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NOV I 2 Zoos Uy Iviussaut: Jx'^Pb^ Reauestfokjsrieetinum Oln Secretary-General J »/F Fv) ^—) Hi Ffhlv Recommend That Secretarv-General Meet with \ "^R^I Adm

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NOV I 2 Zoos Uy Iviussaut: Jx'^Pb^ Reauestfokjsrieetinum Oln Secretary-General J »/F Fv) ^—) Hi Ffhlv Recommend That Secretarv-General Meet with \ Si'* Its ROUTING SUP FICHE DE TRANSMISSION TO: A: Mr. Kieran Prendergast, USG/DPA FROM: f) DE: Geir O. Pedersen, Director APD/DPA i/(\\h /W V Room No. - No de bureau S-3341 A Extension -Poste 7-5082 Date: 13 October 2003 FOR ACTION POUR SUITE A DONNER FOR APPROVAL POUR APPROBATION FOR SIGNATURE POUR SIGNATURE FOR COMMENTS POUR OBSERVATIONS MAY WE DISCUSS? POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER? YOUR ATTENTION VOTRE ATTENTION AS DISCUSSED COMME CONVENU AS REQUESTED XXX SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE RETURN ;=r"7r IP p fl TB 3TKR) JI^ER 1) GL ife 1^ H w Ojj FOR INFORMATION "V P }j| INFORMATION NOV i 2 zoos uy IVIUSSAUt: jX'^Pb^ ReauestfokjSrieetinUM Oln Secretary-General J »/f fv) ^—) Hi ffhlv recommend that Secretarv-General meet with \ "^R^i Adm. (ret.) Ami Ayalon and Prof. Sari Nusseibech from The Peoples' Voice. We have checkecTwith 'Mr. Roed-Larsen, who agress fully. If the Secretary-General is not available on the proposed dates (27 and 28 October), suggest that Mr. Prendregast meet. cc*v ' v t ' n FROM : FfiX NO. : Oct. 08 12: 57PM P r \ [3 IP i•r-^ r, rI _Js"J DOT - T FAX ko The Secretary General - PROM The Peoples' Voice Mr. Kofi Annan NO.PAGES 3 IF AX +1 -2 12-963-2 155 DATE 10/8/03 PHONE CC Amir Dossal SUBJECT The Peoples' Voice Dear Sir, Attached is our request for a meeting with Mr. Kofi Annan, Best Regards, Atar Einav PA AMI AYALON +972-3-7538888 [email protected] www. m i (kad.pnLii ^ The Peoples' Voice « g"^ WWWMIPKAD.ORCUL | FAX 9'?2-3-7S3ft007 OpO | IB. 972-3-7SAftOOB "?0 j 3 HAYUIZIKAST. RAMATCAr/iSRAE^J-nDl 3 .I'V^'D 'm 08/10 '03 WED 06:5"! [TX/RX NO 8089] @001 FROM FflX NO. : Oct. 08 2003 12:57PM \\ H.E. Kofi Annan Secretary General The United Nations Dear Sir, As you may have heard, we have formulated a civil initiative that is aimed to promote the peace process to put an end to the violence in our troubled region and to reach a permanent agreement between Israelis and Palestinians. In these difficult days we are trying to act among the Palestinian and Israeli peoples in order to create massive public support for our joint initiative. We believe that our "Statement of Principles" for the permanent agreement would be a perfect complement to the road map, which we fully support. We would like to present before you our initiative and to listen to your views and comments. Therefore, we would be grateful if you would meet with us. We are I planning to be in New York City on October 2003 between the 25th and 28th, and we I will appreciate if you would meet us then. Sincerely, Adm. (ret.) Ami Ayalon Prof. Sari Nusscibch P.S. Attached is a short brief that details our initiative and the background of the people behind it. 08/10 '03 WED 06:51 [TX/RX NO 8089] @100£ FROM : FflX NO. : Oct. 08 2003 12:57PM P: The People's Voice Initiative The People's Voice is an Israeli-Palestinian civil initiative that is aimed at creating public support for a permanent agreement between the Israelis and Lhe Palestinians, The People's Voice has launched a public process of mass signing on both sides, a process which will influence the leaders on both sides to accept the term sheet thai was signed by Prof Sari Nusseibeh and Admiral (Rut,) Ami Ayalon. The term sheet, also culled the Statement'of Principles, is summarized below and can be found in full at htt).u//ww.w.niii1<ad.om.il/c'f>ti/.l)r_inciplesAgrueriieni.a.sp). It deals in very certain and unambiguous manner with Ihe issues at the core of the conflict, issues which will need to be addressed by the leaderships when a permanent agreement is ever to bo reached. The premise of the project is that the political leaderships on both sides arc trapped in the necessity to react, to current events. Therefore, any political process which tries to attain peace by building trust between the two sides is very fragile, as any perceived deviation from the road map is considered a violation, and any violent act of extremists on either side can cause quick deterioration. It is therefore imperative that the end goal of the peace process be clearly defined. It is also obvious that in order for the process to he successful, each side needs to confront its extremists. Such confrontation can succeed only if the outcome of the peace process is well understood ahead of time. The initiative has stalled in the spring of 2002, and was launched on both sides in June 2003. As of the mid-August, about 30,000 Palestinians and 40,000 Israelis have joined the initiative. The target is to reach hundreds of thousands of signatures on both sides, and to present the signatures to the local leaderships as well as to the international community, together with civil acts that will underscore the will of.' the peoples, The leaders of the initiative are two individuals which posses the combination of vision and practical experience. The leader of the Israeli side is Admiral (Rel.) Ami Ayalon, former commander of the Israeli Navy and former head of the Israeli Security Service ("Shabak"), a leader who considers Israel's security as top priority. Prof Sari Nusseibeh, who leads the Palestinian side, is the president of El-Quds University in Hast Jerusalem, and has held a number of key positions in the Palestinian Authority. Summary of the Statement of Principles: • Two states for the two peoples. • The borders will be based on the June 4, 1967 borders with the possibility of territorial swap. • Jerusalem will be the capital of both stales. The Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem will be under Palestinian sovereignly, the Jewish neighborhoods under' Israeli sovereignty, and the holy basin under no sovereignty. • Right of return - Palestinian refugees will return only to Palestine. Jews will return only to Israel. • The Palestinian state will be demilitarized. • Bnd of Conflict. More information can be found at httt>://wvvw..Tnifl<ad.ori'.i!/cna/. 08/10 '03 WED 06:51 [TX/RX NO 80891 H003.
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