreed upon: the involvement of Mohamed Yusuf, who is considered Boko Haram’s original leader or front-man shortly after it emerged, whether that took place in the 1990s or early 2000s (Comolli, 2015, pp. 46-49). Dispute between Yusuf and Ja’far Mahmud Adam (Izala), Yusuf’s former teacher, eventually led to Yusuf separating from him. The disagreed on several issues. Mahmud Adam believed Western education was necessary for Muslims to eventually fight the Western enemy. Besides, instead of a militant struggle against Nigerian institutions, which he deemed counter-productive in the long-term, he propagated a slowly Islamization process of these institutions (Loimeier, 2012, pp. 148-150)

2002/2003 – 2008 On 21 September 2004, members of the sect attacked two police stations in Borno State, to which a joint force of police and military personnel responded, killing 24 attackers. But in general, this early phase of Boko Haram is generally described as one of relative calm. Apart from sporadic hit-and-run attacks, the period between 2002/2003 and 2008 saw few militant activities, and thus few clashes with security forces (Onuoha, 2010, p. 56; Comolli, 2015, p.

25 51). Consequently, the government did not take the sect seriously and paid little attention to its militant yet mostly unarmed activities. The fact that Yusuf fled to Sudan and later Saudi Arabia, following the September 2004 clashes, may have contributed to this limited government attention (Loimeier, 2012, p. 150).

2009 – present-day After Yusuf’s death in July 2009, his former second-in-command, Abubakar Shekau, took over Boko Haram’s leadership in April 2010. From this moment onwards, the group assumed a more radical ideology and became more violent than before (Comolli, 2015, p. 60). Agbiboa speaks of “…the recommencement of Boko Haram attacks in 2010…”, which he attributes to the desire for revenge that was strongly present among Boko Haram members, after their leader Yusuf had been extra-judicially killed in 2009 (Agbiboa, 2013b). Considering the sect’s modus operandi before and during Shekau’s leadership, a worrisome development can be observed. Whereas previously occasional hit-and-run attacks were carried out, shortly after Shekau took over, more sophisticated tactics and more advanced weapons were used. For example, before 2010, machetes, clubs, and knives were commonly used to harass and assault both civilians and police officers in Boko Haram’s area of operations. Gradually changing from 2010 onwards, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), rocked propelled grenades, and even T-55 tanks were deployed in more strategically planned attacks (Falode, 2016, pp. 43-44). Another and more recent disturbing development regarding Boko Haram’s tactics, is the increased use of children as suicide bombers in North-eastern Nigeria and neighbouring countries, especially Cameroon. A 2016 UNICEF report stated that in 2014, four children had been used as suicide bombers, but in 2015 and the first month of 2016, that number had dramatically increased to 44, with one out of five suicide bombers being a child (UNICEF , 2016, p. 2).

Boko Haram’s Objectives Over time, Boko Haram has been quite ambiguous on its objectives. However, the overarching objective of Boko Haram has been the creation of an Islamic state in Northern Nigeria, ideally in the rest of Nigeria as well (Forest J. J., 2012, p. 58) (International Crisis Group, 2014, p. 9).

Targets

26 According to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), compiled by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), from the July 2009 Battle of Maiduguri until 31 December 2014, 1,313 incidents or attacks could be attributed to Boko Haram. The majority of these targeted private citizens or property (554), the second-most targeted type is the Nigerian police force (328), followed by the military (138). Religious figures or institutions were targeted on 120 occasions, federal government representatives or institutions on 122 occasions, and educational institutions were targeted on 78 occasions, fewer than businesses (95). Prior to 2011, the majority of Boko Haram’s attacks targeted institutional entities and symbols, especially police and security forces. Other attacks, driven by the sect’s interest in the purification of Islam, targeted Muslims, either those who worked for, or cooperated with, state authorities, or those who were deemed apostate or hypocrite. According to Cook (2011), Boko Haram’s targets between September 2010 and September 2011 could be divided into seven target categories: military; police; teachers and universities; banks and markets; purification attacks on beer drinkers and card players; Christian targets, and individuals of their interest, who were assassinated. In contrast to many other fundamentalist Islamist groups, Boko Haram rarely attacked Christians in 2010. However, starting with the major attacks in Damaturu in Yobe State on 4 November 2011 and the Christmas Day attacks in 2011, Boko Haram initiated its campaign of frequently targeting Christians. Apart from two exceptions, the bombing of the UN headquarters in Abuja (2011) and the kidnapping of a French family in Cameroon (2013), up until 2011 Boko Haram’s targets had all been national targets (Cook, 2011). However, this has not remained true for the years following Cook’s 2011 observation. On 19 February 2013, Boko Haram committed its first act outside of Nigeria. Boko Haram members kidnapped seven French tourists in neighboring Cameroon, after which they took them into northern Nigeria, demanding the release of detained comrades who were being held in both Nigeria and Cameroon. Both governments eventually responded by releasing an unknown number of Boko Haram prisoners, in addition to paying ransom, after which the hostages were released (START, n.d.a). In subsequent years, Boko Haram increased its operations in Cameroon. The GTD evidences this increase. In 2014, Boko Haram reportedly carried out 56 attacks in Cameroon, mainly against civilians and security forces (START, n.d.b). Since the end of 2014, Boko Haram has also crossed Nigeria’s borders with Chad (through Cameroon or by vessels across Lake Chad) and Niger, now operating in an area to which is commonly referred as the Lake Chad region (Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, 2016, p. 11). The first Boko Haram attack on Chadian soil took place on 13 February 2015, when members

27 of the sect crossed Lake Chad at night. The attack ended after a confrontation with Chadian forces; reportedly four civilians were killed by the sect (Vanguard, 2015).

6.4.2 Ansaru After a series of attacks in Kano State in January 2012, which resulted in the death of 150 mostly Muslim innocent civilians, a faction called ‘Ansaru’ broke from Boko Haram, reportedly due to its discontent with Boko Haram’s indiscriminate killing of Muslims (American Foreign Policy Council, 2014, p. 8). The faction’s full name is Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan, which means Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa, leaving little doubt about the group’s primary concern. Shortly after Ansaru splintered from Boko Haram, the U.S. Department of State considered the emergence of this faction, taking into account its alleged ties with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a matter of particular concern to the United States, since the group had prioritized targeting Westerners, including Americans (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2013, p. 27). Ansaru was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization in November 2013, after several incidents had taken place. Among these were kidnappings of both Nigerian and foreign civilians and multiple attacks on Nigerian government and security officials. The exact size of Ansaru’s membership is unknown, yet it is estimated that Ansaru is significantly smaller than Boko Haram. The identity of its leadership is also unclear, although an AQIM-linked designated terrorist called Khalid al-Barnawi is supposedly in charge. Remarkably, as to 2014, no attacks have been attributed to Ansaru. This is possibly due to, despite its disapproval of the indiscriminate killing of Muslims, Ansaru still cooperates with Boko Haram since their overall objectives remain quite similar (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2015, pp. 355-356; Comolli, 2015, p. 67).

6.4.3 Maitatsine/Kala Kato The Maitatsine uprisings of the 1980s have been covered in a previous chapter. That chapter ended mentioning Maitatsine’s ‘successor’, as claimed by the successors themselves, Kala Kato. Its name has been interpreted as meaning ‘Those who say “A mere man said it”’, which refers to their belief that the Prophet’s teachings were words spoken by a human, not by a divine entity. This traces back to Maitatsine’s leader Marwa, who used this idea when he declared himself to be a prophet (Adesoji, 2011, p. 116). The current Kala Kato movement is led by the prominent Islamic scholar Mallam Salisu, who claims not to be connected to Boko Haram. Kala Kato ideologically differs from Boko Haram, stating that only the Quran provides a reliable guide for Muslims (Umar, 2012, p. 120). In July 2009, the Nigerian government issued restrictions on preaching outdoors, which followed clashes with Boko

28 Haram. When Kala Kato members disobeyed the ordinance five months later, several clashes with the security forces occurred. These led to the deaths of approximately 70 people (American Foreign Policy Council, 2013, pp. 4-5).

6.4.4 Izala Izala’s full name is Jama’t Izalat al Bid’a Wa Iqamat as Sunna, which means Society of the Eradication of Innovation and Implementation of the Sunna. The movement was established by Abubakar Gumi and Ismaila Idris in 1978, as a result of their break with Sufism due to ideological disagreements with Sufi Brotherhoods. Since its establishment, Izala has been a growing Salafist movement of reform, particularly opposing the traditional Sufi orders that practice acts of bidaa (innovation/heresy), while striving for the purification of Islam. Over the past years, members of the Izala movement have obtained positions in institutions throughout the country, at local, state, and federal levels. It has grown to one of the largest Islamic societies in Nigeria, a success partly attributed to its claim of having been the main initiator of the reintroduction of Sharia criminal law around 2000, as well as to its emphasis on educating women and self-sufficiency in financial matters. Besides, Izala actively encourages education even in often neglected rural areas, albeit in their own ‘modern’ Islamic schools. This development aimed at education has been criticized by Boko Haram’s Yusuf from the start (Loimeier, 2012, pp. 141, 149; American Foreign Policy Council, 2013, p. 5). Another significant factor that contributed to the movement’s success, is the extensive financial support, given by donors from both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (Comolli, 2015, pp. 36-37). Compared with the Islamist movements discussed so far, Izala is a rather peaceful movement. Although, in earlier times, they actively fought the Sufi orders, but had to become more moderate and even found themselves eventually cooperating with the Sufis out of political convenience, when faced with a rise of Pentecostal Christianity in northern Nigeria during the 1987 local government elections, while the Muslim vote was split among the Sufi brotherhoods and Izala (Loimeier, 2012, p. 143).

29 7 ANALYSIS

7.1 Responses to underlying grievances

7.1.1 Context This section deals with the role of religion in Nigerian society, since religion is deemed such an important aspect of Nigerian society. Although religion is formally separated from the state, arguably the opposite is true for the role it plays in the majority of Nigerians’ everyday lives, and thus in society. On first sight, for example by looking at statistics on religiosity, the importance of religion is perhaps most obvious with regard to the private sphere, in which religion constitutes a vital part of life (Akinyoade, 2016, p. 75). According to a 2012 worldwide poll on religiosity and atheism, only Ghana was inhabited by a larger percentage of religious people than Nigeria (94% and 93%, respectively), and just 1% of Nigerians openly qualified themselves as convinced atheists (WIN-Gallup International, 2012, p. 4). Nigerian atheists are exceptions to the rule; however more atheists might actually inhabit Nigeria but prefer to remain silent, since the issue is considered taboo and even punishable in Sharia states (i.e. atheism is interpreted the same way as apostasy). Taking a closer look reveals that religion penetrates the public, societal sphere as well. Two particular elements of religion in society are discussed: the educational system as well as religious conflicts and tolerance.

Religion in educational system The first example of religion penetrating the public sphere that is considered, is Nigeria’s educational system, particularly in northern Nigeria. Education in northern Nigeria has been a major concern for decades. During the colonial era, the British had done little to either reform or add secular schools to northern Nigeria’s predominantly Islamic education system. This lack of interference is ascribed to the British policy of avoiding tensions with their Muslim subjects, since northerners associated secular education with Christian missionaries, who had introduced secular schools in the South. Besides, limited financial resources and an overall fear of self-conscious opponents to its rule made the British reluctant to interfere with traditional the traditional education system. Therefore, immediately after the British left, doubts about northerners’ ability to educate ‘modern’ citizens, who were capable of contributing to the newly united Nigeria, instead of remaining within their religious boundaries, due to the presence of mainly Islamic schools (Hoechner, 2014, p. 68). This concern, although significant and worth further consideration, falls short to the concern that is highlighted here: the widespread assumption of Boko Haram finding easy recruits among

30 these Quranic schools’ students, the Almajirai. Almajirai are boys and young men, ranging from primary-school age to their early twenties, from mostly poor rural families, who are sent away from home in order to receive Quranic education from so-called mallams – or Quranic teachers. They spend their days learning to read and recite Quranic texts, secular elements such as mathematics and science are not part of the curriculum. The almajiri system is outside of the federal and state governments’ scope, there hardly is any oversight in terms of regulations nor is there a financial structure funding the system. Therefore, Almajirai roam the streets begging for money and food, do farm work and petty jobs, while the mallams are largely dependent on community funding for their salaries. However, the assumption that many Almajirai might end up as Boko Haram members is widespread and persistent, and some members are indeed identified as former Quranic students. Yet, there is no systematic evidence to support this claim (Hoechner, 2014, p. 64). That is not to say, the issue is irrelevant or less concerning. The system in which young northern Nigerian boys, far from home, receive nothing but Quranic education, spend their days reciting texts and begging for alms, is unlikely to bridge the northern-southern educational and its consequent economic gap. In modern-day Nigeria, jobs require more, or something else for that matter, than the particular skill of knowing the Quran by heart (Akinyoade, 2016, p. 78). Likewise, the ‘modern’ Islamic education as introduced by the Yan Izala movement has proven to be problematic. An entire generation of students who had gone through this system of education, found that they were not adequately equipped with basic skills and knowledge to enter Nigeria’s labour market (Loimeier, 2012, p. 145). Thus, the issue could be interpreted problematic for a bigger, long-term ideal: creating a united Nigeria in which people have equal chance, irrespective of their place of birth. The government, at least in the following example, has failed to correctly appreciate the issue, even after a wakeup call from abroad, as Mr Akinyoade explained in the case of him applying for the University of Ghana. Together with him, another Nigerian, who came from the North and had received a bachelor’s degree in Arabic language, applied. He was turned down, for the University of Ghana was convinced that he would not be of any use with ‘just’ that degree. So, even though this person went to a university in Nigeria, he was rejected in Ghana based on his degree that is considered of value in Nigeria (Akinyoade, 2016, p. 78).

Religious tolerance and conflicts in society Religious conflicts in Nigeria take different forms and are prompted by different reasons. To acquire a better understanding of the issue, three categories can be distinguished: intra-

31 religious conflicts; inter-religious conflicts; and state versus religious movements (Mahmud, 2009, p. 116). As the latter category is extensively discussed in terms of the Nigerian state versus Boko Haram, this paragraph solely deals with the first two categories. Both Christianity and Islam are divided into numerous religious subgroups. The largest denominations in Christianity are the Roman Catholic and Anglican churches; however all other denominations combined contain a larger population. This religious pluralism also applies to Islam, where the majority of Muslims traditionally belongs to the two major Sufi brotherhoods Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya, while anti-innovation reformist groups such as Izala are growing. The latter has contributed to a religious revival in northern Nigeria, actively accusing traditional Muslim leaders of collaborating with secular and Christian entities, thereby sharpening inter-religious tensions. These inter-religious tensions are also prompted by the continuing struggle between Christians and Muslims for influence and dominance regarding the country’s essential characters such as the nature of the state and its legal system. These conflicts are mainly a consequence of the country’s post-colonial social structure. The British, as mentioned before, left the country divided into three regions that all inhabit a significant majority of either of both religious and ethnic main groups. Years later, these groups still see themselves differently, as if the country has never been united, but rather remained divided in three. Other factors leading to inter-religious conflicts are economic, political, and ethnic grievances. The inter-religious competition, besides leading to acts of religious violence, also increase intra-religious tensions, that is within one overarching religion. Religious leaders of sub-denominations claim to be the best defenders of the overarching denomination against the opponents of the other overarching denomination (Dowd, 2016, pp. 622-623). Historically, this has resulted in severe instances of intra-religious violence, for instance as has been previously described in the case of Izala fighting Sufi brotherhoods. But also, the earliest form of intra-religious confrontations between the two brotherhoods themselves have been witnessed in northern Nigeria, resulting from differing socio-political and religious roles the brotherhoods assumed in society (Mahmud, 2009, p. 116). Various religious movements have been unable to stomach the fact of other existing interpretations of their religion, let alone an entirely different religion. Religious tolerance, or the respect one can produce for the religious freedom of others, is sporadically discovered among these movements. Furthermore, both Christian and Islamic movements pursue goals, for instance by converting as many people as they can, that are doubtlessly escalating tensions. On the one hand, Pentecostal Christians are seeking to make Nigeria a Christian country, which logically angers the Muslim population.

32 On the other hand, Boko Haram aims at turning the same country in a Sharia-governed state, which terrifies Christians. However, contrary to what one might expect based on the described religious diversity and associated tensions in Nigeria, these inter- and intra-religious conflicts and intolerance are not as frequent in all places throughout Nigeria. Dowd (2016) has observed what he calls ‘subnational variation’, meaning that the religious tolerance is not equally distributed across the country. Instead, areas in which religious identities overlap with ethnic identities tend to be confronted both more often and severely with interreligious violent conflicts than those areas in which there is no or less overlap. The ethnic issue of indigenes versus settlers, the former granted more rights than the latter, is indeed considered one of the root causes of many conflicts throughout Nigeria (Akinyoade, 2016, p. 73). With regard to religiously diverse areas in which tolerance, or respect for others’ religious freedom, the example of the Yoruba ethnic group supports this understanding. Roughly equal numbers of Yoruba Christians and Yoruba Muslims seem to uphold a relatively high level of religious tolerance towards one another, except for occasional confrontations in the past (Dowd, 2016, pp. 624- 625).

