Reagan, Central America, and the Human Costs to Waging the Cold War

Matthew J. MacKoul

Thesis submitted to the faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts In Political Science

Mauro J. Caraccioli, Chair Paul C. Avey Ilja A. Luciak

February 26, 2021 Blacksburg, VA

Keywords: History, Latin America, Human Rights

Reagan, Central America and the Human Costs to Waging the Cold War

Matthew J MacKoul Abstract

Since the introduction of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, the United States has maintained a sphere of influence in Latin America. This hegemony has yielded beneficial results, such as the

Panama Canal, and at times, has caused more harm than good. The later result has been the dominant outcome beginning with 1954 and the Central Intelligence Agency’s foray into

Guatemala. U.S. foreign policy has enabled or sanctioned actions resulting in human rights abuses. This can be easily viewed through the Reagan Administration’s re-ignition of Cold War politics based on realist international relations theory

This particular foreign policy blueprint is based on one geo-political thought: Communist

Rollback. Due to this, other concerns, such as human rights, were relegated to a lesser priority.

The purpose of this thesis is to determine the extent to which U.S. foreign policy undermined human rights in Central America during the decade of the Reagan Administration. By understanding the effects of Reagan’s singular focus, this thesis seeks to bring clarity to the deficiencies of current or potentially future foreign policy models. To understand the impact of

U.S. foreign policy this thesis will explore three key case countries: Guatemala, El Salvador and

Nicaragua. These crossroads of policy between the Reagan Administration and their Central

American counterparts will dictate decisions made publicly and secretly that will be the impetus of human rights abuses that are still being uncovered thirty years later. What we will discover is that, ultimately, containment policy failed to slow socialism as an alternative to capitalism and democracy in some of these states at the expense of the human rights of native citizens.

Reagan, Central America, and the Human Costs to Waging the Cold War

Matthew J. MacKoul

General Audience Abstract

This study was conducted with the purpose of evaluating the effects of U.S. Foreign

Policy upon human rights in Central America during the 1980s. The study first reviews both the

Carter and Reagan Administrations' formulation of foreign policy in regard to Central America and Communist expansion. The methodology used to explore this topic is a historical review of events in Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua. The importance of such a study is to ascertain whether a single-issue foreign policy focus can negatively impact the rights of ordinary citizens.

By understanding how foreign policy is created and executed in this manner can bring accountability and transparency for the consequences that follow such a strategy.

Acknowledgments

The basis of this research originally stemmed from my interests in human rights. I chose to focus on Central America and the Reagan Administration because of the personal connections

I have with Central America, and because I first became interested in politics in the 1980’s. I not only hope that this research will be a conclusion to my academic studies, but also a beginning to working with organizations that seek to promote and protect individual rights internationally.

With total transparency, I could not have completed any of this without the incredible support group I have around me. First, my wife and children have allotted me the time to complete my studies and encouraged me throughout the last three years. Second, my mentor,

Mauro J. Caraccioli, who has patiently given me the guidance I wanted and the advice I needed to stay focused. Finally, I would like to thank the members of my committee, Dr. Ilja Luciak and

Dr. Paul C. Avey, who during such an ambiguous time, have given me so much of theirs. Thank you to everyone for your unwavering support.

iv

Table of Contents Abstract ...... ii General Abstract ...... ii Acknowledgments ...... iv List of Figures ...... vi List of Tables ...... vii Introduction ...... 1 1.1 The Creation of Containment Policy ...... 2 1.2 Legacies of Foreign Policy ...... 6 1.3 Relevance ...... 8 1.4 Notes on Data and Methodology ...... 10 Literature Review ...... 15 Two Competing Worldviews ...... 27 3.1 The Carter Doctrine ...... 27 3.2 The Reagan Doctrine ...... 34 Three Manifestations of Rollback ...... 40 4.1 Guatemala: The Silent Holocaust ...... 40 4.2 El Salvador: The Dirty War ...... 54 4.3 Nicaragua: The Main Event ...... 62 Conclusion ...... 68 Bibliography ...... 75

v

List of Figures

I. Figure 3.1: Number of Killings and disappearances by year, 1970-1979, Guatemala; p. 48

II. Figure 4.1: Number of killings and disappearances by year, 1980-1989, Guatemala; p. 49

III. Figure 5.1: Number of killings and disappearances by year, 1990-1995, Guatemala; p. 52

IV. Forces responsible for human rights violations and acts of violence, Guatemala (1962-

1996); p. 53

V. Responsibility for human rights violations and acts of violence, Guatemala (1962-1996);

p. 54

VI. Number of Victims of the Attacks Against Nicaragua Since 1981, By Year; p. 67

vi List of Tables

I. Table 1: U.S. Economic Aid for El Salvador, 1962-1985; p. 58

II. Table 1-1: Reported Killings, 1980-1989, El Salvador; p. 59

III. Number of Victims of the Attacks Against Nicaragua Since 1981, By Year; p. 65

IV. Number of Clashes Between Sandinistas and Contras, 1981-1985; p. 65

V. Approximate # Of Contra Casualties 1981-1985; p. 66

vii

Introduction

The background question this thesis targets is this: Did U.S. Foreign Policy in the Reagan

Administration significantly contribute to the rise in human rights violations in Central America?

Is there a direct correlation between the manner in which the United States acted and the rise in brutality that occurred in a number of nations?

Central America is comprised of many nations that have suffered significant political and cultural upheaval in the past century. At times, these disturbances have been accompanied by horrible abuses in human rights, including the stifling of democratic processes and loss of life.

Recorded in the newspaper articles of the times, such as the February 8, 1982 feature by Barbara

Crossette entitled “Central America Found To Regress On Human Rights,” one would see that there was a steady increase of brutality in the isthmus during the last decade of the Cold War.

(Crossette, 1982) In the case of El Salvador, the New York Times reported that, “The

Administration acknowledged that its figure of 6,116 violent deaths recorded by the United

States Embassy last year was only half the number recorded by church sources within El

Salvador.” (Crossette, 1982) In regard to Guatemala, the same article reported that “While the number of killings which appeared to be politically motivated ranged from 70 to 100 each month in 1980...the estimate for 1981 was 250 to 300 per month. Most of these were non-combatants.”

(Crossette, 1982)

One would often see numerous opinions as to why this occurred. Economies were not stable. Governments were corrupt. Illicit activities such as drug trafficking were overwhelming social institutions. These are all legitimate and understandable opinions. In some regards, they were all correct. The initial question posed, that of the correlation between Reagan’s foreign

1 policy initiatives and human rights’ violations, also demands that we explore how each situation deteriorated so dramatically when the most powerful, hegemonic nation on the planet, claimed itself to be the protectorate of these nations?

My intention is to present as much of the available facts to support the argument that communist containment/rollback, used as the sole arbiter of U.S. foreign policy decision making, gave rise and escalation to human rights violence within Central America. To facilitate this process, it is necessary that I present the creation and implementation of communist containment policy. It is also necessary that we present its counter argument, which is found in the Carter Presidency. This will allow for an easier interpretation of the historical and statistical analysis of the violations that occurred during the chosen time period.

1.1 The Creation of Containment Policy

How important is human rights to foreign policy? When one looks at the actions of the

United States, in particular those of the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Department, the answer becomes clear. The United States has not prioritized the idea or concept of human rights as a foundational part of its foreign policy. In fact, the notion of human rights being violated had seldom been considered a negotiable point in the policy making process. This can be traced to the middle of the twentieth century.

Following the Allied victory in World War II, the United States could no longer be what

President Washington advised, an isolationist country. The world had emerged from the war into a time where relations between states were necessary, especially to the United States which sought to maintain its newfound dominance. The gravest threat to that dominance was the

U.S.S.R. Henry Kissinger explains that a telegram from U.S. diplomat, George F. Kennan, was

2 the genesis of Soviet containment policy. (Kissinger, 1994, 448-449) Kissinger interprets

Kennan’s telegram as follows, “Communist ideology was at the heart of Stalin’s approach to the world. Stalin regarded the Western capitalist powers as irrevocably hostile. The friction between the Soviet Union and America was therefore not the product of some misunderstanding.”

(Kissinger, 448) In essence, a line in the sand had been drawn and U.S. Foreign Policy would aim to prioritize communist containment. The conflict against Communism was now viewed as a conflict for the survival of the American way of life.

According to authors Alan Dobson and Steve Marsh, The Marshall Plan, executed between 1947 and 1949, was the economic backbone of this Cold War policy. (Dobson, Marsh,

22) This economic plan was not just to help rebuild Europe and prevent a resurgence of nationalism, but an effort to prevent Soviet expansion into Central Europe. Simply put, the

Unites States viewed the promotion of Capitalist Democracy as a moral obligation and check against communism. If communism was allowed to thrive or expand, it would be considered a threat to the national security of the United States. Yet this new policy was not just for Europe.

Containment required vigilance in every region, evident by a National Security Council Report from February, 1959. This particular report described Central America as, “primarily as an underdeveloped area,” where “The Communists are utilizing their resources vigorously and intelligently...to disrupt friendly relations with the United States.” (Office of The Historian,

1959)

In 1954, the Central Intelligence Agency had interfered with the political direction of

Guatemala. (Cottam, 1994, 40) In part, this interference helped initiate decades of human rights abuses, including mass killings, mass incarcerations and the disappearances of many others, whose fate is yet to be known. It was primarily because the United States was protecting

3 economic interests, most notably the United Fruit Company, against socialist or communist influence that intervention had been warranted. The government of Guatemala was determined to re-distribute the land, and some of the wealth of the United Fruit Company, back to local farmers and interests. (Grandin, 2004, 14) To the United States, this was an unacceptable action to befall an American company in its own backyard.

By extension, Operation Condor, initiated in the 1960’s and executed into the 1980’s, justified and supported the international torture and killing of politicians and activists opposed to

American ideals and values. Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia and many other nations suffered. Henry Kissinger’s support for Pinochet in Chile; (Grandin, 2015, 149) CIA involvement in Brazil; (Grandin, 2015, 14) and of course, the quagmire of Communist Cuba, are but a few mentions of how adventurism and containment policy in Latin and Central America created more negatives than positives.

However, in the 1980’s, the driver of increased human rights violations and interference with domestic politics was the Reagan Doctrine. Without the aggressive implementation of Cold

War conflict, Central America may have been spared a measure of the violence only now coming into full view some forty years after the fact. According to Dobson and Marsh, the U.S. provided two billion dollars in aid to the Salvadoran government during its civil war with the FMLN.

(Dobson & Marsh, 2002, 39) This aid also included training of military personnel in counter insurgent tactics. It is estimated by the Center for Justice and Accountability that 75,000 civilians died at the hands of the government. (Center for Justice and Accountability) This would include mass casualty events, such as El Mozote, where women and children were murdered by U.S. trained Salvadoran military personnel. (Malkin, 2018) The concern of the Reagan administration in El Salvador was not for the human security of civilians, but to win, by any

4 means, the proxy war against the Nicaraguan/Cuban/Soviet backed FMLN revolutionary force.

The prosecution of containment policy stretched a civil conflict into a twelve-year humanitarian disaster. In an effort to be strong against communism, the Reagan administration offered the full support of the United States to prop up a dictatorial government that committed atrocities against innocents. (Center for Justice and Accountability) Furthermore, this support, like other instances across Central America, was debated through Congressional oversight. Although there existed reports on human rights and their deteriorating conditions, Congressional oversight was not effective in slowing the Reagan Administration’s financial aid to the region.

As records from this era are either incomplete, missing or still classified, I have taken two approaches to the proposed question. The first is to carefully piece together the history of U.S. involvement in a handful of nations. In this study, these nations will include Guatemala, El

Salvador, and Nicaragua. The second approach will be statistical, or quantitative, in that I will chart the human rights violations against the years of 1981 to 1989. What we are looking for in the data is either an increase or decrease in the preservation of human rights juxtaposed against the implementation of U.S. foreign policy. Not only will I look at raw numbers as statistics, but also the nature of the violations. It is important to understand if there is a rise in non-combatant deaths or mass casualty events and if these are related to the environment of violence or driven by political motivations. This simple math cannot be taken as an absolute indictment of the

United States by itself. The re-enforcement of historical data alongside policy decisions will show that the extent of my hypothesis, that the consequences of U.S. Foreign Policy via the

Reagan Doctrine, either facilitated or enabled human rights violations to occur.

5 1.2 Legacies of Foreign Policy

There is both a historical importance and a human/societal necessity to exploring and answering the proposed question. The first will help guide future foreign policy decisions. One cannot avoid the mistakes of the past if one is not aware of them or willing to confront them.

With the current climate of international relations, a resurgent Kremlin, an aggressive China, and a U.S. domestic policy that is again becoming increasingly entwined with events in Central

America, the potential to make the same sacrifices and mistakes is alarming

Expansionism is now a major policy initiative for Vladimir Putin and President Xi. This is something that is beyond speculation. Ukraine and the Crimean peninsula; Building islands in the South Pacific; Support and aid for Maduro in Venezuela; Putin’s recent altering of Russia’s constitution to allow him lifetime appointment, much the same as President Xi in China; (Al

Jazeera 2020) Growing influence in the Middle East, especially Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia;

Economic penetration into Mexico. This entrance into areas of influence traditionally reserved for the United States is reminiscent of the Cold War, when the Soviet Union and the CCP attempted to cultivate individual nations into their Blocs.

Additionally, when we are considering human rights violations, we are not offering a warning specifically about physical harm in the traditional sense. The term human security has become the all-encompassing concept that will be the standard by which we judge our future policies towards foreign groups. This can be demonstrated with the dominant issue facing the globe today, the COVID-19 pandemic. In April and July 2020, then President Trump issued restrictions on immigration applications. As a result, 2.3 million non-immigrants have been unable to receive a court hearing to change their legal status or apply for residency. (Chrishti &

6 Pierce, 2020) The restrictions also include denial of public health facilities because usage would endanger their ability to apply for residential status in the future. In the 1980’s, it was completely relevant to view human rights through the lens of life or death, freedom or tyranny. That lens still remains, but it is expanded in the 21st century to include health security, economic security, environmental security, political security, and privacy. (United Nations 2021).

