GAO-08-80 Economic Sanctions: Agencies Face Competing Priorities
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United States Government Accountability Office GAO Report to Congressional Requesters November 2007 ECONOMIC SANCTIONS Agencies Face Competing Priorities in Enforcing the U.S. Embargo on Cuba a GAO-08-80 November 2007 ECONOMIC SANCTIONS Accountability Integrity Reliability Agencies Face Competing Priorities in Enforcing the Highlights U.S. Embargo on Cuba Highlights of GAO-08-80, a report to congressional requesters Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found The 48-year U.S. embargo on Cuba The loosening of embargo rules on some exports led to increased agricultural aims to deny resources to the shipments to Cuba, but the impact of tighter restrictions on travel, cash Castro regime by prohibiting most transfers, and gifts is unknown. In 2001, responding to a new law, Treasury’s trade, travel, and financial Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and Commerce’s Bureau of Industry transactions with Cuba. The and Security (BIS) loosened embargo restrictions on some trade with Cuba. departments of Commerce, Homeland Security (DHS), Justice, U.S. exports to Cuba—mostly agricultural products—rose from about $6 and the Treasury are responsible million to about $350 million from 2000 to 2006. In 2004, responding to new for enforcing the embargo as well administration policy, OFAC tightened rules on travel to Cuba, for example, as protecting homeland and by requiring that all family travelers obtain specific Treasury licenses and national security. Since 2001, U.S. reducing the permitted frequency of family visits from once a year to once agencies have changed the every 3 years, and it also tightened rules for sending cash transfers and gift embargo’s rules in response to new parcels. Because reliable data are not available, the impact of these tighter laws and policies. GAO was asked restrictions on travel, cash transfers, and gifts cannot be determined. to examine (1) the rule changes in 2001-2005 and their impact on U.S. U.S. agencies enforce the Cuba embargo primarily by licensing and inspecting exports, travel, cash transfers, and exports and travelers and by investigating and penalizing or prosecuting gifts to Cuba; (2) U.S. agencies’ embargo-related activities and embargo violations. BIS processed twice as many exports license applications workloads; and (3) factors for Cuba in 2006 than in 2001, and OFAC issued about 40 percent more Cuba affecting the embargo’s travel licenses in 2006 than in 2003. Reflecting the administration’s embargo- enforcement. GAO analyzed laws, tightening policy, DHS’s Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspects all regulations, and agency data, exports to Cuba at Port Everglades and, since 2004, has increased intensive, interviewed agency officials, and “secondary” inspections of passengers arriving from Cuba at the Miami observed agency activities at Port airport; in 2007, CBP conducted these inspections for 20 percent of arrivals Everglades and Miami International from Cuba versus an average of 3 percent of other international arrivals. CBP Airport, Florida. data and interviews with agency officials suggest that the secondary inspections of Cuba arrivals at the airport may strain CBP’s ability to carry out What GAO Recommends its mission of keeping terrorists, criminals, and other inadmissible aliens from GAO recommends that (1) CBP entering the country. Moreover, recent GAO reports have found weaknesses reassess whether its use of in CBP’s inspections capacity at key U.S. ports of entry nationwide. After resources for intensive inspections 2001, OFAC opened more investigations and imposed more penalties for of arrivals from Cuba at the Miami embargo violations, such as buying Cuban cigars, than for violations of other airport effectively balances enforcing the embargo with sanctions, such as those on Iran. In contrast, BIS, DHS’s Immigration and protecting homeland security and Customs Enforcement, and Justice have primarily investigated, penalized, or (2) OFAC assess its use of prosecuted export violations and crimes that present a greater threat to resources for investigating and homeland and national security or public safety. penalizing Cuba embargo violations. CBP agreed with the intent of a draft recommendation U.S. officials and others told GAO that several factors hinder enforcement of on using risk-based inspections at the Cuba embargo, sometimes acting in concert. (1) Lack of cooperation from the airport but considered it foreign countries has undercut the embargo’s effectiveness and hampered unwarranted. Using additional CBP inspections and investigations. (2) Divided U.S. public opinion, particularly data, GAO revised its report and regarding the new travel and cash transfer restrictions, has contributed to recommendation as appropriate. OFAC commented that it allocates widespread, small-scale embargo violations and the selling of fraudulent