Foreign influences The reintroduction of Sharia criminal law in 1999 in some Northern states of Nigeria was partly driven by missionaries from Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan, all benefiting from Saudi financial support, who were sent to Nigeria in the 1990s. They were instructed to promote Wahhabism, an ultra-traditional branch of Sunni Islam (Agbiboa, 2013a, p. 3). Mohammed Yusuf was strongly influenced by the fourteenth century Salafi scholar Ibn Taymiyyah, who insisted on the comprehensive application of Sharia law. Beside, Yusuf was influenced by Saudi Arabian establishment’s aversion to Western democracy, who claim democracy is un-Islamic, but most of all really just fear it would threaten the country’s monarchy (Mohammed, 2014, p. 14). However, the most important influence on Yusuf’s teachings, argumentation, and beliefs, is the text called “Global, foreign and colonialist schools: Their history and dangers” written by prominent Wahhabi scholar Abu Zayd, who also held some positions in several academic, religious, and judicial institutions in Saudi Arabia. This text provided Yusuf with proof that modern secular education is part of a Western conspiracy to maintain hegemony over Muslim societies, but more importantly, it is natural-science based, embodies Western civilization, is thus un-Islamic and should therefore be fought (Umar, 2012, p. 123).

33 7.1.2 Government responses

The increased targeting of Christians On 4 November 2011, more than 200 Boko Haram members took part in a large-scale attack on Yobe State capital Damaturu, which consisted of suicide bombings and targeted assassinations, killing at least 130 Christians and destroying 10 church buildings. As a result of the attacks, many Christians have fled the city, causing several pastoral ministries in the city to end. In the year before, many Christians had already left Damaturu because of the increased insecurity they experienced. Ten days after the attacks, neither the state nor the federal government had sent officials to the stricken area, much to the dismay of local church leaders (Compass Direct News, 2011). On Christmas Day of the same year 2011, a series of Boko Haram suicide attacks on churches took place in the city of Jos (Plateau State) and the small town of Madalla, near the federal capital Abuja. Several churches were demolished, reportedly around 40 civilians were killed. The federal government responded by deploying the military at the affected areas, in order to retake control after Boko Haram gunmen also attacked police officers who had initially rushed to the scene (Allen & Silver, 2011). A year before, on Christmas Eve, the city of Jos had experienced a similar Boko Haram attack. Due to several explosions, approximately 80 people were killed (Mantzikos, 2014, p. 65). Despite this experience and a warning issued by the sect that it would repeat the 2010 events in Jos, the government remained inactive and did not take adequate measures. Contrary to the Damaturu attacks, an exodus of Christians following the 2011 Christmas Day attacks did not occur in Jos and Abuja, since the Christian population is much larger and thus stronger in these cities than in Damaturu. The abovementioned major attacks marked Boko Haram’s shift towards attacking Christians and Christian properties more often than before, when attacks on Christians appeared to be of less priority and occur at random, not systematically (Cook, 2012). Despite this notable shift towards attacking the Christian community, the government has failed to adequately respond to this development. This lack of response is by no means unique. The next section on attacks on both the Christian and Muslim communities throughout the years of interest to this thesis, will show that this inactivity is a structural phenomenon.

Attacks on Christians, churches, Muslims, and mosques As mentioned before, from July 2009 until the end of 2014, 120 attacks on religious institutions or figures have been attributed to Boko Haram. A selection of attacks, derived

34 from the article of Mantzikos (2014), the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), and several news articles, is listed below. The generally observed (lack of) government responses to this type of religious related violence is described afterwards. One thing to keep in mind: not all incidents are verified Boko Haram attacks, some are based on (reasonable) suspicion and are perhaps carried out by other armed groups.

In January 2011, series of Boko Haram bomb attacks targeted Christian churches. On the 19th of January, a Deeper Life Christian Church pastor was assassinated. Later that year, in both June and July, other churches were bombed as well. Reportedly dozens of people were killed. Boko Haram also attacked Muslims, though not by bomb attacks, but by assassinations of the sect’s critics. On 11 May, 6 June, 12 August, 14 August, 4 September, and 29 October, Boko Haram gunmen killed Islamic clerics or teachers, who had been known for openly criticizing the sect’s ideology and methods, or whom Boko Haram suspected of sharing information with the authorities. On 8 April 2012 (Easter Day), at least one Boko Haram suicide bomber attempted to detonate his car filled with explosives at the All Nations Christian Assembly Church in the city of Kaduna (Kaduna State). Due to security forces, who prevented him from entering the area, he detonated in a nearby street, which killed 42 civilians. Two months later, on 3 June 2012, a Boko Haram suicide bomber attempted to drive his car into a church in the city of Bauchi (Bauchi State). He was denied access by checkpoint guards, detonated in front of them and killed at least 16 people. On 6 August 2012, suspected Boko Haram members opened fire during a service at the Deeper Life Bible Church in Kogi State. At least 19 people were killed by the attack. On 4 May 2013, suspected Boko Haram members killed two Islamic clerics in Borno State by slitting their throats. The clerics, like previously targeted religious figures, had been known for criticizing the sect. One day later, another attack occurred, but this time again, the targets were Christians. This evidences the indiscriminate killing of literally everyone different from themselves, to which Boko Haram had resorted. On 5 May 2013, suspected Boko Haram members attacked a church in Adamawa State. At least 10 people were killed. On 8 august 2013, Boko Haram members dressed in military uniforms killed at least 44 Mulsims who were gathered at a mosque near Maiduguri, Borno State. Two months later, in Damboa (Borno State), suspected Boko Haram members carried out two attacks on Muslims who were just leaving the town’s mosques. At least 12 were killed. The military reportedly killed 15 attackers on this day.

35 On 23 July 2014, suspected Boko Haram members tried to assassinate Islamic scholar Sheik Bauchi in the city of Kaduna. The suicide bomber detonated, but left Bauchi unharmed. 25 other people were killed in the attack. On the same day, suspected Boko Haram members detonated a bomb that aimed to assassinate former opposition leader, now president, Buhari. Again, the intended target survived, but at least 14 civilians were killed. On 28 November 2014, two suspected Boko Haram suicide bombers detonated in front of the Grand Mosque in the city of Kano (Kano State). When the visitors started to flee, a roadside bomb exploded and Boko Haram members opened fire. The events resulted in at least 120 dead and more than 270 injured, therefore constitute the heaviest attack on Muslims in the time frame documented by the GTD (July 2009 – 31 December 2014). In response to the attacks, President Jonathan instructed the military “to launch a full-scale investigation and to leave no stone unturned until all agents of terror (…) are tracked down and brought to justice” (BBC News, 2014).

Regarding the attacks that occurred in 2011, in general, the government did not take any decisive action against these, nor did it effectively arrest and prosecute the perpetrators. On rare occasions, the government apprehended those responsible. But then again, actual convictions appeared even less common. Regarding the prevention of reprisal attacks by angered stricken communities, the government underperformed, leading to a situation of impunity, which has resulted in numerous inter-communal clashes (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2011, pp. 4-5). One of these clashes occurred in August in Jos (Plateau State), during which 100 people died. Nobody was indicted, let alone prosecuted. In addition, it ignored recommendations regarding the mitigation of inter-religious and inter- communal conflicts, provided by inter-religious panels such as the Nigerian Inter-Religious Council (NIREC) (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2011, p. 8). Regarding the attacks that occurred in 2012, a similar observation can be made. Again, the government had not acted effectively to prevent violence, apprehend perpetrators, or prosecute them. And again, like the year before, the federal government mostly ignored recommendations for dealing with the ongoing violence from panels that were, nota bene, receiving federal funding (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2012, pp. 5-6). Regarding the attacks that occurred in 2013, the Nigerian government again remained mostly inactive. It has been criticized by leaders of the Christian community for not adequately protecting Christians in the Northeast, where numerous attacks had been carried out by Boko Haram on Christians and churches in both cities and in rural communities. Immediate assistance after a perpetrated attack also fell short, as well as the addressing the

36 underlying grievances and hostilities that had led to the violence. Regarding events that had occurred in previous years, again little progress had been made in 2013. Five police officers, charged in 2011 with the extra-judicial killing of Yusuf, were still awaiting the legal proceedings against them to commence. Regarding the killing of several Islamic clerics in 2012, not one suspect was indicted throughout 2013 (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour, 2013, p. 6). Regarding the attacks that occurred in 2014, yet again, the government was mainly inactive with regard to preventing or checking religious related violence. The military even was held responsible for increasing the death toll of Boko Haram attacks, due to their heavy- handed response upon arrival at the scene. Besides, according to religious and civil society leaders, the military on occasions did not even show up when Boko Haram attacked. Warnings were ignored, or were responded to be abandoning posts and fleeing, as was the case in June 2014 after a Boko Haram warning of an upcoming attack had been issued (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2014, p. 4).

Economic disparities between North and South The North of Nigeria differs in numerous aspects from the South of the country. Economic prosperity is one of these aspects. The South has a lot of ongoing and flourishing economic activities that enlarge the economic prosperity in Southern states. Among other things, its oil fields and the commercial capital of Lagos generate the vast majority share of Nigeria’s GDP. The North also has substantial economic activity, but to a lesser extent and in different economic areas. Here, agriculture constitutes the major form of industry. The Northern states account for a much smaller portion of Nigeria’s GDP (Anderson, 2013). It is this economic inequality, that is perceived as one of the root causes of the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency (Agbiboa, 2013b). In addition, high unemployment rates in Northern Nigeria, contribute to the frustration of Northerners as well and fuels the insurgency, as stated by the Research Director of the Nigerian Economic Summit Group: “Unemployment is higher in the north than in the south. Mix this situation with radical Islam, which promises a better life for martyrs, and you can understand the growing violence in the north” (Rogers, 2012). Nigeria’s current unemployment rate is at 12,1 per cent. The current youth unemployment rate is much higher, the latest estimate shows 21,5 of all Nigerian youth is unemployed (Trading Economics, 2016). One of the underlying causes of the economic disparities between the North and the South, stems from the time when Nigeria was roughly divided into three regions. The policy of the federal government then, entitled the regions to spend 50 per cent

37 of their earnings on whatever they deemed was best. The Southwest and Southeast spent this money on education. However, the Northern region did not. From this moment onwards, the North has fallen behind in terms of training well-educated and skilled citizens. Consequently, an economic gap between the North and the South emerged, since the industries that did develop in the North, were often crowded with Southern, better educated, workers (Akinyoade, 2016, p. 81).

With regard to the enormous problem of youth unemployment in the country, and mostly in the Northern states, the federal government designed several public programs to which unemployed youths were assigned. These mainly provided jobs in the agricultural sector (Akande, 2014). Directed at the general issue of unemployment, the federal government adopted the National Employment Policy in 1998 and approved the policy in 2002. It aimed to promote full employment for secure and sustainable livelihood; secure improvement in the productivity of labour; and provide the fullest possible opportunity to each worker to use his skills. Despite these formulated goals, the government is still looking for ways to effectively implement the policy (Federal Ministry of Labour & Employment, n.d.). A problem that hinders implementation, is the paradox between overall economic growth and unemployment rates that applies to Nigeria. Normally, one would expect unemployment rates to drop in a period of economic growth. However, although the Nigerian economy has continuously grown over most of the past few years, the unemployment rates have risen as well (Akeju & Olanipekun, 2014, p. 143). In order to increase jobs, the government recently announced the National Policy on Entrepreneurship Development will be presented later in 2016. This policy aims at encouraging (young) Nigerians to become entrepreneurs, which would ideally result in the creation of greater employment (Ugwuanyi, 2015).

Internal displacement Due to the ongoing violence and conflicts in Nigeria, of which the Boko Haram insurgency and the government’s response to it constitute a significant part, roughly 737,000 people are classified as newly internally displaced people (IDP) in the year 2015 alone. In total, as of 31 December 2015, 2,1 million Nigerians are internally displaced (IDMC, 2016, p. 98). Just five countries currently show a larger number of internally displaced people: Syria, Colombia, Iraq, Sudan, and Yemen. Of these IDPs, the substantial Christian minority in Northern Nigeria (31,2 per cent of Northern population, i.e. 30,7 million people) is considered of particular interest since this

38 group is confronted the most with the radical Islamic violence of Boko Haram. It has been affected by numerous incidents of religious violence, the majority of which can be attributed to Boko Haram, but, to a lesser extent, incidents can also be attributed to predominantly Muslim Hausa-Fulani herdsmen who have attacked Christian farmers in the region over cattle grazing issues. The violence has resulted in 11,500 Christians dead between 2006 and 2014 (Mulders, 2016, p. 19). In anticipation of these religious related killings and the overall decrease of the security situation for Christians, per March 2015, an estimated number of approximately 1,1 million Christians had fled Northern Nigeria due to the persistent Boko Haram violence. Statistics on the Northern states, especially those in the far North, show dramatic numbers of displaced Christians between 2000 and 2014. Of the original number of Christians in Borno State, 87,3 per cent have left; in Yobe State, 77,8 per cent have left; in Kano State, 63,4 per cent have left. This exodus, in addition to targeted attacks, has resulted in the disappearance or closing of 13,000 churches in Northern Nigeria. For example, of the 6,210 Christian congregations that were present in 2000 in Borno State, only 890 were still present in 2014. These statistics together illustrate the (deliberate) large-scale de-Christianization of the Northern states. The Northern Christians IDPs have mainly fled to states in Nigeria’s Middle- Belt, which have seen an increase of Christians, Christian congregations, and churches between 2000 and 2014. The percentage of Christians in Plateau State has increased by 75,6 per cent; in Nasarawa State by 44 per cent; in Benue State by 40 per cent. In all Middle Belt states together, 3,500 new churches were established as a result of the influx of Christians (Mulders, 2016, pp. 22-23). By 2012, taken into account the large number of IDPs in Nigeria, the lack of governmental policies that address the problem is remarkable. The Kampala Convention, which is a continental instrument that legally binds participating governments to protect human rights of IDPs, was signed by the Nigerian government in 2009 and was expected to be the government’s first major step towards addressing the issue in a coherent and consistent manner (IDMC, 2012, p. 1). However, by late 2015, the government was still in the process of domestication and implementation. The provisions as enshrined in the Kampala Convention are yet to be passed through the National Assembly, state governments’ legislatures, and then again through the National Assembly (IDMC, 2015, p. 7). The government’s response to the issue of IDPs so far, has been characterized by a lack of knowledge and reliable information regarding the issue. Government agencies are either limited in personnel capacity, or lack adequate methodologies to gather sufficient and

39 valid data in order to create a comprehensive image of the IDP situation in the country (IDMC, 2013, p. 6). For instance, after an attack has occurred, government agencies estimate the resulting number of IDPs by counting destroyed houses in the affected area (IDMC, 2014, p. 9). Consequently, the response is inadequate and far from satisfying as well. Often, the government offers IDPs only short-term solutions during the immediate emergency response phase. Little attention or resources are assigned to long-term solutions, such as helping people return or integrate in their new place of residence. For those purposes, IDPs have to rely on local or international initiatives, which are, due to the absence of a national policy, rather uncoordinated and therefore mostly ineffective (IDMC, 2013, p. 10). In 2015, the government began to facilitate the return of internally displaced persons to their home communities, although often without providing adequate security. With international partners, the Nigerian government set up several institutions to coordinate the reconstruction of Boko Haram-affected areas in the Northeast. However, by the end of 2015 there was no evidence of a coordinated plan to restore civilian security in recaptured territories (Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, 2016, p. 44).

