Quick viewing(Text Mode)

Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone

Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone

About the Author

Asha Sundaramurthy is a young professional with the Viveka- nanda International Foundation. She is a PhD Scholar in Indo-Pacific Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University and a visiting scholar at the University of Malaya. Having worked on the factor in - relations, India-ASEAN relations and Pacific Island States, she is currently working on India's engagement in the Indo-Pacific region.

Delimitation of the (EEZ) of the India- Maritime Border Introduction India and Indonesia have displayed a steady increase of synergy in bilateral relations as the two countries overcome the differences of the past. The two coun- tries were key players in the post-colonial independence era and showed a keen interest in developing their cordial relations as early as the Asian Relations Confer- ence of 1947. The opening up of Indonesia in the early 1990s coincided with India’s ‘Look East Policy’, to emphasise the commonalities of diverse multicultural compo- sitions and linkages of maritime cooperation that have roots in ancient history. Despite India and Indonesia diverging due to the regional security architecture com- pulsions of the Cold divide, bilateral relations still continued unabated between the two countries. The most notable development in bilateral relations during the Cold War period was the delimitation of maritime boundaries. Amongst the various maritime delimitation agreements concluded by India, the India-Indonesia maritime border for the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) has recently resurfaced as a point of discussion and emphasis in bilateral relations. While India and Indonesia have concluded a continental shelf agreement; the EEZ delimitation, for which there exists a separate legal regime, remains pending. In this paper, a closer look at the issues behind the delimitation of the EEZ through an analysis of the Indian and the Indonesian experience with the Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) will be taken. The differences between the continental shelf and the EEZ in the UNCLOS, the concerns behind the demarcation of the EEZ and the impact of concluding the maritime agreement in the larger Indo-Pacific will be examined. A Contemporary Glance at India-Indonesia Interactions The Act East Policy introduced in India in 2014 under Shri Narendra Modi’s , has placed a strong emphasis on maritime security in the Indo-Pacific. A key aspect has been to uplift India’s geopolitical stature in Southeast Asia and East Asia through deepening maritime engagements in the Bay of Bengal, South China Sea and increasing its interactions in the Pacific . There is an increasing focus on deepening the cooperation in the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-

http://www.vifindia.org ©Vivekananda International Foundation Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the India-Indonesia Maritime Border

Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), building Indian Ocean linkages through the ‘SAGAR’ and ‘Project Mausam’, to highlight the growing importance of the seas in Indian foreign policy. The maritime outreach imbibed in the ‘Act East Policy’ has taken shape through regular Malabar Exercises and more recently through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) with India, USA, Japan and Australia. Ideas of an expanded Quad Plus amongst other countries, specifically includes Indonesia, as a primary player in the ASEAN and the Indo-Pacific region. The President of Indonesia, Joko Widodo, unveiled his maritime axis doctrine called the Global Maritime Fulcrum Policy and the Indonesian Ocean Policy in his speech at the East Asian Summit of 2014, to highlight Indonesia as a maritime fulcrum that seeks to utilise its archipelagic state to cement its global stature. The Global Maritime Fulcrum Policy has five tenets, ranging from maritime culture; maritime infrastructure and connectivity; protection of maritime resources; maritime diplomacy and maritime defence and two added pillars of maritime governance and maritime environment.1 India and Indonesia, in May 2018, concluded a document that expressed their shared vision for India-Indonesia Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. This vision acknowledges the increasing convergences between the two countries across various sectors of bilateral cooperation ranging from historical civilizational maritime linkages, enhancing maritime cooperation in order to ensure peace and stability for economic development in the Indo-Pacific region, adhering to interna- tional law on maritime seas in accordance to the UNCLOS, freedom of navigation and overflight, and ensuring a fair and investment order that is beneficial to all. The Shared vision document refers to the pending negotiations between India and Indonesia on the delimitation of the agree- ment, calling for a mutually acceptable solution: “Concurring to build on the existing maritime boundary agreements and reaffirming support to the Technical Meetings for expeditious negotiations for a mutually acceptable solution on the delimitation of maritime boundaries between the two countries based on the principles of interna- tional law, including UNCLOS.”2 Both countries also signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with new entrenched mechanisms for bilateral and trilateral security dialogues. India and Indonesia have been prior Chairs to the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and http://www.vifindia.org ©Vivekananda International Foundation Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the India-Indonesia Maritime Border have worked together to ensure a peaceful, stable and prosperous Indian Ocean Region. As a continuation of its close maritime linkages and strong friendship, the 2018 shared vision document refers to the convergences between India and Indonesia to build ties in trade and investment, sustainable development of oceanic resources, enhancing Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) cooperation, and building tourism and cultural exchange.3 Furthermore, Indonesia is not a member of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships (ReCAAP), which further complicates non-traditional security (NTS) cooperation through established regional forums. Therefore, the bilateral cooperation between India and Indonesia becomes more important in ensuring regional security against NTS threats. India, Indonesia and the UNCLOS India and Indonesia, as peninsular and archipelagic states, respectively, have substantial coastlines and EEZ. The National Institute of Oceanography in India claims that India has a coastline length of 7500 km and a corresponding EEZ of 2.7 million sq. km, whereas Indonesia has 17,508 islands with a coastline of 54716 km and a corresponding EEZ of approximately 6.2 million sq. km.4 India and Indonesia had primary stakes in the first negotiation regarding the laws governing the interna- tional seas, as both countries are sea-faring nations that have a thriving ocean-based economy. The first UNCLOS was pertinent in raising the issue of archipelagic states, as requiring different legislation from land-locked and coastal states. Similarly, with examples of interference in its Indian Ocean backyard, India had challenged certain aspects of the freedom of navigation of warships in the UNCLOS. In the case of India, the ‘, Continental Shelf, and Exclusive Economic Zone and Other Maritime Zones Act’ of 1976 also known as the Maritime Zones Act required foreign warships to notify even in innocent passage through the territorial water.5 However, the UNCLOS III conference claimed that prior authori- sation of innocent passage was not required, resulting in India adding a declaration upon the ratification of the UNCLOS in 1995. The official declaration states that “… India understands that the provisions of the convention do not authorise other states to carry out in the EEZ and on the continental shelf military exercises or manoeu- vres, in particular those including the use of weapons or explosions, without the consent of the coastal state.6” Nevertheless, the national Maritime Zones Act, http://www.vifindia.org ©Vivekananda International Foundation Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the India-Indonesia Maritime Border enacted six years prior, has not been amended or put in conformity with the UN- CLOS, due to other legal differences, such as that of designated areas. The ‘designated areas’ subsection of the Maritime Zones Act allows for India to establish traffic separation schemes and fairways, etc. to ensure that the freedom of navigation clause is not contrary to core national interest.7 India began the demarcation of its maritime boundaries in the early 1970s and settled boundaries bilaterally with Thai- land, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Myanmar, and trilaterally with Myanmar and Thailand, and Maldives and Sri Lanka. The delimitation with and Bangladesh has been comparatively long-drawn, with Bangladesh’s arbitration being concluded in Dhaka’s favour in 2014 and Islamabad’s being unresolved, with the last discussions held in 2011.8

Figure 1: of India-Indonesia-Thailand Continental Shelf Boundaries with the Trijunction point at ‘0’ (Source: Vivekananda International Foundation)

