How Malware and Targeted Attacks Infiltrate Your Data Center
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(U//Fouo) Assessment of Anonymous Threat to Control Systems
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A‐0020‐NCCIC / ICS‐CERT –120020110916 DISTRIBUTION NOTICE (A): THIS PRODUCT IS INTENDED FOR MISION PARTNERS AT THE “FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY” LEVEL, ACROSS THE CYBERSECURITY, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND / OR KEY RESOURCES COMMUNITY AT LARGE. (U//FOUO) ASSESSMENT OF ANONYMOUS THREAT TO CONTROL SYSTEMS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (U) The loosely organized hacking collective known as Anonymous has recently expressed an interest in targeting inDustrial control systems (ICS). This proDuct characterizes Anonymous’ capabilities and intent in this area, based on expert input from DHS’s Control Systems Security Program/Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS‐CERT) in coordination with the other NCCIC components. (U//FOUO) While Anonymous recently expressed intent to target ICS, they have not Demonstrated a capability to inflict Damage to these systems, instead choosing to harass and embarrass their targets using rudimentary attack methoDs, readily available to the research community. Anonymous does have the ability to impact aspects of critical infrastructure that run on common, internet accessible systems (such as web‐based applications and windows systems) by employing tactics such as denial of service. Anonymous’ increased interest may indicate intent to Develop an offensive ICS capability in the future. ICS‐CERT assesses that the publically available information regarding exploitation of ICS coulD be leveraged to reDuce the amount of time to develop offensive ICS capabilities. However, the lack of centralized leadership/coordination anD specific expertise may pose challenges to this effort. DISCUSSION (U//FOUO) Several racist, homophobic, hateful, and otherwise maliciously intolerant cyber and physical inciDents throughout the past Decadea have been attributeD to Anonymous, though recently, their targets and apparent motivations have evolved to what appears to be a hacktivist1 agenda. -
The Evolution of Ransomware
The evolution of ransomware SECURITY RESPONSE The evolution of ransomware Kevin Savage, Peter Coogan, Hon Lau Version 1.0 – August 6, 2015 Never before in the history of human kind have people across the world been subjected to extortion on a massive scale as they are today. CONTENTS OVERVIEW ..............................................................................3 Key information ......................................................................5 Types of ransomware .............................................................5 How ransomware has evolved ...............................................7 Targets for ransomware .......................................................13 Systems impacted by ransomware ......................................14 Ransomware: How it works ..................................................18 Ransom techniques ..............................................................27 How widespread is the problem of ransomware .................33 What does the future hold for ransomware? .......................37 Conclusion ............................................................................45 Appendix ..............................................................................47 Mitigation strategies ............................................................51 Symantec detections for common ransomware families 54 Resources .............................................................................56 OVERVIEW Never before in the history of human kind have people across the world been -
Data-Driven Grasp Synthesis - a Survey Jeannette Bohg, Member, IEEE, Antonio Morales, Member, IEEE, Tamim Asfour, Member, IEEE, Danica Kragic Member, IEEE
TRANSACTIONS ON ROBOTICS 1 Data-Driven Grasp Synthesis - A Survey Jeannette Bohg, Member, IEEE, Antonio Morales, Member, IEEE, Tamim Asfour, Member, IEEE, Danica Kragic Member, IEEE specific metric. This process is usually based on some existing Abstract—We review the work on data-driven grasp synthesis grasp experience that can be a heuristic or is generated in and the methodologies for sampling and ranking candidate simulation or on a real robot. Kamon et al. [5] refer to this grasps. We divide the approaches into three groups based on whether they synthesize grasps for known, familiar or unknown as the comparative and Shimoga [2] as the knowledge-based objects. This structure allows us to identify common object rep- approach. Here, a grasp is commonly parameterized by [6, 7]: resentations and perceptual processes that facilitate the employed • the grasping point on the object with which the tool center data-driven grasp synthesis technique. In the case of known point (TCP) should be aligned, objects, we concentrate on the approaches that are based on • the approach vector which describes the 3D angle that object recognition and pose estimation. In the case of familiar objects, the techniques use some form of a similarity matching the robot hand approaches the grasping point with, to a set of previously encountered objects. Finally, for the • the wrist orientation of the robotic hand and approaches dealing with unknown objects, the core part is the • an initial finger configuration extraction of specific features that are indicative of good grasps. Data-driven approaches differ in how the set of grasp candi- Our survey provides an overview of the different methodologies dates is sampled, how the grasp quality is estimated and how and discusses open problems in the area of robot grasping. -