Equally important is what happened after Reagan left office. In a way, it is more revealing of U.S. Foreign Policy than any other event. Vice-President George H.W. Bush ascended to the presidency. In 1991, the Soviet Union fell. U.S. foreign policy shifted dramatically because the Cold War was over. After such a long period of conflict in the region, where such actors as Manuel Noriega were accepted by the U.S. government, President Bush was forced to remove Noriega from power. Just a few years earlier, Noriega was an ally.

However, because of his actions, such as nullifying an election, remaining in power and the death of a U.S. serviceman at the hands of the Panamanian military, the international image of the U.S. could not be associated with such a dictator. (Knott, 2019) Central America no longer became a battleground for political ideology. It became the battleground of U.S. domestic policy

– specifically the War on Drugs. If we take at face value the rhetoric of the times, the United

States involved itself in Central America to defeat the forces of Communism and maintain

National Security. However, after 1991, the threat of the Soviet Union was put on hold. New threats began to emerge and new economic centers became increasingly important. With the exception of the drug wars, the attention of the United States moved to the Middle East and Asia.

Did that mean that socialism and leftist governments were eradicated from the continent? The answer is no. The United States simply inserted a new single-focused geopolitical policy for another. Instead of Communism, it was the drug trade.

7 What changed was that the Cold War was over. The United States no longer needed to prove that it was in control. We had won. The Soviet Union was defunct. Central America was de-prioritized. Whether a country was leftist or not no longer figured into the equation. What mattered is that extra-hemispheric interference was minimized or erased completely. This global turn of events characterized the United States lack of humanitarian concerns better than any enacted policy in the 1980’s. The void that policy makers left is more telling than the vacuum they previously tried to fill. For the most part, Central America was left to its own devices, unless the drug trade was involved. Panama was invaded as part of the War on Drugs. (Knott

2021) What we saw now was a focus on Central America as infringing upon domestic policy issues within the United States. The actual governance of Central America itself was an external policy issue that no longer greatly influenced how the United States would interact with the

Southern Hemisphere. What did not change, what was held over from the Reagan years, was that military action by the United States was still a primary option to enforce foreign policy and the human rights of the people were not the primary concern for the formulation of those policies. In essence, the perspective of the United States did not change, only the means by which it justified action.

1.3 Relevance

The second need to answer the human rights question is one of transparency. The U.S.

Constitution begins, “We the People.” If the idea of America is to be upheld, the acts of the government in securing liberty and security must be transparent. By no means am I arguing that

National Security should not have some confidentiality. However, that confidentiality must be in

8 the interest of protecting the citizenry. How does not revealing the acts of our intelligence and defense apparatus in another nation-state preserve security? It does not.

The notion that forty years after the actual events occurred, those events are to remain classified or piecemeal, goes against the intention of the Constitution’s Preamble. The People are kept out. By answering this question I propose we can accomplish three things:

1) Ensure that the American voting public and current policy makers are aware of the past and can make informed decisions on how to avoid the same mistakes.

2) Transparency in this area will not damage American credibility in the international world. If we are to expose, accept and take account of these events, it would show a Super-Power willing to act in the way it has always professed.

3) The United States has become a nation of immigrants and refugees, many from the

Central American countries I will explore. If immigration and refugees are a humanitarian crisis, we can help begin the process of alleviating the issues that drove them from their homes by addressing them fully. This would mean accounting for all actors and actions.

The image of America is one that has wavered over the years, depending on what nation you are in. Though I am not boiling this topic down into a popularity contest, concern for the image of the United States on the world stage must be taken into consideration. The initial reaction to uncovering bad deeds by the U.S. government would be one of resistance. However, a lot of these deeds that we speak of today are already well known.

Most importantly, as the United Nations’ High Commission for Human Rights has pointed out, revealing this information, understanding the how and whys, are essential for societies to progress. Whether it is for closure purposes, or for the citizens to face the realities of what was done, the act of full disclosure will inform their future cultural and political decisions.

9 It is inferred that by not having these nationwide moments of catharsis, the growth of that nation is truncated. This, too, includes the United States. As advanced as we promote ourselves, to progress forward politically and culturally, we must also face the tragedies that we have committed. Starting with the Southern Hemisphere, the hemisphere we tout as “ours,” is a logical jumping off point.

1.4 Notes on Data and Methodology

The three case studies that I will explore, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, can be considered the three most active Central American nations in terms of U.S. support and interference during the 1980’s. As the research question suggests, there is a correlation between

U.S. foreign policy and human rights violations. In the past, there have been numerous reports issued by Amnesty International, the United Nations, the U.S. Congress, and others that detail certain events in a narrative format. These narrative formats are compelling reading due the attention to details in reporting the actual events. As well, there are organizations that have attempted to quantify human rights violations within certain time periods and nation states.

These also make for compelling reading when digesting the raw numbers. As we move through the histories of our three case studies, I will also include actions taken and rhetoric produced by the Reagan Administration that connect all three.

This research, while focusing on the correlation between policy and results, is also concerned with the relevance of quantitative data sets that accompany some of the studies.

Beyond the usual notion of wanting to learn from history, to understand the true nature of events, there is something deeper that human rights research can do for the general public.

10 Reconciliation and recognition can be powerful tools in moving a nation forward. History can stain a nation as years pass by. The wounds of the past can have powerful impacts on governing decisions, social cohesion and the credibility of those who govern. By understanding the full measure of events, such as in our three case studies, research such as this can provide an opportunity for those psychologically affected to confront these atrocities and heal. Lastly, through transparency, there can be a recommitment of governments and nations to recognize and adhere to international standards of basic human rights.

Before we enter into our case studies, it is also important define human rights. There are numerous treaties and declarations that address this subject, many of which are accepted as universal norms, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As we entered the twenty- first century, new human rights were afforded more attention, such as climate security and cyber privacy. However, we are focusing on the 1980’s, and therefore we must establish the scope of possible violations. For that, this research will draw upon such norms as those established by the

United Nations High Commission on Human Rights, The Committee Against Torture and Other

Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, among a few. Currently, the United Nations has approximately thirty recognized human rights categories. For this research we will pare those down to the violations that most grossly affected individuals, social groups and were most prevalent during the conflicts as a whole.

The Human Rights Data Analysis Group, which began to compile statistics in 1991 in El

Salvador, will be one of my primary data sources. The work this group has completed has been used by country specific truth commissions, international criminal tribunals and other non- governmental human rights organizations. In their analyses of Guatemala and El Salvador, they

11 have identified fifteen specific human rights violations for their modeling and tracking purposes.

For the purposes of consistency across all platforms, and because a large amount of their data is also sourced from official government reporting as well as United Nations reporting, this thesis will source some of their data. The table below was extracted from the Human Rights Data

Analyses Groups’ spring 2000 report, “Making The Case: Investigating Large Scale Human

Rights Violations Using Information Systems and Data Analysis.” (Ball, Spirer, and Spirer 2000)

The Truth Commissions of El Salvador and Guatemala review human rights from a narrower perspective. The frame of reference these investigative bodies operate under concern only three or four of the most egregious violations. From the United States Institute of Peace’s

1993 report, “From Madness to Hope: The 12-year war in El Salvador: Report of the

Commission on the Truth for El Salvador,” the commission sought evidence for: 1) Peasant

Massacres; 2) Murder of Individuals; 3) Disappearances; 4) Abductions. (Betencur, Buergenthal,

12 & Planchart, 1993) The evidence gathered came from a variety of sources. Eyewitness testimony, government reports, both local and international, newspaper accounts and church records were included in these truth commissions. The obstacle for the investigators was always reliability, for which they sought multiple, independent verifications in order to ascertain verification. (Betencur, Buergenthal, & Planchart,1993)

A final source of anecdotal evidence used to aid in quantifying human rights losses is

Amnesty International. This organization is an activist-based organization that seeks to promote human rights throughout the world. The release of its annual report offers readers a view into over 150 countries and how human rights are either applied or ignored. Due to the fact that

Amnesty International is not bound by any specific government, the reporting can be considered independent. According to MediaBias, a media watch group that rates journalistic integrity,

“Overall, we rate Amnesty International Left-Center biased on political advocacy that favors liberal policy. We also rate them High for factual reporting due to proper sourcing and a reasonable fact check record.” (MediaBias/FactCheck)

With the various databases, reports, and organizations available to source, this research will follow a similar scope to that of the Truth Commissions. Focusing on four specific violations, this research will seek any correlation of: 1) Mass casualty events; 2) Extra Judicial

Killings; 3) Abductions and Disappearances; and 4) Political Imprisonment with U.S. Foreign

Policy from 1979 to 1989. The data will be operationalized by tracking policy implementation with the timing and execution of these violations, including the aid and support given to the guilty parties of such violations. Any tables, charts or graphs that are sourced will be listed and referenced.

13 I should take a moment to comment on the data that will be cited and how it will be used. Most of the cited data comes from United Nations’ commissions and U.S. congressional reporting. These figures are supported with non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty

International or Human Rights Watch. The data is not meant to be definitive because quantifying these types of data sets is difficult because of the nature of the crimes and misinformation surrounding them. The data is used to show the quantifiable results in parallel with U.S. monetary and military aid. The data is important to understand the size and scope of what occurred. As well, within the human rights community, there is a debate between using numerical and statistical data and not using it. The latter group believes it is important to focus on the acts committed and the human story behind them. While it is important to understand the humanity behind these atrocities, the scale and scope of these atrocities cannot be fully comprehended until they are calculated in the universal language of math. The data you will see in tables and figures is culled from official reports, local church archives and media reporting.

14 Literature Review

What effects has the Reagan Doctrine had on human rights in Central and South

America? How are we to evaluate the final result? There are three main thought processes to consider when reviewing the work already completed on these topics. The first is reliant on supposition and assumption from scholars piecing together histories with anecdotal information.

The second relies on incomplete information stemming from Freedom of Information Requests,

U.N. Truth Commissions and organizations such as Human Rights Watch to reveal details previously unknown to the public. However, this process can also be considered incomplete due to redacted materials, insufficient record keeping and obfuscation by possible guilty parties at the time in order to hide their activities. The third thought process involves government reports and publications themselves. Like the previous two, these are also incomplete and, at times, heavily redacted.

Our first thought process brings with it some of the scholarly giants in this area. Greg

Grandin, John Gaddis, and Martha Cottam are only a few of the authors who attempt to piece together a historical record that is at times relying on rumor and assumption. This is not a criticism as much as it is an applause. Without the rumor and assumption, most of which is widely accepted as fact, the history of human rights in Latin and Central America would be indecipherable. The issue that will arise from these scholars is whether political bias affects their arguments.

Grandin’s The Last Colonial Massacre and Empire’s Workshop are sibling works that explain the lure of the Southern Hemisphere in terms of resources and the methods employed to retain them. The idea of Colonialism as a vibrant strategy in the mid to late 20th century is appropriate. Grandin does well to correlate the economic and cultural retardation of Latin and

15 Central America with the one sided, realist, pragmatic capitalism of the United States. Although a great foundation by which to see the schism, Grandin’s work is not able to definitely correlate atrocity with U.S. involvement. He is able to single out certain moments, such as the 1954

United Fruit Company political conflict in Guatemala. However, Grandin’s piece is rife with bias against Republicans.

He calls out with the loudest of voices the Bush Doctrine, Nixon and Reagan, but there is a noticeable skip over Carter, and Clinton is treated with softer hands. The problem with this argument is not that Republicans are singled out. The problem is that this history is incomplete and indicts the individual. The notion of Foreign Policy as a whole, it’s evolution throughout the

Cold War, the domestic policy concerns and the internal Latin American political concerns are marginalized. They, too, are part of the issue. Grandin goes so far as to state in Empire’s

Workshop, “The corollary to the idealism embraced by the Republicans in the realm of diplomatic public policy debate was thus political terror. In the dirtiest of Latin America’s dirty wars, their faith in America’s mission justified atrocities in the name of liberty.” (Grandin, 2006,

88) While Grandin’s concluding statement may be correct, the shortfall is that his accusations are lain at the feet of a political party, not a nation.

John Gaddis, a respected Cold War historian, whose texts are must reads for anyone studying the period, deconstructs the major points in the conflict. The research and work compiled in his books, including The Cold War: A New History, We Know Now: Rethinking

Cold War History, Strategies of Containment, On Grand Strategy, and George F. Kennan: An

American Life, are some of the largest in scope for the subject matter. Gaddis is able to connect each major event in U.S.-Soviet relations to the context in which they occurred.

16 More importantly, Gaddis is able to understand and articulate the cognitive perspective of the U.S. and the Soviet Union from government levels and ordinary citizen psychology using historical record, political rhetoric, and cultural heritage, such as literature and art. As much as

Grandin moved the conversation towards analysis and evaluation, Gaddis is the scholar that roots the conversation in economic and political theory. In his work, Strategies of Containment,

Gaddis defines Kennan’s Containment policy. The argument for Kennan is one that has the luxury of hindsight. Gaddis is also looking at the Cold War through a singular prism.

In his Cold War histories, Gaddis presents the United States and containment policy in terms of security building. He paints the Soviet Union as building security through territorial conquest. (Gaddis, 1997) The shortcoming of this belief is that when one reads Gaddis, he is clearly looking at the United States as the hero, and the Soviet Union as the villain. By no means are we to reverse those roles here. The shortcoming comes in the nature of ignoring U.S. actions that could be and should be deemed unworthy of a benevolent super-power.

In addition, although his treatment of Kennan throughout his texts is decorated with admiration, he contradicts his own conclusions. It is clear in Gaddis’ chapter on the transition from Carter to Reagan in Strategies of Containment, that the idea of the U.S.S.R. invading

Afghanistan was somewhat of a surprise. If containment was successful, how could the Red

Army be on the march? The explanation of this is insufficient. As is Gaddis’ marginalization of

Latin America, Africa and parts of Asia. The Cold War was fought in many regions, and with many armies. Gaddis’ work, although essential for a beginning knowledge, ignores the importance of Nicaragua, Angola, and countless moments in the 20th century that helped pick away at Soviet dominance or revealed the lengths by which the United States was willing to go for victory.

