Country Report: The Philippines
Written by Dr. Francisco Magno Report Commissioned by the Global Initiative for Fiscal Transparency December 2013
Executive Summary:
The Philippines experienced a renewal and the broadening of civil society during the 1980s as mass mobilizations helped bring down the Marcos Dictatorship. The 1987 Constitution, a product of the democratic transition, recognizes the importance of civil society and its participation in governance and development. The Charter declares that the State shall encourage non-governmental, sector-specific, and community-based organizations that promote the welfare of the nation. It emphasizes that the right of the people to organize and effectively participate in all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. To pursue this aim, the Constitution charges government with providing adequate consultation mechanisms.
The 2010 election of President Aquino, Jr is a clear shift in the priorities of the Philippines government. Current President Aquino, Jr campaigned on a reform agenda, seeking to end corruption and poverty. By linking corruption to poverty, Aquino has drawn attention to issues of governance. The Philippine government is directly addressing government corruption as part of its effort to improve the quality of governance; the direct participation and empowerment of citizens is considered a central component of the effort toward this improvement. There have been a series of institutional reforms over the past three years, as the Aquino governments continues to build new institutions that foster the opportunity to alter spending patterns and improve governance.
Aquino’s reform agenda has built upon an array of previous administrations’ reform efforts. Thus, the roots of current reform can be found in several arenas:
First, the World Bank was instrumental in bringing a Community-Driven Development program to rural areas of the country (Labonne and Chase 2008). Community-Driven Development programs allow citizens to be directly involved in the allocation process of specific projects with World Bank Group funding. These programs incorporate government officials in the programs.
Second, CSOs in the Philippines began experimenting with ways to monitor corruption in the production of quality implementation. Road Watch is an excellent example of a CSO that used “participatory auditing” mechanisms to counter misappropriation and misuse of public goods. Another example is the Alternative Budget Initiative, led by Social Watch Philippines, which allows CSOs to provide alternative budget arrangements.
1
Finally, reform-oriented governments elected at subnational levels. Naga City is the best example of a local government unit embarking on reform. The case of Naga City demonstrates how its local government was able to make legal provisions of participation at the local level parallel to national legislation. Particularly, the local government sought to make participation equally available at the local level since participation is primarily observed in national legislation. Naga City’s 1995 Empowerment Ordinance has the objective to empower the people through self-organization, thereby, propelling participation in responsibility alongside the local government.
The government led by President Benigno Aquino has produced a range of reforms. First, the government changed the internal structure of the Presidential administration in order to improve coordination efforts. The Cabinet Cluster on Good Governance and Anti- Corruption (CGAC) is directly involved in promoting citizen participation in policymaking and auditing mechanisms. Second, the government created a series of reforms that have dramatically increased the amount of information that citizens can access. The government has committed to creating a “Citizens’ Budget” whereby basic budget information is made accessible to interested citizens. Third, citizens are now induced to participate in the national policymaking process. Fourth, at the national level, the country is supporting the use of direct participation at the local level.
The reforms in the Philippines appear to be consistently aimed at solving two crucial problems. First, the participatory institutions are geared toward addressing the problem of low knowledge and limited engagement among CSOs and citizens. There is a deliberate effort to empower citizens. Second, there is a specific interest in limiting corruption. The most innovative reforms address both of these issues. These include the People’s Budget, Empowerment Fund for Participatory Governance, Bottom-Up Budgeting, Budget Partnership Agreements, Full Disclosure Policy, Seal of Good Housekeeping, and Citizen Participatory Audits.
2
Section 1: Introduction
The reforms initiated by President Aquino represent an effort to combat clientelism, corruption, and endemic poverty. The current wave of reform builds upon thirty years of civil society organizing and party politics in order to produce a political coalition capable of bringing social and political change to the Philippines. In order to understand the current reform efforts, this report begins with an overview of the recent history of the regime, political party systems, the policy-making process, and civil society renewal.
Historical Overview
The Philippines is a unitary state with a presidential system of government. It is characterized by the formal separation of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches. Historically, the executive agencies, under the direction of the President, enjoyed wide latitude in development planning, spending decisions, and appointments of key people in steering the bureaucracy. Nevertheless, these actions were subject to oversight in the budget and confirmation hearings of Congress as well as the audit procedures of independent Constitutional bodies, including the Commission on Audit and the Civil Service Commission.
Since 1946, free elections were held on a regular basis to choose the leaders from the President to legislators and local government officials- with the exception of the fourteen year interregnum from 1972 to 1986 when the country was placed under martial law. As a platform for voice and accountability, elections leave much to be desired. The combination of a weak political party system, poor election administration, and inadequate voters’ education have led to a low quality of democracy and translated into a failure to convert campaign platforms into effective governance programs. In this landscape, rent seeking opportunities abound through campaign finance contributions as a window to obtain state-conferred business contracts and other concessions. Also, the politicized recruitment of executives for bureaucratic positions, from the top down to middle management, distorted efforts to professionalize the government career executive service.
The weakness in democratic institutions like political parties generated a state vulnerable to elite capture, and one unable to provide ordinary citizens with the voice mechanisms to express their demands thereby gaining access to public services. A two-party system shaped the contours of electoral politics from 1946 until it was destroyed by martial law in 1972. The return of formal democracy in the aftermath of the people power revolution in 1986 gave rise to a multi-party system. Nevertheless, the shift from a two-party towards a multi-party system did nothing to alter the general absence of clear ideological delineations among the major parties.
3
The downfall of authoritarianism led to the establishment of a Constitutional Commission by President Corazon Aquino. In 1987, a new Philippine Constitution was ratified. A reaction to the twenty year presidential rule of Ferdinand Marcos, the new Charter limited the time of the President in office to a single six-year term. Other elected leaders like legislators and local government officials are also held to term limits but can seek re-election under restricted successive term provisions. Another feature is the introduction of proportional representation in Congress for party-list groups that promote the interests of marginalized sectors. Twenty percent of the seats in the House of Representatives are allocated by proportional representation. A party-list group gains a seat when it reaches the threshold two percent of the national vote. It can occupy as many as three seats in Congress.
As a product of the democratic transition, the 1987 Constitution recognizes the importance of civil society and their participation in governance and development. The Charter declares that the State shall encourage non-governmental, sector- specific, and community-based organizations that promote the welfare of the nation. It emphasizes that the right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political and economic decision- making shall not be abridged. To pursue this aim, adequate consultation mechanisms will be set up by the government.
The Philippine experience as it transitioned to democracy resulted in demographic shifts including a growing middle class and expanding urban poor sector, in conjunction with the re-emergence of democratic institutions after the Marcos regime and economic developments (Hedman, 2010). The transition has perpetuated a degree of renewal in civil society and political parties. David Wurfel (2004) notes that civil society has contributed significantly to democratization in the Philippines through a transitory manner as much of NGO activity occurred during the post-Marcos regime. Through these contributions they have been able to solicit support from foreign funding (Racelis, 2005). The transition to a more democratic regime after Marcos allowed NGOs to function without oppression. Thus, their numbers grew, however Wurfel notes that during Corazon Aquino’s presidency their influence in politics was minimal. Still, it must be emphasized that Aquino’s presidency contributed to providing a space for NGOs to seek an opening to influence or participate in politics as democracy was gradually installed (Racelis, 2005). But, during Aquino’s presidency, “it was a time for restoring traditional electoral politics based on patron-client networks and reviving the power of politicians so chosen” (Wurfel, 2004, p. 216).
Wurfel contends that civil society organizations are not safe from the patron-client system and that “even when a new institutional process that would benefit NGOs (such as the party-list elections) appears on the horizon, it is distorted by a Congress dominated by traditional politicians. Democratization, still incomplete, is not an irreversible process” (Wurfel, 2004, p. 222).
4
Participation Under democratic regime
Regarding participation in the new regime, this section draws heavily from Tapales (2001) in her case study titled “Local Governance, Decentralization, and Participation in the Philippines” as included in the International IDEA Handbook Series 4. Of particular importance, the Local Government Code of 1991 fostered local autonomy and a decentralized system. The concepts of decentralization and participation go hand-in-hand. Tapales notes that prior to a decentralized system, the form of government in the Philippines as set up by the Spaniards in 1521 was centralized (e.g. tax collection). Even when the Americans colonized the islands, a centralized system remained, and this continued after Philippine independence. However, the development of a decentralized system of government was cultivated by the passing of the LGC of 1991. Specifically, the Code included the concepts of devolution, funding of local government units, and citizen participation.
Citizen participation goes beyond political activity, and contributed to citizen empowerment. “Law on initiatives, referendums, plebiscite, and recall were reiterated” and “sectoral representation in local councils (called Sanggunians) was provided” (Tapales, 2001, p. 51). The LGC of 1991 emphasized such sectors as the youth and heads of the barangays. In order to represent citizens, local development councils (LDCs) were formed at the local level to formulate and implement projects mainly comprised of members from non-governmental organizations. Other vital boards include the health and school boards.
Tapales (2001) makes an important point regarding citizen participation in governance which may not always be guaranteed. She illustrates that during the time of Marcos people were forced to legitimize the policies of the government through the use of referendums. Even after this regime, “legislation merely instituted the participative mechanisms already at work” and “The 1987 Constitution legalized people’s participation, while the 1991 Code spelled out the mechanics for it” (Tapales, 2001, p. 51).
Party politics, or the features of presidential politics after the transition to democracy, have evidenced stagnation in the consolidation of democracy (Croissant, 2004). Even though democratic institutions have been put in place, shortcomings remain on issues regarding the state, rule of law, institutional stability, and political integration (Croissant, 2004). It must be noted that Philippine elections post- Marcos are the formal route of citizen participation and have become instruments of power; the election periods are ripe with incidences of vote-buying and manipulation and even violence (Croissant, 2002, as cited in Croissant, 2004). In essence, democracy and party politics expose vulnerabilities that “remain a stronghold and guarantee of oligarchic dominance in Philippine society” (Teehankee, 1999, as cited in Croissant, 2004, p. 161).
5
In addition, Rocamora (n.d.) draws attention to the state’s weaknesses in the structures of local and national government relations. These tensions are due to the centralized presidential form of government in the Philippines. This centralization fosters competition for seats at the national level by local elites. Also, political parties are weak and rely upon the local elite to organize votes during the national election period. As the president is the axis of power and authority, the issue of patronage emerges:
“Because of the centrality of patronage for Philippine political parties, the most important powers of the president are his appointing powers and his control over the disbursement of government funds in a highly centralized form of government. The Philippine president appoints a large number of people in the bureaucracy, over a hundred thousand positions by some estimates. Local politicians, anxious to find positions in the bureaucracy for their followers, have to lobby with the president […] Although Congress theoretically has the "power of the purse", the President's line item veto, and control over disbursement gives him much greater power than Congress. Congress persons are adept at allocating themselves large amounts of pork barrel (p. 4).”
In addition, Croissant (2004) highlights that the presidential system of government also produces political actors who can impede socio-economic reforms. Commonly known as Community Development Funds, the pork barrel which is allocated by the president to the House and Senate members allows the president to exert his power on local politicians. Croissant (2004) implies that party-shifting occurs in presidential politics. This happens when those who opposed the political party of the president, and the president himself, would shift their membership if said party wins the election so as to reposition and benefit from pork barrel allocations. Another aspect of this party juggling occurs during the election cycle when parties move to support those doing well.
In terms of the power of the legislature in policy-making, the legislature “determines the character of executive-legislative dynamic and the role of political parties” and “negotiation on policy issues of national significance, more often than not, cut across party lines (Rocamora, n.d., p. 5).
Corruption and Transparency
In order to discuss the history of fiscal policymaking and its issues, the influence of structural adjustments and financial reforms on the “interaction” between monetary and fiscal policies over the decades must first be noted (Halcon & De Leon, 2004). In this frame, the prevalence of corruption and patronage after decentralization emerge (BusinessWorld, 23 March 2001, as cited in Blechinger, 2002).
6
Montes (1991) discusses the fiscal policy in the Philippines in a political economic context and evaluates fiscal reform during and after the Marcos regime. This section draws heavily from these points regarding the fiscal decision-making process. The history of fiscal policymaking may be traced to the American occupation of the country through the 1935 Constitution. After Philippine independence in 1946, the Constitution created the legislative (responsible for taxation and government expenditure), executive, and judicial branches of government. The executive branch as headed by the president held responsibility for the fiscal aspect, specifically the budget process.
Kintanar (1965), as referenced in Montes (1991), illustrates that the budgeting process hinged upon Republic Act 992 with the Budget Commission taking the task of planning the budget. The budgets first had to undergo a consolidation and reconciliation process before submission to the Budget Commission. The process involved public hearings and readings of the proposed budget. Finally, it was the executive head’s duty to submit the budget proposal to Congress As noted by Montes (1991) the budget was scrutinized at different levels before being approved by the House and Senate. In the implementation stage, the disbursement of the budget would follow the calendar year and expenditures were reviewed, subject to approval for projects, and audited.
At that time the budget was not oriented towards development. Montes attributes this to the prioritization other items in the budget which lie close to their private Congressional interests as well as the issue of appropriation. As such, the pre- Marcos fiscal decision-making was in the hands of the Congress. There was also an inadequate bureaucracy-Congress flow of information due to the disproportionate executive lean of the bureaucracy in relation to the other branches. Also, the potential of political parties to stabilize was largely absent as personalistic and feudal characteristics were prevalent (Montes, 1991).
After the period of martial law, the legislature was unable to resume its function in expenditure and taxation. This fiscal policy period was dominated by executive branch “internalization.” In the 1970s the Philippines had foreign-funded public works projects, and its economy affected the financing of these projects:
“Almost all of these projects required counterpart funding from the domestic budget. The economic downturn in the 1980s made difficult the raising of the required domestic funding to complete these projects, which were by nature multi-year, so that their requirements spilled over into subsequent budgets. Similarly, the agenda on tax reform had been dominated by the need to respond to foreign financing. The country's IMF standby programs in the 1970s provided targets for reducing the government's budget deficit, thus
7
creating pressure to Increase revenue generation in the short run (Montes, 1991., p. 29).
Tax exemptions, subsidies, and incentives were also important. Most significantly, “the passage of the investment and export incentives acts, which provided incentives to pioneering and export-oriented enterprises, was the most significant development-inspired fiscal change at that time” (p. 29). These were pivotal in influencing investments in the economic and the private fields (Montes, 1991).
Fiscal policymaking in the Philippines had been characterized as being replete with budget deficits and increasing debt, especially after the Marcos regime. Though budget surpluses were observed in the years 1994 to 1997, these surpluses have not continued (senate Economic Planning Office, 2005). The working paper of Doraisami (2011) for the Asian Development Bank notes that this may be due to “poor economic governance” (p. 28) as well as how wealth was distributed. Diokno (2010, p. 53) notes that government expenditure as a percent of GDP was 14.5 percent at the time, increasing, but declining again (from 19.6 percent to 19.2 percent) during the Estrada administration. Investment in infrastructure and capital outlays has declined after Marcos and Aquino. This figure rose during the Ramos administration to 2.7 percent (from a 2.4 during the Aquino administration), but decreased to 2.0 percent during the time of Arroyo (from 2.9 percent during Estrada) [Diokno, 2010].