7.2 Political responses

7.2.1 Context

Political parties According to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), 30 political parties are currently registered in Nigeria (INEC, n.d.). The two biggest parties, in terms of votes received during the 2015 presidential elections, are the All Progressives Congress (ACP) and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). APC was formed in February 2013, when the four biggest opposition parties decided to jointly take on the PDP at the upcoming 2015 general elections. The PDP had until then delivered all three presidents and had ruled Nigeria since the return to civilian rule in 1999. The PDP was formed in 1998, driven by the objective to restore democracy in Nigeria after decades of military rule, by creating a national and broad- based political party in which all patriotic citizens could come together. The focus on national representation was a necessary condition for aspirant political parties, since regional representation had partially prompted the Nigerian Civil War in the 1960s (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2016). Another necessary condition for establishing a political party, stems from the aforementioned constitutional section 222, which states that a political party should not

40 have any religious connotation whatsoever. For this reason, there are no religious political parties that have a seat in the National Assembly or government. Both parties are so-called ‘catch-all’ parties, seeking to attract the broader electorate rather than focusing on specific groups. Another similarity arises with regard to their stance on certain social issues, such as same-sex relationships, which they both disapprove of. Like the majority of Nigerian political parties, APC and PDP favour social conservatism based on moral and religious grounds. APC does so more firmly than PDP, partly because a sizable amount of its voters are Muslims living in the northern Hausa-Fulani parts of the country, who tend to be more conservative on social issues than other constituencies. Another nuanced difference occurs in the parties’ views on the autonomy of states. APC is dominated by politicians who support the devolution of powers to state governments, including those powers pertaining to religious affairs. PDP, on the other hand, is more moderate in this aspect, not necessarily against some degree of state autonomy and their religious freedom, but by no means willing to simply hand over essential powers from the federal government to state governments. Regarding other issues, there are more evident conflicting objectives and beliefs to be noticed. For example, they differ on economic issues such as government regulation of market policies. APC, the social-democratic party, favours an active role for the government while PDP, the neoliberal party, gives preference to less involvement (PDP, 1998; APC, 2013).

Recent elections Since the country’s return to civilian rule in 1999, five general elections were held, during which Nigerians were asked to vote for one of the competing presidential candidates. The two most recent general elections were held in 2011 and 2015. These elections have yielded divergent results, regarding voter turnout and elected senators, but more importantly, regarding the victorious presidential candidate. In 2015, for the first time in history, the opposition candidate defeated the incumbent president during the general elections. Muhammadu Buhari, Nigeria’s former military ruler from January 1984 until August 1985 after the December 1983 military coup and today’s APC leader, defeated Goodluck Jonathan by 2,5 million votes. Buhari received a majority of votes in 21 of 36 states. The other 15 states, mainly in the Southern part and some in the Middle Belt of Nigeria, went to Jonathan, as well as the Federal Capital Territory (BBC News, 2015).

Public opinion polls

41 This thesis demarcates government responses between the years 2009 and 2015. President Goodluck Jonathan has been the country’s president during most of this time. Monthly polls regarding his job approval rating show ups and downs, as do most of such polls, caused by too many issues to reflect on here. However, one exceptionally high job approval rating is worth mentioning, since it probably relates to Jonathan dealing with the Chibok schoolgirls kidnapping in April 2014. September 2014 saw a 13% increase in Jonathan’s job approval rating (NOIPolls, 2014). Until then, he had remained relatively silent on the matter, which angered parts of the population. However difficult to verify with absolute certainty, this increase could be the result of a visit to the United States made in August 2014, during which he accepted help offered by the U.S. and other nations. In a Washington Times interview, he stated to be optimistic that the government would recover the girls safely and underlined his earlier message that he delivered to a group of 50 rescued girls, to whom he said “…he was dedicated to bringing home the rest of the girls safely” (Boyer, 2014). The acceptance of help from other nations and optimistic statements regarding the girls’ rescue, might have particularly affected women’s opinion regarding president Jonathan. However, as of today, the majority of the Chibok schoolgirls is still missing, their fates unknown. Thus, Jonathan’s response, apart from too late, has been non-effective as well.

Movements excluded from Nigerian politics The constitutional section 222 prohibits associations that are explicitly referring to religion through their name, symbols, or logos, from forming and functioning as political parties. The section also requires associations, in order to be accepted as a political party, to be accessible for all Nigerian citizens, irrespective of their religion (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, p. 63). Consequently, because of this section, (militant) religious movements that are active in Nigeria are by definition excluded from Nigerian politics, since they are either referring to religion in (one or more of) the aforementioned manners or are not accessible for citizens with different or no religious backgrounds. “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad” meets none of the requirements for forming a political party as formulated in the constitution. Obviously, its name explicitly refers to religion and even propagates it, while excluding those who are not ‘people committed to’ their cause. Furthermore, their logo and its symbols contain religious messages as well. The book in the logo’s middle represents the Quran, guarded by two AK-47 assault rifles. On top of the Quran waves a black flag that portrays the shahada in white text, an Islamic creed declaring one’s belief in just one God (Allah) and in

42 Mohammed as his prophet. However, even if these restrictions on religious movements had not existed in the country’s constitution, Boko Haram would never participate in Nigeria’s system of politics as it is organized today. The slightest form of cooperation with institutional elements that belong to or are confined within a system that is secular, democratic, and Western-influenced, in other words un-Islamic, already is reason enough to be killed. This is evidenced, for instance, by the September 2011 assassination of Yusuf’s brother-in-law Babakura Fuggu, which will be discussed in the next paragraph. Consequently, Boko Haram actively participating in politics, which would mean adhering to certain rules and principles and essentially supporting the secular democracy, is unlikely to ever going to happen. Beside the exclusion of religious movements from participation in Nigerian politics, arguably a much larger sector of the society is excluded as well. In order to be qualified for election as a member of the National Assembly, a Nigerian citizen should have attained the age of 35 for the Senate and 30 for the House of Representatives (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, p. 26). This section therefore per definition excludes a large part of Nigerian society, since such a large extent of its population is younger than 30 or 35. Solely on the basis of their age, potentially talented people are excluded from politics beforehand. So far, religious movements and youth movements or groups are excluded due to constitutional sections that prohibit them from engaging in Nigerian politics. The last group discussed here, contrary to those previously discussed, is not so much a movement nor excluded by constitutional sections. Women in Nigeria suffer from other problems when it comes to representation and participation in the country’s political system. Patriarchal gender norms, the negative perception of women in politics, a lack of campaign funds for women, and the masculine nature of political power, are some yet not all factors that are hindering any significant political involvement of women. Women are severely underrepresented in both the National Assembly and the government (Nagarajan, 2015).

7.2.2 Government responses

Sharia law implementation An issue that receives considerable attention throughout this thesis, is the reintroduction or extension of Sharia criminal law in twelve northern states from 1999 onwards. The issue of Sharia law is also, and more in detail, analysed in the chapter devoted to government responses in the legal context (chapter 6.3), but because the issue has been highly politicized since its emergence, it is deemed appropriate to discuss it here as well, as a part of Nigerian

43 governments’ responses in the political context. The response of President Obasanjo (in office May 1999 – May 2007) nicely portrays subsequent (state) governments’ overall initial approach to tricky and inconvenient affairs: denial of the problem, to, in some but not all cases, eventually coming up with a half-and-half solution. In the case of Sharia law, this sometimes led to a compromise, the formulation of which was left to the states. For instance, in Kaduna State, unlike other Northern states, Islamic punishments were not incorporated in the newly extended legal system. The compromise was introduced in November 2001, almost two years after Zamfara State had enacted the first Sharia Penal Code in Northern Nigeria on 27 January 2000 (Peters, 2003, p. 13). The delay in Kaduna was due to recent violent clashes between Muslim and Christian communities, which were related to the extension of Sharia law throughout Northern Nigeria. The Kaduna State Governor aimed at preventing a repetition of such events by implementing a moderate version of Sharia law. The compromise entailed that Muslim local communities were granted more power through the establishment of Sharia courts that would deal with civil matters involving Muslims, thereby aiming at not to antagonize Christians (BBC News, 2001). Not only would this compromise eventually anger Muslims, due to their discontent with the manner of which Sharia was implemented, the fact that the government had allowed the reintroduction and extension in the first place angered Christians as well (Ehrhardt, 2016, pp. 83, 85).

Political incorporation After his return from Saudi Arabia, by 2007, Yusuf had attracted a significant amount of followers around Maiduguri, partly due to seductive rhetoric, partly due to the provision of an informal social welfare structure. These are just two examples that contributed to his popularity, which enabled him to mobilize parts of the northern youth. This ability did not remain unnoticed by Yobe and Borno states’ governors, who offered Yusuf and Buju Foi, another prominent Boko Haram member, involvement in state government affairs in 2007. The extent of this involvement was relatively limited and came down to seats in the Borno committee of Islamic Affairs. It is, however, the only example in Boko Haram’s history that the sect had acquired an official role in state government, the authority of which it had always rejected. Shortly thereafter, the involvement ended with the resignation of Yusuf and Foi, mainly because of the state government’s failure to effectively implement Sharia law in accordance with Yusuf’s wishes (Comolli, 2015, p. 52).

Negotiations and talks

44 In addition to the, with varying degrees, implementation of Sharia law in Northern Nigeria and the attempt to incorporate Boko Haram leaders in state government, other government responses in a political context can be observed as well. One of these are, as mentioned by Miller referring to the category of conciliation, negotiations and talks. On 15 September 2011, former President Obasanjo went to Maiduguri to meet with members of Boko Haram and of the Yusuf family. Although he emphasized this effort was purely his personal imitative, President Jonathan had endorsed and supported it. Obasanjo first and foremost urged the family to “forgive and forget the past”, while simultaneously hoping to mark this meeting as a “first step in being seen to be making a move with a view to resolving this crisis…” (Ajani, 2011). However, the meeting yielded nothing but negative results. Firstly, the level of trust between the two parties further decreased. Boko Haram presented several demands to Obasanjo, including an end to the arrests and killings of their members; payments of compensation to families of killed members; prosecution of security officers involved in the Yusuf killing; and the release of all detained members. Obasanjo delivered the demands to Jonathan, alongside the grievances expressed by those he had spoken to. However, despite having promised to look into the meeting’s results, Jonathan has not appeared to have taken any action, again proving Boko Haram’s view of the government as being insincere (IRIN, 2012). The inaction regarding several demands, for instance that all detained members would have to be set free, is hardly a surprise, since for the government this is simply an unacceptable condition. Regarding the demand to prosecute the security officers involved in Yusuf’s extrajudicial killing, a Vanguard editor reported shortly after Obasanjo’s visit: “Already, some policemen are being tried for the extra-judicial killing of Yusuf” (Ajani, 2011). However, this report’s claim, endorsed by Jonathan, is hard to verify. Secondly, negotiating with or talking to representatives of the government is considered wrongful and worth killing, even if it pertains to Boko Haram or Yusuf family members themselves. This happened to Yusuf’s brother-in-law, Babakura Fuggu. He had already spoken to Obasanjo on several previous occasions, including the meeting discussed here. The day after the September 2011 meeting, he was killed by an unknown gunman, who was suspected to be a Boko Haram member (Marama, 2011). Despite this failure, the Nigerian government again opened talks with Boko Haram in 2012. Through third parties, according to former Media and Publicity adviser Abati, the government aimed at “…understanding what exactly the grievances of these persons are, what exactly can be done to resolve the crises, in the overall best interest of ensuring peace and stability in Nigeria…”. To end the crisis, the government stated that it would listen to anyone’s grievances, including members and leaders of Boko Haram of whom

45 they do not know who they are (Ori, 2012). In 2014, talks between Boko Haram and the government were still ongoing, according to Abati. He optimistically expected that this time, concrete and positive results would be achieved. Now, both Cameroon and Chad were involved as well, being two significant partners since Boko Haram tends to travel across the countries’ borders (BBC News, 2014). Later that year and in the first half of 2015 during the electoral campaign, presidential candidate Buhari promised Nigerians that, contrary to Jonathan, he would not engage in negotiations or talks with Boko Haram. However, by the time he was elected, he explained that he intended to negotiate, if the sect was willing to. Otherwise, he would crush the insurgents anyway, by “the machinery put in place” (Ejiofor, 2015).

Amnesty Besides the multiple instances of (attempted) talks, the issue of granting amnesty to Boko Haram has also been considered. On 31 December 2011, President Jonathan declared the first of two states of emergency during his presidency. After it had ended in July 2012, the possibility of starting a dialogue with the Boko Haram militants was once again discussed among key government and security figures. Instead of the coercive use of force, the government might succeed in ending the violence through negotiations, perhaps even amnesty. Such tactics have remained extremely sensitive ever since they had been suggested for the first time (Comolli, 2015, pp. 115-117). A likely reason for the consideration of amnesty for Boko Haram militants, is the successful 2009 Presidential Amnesty Program that was applied to the Niger Delta crisis, which has been discussed in chapter 5.3. Therefore, on 17 April 2013, Jonathan set up the Amnesty Committee. It consisted of 26 people from varying backgrounds, ranging from (state) senators to human rights activists and from Quranic teachers (mallams) to military figures. Their task was to identify and engage key leaders of Boko Haram, with the eventual objective of developing a viable framework for amnesty and disarmament (Agbiboa, 2013a, p. 11). However, just a few days after the Committee was established, Boko Haram’s leader Shekau unequivocally rejected the very idea of amnesty. According to him, Boko Haram had done nothing wrong that would require an amnesty. Instead, it was Boko Haram that should grant amnesty to the Nigerian government, for all their crimes committed throughout the years towards the Muslim community in general and the sect itself in particular (Chiles, 2013). The failure of the amnesty plan can be attributed to several causes. Firstly, the lack of trust between the involved parties reduced its potential success. Boko Haram members often recalled the

46 insincerity of the government regarding previous commitments, the government likewise was wary of the sect easily breaking its promises, as far as they occurred. Secondly, the fact that Boko Haram is highly factionalized and doesn’t appear to be represented by just one leader, makes negotiations, let alone talks about amnesty, a difficult endeavour (Agbiboa, 2013c, p. 66). One leader may feel attracted to the idea of amnesty, while the other, like Shekau, most certainly does not feel that way. Thirdly, as disclosed by an Amnesty Committee candidate (who turned down the appointment) and human rights activist Shehu Sani, President Jonathan had frustrated negotiation efforts with Boko Haram before and Sani expected him to do so again. Especially regarding the committee’s limited timeframe, imposed by Jonathan, to achieve their objective, Sani stated: “When you give a committee two weeks, it is not going to work (…) I know the committee will achieve nothing” (Nnochiri, 2013). Shortly after Shekau’s rejection, Boko Haram launched attacks on multiple villages, thereby killing dozens of police and security forces. The government responded with the declaration of the second state of emergency on 15 May 2013, little less than a month after the Amnesty Committee was established.

7.3 Legal responses

7.3.1 Context

Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria After decades of military regimes since the country’s independence in 1960, shortly interrupted by the Nigerian Second Republic between 1979 and 1983, the 1999 presidential elections marked Nigeria’s return to civilian rule (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2016). The constitution that accompanied this return is still the most recent constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, dating from 29 May 1999 and forming the foundations of the Fourth Republic. Several of its sections and articles pertain to religion, section 10 arguably being the most important one. Placed under the constitution’s general provisions, it states: “The Government of the Federation or of a State shall not adopt any religion as State Religion” (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, p. 7). In other words, this particular section defines Nigeria as a secular state, in which the constitution takes precedence over everything else, including affairs and laws related to religion. The constitution, in section 1.3, clearly states: “If any other law is inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution, this

47 Constitution shall prevail, and that other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void” (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, p. 1). Besides these general provisions, other constitutional sections mention religion as well. Placed under the constitution’s chapter devoted to fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy, section 15.2 prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion and section 23 determines ‘religious tolerance’ to be one of Nigeria’s eight national ethical principles. With regard to citizens’ fundamental rights, section 38 determines that every individual is entitled to freedom of religion, including the freedom to change his religion, as well as the freedom to manifest and propagate his religion in either worship, teaching, practice, and observance. Furthermore, the section states that no individual attending a place of education shall be forced to receive religious instruction if such instruction relates to a religion other than his own. Section 42, also placed under the chapter devoted to fundamental rights, states that a Nigerian citizen of a particular religion shall not be subjected, by any law or administrative action, to restrictions to which citizens adhering other religions are not subjected. At the same time, a Nigerian citizen of a particular religion shall not be accorded any advantage that is not accorded to citizens adhering other religions. In short, all citizens, regardless of their religion, should be treated equally. The last reference to religion in Nigeria’s constitution is made in section 222. It pertains to political parties and prohibits associations to function as political parties in case their names, symbols, or logos contain any ethnic or religious connotation (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, p. 63).