17 Lastly, Gaddis’ treatment of Reagan is almost mythic. “Like F.D.R.,” he writes, “Reagan believed that the nation was stronger than it realized, that time was on its side, and that these facts could be conveyed, through rhetoric, style, and bearing, to the American people. “[I]t is important every once and a while to remind ourselves of our accomplishments . . . lest we let someone talk us into throwing out the baby with the bathwater,” Reagan told his radio audience in 1976. “[T]he system has never let us down—we’ve let the system down now & then because we’re only human.” (Gaddis, 9)

This passage from Gaddis is typical of the viewpoint in which he portrays Reagan. The comparison of Reagan to FDR, another “wartime” president, is placed purposefully with this quote to correlate it with “the only thing we have to fear, is fear itself.” It is natural for historians to have their own biases when researching a topic. However, the flaw in Gaddis’ interpretations is that these biases preclude him from diving into the murkier parts of Reagan’s actions. The quote selection is also purposeful in that it is almost as if Gaddis is telling us to ignore the collateral damage the Reagan Administration is responsible for. The line concerning throwing out the baby with the bath water can and should be taken as a direct challenge to those who would analyze U.S. achievements with any hint of cynicism or skepticism.

As a counter to Gaddis, Martha Cottam’s work, Images and Intervention: U.S. Policies in

Latin America, offers scholars a decade-by-decade breakdown of administration policy. Where

Gaddis focuses on the main actors, such as Reagan, Cottam dissects the supporting casts. By offering memos and speeches made by such Reaganites as Jean Kirkpatrick and Secretary of

State Alexander Haig, the impetus behind the Reagan Doctrine is shaded in. This defines her work. As well, of all the reference material cited in this thesis, she comes the closest to connecting the dots between U.S. policy and human rights abuses. Two pieces stand out:

18 1) Her treatment of policy speeches by Administration officials, such as the 1981 speech to NATO by Alexander Haig in which he states, “A well-orchestrated international Communist campaign designed to transform the Salvadoran crisis from the internal conflict to an increasingly internationalized confrontation is under way. With Cuban coordination, the Soviet

Bloc, Vietnam, Ethiopia and radical Arabs are furnishing at least several hundred tons of military equipment to the Salvadoran leftist insurgents.” (Cottam, 1994, 118-119)

2) A psychological aspect to international relations is included. In her introduction she explicitly states that her, “central focus is the psychological factors and the decision-making processes that prompted U.S. policy makers to use coercive intervention in conflicts with Latin

American countries.” (Cottam, 1994, 3-4) In essence, Cottam looks at the cognitive images of dependent (nations reliant on help from the outside) and the enemy (extra-hemispheric powers trying to gain influence). What is unique to this view is that they are void of the personality descriptions of the actors involved. It relies solely on the facts and seeks to illustrate causation between policy makers views and policy maker’s decisions.

The strength of such relations is seen in her analysis of the Reagan-Bush era. As in any administration, factions formed between advisers on how best to approach the growing

Communist threat. Cottam details the struggle of Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America,

Thomas Enders. He ultimately loses to the more hawkish political advisers. (Cottam, 1994, 128)

In 1981, the Reagan administration had settled on a course of rollback and military aid determined on a nation-by-nation basis. Cottam does well at encapsulating the cognitive dissonance of the right wing inside the White House. Her contributions are at their best when she is able to link policy analyses to policy action.

19 Like some of her colleagues, Cottam stops short at assigning specific blame. A lot can be inferred, but there is no striking admonishment for the ignorance of the well-being of a civilian population. The other shortcoming in Cottam is that her work does rely solely upon the political psychology of the White House. There is a lack of morality brought to the actions. They are matter of fact and anti-septic. After reviewing her work, one can understand the issues and understand the trends of the time; however, one is left without the size and shape of things to come from these political decisions. To be blunt, there is a timidity to her analyses that wavers to understanding of policy creation and not policy implementation. Therefore, it remains incomplete as a full disclosure.

The three scholars I have looked at represent some of the most pointed work on the subject. There are numerous others that fall into this category, most notable Harold Molineau, who wrote some of the earliest works regarding U.S. foreign policy in Latin America. The rest of my analysis will include some 25 to 30 texts on the history of what happened in Central and

South America. The common denominator is similar in those texts as they are in the ones mentioned above: there is a lack of accountability produced, merely evidence presented, as well the full scope of actions and consequences does reveal itself. The trend of the literature here is what is important. As we will see, the next category will offer a similar trend.

The second strain of research available on this subject matter comes from various forms of international organizations and private foundations. In the last twenty years, the United Nations and higher learning institutions have attempted to investigate and pull back the veil on these events. Most notable are the U.N. Truth Commissions and the work of the

National Security Archive at George Washington University. Both have done tremendous work at digging up the past, accounting for events, and bringing closure to some. They are rooted in

20 the humanity of finding answers for those who lost loved ones and those who are still haunted by those dark moments.

I will detail the contributions of these two institutes here as they are the best examples of what is available and where this department of research falls short. At times difficult to read, the magnitude and scope of the humanitarian violations are revealed in certain countries for certain events. They are not complete records, because they cannot be. Record keeping and accounting was not a priority for those who would commit these kinds of acts. The rise in organized brutality is one that is seldom documented with CPA precision. However, they are some of the best accountings the world has seen.

Established in the early 2000’s, the U.N. Truth Commissions promote their guidelines for these inquiries stating, “The questions of why certain events were allowed to happen can be as important as explaining precisely what happened. Ultimately, it is hoped that the work of the commission can help a society understand and acknowledge a contested or denied history, and in doing so bring the voices and stories of victims, often hidden from public view, to the public at large. A truth commission also hopes to prevent further abuses through specific recommendations for institutional and policy reforms.” What is equally important is that the crimes and violations that are uncovered and brought to the public conscience help further research, like this, into the cause and reasoning that allowed them to be committed. When data, such as these hidden abuses, remain hidden, the accountability for them remains hidden as well.

In almost every aspect, these investigative bodies are able to do what they set out to accomplish. Specifically, in Guatemala and El Salvador, the reporting of violations is thorough

21 and backed with forensic evidence. They present in timeline fashion, attempting to tell the public what happened, how it happened, who it happened to, and who is the culprit. They avoid too much flowery rhetoric and read much like a court reporting. In that sense, their apolitical stance avoids casting dispersions on one type of ideology over another. In their best moments, they are resolutions of absolutes, leaving very little to question.

The same can be said for the National Security Archive projects. Notably, Kate Doyle is at the forefront of the project, writing numerous reports and articles on the subject of

Guatemala and other nations. (Doyle, 2020) They have completed their own investigatory work, not limited by government guidelines. They include de-classified diplomatic cables, unearthed treasure troves of disappearance records, and sometimes the occasional classified materials.

Their goal is similar - transparency. They want the information in the public view so there can be an accounting for the histories in order to move forward and heal.

The material made available through these two groups is at once grand and terrible.

Unfortunately, that is where their power ends. Organizations such as these are non-judicial.

They hold no real power to prosecute or to hold accountable those who encouraged and enabled. Therefore, there is little, specifically within the truth commissions, that is noted about the role of the United States or the Soviet Union. The superpowers of the times are left un- marked. As for the National Security Archive, their records, at times, point to the United States and the Soviet Union, such as in the case of Guatemalan dictator Efrain Rios Montt. A May 2018 posting by the archives suggests the support of Reagan in cementing Montt in his dictatorial position. (National Security Archives, 2018) The same posting by the archive infers U.S. involvement with Guatemala as a strategic response to Soviet support of Nicaragua against the

22 United States. (National Security Archives, 2018) As we will see next, official government records are, at times, inaccessible because of security clearance or redactions. Until this is corrected, Truth Commissions and the National Security Archive will continue to focus on progress and the future, leaving the past to be sorted at a later date.

The third collection of information any researcher must deal with are the varied government reports on South and Central America. These are also the least satisfying in terms of details. What they can do is show a trend in the political thinking of the time. What documents are public, such as Government Accounting Office reports and Congressional records of public testimonies, are carefully curated in opinion and definable facts. They are political documents meant to sway policy maker opinions or inform Congressional panels. They are not to indict the nation on charges of anything nefarious. However, when you read these reports, the findings and recommendations give you a clear sense as to the nature of what was discovered.

An example of the non-descriptive method of reporting can be found in the following passage from the September 1990 GAO report on El Salvadorian assistance. Regarding cash transfers to the Salvadorian government, the GAO reported that, “Between 1980 and 1989, the

United States provided $1.5 billion in Economic Support Funds to El Salvador. In 1989, the level of Economic Support Funds was $206.6 million. Of this, $157 million was for cash transfers to improve El Salvador’s balance-of-payments position, and the remaining $49.6 million was obligated to specific projects.” (Government Accounting Office, 1990) The obvious problem is that the GAO report does not stipulate what specific projects the almost $50 million dollars in tax money went, nor if any of these projects were coordinated with the U.S. Government.

23 There is a lack of accounting in the accounting reports. There are specific numbers, but no trail to follow. Further in the same report, the GAO admits to not being able to give specifics. This is a document prepared for the U.S. House of Representatives. If it is difficult for them to obtain oversight information, the general public are further hindered by bureaucracy.

The documents that are worthy of review, that may contain more specific actions and materials, are still classified. Most of President Reagan’s papers that detail Latin American decisions and policy debates are either classified or under review for de-classification. A current

Freedom of Information Request will result in two years of waiting for a response. The National

Archives are notoriously slow, sometimes letting fifty years or more lapse before releasing a document. As well, the de-classification review is also subjected to CIA, NSA and DoD approval.

In many cases, only partial and redacted documents will be made available.

A final source of literary review is important to mention, and it involves the many journals and studies that detail human rights from a statistical standpoint. Organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and others compile not only the stories of what happened, but a quantitative analysis of the scope of what happened. In the digital era, the idea of big data being an important part of telling the whole story is necessary. When coupled with the truth commissions and journal reporting of non-governmental watch groups, these data sets can begin to fill in the gaps of what happened. They have, over time, become more accessible and more accepted within the human rights community. Any investigation into what happened and why should take these numerical archives and place them into their proper context.

24 As detailed throughout, the literature on this subject matter is wide and varying. The contributions these three categories make are both substantive and fractured. Each makes the sum of historical understanding larger and more robust. Each gathers facts and dates and times, then renders them to the use that best fits the discourse. The differences in discourse are where the literatures separate and achieves certain points, but falls short of completeness.

Our historical scholars, whether relying on realism, Essence of Decision, Sphere of

Influence, or any other political theory, are able to give us multiple interpretations of historical events. How they came to be, how they unfold and the possible aftermaths are present in the literature. Our second category contributes to this historical record, as well. The truth commissions, the United Nations and the National Security Archives record histories as a matter of process, almost incontrovertible and immune to debate. Finally, as we have seen, our own government records are able to set some of the parameters for us to maintain a proper direction.

The shortcomings of these categories are illuminated by their political bias or inability to draw a final conclusion or a lack of understanding of the magnitude of what happened. It is as if they are pieces to a puzzle that have not been fit together properly. The historical records of

Grandin, Gaddis, Cottam and others, lay a foundation for what the Truth Commissions have unearthed, and the government reporting can lend credibility towards. However, they are still missing the bigger picture by not operationalizing the data and not following it backwards enough to the institutions that were responsible for implementing the Reagan Doctrine.

In conclusion, the literature here is extensive, it is robust and it is detailed. There is a genuine hunt for transparency and the truth. There are attempts to understand policy making

25 at the highest levels. There are attempts to decode the jumbled political institutions in Central

America. There are attempts to go beyond simple Cold War ideology for an explanation for how so many nations and so many people suffered for such an extensive period of time. The literature is wildly successful at most of this. The reporting is eye-opening and demands attention and further study. However, the literature does not complete the task. It cannot be fully educational or useful unless it is able to understand how the decisions of America’s executive branch became so punitive to so many under the American Sphere of protection and influence.

26

Two Competing Worldviews

3.1 The Carter Doctrine

In his commencement speech to Notre Dame University in 1977, President Carter announced his allegiance to human rights as a foundational requirement to conduct U.S. Foreign

Policy. This speech downplayed the conflict with the Soviet Union in regard to Soviet

Expansion. President Carter stated, “For too many years, we’ve been willing to adopt the flawed and erroneous principles and tactics of our adversaries, sometimes abandoning our own values for theirs.” (Carter, 1977) The Carter Administration had inherited a foreign policy that was still reeling from the Vietnam War. The U.S. was supportive of Nicaragua’s President Anastasio

Somoza, who was considered a brutal dictator. Most importantly, the “Church Committee” in the

United States Senate demonized the Central Intelligence Agency which had become an important branch of executing U.S. Foreign Policy. In short, Carter was reacting to established government policies that executed morally questionable actions, supported morally questionable foreign leaders and used intelligence resources to support morally questionable subterfuge domestically and internationally. (History Matter 1975)

In this same speech, Carter continued, “The unifying threat of conflict with the Soviet

Union has become less intensive, even though the competition has become more extensive.” This re-evaluation of Containment Policy with the Soviet Union was a dramatic change and became a sticking point for California Governor Ronald Reagan during the next four years. Carter then laid forth his five cardinal principles for foreign policy, the first of which concerns us here. The

President stated, “First, we have reaffirmed America's commitment to human rights as a fundamental tenet of our foreign policy. In ancestry, religion, color, place of origin, and cultural

27 background, we Americans are as diverse a nation as the world has even seen. No common mystique of blood or soil unites us. What draws us together, perhaps more than anything else, is a belief in human freedom. We want the world to know that our Nation stands for more than financial prosperity.” (Carter, 1977)

For President Carter, human rights was not just an answer to an ailing political image of a superpower. Human rights is ingrained in the fabric of American idealism and values. As

Johnathan Alter writes in Foreign Policy, “Carter often argued that the 1948 Universal

Declaration of Human Rights was akin to the Declaration of Independence and U.S. Constitution in its importance. He believed that the values in it were descended from the Sermon on the

Mount in the Gospel of Matthew, in which Jesus taught people how they should treat one another.” (Alter, 2020) As human rights became a greater mechanism for enacting foreign policy, communist containment moved into the background. The Carter Doctrine allowed the

United States to view regional-political issues in terms of the nation states where they occurred.

The lens of Capitalism versus Communism ceased to be the driving force behind decision making on an international basis. Cold War politics and a tradition of U.S. intervention would pause in favor of multilateralism and diplomatic development of democracy.

Carter was given the opportunity to enact these new policies in Central America.