Drawing from Dohner and Intal (1989), Doraisami (2011) identifies that “the allocation of government contracts and access to credit from public financial institutions were provided in return for some interest or ‘kickbacks’ in operations. Second, projects and contracts were also overpriced to generate ‘kickbacks.’ The most publicized of these was the Bataan nuclear power contract, estimated to be responsible for 10% of the foreign debt. Finally, access to credit was provided to cronies at below market rates and through ‘behest’ loans” (p. 28).
In addition, after martial law, the country carried external debt. The response of the succeeding government was to nationalize it. According to Diokno (2010), the tax reform program, or TRP, “was to simplify the tax system, make revenues more responsive to economic activity, promote horizontal equity, and promote growth by correcting existing taxes that impaired business incentives” (p. 44). However, this response, “dramatically increased debt service and domestic borrowing requirements” (Doraisami, 2011, p. 28). The 1986 tax program increased tax effort to 13.1 percent. This continued into the Ramos administration. Particularly, direct taxes increased while trade taxes decreased and the system of taxation performed relatively well economically. “The share of nontax revenues soared to 17.3 percent of total revenues during the Aquino years owing to the sale of sequestered assets of former President Marcos and his cronies” [Diokno 1995, as cited in Diokno, 2010]. In 1997, a reform to the tax system was proposed. The Comprehensive Tax Reform
8
Program or CTRP would address the tax system’s tax rates and tax avoidance while streamlining the tax system’s procedures and tax incentives (Diokno, 2010).
Also, after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the tax revenues did not increase although the national government expenditures “remained stable at around 19.4% of GDP from 1997–2003” (Diokno, 2010, p. 29). In addition, extant was “a chronic inability to collect sufficient revenues due to the weak institutional capacity of tax authorities, complicated and irrational taxation systems, and corruption in revenue collections causing tax evasion” (Manasan 2004, as cited in Doraisami, 2011). Government Owned and Controlled Corporations (GOCCs) and the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) contributed largely to the deficit in the years 2000 to 2004 (Doraisami, 2011). In order to decrease the deficit, various medium term measures were proposed including “achieving a balanced budget by 2010 […] the privatization and restructuring of GOCCs, especially the power sector; improvements in tax administration, rationalization of the bureaucracy; and improvements in public debt and expenditure management” which managed to decrease the debt-to-GDP ratio to 56 and interest payments to 21 percent (Doraisami, 2011, p. 29).
A relevant subset of fiscal policymaking is fiscal decentralization which grants local government units responsibility in raising revenue and creating personalized good governance innovations. Brought about by the Local Government Code and hinged upon local autonomy, the Code seeks to make LGUs responsible not only in raising their own revenues for programs, projects, and other activities, but also in directing LGU spending.
Yet, Diokno (2010) emphasizes that revenue and spending functions are “mismatched” due to the distribution of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) to LGUs. In addition, the IRA is an unconditional block grant (40 percent total), with 20 percent allotted to the area of development. Various basic service programs are also widely implemented at the local level. The national government spends on national priorities (e.g. public goods). Overall, “increasing tax revenues is paramount, both in terms of increasing expenditure on social services and safeguarding fiscal sustainability” (Doraisami, 2011, p. 41).
In 2012, the country had a deficit of 2.3 percent GDP; however, it remains sustainable due to a strong economy. Moreover, “a deficit of up to 2.7 percent of GDP would still be broadly sustainable and justified if incremental expenditure is spent on productive activities, such as infrastructure and social services, and if revenues also increase commensurately.” National debt is projected to decrease by 2015. Also, “[t]otal tax revenues grew by 13.2 percent and tax effort increased from 12.3 to 12.9 percent of GDP—the highest increase in decades that can be attributed to improved tax administration” (World Bank, 2013, p. 19).
The current (2013) fiscal policy situation’s orientation includes reforms in governance outlined in the Philippine Development Plan (2011-2016). The plan 9
describes revenue generation through taxing policies and administration, government spending on social infrastructure, and social programs such as conditional cash transfers (CCTs), and budget reforms and oversight (IMF, 2013). Particular attention has also highlighted accountability and transparency measures in the budget processes (e.g. participatory budgeting). Particularly, the institutionalization of public financial management (PFM) reforms have been recommended. Apart from promoting accountability and transparency in the budget process, access to budgeting information must be made more accessible for public viewing (World Bank, 2013).
On the supply side of line agencies’ responsibilities, the World Bank report recommends that these should be able to provide “i) timely and consistent passage of the national budget, ii) timely release of budget allocations to line agencies, iii) more effective preparation of spending programs and projects, and iv) further improving the procurement process” (2013, p. 27). On the demand side, PFM data and information should be made visible through Open Data and Open Government. Furthermore, a participatory process is favorable to the budgeting process (e.g. bottom-up budgeting and community-driven development) [World Bank, 2013].
Section 2: Current moment of policy and political change
Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Plan
Under this plan, the following have been identified as commitments by the assessment report:
• Zero Based Budgeting • Public Expenditure Management (PEM) Reforms–Organizational Performance Indicator Framework (OPIF) • Quality of Public Service Delivery • Performance Challenge Fund • People’s Participation Partnership Program • Full Disclosure Policy • Business Permit and Licensing System • Speedy Resolution of Corruption Cases • Whistle Blower Protection Law • Witness Protection Program • Office for Competition • National Justice Information System • Revenue Integrity Protection Services • Integrated Philippine Customs System (IPCS) • Pera ng Bayan
10
We shall focus on the following: Zero Based Budgeting, Public Expenditure Management (PEM) Reforms– Organizational Performance Indicator Framework (OPIF), Performance Challenge Fund, People’s Participation Partnership Program, and the Full Disclosure Policy. All are initiatives meant to streamline government services and prevent corruption-related activities. The administration has also turned to various ICT platforms to further its good governance theme (e.g. digitizing of services or transactions).
The first two mentioned are part of Public Expenditure Management (PEM). As the National Budget expresses approved government plans/ programs and implements the priorities, it must also show results. In particular the DBM initiated the PEM to insure that what is allocated will produce results. The goal is holding government accountable. PEM’s objectives have been identified in the 2013 People’s Budget report by the DBM:
1. Aggregate Fiscal Discipline 2. Allocative Efficiency 3. Operational Efficiency
These objectives call for government to be using its resources through planning in the medium-term. It should also allocate within priority areas and aligned with the plans included in the Philippine Development Plan. Lastly, the government must consider the cost of its services. Furthermore, PEM has three pillars: the Medium – Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), OPIF, and Zero-Based Budgeting Approach (ZBB). The MTEF guides government in budgetary prioritization and plan formulation through a top-down allocation of resources. The OPIF directs outcome expenditures in conjunction with measuring agency performance. ZBB, on the other hand, deals with the evaluation and assessment of programs/projects that are in progress. It involves decision-making regarding resource allocation. These programs are subjected to review and assessment for relevancy to development outcomes. Resource allocations are decreased, increased, or discontinued based upon the country’s development priorities. Key cuts include programs deemed unnecessary or found prone to corruption.
The Cabinet Cluster on Good Governance and Anti-Corruption (GGAC) Plan 2012- 2016 has several strategic goals: 1) improved delivery of public services; 2) curbed corruption; and 3) enhanced business environment (DBM, 2013). These goals are carried by open government pillars including transparency, accountability, citizen engagement, anti-corruption efforts, and performance management (Peoples Budget 2013-DBM, 2013). Furthermore, the GGAC has several priority outcomes fortified by the achievement of these goals. These outcomes are:
1) Improved local governance 2) Strengthened public financial management 3) Strengthened agency performance 11
4) Greater prevention and control of corruption.
Results from Open Budget Survey 2012
The Philippines national government scores fairly well in terms of budgetary oversight and engagement. In the 2012 Open Budget Survey, the country was characterized as having moderate legislative strength, strong Supreme Audit Institutions (SAI), and moderate public engagement (indicators scale: Strong for average score above 66 of 100; Moderate for average score between 34 and 66; and Weak for average score below 34) [Open Budget Survey, 2012]. However, it is important to note that the 2012 Open Budget Results for the Philippines demonstrates a slippage in its rankings. Noting from the document released by the International Budget Partnership (IBP), the criteria of the Survey assesses and identifies whether or not a country makes eight budget documents readily available and accessible to the public. The Open Budget Survey (undertaken every two years) also generates the Open Budget Index of a country which ranks a country’s relative transparency in availability and accessibility of budgetary documents.
The Open Budget Index of the Philippines had slipped to 48 from 55 in 2012. This score is classified under “some information” on the budget. This had been the Philippines’ category in the years 2006, 2008, and 2010. Overall, the survey notes that “only 23 countries provide significant information or better, while 41 provide minimal, scant, or no information” (Open Budget Survey, 2012, p. 13). However, in 2010, the Philippines scored a 55. The Philippines Index has thus remained rather stable. The IBP (which surveyed 95 out of a 100 countries) rate this score as higher than average (> 43). The Philippines ranks higher than Cambodia (score of 15), Malaysia (39), Myanmar (10), Thailand (36), Timor-Leste (36), and Vietnam (19), but lags behind Indonesia (62).
Ilagan (2013) writing for the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ), emphasizes that this result “indicates that the Aquino government, just like the Arroyo administration, has made it harder for citizens to get information on how public officials and agencies are spending taxpayers’ money” (“PH budget transparency score slips 7 pts; oversight improves”, par. 5). As the IBP identifies, the country’s score indicates that there is limited transparency in the central government’s budget and during its annual financial undertakings. The Philippines remains among the 100 countries ranked unsatisfactorily in budget management via budget transparency.
Ilagan (2013) notes the “2011 memorandum from the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) titled ‘Guidelines on Partnership and Participation of Civil Society Organizations and Other Stakeholders in the Preparation of Budget 12
Proposals,’ […] formalized government engagement with civil society organizations (CSO)” [par. 9] and “agencies that entered into a Budget Partnership Agreement with CSOs were required to provide information to the latter to help them come up with an ‘evidence-based’ evaluation of the agency's projects or programs” (par. 11). Ilagan (2013) also notes the importance of timeliness and identifies the DBM’s Transparency and Accountability Initiative for Lump-Sum Funds (eTAILS) which “digitizes” this information and provides disclosure on lump-sum funds and related data on the Department of Budget and Management website.
The Philippines’ SAI was commended in the report as a “comprehensive fraud alert” system which is available online. “It also includes an annual summary of fraud complaints received by the SAI, stating the agency involved, subject of allegation, date of receipt of the complaint, and the action taken by the SAI”. The survey offered the Philippines the following recommendation: “greatly expand budget transparency by introducing a number of short-term and medium-term measures, some of which can be achieved at almost no cost to the government” (Open Budget Survey, 2012, p. 2).
This comes into play regarding the publication of the eight budgetary documents. Notably, the results indicate that the Pre-Budget Statement (PBS) is only produced for internal use. Essentially, this document gives information regarding the budget proposal presented in the legislature. The Citizens Budget, Mid-Year Review, and Year-End Report also register a “not produced” status. Essentially, the purpose of these vital documents is to present the public with knowledge concerning government plans and financial mechanisms, gauged effects, and aspects of implementation.
Ilagan (2013) notes that the Pre-Budget Statement is vital to the formulation and presentation of plans and budgets per sector as well in house government budgets. The report found that the following reports have been published in the Philippines: Executive’s Budget Proposal (EBP), Enacted Budget (EB), In-Year Reports (IYR), and the Audit Report (AR). The EPB decreased its score from a 62 in 2010 to a 57 in 2012. The EB, on the other hand, retained a perfect score of a 100 for both years. However, the Citizen’s Budget -which is a simplified version of the EB- has not been produced. The IYR increased its score to a 96 from 92. And the AR increased to 52 from 48. The report ultimately argues for improvement in public accessibility and broadened transparency.
Furthermore, the Open Budget Index suggests an absence of documents. In fact, the country only published half of the eight budget documents suggested. Thus, improvement is possible in budget oversight and public participation in the process (Ilagan, 2013).
The Benigno Aquino administration made governance a primary target after President Aquino won the May 2010 elections. When the president took his seat, he 13
was faced with several issues stemming from corruption and poverty. His agenda for the Philippines ran with the theme kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap or “no corruption, no poverty”. The Philippine Development Plan (2011-2016) targeted the issues of corruption and patronage. On the whole, the development plan revolves around governance and relevant aspects, namely accountability, participation, and transparency. The plan has a wider goal, that is, to reduce poverty and expand the economy. Overarching development efforts are also framed within this context (Philippine Government Action Plan for 2012).
Most significantly, the administration hinged upon “institutionalizing People Power in governance” in order to emphasize citizen engagement in the budgeting process. This area of citizen engagement seeks to create venues for citizens to not only participate in budget preparation, but also to expand participation to other stages in the budgeting process. The move calls for inclusive citizen participation throughout the whole budgeting cycle. In sum, the government’s objective is open governance. As a member of the Open Government Partnership, the Philippine government seeks to improve public services, increase public integrity, and effectively manage public resources. The Philippine Government Action Plan for 2012 was crafted by the government in consultation with various CSOs such as the Caucus of Development NGOs, Budget Advocacy Group, and the Alternative Budget Initiative, among others (Philippine Government Action Plan for 2012).
OGP Commitments
1. Escalating Fiscal Transparency Implemented by the DBM, partially fulfilled
This seeks to facilitate the release of information regarding the budget and its associated documents in online availability (through websites) through various agencies and government departments, state universities and colleges. These budget documents, such as annual procurement plans, are under the Transparency Seal (which can be found on a government agency’s official website) and so must be made accessible via the Web.
The Philippine Country Assessment Report mentions that 17 out of 22 departments have complied with the initiative (particularly they have disclosed the most important fiscal documents online (Approved Budget, Fund Utilization Report, Information on Major Programs and Projects, Contracts Awarded, Annual Procurement Plan). The report also identifies that the national government agencies are undergoing a “comprehensive audit” which is under the Performance Based Incentive System (Open Government Assessment Report, 2013, p. 11).
14
The problem that remains is the level, or willingness, of compliance with the above measures. In order to address the prioritization of fiscal transparency, the government made it a requirement under a performance incentive system. It must be emphasized that the agencies or institutions must comply with full disclosure of the five budgetary or fiscal documents. However, these documents must also consider the kind of information that each presents and consider what will truly be relevant to their disclosure.
2. Electronic or Transparent Bidding Implemented by the DBM, partially fulfilled
Under this umbrella, the government has created the PhilGEPS which displays information about bidding and awards. This electronic bulletin board also identifies “common goods” in procurement. The procurement process will involve e-payment e-bidding. In the long run, and as this commitment progresses, further development will hasten other electronic options as well such as online CSO monitoring.