Underground Hacker Markets ANNUAL REPORT—APRIL 2016
Underground Hacker Markets ANNUAL REPORT—APRIL 2016 1 Underground Hacker Markets | APRIL 2016 Contents 3 Introduction: Welcome Back to the Underground 4 Price List for Hacker Goods and Services 7 Russian Hackers Expand their Working Hours and Use Guarantors to Ensure Customers’ Happiness 9 Hacking Services for Hire 11 Business Dossiers for Companies in the Russian Federation Bank Account Credentials, Tax Identification Numbers (TINS), Articles of Incorporation, Phone Numbers, Lease Agreements 12 Hacker Goods for Sale Bank Accounts, Popular Online Payment Accounts, Airline Points Accounts, Credit Cards, Hacker Tutorials…You Name It 16 Is ATM Skimming Passé? Not on Your Life. 19 Security Measures for Protecting Against Cyber Threats 22 Conclusion 23 Glossary of Terms 2 Underground Hacker Markets | APRIL 2016 Introduction: Welcome Back to the Underground For our 3rd Annual Underground Hacker Markets Report, Dell SecureWorks engaged two of our top intelligence analysts from our CISO INTEL Team. The team members spend time tracking hackers on the numerous underground hacker forums and marketplaces all over the world. While much of the cybercrime hitting organizations throughout the world is the result of cooperation by hackers working outside the confines of publicly-accessible marketplaces, these underground forums provide a small window into the world cybercriminals occupy. In this report, we concentrated on marketplaces located on the Russian Underground and on English-speaking marketplaces between Q3 2015 and Q1 2016. Just as we did in the 2013 and 2014 Underground Hacker Reports, we wanted to see if any trends had emerged. For example, did prices for popular hacker goods such as stolen bank accounts, credit cards, and malware go up or down? What about services such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks or hacking company databases? Not only did we answer those questions, but we also found some intriguing new products for sale and some interesting new trends as well. -
Black Hat Hacker White Hat Hacker Gray Hat Hacker
Crackers or Malicious Hackers: System crackers attempt to access computing facilities for which they have not been authorized. Cracking a computer's defenses is seen as the ultimate victimless crime. The perception is that nobody is hurt or even endangered by a little stolen machine time. Crackers enjoy the simple challenge of trying to log in, just to see whether it can be done. Most crackers can do their harm without confronting anybody, not even making a sound. In the absence of explicit warnings not to trespass in a system, crackers infer that access is permitted. Others attack for curiosity, personal gain, or self-satisfaction. And still others enjoy causing chaos, loss, or harm. There is no common profile or motivation for these attackers. Classification of Hackers: Hackers can be classified broadly into three different categories: 1. Black Hat Hacker 2. White Hat Hacker 3. Grey Hat Hacker Black Hat Hacker Black-hat Hackers are also known as an Unethical Hacker or a Security Cracker. These people hack the system illegally to steal money or to achieve their own illegal goals. They find banks or other companies with weak security and steal money or credit card information. They can also modify or destroy the data as well. Black hat hacking is illegal. White Hat Hacker White hat Hackers are also known as Ethical Hackers or a Penetration Tester. White hat hackers are the good guys of the hacker world. These people use the same technique used by the black hat hackers. They also hack the system, but they can only hack the system that they have permission to hack in order to test the security of the system. -
Mcafee Potentially Unwanted Programs (PUP) Policy March, 2018
POLICY McAfee Potentially Unwanted Programs (PUP) Policy March, 2018 McAfee recognizes that legitimate technologies such as commercial, shareware, freeware, or open source products may provide a value or benefit to a user. However, if these technologies also pose a risk to the user or their system, then users should consent to the behaviors exhibited by the software, understand the risks, and have adequate control over the technology. McAfee refers to technologies with these characteristics as “potentially unwanted program(s),” or “PUP(s).” The McAfee® PUP detection policy is based on the process includes assessing the risks to privacy, security, premise that users should understand what is being performance, and stability associated with the following: installed on their systems and be notified when a ■ Distribution: how users obtain the software including technology poses a risk to their system or privacy. advertisements, interstitials, landing-pages, linking, PUP detection and removal is intended to provide and bundling notification to our users when a software program or technology lacks sufficient notification or control over ■ Installation: whether the user can make an informed the software or fails to adequately gain user consent to decision about the software installation or add- the risks posed by the technology. McAfee Labs is the ons and can adequately back out of any undesired McAfee team responsible for researching and analyzing installations technologies for PUP characteristics. ■ Run-Time Behaviors: the behaviors exhibited by the technology including advertisements, deception, and McAfee Labs evaluates technologies to assess any impacts to privacy and security risks exhibited by the technology against the degree of user notification and control over the technology. -