According to the Office of the Historian at the U.S. State Department, Nicaragua became a focal point in the late 1970’s. “On January 10, 1978, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, the popular opposition leader and editor of La Prensa, was assassinated in Managua.” (LeoGrande, 23, 1998) This began a long series of events that would bring the Carter Administration into conflict with the

President of Nicaragua, Anastasio Somoza, who the United States had been supportive of in the past. (LeoGrande, 24, 1998) As LeoGrande writes, “Should the United States stand by its

28 advocacy of human rights and democratic reform in the face of Somoza’s deteriorating political position? Or should human rights be relegated to second place behind political stability, long provided by a brutal but reliable U.S. ally?” (LeoGrande, 1998, 19) LeoGrande sums up the conflict that elevating human rights in foreign policy can display. What past administrations would deem as a geopolitical battle between socialist insurgencies and a friendly political ally was replaced by Carter as a Nicaraguan problem with regional implications, devoid of any real communist containment concerns.

It would be incorrect to state that the Carter Administration was taking too narrow a view of Nicaragua, or Central America. In a Memorandum from Robert Pastor of the National

Security Staff, the concern over Nicaragua was that of a larger regional problem. In his October

23, 1978 letter, Pastor writes, “Can a Nicaraguan-type crisis happen again? And, if so, what are we doing nor to prevent similar crises? The simple answer is that it can happen again, and is likely to in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala.” (Pastor, 1978) Being aware of the potential spread of violence at the time, the letter continues to outline why it can happen and nowhere does one find the Soviet Union mentioned. The analysis relies on regional, political causes to the actual violence in Nicaragua and the potential for violence in neighboring states. Not only does it warn against dismissing the oppositional political parties in these states, it points the finger at past U.S. policies and how current focuses on human rights is having a positive effect. Pastor notes, “The military governments that once felt they could serve the U.S. interest in stability in whatever way they wanted now feel inhibited from using violence or torture to suppress political opposition or to eliminate guerrilla movements.” (Pastor, 1978) On one side the Carter

Administration needed to continue its human rights commitment. On the other side, they needed to find a way to stop or prevent future instability in nations filled with poverty, corruption and

29 societal tensions. It would be a balancing act that would not always yield the results that

President Carter wished for.

During the conflict in Nicaragua, President Carter tried to balance policy concerns, but did not waver from his human right’s commitment. The problem became that the Sandinistas were having some success, and due to that success, Somoza increased the brutality. According to a New York Times article by Alan Riding in November of 1978, nearly 3000 deaths were recorded after the beginning of the insurrection. (Riding, 1978) Most of these deaths are attributed to Somoza’s brutal response to the opposition which included indiscriminate bombings of towns and villages and the execution of teenage males in an effort to keep them from joining the guerrillas. (LeoGrande, 1998, 20-21)

The Carter Administration’s response was to encourage Somoza to resign, recruit the

Organization of American States to help mediate a peaceful transition, discontinue military aid, and provide humanitarian aid. (https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/central-america- carter) The Organization of American States played a prominent role in the peace process.

Throughout 1978 and into 1979, different proposals for governing Nicaragua were put forth. For the United States, diplomatic influence waned as the Sandinistas continued to battle Somoza’s

National Guard and as more and more Latin American nations supported the insurrection.

(LeoGrande, 1998, 21-27) President Carter, his envoys, the OAS and the reality that he would not be able to maintain his power base were finally able to convince Somoza to leave, turning control over to a brokered government with very little U.S. involvement, something the OAS had sought. (LeoGrande, 1998, 21-27) Carter himself was criticized for the Administration’s role in helping remove a friendly government in favor of a possible socialist ruling party. For the moment, there was a pause in Nicaragua’s civil conflict. It would not last long. The Sandinista

30 revolution threatened to spill over into neighboring states, such as El Salvador and Guatemala, already embroiled in civil strife. These are themes that Reagan seized upon when running for office and while in his first term. Reagan, unlike Carter, saw the conflict between the United

States in a simpler format, that of good versus evil. Carter was willing to turn on a long standing ally in Somoza and allow the international community to dictate the terms of transition in

Nicaragua, which ultimately led to the Sandinistas coming to power. These policy actions were in direct opposition to how the Reagan Administration believed the United States should portray itself, not only in Nicaragua, but the region as a whole.

While the success of President Carter’s strategy in Nicaragua can be debated, the legacy of Human Rights as an instrument of foreign policy cannot. In 1977, the Bureau of Human

Rights and Humanitarian Affairs was created. The mission of this new body was to measure human rights’ compliance in foreign nations. This information would then be used to help determine the level of assistance any particular nation would receive. In his book, The

Predicament of Human Rights: The Carter and Reagan Policies, Volume V, Nicolai Petro states,

“The foreign assistance budget came to pay a key role in defining the objectives of the human rights policy. The administration tried to develop ‘specific tactics and objectives’ for each aid recipient country and revised its procedure for preparing the foreign aid budget to include human rights consideration at the outset along with other U.S. goals and objectives.” (Petro, 1983, 23)

The legacy of the Carter Doctrine remains intact as a major shift in foreign policy during the twentieth century. While my research attempts to ascertain the effect that the Reagan

Doctrine had on Human Rights in Central America, it also offers some insight into the Carter

Doctrine’s results. By using the Carter years in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala as a baseline to measure human rights during the early 80’s, both strategies will become more

31 transparent in their achievements. One important achievement of the Carter Doctrine is that it introduced humanitarian concerns into an area of policy making that relegated it to second class behind national security. Although one cannot say that human rights were strictly adhered to after the 1979 transition in Nicaragua, it is important to note that the provisional government did, according to Amnesty International’s Annual 1980 report, acknowledge human rights. Nicaragua did this by ratifying the American Convention on Human Rights, the International Covenant on

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights, which also granted individuals the right to petition the Human Rights Committee established by these agreements. (Amnesty International, 1980). As the United States, and this research, moves into the Reagan years, not only will it be important to see what happens in regard to these rights, but also the manner in which they are included in policy making decisions and how dedicated the policy makers remain to Carter’s commitment to the international community.

Unfortunately, the Carter Doctrine would change in 1980. Conflict in the Middle East, specifically the 1979 revolution in Iran and the December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan by the

Soviet Union forced President Carter to re-evaluate his stance on containment. In his 1980 State of the Union Address, Carter made the shift clear and underlined the geopolitical reasons that forced his hand. He stated to Congress that behind the move was, “The steady growth and increased projection of Soviet military power beyond its own borders; the overwhelming dependence of the Western democracies on oil supplies from the Middle East; and the press of social and religious and economic and political change in the many nations of the developing world, exemplified by the revolution in Iran.” (Carter, 1980) Previous to this speech, the Carter

Doctrine stressed human rights and a multilateral approach to conflict. This new Carter Doctrine

32 would become a policy that the next administration would seize and build upon. Specifically,

Carter invoked the military in his veiled threat against Soviet aggression or Soviet sponsored aggression. He stated, “Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf Region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the

United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.” (Carter, 1980)

The Cold War, downplayed in his 1977 speech to Notre Dame University, had re-ignited.

President Carter’s hand had been forced by the Soviet invasion and the threat to energy stability within the oil markets. Subsequently, through this same speech, the intelligence community was given new life when he announced that, “We need to remove unwarranted restraints on

America’s ability to collect intelligence.” (Carter, 1980) The Carter Doctrine was re-branded.

Communist expansion was back in center stage of America’s greatest threat and the foreign policy of the nation would need to meet that threat in every way necessary. There are two necessary elements to this shift. The first is that President Carter’s foreign policy shift in late

1979 and into 1980 was reactionary to world events. This particular revision of U.S. diplomacy came out of need to meet the expansion of Soviet aggression. It was a forced policy decision that saw President Carter compromise his previous stance towards eliminating direct conflict with the

Soviet Union. The second element to this shift is that the incoming Reagan Administration viewed direct conflict with the Soviets not as reactionary, but pro-actively meeting the enemy on the battlefield, whether that battlefield be diplomatic, economic or military. It is this world view that would usher in the Reagan Doctrine and systematically unleash conflict in Central America.

33 3.2 The Reagan Doctrine

The Reagan Doctrine was not known as such until Charles Krauthammer coined it in an editorial for the Washington Post on July 19, 1985. (Krauthammer, 1985) However, even before

Ronald Regan was President, his interest in Central America in regard to Soviet and Cuban influence was evident by his campaign rhetoric. In a televised address, then candidate Reagan outlined his vision of U.S. Foreign Policy. In this speech, Reagan stated, “No area of the world should have a higher priority than the place where we live, the Western Hemisphere. My administration will forge a new, more realistic policy toward our own Hemisphere as an integral part of my program for peace. In four years, Mr. Carter’s administration has managed to alienate our friends in the Hemisphere, to encourage destabilization of governments, and to permit Cuban and Soviet influence to grow.” (The American Presidency Project)

If we are to contrast this pre-presidential address with President Carter’s 1977 commencement speech at Notre Dame, to the reactionary President Carter of 1980 during his turn towards meeting Soviet aggression, we can see the noticeable shift from the progressive

Carter and the reluctant pragmatist Carter, to the more triumphalist Reagan. U.S. intervention in

Central America had been a common occurrence since the Monroe Doctrine. Reagan’s view was that the U.S. needed more of this traditional foreign policy and less of Carter’s multi- nationalism. Most significant in these perspectives is that Reagan places the Cold War conflict up front, whereas Carter attempted to move away from such east-west tendencies. Reagan further fueled his anti-communist doctrine in his first presidential press conference when he stated, “I know of no leader of the Soviet Union since the revolution, and including present leadership, that has not more than once repeated in the various Communist congresses that they hold their determination that their goal must be the promotion of world revolution and a one-world

34 Socialist or Communist state, whichever word you want to use.” (Miller Center) To Reagan, there was little difference between socialism and communism. To Reagan, neither was acceptable, especially in the Western Hemisphere. Therefore, just because the Reagan Doctrine was not yet envisioned as such, the policy of Communist Rollback was present from Reagan’s inauguration.

Lee Edwards, writing for Heritage Foundation, detailed the world Reagan inherited as president as follows, “In 1980, after 35 years of containment, the Cold War seemed to be going poorly for the West. From martial law in Poland and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to the

Marxist Sandinistas in Nicaragua and Communist rule in Mozambique and Angola, Marxism-

Leninism was on the March.” (Edwards, 2010) Reliance on just containment was not going to satisfy Reagan, as it had previous administrations. Winning the Cold War was the result this

President wanted. Winning the Cold War, in Reagan’s mind, meant pushing back against the expansion of the Soviets and this would become the primary lens of foreign policy that would guide all other decisions internationally. In the same essay, Edwards quotes Reagan’s solution for the Cold War enunciated in 1977, the same year President Carter was backing away. Reagan simply stated, “We win and they lose.” (Edwards, 2010)

The invasion of Grenada was the first very public display of Reagan’s adherence to communist rollback. Although the invasion was of a small island nation, the implications that the

Reagan administration attached to it were enormous. While the Reagan administration continued to support the right-wing government of El Salvador; cut off aid to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua in favor of the Contras; and continued to support the government of Guatemala; Grenada would be the most prominent use of U.S. military force in the region. The pretext to the invasion was the concern for American citizens who were on the tiny island and seemingly unable to leave.

35 The reality was that Grenada represented the type of situation that the administration wanted to eliminate, that of a socialist government friendly to Cuba, and therefore, the Soviet Union operating in the Western Hemisphere.

The government under Maurice Bishop had been courting Cuba and the Soviet Union since the late 1970’s. (Lynch, 2011, 132). According to Lynch, a Reagan Administration adviser,

“The second threat emanating from Grenada was less direct but serious enough to place Ronald

Reagan’s places for the Caribbean in jeopardy. A heavily armed Grenada, closely allied with the

Soviets and Cubans, and taking advantage of the Communist countries logistical and power- projection capabilities, was a serious threat to the other small island nations of the eastern

Caribbean.” (Lynch, 2011, 129) Bishop’s tenure as president would only last a few years. On

October 10, 1983, the New York Times reported that Grenada’s armed forces had arrested and executed Bishop and that a curfew had been put into place. (NYTimes, 1983) In the same article,

Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard, a hard-line Marxist, had seized control of the island nation. (NYTimes, 1983). To the United States, this was another Caribbean island, another

Marxist revolution, another coup, and potentially, another Cuba.

On October 25, 1983, the United States invaded Grenada. The battle is short. There are few casualties. According to the Department of Defense, Grenada had allowed hundreds of

Cubans into the country to construct an airfield which could serve as an airbase for operations in

Africa and South America. (Haulman, 2012, 136) The Department of Defense concluded its assessment of Grenada by stating it had, “accomplished much more than its triple mission of rescuing U.S. citizens, restoring democracy to the island, and eliminating a hostile Cuban/Soviet base in the Caribbean. It was the first clear U.S. military victory since the war in Southeast

Asia.” (Haulman, 2012, 144) This final addition to the mission results is important to correlate to

36 the Reagan Doctrine. The administration saw the Cold War as a losing effort throughout the 60’s and 70’s. Reagan’s rhetoric pointed specifically to Carter’s appeasement and Nixon’s detente as examples of how the United States was giving in to Soviet expansion. The elimination of a

Marxist government, in any part of the world, was a statement by the Reagan administration that expansion would no longer be tolerated, but met with resistance and an effort to push back. The specter of Vietnam, the invasion of Afghanistan and the taking of hostages in Iran could not, under Reagan, be the legacy of U.S. military or political power.

The Reagan Doctrine received even more intensification in the years to come. In a speech on March 8, 1983, Reagan delivered what has become to be known as “The Evil Empire” speech. In front of the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, FL, Reagan stated, “I urge you to beware the temptation of pride- the temptation of blithely declaring yourselves above it all and label both sides equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire.” (Voices of Democracy) Reagan was clearly delineating that the actions of the United States, in the struggle against communism, were morally acceptable and that the actions of the Soviet Union should be viewed as morally unacceptable. In hindsight, when we look at the results of the Reagan Doctrine, it is possible to extract that Reagan was neither concerned nor bothered by collateral damage, including human rights violations, in the proxy wars that were being waged. For Reagan, it was all for the greater good.