Electronic bidding was expanded to include online bid submissions by the DPWH, an online payment system implemented by the Procurement Service, and the National Tax Research Center, to name a few. The report also notes that in two years (2011- 2012), there was a 68 percent growth in the number of registered government agencies. Also, there was an increase in notices of bidding and contracts awarded. A recommendation is made in this area which calls for citizen participation.
3. Public Access to Information Initiative Implemented by the Presidential Communications Development and Strategic Planning Office (PCDSPO), partially fulfilled
The citizens through this initiative will be able to have greater access to information (e.g. Freedom of Information Act). CSOs have been favored to harness this initiative and insure government agency compliance. This exercise of voice is projected to pressure for further disclosure of information to the public and useful tools (such as information technology systems) by which citizens may be able to gain access to information. The initiative includes the participation of various stakeholders in its planning and implementation.
The national government and local governments are also required to disclose information (e.g. budget). In order to facilitate this disclosure, the Transparency Seal and eTAILs have been put in place. They have recommended that the Freedom of Information Act require support from the executive and that other vital information from all branches of government must be included in the disclosure.
4. Philippine Partnership for Open Governance
15
Under this enactment, the Philippine OGP will monitor the status of government under the open government initiative, especially its programs and reforms. This is comprised of a committee with delegates from government, business, and CSOs who meet regularly while the open government plan is being implemented. As of 2013, this committee has not met regularly.
5. Expanded Participatory Budgeting Implemented by the Department of Interior and Local Government, Fulfilled
This particular commitment has focused on CSO participation in the budgeting process. As implemented by the DBM, it seeks to engage organizations in the budget formulation stage. It sought to improve the budget process for 2013 and address problems in other budgeting stages (legislation, execution, accountability). In 2011 and December 2012, national government agencies and GOCCS were included in the initiatives. Recent information shows that the program on participatory budgeting has now included 12 national government agencies and 6 GOCCs. Procedures on CSO engagement in the budgetary process (at all stages) has been through National Budget Circular Nos. 536 and 53. A 2011 and 2012 People’s Budget has been issued.
6. Bottom-Up Participatory Planning and Budgeting National Anti-Poverty Commission, Department of Interior and Local Government, Department of Social Welfare and Development, Department of Budget and Management, Fulfilled
Partnership with various stakeholders is seen at this level (national government agencies, local government units, and CSOs at the community level. It focuses on poverty reduction and will formulate action plans to address poverty. As such, it is predicted that these plans will be prioritized by national budget formulation. Due to its local level focus, it propels a bottom-up approach. To address the issue of poverty, governments at the local level must produce local poverty reduction plans. Drawing from recent data, participatory budgeting and planning has already been done in 595 cities and municipalities. The 2013 National Budget includes their priority plans and programs which are worth P8.4 billion.
For the next fiscal year, over a thousand cities and municipalities are forecasted to participate in bottom-up participatory planning and budgeting. The outlook for this initiative expands as it progresses.
7. Empowerment Fund Implemented by the Department of Interior and Local Government, In Progress
This initiative focuses on service delivery as well as capacitating the marginalized. The CSOs are tasked to undertake these objectives.
8. Participatory Social Audit for Public Infrastructure Projects 16
Implemented by the Commission on Audit, Partially Fulfilled
This participatory audit focuses on projects relating to infrastructure and agriculture. It involves a citizen-COA collaboration/ partnership in undertaking audits. CCAGG has previously identified corruption and misuse of funding in road projects. Thus, this initiative seeks to foster honest use of public resources. This was launched in November of 2012 and has been under pilot implementation by the DPWH.
9. Harmonize Government Measurement Systems Implemented by the Department of Budget and Management, Fulfilled
This initiative is result-based and operates through monitoring and reporting on department and agency performance at the national level. The Results- Based Performance Management System, or RBPMS, is based on the Organizational Performance Indicator Framework. The RBPMS already has a framework, and the Performance Based Incentive System is undergoing its pilot implementation. For government employees, the performance based bonus has been initiated. Aside from these incentive systems, certification criteria have also been formulated for good governance. These incentive system and criteria are still in need of validation, and this particular area has not identified CSO participation in that validation process.
10. Improve Citizen’s Charter Implemented by the Civil Service Commission, Partially Fulfilled
This seeks to enhance compliance to citizen’s charters. This particular initiative is done through the Anti-Red Tape Act (ARTA) Watch which conducts check-ups on NGAs. The agency also conducts seminars on anti-red tape and service delivery. This initiative seeks to prevent fissures and evaluate the services of these agencies. Those agencies who comply are awarded a Citizen's Satisfaction Center Seal of Excellence, and those who fail to comply must undergo a service deliver excellence program. As of recent data, 70 percent have complied.
11. Roll-out Internal Audit and Internal Controls Implemented by the Department of Budget and Management, Fulfilled
This commitment sought to respond to how agencies developed, implemented, and monitored their internal audits and controls. This initiative also contributed to the agencies’ own responsibilities and functions regarding their projects and programs. A manual was created for this specific purpose. In sum, the manual served as a guide for the internal operations of agencies. As a result, several trainings had already been conducted in various agencies and will be enhanced further.
12. Embed Accountability in Local Governance 17
Implemented by the Agency Department of Interior and Local Government, Fulfilled
Through the Seal of Good Housekeeping (SGH), exacting accountability can be promoted. This focus is local governance and LGUs who exhibit excellent internal housekeeping in resource allocation arenas and overall good governance innovations. Those LGUS who have the seal qualify to be a recipient of the Performance Challenge Fund or PCF. The target is to have all lower income cities and municipalities qualify for the SGH by the year 2016 as well as increase compliance for the SGH. As of 2012, 77 percent (1322 out of 1714) of LGUs have obtained the SGH.
Technology
In addition, various innovations and technologies have been proposed and implemented. One of these is Interactive Fiscal Transparency through the Budget ng Bayan website which has already been launched. This website lets citizens learn more about the budget and the budgeting process. Others have focused on Electronic Procurement systems, digitizing releases of Congressional allocations, and garnering public feedback online.
Section 3: Participation in national level policies
Participatory Budgeting
The political and constitutional context of participatory budgeting in the Philippines stems from constitutional change driven by civil society and mass demonstrations ousting the former authoritarian regime. These constitutional and legal provisions supporting civil society participation and decentralization are institutionalized in the Local Government Code of 1991. As such, this code seeks to promote greater civil society and LGU participation in local planning and service delivery. The code also lays groundwork in the creation of local development councils which provide CSO or NGO representatives the opportunity to participate in these endeavours (Fölscher, 2007).
Fölscher (2007) identifies a significant point regarding participation in national policies by citing the Naga City example. Here, the author recognizes the need for outlining citizen participation within a legal framework in the of national government context. As is, citizen participation in budgeting and the fiscal process is primarily found at the subnational level. The author also notes that participation in Asian cases is generally implemented by local actors with a prior history of accountability and citizen engagement where the relationship between people and the government has been cultivated (Fölscher, 2007).
18
In tracing the development of civil society participation in the Philippines, Fölscher (2007), citing Brillantes (2005), argues it unfolded as a reaction to the centralized system and its inability to deliver local services prior to 1986. After Marcos, the presence of civil society in governance was made a priority, particularly through participation and at various levels of decision-making in social and political realms.
In addition, the Local Government Code of 1991 allows NGOs seats in the Local Development Councils, committees, and local health and school boards. One particular case of participation has been documented in Naga City, where the LGUs have supported citizen participation (Fölscher, 2007). Its citizens participate in secoral concerns, and have also created a partnership (e.g. Naga City People’s Council) with various stakeholders, especially civil society. This council represents the people and can get access to vital information concerning issues related to governance (Fölscher, 2007).
With regard to permitted citizen participation, Fölscher (2007) outlines citizen engagement in public processes. The author refers to this involvement as “participatory budgeting” whereby citizens are included in venues for planning, allocation, and monitoring processes. Before identifying cases under these types of participation, the author first defines these participatory initiatives. During the budgeting process, citizens (usually NGOs or CSO coalitions) share the public space in a drive to advance government transparency and accountability. Their responsibilities cater towards influencing the state in generating public policy information (which happens outside of the state) [Fölscher, 2007]. Access to quality information is essential as citizens play a representative role in decision-making and policy formulation on development objectives and the allocation of resources. It must be noted that this depends on the enabling environment available in decision- making.
On the other hand, citizens in the decision-making processes, particularly in the budgeting process can share information, participate in consultations, and implement projects (McGee, et. al., 2003, as cited in Fölscher, 2007). The Philippines offers an exemplary case of an initiative that focused on improving transparency and accountability. This is particularly true of civil society engagement in the budgeting process and signaling mechanisms to subnational levels of government concerning the priorities of local communities. In essence, civil society influences decision-making in the budgeting process. Participation in fiscal or budgetary processes requires correct information in order to accurately formulate fiscal priorities and assess valuable services. In addition, people need to understand the budget and the budgeting process to engage in the monitoring and auditing of government projects (Fölscher, 2007).
The case of the Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Governance (CCAGG) is a relevant initiative focusing on participation, transparency, and accountability. In 1986, the CCAGG was created and focused on development-oriented programs. The 19
individuals who created the CCAGG were more familiarized with this line of work through participation in a training session with the NEDA (after signing a memorandum of understanding), particularly in project monitoring. This case is noteworthy because the CCAGG found 27 projects that had been declared by the Ministry of Public Works and Highways as “complete” in the province of Abra had not actually been accomplished (Fölscher, 2007; Ramkumar, 2008).
The response of the CCAGG was to render proof regarding the incompletion of these projects in order to overturn the public announcement released by the Ministry. In pursuit of this end, the members of the CCAGG collected photographic evidence and documented accounts of citizens in the different project areas. The national government was then notified by the submission of this evidence. The Abra case, known for its citizen participation, also demonstrates public and official auditing capacity, in conjunction with its harnessing of public opinion which held several officials accountable. The case further demonstrated the need for proper recourse concerning official corruption. In other words, the people in the community seized the opportunity to voice their opinions regarding the matter, and the result was corrupt officials appropriately reprimanded for their actions.
To emphasize, in order to identify projects with incidences of corruption, the CCAGG turned to voluntary ordinary citizens, such as housewives and students, in close proximity to neglected areas to report their findings to the experts investigating the project sites. Apart from finding that road construction projects had rigged contracts or fixed arrangements, the CCAGG, with the help of these volunteers, also discovered that one of the projects’ funding had been embezzled by the contractors (Fölscher, 2007).
CCAGG is a representative case because it features a partnership with the Philippine supreme audit institution on development plans in Abra (Ramkumar and Krafchik, 2005, as cited in Fölscher, 2007). In the CCAGG case, there was the support for enhanced vertical accountability, which gave rise to quality horizontal accountability. This is said to be forged partly by partnerships with CSOs (Fölscher, 2007).
Participation or citizen engagement in the planning and budgeting process in local- level Philippine politics are separate orbits. In addressing this chasm, tools that enable citizen participation may work favorably in environments where factors like patronage and corruption are minimal, but still capable of activation through the budget process (Brillantes & Tiu Sonco III, 2005, as cited in Fölscher, 2007).
Citizen participation not only improves transparency and fosters accountability, but may also open venues primed for citizen action and inquiry in the public space. It has also been emphasized in the case studies identified by Fölscher that initiatives in participatory budgeting build support and result in increasingly engaged actors.
20
However, approaches, and projects which capitalize on citizen participation, rest on how they are introduced, planned, and executed (Fölscher, 2007).
Executive: Budget and fiscal issues
Here we focus on the People’s Budget and how citizens can become engaged in decisions that concern them. In the 2013 People’s Budget report by the DBM, citizen participation has been mainly composed of CSOs, POs, and communities seeking venues to directly address pertinent issues.
The report by AusAid on the Philippine-Australia Public Finance Management program mentions that citizen and civil society (CS) participation has been accelerated by the legislature through public hearings, but “the interaction between the legislature and CS on general budget and PFM issues outside of respective district concerns is less developed.” For greater participation in the fiscal process, portions of the budgeting process have included CSOs. Through the current administration’s Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Cluster Action Plan for 2012-2016, the participation of citizens is fortified and moving towards formalization. In the beginning phases of the administration, CSOs collaborated with the DBM in creating a policy to better engage CSOs in the budgeting process. From this, Budget Partnership Agreements (BPAs) were created with NGAs and Government Owned or Controlled Corporations (GOCCs). The BPA was used to gather inputs for the budgeting process in phases of preparation and execution (Philippines-Australia Public Financial Management Program (PFMP)-, AusAid, 2012).
When piloted in 2011 and 2012 in national budget preparation, the capacity of both the government and CSOs was revealed to be in need of critical and technical input provided by a government willing to work with the CSOs. The current commitment and initiatives of the government are favorable in adhering to the goals of the administration of a transparent, accountable, and participative system. It has been noted that “intensified and repeated involvement of CSOs should gradually contribute to generate additional demand from the citizenry for better allocation of resources, as well as effectiveness and efficiency in government operations and expenditures” (Philippines-Australia Public Financial Management Program (PFMP)-AusAid, 2012, p. 5). This may be the main contributor in the development of Philippine governance.
This can be further enhanced by the 2013 Empowerment Budget as illustrated in the 2013 People’s Budget released by the DBM. They target the Empowerment Budget as the most conducive to enhancing participation in decision-making processes as described in its principles and strategies. To quote, “this budget pursues empowerment by creating more opportunities for public participation in governance. It invests significantly in the people’s capabilities by prioritizing funding for public services that provide jobs, educate our youth, ensure a healthier 21
citizenry, and empower each Filipino to participate in economic activity” (Peoples Budget 2013-DBM, 2013, p. 11). The principle that has most relevance in this overview is “greater stakeholder participation in budget preparation and execution” (Peoples Budget 2013-DBM, 2013, p. 11). As mentioned previously, this involves social accountability to bring to address people’s needs. As briefly described above, accountability includes the performance-based budgeting system, the results-based management system, and the performance-based incentive system.
In seeking greater stakeholder participation in the budget process including budget preparation and execution, the Bottom-Up Budgeting Approach was initiated. This involves conducting consultations with community organizations in order to determine needed services. The 2013 People’s Budget reports that a total of 595 poor municipalities had undertaken this process. In addition, the same report mentions Agency-Civil Society Budget Partnerships which included 12 departments and six government firms (e.g. DepEd, DOH, National Food Authority, Light Rail Transit Authority, among others). Public-Private Partnerships will also be tapped in order to facilitate the maintenance and delivery of social services (e.g. building and maintaining school facilities, human infrastructure projects).
Aside from the budgetary process, CSOs and others find additional channels for participation. The DBM report mentioned the program Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps), a conditional cash transfer program for poor families. This initiative involves parents sending their children to school, attending 85 percent of their classes, and investing in their health. CSOs, NGOs, POs, and other groups “participate in the program to conduct social audit; to ensure that beneficiaries fulfill the conditions and to monitor progress” (Peoples Budget 2013-DBM, 2013, p. 30).
Pera ng Bayan, for instance, is an online platform which allows citizens to report on the performance of their government. In 2012, 196 cases were identified, but the website and system lacks sustainability.