Sharia law Nigeria’s legal system is largely influenced by the country’s colonial history. Before the introduction of English Common Law by the British colonial administration, customary laws were already in place throughout the country, depending on the nature and background of the people that resided in a certain area. Consequently, in the Muslim Northern part of Nigeria, these customary laws, which included both civil and criminal laws, were based on Islamic principles (Nmehielle, 2004, pp. 735-736). These principles are part of the Sharia law system, its interpretation varies per school of jurisprudence and its doctrine. The Maliki school is the prevalent school in (Northern) Nigeria (Peters, 2003, p. 1). Furthermore, contrary to modern popular belief, Sharia entails more than just a criminal code that dictates inhumane punishments. It encapsulates the entire moral-ethical structure of Islam, which Muslims understand as Allah’s will and the right path to salvation (Hansen, 2015, p. 8). The British colonizers allowed these customary laws to exist beside English Common Law, albeit inferior

48 to English Common Law and, regarding criminal laws, under British restriction. This basically resulted in the British Criminal Code to govern criminal conduct, irrespective of the area to which it was applied (i.e. both North and South). Particular Northern Nigerians felt increasingly uncomfortable with this course of events, since they believed the British Criminal Code was incompatible with their Islamic lifestyle. However, introducing the entirety of the Sharia law system would have upset the non-Muslim community. Therefore, a compromise was proposed, as was previously done by the British in India and Sudan. For Nigeria, it meant the adoption of the Penal Code for Northern Nigeria (Nmehielle, 2004, p. 736). In October 1999, only five months after Nigeria’s new constitution came into force, Zamfara State governor Ahmed Sani proclaimed Sharia Law as the controlling Islamic legal system for the state when cases occur in which Muslims are involved, existing side by side with the secular system that pertains to cases where non-Muslims are involved. Before this proclamation, Islamic law was already present in several Northern states. However, it was applied only to cases regarding civil matters, like marriage and succession. From the October 1999 proclamation onwards, criminal were are also covered by Sharia law (Nmehielle, 2004, pp. 731-732). Eleven other Northern states followed Zamfara State’s example: Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Niger, Sokoto, and Yobe. To varying extents, these states’ Houses of Assembly have established State Sharia Courts where the Sharia Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes are applied, tax collection bodies, Hisbah militias for the enforcement of Sharia, and State Sharia Commissions (Comolli, 2015, pp. 20-21). Sharia courts do not have the authority to compel participation by non-Muslims, but in the past some non-Muslims voluntarily took cases to Sharia courts, because of their relatively high speed and low cost (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2014, p. 3) (Ehrhardt, 2016, p. 85). Proponents of Sharia law argue that the secular law system only services Nigeria’s corrupt elite, who are believed to get away with anything. The notion, especially propagated by anti-innovation movements such as Izala, of the secular state’s inability to uphold the law and to tackle (its own) corruption, resonated well among northern Muslims. Sharia law, in their opinion, addresses the grievances of and pursuit of justice for the poor, contrary to its secular counterpart (Forest J. J., 2012, p. 87). Furthermore, proponents claim that “Muslims in Nigeria truly believe that the profession of the Islamic faith (…) is inchoate if it is not accompanied by submitting totally to dictates of Allah as expressed and embodied in the Sharia legal system” (Nhmehielle, 2004, p. 738). With that, proponents mean the entire

49 implementation of Sharia law, to all matters imaginable. Dealing with affairs partly according to secular laws, would make one essentially a hypocrite Muslim, an accusation often directed at traditional Muslim leaders. The issue of Sharia criminal law has been highly politicized since talks commenced prior to its reintroduction in 1999. Having sensed popular discontent with the status quo, northern governors saw an opportunity to increase popular support for their positions. Keen on acquiring this support, they portrayed themselves as ‘protectors of faith’ when they advocated and eventually incorporated Sharia law in their states’ constitutions. Thus, they may have advocated and reintroduced Sharia law mainly to gain electoral benefits from it, rather than addressing the actual religious interests of their constituencies. They promised the implementation of Sharia, but ended up disappointing the community, for the Sharia was mainly a political tool for them. This disappointment among northern Muslims is believed to be one of the factors contributing to the increased popular support for and increasingly resonating narrative of Boko Haram. The Sharia as it was implemented, was not what the majority of northern Muslims had in mind when they voted for politicians who advocated Sharia, who turned out to be rather insincere about its proper implementation (Tertsakian, 2004, p. 90; Badejogbin, 2013, p. 245; Ehrhardt, 2016, p. 84).

7.3.2 Government responses

Constitution versus Sharia law Article 1.3 of Nigeria’s current constitution states: “If any other law is inconsistent with with the provisions of this Constitution, this Constitution shall prevail, and that other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void” (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, p. 1). Article 277.1 states: “The Sharia Court of Appeal of a State shall (…) exercise such appellate and supervisory jurisdiction in civil proceedings involving questions of Islamic personal Law…” (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, p. 75). Of specific interest here, is the passage that mentions the type of proceedings that are to be brought before a State’s Sharia court. The constitution explicitly only refers to civil proceedings. However, since 1999, twelve Northern states have, with varying degrees, extended the jurisdiction of Sharia courts to criminal matters as well. The constitution also prohibits the involuntary participation in Sharia courts. However, Zamfara State’s law requires all cases involving Muslims to be brought before the Sharia court. Clearly, this practice is far from compatible with the federal constitution. In response to this contradiction, the federal government

50 generally has remained silent (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2014, p. 3). Right from the moment that Northern states started to extend the Sharia law system’s jurisdiction, President Obasanjo and his federal government could have contested the development, but they chose not to (Akinyoade, 2016, p. 77). Years later, the same president still avoided the issue and still had not taken a clear stance in the ongoing debate (Tertsakian, 2004, p. 96).

Terrorism-related legislation As to counter-terrorism legislation, again little progress had been made. Until 2010, efforts to revise or create, for that matter, Nigerian (counter-)terrorism related legislation had not been a priority for the country’s legislative bodies. Although both executive and legislative leaders expressed their intentions to speed up the passage of a counter-terrorism legislative act, it was not until May 2010 before the National Assembly had conducted a final reading of the bill regarding Nigeria’s first piece of counter-terrorism legislation (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2011, p. 22). The proliferation and intensification of Boko Haram attacks since Shekau took over the group’s leadership in April 2010 and external pressure exerted by the U.S. after a failed bombing attempt of a U.S. airliner approaching Detroit from Amsterdam by a Nigerian citizen in December 2009, for which al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) claimed responsibility, have both contributed to the development of the first terrorism-related legislative act in Nigeria (Onuoha, 2014, p. 175). In May 2011, the National Assembly passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2011. On 3 June 2011, President Jonathan signed the bill into law. The act is based on international standards and UN guidelines. It includes, inter alia, the prohibition of acts of terrorism, it defines proscribed organizations, and it describes a variety of terrorism-related actions, such as (financial) support and obstructing investigations, which are from now on punishable (Prevention of Terrorism Act 2011, 2011). However, this first piece of Nigerian terrorism-related legislation did not clearly outline which agency would take the lead in investigating suspected acts of terrorism. Due to this ambiguity, very few Boko Haram members were convicted based on the act’s provisions: only 10 by August 2013 and 40 by February 2014 (Comolli, 2015, p. 138). However, according to former Attorney General Adoke, these efforts should nevertheless be called ‘considerable’ (Ajasa, 2014). Noteworthy, despite the small number of convictions, on 14 October 2011, Borno State senator Ali Mohammed Ndume (ruling PDP) was charged with four counts under this newly enacted legislation, for collaborating with Boko Haram (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2012, p.

51 26). The 2011 Act also fell short in providing due process safeguards for human rights, it lacked severe punishments for terrorist offences, and it was limited to within Nigeria’s borders, making extra-territorial efforts hard to pursue (Badejogbin, 2013, p. 244). The adoption of the Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013 in June 2013 constituted Nigeria’s next step in its limited history of counter-terrorism legislation. Among the problems that deterred or hindered more effective law enforcement and border security by the Nigerian government were a lack of coordination and cooperation between Nigerian security agencies; a lack of biometrics collection systems and the requisite databases; corruption; misallocation of resources; the slow pace of the judicial system, including a lack of 46 timely arraignment of suspected terrorist detainees; and lack of sufficient training for prosecutors and judges to understand and carry out the Terrorism (Prevention) Act of 2011 (CRT15, p. 45-46). Its purpose was to strengthen the weaknesses of its 2011 predecessor, the country’s first counter-terrorism related legislative act. The ambiguity concerning agencies involved in terror investigations and the expediency of the overall judicial system are two examples that the 2013 amendment aimed to improve (Comolli, 2015, p. 138). Therefore, the 2013 amendment appointed the National Security Adviser (NSA) as the coordinator for all counter-terrorism intelligence activities. Besides, the attorney general was appointed as the responsible body for the law’s enforcement. Although the NSA was formally appointed to coordinate the variety of involved security agencies, the level of interagency cooperation and information sharing remained limited (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2015, p. 43).

Law enforcement The recently introduced terrorism-related legislative acts aimed at, among other things, strengthening Nigeria’s capabilities in terms of law enforcement. Based on the 2013 amendment, on 30 September 2014, the Federal High Court in Lagos sentenced three Boko Haram members to 25 years in prison. They were convicted on several charges: conspiracy to commit terrorist acts, possession of firearms, and Boko Haram membership. However, apart from sporadic convictions such as these, in general, the government’s prosecution of Boko Haram members is either very slow or non-existent. Some suspected Boko Haram members were held indefinitely, without knowing whether or not (and when) the legal proceedings would commence (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2014, p. 5). A variety of factors impedes effective law enforcement in Nigeria. Firstly, resources are often misallocated. Secondly, there is a deeply rooted lack of coordination between the involved law enforcement agencies. Thirdly, there are simply not enough judges and prosecutors who

52 are adequately trained to deal with the newly adopted legislation (Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, 2016, p. 45). Overall, the government’s criminal justice institutions are not strong enough to operate effectively. All Country Reports on Terrorism between 2010 and 2015 notice that, despite UK sponsorship and assistance regarding procedures of investigating and prosecuting suspects, the institutions were still not capable enough to manage their tasks correctly. However, in May 2015, the Nigerian Administration of Criminal Justice Act came into force. This agency is intended to regulate the procedures of all terrorism-related investigations and trials (Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, 2016, p. 44). It is yet too soon to see the fruits of this newly emerged government agency and response regarding law enforcement.

7.4 Military responses

7.4.1 Government responses Since Boko Haram’s inception both the police and military, whether or not in a joint effort, have engaged in multiple skirmishes with Yusuf’s followers. Following the Christmas Eve attacks in Yobe State in 2003, a joint police and military crackdown was launched. In 2004, military forces engaged with and later pursued Boko Haram sect members in the Nigeria- Cameroon area. Because the sect, prior to 2009, was predominantly occupied with preaching and lived in secluded areas, rather than the violence in which it engaged after the 2009 Maiduguri battle (described below), these kinds of security operations were relatively rare in comparison to following years (Comolli, 2015, p. 111). On 28 July 2009, the Battle of Maiduguri (Borno State) took place. The army-led attack was aimed at Boko Haram’s headquarters and was a retaliation for a series of armed attacks on police stations and prisons, which were carried out earlier that month, in Bauchi, Yobe, and Borno states. Those attacks were instigated by Boko Haram in order to free hundreds of its arbitrarily detained members, who were arrested during previous police raids (Hansen & Musa, 2013, p. 286). The battle of Maiduguri lasted three days and resulted in the death of at least 800 people including Boko Haram members but also non-combatants and the arrests of several Boko Haram members including its leader Mohammed Yusuf. The exact circumstances surrounding and following his arrest are still unclear. Yusuf was captured in good health by the military on the 30th of July, which handed him over to the police for questioning. Shortly thereafter, images and videos showing his body riddled with bullet holes

53 started to leak, which contributed to the belief that Yusuf was extra-judicially killed by the Nigerian Police Force (Comolli, 2015, pp. 53-55). The government has defended its line of extremely violent actions during the Battle of Maiduguri as being both ethically and legally justified, since the series of Boko Haram attacks prior to the three-day battle were entirely unprovoked (Hansen & Musa, 2013, p. 286). From this moment onwards, the tone for the government’s approach to the Boko Haram insurgency was set: meeting violence with violence (Solomon, 2012, p. 6). After the 2009 Battle of Maiduguri and Yusuf’s extra-judicial killing, the sect goes underground. It was only when Shekau announced himself as the sect’s new leader in June 2010, that Boko Haram resurfaced. The sect launched multiple attacks, more violent than ever before, against police and military forces, their rage fuelled by the loss of Yusuf (International Crisis Group, 2014, p. 14). However, in between, Nigeria experienced almost a year of no Boko Haram and thus military operations. A National Police spokesman even assessed that the killing of Yusuf had been the end of Boko Haram, without its leader, the sect was deprived of any aspirations and would soon be forgotten. In some regard, this might have been true at the time. After the Battle of Maiduguri, many members were either killed or arrested, or had fled into neighbouring countries to seek shelter (Comolli, 2015, p. 59). The emergence of Shekau, in 2010, proved the police spokesman wrong. The violence was back and insecurity throughout Northern Nigeria grew. Besides the death of hundreds of Boko Haram members, ordinary civilians, and former leader Mohammed Yusuf, the July 2009 Battle of Maiduguri had led to other results as well. Pérouse de Montclos typifies the events as the turning point in Boko Haram’s existence, at which it moved “from extreme ideology to extreme violence” (2014a, p. 11). Arguably, the harsh military operations have contributed to the sect’s resurgence in 2010, when it came back more violent, more extreme, and stronger than ever before. This is due to several causes. Firstly, the sect fragmented into multiple subgroups. Those sect members who were initially seen as ‘moderate’, who at times had even been willing to negotiate with the government, were either killed by security forces during the Battle or were, afterwards, killed by their more extreme colleagues. The moderates were thus marginalized, consequently the more extreme ones took the upper hand in shaping the sect’s character. The splintering of Boko Haram may have resulted in some sort of competition between the newly emerged factions, who try to outbid the other factions by using (an increased level of) violence (Weeraratne, 2015, p. 11) Secondly, the military operations of July 2009 forced the splintered sect to go ‘underground’. Some of Boko Haram’s leaders and foot soldiers who survived, fled to neighbouring

54 countries, where they found shelter from the Nigerian military. More importantly, in those countries they allegedly made contact to other jihadist movements, from whom they learned new terrorist tactics, such as suicide bombings and guerilla warfare (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014a, p. 6). It appears that the relative calm year between July 2009 and May 2010 has been crucial for the sect’s transformation, a year in which it connected to their ‘brothers’ abroad. These newly established or strengthened ties not only led to the adoption of new tactics, they allegedly yielded financial support as well (Weeraratne, 2015, p. 13). Thus, it may be argued that although the military crushed a significant part of Boko Haram in 2009, they also drove the surviving members into the arms of foreign jihadist organizations, who were at the time engaged in activities that were not experienced yet in Nigeria. In sum, the developments and causes as described above have contributed to Boko Haram’s resurgence in 2010, after nearly a year of relative calm that followed the July 2009 Battle of Maiduguri. New tactics learned from foreign jihadists strengthened the group’s terrorist capacities. From 2010 onwards, they were able to stage multiple attacks in Northern Nigeria simultaneously. From 2013 onwards, they were able to hold newly conquered territory (Bappah, 2016, p. 151). In response to the growing insecurity after Shekau’s succession, on 15 June 2011, the Joint Task Force Operation Restore Order (JTF ORO, or JTF) started its operations. This multicomponent task force led by the army’s 21st Armoured Brigade was headquartered in Maiduguri, north-eastern Borno State’s capital and consisted of a variety of Nigerian security forces, including the Nigerian Air Force 79th Composite Group, the Defence Intelligence Agency, the State Security Service, the Nigerian Customs Service, the Nigerian police force, and the Nigeria Immigration Service. JTF ORO’s primary objective was to restore law and order to the north-eastern states of Nigeria (Comolli, 2015, p. 111). Despite the creation of this task force that marked the introduction of a comprehensive military approach to Boko Haram, the number of attacks carried out by Boko Haram members increased throughout 2011. Especially December 2011 saw an increase of attacks in Northeast Nigeria; among the targets were mosques, churches, military positions, markets, beer gardens, shops and many more places, displacing over 10,000 civilians and resulting in an unknown yet unquestionably large number of deaths (Mantzikos, 2014, pp. 66-72). Roughly a month earlier, during the 17th Nigerian Economic Summit on 11 November 2011, President Jonathan was already asked about the intensification of attacks, to which he responded: “… and I can assure Nigerians and I can assure the global community that this is a temporary setback and we will get over it” (CNBCAfrica, 2011). How to get over this ‘setback’ was not disclosed, however, on 31 December 2011, the President declared a state of emergency in fifteen Local Government