Address Munging: the Practice of Disguising, Or Munging, an E-Mail Address to Prevent It Being Automatically Collected and Used
Address Munging: the practice of disguising, or munging, an e-mail address to prevent it being automatically collected and used as a target for people and organizations that send unsolicited bulk e-mail address. Adware: or advertising-supported software is any software package which automatically plays, displays, or downloads advertising material to a computer after the software is installed on it or while the application is being used. Some types of adware are also spyware and can be classified as privacy-invasive software. Adware is software designed to force pre-chosen ads to display on your system. Some adware is designed to be malicious and will pop up ads with such speed and frequency that they seem to be taking over everything, slowing down your system and tying up all of your system resources. When adware is coupled with spyware, it can be a frustrating ride, to say the least. Backdoor: in a computer system (or cryptosystem or algorithm) is a method of bypassing normal authentication, securing remote access to a computer, obtaining access to plaintext, and so on, while attempting to remain undetected. The backdoor may take the form of an installed program (e.g., Back Orifice), or could be a modification to an existing program or hardware device. A back door is a point of entry that circumvents normal security and can be used by a cracker to access a network or computer system. Usually back doors are created by system developers as shortcuts to speed access through security during the development stage and then are overlooked and never properly removed during final implementation. -
Crimeware on the Net
Crimeware on the Net The “Behind the scenes” of the new web economy Iftach Ian Amit Director, Security Research – Finjan BlackHat Europe, Amsterdam 2008 Who Am I ? (iamit) • Iftach Ian Amit – In Hebrew it makes more sense… • Director Security Research @ Finjan • Various security consulting/integration gigs in the past – R&D – IT • A helping hand when needed… (IAF) 2 BlackHat Europe – Amsterdam 2008 Today’s Agenda • Terminology • Past vs. Present – 10,000 feet view • Business Impact • Key Characteristics – what does it look like? – Anti-Forensics techniques – Propagation methods • What is the motive (what are they looking for)? • Tying it all up – what does it look like when successful (video). • Anything in it for us to learn from? – Looking forward on extrusion testing methodologies 3 BlackHat Europe – Amsterdam 2008 Some Terminology • Crimeware – what we refer to most malware these days is actually crimeware – malware with specific goals for making $$$ for the attackers. • Attackers – not to be confused with malicious code writers, security researchers, hackers, crackers, etc… These guys are the Gordon Gecko‟s of the web security field. The buy low, and capitalize on the investment. • Smart (often mislead) guys write the crimeware and get paid to do so. 4 BlackHat Europe – Amsterdam 2008 How Do Cybercriminals Steal Business Data? Criminals’ activity in the cyberspace Federal Prosecutor: “Cybercrime Is Funding Organized Crime” 5 BlackHat Europe – Amsterdam 2008 The Business Impact Of Crimeware Criminals target sensitive business data -
Identifying and Defining Relationships: Techniques for Improving Student Systemic Thinking
AC 2011-897: IDENTIFYING AND DEFINING RELATIONSHIPS: TECH- NIQUES FOR IMPROVING STUDENT SYSTEMIC THINKING Cecelia M. Wigal, University of Tennessee, Chattanooga Cecelia M. Wigal received her Ph.D. in 1998 from Northwestern University and is presently a Professor of Engineering and Assistant Dean of the College of Engineering and Computer Science at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga (UTC). Her primary areas of interest and expertise include complex process and system analysis, process improvement analysis, and information system analysis with respect to usability and effectiveness. Dr. Wigal is also interested in engineering education reform to address present and future student and national and international needs. c American Society for Engineering Education, 2011 Identifying and Defining Relationships: Techniques for Improving Student Systemic Thinking Abstract ABET, Inc. is looking for graduating undergraduate engineering students who are systems thinkers. However, genuine systems thinking is contrary to the traditional practice of using linear thinking to help solve design problems often used by students and many practitioners. Linear thinking has a tendency to compartmentalize solution options and minimize recognition of relationships between solutions and their elements. Systems thinking, however, has the ability to define the whole system, including its environment, objectives, and parts (subsystems), both static and dynamic, by their relationships. The work discussed here describes two means of introducing freshman engineering students to thinking systemically or holistically when understanding and defining problems. Specifically, the modeling techniques of Rich Pictures and an instructor generated modified IDEF0 model are discussed. These techniques have roles in many applications. In this case they are discussed in regards to their application to the design process. -
