CHAPTSR IX the FIRST ANQLO»MARATHA WAR » a REVIEW The

- «• CHAPTSR IX THE FIRST ANQLO»MARATHA WAR » A REVIEW The preceding chapters of the present tdiesis were devoted to the analysis of the major battles fought on the Konkan and Gujrat fronts during the three different phases of the first Anglo-i<'Iaratha «iar. In this concluding chapter, however, an attempt has been made to make a critical rc^view of all the three phases of that war simultaneously. This general review of the first Anglo-Maratha War not only leads to certain broad generalisations from the military point of view, but also reveals some of its special features. As explained in the chapter II of this thesis, the first Anglo-Maratha War represented a clash between two modes of warfare’, one based on trained and disciplined infantry backed by artillery, while the other on mobile cavalry, swift manoeuvres and harassment of the enemy by cutting off his lines of communication and supplies rather than fighting pitched battles. Both these modes of warfare proved useless in bringing about the decisive result of the first Anglo- Maratha War, The ganimi k5vl or the ktita yuddha of the Marathas, by its very nature, covild tire out an enemy by its negative tactics, but it was incapable of crushingits military strength. On the other hand, the British guns and artillery were capable of crushing the enemy, but as they were not backed by mobile cavalry,the British troops could not pursue the Maratha cavalry bands, when their guns 359 360 had made a breach in the enemy lines and bring the war to a speedy conclusion. The first Anglo-Maratha War thus demonstrated that for a decisive victory in a war, a proper balance between trained infantry, artillery and cavalry is essential. During the first Anglo-Maratha Aar, almost all the major battles were fought on the Konkan front. Out of the five major battles fought on this front and one in the Gujrat region, the .4arathas won three - the battle of Talegao, the second Borghat expedition and the siege of l°Ialanggad. The British won two siege battles - the siege of the fort of Sashti in 1774 and the siege of the fort of Vasai in 1780. rhe battle of adas was evenly matched, as both the sides suffered heavy losses and still no decisive result came out of it. These respective victories of both the contending parties show that the Marathas won the battles against the British only when geographical factors favoured them. The plains of Talegao were suitable for the swift movements of their cavalry and the hilly and thiclcly wooded Borghat was very helpful to their ganiml kSva. Similarly, in the siege of Malanggad the natural impregnability of that fort made the British artillery ineffective. Contrary to this, in adverse geographical surroundings and situations such as during the sieges of the Sashti and Vasai forts, the ganiml kSvS of the arathas failed and the British artillery and navy were successful. The loss of the forts of Sashti and Vasai by the arathas Indicated that the .larathas of the 361 later 13th century had lost their traditional skill in sigge* fighting. A comparative study of all the three phases of the first Anglo-Maratha war reveals that the I'larathas scored only a temoorary success over the British during the War, Theirs was not a sound, convincing victory. They only suc ceeded in thwarting the British design to attack Pune and make naghoba the Hegent of Peshwa i.adhavrao II, They defini tely showed strength and vitality in defence vdien hard pres sed, but they could not crush the British military power. The first Anglo-Maratha War did not put an end to the issue of supremacy in India in the later half of the 18th century, as neither the British nor the <4araohas were the victors of the War. fcven though the British had to retreat in the two Borghat expeditions and during the siege of t^lalanggad, their mode of warfare indicated the future trend of Indian politics. It was a sign of the future ascendancy of tJ:ie British power and the decline of the Marathas, Throughout the War, the British were on the offensive and the îarathas on the defensive. Twice nearly the whole of the British army had left Bombay and entered the Borghat to attack Pune. Very small force was then left to guard and defend Bombay, liven then the .-*aratha land and naval forces could not attack Bombay in spite of tneir vast resources in men,money and material. Let alone the attack on Bombay, the .arathas were neither able to capture an inch of the British territories nor were they able to recover any of the 362 territories they had lost to the British during the War on the strength of their arms. The recovery of these terri tories in the treaty of Salbai was a combined result of Haidar A li’s brilliant military feats in Karnatak and the general political atmosphere in India unfavourable to the British. The so-called Maratha victories at Talegao, Borghat and /lalanggad were negative victories. They did not prove that the *.aratha army and its art of warfare were suoerior to those of the British, ^hese victories were achieved by the îarathas by negative tic ties like burning and ravaging their own territories and cutting off the supply lines of the enemy from a distance. They were,âble to make frontal attacks on the British troops, make breaches in their easiay lines and rout them. In the second Borghat expedition, Goddard could successfully retreat to Panvel from Khandala. The ^^larathas were not in a position to force him to surrender. During the sieges of the Sashti, :ialanggad and Vasai forts also, the iÎaratha troops sent by Nana for the rescue of these forts were unsuccessful against the besiegers. The only chance the Marathas had of crushing the military power of the Bombay Uovernment was at Vadgao in 177^-79. In the battle of Talegao-Vadgao, the i.arathas had completely encircled the British forces. It was then within their hands to annihilate these forces. Of course this situation arose not because of the superiority of the laratha arras, but because of the tactical mistakes committed by the British 363 commanders, tven so, the I'iarathaa did not take advantage of these mistakes and let slip the golden opportunity of humiliating the Bombay army by allowing it to retreat towards Panvel. The negative victories of the j/larathas could never cavise any intimidation in the -'inglish camp, This can be easily realised when the waratha victories are compared with those of Haidar iQ.i over the Singlieh in 1780. The resources at Haidar /di*s disposal as compared to those of the Marathas were limited. But the victories he achieved over tê English were, unlike those of the iÂrathas, positive victories. He took offensive, entered into the British territories, conquered as much of them as possible and knocked at the very doors of the i'âdras Government. The havoc wrought by him created such a terror in the British Ci^mp that all the three Ensîsh Presidencies in India had to take cognizance of it and make a serious attemot to check the growing DOwer of Haidar Ali. Hastings had to rush in his battalions from Calcutta to i>iacira& and tê iîadras Government had to request Goddard and the Bombay Government to send their troops in Haidar A li’s territories. Haidar could achieve positive victories over the best of the British troops under Sir Eyre Ooote, The .Aarathas, however, during the first Anglo-Maratha war, were never able to create the terror and awe in the British minds, which Haidar could create. Haidar could score his resounding victories over the British because of three factors. 1-irstly, he struck a balance 364 between the traditional and new western mode of warfare. He had an infantry and artillery which were excellently built up by the french officers. At the same time he did not abandon his cavalry which gave mobility to his trained infantry. Secondly, Haidar being the chief commander of all his forces, tliere was lUfiity of command in his army, rhirdly, he had a good civil and financial system to support him. If the j*!arathas had followed Haidar’s methods, they too could have become a formidable power in the eyes of the British. The negative tactics and the negative victories of the Marathas had their impact on the negotiations of the treaty of Salbai. Inspite of the retreats of the British troops from the Borghat in 1778-79 and 1781 and from the i-ialanggad fort in 1780, Anderson negotiated with i^lahadaji at Salbai with an air of superiority complex, because Hastings had instructed him to impress upon Mahadaji the positive victories scored by the British over the .arathas at Sashti and Vasal. Mahadaji, even though the general polinical circumstances in India prior to the treaty of Salbai were anti-British and favourable to the Marathas, was ijmder the pressure of an inferiority complex that he was not able to recover Sashti and Vasai by force of arms. It was on this point that Hastings scored over Nlahadaji. He could make Mahadaji think that the British arms were superior to those of the %rathas. Due to this inferiority comolex,Mahadaji could not bargain from the position of strength and allowed Sashti and its deoendencies to remain in the British hands. 365 During the three phases of the War, the British navy- co-operated with the land army.

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