55 Areas (LGA) across the states of Borno, Niger, Plateau, and Yobe. Furthermore, he ordered the closing of the borders with neighbouring Chad and Niger and introduced a curfew in several other states (Comolli, 2015, p. 112). By closing the borders, the government attempted to prevent Boko Haram members from fleeing into neighbouring countries as well as receiving reinforcements of foreign jihadi elements in the region (Solomon, 2012, p. 7). Under the state of emergency, the additional powers that are granted to authorized security personnel include provisions that pertain to the detention of suspects, the taking of possession or control of any property in the emergency area, the entry and search of any premises, and the payment of compensation and remuneration to people affected by the order. A declared state of emergency is in force for a period of six months, as determined in the constitution, but can be extended by a National Assembly (NA) renewal. The NA, however, did not renew the declaration, therefore President Jonathan officially recognized the ending of the state of emergency and its additional powers on 18 July 2012 (Amnesty International, 2012, p. 8). Although the constitution justifies extraordinary measures to be taken in order to restore peace and security during a state of emergency, the JTF is accused of impinging citizens’ human rights and freedoms on a large scale during and even after the state of emergency. During the six-month state of emergency, JTF has embarked arbitrary mass arrest, detention, and extra-judicial killing of suspected individuals (Sampson, 2015, p. 38). Given the fact that Boko Haram’s stronghold is located in northeast Nigeria, which borders Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, the federal government got increasingly worried about Boko Haram attracting new members and weapons from these countries, which were easily transported across numerous miles of porous and unchecked borders. Therefore, the government decided to repatriate foreigners, which was executed by the Nigerian immigration services. As at 28 February 2012, after six months of aggressive crackdowns on illegal immigrants, 11,000 foreigners, most of whom coming from Chad and Niger, were repatriated (Vanguard, 2012). Together with these repatriation efforts, the government decided to close parts of the country’s northern borders in February and to set up intelligence missions in both Mali and Niger, for the purpose of creating a better grasp of the security situation in the Sahara-Sahel region. Furthermore, security forces received additional training in both counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations, in terms of close-quarters combat, amphibious operations, tactical information, urban warfare, civil-military relations and so on (Onuoha, 2014, p. 176). Although amnesty for Boko Haram members was still considered, a large JTF operation took place between 19 and 26 April in Northeastern Baga. The operation left

56 approximately 187 people dead (Mantzikos, 2014, p. 77). On 14 May 2013, president Jonathan declared a second state of emergency. This time, it applied to the entire states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe, an area (155,000 square kilometres) almost four times the size of The Netherlands (Comolli, 2015, pp. 120-123). Three days after the declaration, another JTF operation is launched in the Northeast, due to recent territory loss to Boko Haram (Mantzikos, 2014, p. 77). In August 2013, three months after the second state of emergency was declared, the JTF was replaced by a newly created Army 7th Infantry Division, which meant that Nigeria’s counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations shifted from a multi-agency effort towards a solely military operation (Omonobi, 2013). Furthermore, the National Assembly issued the six-moths extension of the ongoing state of emergency, due to Boko Haram’s adaptability and resilience (Comolli, 2015, p. 128). The Army 7th Infranty Division was headquartered in the heart of Boko Haram territory, in Maiduguri. Meanwhile, another division was headquartered in Adamawa State. Despite these deployments of entire divisions, the military could not prevent Boko Haram from seizing territory and conquer villages in the region. On several occasions, they even had to retreat across the border with Cameroon (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2015, p. 40). However, some successes were achieved as well. During the first three months of 2014, the military succeeded in killing and arresting many Boko Haram members, while more or less containing the violence in the states to which the state of emergency applied. But then, in April, the kidnapping of over 200 schoolgirls in Chibok took place (Comolli, 2015, p. 130). This event immediately diminished whatever optimistic belief was present at the time. The military approach, as holds for the previously discussed years, had again not resulted in the desired effects. In terms of the military approach to the Boko Haram insurgency, the tide was changed in 2015. Due to a number of factors, actual sustainable results were achieved. Firstly, the formation of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF), a cooperation between regional partners Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, had led to significant gains of territory previously held by Boko Haram. Basically, the sect was pushed back to the Sambisa Forest in Borno State. The retaking of villages in the North meant, inter alia, the freeing of thousands of people who had been living under Boko Haram control (Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, 2016, p. 43). These developments, specifically Boko Haram’s loss of territory, essentially meant the end of the sect being able to mount large-scale conventional attacks on centres of communication and populations. Instead, they now had to fall back on using non-conventional tactics such as suicide bombings, which they had carried out multiple

57 times in previous years. Late December 2015, President Buhari stated: “Nigeria has technically won the war against Islamist Boko Haram militants” (BBC News, 2015). Secondly, the involvement of South-African mercenaries has been of critical influence to the 2015 turning point of Nigeria’s battle with Boko Haram. Highly trained veterans from South-Africa, using a tactic called ‘relentless pursuit’, were able to put Boko Haram in the defensive. Contrary to the conventional Nigerian military forces, these mercenaries knew how to engage in the type of war or insurgency, such as the one in (Northern) Nigeria (Falode, 2016, p. 45). Thirdly, however far less important than the former two factors, since Buhari took office as president, the increased allocation of resources to fight Boko Haram as well as the change of military leadership, contributed to the military’s advancement, according to the military itself (Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, 2016, p. 43).

Most of the reports used in this thesis do not cover the year 2016. However, to give an impression of the current status of the insurgency, and the military responses to it, some examples of events, derived from news sources, is used. After having been pushed back into the Sambisa Forest in 2015, Nigerian military forces aim at ending the sect’s existence there. General Abubakar stated in February 2016: “What is left is Sambisa Forest. That is the last battle ground with the insurgents (…) We have decimated Boko Haram. This is the reality” (Nathaniel, 2016). As of 9 June 2016, again according to sources within the military, the remaining Boko Haram members are trapped in the forest, completely surrounded by the military (Yuliia, 2016). However, just a week earlier, while being ‘technically defeated’, to recall President Buhari’s exact words, Boko Haram is far from eliminated. On 3 June 2016, hundreds of Boko Haram members attacked Nigerien soldiers in the town of Bosso, close to the border with Nigeria. They managed to kill 32 soldiers, the response of the MNJTF reportedly killed many Boko Haram fighters, which eventually led to the retaking of Bosso. However, two days later, Boko Haram launched yet another attack and defeated the military forces that were present (Back, 2016). In light of Buhari’s claims, this event of a conventional attack on security forces proves otherwise. Furthermore, it seems that the surrounded sect members in Sambisa Forest are far from the only ones left.

58 7.5 Comprehensive response to Boko Haram– a draft of Nigeria’s National Counter- Terrorism Strategy

So far, this thesis has discussed a variety of different responses to Boko Haram as undertaken by successive Nigerian governments. The abovementioned events of 2016 could have been the logical ending of the story. However, one more element is to be addressed: Nigeria’s draft of the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST), which constitutes the country’s initiative towards a comprehensive response. The subject is interesting for two reasons. Firstly, it constitutes the country’s first attempt to address the Boko Haram insurgency in a combined effort of different responses. Secondly, after an enthusiastic round of presentations made by government officials, the draft has somehow disappeared and little is known about its current existence, let alone implementation. The discussed issue below pertains to 2013/2014, prior to recent military successes. By 2014, the variety of responses of subsequent Nigerian governments to Boko Haram that are analysed so far, had neither resulted in an improved security situation in Northern Nigeria nor the elimination of the sect. Negotiations and amnesty talks on the on hand, heavy- handed military operations on the other hand, had all proven to be mostly ineffective. The military approach that had dominated Nigeria’s campaign against Boko Haram, suffered from, inter alia, popular distrust of the JTF, corrupt politicians and security officers, and extra- judicial killings. These are some but by far not all factors that contributed to its failure (Forest J. J., 2012, pp. 90-92). The constant alternation between different responses illustrates the government’s overall ‘flip-flop’ approach (Agbiboa, 2013a, p. 14). Moving from the Amnesty Committee to the deployment of a large military force within just one month (April – May 2013) well exemplifies this inconsistency. The government then decided, that in order to effectively deal with Boko Haram, a more sophisticated and comprehensive approach was needed, one that combines multiple elements of counter-terrorism responses (Dasuki, 2015, p. 2). The NSA, established by the 2013 legislative amendment, was granted the responsibility to “…ensure the effective formulation and implementation of a comprehensive counter- terrorism strategy for Nigeria…” (Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013, 2013, pp. 4-5). The NSA created the Counter Terrorism Centre (CTC), which housed the Joint Terrorism Analysis Branch (JTAB) and the Behavioural Analysis and Strategic Communication Unit. CTC coordinator Major General Sarkin Bello designed Nigeria’s long- awaited National Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The NACTEST was intended to serve as a

59 sophisticated approach that would complement the original military approach, or as NSA director Dasuki stated: “…the military would continue to battle the insurgents (…) but the government was also set to use a carrot and stick approach” (AFP, 2014). The NACTEST is inspired by the best practices of other countries, such as the UK, the US, Singapore, Indonesia, and Turkey. Its purpose is to clearly define the roles and responsibilities of ministries, departments and agencies, as well as the civil society. Its primary target, according to Dasuki, was to prevent people from becoming terrorists in the first place. This ‘prevent’ programme consisted of four strands, as presented by Dasuki in Abuja on 14 March 2014: 1) prison-based de-radicalization run by the Ministry of the Interior; 2) counter-radicalization through community engagement, the building of societal resilience against extremist views, and education, accompanied by a Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Programme; 3) strategic communication training for both law enforcement and military personnel, civil servants, public relations and media reporters; and finally 4) the economic revitalization plan for northern states in order to alleviate poverty and thereby addressing one of the perceived root causes of Boko Haram terror (Dasuki, 2014; Comolli, 2015, p. 139). However, since Jonathan lost the elections and NSA Dasuki was arrested over an alleged arms fraud (BBC News, 2015), little has been heard of the promising plans that were formulated in the NACTEST. Perhaps more importantly, recent military wins against Boko Haram give little reason to embark on the more difficult approaches, such as counter- radicalization and de-radicalization, of which the strategy consists.

8 CONCLUSION

The central research question that is pivotal in this thesis was: How have successive Nigerian governments dealt with Boko Haram between 2009 and 2016? This chapter provides an answer to this question.

From 2009 until 2016, the Nigerian government has attempted to tackle the Boko Haram insurgency in various ways. Over the course of these years, the use of force has dominated the government’s approach. President Goodluck Jonathan had declared a state of emergency twice, in northern areas of the country. The first one lasted from December 2011 until July 2012, the second one lasted from May 2013 until November 2014. During these states of

60 emergency, countless military operations have been initiated. In between the states of emergency, both negotiations and the issue of granting amnesty were considered multiple times. However, before a deal was even proposed to Boko Haram, Shekau already rejected it, since he believed there was nothing Boko Haram had done that would require an amnesty. In fact, he found, it should be the other way around. If an amnesty programme was to be introduced, it would be Boko Haram granting amnesty to the government, for their years of atrocities against Muslims. Negotiations with Boko Haram, as far as these sporadically occurred, and as far as these have become public knowledge, proved to be another impossible endeavour. Firstly, the sect’s demands and the interests of the Nigerian government are simply irreconcilable. Secondly, not one single individual appears to be in control of the entire cluster of factions affiliated to Boko Haram, something which reduces the likelihood of effective negotiation. Thus, after amnesty and negotiations failed, again mainly military interventions were conducted during the second state of emergency. The analysis of this thesis shows that the responses of successive Nigerian governments have predominantly been military responses. The first hypothesis stated: The persistence of the Boko Haram sect is caused by Nigerian governments’ neglect for underlying grievances in society; this neglect decreases the effectiveness of the governments’ overall response to Boko Haram. Underlying grievances in society are mostly neglected, or are at least lacking adequate measures. In particular the economic disparities between North and South, a lack of justice for targeted religious communities (both Christian and Muslim) after Boko Haram attacks, and insufficient attention to the issue of IDPs, give the impression that successive Nigerian governments have mainly dealt with the specific issue of fighting Boko Haram on the battlefield rather than with the more structural problems that confront the Nigerian society. Whether this neglect has fuelled the Boko Haram insurgency and its terrorist activities and enabled it to persist, is not concluded on the basis of the observed data. Statistics on public support for the cause of Boko Haram are unavailable, which makes it impossible to draw a connection between grievances and support. More importantly, Boko Haram has always been diffuse about its actual objectives. One might say the overall objective is to overthrow the Nigerian government and impose Sharia law throughout the country. Fighting grievances of the Nigerian society is not observed as an actual objective of the sect, therefore a connection between their terrorist campaign and those grievances is also unclear. Because of these considerations, the first hypothesis is rejected. The same goes for the relationship between this neglect and the effectiveness of the overall response to Boko Haram. Because, in terms of effectiveness, the tables turned in 2015, and not due to an

61 increased attention to underlying grievances. Mainly due to the involvement of South-African mercenaries and the formation of and cooperation within a Multi-National Joint Task Force, the military approach eventually yielded significant results. This led Buhari to claim, by the end of 2015, that Boko Haram was “technically defeated”. According to military sources, as of 9 June 2016, the sect has been trapped in the Sambisa Forest, surrounded by armed forces which have called the area the ‘last battle ground’ of the Boko Haram insurgency. However, the large-scale attack in Bosso, Niger, launched by hundreds of Boko Haram members on 4 June 2016, gives reason to suspect the actual last battle ground has yet to be identified. However, before 2015, the one-sided and predominantly military approach had clearly proven to be insufficient for the purpose of decreasing the Boko Haram threat, let alone eliminating it, several other initiatives have been undertaken. In both 2011 and 2013, Nigeria’s counter-terrorism legislation was strengthened, or newly introduced, by one principal act and its amended successor. Furthermore, in 2014, a softer and more sophisticated approach to countering Boko Haram was introduced by the NSA: NACTEST. Containing various elements of counter-terrorism options, one might interpret this move as a step in the right direction. It involved community engagement, de-radicalization programmes, and even plans to revive the northern economy, a presumed breeding ground for terrorism in the region, were included. Although this strategy was based on best practices from abroad, and was presented with great enthusiasm and high expectations, little is known about its implementation, let alone its effectiveness. The second hypothesis stated: The large and brutal military operations performed by the Nigerian armed forces, especially in Maiduguri, in July 2009 have been counterproductive; they contributed to Boko Haram resurfacing stronger and more violent than ever before in April/May 2010. Without absolute certainty, the developments that followed the Battle of Maiduguri give reason to believe that due to the military operations in July 2009, the Boko Haram sect evolved into a greater and more powerful threat than before. Members and leaders who found shelter abroad, connected and trained with foreign jihadist organizations, as a result of which they acquired new and more deadly terrorist techniques. Besides, the extra-judicial killing of Yusuf arguably caused the more extreme members to take over the sect, reshaping its identity and intensifying (the nature of) its activities. These considerations lead to the acceptance of this hypothesis, and thus to the acceptance of the crucial negative role Nigeria’s military crackdown played in the development of Boko Haram between July 2009 and April/May 2010.

62 To conclude, the responses of successive Nigerian governments to Boko Haram are best typified as inconsistent, or as Agbiboa strikingly stated a ‘flip-flop’ approach. Different responses have been tried over the years 2009 to 2016, none of them yielded satisfying results, arguably because of a general lack of commitment to one (or a combination of) chosen approach(es). This is best seen in the example of April/May 2013, when the government shifted within a month from considering amnesty towards the declaration of the second state of emergency. In the meantime, little attention is paid to underlying grievances in society, which gives little hope for the future. In case the recent military successes are extended and ultimately lead to the defeat of Boko Haram, these grievances might still be a ‘water’ for other terrorist organizations to swim in.

63 9 RECOMMENDATION

As long as fundamental issues, such as the high (youth) unemployment rates, poor education in Northern Nigeria, and economic disparities between the North and the South, are not adequately addressed by durable, consistent, and fair government policies, the recent successes against Boko Haram may not be enjoyed for too long. Also, inter-religious tolerance, indigene / settler disputes, corruption, respect for basic human rights, belong to a list of subjects that the Nigerian government needs to prioritize, alongside its military campaign against Boko Haram. These issues, if managed correctly, decrease support for terrorist causes. If neglected, even if Boko Haram will be defeated in the (near) future by a cooperation of Lake Chad region’s military forces and special units of mercenaries, it will just be a matter of time until a next generation of violent insurgents takes advantage of the chaotic situation in Nigeria, by exploiting deeply rooted fault lines of ethnicity and religion.

10 DISCUSSION

This thesis has proven to be a real challenge from start to finish. Especially due to the complex natures of Nigeria as a country and Boko Haram as a sect, and the difficulties that I confronted in terms of obtaining reliable, valid, and comprehensive data regarding all that has happened and that is still going on, writing about the particular topic of government responses to Boko Haram was all but an easy task. This may also be due to the relative lack of initial knowledge about the topic of this thesis. I had hoped to bridge some of the knowledge gaps and difficulties by conducting two interviews with experts in the field, however after all was said and done, I must admit that these interviews have not yielded the desired results. Despite these difficulties, I have not lost my interest in Nigeria in general and Boko Haram in particular and I will certainly try to keep myself well-informed of the developing situation.