In 1985, the Reagan Doctrine was officially announced. According to the Department of

State’s archives, Reagan’s 1985 State of the Union Address would alter U.S. Foreign Policy for the foreseeable future. Ronald Reagan asked the Congress and the nation to stand against the

Soviet Union. (U.S. State Department) Reagan stated, “We must stand by all our democratic allies. We must not break faith with those who are risking their lives, on every continent, from

37 Afghanistan to Nicaragua, to defy Soviet-supported aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth.” (U.S. State Department) Finally, National Security Decision Directive 75, which details the entire U.S. response to the Soviet Union from 1983 through the next administration. Most important to this research is the second paragraph under the Geo-Political subheading titled: The Third World. It reads:

The U.S. must rebuild the credibility of its commitment to resist Soviet encroachment on

U.S. interests and those of its Allies and friends, and to support effectively those Third

World states that are willing to resist Soviet pressures or oppose Soviet initiatives hostile

to the United States, or are special targets of Soviet policy. The U.S. effort in the Third

World must involve an important role for security assistance and foreign military

Sales, as well as readiness to use U.S. military forces where necessary to protect vital

Interests and support endangered Allies and friends. (NSA 1983)

As my research has reviewed both the Carter Doctrine and now the Reagan Doctrine, the purpose is to note that one heavily favored interest in Human Rights. The other, did not. It would be incorrect to completely exclude human rights from the dialogue that Reagan and his advisors were having, as human rights is rhetorically mentioned in other speeches and papers. However, the doctrines are meant as a starting point for our measurements of violations. They will act as time frames by which to operationalize future data. What this chapter has sought to explain is that the goals and direction of each administration were so vastly different, until 1980, when

Carter’s hand was forced due to world events. It is also clear that each doctrine was rooted in each presidents’ value system. Well before his Presidency, Jimmy Carter was a man deeply rooted in his faith, through which he divined the necessity to put human security at the top of his

38 priority list. Counter to this was Reagan’s experience within Hollywood as an actor. Reagan scholar, Lee Edwards (2006), recognizes that Reagan’s experience with communism and its attempt to infiltrate Hollywood in the 1950’s solidified his resistance to the philosophy.

Therefore, to conclude this chapter, it is important to understand that regardless of agreement on policy, each president approached these matters from not only a political standard, but a moral one, which may explain why each pursued them with such consistency throughout their terms in office.

39 Three Manifestations of Rollback

The selection of nation states as cases studies was predicated on a few prerequisites. It was important to study cases from the same region because foreign policy is often conceived on a regional basis first and then on individual considerations. Each nation was selected because they also had significant importance to the United States during the Reagan years, each with civil strife and political instability. As for the order in which we discuss these cases, it was logical to place Guatemala first as it has been politically and socially affected by U.S. foreign policy since

1954. El Salvador followed because it had a traditional relationship with the U.S. during the

Reagan years, that of aid being given to the recognized government. Nicaragua was placed last because in this particular case, we see the U.S. government actively supporting an insurgency group. In El Salvador and Guatemala, insurgencies are what the United States sought to eliminate. In Nicaragua, the fomenting of government instability was the U.S. goal. This lends support to the thesis that Reagan’s single-issue focus, communist containment and rollback, dominated policy and military decisions and displaced human rights as long as U.S. security interests were being pursued.

4.1 Guatemala: The Silent Holocaust

Guatemala’s civil conflict and violence occurred in the midst of President Carter’s human right’s pivot. As the Carter Administration sought to install human rights as a pre-requisite to foreign aid and U.S. assistance, this small Central American nation had a choice to make.

However, the governments of Guatemala and El Salvador were of the opinion that they would

40 not be held subject to such oversight by the United States and began to refuse military assistance from the United States in 1977. (LeoGrande, 1998, 17) This did not include non-military

economic assistance. According to the 1980 disclosure from USAID, the governmental body which manages foreign aid budgets for the United States and reports directly to Congress,

Guatemala continued to receive over twenty million dollars in 1977, ten million in 1978, twenty- five million in 1979 and thirteen million more in 1980. (USAID 1981) What is compelling in the aid budget is that during the decade of the 1980’s, economic aid was increased, but only for non- military purposes. Not until 1985 did military aid appear as a line item in the budget reporting.

Economic aid under the Reagan administration increased to fifteen million dollars in 1982, 30 million in 1983 and 1984, and then a staggering increase to over 100 million in 1985, which is also the first year military aid is officially re-instated by the United States. (USAID 1986)

The government of Guatemala had cause for concern regarding scrutinization of its human rights record. The 1980 Country Report of Human Rights Practices, required by Congress to ascertain foreign aid assistance, was highly critical of the Guatemalan government. On page

441 of the report it states:

Violence has plagued Guatemalan history, and there have been many non-

constitutional changes of government. In 1980, kidnapping and assassinations

reached higher levels than in 1979. Deaths that appeared to be politically

motivated averaged about 75 to 100 each month. Reportedly, these acts were

carried out by armed extremists of the left and right and by elements of the

official security forces. The government has not taken effective steps to halt

abuses or carry out serious investigations. The high incidence of political and

41 personal violence continued to seriously affect the exercise of the most

fundamental liberties. (U.S. Dept of State, 1981)

This government report is not alone in the assessment of Guatemalan human rights in

1979-1980. Amnesty International, in its 1980 annual report, relays the sentiments of official government officials within the Guatemalan government. It stated on page 140 that, “In April

1979 Interior Minister Donaldo Alvarez Ruiz, responsible for the police, referred to the murders attributed to the death squads as the liquidation of criminals.” (Amnesty International 1981)

However, within the same annual report, the killings reported by the government were grossly understated. In November 1979, according to a Guatemalan newspaper, the cases of 3,252 victims of the Death Squad had been reported in the first 10 months of 1979 alone. (Amnesty

International 1981) It would be these types of statistics and anecdotal evidence that would prevent the Carter Administration and Reagan Administration from providing military aid to

Guatemala until 1985.

A final comment on the abuses that occurred within Guatemala would come from the report titled, Guatemala, Memory of Silence, authored by the Commission for Historical

Clarification and delivered to the Guatemalan government and Secretary General of the United

Nations. The report focused not just on the 1980’s, but the entirety of the Guatemalan Civil War.

Bearing in mind that the history of violence and brutality can be traced to the early 1960’s, and just after the Central Intelligence Agency interfered with Guatemalan politics on behalf of the

United Fruit Company in 1954, the statistics encompass all previous reporting. In the conclusion of the report, the Commission for Historical Classification states that it, “Registered a total of

42,275 victims, including men, women and children. Of these 23,671 were victims of arbitrary execution and 6,159 were victims of forced disappearance. Combining this data with the results

42 of other studies of political violence in Guatemala, the CEH estimates that the number of persons killed or disappeared as a result of the fratricidal confrontation reached a total of over 200,000.”

(CHC, 1995)

The disparity between the Carter Administration and the Reagan Administration in terms of aid, lethal and non-lethal, is typical of Reagan’s future doctrine to push back against communist expansion. As a candidate for the presidency, Reagan surrounded himself with like- minded individuals, including Roger Fontaine, a member of Georgetown’s Center for Strategic and International Studies. Fontaine would become instrumental in crafting what would become known as the Committee of Santa Fe’s “A New Inter-American Policy For The Eighties.” (Small

1980) These policy recommendations would reveal how Reagan truly believed that the Soviet

Union had taken advantage of the Carter Administration’s lack of focus on communist expansion. For Reagan, Carter had allowed the Soviet Union to move unchecked throughout the world. Afghanistan, Angola, and most important to Reagan, Latin America. One excerpt from the Committee of Santa Fe reads:

Nations exist only in relation to each other. Foreign policy is the instrument by

which peoples seek to assure their survival in a hostile world. War, not peace, is

the norm in international affairs.

Detente is dead. Survival demands a new U.S. foreign policy. America must seize

the initiative or perish. For World War III is almost over. The Soviet Union,

operating under the cover of increasing nuclear superiority, is strangling the

Western industrialized nations by interdicting their oil and ore supplies and is

encircling the People’s Republic of China.

43 Latin America and Southeast Asia are the scenes of strife of the third phase of

World War III...The Monroe Doctrine, the historic cornerstone of United States-

Latin American policy, recognized the intimate relationship between the struggle

for power in the Old World and the New. The three great principles of that

doctrine were: 1) “no further European colonization in the New World”; 2)

“abstention” by the U.S. from European political affairs; and 3) opposition by the

United States to European intervention in the governments of the Western

Hemisphere....The Committee of Santa Fe therefore urges that the United States

re-proclaim the Monroe Doctrine. (Small 1980)

It is clear that a potential Reagan presidency was not concerned with anything other than defeating communism in Central America. Although the report does explain certain economic policy recommendations, such as what crops to grow in El Salvador and Guatemala to maximize profits, the onus is not on creating wealth. The onus is on capitalism, through which Reagan believed would the forces of socialism/communism could be defeated. To fully understand the correlation between human rights, Reagan’s anti-communist philosophy, and the results U.S. foreign policy produced, it is important to understand Guatemala just before and during Reagan’s term.

Between 1977 to 1979, Guatemala was growing economically, and as in most nations that see economic expansion, worker’s rights became a prominent social issue. As detailed in the

Truth Commission for Guatemala’s volume, State Violence In Guatemala, 1960-1996, the year of 1977 ended with a massive march of laborers in Guatemala City. In response, in 1978, state sponsored killings would begin to manifest, the victims normally critics of the government or labor organizers. (Ball, Kobrak, & Spirer, pg. 21, 1999) This time period would see the

44 beginning of something new in the Guatemalan Civil War, that of institutionalized violence on a massive scale. In 1978, President Fernando Romeo Lucas Garcia would lead his nation through a period of time that would see extrajudicial killings rise from 100 in 1978 to over 10,000 in 1981, what some would label the Silent Holocaust. (Center for Justice and Accountability )

As Marxist opposition continued to grow and conflict continued in the mountains and highlands of the country, peasants and church officials would become key players. The

Committee for Peasant Unity would appear in 1978 and begin to make known to the people in the urban areas what was happening in rural Guatemala. (Ball, Kobrak, Spirer, 1999) In 1981, as rebels in the mountains continued their attacks, President Garcia would begin Operation Ashes.

The plan was simple and brutal. The army would march up the Pan-American Highway, killing in mass and burning villages. (Ball, Kobrak, Spirer, 1999) This would be considered tame after

General Garcia was replaced by General Rios Montt in March of 1982. (Ball, Kobrak, Spirer,

1999) There have been many reports and investigations into the seventeen month reign of Rios

Montt. One article from the International Justice Monitor reads, “The short 17 months in which

Rios Montt ruled Guatemala were the most brutal of the conflict. Human rights organizations estimate that 10,000 people were killed in the first three months of his government alone. During the first eight months of his government, there were 19 massacres each month, and more than

400 indigenous communities were destroyed.” (Burt & Estrada, 2018)

In revisiting the legacy of Rios Montt, Santiago Wills, reporting for ABC news, wrote about the relationship between Montt and President Reagan. The article recites Reagan’s proclamation that Rios Montt is, “a great man of great personal integrity and commitment,” and when pressed about human rights violations, Reagan stated, “I am inclined to believe they’ve been getting a bum rap.” (Wills, 2013) It is difficult to think that the President of the United

45 States was unaware of the events in Guatemala. His administration was focused on insurgencies in Central America, including Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala, so being blind to the facts on the ground did not seem plausible. This would turn out to the case. In her work with the

National Security Archives, Kate Doyle has been able to uncover information from declassified

U.S. government documents that show the Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence

Agency knew otherwise about the local violence. (NSA, 1982) This is only one of dozens of declassified CIA cables that either warn or document human rights violations on the part of the

Montt government. In short, Reagan must have known the reality of the situation and nature of the man he was supporting. The easy question to answer is: Why did Reagan support Montt?

Simply put, the single issue of communist/Marxist/socialist rollback was the priority above any other for the administration. Unlike in the Carter Administration, human rights were dissolved of its importance in understanding foreign relations.

Montt’s seventeen months reign would come to a close in the manner in which it started.

Another coup and another president. General Oscar Humberto Mejia Victores would rule the country and bring elections in 1986. (Ball, Kobrak, & Spirer, pg. 28, 1999) But it would not be an end to the violence. Throughout the rest of the decade hardliners in the government would continue to use extreme tactics. There was still a civil conflict being fought. There was still opposition to the government, critical of its violations of fundamental liberties. The end of the decade was similar to the beginning, violence against opposition and an attempt to control the surrounding political space. (Ball, Konrad, & Spirier, pg. 30, 1999) Although the violence was becoming transparent in the United States, foreign aid continued to fund the Guatemalan government. In the span of 1987 to 1990, over $600 million was handed out in grants and loans.

(USAID, 1991)

46 As the decade of the 80’s ended, and the Reagan Administration turned to the Bush

Administration, the nation of Guatemala began to make progress. In the 1992 Country Report for

Human Rights, the U.S. government, using information from intelligence sources and the

Archbishop in Guatemala, stated:

Although there were some improvements in the human rights situation in 1992,

serious human rights abuses occurred frequently. Statistics prepared by the

Human Rights Ombudsman office and the Archbishop’s Human Rights Office

showed a substantial drop during 1992 in reported human rights violations,

particularly extrajudicial killings, torture, and disappearances. (U.S. Dept of State,

1993)

As the sourced data will point out, the significant spike in violations occurred during a period in

Guatemala’s history considered to be one of its most turbulent. Data for the graphs and tables come from the following sources: The Human Rights Data Analysis Group, the United Nations

Truth Commissions, Amnesty International and the Commission for Historical Memory, all of which provide for me some of the more robust quantitative analysis in terms of occurrences.

47

The above chart, Figure 3.1 from the report State Violence in Guatemala, 1960-1996, shows us the number of killings and disappearances during the 1970’s. As we are, at times, using the

Carter Administration as a foundation for measuring human rights in Reagan Administration, this chart illustrates that there were declining levels of violations on a yearly basis throughout the

Carter Presidency. If one were to take into consideration the pre-requisites of human rights certifications for foreign aid, Carter’s prioritization of human rights principles within foreign policy creation, and the lack of communist threat as a motivator for foreign engagement, one can

48 draw the conclusion that these levels were positively affected by U.S. foreign policy. In 1979, when the Carter administration was needing to take the threat of communist expansion more seriously, there is still a drop in these two most important violations. This is in no way an endorsement of the government of Guatemala at the time, however, it is a recognition that the violence may have not risen to the brutal levels we shall see in the next chart.