resources based on several factors. religious and other travel licenses, among other problems. (3) Some embargo violations are difficult to detect or control, such as fraudulent licenses and on- To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on GAO-08-80. line money transfers via third countries. (4) The embargo’s complexity and For more information, contact David Gootnick changing rules may have led to unintended violations by some individuals and at (202) 512-3149 or [email protected]. companies. United States Government Accountability Office Contents Letter 1 Results in Brief 3 Background 9 Loosening Embargo Led to Increased U.S. Exports, but Impact of Tighter Restrictions on Travel, Remittances, and Gifts Is Unknown 19 Agencies Performed More Licensing and Inspections, Straining Inspection Resources, while Most Investigations and Penalties Targeted Minor Violations 35 U.S. Agencies Face Several Challenges in Enforcing the Embargo on Cuba 52 Conclusions 59 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 61 Appendixes Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 64 Appendix II: Evolution of the U.S. Embargo 70 Appendix III: U.S. Sanctions on Cuba and Other Countries 74 Appendix IV: OFAC Investigations and Civil Penalties for Violations of the Cuba Embargo and Other Sanctions Programs, 2000-2006 78 Appendix V: Results of Votes in the UN General Assembly on Resolutions Calling for an End to the U.S. Embargo on Cuba 79 Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 81 Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of the Treasury 83 Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of State 85 Appendix IX: Comments from the Department of Commerce 88 Appendix X: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 90 Tables Table 1: U.S. Agencies’ Cuba Embargo Enforcement Activities 15 Table 2: Key Agency Missions and Priorities 17 Table 3: Trade and Related Rule Changes Implementing TSRA 21 Table 4: Restrictions on Family, Educational, and Religious Travel before and after 2004-2005 24 Table 5: Restrictions on Remittances and Gift Parcels to Cuba before and after 2004 Embargo Rule Changes 25 Table 6: Composition of U.S. Exports to Cuba in 2006 30 Page i GAO-08-80 Cuba Embargo Contents Table 7: Comparison of Cuba Travel Licenses Issued by OFAC, 2002-2003 and 2005-2006 39 Table 8: Evolution of the U.S. Embargo on Cuba, 1960-2007 70 Table 9: Comparison of U.S. Sanctions on Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria 74 Table 10: OFAC Investigations of Suspected Violations of the Cuba Embargo and Other Sanctions Programs, 2000-2006 78 Table 11: OFAC Penalty Cases and Fines for Violations of the Cuba Embargo and Other Sanctions Programs, 2000-2006 78 Table 12: Results of Votes in the UN General Assembly on Resolutions Calling for an End to the U.S. Embargo on Cuba, 1992-2007 79 Figures Figure 1: Cuban Agricultural Imports from the United States and Other Countries, 2000-2006 29 Figure 2: Data on U.S. Travel to Cuba and Travel Licenses Issued, 2000-2006 33 Figure 3: Cuba Export License Applications Processed by BIS, Fiscal Years 1999-2006 37 Figure 4: OFAC Investigations of Suspected Violations of the Cuba Embargo and Other Sanctions Programs, 2000-2006 46 Figure 5: OFAC Civil Penalty Cases and Fines for Violations of the Cuba Embargo, 2000-2006 50 Page ii GAO-08-80 Cuba Embargo Contents Abbreviations BIS Bureau of Industry and Security (under Commerce) CACR Cuban Assets Control Regulations CAFC Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba CBP Customs and Border Protection (under DHS) DHS Department of Homeland Security EU European Union GDP gross domestic product ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement (under DHS) ITC International Trade Commission OAS Organization of American States OEE Office of Export Enforcement (under BIS) OFAC Office of Foreign Assets Control (under Treasury) TSRA Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 UN United Nations This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. Page iii GAO-08-80 Cuba Embargo A United States Government Accountability Office Washington, D.C. 20548 November 30, 2007 Leter The Honorable Charles B. Rangel Chairman Committee on Ways and Means House of Representatives The Honorable Barbara Lee House of Representatives For nearly five decades, the United States has maintained a comprehensive embargo on Cuba through various laws, regulations, and presidential proclamations regarding trade, travel, and financial transactions. The stated purpose of this embargo—the most comprehensive set of U.S. economic sanctions on any country—is to weaken the Castro regime by denying it hard currency. To achieve this goal, the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR),1 which the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) administers, generally prohibit all trade, travel, and financial transactions with Cuba or Cuban nationals by U.S. citizens, residents, foreign visitors, or foreign subsidiaries of U.S.