64

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73 Appendix A Interview Dr. A. Akinyoade – Senior Researcher at African Studies Centre 26 April 2016

What are the main sources of conflict in present-day Nigeria? It is difficult to say, because each conflict can manifest different causes. Or, as the conflict continues for a while, then other factors start to come into play. Take for an instance in Jos, there was… Nigeria is made up of many ethnic communities, ethnic nationalities so to speak. So take for example somewhere in Jos, where a particular ethnic group has been living for a while. This particular ethnic group, or like all Nigerians, you will hardly find a vegetarian Nigerian. We all love to eat meat. So you have the Fulani, that’s a cattle (…), but they are nomadic, they are always on the move. Whenever they get to a place where they think the market for their cows is okay, then they settle down a bit. And then they sell cow meat or cows. Once that is established, then there is always a kind of feedback to maybe other Fulani communities. I’m just giving examples. It seems the meat market here is good! So over time, you see that maybe it was initially one Fulani man for example, then over time it grows into a small community, doing their meat business. Because of course, the other ethnic group that lives their permanently loves eating meat. But then, Nigeria has always been governed, there was a period of military rule, then democratic rule. It keeps changing. In that changing in governance, something developed. And what developed was, that when an area, a land area, a location, when 180.000 people live in there, then such an area can get what we call Local Government Administration. And the Local Government Administration receives direct funding from the central government. So we have three levels of government. We have the national, we have the state, and then local governments. But you can demand for the creation of the local government, if you think “oh we in this area now we’re up to 180,000”. So you see that over time, local government areas have been increasing in Nigeria. So, then contestations start. For instance that, the original people who live here, they own the land, and then the immigrants, for example the meat sellers, are going to settle in that area and say: ‘we are renting this land from you’. But over time such people, also grow to that 180,000 and they start demanding for the creation of local government. So the first fight is this. The first fight is that, the original settlers will not be happy. Because once you create a local government out of the existing local government, then you are cutting away funding to the original local government. And that happens throughout Nigeria? In many cases. In the North, in the South, it is there. So, when you see, initially it may not necessarily be a bad idea. It can be

74 accepted or rejected. Rejected because, well, I mean you are not original settlers here, we only lend you the land. So, please go back to where you come from and go create a local government there. So that is where the first manifestation of conflict occurs. But secondly, we can accommodate you. If you promise, if you show that you can support the political party that is already in place. And if you cannot, then it becomes a problem. And politicians also play on that. For example, they can go to the settler community, and say ‘hey, if you vote for me, I will make sure local government is created’. Otherwise, please go. So that is where most conflicts start from, most conflicts. But that would be between ethnically defined groups, because you mentioned the Fulani? Not necessarily, I mentioned the Fulani because they are typical nomadic people rearing cattle. And we all love meat. So in a way you can’t send them away, in another way you cannot accommodate that. So there is always a tension. And we have to be careful here, because once a politician, either local or state or national, starts to play on that rift because they want to gain votes, then it is a problem. That are the first sources of conflict, in many cases in Nigeria. Now, Fulanis by tradition are Muslims. Where most of the places they always go to, they are Christians. So again, people say it is all a Christian- Muslim thing, but at the background of it all is the idea that we need separate independent administration, local administration. So there are manifestations of ethnicity. But, underneath it all, is an issue of who gets hand on the local resources, who gets hand on the money that is transferred from the central government. That is the thing. So, it is always a bit tricky when you hear in the foreign press, even the local press, from lazy journalists sometimes, when you hear “oh Christians are fighting the Muslims”. It is perhaps more easily to divide between Muslims and Christians? Because then you wouldn’t have to dig deeper into background issues? That is, when you look at most conflicts in Nigeria, even from the place where I live, where my parents lived, in Osun State in the South, because I want to bring in the issue of ethnicity you mentioned. We are both Yorubas. But, the local politicians played on the intelligence of the settlers, they said: “look, if you vote for us, we will make sure to create local government for you”. Then the original guys said: “no, we lend you this land. So if you’re not going to vote for us, for our party, then go”. But these guys had been living there for sixty, seventy years. Where would they go to, honestly? But the point is, that because there are still renting the land, they are not really the owners of the land, that puts them in a precarious situation. That okay, here my father rented the land to you, but I need the land now so go. So it creates issues of internally displaced persons. Apart from the fight, the shootings an things like that, it also leads to internal displacement. Not because of the fighting, but because they don’t have access to this land, and if the original guys need the land now, the

75 settlers have to go. So you are also mentioning a certain struggle for resources? Struggle for resources, though they would not call it a struggle for resources because, I mean if you come here now and we’ve been on this table and all of a sudden we realize that maybe this place has been booked, to be used for a meeting, we just have to leave. It is not a struggle. The original people who booked this want to use it. So that is the informal way of perpetuating conflict, perpetuating internal displacement. So in a way it is: “thanks, your lease is over, please go”. But beneath it all, is the fact that because politically, you want to be independent.

About religion, roughly half the population is said to be Muslim and the other half Christian, with some who are also pursuing some more indigenous religious beliefs. How would you describe the role of religion in Nigerian society? Does it determine people’s daily lives? Yes, in many ways. Sometimes it does, in the private sphere it does. In the public sphere it also does, whether it is Christian or Muslim. It never used to be the case. At least in the South-West where I grew up. It never used to be the case. Ideally Nigeria is divided in three geographical areas: the North, the Southwest and Southeast. So, in the 1950s, ten years before independence, the Southwest groups started the Free Education program, irrespective of your gender, age, or religion. You were entitled to free education. Over the years, also this was copied in the Southeast. It helped in developing a group of skillful people, educated people. While the North did not to that. What I’m trying to bring in is that over the years, there was a lack of influence of religion. Because we all had access, in the South, to education. There was no discrimination whether you were Christian, Muslim, or what have you. So, the main problem came when mismanagement set in and then there was, what are called mission schools, the religious mission schools, whether it is Christian whether it is Muslim. It gained more ground that you’d rather prefer to go a Christian school or a Muslim school. I’m a Christian, most of my family are Christians, some are also Muslim. But my aunt, who is a Christian, was admin of a Muslim primary school. I mean, that was no problem at all. But when mismanagement in the general sense, money was not getting down anymore, to local government, it was stolen and things like that, then some religious institutions started giving preferences to give an education for instance to their own group. They decided to take up the responsibility of education for themselves? For themselves. We have many universities, we have so many universities started by religious institutions. And some of the religious institutions would determine that ‘okay this is our code of conduct’, not necessarily saying ‘this is religious’ but at the time you look at the code of conduct then you see this is what the

76 Muslims or Christians will ask for. For instance that Muslims say you have to dress this way, and of course a Christian would not go to that school, wanting to put on veils. So, religion in the public sphere, you find it like that. And in the private sphere, of course I mean this is across West-Africa not just Nigeria, people are highly religious. There is a belief in God, there is a belief that God directs many, in fact all the things you achieve. In the private sphere, religion is of big importance. And in the public sphere it used to be not an issue? Not an issue! And this mismanagement you spoke of, when did that start? It started kicking in, I think the turning point was around 1979/1980. The military had ruled up to 1979, despite the fact that people always complain about dictatorships, but really the military were the ones who put in place the structures we were talking about: access to schools, access to public services, trying to equalize society. The military put this in place. But the military was lucky because there was an increase in price of oil, so they could do many things, construct many things, you could be anywhere you wanted without any problem. But, by 1979 the price of oil started going down, and that was the time of the transition from military to civilian government. And the civilian government that came in, honestly, were not prepared to handle the situation. So they kept spending the way we used to spend, when there was money. But, they started accumulating debts. On top of that is also the issue of mismanagement, stealing money and things like that, so it was really a turning point. As to religion in the private sphere, that was standard all over time. But this turning point caused religion to enter the public sphere as well, like schools.

To what extent are conflicts and clashes in Nigeria related to religion, so purely on the religious justification that someone or a group attacks one of another religion? No I mean really, of that are few instances. But many conflicts actually are problems of resource, management of resources, access to resources. Would you then say that religion was used to gather support? So not a religious affair, but along religious lines certain groups could gather support of more followers? Exactly, yes. It was in the 80s my mom’s sister was the admin of a Muslim primary school, and she is a total Christian. I mean, there was no problem regarding that.

Since the return to civilian rule in 1999, how would you in general describe the subsequent governments’ approaches to conflicts in the country between religious communities? Or between other communities, for instance in the case of settlers versus indigenes? Have they

77 stayed away from those conflicts, or have they tried to directly interfere by imposing policies? In matter of policies we cannot really say, but what we see… I cannot for now talk of any clear policy on the ground. But what we can see is implementation. And sometimes because there is no pattern, to this implementation of interventions, then you might actually see maybe there is no policy. For instance.. First, in general, Obasanjo is a military man, so his own approach, his action, is force. He knows command, he knows how to give orders. So his approach has been heavy-handed.

Are you familiar with the four streams that form the National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST), introduced in 2014 by former National Security Adviser Dasuki? If yes, to what extent do you see empirical evidence of the soft intentions that are formulated on paper, which should complement the predominantly military approach? I’m not familiar with the strategy, but do you have the streams for instance? Yes, the streams are counter-radicalization through community engagement, including the Countering Violent Extremism program. That’s one. Then, de-radicalization of already convicted or suspected terrorists. Strategic communications training. Finally, economic revitalization plan presented by President Jonathan. Do you have any insights regarding this plan’s existence or were these just nice words on paper? I’ve not been to that section. I’ve only talked with people that.. I was in Finland lately at a meeting, I talked with some people from Borno State, from the university who are working there and I discussed with them a few things. That strategy you talked about, those four points, I don’t know. But one thing I know, they try to do even though you may not have it in a central database, is to de-radicalize those that have been convicted. They go to prisons, try to talk and counsel and do many things like that. Yes, that has been ongoing, even though maybe not on a scale we would love it to be. But, apart from that, nothing else. Really, the economic opportunities have been there, for instance for those who went to school in Saudi Arabia and Libya. And came back. And they found jobs to do, but they were trained in the Nigerian industry. There would be no fight with. Because basically that is why the Muslims and the Christians in the South are not fighting. We all have access to the same schools, to the same jobs, there was no discrimination of this and that. So, if that was then the North, probably there would have been no Boko Haram. There would be no contestations against that kind of education. Two, countering violent extremists. The average cleric produces CDs. You just do some recordings and put your picture on the CDs, and sell it to people. Nigeria is a large consumer market for religious

78 ideas. So there have been many like that. Some who even would twist what the Bible says, twist what the Quran says. Put it on paper, print it, sell it. Some get support, even from outside, from Senegal, from Saudi Arabia, like you said, to make such things. Those are not government initiatives right? No! Because one of the elements of this CVE program, was that the government would select certain clerics whom they deemed were fit to propagate the right message of religion. Exactly, and that is where I’m going that, for individual clerics, no matter how small or big, to try to come at religious markets for themselves, nothing was done to counter it. And you need to realize, numerous CDs and publications are around. There was no organized effort by government to regulate such publications. So if I understand you correctly, those CDs and other exclamations of religious messages were already so overwhelmingly present, that initiatives now formulated by the government in 2014 was too little too late? Because people already had those messages, but them from nongovernmental sources? Too little too late! But again, even in the formally organized segment there was no rule that says “okay this kind of thing, school services you can provide”. Also there was nothing that said: “okay these kinds of publications you can make, the kind of CDs you can make”. There was no commission to regulate what is central public consumption. But all of it comes from the constitution, because we have space to do that, as individuals. Religion is the private domain. So, if I put anything on CD, and share with my friend, then you cannot do something about it. Then it is actually quite strange, because the previous government (Jonathan) wanted to interfere in religious affairs, although the constitution says the government should not? Exactly, and the day you try this, you will start seeing cases in court. “Why are you affecting my religious fundamental rights?”. So the only easier thing to do, in those four streams you mentioned, is to say okay: “those of you we have arrested, we can speak to you”. At least, in the confined zone of a prison, we can counsel you. Between four walls. Those other efforts, I can’t verify them and you can’t? Yes, you wonder whether they are existing. Can you think of some other soft elements that are used in the past or now, apart from military crackdowns? Well, education really always has been the key. Access to, I mean if you can put it loosely, Western education, access to the formal job system. Whether you want to work in industries… It is not what you learned in Quran that will give you a job in industries. A good example I always give is, when I wanted to go do my masters, to study Statistics Demography in the University of Ghana, two of us wanted to go, who were given funding to do it. But the University of Ghana rejected the other guy, because he had BA, Bachelor in Arabic. But in normal Nigerian situation, they would have wanted someone from the North and from the South. So my profile fitted perfectly to what the university of Ghana

79 wanted. And despite the money, I believed, the University of Ghana could not accept this other guy, because there was no way this guy with BA Arabic could function in a highly statistical environment. So they rejected him, internationally, they rejected him. Yet, this guy came back, got angry. Went to Obada’s office, complained a little bit and he asked a job in the Nigerian Central Bank. BA Arabic. So, education… So in that respect, putting somebody with BA Arabic in a highly statistical institution like the Central Bank of Nigeria with economic policies and things like that, how will he fit, how will he work? No way. But because of the federal character principle, he was allowed to go. And it should have been a wake up sign for the Nigerian government, that somebody we nominated was not accepted in international circles. The education in the North won’t help, despite attending university, but it was just BA Arabic. At that time they could have changed, those were missed opportunities actually. But they didn’t do anything.

In December 2015, President Buhari claimed BH was technically defeated and could no longer mount conventional attacks on security forces and population centers. How do you assess this statement, because he has been criticized for this statement for being too optimistic? No but it is true, the statement is a fact. The military understands this. Conventional attack means mounting the big force that they used to do, go into fights and win, conquer and hold land. Boko haram cannot do that. In the course of last year, Boko Haram really was, the territory they were in control of has shrunk. Before they were able to hold territory, but now they couldn’t. They have been degraded massively and actually pushed to a very small area. That’s why they are fleeing across borders. The fact that they can launch attacks in Cameroon, around Lake Chad and all those areas again, which also brings, when you asked the question on causes of conflict. In that sector, if you look at the map of Lake Chad, you see that Lake Chad has been shrinking in size. It used to be very big, 41,000 square kilometers or something. Lake Chad is so small now. But this is a boundary that was shared by.. the lake was shared by four countries: Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, and Chad. As desertification was shrinking Lake Chad, as dams were being built on rivers, stopping water flowing into Lake Chad, as agricultural practices around Lake Chad started sucking water away from Lake Chad, Lake Chad started to shrink. As Lake Chad was shrinking, you found that you thought initially “you’re living here, the water used to be here, the water shrunk to this point. Then again you move and build your house here”. And all of a sudden, people were entering into each other’s boundaries and contesting for access to the limited water remaining for fishing,

80 for many things, which are also resources. That caused more problems than Boko Haram. So sometimes, there have been attacks, here and there. Sometimes it also more about “you came here to steal our fish, you’re not supposed to be here”. These are things we need to consider. This is one of the immediate factors of many of the clashes we have been seeing, along with access to water for irrigation.