In the case of Indonesia, the Djuanda Declaration of 1957 marked Indonesia’s initiative to assert its maritime boundaries. The Declaration claimed ‘absolute sover- eignty’ for archipelagic states for straight baselines over waters drawn from the outermost islands of Indonesia.9 Jakarta passed the Djuanda Declaration into national legislation in 1960, raising concerns of regional neighbours such as Malaysia, Singapore and Australia.10 The most vociferous protests came from the Western http://www.vifindia.org ©Vivekananda International Foundation Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the India-Indonesia Maritime Border states such as , at the time, which feared the potential to restrict passage of naval forces and world shipping, condemning it a violation of freedom of seas. Through extensive discussions and negotiations conducted to legitimize the claim of archipelagic states as requiring separate legal structures to coastal and landlocked states, the 1982 UNCLOS III incorporated recognition of Indonesia’s claim. The dip- lomatic manoeuvring of Mochtar Kusumaatmadja and Hasjim Djalal in the UNCLOS conferences was integral in the acknowledgement of archipelagic states. Despite USA refusing to sign the UNCLOS in 1982, it recognised the principles of archipe- lagic states in 1988, according to Indonesia’s declaration.11 India, Indonesia and Thailand signed a maritime delimitation agreement in 1978 as a determination of the Trijunction point between the three countries that included the related boundaries of the three countries in the Andaman Sea. While the map (fig. 1) shows the agreements between India-Thailand, Indonesia-Thailand and India-Thailand, the segment of the India-Indonesia border between the Sumatra islands and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands has recently been brought into atten- tion in bilateral discussions, with various leaders and stakeholders expressing their willingness to conclude a new EEZ agreement, one which is separate from the continental shelf agreement.12 Why a Separate Agreement? Distinctions between an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf A cursory glance of the UNCLOS reads the subsections of the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf as complimentary with multiple similari- ties. Both zones coincide partially in hydrospace, both encompass the necessity to regulate the exploration and exploitation of resources, and give coastal states primacy over other states (limited by functional considerations). However, it is in the differ- ences that encapsulates the Indonesian push for a separate EEZ agreement. According to O.P. Sharma, Article 56 of the UNCLOS enshrines within it the sovereign rights of EEZ, economic exploitation, artificial islands, installations, ma- rine scientific research, environment and aspects included in the continental shelf but with an added focus on fisheries and “something more”.13 The difference also lies in the area covered. As shown in Fig (2) the EEZ does not extend beyond 200 nauti- cal miles (nm) from the baselines of the territorial waters. In the case of the continen- tal shelf, where it extends till within the EEZ it is complimentary, however for cer- http://www.vifindia.org ©Vivekananda International Foundation Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the India-Indonesia Maritime Border tain countries can extend from 200 nm and not beyond 350 nm. Another difference lies in the resource sharing aspect, where coastal states are required to give surplus living sources to landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states.14 However, in the case of the continental shelf, there are no similar obligations to share the re- sources with other countries.15 The primary difference that underlies the necessity of the agreement lies in , where the EEZ and the continental shelf have been demarcated as separate maritime zones. The continental shelf refers particularly to the seabed of non-living resources, whereas the EEZ specifically delineates the water body and includes living and non-living resources. The requirement of a separate agreement becomes evident with separate legal regimes of the EEZ and the continental shelf in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the International Tribunal of the Law of the Seas (ITLOS), tribunals and special arbitration tribunals created to settle disputes.16

Figure 2: UNCLOS Maritime and Zones. Source: Bataongbacal and Baviera (2013) In the case of India-Indonesia relations, the trend of mutual cooperation has ensured that disagreements have not escalated to the international courts. Notably, the continental shelf boundary agreement and the EEZ agreement are a single mari- time boundary line with India’s neighbouring maritime states, except for Thailand and Indonesia. The emphasis on a separate agreement for the EEZ by Indonesia lies in its primary concern of fisheries zones. The preservation and maintenance of fisher- ies is of national interest to Indonesia as an archipelagic state with a heavy depend- http://www.vifindia.org ©Vivekananda International Foundation Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the India-Indonesia Maritime Border ence on fishing, where illegal unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing by fishermen of neighbouring states is a persistent concern.17 The Global Maritime Fulcrum Policy is focused on staunchly tackling illegal fishing by destroying foreign fishing in its waters. This stringent policy against foreign illegal fishing has garnered widespread support for the Fisheries Minister Susi Pudjiastuti. Notably, during the Independence Day celebrations in 2016 in Indonesia, 60 foreign ships were seized and sunk to symbolically show the severity of punitive action against illegal fishing. In a particu- lar case, Chinese fishermen were also detained with one sustaining injury in June 2016 as a response to the increasing presence of Chinese fishermen in their water.18 In October 2017 Anti-Illegal Fishing Task Force in Indonesia sunk 17 foreign ships by making holes in the hulls to show a symbolic continuation of its tough policy in protecting its fishery.19