49 In Figure 4.1, sourced from the same report, we can see the approximate number of killings and disappearances in the first and second terms of Ronald Reagan. A basic comparison of the charts brings into focus the enormity of the shift towards brutality. The first chart is measured in hundreds. To accommodate the rise in killings and disappearances during Reagan’s foreign policy outreach to Guatemala, one needs to operationalize using thousands. One can argue that a type of perfect storm occurred in the early 1980’s. In Guatemala, multiple military coups brought to power dictators that were some of the worst leaders Central America had seen in the twentieth century. In the United States, President Reagan, a fervent anti-communist who saw the Cold War as the ultimate struggle between good and evil, was given a mandate by the people to execute his foreign policy, one that had no room for the welfare of foreign peoples.

It is true that one must blame, first and foremost, the leaders of Guatemala for the atrocities committed against their own citizens. However, when one reads the declassified cables from U.S. intelligence agencies and understands that the instruments of U.S. foreign policy were aware of the killings before Reagan made commitments to people like General Montt, there becomes plenty of blame to be administered. In addition, as stated in the beginning of this chapter, U.S. foreign assistance was economic and non-lethal. However, that reporting is accurate only when considering spending. A 1982 New York Times article written by Richard

Meislin uncovered that the United States was still providing military aid to the Guatemalan government, including General Montt after the 1977 congressional ban on such funding.

(Meislin, 1982). The explanation for this in the article is that there were already orders backdated prior to 1977 and therefore not technically illegal or in violation of congressional oversight.

According to another oversight agency, the General Accounting Office of the United States, between 1981-1988, due to loopholes, Guatemala still received over $600 million in military aid.

50 (GAO, 1989) This aid came in other forms, such as spare parts or repair parts for items already sold to the Guatemalan government or, according to another New York Times article, reclassified 23 Bell helicopters as non-military in order to complete the $25 million sale.

(Williams, Peace, Kuzmurov)

Before we leave the 1980’s, one last compelling piece of evidence comes from Allan

Narin, an investigative journalist who was on the ground in Guatemala in 1982. (U.S. Foreign

Policy, 1982) What follows is an excerpt from an interview with Narin. When asked about the proximity of U.S. involvement with the government of General Montt, Narin replied:

Well, they knew, essentially, everything. But more than that they were

participating in it. Rios Montt and the Guatemalan army were clients of the

United States. Reagan personally endorsed Rios Montt at the height of the terror.

Congress was trying to block U.S. weapons supply to Guatemala, but the

administration did a series of end runs to supply weapons, the most important of

which involved the government of Israel. The U.S. brought in Israel, which

supplied Galils and Uzis and also advisors to the Guatemalan army. There were

actual U.S. military personnel in Guatemala, working with the army as they were

doing the massacres. I interviewed one of them, a Green Beret captain. (Bernstein,

2016)

As the 1990’s focused more on the Middle East, the Guatemalan Civil conflict was still ongoing.

The money and arms sales were continuing. However, the Cold War was over. The idea that the

51 Soviet Union would colonize Central America was no longer a legitimate threat, if it ever was.

The next chart we see will detail the same violations as the previous two.

Figure 5.1 is taken from the same report as the previous two. The data speaks for itself. Even in a time of civil conflict, as it was in the 1970’s, human rights violations continued to decline. The varied reasons for this could be increased awareness; a change in government; a reduction in civil conflict itself; however, these were variables that existed throughout. Human rights was always a visible concern in Guatemala throughout the Carter years, the Reagan years and then the Bush years. The government had continually changed, from one military ruler to another since the 1960’s. The civil conflict did not subside until 1996 when it ended. That leaves us with our two variables: a Guatemalan Leader who was willing to commit these atrocities and a U.S. president willing to support these atrocities. The next question is for those who believe the variable we should include is the rebel forces. They are not exempt from being blamed for

52 human rights being violated. However, the truth commissions, amnesty international and the country reports on violence have similar findings as the next chart, provided by Commission for

Historical Clarification.

The bar graph, taken from page 86 of the Commission’s report on Guatemala, is overwhelming in its intention. Clearly, from the investigative teams that were in the field and collecting the data, recording the histories, it was official security forces, including the army, who perpetuated these violations. These are numbers that are aggregate from 1962-1996.

Another chart from the same reporting shows this data in another manner.

53 Again, the bar graph is clear in its intention, and that is to declare that the Guatemalan government, the state itself, were the practitioners of human rights violations on a large scale, one that could be labeled as systematic and institutionalized. Guatemala is a nation that has suffered through decades of war, decades of poverty, and most importantly decades of terror. As the year 1996 came, it was a moment for Guatemala, and the rest of Central America and the

United States, to reboot and begin to build a Central American state without the fear, killings and disappearances so common to Guatemala in the twentieth century.

4.2 El Salvador: The Dirty War

El Salvador, the next nation in our trifecta of case studies, is another Central American state suffering from internal conflict. As talked about in the previous section, the Carter

Administration imposed human rights’ pre-requisites upon any military aid offered from the

United States. (Lynch, 53, 2011) Between 1978 and 1979, El Salvador received no lethal aid and minimal economic assistance totaling approximately $30 million. (USAID, 1981) In terms of

54 foreign aid, this was a pittance compared to other allied Central American nations in similar situations. According to a sanitized Central Intelligence Report from 1984, “Prior to 1979 the military ran the government under its own system of one party-rule, which became increasingly oppressive to most elements of Salvadorian society during the 1970’s. Fraudulent elections were accompanied by increasing repression of dissenters, often in response to the actions of militant leftist opposition forces. Entrenched wealthy interests resisted suggestions for even mild political liberalization.” (CIA, pg. iii, 1984)

El Salvador’s political struggles, while not the main topic of this research, requires some mentioning. Multiple political parties dotted the political landscape throughout the 1970’s. These political parties ranged from extreme left to extreme right, involving labor, religion, the military, the peasants, the wealthy elite, and academia. Prior to General Romero coming into power in

1977, the government of El Salvador was already seeing increases in civil conflict. The government of Colonel Molina was in conflict with the peasant population, partly organized by the church. Left leaning political opposition to the military dictatorship of Molina formed from workers and peasants united by local church authorities. By 1977, General Romero was elected president, and as President Carter introduced human rights into American foreign policy up north, human rights took a drastically different turn in Central America. An attempt by Romero’s government to quell any dissent came in the form of the Public Order Law of 1977, which made any dissent illegal and prosecutorial. (LeoGrand, 1998) The ruling military party was supported by the social and political right wing, which would eventually include the National Guard.

Within this power structure came the notorious Death Squads, blamed for almost 30,000 extra- judicial killings between 1979-1980. (BBC)

55 The Carter Administration continued to try and back the government of El Salvador, despite President Carter’s reservations of supporting these types of military regimes. The lessons of Nicaragua were still fresh inside the political culture. However, other geo-political forces were already beginning to push Carter towards a more Cold-War mentality where the United States had to choose a friendly, corrupt government over a Marxist or socialist insurrection. As the U.S. administration failed to find a solution, even after General Romero was replaced by a military junta in 1980 that appeared to be more compromising, despite the continuation of military supported violence against the citizens, the extreme left began to solidify.

Of particular note is the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, or FMLN. This political party, formed in 1977 as a reaction to the right-wing supported civil conflict, was comprised of guerrilla groups fighting against the established military junta with two other smaller groups. The first was the Partido Comunista de El Salvador and the second was the

Partido Revolucionaro de los Trabajadores Centroamericanos. Each party leaned left and held the values of peasant rights with a communist perspective on how society should be organized.

By 1980, and the end of the Carter Administration, both sides had solidified.

The United States, in a 1981 country report, stated that the FMLN was supported by

Cuba, was Marxist, and intent on overthrowing the government. (U.S. State Dept, pg. 425, 1982)

However, the same report established that it was very difficult to trust any conclusion as to who was responsible for the violence at any given time. Various organizations published reports, including the U.S. Embassy, the local Catholic Church and the El Salvadorian Legal Aid office.

(U.S. State Dept, pg. 426, 1982) Regardless of the fluidity of statistics, what becomes apparent in

El Salvador is what the El Salvador Truth Commission deemed as “The Institutionalization of

Violence.” (USIP, 1993). For its part, the United States continued to use military aid as a carrot

56 and stick approach with the El Salvadorian military rulers, but it was clear that the United States was opposed to allowing a non-democratic government to emerge. As Carter left office, El

Salvador would become a central part of Reagan’s Central American strategy to push back on

Communism and it was clear which side would benefit from his perspective.

The period between 1980 to 1983, due to the political instability, saw human rights abuses increase. According to the Truth Commission, “There were appalling massacres, such as those at the Sumpul River (14-15 May 1980), the Lempa River (20-29 October 1981) and El

Mozote (December 1981). Organized terrorism, in the form of the so called ‘death squads’ became the most aberrant manifestation of the escalation of violence. Civilian and Military groups engaged in a systematic murder campaign with total impunity.” (USIP, 1993) It was evident at this time that there was violence on all sides of the conflict with the civilian population caught in the middle.

Within this torrent of partisanship, certain bad actors were able to thrive. Two names of concern would rise above the rest. General Jose Alberto Medrano and his protege Roberto

D’Aubuisson became notorious in El Salvador. In his book, Our Own Backyard, William

LeoGrande details the military and political careers of each man. Medrano instituted the first known Death Squad, The White Hand and D’Aubuisson the second, The White Warriors Union.

(LeoGrande, 1993, 48-50) These “Death Squads” became the international symbol for the violence that engulfed El Salvador. The most notable killing committed by these Death Squads was that of Archbishop Romero on March 24, 1980 by The White Hand. (USIP, 1993). Due to the facts that these death squads remained active for so long and that they had affiliations with or connections to those in political power, they cannot be classified as an organic phenomenon.

They must be considered systematic and institutionalized forms of repression and murder. The

57 question then was raised about how much the U.S. government was involved with these death squads?

One of the most publicized massacres that would occur in December 1981. El Mozote would become a defining moment of violence that is still being fully uncovered to this day.

Approximately 1,200 men, women and children were killed by the Atlacatl Battalion after being tortured, raped and children separated from parents. (Bonner, 2018) Due to the Reagan

Administration’s focus on pushing back communism, the response from the United States was murky. U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, Deane Hinton, stated on January 8, 1982, “I certainly cannot confirm such reports, nor do I have any reason to believe they are true. None of the tested sources available to this Embassy has given even hint of massive civilian casualties.” (Human

Rights Watch, 1992) In a Human Rights Watch report detailing the massacre at El Mozote, the

United States’ connection to these crimes was elevated beyond mere economic aid and political support. It is revealed that the Atlacatl Battalion was trained by the U.S. military as a rapid reaction force capable of full-scale counterinsurgency warfare. (Human Rights Watch,1992). The

Battalion was praised by Administration officials as it was also being blamed for some of the worst offenses during the Civil War. Truth Commission reports tie the battalion to the 1981 massacre at the Lempa River, which slaughtered 147 civilians trying to flee across the water into neighboring Honduras; a series of fourteen bombardments of civilians in Cabanas in 1981; the massacre in Copapayo in 1983 in which women and children were shot or forcibly drowned; Los

Llanitos, in 1984, killing another sixty-eight; the Gualsinga River, in August of 1984, another forty-eight civilians perished as their village was burned. (Human Rights Watch, pg. 14-15,

1992)

58 These massacres, and other abuses, were not properly acknowledged by the U.S. State

Department. Page 513 of the 1984 Country Report for Human Rights, issued to the Congress, states, “The Armed Forces continue to be accused of human rights abuses, but the focus of these allegations has shifted primarily to the killing of non-combatants by gunfire or aerial bombardment. Most of these accusations, however, originate with the guerrillas themselves or from sources close to and sympathetic to the guerrillas and are in most cases either exaggerated or simply baseless.” (U.S. State Department, 1985) As late as 1984, President Reagan himself would continue to advance the idea that the violence in El Salvador was due to Communist aggression from the Soviet Union and Cuba. The single issue for Reagan remained communist expansion in the Western Hemisphere, not the reported massacres or the need to de-escalate the growing refugee problem. In an address to the nation on May 9th, 1984, Reagan stated, “Right now in El Salvador, Cuban-supported aggression has forced more than 400,000 men, women and children to flee their homes...What we see in El Salvador is an attempt to destabilize the entire region and eventually move chaos and anarchy toward the American border.” (Reagan

Presidential Library, 1984) The specter of the Soviet Union and of Cuban revolution continued to weave its way through the Reagan Administration’s narrative. The idea that the Soviet Union was conducting this type of aggression and support is not fully accurate, nor has it been fully substantiated. What the rhetoric of Reagan reflects are two aims by the administration. The first aim was to provide a public marketing for the U.S. involvement in El Salvador. For the U.S. population it was necessary for Reagan to give a psychological reasoning for supporting a regime that was being accused of horrible crimes and put forth a counter narrative that would provide political cover. The second aim was to continue to signal to the El Salvadorian government that

59 U.S. support was ever present and to the left-wing elements that this civil conflict in Central

America was now a top priority for the most powerful nation in the global community.

One can ask: Is it possible that the Administration was just getting bad intelligence? Or is it

probable that the Administration was very aware of the event occurring on the ground in El

Salvador, but chose to ignore them because of the Reagan Doctrine’s overriding authority within

foreign policy? As materials have been declassified and truth commissions have been concluded,

the later explanation seems more plausible. The administration continued its funding. The

military continued its training of El Salvador’s response forces. As this occurred, the killings and

disappearances and political arrests escalated.