Comptia® Security+ SY0-601 Cert Guide
CompTIA® Security+ SY0-601 Cert Guide Omar Santos Ron Taylor Joseph Mlodzianowski A01_Santos_Fm_pi-plii_1.indd 1 01/06/21 2:49 pm CompTIA® Security+ SY0-601 Cert Guide Editor-in-Chief Copyright © 2022 by Pearson Education, Inc. Mark Taub All rights reserved. No part of this book shall be reproduced, stored in Product Line Manager a retrieval system, or transmitted by any means, electronic, mechanical, Brett Bartow photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without written permission from the publisher. No patent liability is assumed with respect to the use of the Executive Editor information contained herein. Although every precaution has been taken in Nancy Davis the preparation of this book, the publisher and author assume no respon- Development Editor sibility for errors or omissions. Nor is any liability assumed for damages Christopher A. Cleveland resulting from the use of the information contained herein. ISBN-13: 978-0-13-677031-2 Managing Editor ISBN-10: 0-13-677031-2 Sandra Schroeder Library of Congress Control Number: 2021935686 Senior Project Editor ScoutAutomatedPrintCode Tonya Simpson Copy Editor Trademarks Chuck Hutchinson All terms mentioned in this book that are known to be trademarks or ser- vice marks have been appropriately capitalized. Pearson IT Certification Indexer cannot attest to the accuracy of this information. Use of a term in this book Erika Millen should not be regarded as affecting the validity of any trademark or service mark. Proofreader Abigail Manheim Warning and Disclaimer Technical Editor Every effort has been made to make this book as complete and as accurate Chris Crayton as possible, but no warranty or fitness is implied. -
Trojans and Malware on the Internet an Update
Attitude Adjustment: Trojans and Malware on the Internet An Update Sarah Gordon and David Chess IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center Yorktown Heights, NY Abstract This paper continues our examination of Trojan horses on the Internet; their prevalence, technical structure and impact. It explores the type and scope of threats encountered on the Internet - throughout history until today. It examines user attitudes and considers ways in which those attitudes can actively affect your organization’s vulnerability to Trojanizations of various types. It discusses the status of hostile active content on the Internet, including threats from Java and ActiveX, and re-examines the impact of these types of threats to Internet users in the real world. Observations related to the role of the antivirus industry in solving the problem are considered. Throughout the paper, technical and policy based strategies for minimizing the risk of damage from various types of Trojan horses on the Internet are presented This paper represents an update and summary of our research from Where There's Smoke There's Mirrors: The Truth About Trojan Horses on the Internet, presented at the Eighth International Virus Bulletin Conference in Munich Germany, October 1998, and Attitude Adjustment: Trojans and Malware on the Internet, presented at the European Institute for Computer Antivirus Research in Aalborg, Denmark, March 1999. Significant portions of those works are included here in original form. Descriptors: fidonet, internet, password stealing trojan, trojanized system, trojanized application, user behavior, java, activex, security policy, trojan horse, computer virus Attitude Adjustment: Trojans and Malware on the Internet Trojans On the Internet… Ever since the city of Troy was sacked by way of the apparently innocuous but ultimately deadly Trojan horse, the term has been used to talk about something that appears to be beneficial, but which hides an attack within. -
Malware to Crimeware
I have surveyed over a decade of advances in delivery of malware. Over this daVid dittRich period, attackers have shifted to using complex, multi-phase attacks based on malware to crimeware: subtle social engineering tactics, advanced how far have they cryptographic techniques to defeat takeover gone, and how do and analysis, and highly targeted attacks we catch up? that are intended to fly below the radar of current technical defenses. I will show how Dave Dittrich is an affiliate information malicious technology combined with social security researcher in the University of manipulation is used against us and con- Washington’s Applied Physics Laboratory. He focuses on advanced malware threats and clude that this understanding might even the ethical and legal framework for respond- ing to computer network attacks. help us design our own combination of [email protected] technical and social mechanisms to better protect us. And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free. The late 1990s saw the advent of distributed and John 8:32 coordinated computer network attack tools, which were primarily used for the electronic equivalent of fist fighting in the streets. It only took a few years for criminal activity—extortion, click fraud, denial of service for competitive advantage—to appear, followed by mass theft of personal and financial data through quieter, yet still widespread and auto- mated, keystroke logging. Despite what law-abid- ing citizens would desire, crime does pay, and pay well. Today, the financial gain from criminal enter- prise allows investment of large sums of money in developing tools and operational capabilities that are increasingly sophisticated and highly targeted.