For citizens to participate in the budgeting process, the current administration has sought to make venues more accessible or open. Citizen participation has been made available during budget preparation, and development for inclusion in all the phases of the budget process is now underway. The following have been set up in order to make this possible (Peoples Budget 2013-DBM, 2013):
1. Budget Partnership Agreements or BPAs 2. Bottom-Up Budgeting or BUB 3. Citizens Participatory Audit
The BPAs are agreements between agencies and CSOs at the beginning of the budget cycle (e.g. proposal stage). DBM (2013) mentions that it has now extended to the execution phase. As noted previously, the BUB had a pilot run in several municipalities through their CSOs. This has also been extended to the execution 22
phase to oversee project implementation. The purpose of the BUB is to serve as a guide for poverty reduction projects. Bottom-Up Budgeting will help prepare agencies’ budgets. Its particular consideration is delivering basic social services to the poor. In addition, the budget will have inputs from basic sector organization and CSOs. Overall, they compose the Local Poverty Reduction Action Team, or LPRAT. Included in the team are the Local Chief Executive and National Government Agencies such as the DBM and the DILG. Forty percent of the group must be women. Also, communities at the barangay level should be able to implement the BUB projects. The experience of the Community Driven Approach, which includes participatory processes, should prove favorable. Those who do not have the experience may still be eligible, but they must be given technical assistance by the LGU and a government agency as indicated in DBM-DILG-DSWD-NAPC Joint Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 2012.
The Citizen Participatory Audit by the COA and the DPWH and the Affiliated Network for Social Accountability – East Asia and the Pacific (ANSA – EAP) will involve citizens in auditing government programs (Peoples Budget 2013-DBM, 2013).
In a draft prepared by Juan Mayo Ragragio for the Asia Foundation (2013), the author assessed CSO participation in BUB, SGH-PCF, and Local Special Bodies (LSBs). CSO participation in BUB was found sub-par and lacking by the Association of Foundations conference in 2012. The author also cites a study which assessed the BUB process and found only 44 out of 74 of the FGD’s participants were involved in the process. They were, however, involved in the LPRAT as members or as participants in its planning activities (Ragragio, 2013).
CSO participation in the Seal of Good Housekeeping and in the Performance Challenge Fund were also limited as less than 20 of the 74 participants in the FGD said that they were engaged in SGH and PCF. Also, three out of the 18 CSOs did not analyze or read any of the documents released by the LGU, and only 15 were incorporated into activities like implementation, monitoring, or the DILG evaluation team. However, as reported to the Bureau of Local Government Development (BLGD) by the DILG Office of Internal Audit Services (OIAS), CSOs were not present in review and monitor project activities and did not observe PCF guidelines, but showed better engagement in PCF evaluation and monitoring. CSO participation in Local Special Bodies also demonstrated less than outstanding involvement in LSBs. The LDC was reported to have the highest attendance. In three cases, the CSOs participated or were engaged with the LSBs and were content with their participation. One CSO in Mindanao (Lantawan, Basilan) was not involved and cited the peace and order condition as a reason (Ragragio, 2013).
In order for CSOs to support the SGH and the PCF, the Asia Foundation has proposed that CSO assemblies should consolidate, review CSO accreditation (and respond to its weaknesses), and strengthen CSO resources by filling knowledge gaps through 23
funding by the national government, donor agencies, and local funding institutions (Ragragio, 2013).
Executive: Other policy arenas
McGee, et. al., (2003) in her report regarding citizen participation, mentions that by virtue of the 1991 LGC the government has allowed citizen participation. In her report she identifies that in the Philippines and Brazil, a legal framework for citizen participation may call for the “joint action” of two actors – the government and CSOs. This is particularly the case in responsibilities related to local-level governance. For the Philippines, the Local Government Code is a prime example of how the government allows citizen participation.
Similarly, Magno (2011) notes that citizen participation is vital to the governance process as has been emphasized in both the 1987 Constitution and the LGC of 1991. In addition, they also call for partnerships between government and NGOs. Citizens have a right to participate in policy-making and particular provisions illustrate this. Magno (2011, p. 22) lists some of these:
“SEC. 34. Role of People’s and Non-governmental Organizations. – Local government units shall promote the establishment and operation of people’s and nongovernmental organizations to become active partners in the pursuit of local autonomy.
SEC. 35. Linkages with People’s and Non-Governmental Organizations. – Local government units may enter into joint ventures and such other cooperative arrangements with people’s and non-governmental organizations to engage in the delivery of certain basic services, capability-building and livelihood projects, and to develop local enterprises designed to improve productivity and income, diversify agriculture, spur rural industrialization, promote ecological balance, and enhance the economic and social well-being of the people.
SEC. 36. Assistance to People’s and Non-governmental Organizations. – A local government unit may, through its local chief executive and with the concurrence of the sanggunian concerned, provide assistance, financial or otherwise, to such people’s and nongovernmental organizations for economic, socially-oriented, environmental, or cultural projects to be implemented within its territorial jurisdiction”.
In order to illustrate how citizens participate, the following arenas will be briefly outlined. 24
Health
In the health sector, citizens can participate in Local Health Boards (LHBs). The LHB has the function “to propose… the annual budgetary allocations for the operation and maintenance of health facilities and services within the municipality, city or province, as the case may be. It should also serve as an advisory committee to the local sanggunian on health matters such as the necessity for, and application of, local appropriations for public health purposes” (Magno, 2011).
The author cites a study that found when citizens were able to participate in LHBs, more openings or venues were established where the people were consulted, and more action for health was undertaken. The community also exhibited high per capita expenditure on health due to “functional LHBs” (Ramiro, et al., 2001, as cited in Magno, 2011, p. 26).
Education
In education, citizen participation in policy-making is apparent at the local level. The Local School Boards have the responsibility “to determine the annual supplementary budgetary needs for the operation and maintenance of public schools within the province, city or municipality and the supplementary local cost of meeting such needs which shall be reflected in the form of an annual school board budget corresponding to its share in the proceeds of the special levy on real property constituting the Special Education fund and such other sources of revenue” (Magno, 2011, p. 25).
The LSB may also participate in “the decisions of the local sanggunian on issues concerning education particularly local appropriations for educational purposes by serving as an advisory committee to the sanggunian” (Magno, 2011, p. 25). The LSB also has NGO presence through parent-teacher association representatives. It is also composed of the school staff (teachers) and the “non-academic personnel organization” (Magno, 2011, p. 25). The author mentions the case of Naga City which improved its LSBs in order to include other stakeholders. Various actors were included in the LSBs from the private sector such as business, academia, alumni, and NGOs, among others (Pabico, 2008, as cited in Magno, 2011).
LSBs relate to the LGC of 1991 which states that citizens can participate in local development councils. It also mentions that the national government must consult with governments at the local level on priorities and plans. Therefore, development and planning at the local level calls for citizen participation. Citizens at this level may become more familiar with avenues of effective participation. Decentralization within the country becomes crucial in this phase (McGee, et. al., 2003).
Bantay Lansangan (Road Watch) 25
The Road Watch experience of Iloilo, Philippines focuses on monitoring infrastructure projects post-construction (roads). To mobilize volunteers in observing the discrepancies in road construction quality, jeepney drivers were recruited, trained to conduct inspections, and who simply report their findings. They have been chosen to be monitors since they have first-hand knowledge of the condition of the roads based on everyday use.
The Road Watch experience of Iloilo was fruitful particularly due to the participation of an NGO network called Iloilo Caucus of Development Non- Government Organizations, Inc. (ICODE) which partnered with the Transparency and Accountability Network. ICODE also approached the initiative effectively and was able to gather relevant documents from DPWH in order to examine if corruption or questionable practices could be identified.
The DPWH and the volunteers also cooperated well with each other and cited the importance of collaboration. The Bantay Lansangan experience showcases how to effectively engage different actors in road monitoring. More significantly, Road Watch facilitates collaborative efforts between ordinary citizens and communities in the promotion of transparency and accountability (ansa-eap, 2010).
Legislature
An accountable government requires an effective oversight system which is the function of the legislative branch of government. In addition it provides checks and balances. In promoting good governance as a whole, the legislature and its capacity for oversight is a contentious issue. Discussion regarding the subnational legislatures and institutional actors, the political terrain, and Philippine decentralization must be explored further (Abellera, 2011).
The extent of public participation in legislation over taxation is limited. At the local level, this is a responsibility of the LGUs in creating their own sources of revenues. Though public participation is mandatory in the legislative process “which includes the conduct of series of consultations and public hearings as provided in the Local Government Code” (Magno, 2011, p. 23), and:
“The extent of people participation in the enactment of revenue codes, however, cannot be quantified. There is no published data as to how many people attend consultations and public hearings. What is available is the number of congress and local legislative council members who voted for or against a certain revenue code and more importantly, the amount of revenues raised as these national and local revenue codes are implemented. Direct people participation in revenue generation, obviously, is through the payment of these tax and non-tax revenues” (Magno, 2011, p. 23). 26
There is no law which requires public participation in this matter. Magno (2011) notes that much material regarding public finance has focused on the aspects of governance – transparency, budgeting and monitoring, “and their willingness to pay taxes” (Ahmad, 2008; Sirker, 2006; Ziria, 2008, as cited in Magno, 2011, p. 23). These are linked to citizen participation and their ability to access information regarding budgeting and expenditures in order to discern the quality and quantity of public services (Magno, 2011).
Provided in the Local Government Code of 1991, the powers of the legislature were devolved “allocating sub-national legislatures relevant law-making and oversight role” (Abellera, 2011, p. 294). In line with this devolution, the executive has the capacity “to introduce legislation affecting budget, taxation, expansion of employment in public service and other administrative matters […] Powers of executives would include ―sending notes to the local council, using veto power, appointing and removing subordinates, and preparing the budget” (Padilla, 1998, p. 40, as cited in Abellera, 2011, p. 298). However, for the purpose of this section, we will discuss budget scrutiny and public (e.g. citizens, CSOs, NGOs) participation in budget legislation.
Budget legislation should give way for other actors to conduct oversight. It has been noted by Abellera (2011) that CSOs, and even the media (as external actors), can be targeted in order to assist in the oversight function. It has been said that their presence has been favorable and has also “proven to be effective in demanding government accountability” (Abellera, 2011, p. 323). As such, it may be necessary to create partnerships with these actors and agencies, such as the COA, not only in overseeing the policies of government, but also in the budget process, especially implementation. Essentially, an accountability framework is stressed- one that is not only horizontal, but vertical as well (Abellera, 2011).
As mentioned previously, the budget legislation stage remains the most visible and tangible for citizen participation. One organization, Social Watch Philippines, has been active in this stage of the budgeting process, and has consistently monitored how the budget has been constituted. It has focused on social development. In order to participate in this stage, Social Watch submits alternative budgets. This has been called the Alternative Budget Initiative which has become a part of the stage. As mentioned earlier, these alternative budgets are subjected to hearings by the Appropriations Committee. Aside from Social Watch Philippines who have submitted alternative budgets since 2006, other groups have supported this initiative as well. In addition, “in terms of response, legislators sponsor items in the Alternative Budget Initiative and include these in the amendments” (Briones, 2011, p. 33).
Another aspect promoting citizen participation, especially by CSOs or NGOs, is contained in the LGC of 1991. Particular focus has been placed on their capability for 27
oversight as well as participation in policy-making at the local level (since they also become representatives for sectors while in the Local Development Councils). As such, these various groups, representing different sectors in development, can utilize their seats in the development councils to gather information regarding government plans and priorities as well as the allotment of funds for local development (Abellera, 2011).
In addition, CSOs can participate in public hearings “prior to the enactment of ordinances in which local people‘s voice are represented in the policy-making process” (Abellera, 2011, p. 320). However, Abellera (2011) identifies that “actual inclusion of civil society‘s voice in policy-making has yet to be realized since some LGUs only choose CSOs/NGOs that are allies of executives (e.g. Chamber of Commerce, Rotary Club, women organizations) to secure unopposed implementation of the executive agenda” (Abellera, 2011, pp. 320-321).
Various cases have documented how citizens can participate in oversight or how they can access information regarding the budget. It has been noted that urban groups or organizations have been more active in this as information is more accessible. The media who report on how the government spends the funds has been cited as one contributor to this. In addition, “the civil society can work in tandem with local media in demanding their representatives to employ oversight of local budgets and policies” (Abellera, 2011, p. 321).
In June 2009, the Provincial Engineering Office was found to have engaged in an infrastructure scam on their projects. This information spread quickly through the local media and newspapers, and resulted in CSOs demanding appropriate action to hold those involved in the case accountable. In effect, “the presence of several media groups and activities by the civil society has encouraged provincial officials to be more careful in their dealings and the legislature as the main oversight branch became more vigilant in overseeing annual budgets and disbursement of funds” (Abellera, 2011, p. 321).
According to McGee, et. al., (2003), generally governments at the local level can only legislate in a few matters of governance and not on aspects which focus on “the relationship between governors and the governed at the local level, which tend to be regulated by national laws” (p. 45). The author cites Naga City as a case example which does not depict a regulation from above.
Particularly, the author focuses on Naga City’s local legislation of its city council. This is illustrated by its 1995 Empowerment Ordinance which was passed at the local level by the Naga City Council. In Sections 2 and 3 of the Ordinance, citizen participation at the local legislature is made concrete. In Section 2 the Naga LGU should support the idea that “the will of the people shall always reign supreme” (McGee, et. al., 2003, p. 45), in sectorial concerns. It calls for people to organize themselves and form partnerships in order to address these concerns. Section 3 28
illustrates the partnerships. This would involve POs and NGOs “in the conception, implementation and evaluation of all government activities and functions” (McGee, et. al., 2003, p. 45). As such, this is an environment where CSOs’ roles in governance can be made more significant.
Supreme Audit Institutions
In the Philippines, there was a notable case in terms of auditing, particularly that which relates to participatory audit and procurement. In order to illustrate how citizens or CSOs can become engaged in the budget or fiscal processes, the case of the Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Government (CCAGG) and the case of Procurement Watch Inc. will be briefly outlined. This account will be drawn heavily from the 2007 UN report contributed by Anam, et. al. (2007) titled Auditing for Social Change: A Strategy for Citizen Engagement in Public Sector Accountability.
The CCAGG shows that NGOs and citizens can become engaged in a participatory audit through forming a partnership with the Commission on Audit (COA), the Philippines’ audit institution, and the NGO CCAGG. Procurement Watch Inc. is also an example of the latter, but deals more with transparency and accountability in the procurement process. Both cases depicted for possible replication in other governments (Anam, et. al., 2007).
CCAGG is notable for its participatory auditing and monitoring activities. Citizen participation was effectively harnessed by having members of the community in close proximity of a road project engage. The members of the organization- housewives, youth, and students- were charged with the duty of reporting observations to those in authority. Once they received the reports, the details were re-evaluated at the site of the project. The NGO served as the main investigator.