Figure 3: Map of India-Indonesia Continental Shelf Boundary Agreement 1974 (Source: Vivekananda International Foundation) The conception of the EEZ in the UNCLOS was directly related to overlapping and unresolved disputes over fishing. Indonesia’s assertiveness in concluding a separate agreement for the EEZ pertains to its national policy of secur- ing the maritime zones to address all potential maritime security concerns including and particularly fishing, which Jakarta holds integral. http://www.vifindia.org ©Vivekananda International Foundation Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the India-Indonesia Maritime Border

The EEZ Delimitation of the India-Indonesia Maritime Border The demarcation of the EEZ maritime border is expected to follow the trend of the continental shelf agreement, though there are possibilities of Indonesia claiming for a slightly bigger portion of the Indian Ocean. The India-Indonesia continental shelf agreement was first concluded in 1974 and an expanded agreement in 1977 in the Andaman Sea and the Indian Ocean.20 The first agreement (fig. 3) covered the points 1, 2, 3, and 4, whereas in the second agreement of 1977 (fig. 4), the points in the Andaman Sea connect the points 1, to K, N and O, and in the area of the Indian Ocean from 4 to R, S, T, and U.

Figure 4: Map of India-Indonesia Continental Shelf Boundary Agreement 1977 (Source: Vivekananda International Foundation) The Equidistance Method and the Equitable Result While the UNCLOS outlined the necessity to demarcate maritime boundaries, there was no consensus on any single universal set of principles by which the bound- aries were to be set. The generally agreed principle is that of ‘equidistance’ or ‘median’ between the two opposite coastal states, which has also been applied in the case of the India-Indonesia continental shelf agreement. The 1958 Convention defines equidistance as “as the line every point of which is equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each of http://www.vifindia.org ©Vivekananda International Foundation Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the India-Indonesia Maritime Border the Two States is measured.21 In this method, a provisional median line is created between the shores of two opposite states. After this equidistant line is drawn, special circumstances are deliberated such as historical considerations, presence of smaller islands, which would consequently shift the median line. The aim to ensure an equitable result may not be possible by observing a line drawn only on the principles of equidistance. The equitable principle puts forth other geometrical criteria of delimitation to ensure that the equal division of areas remains ideal. For example, the ICJ in Nicaragua vs Honduras, asserts that while equidistance is the starting point of demarcation of boundaries, to ensure an equitable result, mere adjustment of the median line is insufficient.22 Rather, the bi-sector method was used in the case of Nicaragua vs Honduras, where a line bisecting the angle created an approximate linearity of coastlines. The acceptable international standard for concluding maritime boundaries is a combination of the equidistance principle and equitable result, as there was an acknowledgement in international law, in the Gulf of Maine case that “There has been no systematic definition of the equitable criteria that may be taken into consideration for an international maritime delimitation, and this would in any event, be difficult a priori, because of their highly variable adapta- bility to different concrete situations. Codification efforts have left this field untouched.”23 However, Indonesia’s claim for a separate EEZ agreement is based on the ICJ ruling that the application of equidistance was not necessarily obligatory in all cases, as it might lead to inequitable result. Moreover, in the Libya v Malta (1985) ICJ case, it was laid down that the EEZ did not observe the continental shelf, even as they co-existed and were complimentary.24 The ICJ in the Black Sea Case of 2009 held that the first step was to use an equidistance line first as the hypothetical starting point which would be provisional.25 The second step lies in examining the provision- al line according to the relevant scenario to ensure whether the hypothetical line needs to be adjusted to ensure a more equitable result. The equidistant line for India begins from its coast as the baseline; however it is different in the case of Indonesia as an archipelagic state. The provisions for change in the baselines were only encompassed in the 1982 UNCLOS Agreement, whereas the Continental Shelf Agreement was concluded in 1977. Jakarta asserts that the changes in the new EEZ agreement would take into account the changed baseline http://www.vifindia.org ©Vivekananda International Foundation Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the India-Indonesia Maritime Border for archipelagic states that was previously not present in the 1977 agreement, leading to minor differences from the Continental Shelf