The following is a compilation from the USAID reports that detail both economic and military

aid for El Salvador:

Table 1

Year 1962-1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985

Economic 182.2 58.3 114.0 182.2 245.6 215.9 433.9 Aid

Military 82.0 5.9 35.5 82.0 81.3 196.6 136.5 Aid

Total Aid 264.2 64.2 149.5 264.2 326.9 412.5 570.2

The World Peace Foundation posted a report in 2015 that attempted to account for the

killings during the ten-year period between 1980 to 1989. The report used multiple sources to

compile statistics. However, these statistics are only those extrajudicial killings that were

reported or able to be reported, therefore the numbers are conservative totals. The reality is, more

than likely, higher than what can truly be accounted for. The sources the report data mines from

60 are The Center for Documentation and Information; The Archbishop Oscar Romero Christian

Legal Aid Office, The U.S. Embassy, Socorro Juridico Cristiano, Tutela Legal, and The

Organization of American States. (World Peace Foundation, El Salvador, 2015)

Most estimates place the total number of civilian deaths during the entire El Salvadorian

Table 1-1

Year Reported Killings 1980 12,000 1981 16,266 1982 5,962 1983 6,096 1984 1,965 1985 2,000 1986 101 1987 113 1988 249 1989 2,868

Civil War at 75,000, most of which are attributed to government forces. (Center For Justice and

Accountability) In the end, the war would conclude in 1992, a few years after the Soviet Union fell and during a time in U.S. Foreign Policy when the Middle East was the focus. The timing is not to be misinterpreted. The Reagan Doctrine sought to eliminate communist influence and it can be credited for doing just that. El Salvador, for a greater than ten-year period, was a proving ground for Reagan’s fixation on Central American policy. The FMLN and the government would reconcile. The Truth Commission would begin and attempt to bring some closure to the survivors of the violence and bring recognition to the events that had been ignored.

61

4.3 Nicaragua: The Main Event

If Guatemala and El Salvador were not clear instances of the Reagan Doctrine’s casting aside human rights to achieve a geo-political goal, Nicaragua would provide such evidence. The significant difference between Nicaragua and our other two case studies is that the United States was supporting the rebellion, not the government. El Salvador and Guatemala were dominated by state-sponsored acts of terror and abuse. The Contras, America’s allies in Nicaragua were seeking to become the legitimate ruling party.

Prior to 1979, Nicaragua was ruled by the Somoza dictatorship and maintained friendly relations with the United States due to its anti-communist stance. (Seelke, 2008) Candidate

Reagan would have viewed Nicaragua in the 1970’s as a nation that could be relied upon to help push back against socialist and communist rebels. Everything changed in 1978 and 1979. A coalition of Latin American nations, along with support from the Carter Administration, worked through a lengthy and arduous peace process that negotiated Somoza’s resignation. The

Sandinistas rise to power was partly due to the United States, under Carter, because the administration acquiesced to the Central American Peace Process and was not willing to see more conflict and more instability in Nicaragua. (LeoGrande, 26, 1993) The Carter Doctrine was partly responsible for this transition. Systemic human rights abuse claims were constantly being leveled at the Somoza government, of which the U.S. had turned a blind eye. The Inter-American

Commission on Human Rights reported in October of 1978 that, “Although the lack of respect for human rights in Nicaragua is neither recent nor sporadic, but rather has constituted a system practiced for many years.” (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1982)

62 As with our other nations, monetary aid would be pivotal in determining the direction of the crisis. The Carter Administration suspended all military aid to Nicaragua in 1979.

(LeoGrande, 27, 1993) The records of USAID show that minimal economic aid was given,

“totaling thirty-three million over the period of 1977-1979, only increasing in 1980 with the ouster of Somoza and the ascendency of the Sandinistas to forty million.” (USAID, 1981) The

Reagan Administration would deny foreign aid to the Sandinistas in favor of the Contras after the election. A New York Times investigation states that between forty and ninety million dollars were released to the rebel group. (New York Times, 1986) A Washington Post column would estimate almost $200 million over a five-year period. (Washington Post, 1996) This money would ensure that the Contras became an instrument of the Reagan Doctrine.

The Nicaragua conflict was also significant due to regional assessments produced by the

Central Intelligence Agency. A declassified CIA report titled Nicaragua: Domestic and Foreign

Policy Trends, assesses the influence of the Sandinistas on neighboring countries, specifically El

Salvador. It states, “Guerrillas and radio also in Central America- particularly El Salvador- have long been the recipients of clandestine Sandinista support.” (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013)

Not only was the United States concerned about Nicaragua becoming a Marxist stronghold, the intelligence pointed to Nicaragua exporting revolution into nations the United States had spent years and millions of dollars to remain under the American sphere of influence. The idea that a communist-domino effect in Central America could become a reality put the full pressure of the

Reagan Doctrine into action. The CIA report further fueled concerns when it named the Soviet

Union and Cuba as the primary suppliers of lethal aid to the Sandinistas, who, in turn, provided it to the FMLN in El Salvador. (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013) Over a period of eight years, from 1980 - 1987, Communist military aid is estimated at $120 million U.S. dollars, which aided

63 the Sandinistas in giving the FMLN military training, weapons and ammunition, and other logistical support. (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013) The Sandinistas were the type of government that the Reagan Doctrine was created to combat. However, here is another example of intelligence being used to support the argument that Soviet expansionism was stretching into the Western Hemisphere. This type if intelligence reporting was meant to not only justify actions in Nicaragua to administration officials, but also combat the growing narrative in the U.S.

Congress and the American public that the conflict in Nicaragua was risky, unwarranted, or worse, immoral and illegal.

The Reagan Doctrine would have obstacles in Nicaragua. Although Congressional oversight for funding to El Salvador and Guatemala was a debated topic every year, Nicaragua produced more vitriolic opposition to the President. The Boland Amendments would become a series of stipulations attached to defense appropriation bills that sought to prohibit and restrict military funding to the Contras. (Purdy, 2008) The first of these Amendments, enacted in 1982, prevented any funds in the defense spending bill from being used “to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua or to provoke a military exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras.” (Fisher,

1987, 275) The administration found loopholes in the amendment and early in 1984 it was reported that the CIA had used some of these funds to mine the harbors in Nicaragua, prompting

Congress to pass a more restrictive Boland Amendment. (Fisher, 275, 1987) The Amendment read:

During fiscal year 1985, no funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the

Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expanded for the purpose of which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by

64 any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual. (Fisher, 1987, 276) Although this research is not specifically concerned with explaining what would be the Iran-Contra Affair, it is important to understand that the Reagan Doctrine not only ignored International Laws, as in the case with mining the harbors of Nicaragua, but also ignored domestic laws. The lack of concern by the Reagan Administration to adhere to United States policies, voted on and enacted by the

Congress only magnifies its lack of regard for laws in foreign nations, including human rights.

The Administration was willing to subvert the Constitution. The context here is that it was also willing to subvert the treaties and acts defining human rights of which it was a signatory to. The

Reagan Doctrine accomplished this by continuing funding, at times illegal funding, of the

Contras, whose human rights record would soon be called into question.

The Contra War was difficult to operationalize because the violence was often under reported or minimized by the Reagan Administration. In his book, Commandos: The CIA and

Nicaragua’s Contra Rebels, Sam Dillon reports that the CIA and the Reagan Administration was aware of human rights abuses but called them a “nuisance,” because “they had a war to fight.”

(Dillon, 198, 1991) The American Journal of Public Health investigated Contra abuses on behalf of the medical community in Nicaragua, who were also becoming victims of Contra violence. In their 1987 article, Health-Related Outcomes of War in Nicaragua, the authors estimate that .04% of the country’s 3.3 million population has been killed in fighting since 1982. (Garfield, Friedan,

& Vermund, 615, 1987) A major contributor to the killings in Nicaragua, according to the report are the mines used by the Contras and supplied by the United States. The article estimates 4900 war-related injuries and 3800 kidnappings from 1983-1985, most of these killings coming from particular Contra attacks from mining rural roads, mortar attacks on isolated villages, and ambushing vehicles; by the end of 1985, over 100 rural communities had been attacked, 354

65 civilian vehicles had been ambushed, and 51 assassinations of local leaders reported. (Garfield,

Friedan, & Vermund, 616, 1987)

The following chart is sourced from the AJPH article and is considered a very low calculation of civilian killings due to under reporting and misinformation. As per our original question, can human rights violations correlate with increase application of the Reagan Doctrine?

The graph is an example of escalating violations that coincide with increased illegal aid to the

Contras. Some of the best statistics were gathered in 1987 by Gary Prevost for his article, The

“Contra” War in Nicaragua in Conflict Quarterly. The statistics have been transcribed into a simpler table form for presentation purposes. The first table represents the estimated number of civilian victims from 1981-1985; the second represents the estimated number of clashes between the Sandinistas and Contra forces from 1981-1985; the final represents the Contra casualties as another representation of the escalating violence as military aid increased from the United States.

66

The Contra War in Nicaragua, like El Salvador and Guatemala, came to end in the late

80’s and peace negotiations with the Organization of American States and the United Nations continued into the early 1990’s. The common thread of our three case studies is that the violence

67 escalated in the late 1970’s and continued to escalate as Reagan and his Doctrine fueled the conflicts with military aid and assistance on various levels. As evident by their endings, these three conflicts ran out of steam when the Bush Administration took office and no longer prioritized Central America or the Soviet Union. Central America went back to its status, as

Richard Nixon once pronounced, “Latin America does not matter. As long as we’ve been in it, people don’t give one damn about Latin America.” (Grandin, 1, 2006) The Soviet Union was history. The FMLN, the Sandinistas and every other leftist guerrilla force was left with just Cuba as a support mechanism and that would not be enough to stave off the dominance of U.S.

Hegemony. The Cold War was over. Nicaragua, which would remain in Sandinista hands, would continue to see violence and conflict, but ultimately, it would remain an internal issue and no longer fit for U.S. Foreign Policy consumption.

Conclusion

The Reagan administration’s decision to prioritize the rollback of Communist influence in Central America incited and exacerbated human rights violations, particularly in our three case countries of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. The incitement of the violations came as a result of President Reagan’s, and those in his administration, embracing of political leaders who used violent methods to quell political and social dispute, and ultimately, to retain their power structure. The situation was exacerbated by the Reagan administration’s single concern for communist expansion, which resulted in massive military and economic aid throughout the decade. Through this military aid, whether to Duarte in El Salvador, Montt and Humberto in

68 Guatemala, or the Contras in Nicaragua, weapon shipments fed the violent tendencies that already existed in bitter political disputes.

The conflicts that were presented are thirty to forty years in the past, but the lessons that we should take away, especially the United States, are still relevant in this decade.

Historical analysis of policy decisions is important because it provides to policy makers the pitfalls of narrowing the scope of international relations to a few, and in this case, one specific concern. In the past year, in Central and South America, history has begun to repeat itself.

Nicaragua has seen civil unrest and a disregard for human rights in the past three years.

According to Human Rights Watch, in conjunction with the National Police, pro-Ortega groups,

“in 2018 left 300 dead, over 2000 injured, and hundreds arbitrarily arrested and prosecuted.”

(Human Rights Watch, 2020) Venezuela has been in a spiral of social and political conflict for five years. Guatemala recently let its membership with the United Nations International

Commission expire, including the human rights protective mechanisms put into place in response to their civil war. (Human Rights Watch, 2020) As seen in the past, these types of conflicts can create the type of environment for communism and socialism to foment. The lesson the United States must take away from the decade of the 1980’s is to not allow that fear, of an increasingly aggressive Russia or highly ambitious China, blind U.S. foreign policy to the root causes that energize this activity. Poverty, crime, climate changes, inferior medical infrastructure, government corruption, are just a handful of the issues that should also receive the same attention as National Security interests, such as communist/socialist expansion.

The statistical data for our three case studies are clear. As the Reagan Administration increased military aid, military training, and extended an umbrella of approval, human rights

69 violations increased year over year, until Congress became involved. In the case study for

Guatemala, the Human Rights Data Group projected out that the number of killings and disappearances in 1977, 1978 and 1979 remained relatively low, numbering about 200 to 250 per year. As the Carter and Reagan Administrations pivoted towards a Cold War stance, and as aid increased, those number increased dramatically. In 1980, the U.S. Congressional Aid Reports that the aid delivered to Guatemala was increased to thirteen million. This coincided with a ten- fold increase in killings and disappearances to over 2,100. That number doubled in 1981, and the military aid continued to increase another fifteen million. In 1982, Guatemala saw its deadliest year at 18,000 killings and disappearances. As decade went on, the killings and disappearance dropped to 1980-1981 levels, but military aid increased, totaling almost 100 million in 1985. All of these figures provided by Human Rights Data Group and USAID tell the story of how human rights violations increased and then plateaued during the last year of

President Carter and the first term of Ronald Reagan. The drop in 1983-1985 of killings and disappearances occurred for two possible reasons. The first is that human rights groups brought attention to the events on the ground in Guatemala which put pressure on the international community to stem the tide of violence. The second is that the Guatemalan government, while in continuous conflict, was able to control most of the state territory, making it difficult for the insurgency to function and putting a general pause to the violence until a settlement was reached in the early 1990’s. (Ball, Kobrak, Spirer, 1992) This idea that the killings and disappearances flattened out because of military inactivity is supported by the estimate by the

Guatemalan Truth Commission that 93% of the violence in our studied timeframe was state

70 sponsored. If the state pulled back on its offensive actions, a significant drop in extrajudicial killings should be observed, and it is.

El Salvador, like Guatemala, sees a similar trend. As Carter moves towards conflict with the Soviets, the increase in aid in El Salvador opens up from almost nothing in 1979 to 64 million in 1980. In that same year, the El Salvador Truth Commissions estimates almost 12,000 killings and disappearances from our charts previously listed. Like Guatemala, aid increases greatly as Reagan takes office. 1981 through 1985 saw steady 100 million dollar increases from

150 million in ’81 to 570 million in ’85. In line with our hypothesis, killings spike upward dramatically again. In 1981, the Truth Commission estimates over 16,000 killings after a year that saw 12,000. These numbers steadily drop as to 6000 per year until 1985 when they drop to

2000. There is room for supposition as to why the dramatic drop in 1985, much like Guatemala.

There was increased scrutiny on the administration in all things Central America, due in part to the Iran-Contra Affairs. There is also the notion that the civil war came to a place where both sides were at a stalemate and that the ruling party of El Salvador, particularly President Duarte, began to negotiate with the FMLN to put an end to the violence. These would both be ideal reasons to see a drop in killings and a remaining increase in aid as the United States would still maintain an ally in El Salvador.

The case for Nicaragua was important because it not only supported this hypothesis, but it also supported the idea that Communist Rollback was so central and so dominant of a policy that the Administration was willing to violate domestic laws to achieve those policy goals.