As such, due to CCAGG’s role in preventing corruption in implemented projects in Abra, the COA decided to partner with the organization in order to make way for a participatory audit of the government in the region. It also undertook an assessment of the audited government “to determine whether the program/project achieved its desired results” (Ramkumar and Krafchik, 2007, p. 40). This was supported by the UNDP and, when ended, was deemed to have reached the desired goals. As a result of this fruitful partnership with a Supreme Audit Institution (SAI), a manual on participatory auditing was made and published. Still, obstacles during the process were identified. First, the COA did not want to reveal initial audit findings to the community. The CCAGG identified this restricted access to information by “losing potentially valuable findings” (Ramkumar and Krafchik, 2007, p. 40). The set-up and the participatory audit itself could not be made sustainable after the COA administration changed. Therefore, participatory audit activities were deprioritized when other COA plans were deemed more urgent.
29
Within procurement, Procurement Watch Inc. and the COA cooperated with each other in undertaking an audit of the procurement process and passing procurement reform law. The COA was mainly responsible for providing PWI valuable procurement documents which the organization used to measure any level of corruption in the processes of procurement. Ramkumar and Krafchik (2007) note that the cooperation of both actors, especially because the organization was “specialized” in procurement, contributed to reinforcing the performance of procurement audits.
The paper now turns to recent developments in furthering the operationalization of governance and related aspects. This section will not be exhaustive, but will serve as an overview and update of said developments. It will enumerate and identify these developments in various governance areas as a whole.
Citizens can engage in government auditing in various ways. Citizens, CSOs, media, and special interest groups have a venue in audit participation. They can give feedback by identifying cases of corruption and reporting these findings to COA. For example, COA’s Fraud Alert, an online form which is filled out on their website, lets citizens report instances of fraud and misuse of funding by the government. It also has the COA Citizen’s Desk (email and phone) which also allows for citizen feedback. In addition, the website features a summary of complaints and the corresponding responses submitted to COA.
They can also give feedback on the performance of government offices and concerns regarding external actors such as the business sector. Awareness can be forged between civil society and the media. Civil society can arrange for public forums where dialogues concerning service delivery issues can be launched. The media, on the other hand, can disseminate government information, thereby making it more mainstream. The media also can play a strong role in audit advocacies and can gain the support of citizens.
Civil society has larger support when it comes to the aspect of monitoring. It is key for spreading information from COA findings and may bring these to the attention of the authorities who they believe can address them. Civil society, in their monitoring function, can also do follow-ups from these findings. In the advocacy aspect, civil society can pressure the government and can create “Integrity Circles” which have roles during consultations. Development partners and donors, such as the World Bank, also provide pressure in terms of policies regarding the budget and lending matters.
In joining the participatory audit, civil society organizations can undertake independent Budget Analysis and can formulate relevant indicators or measures for the Citizens Participatory Audit (CPA). Experts from academia and think tanks can provide technical assistance through data analysis and valuable research. In addition, these actors can also formulate transparency and performance indeces for 30
assessing the government services (Ayaso-Talavera, 2012, as cited in iKwenta, 2013).
Empowerment Fund for Participatory Governance
The following is drawn from the Peoples Budget 2013 report. The EFPG facilitates grant-giving which offers CSOs funding to support participatory governance processes as well as capacity-building, community activities, and projects. This fund intends to support poverty reduction mechanisms for marginalized sectors and impoverished communities. It seeks to capacitate CSOs and other groups through involvement in participatory processes; to improve CSO/government partnerships at the local level particularly in planning, budgeting, and implementation; and to harmonize NGO and government funding (which lend support to CSO and government involvements at the sub-national level).
The EFPG lets qualified and accredited CSOs and NGOs function as intermediary fund managers who will become involved in grant agreements with the DILG. Those who do not belong to any network may pick the organization which complies with the criteria for accreditation. Through a Memorandum of Agreement they can become intermediary funding institutions. Also, they may arrive at sub-contractor agreements with involved organizations in project activities at the local level.
At the local level, organizations implement projects with CSOs. These projects are implemented in impoverished sectors, or areas of the community, and support through funding is given to CSOs by the IMFs. The CSOs, on the other hand, remain accountable for the funds provided by their donors and private local funding institutions. These organizations can become direct partners and project implementers. As projects are being implemented, local organizations previously unaffiliated with consortiums showing reliable records, can eventually apply for accreditation. In turn, the DILG provides technical assistance to local organizations relating to the planning of projects. The empowerment projects require that CSOs will be represented in Local Special Bodies and other inter-local mechanisms.
CSOs and governments shall also participate in initiatives for good governance in order to enhance their participation in BUB, Full Disclosure Policy, SGP, Local Governance Performance Management System, PCF, among others in order to promote transparency and accountability. In effect, they shall formulate, execute, and monitor various areas for governance. This will include the expertise of the academe and media CSOs in order to build up efforts. The eligible projects and activities should cover agrarian reform, fisheries reform, environment, climate change adaptation, safe and secure shelter and habitats for urban communities, indigenous peoples’ rights, gender and development, women’s human rights, peace building, basic education, and public health.
31
The projects which are ineligible are those relating to scholarships or formal academic training programs and the like, direct community level projects such as livelihood programs and basic services, faith-based activities with the purpose of converting or evangelization, construction of physical infrastructure, and regular CSO support for their operations.
For the next section, several initiatives will be described which aim to respond to the call for enhanced transparency, accountability, and LGU participation. These are relevant to good governance and help build greater foundations for its approach.
Local Governance Watch
The Local Governance Watch, or LG Watch, is a social accountability mechanism that seeks to improve and foster greater participation of CSOs and citizens in local governance. Participation entails building greater transparency and accountability, especially in service delivery and the execution of programs. The LG Watch expects to increase the capacity of CSOs in engaging in public administration or local governance processes. In line with this, CSOs are able to involve themselves in planning, monitoring, and evaluating various projects and programs. This is made possible through effective CSO-government collaboration. The LG Watch has three major components, namely, Citizens Satisfaction Index System (CSIS), Civil Society Participation Fund (CSPF), and the Capacity Development for Civil Society Organizations (CDCS).
The CSIS will function as a feedback mechanism for the Local Government Performance Management System (LGPMS). Furthermore the CSIS was designed in order to determine any loopholes or gaps in the delivery of services, and “determine citizens’ awareness and satisfaction along the various areas of local governance, and provide the basis for appropriate policy recommendations and positive interventions to enhance local service delivery” (BLGS, 2011, p. 32). The LGPMS serves as a mechanism for assessing and evaluating the performance of local government units. The CSIS is also a platform for citizen feedback on service delivery. It was piloted in 2012 in 7 LGUs.
The Civil Society Participation Fund (CSPF) will give incentives or benefits to those CSOs who are active in their involvement with LGUs in the area of local development. This gave small grants to 12 CSOs in 2012. Also, the CDCS involves enhancing CSO skills and knowledge in local governance processes. The CSPF is a grant facility and provides CSOs an enabling environment in the decision-making processes of government.
The CSO or People’s Participation Partnership Program will be able to enhance DILG-CSO partnerships as well as the private sector by forming an initiative which will promote CSO participation in regional management coordinating committees and local special bodies or LSBs. This partnership also aims to capacitate CSOs’ roles 32
in good governance. The LG Watch is actually a component of the People’s Participation Partnership Program.
Seal of Good Housekeeping
The Seal of Good Housekeeping is an award system which is given to local government units who have exemplified aspects of transparency, accountability, participation, and overall performance. The 2011 BLGS report states that “a total of 1,323 LGU comprising of 70 provinces, 110 cities and 1,143 municipalities passed the criteria set by the Seal” (p. 17). The LGUs must have sound fiscal management and comply with the Full Disclosure Policy. This qualifies them to access the Performance Challenge Fund or PCF which provides financial support to be used in the respective LGUs’ projects. These projects must parallel the Millennium Development Goals. In 2012, new criteria was created, and it has three categories. These are bronze, silver, and gold. The bronze category focuses on accountability and transparency, the silver category has the same focus but emphasizes the delivery of services. The gold category includes the aforementioned with an emphasis on a participatory system or mechanism. Annual targets have been set from 2013 to 2016 which sought to increase the number of LGU eligibility for SGH (DILG-NCR, 2012; OGP Country Assessment Report, 2013).
Full Disclosure Policy (FDP)
The FDP is a major criterion for the Seal of Good Housekeeping (SGH). At the local levels of government (provinces, cities, municipalities), local officials have to comply with the full disclosure of information and fiscal documents. This information, if fully disclosed, promotes an informed citizenry regarding the budget and its allocation, management, and utilization. In order to promote this, the documents should be displayed in three places and in the FDP Portal (for viewing, downloading, and printing) for public access. Also, these can be disseminated through traditional media and online (websites). Memorandum Circular No. 2011-134 states that the Local Chief Executives must make these documents available to the media, civic, basic sector, and business groups. When this circular was issued in 2011, it was instructed that it must be disseminated by all DILG Regional Directors and the ARMM Regional Governor (DILG Memorandum Circular No. 2011-134, 2011). It is hoped that by 2016, all LGUs will have complied by posting their vital documents concerning the use of their funds in the three conspicuous places (bulletin boards, traditional media, and websites). The Full Disclosure policy Portal has been launched where budget information is disclosed online.
Performance Challenge Fund
The PCF is an incentive which is given to LGUs who have passed the SGH. It is also a form of funding for the LGU projects identified in their Annual Investment 33
Program in line with national development priorities. This is “funded out of the 20% Local Development Fund” (NCR- DILG, 2012, par. 1). Like the SGH, the fund should be used to fulfill the MDGs as well as “maintain core road network to boost tourism and local economic development” (DILG-NCR, 2012, par. 1). PCF-funded projects may be in the areas of infrastructure, health, tourism, and environment, among others.
The recent 2013 Philippines Country Assessment Report noted that the PCF implemented by the DILG had achieved the following: 515 LGUs became recipients of the PCF. With the help of the improved PCF website, status reports on the PCF funded projects could be posted (DILG-NCR, 2012).
Local Governance Performance Management System (LGPMS)
The LGPMS is an online platform (web-based tool) which engages citizens to provide feedback regarding LGU service delivery. This tool uses a results-based approach in terms of how an LGU manages its resources and provides telling in formation on its performance. From this collection of information as provided by the citizens, an annual report is released which includes information regarding the LGU’s performance on good governance indicators and in various areas such as administration, social services, and environmental management, to name a few. The Annual State of Local Governance Report, or SLGR, can be downloaded from the website. The LGPMS also include a LGU Scorecard on health and local tourism.
The LGPMS is crucial for LGU access to the SGH Gold category and for the Gawad Pamanang Lahi award. This is an award given to LGUs (in provinces, cities, and municipalities) who have shown outstanding performance in aspects concerning economic development, environmental management, social services, among others. The LGPMs web-based tool is useful for this since it identifies LGU performance.
The Gawad gives a Regional Award every year and a National Award every three years. The Regional Award for an LGU must show that the LGPMS Overall Performance Index scores a 4.00 and must be the bearer of an SGH silver category. The National Award requires the recipient to have an LGPMS OPI average of 4.31 and have three SGHs in the silver category. It also must have been awarded any national level awards in the aspect of governance. The 2013 Country Assessment report reported that 48 LGUs were granted the Gawad Pamana ng Lahi award (DILG-NCR, 2012).
DILG’s role is also very relevant in LGU accountability, transparency, and good governance. Likewise, the DILG and the LGUs are to work together in making available the venues for citizen participation. The DILG-LG Local Sector Framework illustrates how the Social Contract can be fulfilled. In order to achieve inclusive growth and poverty reduction, there is a need for collaboration and cooperation on 34
the side of the central government, the citizens, and the private sector as well as the LGUs. In order to improve sustainability, the LGUs are to be made more self- sufficient and less dependent on the national government. The framework emphasizes that peace and law and order in LGUs must be enhanced. The DILG promises programs that will respond to local economic development, environmental management and protection, and poverty reduction. However, this can only be achieved if other sectors, such as government agencies and CSOs, work together to create an enabling environment for the fulfillment.
An accountable and transparent government can be achieved if it allows participation, and internal development can be assessed by the performance of the LGU and its offices and the management and quality of service delivery. This is a process which will be a supervisory task of the DILG. It has been identified by the DILG that programs and projects which exhibit the principles of good governance must be sustained and maintained. The role of DILG in good governance will demand it to strengthen its internal system as well as establish strong partnerships in order to address any gaps and limitations in its practice.
DILG’s outcome areas and programs for the Fiscal Year 2014 to 2016 focus on SGH competitiveness, awards related to the protection of the environment and climate change adaptation, and disaster resiliency. It also focuses on creating safe LGUs which uphold social protection as well (e.g. Bottom-Up Planning and Budgeting, among others). Particularly, the SGH and PCF will determine exemplary LGUs who exhibit accountability, transparency, and effective participation of citizens in good governance (e.g. Full Disclosure Policy and Full Disclosure Portal, LG Watch and Citizen’s Satisfaction Index System, Civil Society Participation Fund, Capacity Development for CSOs, among others).
The above outcomes, however, will require mechanisms that will embody constructive engagement and collaboration with the government and various other actors concerned in exacting social accountability and future Philippine development as a whole. Furthermore, these must facilitate a systematic engagement of CSOs and citizens (who are also the beneficiaries of government services).
In order to describe participation in budgetary or fiscal matters, a few case studies will be outlined in the next section. These will focus on how participation can be undertaken and will identify the challenges that remain in the participatory process.
Section 3: Case Studies
NAMFREL-DOH Medicine Monitoring Project 2 (MMP2)
35
The following is drawn from the 2012 NAMFREL project completion report on medicine monitoring report 2. Focusing on procurement, monitoring, and delivery of medicines, NAMFREL and the Coalition Against Corruption (CAC) with the Department of Health (specifically its Integrity Development Committee) signed a commitment to cooperate for said project (MMP2). The project deals with the procurement, monitoring, and delivery process, and also addresses the aspects of transparency and accountability in all hospitals and health centers (covering selected areas in National Capital Region, Northern Luzon, Southern Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao).
The project was supported by the Partnership for Transparency Fund (PTF) and was undertaken in 28 DOH Retained Hospitals and centers in the Philippines. MMP2 covers the second phase of the project which includes budgeting and the pre- bidding stage (before delivery of medicines and drugs). In line with aspects of transparency, this project sought the participation of CSOs in the procurement process, thereby expanding from phase one which included their participation in the bidding process of medicines, the procurement of hospital supplies and services, to monitoring hospitals and regional health centers under the Government Procurement Reform Act or GPRA.
The project used, as framework to monitor the procurement of medicines, the tools by Procurement Watc, Inc., namely, the Public Bidding Checklist and the Diagnostic Report. This tool provided the information where medicine procurement was lacking such as discrepancies in the medicine procurement process with the GPRA in a year. In all, the tool identified questionable practices in procurement and the performance of the health authorities in procuring medicines and other hospital supplies and equipment.