Agreement.26 The issue of equidistance and ensuring a final equitable result could potential- ly pose differences in negotiations between India and Indonesia. Possible arguments put forth by Indonesia could include an extension of the line in Jakarta’s favour, as the Nicobar Islands are sparsely populated compared to Aceh. An article written for The Wire by Devirupa Mitra, claims that Indonesia may lay claim to the water column at one section of the border, with India receiving the sea bed. Indonesia has similarly differed in the agreements with Australia and Malaysia.27 As a part of its Global Maritime Fulcrum Policy, Indonesia has signed EEZ agreements with Papua New Guinea, Philippines and Australia with negotiations pending with Malaysia and Vietnam. With Australia, the line demarcating the water column is separate from the sea bed whereas with Malaysia the new EEZ asserted by is also different from the continental shelf agreement, with Kuala Lumpur seeking to retain the old line. While changes to the continental shelf agreement with a varied equidistant line, as per Indonesian negotiations would be considered by India, there are several possible arguments for also retaining the existing line. According to the UNCLOS Article 281, the settlement of an agreement between two countries before the appli- cation of the convention done by peaceful means of their own choice, is applicable. As a result, India asserts that the EEZ agreement should only extend the un-delimited waters.28 However, with Indonesia pushing for the EEZ line to be redrawn even over the continental shelf boundary areas, New Delhi has to consequently consider its national interests in potentially altering the new EEZ line. A coastal state has primary to exploit the non-living sources of the continental shelf containing me- tallic and non-metallic ores, oil and hydrocarbons, with India investing substantially in exploring the deep for cobalt, polymetallic nodules and hydro- thermal sulphides.29 The argument for minor divergences to the EEZ line could also be agreed by India as the Aceh region is more densely populated with dependency towards fishing, as compared to the Nicobar Islands. Moreover, the changed baseline for archipelagic states as separate from coastal states, which was not followed in the continental shelf agreement, could be addressed in the new EEZ line. According to Indonesia, the concession of not applying separate archipelagic rules in the 1970s was due to its http://www.vifindia.org ©Vivekananda International Foundation Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the India-Indonesia Maritime Border concerns of swiftly securing its maritime borders, in light of the Chinese claim of the Spratly islands in 1974. While Indonesia is developing its maritime capabilities, India is better equipped to extract the increasingly discovered resources in the sea bed, which could then be potentially shared according to Article 3 of the 1974 Agree- ment and Article 5 in the 1977 Agreement.30 Impact and Significance of the new EEZ Agreement The final negotiations between India and Indonesia for the Exclusive Econom- ic Zone agreement are yet to conclude. Nevertheless, the impact of signing this agreement is bound to create a ripple in the region. India’s track record for peacefully concluding maritime border agreements would further be reinforced, keeping in mind New Delhi’s observance of the ICJ ruling in favour of Bangladesh in 2014, thereby providing credibility to India’s role as a responsible regional player in the Indian Ocean. The signing of the agreement for Indonesia would further strengthen its fisher- ies governance, which is at the forefront of its Global Maritime Fulcrum Policy. Moreover, the conclusion of the agreement would also add to Jakarta’s reputation as a rising regional player, nestled between the Indian and Pacific and increas- ingly taking leadership in the ASEAN. Accordingly, Indonesia has sought to improve its maritime capabilities by improving its naval infrastructure, enhancing the reach of governance in the numerous islands and stringently applying security mechanisms against IUU fishing.31 A similar agreement with Thailand is also pending, whose maritime border remains under the parameters of a continental shelf agreement, but does not cover the exclusive economic zone. It is to be noted that if India provides concessions to Indo- nesia on its claims, there might rise an occasion that Bangkok may also potentially revisit the agreement under altered provisions. Therefore, any negotiation with Indo- nesia needs to consider the cascading effect on the regional neighbours. Furthermore, the political and strategic ramifications of concluding this maritime boundary agree- ment will open new vistas for defining maritime governance and order in the region. The conclusion of the EEZ of the India-Indonesia maritime border agreement also reinforces the importance of adhering to established international law and order in Indo-Pacific, which in recent years have been challenged by regional disputes. The

