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Due Eventi Del 1935 a Chicago E a New York: Il Golden Glove Contest E Il Match Louis-Carnera

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Due Eventi Del 1935 a Chicago E a New York: Il Golden Glove Contest E Il Match Louis-Carnera Quaderni della Società Italiana di Storia dello Sport DUE EVENTI DEL 1935 A CHICAGO E A NEW YORK: IL GOLDEN GLOVE CONTEST E IL MATCH LOUIS-CARNERA Marco Impiglia [email protected] Nel 1935 la Federazione Pugilistica Italiana ebbe tra le mani un paio di affari piuttosto delicati, da svolgersi negli Stati Uniti d’America. Riguardavano entrambi i campi nella sua giurisdizione: la boxe dilettantistica, pienamente sotto controllo da ormai sette anni, e l’altra boxe, più sfuggente, legata al professionismo. La prima questione fu l’organizzazione della spedizione di una rappresentativa chiamata a disputare una prestigiosa sfida Golden Glove. Il lato politico-propagandistico della missione era preminente: dimostrare alla nazione sportiva egemone (Los Angeles 1932 aveva deliberato in tal senso) che la nuova Italia mussoliniana disponeva di atleti di prim’ordine; campioni perfettamente in grado di battersi alla pari con quelli delle razze nordiche in uno degli sport più amati, indicatore delle qualità eugenetiche di una razza. La seconda questione, vera patata bollente, fu la gestione di Primo Carnera dopo la disfatta subita con Max Baer. L’ex world champion degli heavyweight, assurto nel 1933- 1934 al rango di eroe eponimo ed ora lasciato sospeso in un limbo, poteva venire rimesso sul piedistallo in breve tempo, profilandosi l’effettuazione di una eliminatoria a New York per la riconquista del titolo. Monitorando la stampa dell’epoca e basandoci sui carteggi e i docu- menti conservati presso il Ministero degli Affari Esteri (AMAE), daremo nota dell’attenzio- ne speciale con cui furono seguiti i due eventi, sia a livello mediatico che politico-diplomatico. 1. Le kermesse del “Guanto d’Oro” fucina del professionismo americano Al volgere degli anni venti, si cominciarono a disputare tornei denominati “Guanto d’Oro”. Competizioni che concedevano a giovani ragazzi di medio-basso ceto la possibilità di speri- mentare, partendo da zero, un’attività agonistica nel pugilato. La novità veniva dagli States, dove la matrice era cattolica a sfondo sociale. Per meglio dire: una combinazione, tipicamente nord-americana, tra intenti moralistico-pedagogici e commerciali. Le origini dei Golden Glove Contest affondano quasi nella leggenda, protagonista la se- conda metropoli USA per numero di abitanti: Chicago. Capitale dell’Illinois, “the Windy City” aveva sviluppato un’area metropolitana, la Chicagoland, che superava in estensione quella di Los Angeles. La popolavano poverissime famiglie emigrate in maggioranza dall’est Europa, ebrei e cattolici polacchi soprattutto, ma anche dall’Irlanda e dall’Italia. Molti gli italiani, tan- to che era sorta, sulle sponde del lago Michigan, una Little Italy sul tipo di New York. Molti pure gli afro-americani, che salivano dal Midwest e dagli stati più conservatori del meridione, ad esempio l’Alabama, per sganciarsi dal sistema capestro della coltivazione del cotone. Un sottoproletariato esplosivo fiancheggiava da ogni lato la città in espansione, coi suoi grattacieli Qds 88 QUADERNO_SISS_11_04_2017.indd 88 13/04/17 11:24 Storia e sviluppi della disciplina del pugilato in Italia che identificavano la city del business, e il suo atteggiamento progressista (nel 1924 vi nacque la Society for Human Rights, la prima associazione di difesa dei diritti degli omosessuali) che attirava chi, in altri territori dell’immenso paese, si sentiva a disagio. Un sottoproletariato siffatto costituiva un humus ad hoc per i reclutamenti della malavita organizzata, diretta dagli esponenti più spregiudicati delle summenzionate etnie. Le leggi sul Proibizionismo, entrate in vigore nel 1919, erano state manna dal cielo per loro. Ma altrettanto bene la magmatica miscela serviva le organizzazioni legate alle chiese cristiane. E toccò ad esse muovere la prima pedina del domino1. Fu, infatti, un oscuro parroco cattolico di un quartiere tra i più miserandi a inventare dal nulla, nel 1923, il primo torneo di boxe riservato ai novizi dilettanti. L’intento era quello di allontanare i giovani uomini dalla frequentazione delle onnipresenti sale da biliardo, terreno della criminalità, e incanalare la loro aggressività verso forme di esercizio fisico socialmente più accettabili degli scontri per strada con coltelli e mazze da baseball; attività che andavano di pari passo con l’alcolismo e l’altro peccato, molto grave, del sesso prematrimoniale. Il con- test svolto in un quartiere cittadino, sorta di Palio di Siena dove, al posto delle contrade, si sfidavano le etnie, riscosse un immediato successo, tanto da attirare nel 1926 l’interesse del Chicago Daily Tribune. Il “Tribune”, col suo milione di copie di tiratura, era il