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Public Transcript of the Hearing Held on 31 May 2016 in the Case of Ayyash Et

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20160531_STL-11-01_T_T269_OFF_PUB_EN 1/98 PUBLIC Official Transcript Procedural Matters (Open Session) Page 1 1 Special Tribunal for Lebanon. 2 In the case of The Prosecutor v. Ayyash, Badreddine, Merhi, 3 Oneissi, and Sabra 4 STL-11-01 5 Presiding Judge David Re, Judge Janet Nosworthy, 6 Judge Micheline Braidy, Judge Walid Akoum, and 7 Judge Nicola Lettieri - [Trial Chamber] 8 Tuesday, 31 May 2016 - [Trial Hearing] 9 [Open Session] 10 --- Upon commencing at 10.05 a.m. 11 THE REGISTRAR: The Special Tribunal for Lebanon is sitting in an 12 open session in the case of the Prosecutor versus Ayyash, Badreddine, 13 Merhi, Oneissi, and Sabra, case number STL-11-01. 14 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Good morning. 15 Can we please take appearances, starting with the Prosecution. 16 Good morning, Mr. Cameron. 17 MR. CAMERON: Good morning. It's Graeme Cameron for the 18 Prosecution, assisted by Ms. Tanja Zekaj and Mr. Leroy Stockton. 19 MR. HAYNES: Good morning, Your Honour. Peter Haynes for the 20 participating victims, assisted today by Kinga Tibori-Szabo and Kiat Wei 21 Ng. 22 MR. AOUN: Your Honours, good morning. Good morning, everyone. 23 Emile Aoun, Thomas Hannis, Chad Mair, and Scott Johnstone. And we are 24 representing the interests of Mr. Salim Ayyash. Thank you. 25 MR. KORKMAZ: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours. Tuesday, 31 May 2016 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20160531_STL-11-01_T_T269_OFF_PUB_EN 2/98 PUBLIC Official Transcript Procedural Matters (Open Session) Page 2 1 Antoine Korkmaz representing the rights and interest of Mr. Mustafa Amine 2 Badreddine, assisted by Ms. Dimitri, Mr. Edwards, as well as Ms. Sipala. 3 Thank you. 4 MS. WISTINGHAUSEN: Good morning, Your Honour, Natalie von 5 Wistinghausen representing the interests of Mr. Oneissi. Thank you. 6 MR. YOUNG: Your Honours, good morning. Representing the 7 interests of Mr. Assad Sabra, David Young, along with Mr. Geoffrey 8 Roberts. 9 MR. KHALIL: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours, ladies 10 and gentlemen, Jad Khalil and Dorothee Le Fraper du Hellen representing 11 the interests of Mr. Hassan Merhi. Thank you. 12 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: And I note the presence of two 13 representatives of the Defence Office, including the head of Defence 14 Office. 15 This morning we're going to hear evidence and legal submissions 16 in relation to Mr. Mustafa Amine Badreddine. The Prosecution has 17 provided the parties and the Chamber with the evidence it's going to 18 present. We've had a look through that. And counsel for Mr. Badreddine, 19 Mr. Korkmaz, has also provided us with some material. And I understand 20 the Legal Representative of Victims will also, if not be presenting 21 material, be making submissions. 22 So the way we'll proceed is we'll hear the evidence first from 23 the Prosecutor and any other parties that have anything of an evidentiary 24 matter to add and then we'll proceed to submissions. 25 Thank you, Mr. Cameron. Tuesday, 31 May 2016 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20160531_STL-11-01_T_T269_OFF_PUB_EN 3/98 PUBLIC Official Transcript Submissions by the Prosecution (Open Session) Page 3 1 MR. CAMERON: Thank you. For the benefit of all and the members 2 of the public, I thought that perhaps I could provide a short summary of 3 what brought us here today, and that began on the 13th of May of this 4 year when the Lebanese media began airing and publishing reports from 5 various sources that Mustafa Amine Badreddine had been killed in an 6 explosion in Syria. 7 The Court was not scheduled to sit that day nor on the following 8 Monday, the 16th of May. But when we resumed on the 17th of May, in 9 light of the reports of Mr. Badreddine's passing, the Trial Chamber 10 considered it appropriate to adjourn the proceedings until the stage was 11 reached when it could consider the issue in the context of an appropriate 12 evidentiary basis. 