http://www.vifindia.org ©Vivekananda International Foundation Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the India-Indonesia Maritime Border contrary claims of China and the Southeast Asian countries in the South China Sea, of which Indonesia is also a claimant amongst Brunei, Taiwan, Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam; further highlights the importance of a peaceful, non-violent and coop- erative resolution according to UNCLOS and international law, as it is the core tenets of the India-Indonesia negotiations of the EEZ agreement. China’s increasing asser- tiveness in militarising the disputed islands and not abiding by the Permanent Court of Arbitration verdict, laying claim to Indonesia’s sector of the Natuna Islands has raised concerns for Jakarta to sort all existing agreements with its neighbours to emphasise its consistency and the significance of the UNCLOS in negotiations. This will also demonstrate the resolve and heft of the two G20 counties and discourage extra-regional players to dictate norms or influence other smaller countries in the region. India-Indonesia joint endeavour will also dispel the hegemonic apprehensions of any single country. As a result, the EEZ agreement with India and Indonesia, with the added context of Indonesia also delimiting its maritime boundaries with its neighbours Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand and Australia sets a firm example of the importance of adhering to UNCLOS and international law in the region.

End Notes 1. Keoni Indrabayu Marzuki, “PacNet #14A - The Meaning of Indonesia’s Global Maritime Ful- crum” 22 February, 2018, available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-14a-meaning- -global-maritime-fulcrum (Accessed 6 June, 2018). 2. Ministry of External Affairs, India (2018). Shared Vision of India-Indonesia Maritime Coopera- tion in the Indo-Pacific. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, India at: https:// www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/29933/ Shared+Vision+of+IndiaIndonesia+Maritime+Cooperation+in+the+IndoPacific (Accessed 7 June, 2018). 3. Ministry of External Affairs, India (2018). India-Indonesia Joint Statement during visit of Prime Minister to Indonesia. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, India. Available at:https:// www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/29932/ IndiaIndone- sia+Joint+Statement+during+visit+of+Prime+Minister+to+Indonesia+May+30+2018 (Accessed 7 June, 2018). 4. Sea Around Us: Fisheries, Ecosystems and Biodiversity: For India and Indonesia at: http:// www.seaaroundus.org/data/#/eez (Accessed 22 June, 2018) 5. The Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and other Maritime Zones Act, 1976, Act No. 80 (1976) available at: http://www.un.org/depts/los/ LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/IND_1976_Act.pdf (Accessed 12 June, 2018). 6. India—Declaration Upon Ratification (New York: United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea), available at http://www.un.org/ depts/los/convention_agreements/ convention_declarations.htm (Accessed 11 June, 2018). http://www.vifindia.org ©Vivekananda International Foundation Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the India-Indonesia Maritime Border