If you had to come up with a solution, where would you begin? Where to begin for me always is education. Give access to education. I mean we have, population size has been increasing. Especially population of the youths. More people have been born, even in conflict zones. Government still needs to invest heavily in the provision of education, also in conflict zones. What will provision of education do? It will ensure that those that are coming up, are actually trained in what life is supposed to be, via education. Whether it is mathematics, English, physics, chemistry, biology, agriculture or other subjects. People in school will spend the next ten years of their lives in school. It happens anywhere in the world, basic education, secondary education. Solid ten years. So, you already have this scheme that makes everybody quiet. Give everybody equal access to that schooling system. Set up the facilities. It requires investment, it requires money. And if it’s rejected by the population, because of previous bad records and disappointments of those left out? It won’t be rejected. It was the style. What was provided in the North, was different from what was provided in the South. The types of education was what caused the problem, I mean people are learning Islamic religious studies, learning memorizing the Quran. To do what? You cannot memorize Quran and then expect to earn wages, no, those you can do as part time. I mean in Southern Nigeria we have religious studies, whether Islam. We have Islamic Religious Studies and Biblical Religious Studies, but they’re optional courses, they’re optional subjects in schools. They are not compulsory. Because you need to learn things that will give you access to jobs, in the formal structure that we have. So, people went to school in the South, not having religion as the central focus. You do not learn the Bible, it is optional if you want to do it. Just one course of an entire collection of subjects. In the North, it is the main part. So, renew the syllabus in the North, the curricula for education, to have subjects that equip people with skills. Do you think that should be the primary task of the federal government, to lift the educational programs in the North to the same level as in the South? Yes. Because, at the beginning of this interview, you talked about the free education program and that it was implemented in the South. Why wasn’t that the case in the North? They refused, because.. Nigeria was divided in three zones, three regions. And each region

81 had a governor, there was a president in the center. But the regions, whatever money they made from their resources, the region is entitled to spend 50 per cent of that money on whatever they think is good for their own development. So the Southwest, for instance, spent that entire money on education. They were selling coco, they spent it on education. The Southeast was selling palm oil, 50 per cent went to the central government, the other 50 per cent was spent on education. In fact, the budget for education in the Southwest was 80 per cent, every year. When the students were getting promoted, there were few universities. And again, the Southwest spent money on establishing universities. The North, nobody knows what they did, I’m telling you. Now, the problem started in 1966, around the time that oil was discovered in commercial quantities in the Southeast, in the Delta. And the question was that, wait a minute, we used to say 50 per cent. These guys now start making 50 per cent from crude oil. So they [the federal government] changed the percentages, until that percentage that you can spend in your region actually got as low as three per cent. Usually it was 50 per cent, and it went down to three. They [the federal government] said “no guys, this money from oil will skew things, always put that money in the center so that the president in the center will now determine, let’s do this here, let’s do that program there”. Unfortunately, those in the center started stealing the money. That’s part of the corruption in the federal center. You sell oil, fine, but transfer most of the money to the center. It used to be 50 per cent, that the regions could spend for themselves, when it was just commodities: coco, palm oil, nuts. Usually 50 per cent, but when oil came.. I mean if you sell oil in one day, you will get the entire coco money for one year. But even despite the decline in the income to the Southern states, there was still a commitment to education. And that is where you find a difference in the industrial development in the North and the South. That, Southern areas are more industrially developed. One, because of the resources. Two, because the people to work in the factories are there. They are trained. So why do you want to go and set up your company in the North when there is nobody fit to work for you there? When you even do set it up in the North, most people that work there, are Southerns. So, for me the issues. Give education, give it in a way that is useful to the Northern people. So they can catch up? So they can catch up, it will take time. And again, thank you for mentioning that word catch-up, it was when they found out that it would be difficult, the South already built 20 years of experience ahead of the North. Of manpower. That was when the military in the 1980s started destroying really, the educational system in the South. They started stifling universities of funds in the South. Because by the 80s, the only person that actually had money, was the central federal government. So instead of giving the money, they actually stopped it now. So education

82 became less free in the South, people started paying to go to schools. But people could pay to go to school because they saw the advantages of schools. So that’s the first thing, so give the schooling system new curricula in the conflict areas. Secondly, you cannot rely on federal government for life, for money. So you need to also encourage a system of taxation. First, that addresses the rich people. Not in a punitive way, but in a way that encourages the rich people that “okay, let me also contribute some money to the provision of education”, for example. Provision of hospitals. Make them see the advantages of it and that what they are paying for, they will benefit from it and also the society will benefit from it. It is only after then, you can expand the scope of taxation to the poor citizens. So okay, you cannot get free lunch for life, you also have to contribute something. But, make them see that the rich are contributing so that they are also encouraged to contribute. It’s a process that takes time, but then they invest in their own lives so to speak. Ongoing with this is a reform of the tax administration system. This has been bad in Nigeria, very bad. That is the responsibility of the federal government, to collect taxes? Both, also state governments. So there are always contestations, “oh you are interfering in my area”. So they tax system in Nigeria has been bad. Even non-existent in many areas. So, once you start showing that the rich in these conflict areas are contributing to the provision of public services, then the relatively poor also start buying into it little by little. Use that to expand the development of the tax system, and over time, gradually you are able to buy back the areas that have been lost. There is no magic that you can reach in two years.

Appendix B Interview Dr. D.W.L. Ehrhardt – Assistant Professor at Leiden University College 4 May 2016

In hoeverre acht u de herintroductie of uitbreiding van het Sharia recht in 1999, in conflict met de provisies over staatsreligie die in de constitutie staan? Er is wel een spanning tussen mensen die Nigeria een seculiere staat willen maken, als in, niet zozeer on-religieus, want er zijn eigenlijk geen on-religieuze mensen in Nigeria, maar wel ‘neutraal’. En dat was wel de bedoeling, dat de staat in ieder geval niet een van de twee religies zou vertegenwoordigen. Dat is wel min of meer de bedoeling van de federale constitutie. Maar ja, het punt is dat in die twaalf noordelijke staten, en in ieder geval de staten van het ‘core north’, daar wil gewoon de overgrote meerderheid van de bevolking Sharia, dat is heel simpel. Voor alle rechtsgebieden? Ja hoor, die willen het liefst voor het hele leven denk ik Sharia wetgeving, want daar geloven ze in dat dat de beste wetgeving is die bestaat.

83 Er zit dus inderdaad een zekere tegenstrijdigheid in het feit dat die statelijke overheden religie min of meer, of de islam min of meer tot hun religie maken. En aan de andere kant de federale overheid die zegt dat dat niet kan. Wijst dat op onmacht vanuit centrale regering? Nee wijst op fundamenteel probleem. Het is gewoon heel moeilijk om één staatssysteem te bedenken voor groepen mensen die zo ontzettend verdeeld zijn over hoe die staat ingericht zou moeten worden en het zo fundamenteel oneens zijn met elkaar over wat de basis van die staat zou moeten vormen. Je hebt gewoon één helft die zegt: Sharia zou eigenlijk de basis moeten zijn van onze staat, dat is de beste manier om een staat te organiseren. En dan heb je een Christelijk deel dat soms hele expliciete meningen daarover heeft, vaak vooral vindt dat het niet Sharia zou moeten zijn en dan vooral vindt dat het maar een beetje neutraal zou moeten zijn. Niet seculier of atheïstisch, dat is niet de bedoeling. Eigenlijk staat er impliciet in de constitutie: we zijn seculier. Ja en daar is niemand, seculier is een beetje een vies woord. Ook aangezien bijna iedereen gelovig is. Ja, seculier of atheïstisch echt, dat wil niemand. Een overheid die geen kant kiest, daar zijn wel mensen voor, ook hele weldenkende moslims zijn daar voor. Maar niet op het lokale niveau, waar je dan een absolute meerderheid hebt. Waarom zou je daar dan niet Sharia invoeren? Dat snap ik wel. Als je een absolute meerderheid hebt. En ik denk dat er zelfs nog wel mensen zijn die zeggen ‘ja we hebben wel Shariawetgeving ingevoerd, maar dat betekent niet dat wij nu…’ Kijk feitelijk is nu niet de gouverneur een imam, het is niet zo dat de kerkelijke en statelijke macht ook echt verbonden zijn. Het wetssysteem wat ze op statelijk en lokaal niveau hebben ingevoerd, dat islamitisch is, dus misschien is dat een manier om je er een beetje uit te kletsen. Dat het toch niet echt een religieuze staat is geworden. Want het is niet zo dat de gouverneur een imam is. U zei dat een grote meerderheid van de bevolking achter de Sharia staat. Veel moslims willen Sharia. Dat wil niet zeggen dat ze erachter staan hoe het geïmplementeerd is, maar er zijn wel veel moslims die Sharia willen. Omdat ze denken dat dat goed zou zijn.

U ziet daarin niet dat moslims gediscrimineerd worden, op basis van Shariawetgeving, omdat zij voor eenzelfde misdaad veel strenger gestraft worden dan een Christen of een andere gelovige, die ook helemaal niet naar dat Sharia court hoeft. Omdat die Sharia courts in eerste instantie bedoeld zijn om voor zaken waarin het moslims betreft op te treden? Of nemen ze dat voor lief, want daar is nu eenmaal voor gekozen? Ik heb nog nooit iemand dat horen zeggen, dat wil niet zeggen dat mensen het niet zeggen hoor, maar wat denk ik deels komt door het feit dat je een beetje jezelf als een crimineel neerzet op het moment dat je dit zegt. Omdat je dan zegt: als ik dan voor die rechter sta en ik denk dat de meeste mensen

84 het niet zullen zeggen of niet vanuit gaan dat zij echt voor een crimineel misdrijf voor de rechter komen te staan bij een Sharia court. Want het zijn geen criminelen. Tenminste de meeste mensen met wie ik gepraat heb, zullen dat niet zo gauw zeggen. Die zullen eerder juist andersom zeggen: Shariawetgeving is veel effectiever, het schrikt af tegen die criminelen. Dus dat is goed! Als het al ter sprake zou komen, heb ik het eerder op die manier gehoord dan “het is discriminatie”. Het is wel zo, en ook dat is weer een groot dilemma, dat op allerlei manieren opgelost wordt, waar moet je naartoe? Naar welk court moet jij als moslim maar ook als christen, en voor welk misdrijf en hoe werkt dat dan? Ben je verplicht om als moslim naar een Sharia court te gaan? Is dat een fundamenteel gebrek aan kennis van hoe het werkt? Nee ook wel een gebrek aan duidelijkheid over hoe het zou moeten. Ook een gebrek aan coördinatie in die zin dat de politie is federaal. Voor zover ik weet, als die mensen oppakken, dan sturen ze die niet naar Sharia courts. Volgens mij stuurt de politie ze over het algemeen naar de normale courts, want dat is hun ding, die er gewoon naast blijven bestaan. Volgens mij is dat zo. Hoe dat dan werkt, moet ik eerlijk zeggen, hoe criminele misdrijven bij de Sharia courts terechtkomen weet ik eigenlijk niet. Soms zal de hisba ze oppakken. Maar die hebben geen pistolen hoor, die zullen wel eens iemand oppakken, dat zal inderdaad wel op die manier gebeuren maar of dat alles is weet ik eigenlijk niet.

Wat zijn volgens u de echte gevolgen, behalve die relatie tussen statelijke en federale overheid, van de herintroductie van de Sharia in 1999 tot aan dit moment? Hebben mensen er überhaupt iets van gemerkt, is het geleidelijk verlopen? Of zijn er mensen daadwerkelijk op achteruit gegaan? Zo zijn er spanningen ontstaan die tot heel bloedige clashes hebben geleid tussen christenen en moslims in 2000? Structurele gevolgen? Ik denk dat er sowieso grote verschillen zijn tussen verschillende plekken waar het ingevoerd is. Dus op plekken waar echt een absolute moslimmeerderheid is, is het weer anders dan op plekken waar dat allemaal wat spannender is. Er zijn ook deels daardoor grote verschillen in de mate waarin Sharia is ingevoerd. Op sommige plekken is het serieuzer ingevoerd dan op andere. Al die dingen maken wel uit. In het algemeen heeft het denk ik voor christenen het leven wat spannender gemaakt, in die zin dat die zich wat… of dat op de lange termijn nou ook zo is weet ik niet… maar in ieder geval op de korte termijn was dat wel zo. Kan ik hier nog wel wonen. Is dit noorden nog wel een plek waar ik als christen ook kan zijn? Dus het heeft hun leven denk ik wel onzekerder gemaakt, maar ja, met het voorbehoud dat het toch ook vaak niet zo heel serieus was en het allemaal niet zo gek veel uitmaakt. Soms kwam het ook wel vooral neer op, het oppakken van een vrachtwagen met een stapel bier erin, die

85 flesjes kapot gooien daar een foto van maken en dat in de krant zetten. En soms was het dat. En was er verder voor de lokale christenen niets. Behalve dan de retoriek. Ik denk dat die retoriek een zwaarder effect had. Politici hebben het als een dolle opgepakt, zeker in die eerste jaren afhankelijk van waar. Zeker in Kano bijvoorbeeld, toen Shekarau daar nog de baas was, dat was alleen maar praten over Sharia. Dat is voor christenen niet heel makkelijk geweest. Dat is één. Beetje tegenstrijdig, maar ik denk dat heel veel moslims op de iets langere termijn heel erg gedesillusioneerd zijn geraakt. Mensen hadden natuurlijk enorme hoop en enorm veel optimisme over wat Sharia zou gaan doen. Het zou de politiek minder corrupt maken, het land zou beter af zijn. Het zou allemaal beter worden. En toen bleek dat het eigenlijk niet ingevoerd werd en dat het nog steeds politiek ‘as usual’ was. Wat een deel van de reden is waar Boko Haram uit voortkomt. Uit die onvrede over het feit dat Sharia eigenlijk helemaal niet toegepast werd. Political Sharia, zo werd het wel genoemd. Het was eigenlijk alleen maar retorisch. Dit is wel een heel negatief beeld hoor. Ik denk ook wel dat sommige mensen en dat het op sommige plekken de rechtsgang wat versneld heeft. Ik heb ook wel verhalen gehoord waar zelfs christenen naar Sharia courts gingen voor zakelijke conflicten omdat die veel efficiënter waren en ook daadwerkelijk de straf konden uitvoeren. Dus het hangt erg af van waar je kijkt, maar je zou een verhaal kunnen maken waar in ieder geval op het retorische vlak er onvrede is zowel onder de christenen als onder de moslims, omdat het wel ingevoerd is maar niet goed.

Het schoolsysteem, daar sprak ik met de heer Akinyoade over, hij noemde dat een fundamenteel probleem in zeker het noorden van Nigeria, de almajirai. In hoeverre is dat nou een obstakel voor het ontwikkelen van Nigeria? Wie weet. Punt is, dit weten we niet. Het grote probleem is dat er gewoon niet genoeg goeie opleidingen zijn. Er is gewoon niet genoeg plek. Er zijn namelijk heel veel mensen die hun kind naar een islamiyya school zouden willen sturen. Dat is een school waar je zowel Westerse wiskunde etc. én de koran leert. Er zijn hartstikke veel mensen die dat goed zouden vinden en daar ook echt wel de voordelen van zien. Maar daar zijn er niet genoeg van. En degenen die er zijn, die zijn slecht. Dat is best wel een duister beeld hoor, dat gaat niet zo goed. Ik zou niet zeggen dat de oorzaak is ‘het bestaan van almajirai’, dat mensen daar waarde aan hechten. Ik denk dat voor een heel groot deel ook gewoon nog steeds zo populair is omdat er zo weinig alternatieven zijn. Zou de overheid niet moeten investeren in alternatieven, niet zozeer in die Almajirai omdat dat een doodlopende weg is? Of kunnen kinderen daar echt iets mee worden? Het is wel zo dat Koranopleiding, dat vinden mensen

86 wel belangrijk. Dus een islamitische opleiding, dat je daarin goed geschoold wordt en dat je weet wat de Koran zegt en dat je dat kunt reciteren voor een deel en dat je leert over wat in de haddith allemaal staat en wat je zou moeten doen als goede moslim. Voor moslims is dat wel heel belangrijk. Dus je moet, als je daar onderwijs zou willen aanbieden, moet je dat in ieder geval ook aanbieden. Maar ik denk dat de beste weg vooruit is dus om dat te combineren, met onderwijs dat buiten het spirituele leven ook nuttig is. Want tot nu toe worden die Almajirai scholen niet erkend, die worden niet overzien, niet gesteund? Nee dat is allemaal niet zoveel, dat is gewoon een mallam, zo’n leraar die zitten met een paar jongetjes onder een boom. Die jongetjes wonen bij hem in het huis. Het grootste deel van de tijd, dat was in ieder geval zo, voor veel van die mensen, die krijgen niet echt betaald. Er gaat niet heel veel geld in om. Dus sturen ze die jongetjes de straat op met zo’n plastic bakje, die moeten dan bedelen om hun geld bij elkaar te halen. Dat is zo’n schooltje. Heeft u enig idee hoeveel van dit soort jongens in die Almajirai schooltjes onderwijs krijgen? Honderdduizenden, afhankelijk van waar je bent. In de grote steden zijn het er echt wel veel. Dat zou ik even moeten opzoeken, hoeveel jongens er in Noord-Nigeria wonen. Maar het zijn er echt wel veel. Het is niet het probleem? Kan wel een groter probleem worden, dat is ook waar het HRW rapport van twee weken terug over ging. Dat na BH nog veel vernietigd is van wat er al was aan scholen. Dit is wel een heelg root probleem. Er zijn ontzettend veel kinderen, ouders met heel veel hoop voor al die kinderen. Als die allemaal niks kunnen gaan doen, dat is wel echt een probleem. Enorme visvijver voor nu BH, maar daarna ook voor volgende club? Ja natuurlijk, die mensen moeten allemaal wel iets gaan doen. Die mensen gaan naar grote steden, daar baan zoeken, daar voor overlast zorgen met teveel mensen. Dus dat zou kunnen, dat er radicale bewegingen opstaan die daar op inspelen. Dus dat is allemaal wel heel slecht nieuws. Wat ziet u de federale en statelijke overheden hieraan doen? Je zou kunnen zeggen tweeledig: aan ene kant die scholen zelf proberen te ondersteunen, aan de andere kant het alternatief te verbeteren? Ja ik geloof dat er ook aan allebei wel wat gedaan wordt. Niet zozeer op federaal niveau, voor zover ik weet, maar ik geloof dat er vooral op statelijk niveau wel geïnvesteerd wordt. In beide, maar meer in de islamiyya scholen, daar wordt wel meer aandacht aan gegeven. De wat modernere Islamitische scholen. Maar, er is geen geld op dit moment. Dus alle investeringen liggen plat. Dat is nu even een extra bijkomstige narigheid. Oliegeld is even opgedroogd. Van de laatste vier a zes maanden. Maar men weet echt wel dat dit een groot probleem is, en er zijn ook echt wel politici op lokaal niveau die daar wat aan willen doen, maar nu is het gewoon heel moeilijk omdat er weinig geld is. Hoe de federale overheid omgaat met (militante) religieuze bewegingen. Binnen de Islam heb je talloze kleinere