13 On Wednesday the 18th of May, the prosecutor-general of the 14 office of the public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation in Lebanon, 15 issued a report to the attention of the president of the Tribunal, Judge 16 Ivana Hrdlickova. This particular report is one which is prepared 17 monthly in the normal course to address the ongoing efforts of the 18 Lebanese authorities to apprehend the five accused identified in the 19 consolidated indictment before you. 20 Now, at that time the prosecutor-general was not in a position to 21 provide any official documentation issued by the Lebanese authorities 22 regarding the death of Mr. Badreddine. And in consequence, on the 23 following day, the 19th of May, 2016, a request for assistance, number 24 2016/RFA0113/LEB/GRC was sent to the prosecutor-general by the office of 25 the Prosecutor asking for additional forms of confirmation regarding the Tuesday, 31 May 2016 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20160531_STL-11-01_T_T269_OFF_PUB_EN 4/98 PUBLIC Official Transcript Submissions by the Prosecution (Open Session) Page 4 1 death of Mustafa Badreddine and included the following requests: For a 2 certified copy of the death certificate, together with certified copies 3 of all documents, reports, or other documentation submitted to the 4 Lebanese authorities in support of their verification of the death and/or 5 the circumstances of the death. 6 And, in addition, the request was for a certified copy of any 7 report compiled by or in the possession of Hezbollah or others regarding 8 the death of Mustafa Amine Badreddine, including information relevant to 9 the circumstances of the death, location, associated victims, and imagery 10 of the scene of death. 11 Now, as the Trial Chamber is aware, the usual evidence offered by 12 a party to a judicial body in support of a submission that an accused is 13 deceased is a certificate, often termed a death certificate, issued by 14 the state in which the accused died attesting to the fact of his death. 15 In this case, we do not understand that a death certificate has been 16 issued by the Lebanese authorities, and it's important to emphasize that 17 the Office of the Prosecutor does not in any way find fault with the 18 Lebanese authorities, and in particular the prosecutor-general, who has 19 worked, as he always does, diligently on this issue. 20 There are a number of contributing factors for the fact that no 21 death certificate is available to be provided to the Trial Chamber, but 22 among them two might be said to be principal factors. The first is that 23 there was an acknowledgement by Hezbollah that Mustafa Badreddine was its 24 top military commander at the time of his death and that he was actively 25 engaged in military duties in Syria when he was killed. This means, in Tuesday, 31 May 2016 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20160531_STL-11-01_T_T269_OFF_PUB_EN 5/98 PUBLIC Official Transcript Submissions by the Prosecution (Open Session) Page 5 1 effect, that Hezbollah assumed exclusive jurisdiction and control over 2 the investigation of Mr. Badreddine's death in Syria, the transportation 3 of his body to Lebanon, the organization of his funeral, and his 4 internment in Hezbollah's Martyr's Shrine. 5 There appears to have been no involvement by the Lebanese 6 authorities as one might expect for a civilian who is not an active 7 member of Hezbollah's military. 8 Second, the secretary-general of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, the 9 leading figure of that organization, has, as you'll see a little later, 10 stated that he does not afford the appropriate degree of respect for the 11 Special Tribunal for Lebanon and is unlikely, for reasons of his own, to 12 cooperate with any requests made by the Special Tribunal in connection 13 with Mr. Badreddine's death. 14 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Mr. Cameron, are you able to tell us about 15 the status of Hezbollah in relation to what you've described as the 16 exclusive jurisdiction and control over the investigation of 17 Mr. Badreddine's death in Syria and the transportation of his body to 18 Lebanon? 19 MR. CAMERON: Yes, I'll be going through a series of events that 20 number ten in number, and you'll see that in respect of each of the 21 events, whether they are statements, ceremonies, the funeral, or other 22 matters, they have all been organized and participated in by Hezbollah. 23 So it's our understanding that Hezbollah maintained control over the 24 transportation of the body back to Lebanon and over the funeral services 25 and the internment in a shrine that they have termed their Martyr's Tuesday, 31 May 2016 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20160531_STL-11-01_T_T269_OFF_PUB_EN 6/98 PUBLIC Official Transcript Submissions by the Prosecution (Open Session) Page 6 1 Shrine. 2 The information, my information, and the circumstances from which 3 you can find that Hezbollah exerted that control is circumstantial from 4 the nature of the evidence. I have no further information beyond which 5 I'll be offering you. 6 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: I'll clarify what I was asking. I was more 7 interested in the legal status of Hezbollah in relation to an 8 investigation.
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