7. Iskander Rehman, ‘India, China, and differing conceptions of the maritime order,’ Project on International Order and Strategy: Brookings, June 2017 at: https://www.brookings.edu/wp- content/uploads/2017/06/rehman- india_china_and_differing_conceptions_of_the_maritime_order.pdf (Accessed 17 June, 2018). 8. Rahul-Roy Chaudhary, “Trends in the Delimitation of India's Maritime Boundaries,” Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses at: https://www.idsa-india.org/an-jan9-5.html (Accessed 15 June, 2018) 9. Iskander Rehman, no.vi. 10. United States Department of State Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scien- tific Affairs, “Indonesia: Archipelagic and other Maritime Claims and Boundaries No. 141,” Limits in the Seas, September 15, 2014 at: https://www.state.gov/documents/ organization/231912.pdf (Accessed 12 June, 2018). 11. John G. Butcher and R. E. Elson, “How did Indonesia become an archipelagic state?” at http:// www.aspistrategist.org.au/indonesia-became-archipelagic-state/ (Accessed 11 June, 2018). 12. U.S. Department of State, “Continental Shelf Boundaries: India-Indonesia-Thailand” Limits of the Seas No. 93 (1983). 13. O.P. Sharma, “India and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” Ocean Devel- opment and International Law 26 (1995): 153-154. 14. UNCLOS, 1982. Article 56 15. UNCLOS, 1982, Article 62. 16. Ibid. 17. John G. Butcher and R.E. Elson, no. ix. 18. BBC News, “Indonesian Navy Fires On Chinese Fishing Boat In Disputed Waters,” 20 June, 2016 at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36573291 (Accessed 14 June, 2018). 19. News Desk, “Indonesia sinks 17 more fishing ships” The Jakarta Post, 30 October, 2017 availa- ble at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/10/30/indonesia-sinks-17-more-fishing- ships.html (Accessed 16 June, 2018). 20. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the Repub- lic of Indonesia relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Boundary between the two Countries (8 August 1974) available at: http://www.un.org/depts/los/ LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES//IND-IDN1974CS.PDF(Accessed 9 June 2018). Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia on the Extension of the 1974 Continental Shelf Boundary between the two Countries in the Andaman Sea and the Indian Ocean (14 January 1977) at http:// www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/IND- IDN1977CS.PDF (Accessed 9 June 2018). 21. Convention on the High Seas, 1958 at: https://www.gc.noaa.gov/ documents/8_1_1958_high_seas.pdf (Accessed 9 June, 2018). 22. United Nations Development Programme, “The Maritime Boundaries and Natural Resources of the Republic of : Challenges and Opportunities,” December 2014, at: http:// www.undp.org/content/dam/lebanon/docs/Governance/Publications/Legal%20section%201- 6.pdf (Accessed 15 June 2018). 23. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (/United States of America), Judgment of 12 October 1984, para 157, p. 137, available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/ http://www.vifindia.org ©Vivekananda International Foundation Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the India-Indonesia Maritime Border

docket/files/67/6369.pdf (Accessed 14 June, 2018). 24. International Court of Justice (ICJ) verdict in Libya v Malta case, 1985. 25. International Court of Justice (ICJ) verdict in Black Sea Case 2009. 26. John G. Butcher and H.E. Elson, no. ix. 27. Devirupa Mitra, “In Indonesia, Modi Will Find Good Ties Also Mean a New Pact for Sharing Oceans,” at https://thewire.in/diplomacy/india-indonesia-eez-continental-shelf (Accessed 13 June, 2018). 28. UNCLOS, 1982, Article 281. 29. Devirupa Mitra, no. xxv. 30. 1974 Agreement; 1977 Agreement, no. xviii. 31. Lupita Wijaya, “The Rise of Indonesian in Response to Illegal Fishing,” The Con- versation, 25 January, 2018, at: http://theconversation.com/the-rise-of-indonesian-nationalism- in-response-to-illegal-fishing-86947 (Accessed 15 June 2018).

http://www.vifindia.org ©Vivekananda International Foundation

About the VIVEKANANDA INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION The Vivekananda International Foundation is an independent non- partisan institution that conducts research and analysis on domestic and international issues, and offers a platform for dialogue and conflict resolu- tion. Some of India’s leading practitioners from the fields of security, mili- tary, diplomacy, government, academia and media have come together to generate ideas and stimulate action on national security issues. The defining feature of VIF lies in its provision of core institutional support which enables the organisation to be flexible in its approach and proactive in changing circumstances, with a long-term focus on India’s stra- tegic, developmental and civilisational interests. The VIF aims to channel- ise fresh insights and decades of experience harnessed from its faculty into fostering actionable ideas for the nation’s stakeholders. Since its inception, VIF has pursued quality research and scholarship and made efforts to highlight issues in governance, and strengthen national security. This is being actualised through numerous activities like seminars, round tables, interactive dialogues, Vimarsh (public discourse), conferences and briefings. The publications of VIF form lasting deliverables of VIF’s aspi- ration to impact on the prevailing discourse on issues concerning India’s na- tional interest.

VIVEKANANDA INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION 3, San Martin Marg, Chanakyapuri, New Delhi – 110021 Phone: +91-11-24121764, 24106698 Email: [email protected], Website: http://www.vifindia.org Follow us on twitter @vifindia