87 bewegingen die of dit of dat nastreven. Hoe kijk de overheid daar naar? Laten ze die van ‘als jullie je maar gedeisd houden’ dan doen wij niks met jullie? Dat hangt er erg van af wie of waar en welke overheid je bedoelt. Sommige mensen kijken er met argusogen naar. Een aantal van die groeperingen is erg anti-seculiere federale overheid, dus die accepteren echt de overheid niet. En er zijn echt wel veel mensen die binnen de overheid, die dat een groot probleem vinden. En die ook eigenlijk vinden dat die organisaties niet zouden moeten bestaan. Dat is één tak, denk ik. Probleem is natuurlijk altijd dat het heel gevoelig is om er wat tegen te doen, omdat die groepen ook veel steun hebben en ook enorm gevaarlijk iets om je als overheid mee te gaan bemoeien met welke groeperingen er wel of niet mogen bestaan. Meestal als je dat doet leidt dat tot heel nare dingen en dat weten ook veel mensen. Dat is met Boko Haram ook gebeurd. Er zijn ook veel mensen, denk ik, afhankelijk van welke religie… er zijn zeker veel Christenen die echt heel bang zijn voor die radicale/extreme Islamitische groeperingen. Vice versa zijn er ook veel moslims die enorm wantrouwend zijn over die heel extreme Christelijke groepen. Dus over en weer, tussen de religies. En je hebt ook mensen binnen de federale overheid die denken ‘daar gaan wij niet over’. Laat ze het maar lekker uitzoeken. Die religie echt liever binnen de private sfeer willen houden, en dat niet tot hun overheidstaak willen brengen? Als je je ermee gaat bemoeien als overheid, dan zeg je dus eigenlijk als overheid, wij gaan ons mengen in mensen hun persoonlijke levenssfeer? Ja precies, en ik denk dat er ook echt wel mensen zijn die vinden dat religie aan de mensen zelf gelaten moet worden. Maar er is denk ik meer angst dan ik had gedacht onder overheidsmensen voor die groeperingen die de staat verachten. Ik denk dat daar meer wrevel zit, ook onder het leger, die houden niet zo ontzettend van groeperingen die exclusief de staat niet accepteren. En dat hoeft niet per se een religieuze beweging te zijn? Nou dat zijn ze wel vaak, op Biafra na dan. De militante religieuze beweging die centraal staat is Boko Haram. Hoe zou u de algehele benaderingen van de federale overheid naar Boko Haram toe beschrijven, in ongeveer deze periode. In welke periode specifiek? Ik heb het nu over 2009, na die gewelddadige opstand waar Yusuf is omgekomen in gevangenschap, tot 2015. Voor 2009 was het negeren op hier en daar een paar heftige clashes na. Grotendeels ja, het doel was onderdrukken, door gewoon te vechten. Daarna eventjes niks natuurlijk en dan vanaf 2010 toen duidelijk werd dat het echt wel een terroristische beweging is die aanslagen plegen. Maar die militaire onderdrukking was de hoofdmoot. Verslaan. Dus hard militair ingrijpen? Ja en ook wel inlichtingen, dat hoort daar ook bij, maar toch vooral militair. En het opzetten van een CTC, dat valt ook onder die tak van aanpakken? Er is wel gepraat over hearts and minds, er is wel gepraat over amnestieregeling zelfs, er is wel gepraat over het deradicaliseren

88 enz., maar dat is gewoon echt wel moeilijk. In dit soort situaties kunnen ze vooral goed vechten. En ook wel inlichtingen winnen, maar dat leidt toch ook wel vaak tot hard ingrijpen. Dat is gewoon wat de staat doet op zo’n moment. Zit dat er gewoon in, omdat ze daar toch wat ervaring mee hebben in de jaren 80 Maitatsine, keihard neergeslagen succesvol? Het leger is ook echt wel belangrijk, dat is ook wel machtig denk ik. Het is ook makkelijker. Als je een leger hebt dat sterk is, dan kun je dat hier inzetten. Het is veel moeilijker om, wat Amsterdam doet, om van die sleutelfiguren te identificeren en om een heel fijnmazig netwerk te maken van allemaal mensen die jou vertrouwen als overheid. Dat is gewoon best wel lastig voor een overheid die niet heel erg populair is. En die misschien ook wel wat mist in kennis op dat gebied? Ja dat denk ik wel, er worden niet direct voor opgeleid. Het is niet de standaard manier van interveniëren. Dus eigenlijk ziet u een redelijk regelmatige trend van militair ingrijpen en het maar daarmee proberen in te dammen? Ja ze proberen eerst zo’n groep te co-opteren, om het erbij te pakken, om Mohammed Yusuf een deel te maken van de politieke elite. En als dat dan niet lukt, ja dan is het vaak repressie of afkopen. Dat hangt er vanaf. Dat hebben ze met het Zuidelijke, in de Delta gedaan, dat is ook een manier. Dat kan ook. Is wel duur. Dat is duur en het moet kunnen, want je moet partners hebbend ie je kunt vertrouwen, je moet niet al te veel, klinkt gek, maar je moet niet al te veel echt gelovige radicalen hebben. Die gaan, die zijn moeilijker af te kopen. Dat is wat ingewikkelder. Maar ik geloof niet dat dat het probleem was. Er was gewoon veel te weinig vertrouwen tussen BH en de overheid. Ze hebben amnestie aangeboden. Ja die is afgeslagen. En in die periode was Jonathan president en dat is niet iemand met wie BH ooit hd kunnen praten. Die spreekt niet eens dezelfde taal, dat was niet te doen. Als Buhari toen, zeg 8 jaar geleden, de baas was geweest. Wellicht was dat dan wat geweest. Dat station lijkt nu ook gepasseerd, praten. Nou ja wie weet dat er nu op den duur een keer amnestie aankomt, voor de mensen die nog over zijn. Om de laatste daar weg te halen. Buhari is redelijk overtuigd dat ze nu ‘technisch verslagen’ zijn. Ja maar ze zijn nog niet weg. Ze schijnen nog wat dorpjes te hebben, maar het is nu niet meer op die schaal als het geweest is.

Met betrekking tot de NACTEST, in hoeverre denkt u dat dit soort elementen dat mooi op papier staat en mooi is gebracht, ook daadwerkelijk gerealiseerd wordt of al zijn, als daar überhaupt aanwijzingen of bewijs van zijn, van daadwerkelijke implementatie van (een deel van) dit soort plannen? Ik heb er over gehoord en weet dat er over gesproken is. Ik denk wel dat er een serieus besef was dat er iets meer moest, en dat dit misschien ook wel een goeie manier was om dat te doen. Om te vechten tegen BH op een manier die niet alleen maar

89 gewelddadig was. Ik denk dat er toen niet zo gek veel van terecht gekomen is. Ik denk ook dat, als je een beetje leest over dat deradicaliseren, dat is me toch ingewikkeld. Dat is echt een van de moeilijkste dingen om als overheid die de vijand is van die groepering, om dat te organiseren. Dat is echt gewoon moeilijk. In Egypte hebben ze daar wat ervaring mee en in S- A hebben ze daar ook wat ervaring mee. Maar is allemaal heel ‘schaduwig’ over wanneer dat nou werkt en hoe dat werkt en wat dat allemaal is. Dus even buiten of Nigeria het kan, is het gewoon echt heel moeilijk om dat op te zetten. En inderdaad, met de wisseling van de wacht met Jonathan die verdween en Buhari die het overnam zijn er inderdaad ook wat wisselingen geweest binnen de NSA en ik kan me zomaar voorstellen dat dit nu weer verdwijnt. En dat is niet per se omdat niemand er achter staat en niemand dit voor elkaar wil krijgen. Maar gewoon dat het politieke belang/wil er niet is, en het belang om dit te doen. Zeker nu niet meer. Je hebt ze nu bijna verslagen, dus nu is het echt weer een marginaal probleem voor het noordoosten geworden. En dat is altijd al een beetje de gedachte geweest toch? Marginaal probleem in N-O. Jonathan had daar weinig stemmen gekregen, dus dacht hij: wat moet ik daar überhaupt? Klopt, tot op het laatst. Er moet een moment zijn geweest, vrij kort voor de verkiezingen, waarop die zich heeft gerealiseerd, ik ga dit verliezen vanwege BH. Ik ga dit niet winnen, omdat ik dit heb laten doormodderen. Maar het is inderdaad heel lang totaal niet druk gemaakt. Zou kunnen dat dit idee van tafel gaat of in de koelkast gezet wordt, maar is dat omdat, we hadden het net al even over militair ingrijpen, dat zit wat meer in de genen is gewoon makkelijker. Of is er echt het besef ‘dit kunnen we gewoon niet’? Ja in de context, makkelijker als je een leger hebt dat dit soort dingen kan. En als je niet een organisatie hebt die niet heel makkelijk hearts and minds kan winnen. Dat is moeilijk om hearts and minds te winnen van een bevolking waar je allerlei dingen doet, waar je niet eens goed onderwijs biedt. Ook het leger, was in eerste instantie echt een conventioneel leger. Log apparaat en was niet voorbereid op dit soort opstand, meer guerrilla opstand. Goeie, moeilijke vraag. Het is heel raar waarom het leger zo’n tijd lang zo zwak was en zwak leek, en hoe het nu ineens heel sterk overkomt. Daar zijn aparte units voor opgezet. Ja dat weet ik wel maar dan nog. Best wel snelle ommekeer, dat het zo snel verandert. En je kunt volgens mij niet in een paar jaar tijd met training echt een leger vervangen, dat kan niet. Het moet er altijd wel geweest zijn, maar moet op een of andere manier of niet gemotiveerd, of niet goeie incentives gehad, of gewoon niet goed ingezet. Samenwerking met buurlanden geïntensiveerd. Dat is wel een doorslaggevende factor, dat Chad en Kameroen mee doen. Maar er is afgelopen anderhalf jaar ook echt een ommekeer geweest in het leger. Want mensen deserteerden bij de vleet en dat is voor zover ik weet helemaal niet aan de orde. Daar is iets gebeurd. Kan ook puur zijn dat de

90 salarissen zijn uitbetaald. Dat soort dingen kan ook, dat er een tijd lang mensen geen wapens geen salarissen geen reden zagen om daartegen te gaan vechten en dat dat nu anders is. Maar hoe dat precies zit, en waar precies die ommekeer vandaan komt, wanneer die gebeurd is dat weet ik niet. Wel sinds Buhari hoor, maar waar precies en hoe dat weet ik niet. Misschien is hij gezien zijn militaire ervaring, voelt hij beter aan hoe hij een leger moet aansturen? Ja kan, maar de overwinningen begonnen al voordat hij het overnam, die vonden net voor de verkiezingen al plaats. Dat is gebeurd op het moment dat Jonathan besloot: ik moet hier iets mee. Als dat echt zo is, is het zo’n sterk teken aan de wand van hoe belangrijk de ‘big man’ is. Als de president er achter staat, dan gebeurt er iets. Staat ie er niet achter, dan gebeurt er niets. Hoe dat dan precies komt, ja als salarissen betaald worden. Eigenlijk ongelooflijk in een land van 180 miljoen inwoners dat het daar vanaf kan hangen. Ja zeker maar dat is voor een deel wel echt zo. Deze vraag stelde ik vorige week ook aan Akinyoade, die moest een beetje lachen dus wie weet. De vraag is als u een langdurige oplossing voor het probleem in Nigeria moest bedenken, wat zou die oplossing inhouden? Natuurlijk ben ik het met Akinyoade eens dat het schoolsysteem verbeterd moet worden. Zo lang dat gebied (Noorden) zo straatarm en gemarginaliseerd blijft, dan is de kans vrij groot dat mensen daar boos om worden en iets omheen gaan organiseren. Het tweede wat je zou kunnen zeggen, als je kijkt naar hoe dit soort gewelddadige organisaties ontstaan, je hebt een heleboel groeperingen die boos zijn en die protesteren, die vinden dat er hervormingen plaats moeten vinden en dat de corruptie minder moet, maar er zijn er eigenlijk maar heel weinig die heel gewelddadig worden. Je kunt je natuurlijk als overheid wat cynischer richten op het voorkomen van specifiek dat gewelddadige, en dat zit ‘m in ieder geval ook in de manier waarop je die groeperingen benadert. Dus wat ze met Boko Haram erg verkeerd gedaan hebben is eerst uitnodigen en geld geven en allerlei dingen beloven, vervolgens bedriegen, en als ze dan boos worden ze keihard met de grond gelijk maken. Op zo’n manier dat ze net niet weg zijn, maar dat ze ondergronds kunnen gaan en dan verder kunnen doorgroeien tot een terroristische organisatie. Ja daar heb je als overheid ook echt wel een rol in gehad, in dat creëren van die organisatie. Dus je kunt ook volledig inzetten, of heel erg inzetten, op het beter omgaan met die organisaties die misschien die gewelddadige kant op lijken te gaan. Dat je daar dus niet als blinde stier op in gaat maar op een andere manier. Maar zou dat betekenen het delen van macht/invloed? Nou ja voor een deel is het inlichtingen, dus dat je investeert in dat je lokaal weet wat er aan de hand is. Je had die mensen ook op kunnen pakken en gewoon voor de rechter kunnen brengen. Dat had best gekund, dat was echt niet onmogelijk. Yusuf is meerdere keren ondervraagd. Precies, die is ook een aantal keren opgepakt. Dat hadden ze

91 toen ook kunnen doen en op dat moment hadden ze ‘m echt wel iets aan de broek kunnen hangen. Je kunt ook proberen om een rechtsstatelijke oplossing te vinden. Dat is meer gericht op die bewegingen zelf? Ja dat is meer gericht op voorkomen dat ze heel gewelddadig worden. En natuurlijk ook gewoon praktisch: waar komen dei wapens vandaan? Boko Haram is ontzettend goed uitgerust op een gegeven moment. Je kunt je ook richten, als het je echt om het geweld gaat, op het geweld, op die dingen die nodig zijn voor geweld namelijk wapens en mensen en grondgebied. Dat is misschien makkelijker te realiseren dan het fundamentele probleem van een schoolsysteem? Ik denk, maar dat is een grote claim, dat het makkelijker is om sommige van dit soort bewegingen te voorkomen met zo’n aanpak, dan om te zeggen ‘we gaan voor ontwikkeling en educatie’. Natuurlijk ben ik het daar helemaal mee eens, maar daar zijn we nog niet. En misschien ook als er wel ontwikkeling is, zouden zulke bewegingen gewelddadig kunnen worden en zou zo’n (agressievere) aanpak er ook naast kunnen bestaan? Dat kan. En dan heb je ook nog te maken met buurlanden. Maar het moeilijke met gewelddadige bewegingen is vaak dat je niet zo heel veel mensen nodig hebt om wat te doen. Dus stel dat er in Kameroen zo’n beweging opkomt, of dat ze vanuit Libië overkomen, of dat AQIM vanuit andere gebieden gaat zitten ronselen in Nigeria, dat kan. En dan moet je wel heel veel welvaart brengen om dat echt te voorkomen. Dus ik ben met beide eens. Sowieso onderwijs en investeren in gewone dingen die mensen nodig hebben, en dat zal zeker de voedingsbodem en legitimiteit voor dit soort bewegingen doen afnemen. Daardoor ook makkelijker om inlichtingen te winnen en te weten komen wat ze doen. Maar tegelijkertijd, ook gewoon verstandige inzet op het voorkomen van geweldsuitbarstingen. En de militaire aanpak die nu toch succesvol blijkt te zijn, tenminste relatief, die kan daarnaast ook gewoon blijven door bestaan? Of is dat een weg die je dan niet meer zou moeten inslaan? Je kunt moeilijk als overheid zeggen “we gaan jullie niet aanvallen”, als delen van je grondgebied ter discussie staan. Ik snap dat dat moeilijk is. De manier waarop je doet is wederom voor meerdere opvattingen vatbaar. Je zou meer kunnen zorgen dat in gevecht je de bevolking aan je kant houdt. Het was heel lang onmogelijk voor mensen om BH te verlaten. Ten eerste levensgevaarlijk vanuit BH, maar als het leger je pakte had je een net zo groot probleem. Je kunt ook inzetten op dat soort dingen wel mogelijk is, dat je faciliteert dat mensen eruit kunnen stappen. Zo’n exit programma kwam ook in de NACTEST naar voren, afgeleid van best practices in andere delen van de wereld, maar lijkt niet meer actueel te zijn? Ik denk dat het opzetten van dergelijke programma’s moeilijk is dan enkele andere zaken die we besproken hebben. Bepaalde onderdelen van de NACTEST zouden best weer

92 eens boven water kunnen komen. Die strategie lijkt het voorlopig alleen niet zo gered te hebben zoals ze het oorspronkelijk groots van plan waren.

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