Exposing an administration that lacked any fidelity to its own congressional mandates only strengthens the argument that it would hold no fidelity to the rights of non-citizens in a foreign

71 land. Estimates of 30,000 killed in the Contra War from our sourced data sets at Human Rights

Watch and Human Rights Data Group show a similar pattern of escalation followed by a sudden drop. As Reagan illegally supported the Contras, increasing aid year over year, the killings and violations increased as well. With the election of Ortega in 1984 came a cooling off period where all sides were able to step back. Although civil strife continued throughout the 1980s, it never reached the level of fighting seen in the early 1980s.

In terms of Political Science, the research suggests that quantifiable data should be in integral part of human rights reporting. The majority of the human rights reporting is anecdotal, evidentiary, and archival. The addition of statistical data, as seen in this research and in some data bases, augments the necessity of human rights as a vital part of any nation’s foreign and domestic policy agenda. The U.N. Truth Commissions for El Salvador, published in 1993, and

Guatemala, released in 1999, are compelling reading and provide ample opportunity for a people to find closure and healing in the aftermath of tragedy. However, the reporting, without their statistical counterparts, does not convey the magnitude of what happened in a certain time and in a certain place to those who did not witness or become touched by the events themselves. The statistics are the closing argument of a legal case that should be presented to the public in order to effect changes.

What is most interesting is when we look at where El Salvador, Guatemala and

Nicaragua are currently. According to Human Rights Watch, the current state of affairs in

Guatemala is dangerous. Corruption, gang violence, displaced persons and a lack of adherence to agreed to human rights standards are crippling the country. (Human Rights Watch, 2020) El

Salvador has not faired better. Human Rights Watch reports that the current President has

72 instituted martial law to keep the pandemic under control, but is also using the military to intimidate rivals as criminal gangs terrorize the local citizens. (Human Rights Watch, 2021) What is described in 2020, the violations that are occurring, attempt to rival those of 1980 and 1981.

Nicaragua has seen the return of Daniel Ortega to power. Human Rights Watch reports that extra judicial killings and a banning of opposition parties has caused even the OAS and the

United Nations to ask for some sort of truth commission to help mediate the events on the ground. (Human Rights Watch, 2021) Therefore, forty years later, can we even say that the conflicts that Cold War diplomacy focused on were successful? Forty years later, there is still human rights violations in these nations. There are still leftist oppositions and right-wing militaries willing to clash over power and control. The legacy of the Reagan Doctrine in Central

America is tainted, at best, by the violence it allowed and supported in the early 1980s. It is again marred by the institutionalized violence it helped to establish that again, now, emerges in our three case study nations.

The next logical question to ask after this research is how effective is human rights reporting to government bodies? Did the country reports for the United States constitute any consistent, meaningful changes in U.S. policy? Did the truth commissions meet their goals of continued improvement and a reduction in corrupt and violent domestic policies in those respective nations? The first step is to understand how to report the data with the story. The next is to understand if the operationalizing of human rights violations have a positive effect in combatting the issue. This research, as with any regarding human rights, is limited in its reach.

The information available is incomplete and may never be complete. Time erodes the ability to get first-hand knowledge from the participants and the victims. Corruption, then and now,

73 continues to hide and obfuscate the whole truth. This research, like the others, must be satisfied with being incomplete and with being just the next step forward in confronting these moments of violence and inhumanness. With each new piece of information, the picture becomes clearer, and until classified materials are made available, scholars and advocates will have to be content with what they can retrieve as documents are sanitized and released.

74 Bibliography

Al Jazeera, . https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/07/03/putin-orders-constitution-changes- allowing-him-to-rule-until-2036/

Alter, Johnathan. How the United States Learned to Love Human Rights. Foreign Policy. September 29, 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/29/human-rights-jimmy-carters-legacy- is-on-the-2020-ballot/

The American Presidency Project. Reagan, Ronald: Televised Address by Governor Ronald Reagan “A Strategy for Peace in the 80’s.” October 19, 1980. Https://presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/televised-address-governor-ronald-reagan-strategy-for- peace-the-80’s.

Amnesty International. Amnesty International Report: 1980. Amnesty International Publications. London, England. 1981. https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/POL1000031980ENGLISH.PDF

Ball, Patrick, & Kobrak, Paul, & Spirer, Herbert. State Violence in Guatemala, 1960-1996: A Quantitative Reflection. American Association for the Advancement of Science. Washington, D.C. 1999. https://hrdag.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/state-violence-guate-1999.pdf

Ball, Patrick, & Kobrak, Paul, & Spirer, Herbert. Making the Case: Investigating Large Scale Human Rights Violations Using Information Systems and Data Analysis. American Association for the Advancement of Science. Washington, D.C. 2000. https://hrdag.org/wp- content/uploads/2013/01/MakingtheCase-2000-fulltext.pdf

BBC. 2018. El Salvador: A Timeline. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19402222

Bernstein, Dennis. Seeking Justice For Guatemala Slaughter. Consortium News. Vol. 26, No. 345. December 10, 2020. https://consortiumnews.com/2016/01/27/seeking-justice-for- guatemalan-slaughter/

Betancur, Belisario, Buergenthal, Thomas, & Planchart, Reinaldo. 1992. El Salvador: The Massacre at El Mozote; The Need to Remember. https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/pdfs/e/elsalvdr/elsalv923.pdf

Betancur, Belisario, Buergenthal, Thomas, & Planchart, Reinaldo. 1993. From Madness to Hope: the 12 year-war in El Salvador: Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador. United States Institute of Peace. 1993. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/ElSalvador- Report.pdf

Bonner, Raymond. America’s Role in El Salvador’s Deterioration. The Atlantic. January 20, 2018. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/01/trump-and-el-salvador/550955/

75 Burt, Jo-Marie & Estrada, Paulo. The Legacy of Rios Montt, Guatemala’s Most Notorious War Criminal. International Justice Monitor. April 3, 2018. https://www.ijmonitor.org/2018/04/the- legacy-of-rios-montt-guatemalas-most-notorious-war-criminal/

Carter, Jimmy. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-commencement-exercises- the-university-notre-dame. May 22,1977.

Carter, Jimmy. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-state-the-union-address- delivered-before-joint-session-the-congress. January 23, 1980

Chishti, Muzaffar & Pierce, Sarah. Crisis Within A Crisis: Immigration in the United States in a Time of COVID-19. Migration Policy Institute. March 26, 2020. https://www.migration.policy.org/articles/crisis-within-crisis-immigration-time-COVID-19 Center for Justice and Accountability. https://cja.org/where-we-work/guatemala/

Center for Justice and Accountability. https://cja.org/where-we-work/el-salvador/

Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA- RDP93T01222R000300140001-6.pdf

(CHC) Commission for Historical Classification. Guatemala: Memory of Silence. 1995. https://hrdag.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/CEHreport-english.pdf

Cottam, Martha L. Images & Intervention: U.S. Policies in Latin America. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994. Print.

Crossette, Barbara. Central America Found To Regress On Human Rights. New York: New York Times. February 8, 1982. https://www.nytimes.com/1982/02/08/world/central-America- found-to-regress-on-human-right.html

Dillon, Sam. Comandos: The CIA and Nicaragua’s Contra Rebels. Henry Holt & Co. NY, NY. 1991

Dobson, Alan, & Marsh, Steve. 2001. U.S. Foreign Policy Since 1945. Routledge. London.

Doyle, Kate. https://Nsaarchive.qwu.edu/postings George Washington University. Web. 11 March 2020.

Edwards, Lee. Ronald Reagan and the Fall of Communism. Heritage Foundation. January 27,2010. https://www.heritage.org/report/ronald-reagan-and-the-fall-communism

Fisher, Louis. Investigating Iran-Contra. 1987. https://archive.constitutionproject.org/wp- content/uploads/2017/05/Iran-Contra.pdf

Gaddis, John. Strategies of Containment. New York: Oxford University Press. 1982. Print.

76

Gaddis, John. We Know Now: Rethinking Cold War History. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1997. Print.

Gaddis, John. On Grand Strategy. New York: Penguin House. 2018

Garfield, Richard M., Friedmen, Thomas, & Vermund, Sten H. Health-Related Outcomes of War in Nicaragua. American Journal of Public Health. 77:615-618. 1987. (https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/pdf/10.2105/AJPH.77.5.615)

Government Accounting Office. July 1989. Central America: Impact of U.S. Assistance in Latin America. Washington, D.C. https://www.gao.gov/assets/nsiad-89-170.pdf

Government Accounting Office. September 21, 1990. Washington, D.C. https://www.gao.gov/assets/150/149630.pdf

Grandin, Greg. The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004 Print.

Grandin, Greg. Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, The United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism. New York: Holt, 2007. Print.

Grandin, Greg. Kissinger’s Shadow: The Long Reach of America’s Most Controversial Statesman. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2015. Print.

Haulman, Daniel, L. Crisis in Grenada: Operation Urgent Fury. https://media.defense.gov/2012/Aug/23/2001330105/-1/-1/0/urgentfury.pdf. 2012.

History-Matters.com. https://history-matters.com/archive/church/reports/ir/contents.htm

Human Rights Watch. El Salvador: The Massacre at El Mozote and the Need to Remember. March 1992. https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/pdfs/e/elsalvdr/elsalv923.pdf

Human Rights Watch. 2020. Nicaragua: Events of 2019. https://www.hrw.org/world- report/2020/country-chapters/nicaragua

Human Rights Watch. 2020. Guatemala: Events of 2019. https://www.hrw.org/world- report/2020/country-chapters/guatemala#

Human Rights Watch. 2021. El Salvador: Events of 2020. https://www.hrw.org/world- report/2021/country-chapters/el-salvador

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. 1978. http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/nicaragua78eng/chap.1.htm

Kissinger, Henry. 1994. Diplomacy. Simon and Schuster. New York, New York.

77

Knott, Stephen. “George H. W. Bush: Foreign Affairs.” https://millercenter.org/president/bush/foreign-affairs. Accessed:

Krauthammer, Charles. The Reagan Doctrine. The Washington Post. July 19, 1985. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1985/07/19/the-reagan-doctrine/b2a06583- 46fd-41e5-b70d-c949dd3c50c2/

LeoGrande, William M. Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977-1992. Chapel Hill & London. The University of North Carolina Press. 1998. Print.

Lynch, Edward. The Cold War’s Last Battlefield: Reagan, the Soviets, and Central America. State University of New York. Albany, NY. 2011

Malkin, Elisabeth. Survivors of Massacre Ask: ‘Why Did They Have To Kill Those Children. New York: New York Times. May 26, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/26/world/Americas/el-Salvador-el-mozote-massacre.html

Media Bias/Fact Check. https://mediabiasfactcheck.com/amnesty-international/

Meislin, Richard, J. U.S. Military Aid For Guatemala Continuing Despite Official Curbs. New York Times. December 19, 1982.

Miller Center. Reagan, Ronald. January 29, 1981: First Press Conference. https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/preidential-speeches/january-29-1981-first-press- conference.

Molineu, Harold. U.S. Policy Toward Latin America: From Regionalism to Globalism. Boulder: Westview Press, 1990. Print.

National Security Archives (NSA). 1982. George Washington University. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB32/docs/doc23.pdf

National Security Archives (NSA). 1983. George Washington University. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-75.pdf

National Security Archives (NSA). 2018. George Washington University. The Guatemala Genocide Ruling, Five Years Later. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/guatemala/2018-05- 10/guatemala-genocide-ruling-five-years-later

New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/1983/10/20/world/leader-of-grenada-is-reported- killed-by-troops.html

New York Times. newyorktimes.com. https://www.nytimes.com/1986/03/20/world/us-aid-to- the-contras-the-record-since-81.html

78 Office of The Historian. “National Security Council Report: Statement Of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America.” February 16, 1959. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958- 60v05/d11

Pastor, Robert. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian. October 23, 1978. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v01/d98

Petro, Nicolai. The Predicament of Human Rights: The Carter and Reagan Policies, Volume V. University Press of America. Lanham, MD. 1983

Prevost, Gary. “The ‘Contra’ War in Nicaragua.” Conflict Quarterly No. 7. June 1987

Purdy, Elizabeth R. 2008. Britannica. (https://www.britannica.com/topic/Boland-Amendment)

Reagan, Ronald. Reagan Presidential Library. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/address-nation-united-states-policy-central- america

Riding, Alan. U.S. Leads Efforts to Oust Somoza And Lead Nicaragua to Democracy. New York Times. November 16, 1978. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/central-america- carter

Seelke, Clare Ribando. Political Situation and U.S. Relations. Congressional Research Services. Washington, D.C. March 2008. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22836.pdf

Sexton, Jay. The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in 19th Century America. New York: Hill and Wang. 2011. Print.

Small, Dennis. Reagan Advisers Outline Inter-American Strategy. EIR National. Vol. 7, No. 23. Larouche Publishing. August 26, 1980. Online: https://larouchepub.com/eiw/public/1980/eirv07n33-19800826/eirv07n33-19800826_052- reagan_advisers_outline_inter_am.pdf

United Nations, https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/human-rights/

USAID. 1981. https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNAAN238.pdf

USAID. 1986. https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNAAV360.pdf

USADI. 1991. https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNABS486.pdf

U.S. Department of State. 1980. Country Reports On Human Rights Practices. U.S. Government Printing Office. Washington, D.C. 1981.

79 U.S. Department of State. 1981. Country Reports On Human Rights Practices. U.S. Government Printing Office. Washington, D.C. 1982.

U.S. Department of State. 1982. Country Reports On Human Rights Practices. U.S. Government Printing Office. Washington, D.C. 1983.

U.S. Department of State. 1985. Country Reports On Human Rights Practices. U.S. Government Printing Office. Washington, D.C. 1986.

U.S. Department of State. 1993. Country Reports On Human Rights Practices. U.S. Government Printing Office. Washington, D.C. 1994.

U.S. Department of State, Archives. https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/rd/17741.htm

U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian. Central America, 1977-1980. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/central-america-carter

United States Foreign Policy: History and Resource Guide. http://peacehistory-usfp.org/central- america-wars/

Voices of Democracy. Reagan, Ronald. https://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/reagan-evil-empire- speech-text/

Washington Post. washingtonpost.com. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/02/03/us-aid-to-the-contras/842e041b- e9b3-4741-a787-6eae1f3a34da/

Wills, Santiago. Did Reagan Finance Genocide in Guatemala? ABC News. May 14, 2013. https://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/News/ronald-reagan-finance-genocide- guatemala/story?id=19179627

World Peace Foundation. 2015. https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/el-salvador

80