Those who volunteered to implement the project attended an orientation and training on GPRA 9184 and its Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations. The objective, and significance, of the training was to raise volunteers’ awareness and provide them with adequate knowledge on the bidding process, harness oversight of the committee handling the bidding and awards to insure compliance with the GPRA, as well as being transparent and accountable in procurement. Consultations and meeting with the hospital staff (Supply Officers and Pharmacy Officers) and the Bidding and Awards Committee was undertaken from November to December (2010) in order to generate their backing for the project. In March and July 2011, consultations were undertaken to assess the experiences of the volunteers during the project’s implementation. It was identified during this consultation that procurement monitoring needed validation through obtaining hospital documents.
In all, this project aimed to enhance the delivery of health services and to seek out inconsistencies in procurement and monitoring. Most of all, the project intended to promote the participation of citizens in the processes, especially in monitoring, thereby safeguarding transparency and efficiency of hospitals and regional health 36
centers and their delivery of services. The project was made possible due to its partners – CSOs, provincial NAMFREL chapters, and private sector groups who undertook project implementation while being coordinated by the NAMFREL Secretariat. Volunteers were generated or recruited by the partners and were made responsible in observing the BAC in the procurement process. The volunteers had to write reports about their observations which their team leaders submitted to the secretariat. Those who were selected for the project were based on COA’s two reports (one from 2004 and the other from 2008) which identified the various inconsistencies in procurement in these DOH hospitals. Most notably, the areas were chosen according to the activeness of citizen participation in good governance.
In its project overview, the PTF reports that there were 32 volunteers in October of 2010 and 18 provincial team leaders. There were 14 volunteers working in the field who participated in a training on GPRA 9184. The volunteers reported in November of 2010 that they had conducted their monitoring activities on Php 184.1 million worth of medicine and supplies, as well as equipment and infrastructure projects, in 7 out of the 21 hospitals. In February of 2011, the procurement and monitoring activities were still engaged in by the volunteers. They were also in the process of securing documents from the hospitals and regional health centers that would securing said process by validating beneficiaries received quality health services and medicines as specified in contracts.
The volunteers monitored the bidding process and were to check this with the Annual Procurement Plan or APP to verify if the drugs or medicines were approved by Philippine National Drug Formulary (PNDF). In monitoring delivery, the volunteers had to monitor if there was a Notice to Proceed, review if the Notices of Award listed the total number of quantities and the list of drugs and the like, review purchase orders, and answer the Inspection and Acceptance Form which specified the drugs to be delivered as well as their batch number and expiry dates. When delivery was accomplished, the volunteers were responsible for monitoring inventory and submitting an inventory monitoring report.
There were several challenges in monitoring such as volunteers not being able to attend or insufficient attendance during the bidding process’ stages, issues in obtaining the needed hospital documents, and difficulty in recruiting volunteers since monitoring is a heavy task to undertake, among others. Results of the final report by NAMFREL find that the project has improved procurement in health services and has contributed to its efficiency as well. In summary, the report identifies that public bidding has become more transparent and compliant with GPRA 9184. Furthermore, NAMFREL has made this process more inclusive and has made volunteers as Official Observers and members of the Integrity Development Committee in the stages of the public bidding process. Efficiency of the delivery of health services showed that Php 302.51 million worth of medicines were monitored. These complied with the contract. In addition, these were delivered on time. The report identifies that as much as Php 175.89 million worth of medicines were 37
received by the beneficiaries. In terms of storing medicines or drugs, the volunteers’ feedback was vital in improving the warehouses or storage areas where these medicines or supplies were being kept (this was feedback identified in phase one of the project). Lastly, the bidding process may have been made more competitive. This makes hospitals and health centers more aware in choosing the best bid price in the process (PTF, 2013).
G-Watch
Ramkumar (2008) in “Our Money, Our Responsibility: A Citizens' Guide to Monitoring Government Expenditures published by the International Budget Partnership (IBP) discusses citizen participation by a CSO that partnered with the government in the procurement, monitoring, and delivery of textbooks to schools. G-Watch was formed in 2000 and is an anti-corruption initiative by the Ateneo School of Government. G-Watch is known for partnering rather heavily with CSOs, especially in the monitoring of the budget. The Philippines has experienced corruption in the education sector since the 1990s in the form of failing to deliver textbooks, as well as their being in poor condition (OECD, 2006, as cited in Ramkumar, 2008). Thus, it was in 2003 that the Textbook Count Program was created which became part of G-Watch.
This program relied on the civil society organizations’ participation in the procurement process as well as the monitoring of school textbooks. CSO participation has been vital to the program. Along with the participation of NAMFREL, who is an NGO also dealing with monitoring processes (e.g. in elections), G-Watch has also gained the participation of the Transparency and Accountability Network (TAN) which is a network of a various number of groups centered on aspects of transparency and accountability. In addition, students have also participated in anti-corruption initiatives. These are the Boy and Girl Scouts. Religious or faith-based organizations have also joined the program.
The Textbook Count case showcases a proactive role that civil society can play in the bidding process, thereby ensuring that textbooks are not only delivered, but are of quality as well. Ramkumar (2008) bases his case study on the 2006 report of G- Watch in which it presents the results of the program from the previous year. Citizen participation was carried out in the following activities: monitoring of the bidding process, inspecting the textbooks or conducting a quality check, and monitoring textbook delivery and distribution. In the first activity, G-Watch was primarily responsible for observing the bidding process by the department of education. This also included pre-bidding, pre-awarding, and the issuance of contracts. The CSOs, or volunteers, were responsible for checking that the submitted bids complied with the requirements.
The inspection of the textbooks was undertaken by department officials and CSOs. Those who were part of the inspection team underwent a seminar which presented 38
to them the process of book production, the book printing process, and the constraints or issues that could be found in these. They were also trained in the inspection process. The team’s responsibility was to inspect the three printing presses that won the contracts and inspect their overall production process or 10 percent of the stock of production. If any shortcomings were detected, the supplier was tasked to correct these errors. To verify if the supplier complied, the team conducted follow-up visits.
In order to monitor the delivery of textbooks and their distribution, the program needed a large number of volunteers. In the case study by Ramkumar (2008), he notes that around 6,000 volunteers from CSOs were needed in order to deliver textbooks to 4,800 locations. The Textbook Count Program proved to be efficient and effective. The Department of Education put the suppliers under pressure to fix their delivery schedules so that volunteers could be present at the same time they were being delivered. It was the responsibility of the department to submit a list of areas where these textbooks would be sent and how many would be delivered as determined by schedule. Reciprocally, G-Watch submitted to the department and the suppliers a list of individuals who would monitor their delivery activities. G- Watch also administered the duties of the volunteers and issued the needed materials for their monitoring activities. For those who volunteered, an orientation was held to familiarize the volunteers with the delivery and inspection process. However, issues were still present in the monitoring process like discouraging delays in textbook delivery.
Fortunately, the program proved to be beneficial in a number of ways. Like the first case, the process of bidding became more competitive which paved the way for the lowering of textbook prices (in half) resulting in savings. Those textbook that suffered in quality were replaced. In this particular aspect, CSO participation proved to be vital. The members of CSOs participated in 19 out of 25 inspections to the suppliers. “During these visits, approximately 165,000 textbooks were inspected, 13 percent of the total number procured. The inspections led to the repair or replacement of approximately 62,000 defective textbooks, worth approximately 3 million Philippines Pesos (US $61,000)” (Ramkumar, 2008, p. 61).
About 76 percent of the areas for the delivery of textbooks were monitored by volunteers. It was noted “approximately 767,000 textbooks costing approximately 47 million Philippines Pesos (or US $1 million)” were delivered (Ramkumar, 2008, p. 61). This has improved as there was a lower percentage of textbooks delivered in the past (only 40 percent). However, even though the program was largely a success, challenges remained. Issues that came up were attributed to delays in delivery, inadequate identification of poor quality textbooks, and the issue of insufficient funding to deliver textbooks in schools located in rural locations. A company, Coca Cola, has undertaken this delivery but was met with criticism. A Textbook Walk was launched after the 2006 Textbook Count Program
39
in order to help extend textbook distribution. The schools and the community members were mobilized for this endeavor.
For the Textbook Walk, 12 districts were selected from their divisions: Siargao (Dapa West, Socorro West, General Luna) and Davao Oriental (Mati North, Mati South, Mati Central), four from Negros Oriental (Dauin, Bindoy, Zamboanguita, Sibulan) and two from Bayawan City (Bayawan East, Bayawan West) [Government Watch-Ateneo School of Government, 2007]. From these districts schools were selected for the Textbook Walk which was organized by the Boy Scouts and the Girl Scouts and the District Offices. These schools were selected through criteria which identified their capability to provide food and transportation and overall finances of the school. The schools mobilized their school staff such a Parent-Teacher Community Associations in order to become a member of the Community Coordinating Team which would handle the Walk. Other representatives in this committee came from the Girl Scouts and Boy Scouts as well as NAMFREL councilors. They would be in charge of the management of the Textbook Walk at the district and school levels. In addition, volunteers from CSOs were in coordination with them and handled the monitoring of textbooks as they were being transported to the schools. The Textbook Walk was also being reported by CSOs.
The 2007 report of Government Watch-Ateneo School of Government identified that the Textbook Count is becoming localized. The activity showcased a certain level of ownership by the community and schools who participated in the activity. The report notes, however, that dependency of the community still needs to be addressed in textbook distribution. Fortunately, in February of 2007DepED Order No. 59, series of 2007 was signed. It was called “Institutionalizing NGO and Private Sector Participation in the Department’s Procurement Process” and promises to enhance the participatory process. It has been noted that a institutionalization study written in 2006 stated that the DepEd Order is “beneficial to civil society because it “expands the scope of monitoring, lowers barriers to participation by organized groups, and deepens the cadre of procurement observers/monitors to include concerned but unorganized citizens” (Government Watch-Ateneo School of Government, 2007, p. 29).
Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Governance
The Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Governance, or CCAGG, is a NGO that engages in project monitoring in the Abra region. It was established in the late 1980s when it saw the potential of CSOs for taking part in development programs outlined during the Corazon Aquino administration. The CCAGG monitored infrastructure projects in the region and utilized the community-based approach. In order to facilitate this, the NGO signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) for the project monitoring activities. Subsequently, trainings were undertaken in order to familiarize volunteers with the process of project monitoring and related activities. 40
Under the project monitoring activity, volunteers were to observe the construction of roads or bridges, and especially contract compliance in infrastructure projects. After the volunteers reported their findings, they were verified by the civil engineers and then reported. CCAGG is a notable case of participatory audit since it was awarded an Integrity Award by Transparency International in 2000. CCAGG is also significant since it provides the local community a degree of empowerment by fighting corruption and dishonesty in development projects.
CCAGG started its project monitoring after the Corazon Aquino administration implemented the Community and Employment Development Program (CEDP) which was under NEDA. The program had various projects aimed at health, education, and infrastructure. Those who benefited from these projects were made employees. CSOs participated for monitoring duties. One of these was the CCAGG who signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with NEDA. The NGO was then trained on project monitoring and provided the necessary information to start their monitoring activities.
CCAGG reported regularly to NEDA and provided its own recommendations for the projects it monitored. Vital to the project monitoring activity, CCAGG also trained the beneficiaries of the projects in order to further include them in the monitoring process. In addition, the NGO was proactive in engaging local media (print and radio) in the dissemination of information regarding what they were doing and the stages of project implementation.
The monitoring of the projects proved to be fruitful in identifying corruption and dishonesty (e.g. they found that funds for the project were embezzled). Projects were not being reported correctly. Specifically, some projects were reported as complete when they showed otherwise. One case revealed a lack of transparency and accountability of an infrastructure project. This case became high profile after a local newspaper reported that the DPWH office of the region accomplished 27 projects. The CCAGG, knowing the truth, decided to respond appropriately.
The NGO sought to provide and present evidence that these projects had not been finished by documenting the project sites. In addition, the CCAGG engaged local community members living in proximity to these project sites to report their observations and/or findings. Photographic evidence was also used. After completing documentation, the CCAGG submitted these to the national office of the DPWH. Due to the report, the district office of the DPWH was investigated through a national audit. The findings of the audit supported the report of the CCAGG.
Appropriate action was undertaken, and those involved in the projects were punished. However, they also sought leniency and official reprimand for their mishandling of the projects. As a response to this, the CCAGG asked the citizens for assistance. Specifically, they sent telegrams to the office of the secretary of the 41
DPWH insisting that proper action be undertaken. This proved to be effective as the 11 civil engineers of the government were later suspended. Those of higher position in the DPWH of Abra (chief and deputy chief engineer of the DPWH in Abra) were no longer allowed to practice in the region.
The CCAGG case is often cited in literature or studies dealing with anti-corruption, transparency, and accountability, and in a larger context because it portrayed the effectiveness of civil society organizations and citizens exerting united effort in goal achievement. The participatory audit showcased by the CCAGG and community members catapulted the CSO to the position of monitoring any project before it would eventually be funded in the region. In 1988, the administration gave it a Presidential Citation because of its activities and services to the community and its role of implementing the development project of the administration.
Indeed, this case showed the potential of CSOs collaborating with ordinary citizens and agencies, and eventually with the government itself. The Commission on Audit (COA) decided to partner with CCAGG directing participatory audits. Conducting these participatory audits was made possible by the support of the UNDP. From this successful partnership, the COA later published a manual describing the lessons and experiences from the participatory audits conducted. Aside from becoming a member of the Multi-Sectoral Anti-Corruption Council (MSACC) of the government, the CCAGG also chairs the Philippine Road Watch dealing with DPWH procurement and conducts training with CSOs in public works monitoring and other government programs.
This was not without challenges. Ramkumar and Krafchik (2007) found the common issue was the audit methodology of CCAGG. This methodology conflicted with COA who asked that results of the audit be revealed at the end of the process or after the project, whereas the CCAGG sought to release the information prior to the project. Another issue was the sustainability of the participatory audit, particularly its sustainability as a priority (IBP, n.d.).
Alternative Budget Initiative (ABI)
For different policy arenas, the ABI by Social Watch Philippines focuses on participatory budgeting done by various NGOs who present alternative budgets per sector as outlined in ABI reports. In this way civil society groups are able to participate in budget preparation so that the government can be made more accountable and uphold development priorities. During the 2012 budget call, consultations with CSOs, the private sector, and government agencies were undertaken. These consultations were significant in that these stakeholders could give feedback regarding the budget and its programs. These pilot consultations would be implemented by various agencies, namely, the Department of Agriculture, Department of Agrarian Reform, Department of Education, Department of Health,
42
Department of Public Works and Highways, and the Department of Social Welfare and Development. CSO participation would be made possible through consultations.
The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) with CSOs held meetings in 2010 and 2011 to draft a DBM circular which would support CSO engagement. This circular (National Budget Memorandum 109) would institutionalize CSO participation in budget preparation. However, the ABI criticized this as being limited to CSO monitoring only. Under this, The DBM implements CSO participation through a formal engagement, the Budget Partnership Agreement (BPA). In the 2012 budget preparation phase, CSO participation has been done outside NBM 109. Thus, the CSOs are given free reign under the BPA.
In 2012, notable cases have been identified that made CSO participation possible in budgetary processes. These have been documented in the education, health, and agriculture sector. In short, all of these sectors displayed that the participatory budgeting process could influence vital points in the budget and created more relevant partnerships. More importantly, CSO engagement with other partners helps broaden the spaces of participation and facilitates the growth of transparent and accountable practices.