più venduto quotidiano al mondo. Dedicava due, tre e anche quattro pagine agli eventi sportivi, ed in que- sto possedeva tutta la modernità tipica dei media statunitensi. L’amministravano personaggi riconducibili alla sfera cristiano-protestante e cristiano-cattolica. Vicino agli ambienti cattolici (aveva concluso gli studi al collegio Notre Dame) era il suo nuovo sports editor, il trentenne Arch Ward2. Questi prese accordi ben precisi col vescovo ausiliario di Chicago, Bernard James Sheil. Il reverendo Sheil aveva svolto l’intero suo mi- nistero a Chicago e si era fatto un punto d’onore nel contrastare l’influenza che due orga- nizzazioni sorte durante la belle époque, la Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) e i Boy Scouts, mantenevano sulla gioventù maschile. Bisogna considerare che dalla fine dell’Ottocento era attivo nella Chicagoland il più esteso sistema americano di scuole parroc- chiali, impiantato dai cattolici per arginare il predominio nelle public school dei protestanti, più precoci e intuitivi nell’usare lo sport come mezzo di raccolta. Nel 1927 partì così il primo torneo ufficiale Golden Glove. Fu sostenuto dallo Sports Department del “Tribune”, posto sotto l’egida morale di Sheil, nominato presidente della manifestazione, e l’egida tecnica della Illinois Athletic Commission (IAC), branca della Amateur Athletic Union (AAU) go- vernante la boxe dilettantistica su scala nazionale. Pochi anni dopo, nel 1931, con l’emersione della Christian Youth Organization (CYO), l’istituto voluto da Sheil per meglio gestire la cattolicizzazione delle comunità inurbate, la CYO sarebbe entrata a pieno titolo tra gli enti patrocinatori dei tornei Golden Gloves3. Nel 1928 lo scrittore e giornalista Paul Gallico, sports editor del New York Daily News, altro quotidiano che puntava sugli avvenimenti atletici per incrementare le vendite, si accordò con Ward per far partire nell’area metropolitana dello Stato di New York un analogo contest, nel quale la YMCA ottenne il suo spazio di manovra. Seguirono a rotta di collo il filone il San Francisco Examiner, famoso per aver ospitato le cronache di Jack London, e il Philadelphia In- quirer. Nel giro di un lustro, si formò una rete di franchigie pompate da quotidiani ad ampia tiratura e dai due principali enti preposti all’organizzazione del tempo libero della gioventù cristiana. Diramandosi da questi centri propulsori, gli Intercity Golden Gloves andarono a Qds 89 QUADERNO_SISS_11_04_2017.indd 89 13/04/17 11:24 Quaderni della Società Italiana di Storia dello Sport coinvolgere ragazzi sia ebrei che cristiani, la disciplina del boxing essendo una fede condivisa da tutti. Il contest più atteso divenne quello che poneva di fronte i campioni di Chicago e New York. La manifestazione regina rimase, invece, il National Golden Gloves che, seguendo lo schema inaugurato dai collegi universitari col basket e il football – tournament cittadino, in- terprovinciale, statale, interstatale e nazionale –, acquisì una popolarità enorme. In breve, tra i Golden Champions che accettavano di ritardare il loro passaggio al professionismo si comin- ciarono a scegliere i componenti del Team USA per i Giochi Olimpici. Una delle ragioni, la scatenante, che portò alla rete dei Golden fu il fatto che durante i Roaring Twenties caddero, dapprima nel 1920 con la Walker Law nello Stato di New York, e poi via via nei restanti stati, le proibizioni inerenti la pratica pubblica del pugilato4. Per comprendere cosa significò il fenomeno Golden Glove tra le due guerre mondiali, bisogna immaginarsi decine di moderni impianti sparsi nelle maggiori città, che ospitavano kermesse in otto categorie di peso il cui gong d’apertura suonava alle una post-meridiane e l’ultimo alle due antimeridiane. Pubblici di 10, 15 e 20 mila spettatori costituivano la routine. I competitori, per giocarsi la finale del “National”, avevano davanti a loro dai venti ai trenta incontri, e in alcuni turni gli poteva capitare di salire sul quadrato anche tre volte nell’arco della giornata. Gli iscritti risultavano suddivisi in due schiere distinte, “classified” e “non-classi- fied”. I primi erano gli amateurs di cui si conosceva il valore: merce poco interessante. I secondi rappresentavano le vene d’oro da esplorare per la nuvolaglia di manager, coach e reporter che ruotava attorno. I non classificati erano i corrispettivi dei “novizi” nel sistema italiano; i quasi digiuni di boxe che esordivano all’agonismo e, dopo un dieci, dodici mesi di assalti alla baio- netta, se giungevano nei primi posti venivano scritturati professionisti. Il Golden Glove si sviluppò in un sistema perfetto, che accontentava le istituzioni religiose, civili e sportive, la stampa e gli addetti ai lavori; e in una maniera laterale e indiretta finiva per servire anche alla criminalità organizzata. Una macchina da soldi che, dal 1927 ai tardi anni settanta, promosse alla ribalta i
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