Likewise, the 2013 Alternative Budget Initiative by Social Watch notes the proposed budgets by sector by which CSOs or NGOS could participate. For example, in the agricultural sector, the ABI has proposed that CSO participation be allowed in the Department of Agriculture’s formulation of commodity programs in order to support small farmers. This also includes taking note of how the budget will be implemented in said sector. The CSOs who proposed an alternative budget for the agricultural sector are also vying for the support of the procurement of palay and a sustainable farming system. In addition, they also are supporting the inclusion of a budget item which will focus on monitoring trade and create a smuggling watch.
These also showcase how civil society organizations can participate in Congress and propose their alternative budget proposals.
Bantay.ph
Bantay.ph “is a non-profit organization that aims to fight corruption in the Philippines by educating Filipinos about the Anti-Red Tape Act (ARTA), which was passed to improve efficiency in the delivery of government services” (Bantay.ph, 2013). Its goal is to “map and track reports on ARTA compliance and violation, including instances of graft and corruption” (Bantay.ph, 2013). Particularly, in order to promote citizen engagement, it has mobilized the youth in monitoring frontline services of the government. The volunteers who conduct the ARTA monitoring activities of government services are deputized by the Civil Service Commission (CSC). After having monitored the services, the volunteers report their findings to the CSC. They also engage in advocacy work in their schools and communities. The 43
official school partners of Bantay.ph are the University of the Philippines-National College of Public Administration, Ateneo de Manila University, and De La Salle University.
The Bantay.ph website maps out the ARTA compliance of the offices of the government and uses creative data visuals to simplify the data that is reported by the volunteers or shared by users of the website. In addition, the website allows users to see instructions on how they can report cases via mobile, submit a report online, print and post informative posters illustrating government services, apply to become a Bantay.ph volunteer, donate financially to support Bantay.ph, and communicate for partnerships.
The Bantay.ph and the Civil Service Commission conducted two spot-checks on May 2013. The first was undertaken in the GSIS-NCR office and the other in the Rizal Medical Center to check for compliance with ARTA. These government agencies were chosen due to their failure in the Report Card Survey, thus, a failure in complying with the ARTA. The Report Card Survey looks at compliance with the Citizen’s Charter (frontline services) properly labeled posters placed in strategic location and the like, to improve service delivery. Generally, both agencies were engaged in the process of complying with said criteria, and the outlook has been positive (Bantay.ph, n.d.).
Section 4: Outcomes
The Philippine case of civil society engagement shows that it is approaching a process of a more systematic and strengthened civil society. In essence, civil society engagement has moved towards the achievement of development outcomes, most significantly focusing on sectorial development (education, health, roads, among others) and pro-poor initiatives as well as an open and competitive environment for business and economic development. The Philippine case also illustrates that constructive and collaborative participatory governance can be achieved in the long run. The mode which the administration has used is inclusive and has made the role of civil society, citizen groups, and individuals more mobile. The aspects by which it helps the various groups thrive exists in its achievement of development goals and priorities that hinge upon the availability of an enabling environment that emphasizes accountability, transparency, and good governance.
In addition, aside from establishing reforms within the anti-corruption framework and motive of the administration, the promotion of participatory governance especially at the local level, creates better relationships with various actors and partners. These networks insure that building CSO and citizen capacity is possible.. An effective participatory approach supports civil society influence in policy direction and strategic decision-making as needed in budgetary and fiscal processes that concern Philippine development. Furthermore, creating a space for more local 44
government and civil society participation may help communities in local or community development planning.
The Philippines is moving towards institutionalizing or formalizing citizen engagement in areas of the budget process and service delivery, and eventually policy direction. Most significantly, the participatory tools and mechanisms showcase that citizens may engage beyond the electoral process. The transition of civil society and citizen engagement has opened spaces were citizen’s needs can be appropriately responded to. The discourse has put CSOs and citizens as “managers” of development priorities. The social contract as espoused by the administration has made the government an enabler of transparency and accountability in an effort to combat corruption and dishonesty.
The role of technology is evidently playing a large role in the process of good governance and has allowed citizens to provide feedback regarding government services and delivery. All the more, these have served as benchmarks or criteria in assessing the performance of LGUs and have provided incentives (e.g. PCF and SGH, among others) to those who prove exemplary in this field and who uphold good governance.
The most successful achievements of the current administration have been the initiatives for expanded participation in the budgetary processes. As illustrated in the 2013 People’s Budget, the move for reforms in citizen participation have been brought about by Bottom-Up Budgeting, an example of how to engage the local communities in addressing poverty and promoting empowerment in the development of plans. In the long run, participation in all phases of the budget process is sought. As such, the move to be more inclusive in the process is a developing opportunity for citizens and provides better ground for transparency and accountability in the management of the budget and addressing priorities of various sectors.
Along with the initiative for more venues for citizen participation, the government is also pursuing the streamlining of government services in order to better serve and become more efficient for the public. Also, in the prevention of corruption and promoting good governance, the services of the government and their management have included innovations such as digitizing these services. In addition, the move to make information to the public more accessible has included the initiative for more efficient services in transaction.
Significantly, the reforms of this administration have focused on the ways by which citizens may participate in the budgetary processes. Previously, this has been found to be strong in the auditing aspect as illustrated by the Commission on Audit’s Citizens Participatory Audit.
45
As seen the administration is increasingly vying for a more critical citizenry. This is a broad process which involves various actors who are concerned with the accountability process. In the country this has been displayed by the Citizens Participatory Audit of the Commission on Audit which has created specific areas where citizens can participate. The media has also been emphasized as having a role in the dissemination of information regarding issues which are meant to better inform the citizenry and make them aware of crucial developments in the field of good governance. It may be said that the approach undertaken by the government is bottom-up and not entirely vertical. As such, decision-making processes provide a venue for CSOs and citizens to open into important processes such as budgeting and auditing.
The participatory process does have limitations. This can be easily identified when looking into the participatory budgeting process. Although, there have been cases where participatory processes were effective, the argument remains concerning whether or not citizens and CSOs have enough knowledge or expertise to carry out the implementation of the budget as well as project monitoring.
Understanding the history of civil society and citizen participation in the Philippines means that these processes work within a context. Different individuals and groups have their strengths which can be harnessed. In all, the common goal of the administration is to create a knowledge base to increase information-sharing among CSOs, the private sector, and the government. CSO engagements that have been successful may have the potential to be scaled up and can be promoted for replication in other regions of the country.
Results of the participatory process vary, but further research and inquiry may still be needed. This is a question on how well integrated and how well citizens have been mobilized into the decision-making process of government. It must be said that to measure the impact of these results may be difficult to gauge as this is a question on the effectiveness of tools and measurements used in the participatory process. This may be best explained by looking into how citizens are being informed and the quality of that information. Also, to be considered is the quality of leadership of local chief executives and their commitment to engaging in participatory processes in each LGU. The degree of sustained participation is also an issue to consider in assessing the resources available to mobilize upon previously built the arrangements.
The citizen and state relationship will depend largely on how the democratic system will expand upon accountability mechanisms and the extant and developing constraints to achieving good governance. Participation, especially at the local level, must be enhanced in order to provide better leverage for development needs and to operationalize inclusive citizen engagement. The emphasis at the local level is given since most initiatives aimed at this level are undertaken by CSOs or NGOs who may undertake project execution, management, and monitoring. 46
Limitations to the success of a participatory process in the budgeting process involve organizational or structural management of the institutions working in this area. The question is how to best mobilize and operationalize citizen engagement in order to make it effective and efficient in various phases of the budget. Likewise, as has been mentioned, CSOs will need to be capacitated and made more familiar with the processes involved in budgeting. Along with this, directing resources to more relevant areas must be an essential objective. In addition, CSOs must be strengthened as the government takes on a more progressive approach to good governance.
In all, results may vary as we examine the two sides of the equation: the demand and the supply side of the participatory process and its dynamics. The question of how citizens may engage in the budgeting process must address the accessibility of vital information on fiscal documents. This information must be made more understandable or meaningful to CSOs in order for them to properly assess the contents. As such, vertical and horizontal relationships between different actors in the participatory process must consider the most favorable way by which they can undertake and harmonize their roles and functions in said processes while exercising transparency and accountability in service.
4.4 Motivating participation
Related to the above is the aspect of motivating citizens to participate. As identified in the Philippines’ Open Government Plan and in its Good Governance and Anti- Corruption Plan (GGAC) running until 2016, the country’s motivation in making participatory governance and its processes a major part of its plan can be identified. Aside from the current administration’s theme kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap, the question stands: how to operationalize citizen engagement in the budgetary processes? Initially, this was probably best answered through two of DBM’s national circulars (109; February 17, 2011 and 536; January 31, 2012) – Guidelines on Partnership And Participation of Civil Society Organizations And Other Stakeholders in the Preparation of Budget Proposals and Guidelines on Partnership with Civil Society Organizations and Other Stakeholders in the Preparation of Agency Budget Proposals. On the other hand, COA’s Citizens Participatory Audit has paved the way for citizen engagement in auditing.
Citizen engagement originates from a long history of Philippine experience in governance. It has been noted that citizen groups have been present for a very long time- since the Spanish period- only becoming more mobilized during the Marcos era and the Corazon Aquino administration. The objective at the time of the dictatorship was to overthrow Marcos. After this period, the 1987 Constitution “recognized the right of people and their organization (nongovernmental, community based, sectoral organizations, and independent people’s organizations)” to engage in decision-making processes (Philippines-Australia Public Financial 47
Management Program (PFMP)-AusAid, 2012, p. 4). As identified in the beginning of the report, the motivation for the participation of citizens and the willingness to engage the public in said process stems from the 1991 Local Government Code which retains a place for citizen participation in holding the government accountable.
The enabling environments for maximized citizen participation in the budget process for instance, local government units, have a vital role here. Good governance includes the delivery of services if done effectively. Also, when these processes show an improvement in government responsiveness, they may build people’s trust.
Participation provides incentives to both CSOs and officials who may adhere to calls for participation in order to broaden their political base and influence their performance at the polls. Likewise, public perception of these officials plays a role here. The ability to hold official accountable may mean that the management of resources can identify development trajectories to take bearing in mind the more disadvantaged sectors of the society. Incentives exist for CSOs to support participatory processes in that it may generate relationships with other actors or stakeholders. Though various CSOs may have different interests, one incentive is that they can influence decision-making as showcased in the preparation of the budget and in the Alternative Budget Initiative. Having this kind of participation, CSOs learn to engage with the government and government agencies. In line with this, it may be said that this kind of relationship, may provide a favorably enabling environment, and may contribute significantly to citizen participation in budgetary process. From this participatory process, patronage, traditional systems, and related issues may be addressed in order to facilitate overall development. This aspect remains to be seen as the country embarks on its agenda for good governance, accountability, transparency, and participation.
Citizen engagement in the Philippines may be said to not only be limited to participation in elections through voting, but may be seen, in the future, to progress towards engagement in the decisions of the national government. Also, it is more likely to see more good governance models at the local level if these are to continue to be pursued and sustained. The decentralized nature of the Philippines may have contributed to this development.
As such, not only should the government have reforms and a role in good governance, but the citizens are to be included. Advantageous to this scenario is the country’s vibrant civil society sector. Their role has already been documented in the history of Philippine transition to democracy and the move towards preventing corruption. Not only was citizen engagement a relevant part of this era, but also it served to influence future endeavors towards a good governance process. It may be said that from the events that occurred in the past to the Philippine system of today, the people should become more empowered in steering government processes and whether or not public access to information is truly present. On the other hand, the
48
delivery of government services especially at the local level offers more opportunities for citizen engagement. As mentioned in an earlier section of this paper, the Local Government Code of 1991 which mentions the role of CSOs in local development councils can contribute to this aspect.
The favorable environment for participatory processes may be best undertaken during the budgetary phases. When people are encouraged and informed about the possible ways for inclusion in decision-making such as through the Alternative Budget Initiative (ABI), it offers them meaningful reasons to participate. This is vital to the observance and response to development priorities management and distribution of the governmental service delivery. In this regard citizens, in a participatory system of governance, can provide feedback when benefits are deemed inadequate, have been subjected to corruption, inadequacies of good governance, and the related aspects of transparency and accountability. The Citizens Participatory Audit, for instance, may be one major contributor to transparency and participation for it presents how partnerships between actors is possible. Not only does this display participation, but also manifests collaboration towards a common objective. In all, the need for the engagement of truly informed citizens will become more significant.
Conclusion
The key features of participation show that citizens can become engaged in the phases of the budget although much remains still to be seen in this aspect of decision-making. What has been promoted by the current administration points to the fact that the system provides a more enabling environment for citizen engagement. In addition, greater attention has also been given to civil society and partnerships involving government agencies.
For this to happen more sustainably, the government will need to strengthen its initiatives against corruption and support the initiatives in progress as outlined in the Open Government Initiative. Advances in the area of CSO engagement will include how CSOs use their roles not only as watchdogs, but also as managers of resources. In the spirit of inclusivity, and through their advocacies and real action on the ground, CSOs may be able to effectively and efficiently provide the much needed cooperative mechanisms to facilitate the delivery of projects and expenditure management.
Improvements will soon be seen in the involvement of citizens in all phases of the budgeting process as well as in the auditing of government development projects. As such, the role of CSOs may be made more visible in exacting accountability from authorities. However, difficulties may arise in sustaining a trusting partnership or relationship with the central government and other vital actors. The trajectory by which the administration is handling the aspect of participation requires a shift in the structure of institutions as well as how the path of engagement with people is 49
developing. This may also be a question on how CSOs will treat the budget process as there may be contentions.
As these initiatives progress, later development may occur which may change the landscape further. It will be likely that the topic on participation and transparency will be further looked into by development practitioners and academics who are better equipped to explain and provide relevant discourse on aspects concerning citizen participation in governance process and government accountability.
Furthermore, the enabling environment of today will promote the innovation and creativity needed to enhance venues which grant open access to citizens in upholding good governance and preventing corruption. As such, the voice of CSOs becomes more relevant when the process of engagement comes to the attentions of institutions. CSOs should have a fluid space to participate, however, when this space becomes limited due to an interplay of factors such as the breadth of their participation or a lack of political will, then the hurdle is activated. Having said this, CSOs who do not have the resources to facilitate themselves and who lack the knowledge for doing so may be less critical and discerning of the government, its services, and overall performance. Internal and external CSO issues aside, the government must complete the equation of the participatory process. This does not necessarily diminish the fact that CSOs can generate their own opportunities which they will find advantageous and beneficial in difficult environments.
The direction which the current administration is undertaking focuses on improving accountability and participation. In the spirit of democracy, citizens will be made more integrated in government processes, especially those concerning the budget process, its implementation, and auditing. Citizen engagement mechanisms continue to become enhanced and can facilitate relationships with various actors resulting in beneficial outcomes and developments. This may depend on the participatory environment in the country. In essence, the current administration is building areas for the entry of citizen engagement. Through this process, development projects and programs can be implemented with the potential of sustaining engagement.
In all, there is still much to be improved upon in the plans and initiatives of governmental promotion of transparency and accountability. The current administration is heading down a positive path towards creating more venues for citizen engagement in processes of government as well as strides to prevent corruption. In the long run, the commitment to good governance may remain strong and the deepening of accountability, transparency, and participation may be continuously and sustainably maintained in a manner consistent with development priorities and issues.
50
51
Bibliography
2012 Philippine Open Government Partnership Country Assessment Report. (2013). Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines. Retrieved June 15, 2013, from http://www.gov.ph/2012-philippine-government-action-plan/
Abellera, E.M. (2011). Explaining Legislative Oversight in Philippine Sub-national Governments: Institutional Impediments in Good Governance. Nagoya Repository. Retrieved from http://ir.nul.nagoya-u.ac.jp/jspui/handle/2237/15880
Aceron, J. (2009). It’s the (Non-) System, Stupid!: Explaining ‘Mal-development’ of Parties in the Philippines. In Reforming the Philippine Political Party System: Ideas and initiatives, debates and dynamics, published by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Retrieved from http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/philippinen/07131.pdf
Ansa-eap. (2010). THE BANTAY LANSANGAN (ROAD WATCH) EXPERIENCE. Retrieved July 15, 2013 from http://www.ansa-eap.net/assets/200/59-1- 4_Bantay_Lansangan_Road_Watch_Experience.pdf
Arlegue, C. and Coronel, J.J. (2003). Philippines. In Political Parties in Asia Promoting Reform and Combating Corruption in Eight Countries, edited by Peter M. Manikas and Laura L. Thornton, ISBN 1-880134-32-2, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. Retrieved from http://www.ndi.org/files/1681_asia_polparties_050404.pdf
Bantay.ph. (n.d.). Hold your government accountable. Retrieved July 13, 2013, from http://www.bantay.ph
Barns, J. (2003). Engaged Governance. An overview of the Philippine experience. Retrieved from http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan014414.pdf
Blechinger, V. (2002). Corruption and Political Parties. Management Systems International. Retrieved from http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACT879.pdf
Brillantes, A., and Sonco, J.T. (2005). Citizen Participation in Sub-national Planning and Budgeting Processes . In Participatory Planning and Budgeting at the Sub-national Level, published by the United Nations. Retrieved from http://www.unpan.org/Portals/0/60yrhistory/documents/Publications/Participat ory%20Planning%20and%20Budgeting.2005.pdf
Briones, L. (1999). Public Financial Accountability for Integrity and Results: The Case of the PhilippineBureau of the Treasury. Asian Development Bank. Retrieved from http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/pub/1999/governance-corruption-public- financial-management.pdf
Bunbongkarn, S. (2004). The Role of Civil Society in Democratic Consolidation in Asia. In Growth and Governance in Asia, edited by Yoichiro Sato, Asia-Pacific Center for 52
Security Studies. Retrieved from http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/GrowthGovernance_files/ Pub_Growth%20Governance/Pub_GrowthGovernance%20book.pdf
Cheng, T. (2003). Political Institutions and the Malaise of East Asian New Democracies. Journal of East Asian Studies, 3(1). Retrieved June 23, 2013, from http://www.eai.or.kr/data/bbs/eng_jeas/2009070210201580.pdf
Croissant, A. (2004). From Transition to Defective Democracy: Mapping Asian Democratization. Universität Heidelberg. Retrieved from http://www.uni- heidelberg.de/imperia/md/content/fakultaeten/wiso/ipw/croissant/publications/ croissant_2004_transition_defective_democracy.pdf
Diokno, B. (2010). Philippine Fiscal Behavior in Recent History. Philippine Review of Economics. Retrieved from http://pre.econ.upd.edu.ph/index.php/pre/article/view/645
DILG-NCR. (2012). Seal of Good Housekeping. Retrieved July 13, 2013, from ncr.dilg.gov.ph/home/index.php/2012-05-26-06-07-22/capacity- development/seal-of-good-housekeeping
DILG-NCR. (2012).Performance Challenge Fund. Retrieved July 13, 2013, from http://ncr.dilg.gov.ph/home/index.php/2012-05-26-06-07-22/capacity- development/performance-challenge-fund
DILG-NCR. (2012). Local Governance Performance Management System. Retrieved July 13, 2013, from http://ncr.dilg.gov.ph/home/index.php/2012-05-26-06-07- 22/capacity-development/local-governance-performance-measurement-system
DILG-NCR. (2012). Gawad Pamana ng Lahi. Retrieved July 13, 2013, from http://ncr.dilg.gov.ph/home/index.php/2012-05-26-06-07-22/capacity- development/gawad-pamana-ng-lahi
Doraisami, A. (2011). The Global Financial Crisis: Countercyclical Fiscal Policy Issues and Challenges in Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore. ADBI Working Paper 288. Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute. Retrieved from http://www.adbi.org/files/2011.06.07.wp288.gfc.countercyclical.fiscal.policy.issues .challenges.pdf
Fionna, U. (2008). Political Parties in Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines: Reflections of democratic tendencies. MAKARA, SOSIAL HUMANIORA, VOL. 12, NO. 2: 65-71. Retrieved from http://repository.ui.ac.id/contents/koleksi/2/5969489587a6ecfb0418c77b2e8687 b648b52c18.pdf
53
Fölscher, A. (2007). Participatory Budgeting in Asia. In Participatory Budgeting, edited by Anwar Shah, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank. Retrieved from https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/6640/394980RE VISED0101OFFICIAL0USE0ONLY1.pdf?sequence=1
Government Watch-Ateneo School of Governement. (2007). PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT ON THE CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN TEXTBOOK COUNT 4. Retrieved July 12, 2013, from verafiles.org/docs/textbook-count4.pdf
Guinigundo, D. (2012). Fiscal policy, public debt management and government bond markets: the case for the Philippines. Bank for International Settlements. Retrieved from http://www.bis.org/search/?q=Fiscal+policy+public+debt+management+and+gove rnment+bond+markets%3A+the+case+for+the+philippines&mp=phrase&_st=false &c=10&sb=0
Halcon, N.A. and De Leon, L.M. (2004). Efficiency of Fiscal and Monetary Policies in the Philippines: the St. Louis Model Approach. Bangko Sentral Review. Retrieved from http://www.bsp.gov.ph/downloads/publications/2004/BSR2004b_04.pdf
Hedman, E. E. (2010). Democratisation & new voter mobilisation in Southeast Asia: Beyond machine politics?: Reformism, populism and Philippine elections. LSE Research Online. Retrieved from http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/43564/1/Democratisation%20%26%20new%20voter%20 mobilisation%20in%20Southeast%20Asia_beyond%20machine%20politics%28lse ro%29.pdf
Hutchcroft, P., and Rocamora, J. (2003). Strong Demands and Weak Institutions: The Origins and Evolution of the Democratic Deficit in the Philippines. Journal of East Asian Studies, 3(2). Retrieved June 23, 2013, from http://www.eai.or.kr/data/bbs/eng_jeas/200907021021520.pdf
IBP. (undated). Partnering to make budgets work. Retrieved July 21, 2013, from internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/Profile-of-CCAGG-Philippines- 2011.pdf i-Kwenta. (2012). The Citizen Participatory Audit. Retrieved from http://i- kwenta.com/audit-101/the-citizen-participatory-audit/
Ilagan, K. (2013). PH budget transparency score slips 7 pts; oversight improves « Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism. Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism. Retrieved July 10, 2013, from http://pcij.org/stories/ph-budget-transparency- score-slips-7-pts-oversight-improves-2/
54
Ilagan, K. (2013). Progress in public participation « Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism. Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism. Retrieved July 10, 2013, from http://pcij.org/stories/progress-in-public-participation/
IMF. (2013). Philippines: 2013 Article IV consultation Staff Report. IMF Country Report 13/102. Retrieved from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13102.pdf
Kawanaka, T. (2010). The Urban Middle Class in the Instability of New Democracies. Institute of Developing Economies. Retrieved from http://ir.ide.go.jp/dspace/bitstream/2344/922/1/ARRIDE_Discussion_No.260_kaw anaka.pdf
Keuleers, P. (2002). The role of the Governor and of the provincial administration: Comparative experiences. United Nations Development Programme Bangkok SURF. Retrieved from http://www.undp.or.id/programme/governance/role_of_the_governor- paper_020902.pdf
Krafchik, W. and Ramkumar, V. (2007). The Role of Civil Society Organizations in Auditing and Public Finance Management. In Auditing for Social Change: A Strategy for Citizen Engagement in Public Sector Accountability, published by United Nations. Retrieved from http://www.unpan.org/Portals/0/60yrhistory/documents/Publications/Auditing %20for%20Social%20Change.2007.pdf
Kuthy, D. (2011). The Effect of State Capacity on Democratic Transition and the Survival of New Democracies. Georgia State University Digital Archive @ GSU Political Science Dissertations. Retrieved from http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1020&context=political_s cience_diss
Magno, C. (2011). Towards an Informed Citizens’ Participation in Local Governance: Sourcebook on local public finance. Social Watch Philippines. Retrieved from http://socialwatchphilippines.org/images2/pub_sourcebook.pdf
Marsh, I. (2006). Democratization and State Capacity in East and Southeast Asia. Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 2, No. 2: 69-92. Retrieved from http://www.tfd.org.tw/docs/dj0202/04%20Ian%20Marsh.pdf
McGee, et. al. (2003). Legal Frameworks for Citizen Participation: Synthesis report. LogoLink. Retrieved from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPCENG/Resources/SynthesisRep-Web.pdf
Montes, M. F. (1991). Financing development: the political economy of fiscal policy in the Philippines. Manila: Philippine Institute for Development Studies. 55
People’s Budget 2013. (2013). Budget ng Bayan. Retrieved July 15, 2013, from http://budgetngbayan.com/peoples-budget-2013-2275/
Perron Campaigns. (2011). Resources. Retrieved July 21, 2013, from http://www.perroncampaigns.ch/resources.php
Perron, L. (2008). Election Campaigns in the Philippines. In the Routledge Handbook of Political Management, edited by Dennis W. Johnson. Retrieved from http://www.perroncampaigns.ch/uploads/files/File- 6_11_ArtikelRoutledge2_jan26.pdf
Poolitikang Pinoy 2010. (2009). A Look at Philippine Political Parties in Paper and in Practice. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Philippines, Volume 1, Issue 7: 1-8. Retrieved from http://www.fes.org.ph/media/uploads/documents/issue07_PoP2010_dec09.pdf
PTF. (2013). East Asia Projects for Transparency. Retrieved July 13, 2013, from http://ptfund.org/where-we-work/east-asia/east-asia-project-reports/
Quimpo, N. G. (2005). Oligarchic Patrimonialism, Bossism, Electoral Clientelism, and Contested Democracy in the Philippines. JSTOR: Comparative Politics, 37(2). Retrieved June 25, 2013, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20072884.pdf?acceptTC=true
Racelis, M. (2005). Civil Society, Populist Politics and the State – Philippine Democracy Today. Retrieved from http://www.die-gdi.de/CMS- Homepage/openwebcms3.nsf/(ynDK_FileContainerByKey)/ADMR- 7AWENW/$FILE/MAK-MRacelis-CivilSociety-Final.pdf?Open
Ragragio, J.M. (2013), A study on civil society-local government engagement towards transparency, accountability and responsiveness in governance draft for The Asia Foundation.
Ramkumkar, V. (2008). Our Money, Our Responsibility: A citizen’s guide to monitoring government expenditures. International Budget Project. Retrieved from http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/Our-Money-Our- Responsibility-A-Citizens-Guide-to-Monitoring-Government-Expenditures- English.pdf
Reilly, B. (2007). Electoral Systems and Party Systems in East Asia. Journal of East Asian Studies 7. Retrieved from https://cdi.anu.edu.au/.AP/2007- 08/2007_07_AP_RES_BR_East_Asian_Party_Systems/2007_07_AP_RES_BR_East_Asia n_Party_Systems.pdf
Republic of the Philippines Public Administration Country Profile. (2004). Division for Public Administration and Development Management (DPADM) & Department of
56
Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) United Nations. Retrieved from http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan023241.pdf
Rocamora, J. (undated). Philippine Political Parties, Electoral System and Political Reform. Retrieved from http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan006915.p df
Serrano, I. (undated). Civil Society in the Philippines: Struggling for sustainability. Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement. Retrieved from http://www.prrm.org/wp content/uploads/2009/11/civil.pdf
Shin, J. (2011). Why Personalistic Parties?: The Choice of Candidate-Centered Electoral Systems in New Democracies. University of California. Retrieved from http://www.scpi.politicaldata.org/SCPII/Shin-Choice%20of%20Candidate- Centered%20Electoral%20Systems.pdf
Soliman, S. M. (1997). The Philippines Tries the Party-List System (A Progressive Perspective). Kasarinlan, 13(2). Retrieved from http://www.journals.upd.edu.ph/index.php/kasarinlan/article/view/320/315
Teehankee, J. (2002). Electoral Politics in the Philippines. In Electoral Politics in Southeast & East Asia, edited by Aurel Croissant, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Retrieved from http://library.perdana.org.my/Digital_Content/PLF/000001/Electoral%20Politics %20in%20Southeast%20&%20East%20Asia.pdf
Teehankee, J. (2009). Citizen-Party Linkages in the Philippines: Failure to connect?. In Reforming the Philippine Political Party System: Ideas and initiatives, debates and dynamics, published by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Retrieved from http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/philippinen/07131.pdf
The PFMP launches its Strategy on Civil Society Engagement: Supporting the Enabling Environment for Civil Society Engagement in Public Financial Management in the Philippines. (2012).Philippines-Australia Public Financial Management Program (PFMP). Retrieved July 6, 2013, from http://pfmp.org.ph/index.php/hidden3/96- the-pfmp-launches-its-strategy-on-civil-society-engagement-
Trajano, J.C. (2012). Myanmar: Learning from the Philippines’ democratic transition. RSIS Commentaries. Retrieved from http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS1112012.pdf
Ufen, A. (2012). Party Systems, Critical Junctures and Cleavages in Southeast Asia.. SEARC Working Paper Series. Retrieved from http://www6.cityu.edu.hk/searc/Data/FileUpload/335/WP129_12_Ufen.pdf
57
Wurfel, D. (2004). Civil Society and Democratization in the Philippines. In Growth and Governance in Asia, edited by Yoichiro Sato, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. Retrieved from http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/GrowthGovernance_files/ Pub_Growth%20Governance/Pub_GrowthGovernance%20book.pdf
Working Papers . (2011). Southern California Comparative Political Institutions. Retrieved August 5, 2013, from http://www.scpi.politicaldata.org/?page_id=12
World Bank (2013). Philippine Economic Update: Accelerating reforms to meet the jobs challenge. Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit East Asia and Pacific Region. Retrieved from http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/EAP/Philippines /Philippine_Economic_Update_May2013.pdf
58