Taves, Ann 2018 80 Explanation W EA
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1 1 2 2 3 Chapter 13 3 4 4 5 5 6 Explanation and the Study of Religion 6 7 7 8 8 9 Egil Asprem and Ann Taves 9 10 10 11 11 12 Introduction 12 13 13 14 The rise of the evolutionary and cognitive science of religion in the last two dec- 14 15 ades has sparked a resurgence of interest in explaining religion. Predictably, these 15 16 eforts have prompted rehearsals of longstanding debates over whether religious 16 17 phenomena can or should be explained in nonreligious terms. Little attention 17 18 has been devoted to the nature of explanation, methods of explanation, or what 18 19 should count as an adequate explanation. 19 20 The lack of attention to explanation is further aggravated by a concomitant 20 21 lack of attention to what we mean by theory in the study of religion. As has been 21 22 the case in anthropology (Ellen 2010), we routinely discuss theories of religion 22 23 without discussing what counts as a theory. For some, theory is associated with 23 24 the range of classical and contemporary theories of religion included in intro- 24 25 ductory texts (see for example Pals 2014 or Stausberg 2009). For others, including 25 26 many in the humanities, theory is associated with “critical theory,” of either the 26 27 literary or social science variety. 27 28 As Stausberg (2009: 2–3) indicates, there are, however, many competing views 28 29 of and controversies over the meaning of theory in the diferent sciences and 29 30 disciplines. For our purposes, it is enough to note (1) the distinction between the 30 31 colloquial and scientifc defnitions of the term and (2) the intimate connection 31 32 between scientifc theories and explanation. The American Heritage Dictionary (as 32 33 cited by Reznick 2010: 220) makes the basic distinction we will presume here. 33 34 Colloquially, theory typically refers to abstract reasoning, speculation, hypothe- 34 35 sis or supposition. In the sciences, however, it refers to “systematically organized 35 36 knowledge applicable in a relatively wide variety of circumstances; especially, a 36 37 system of assumptions, accepted principles, and rules of procedure divided to 37 38 analyze, predict, or otherwise explain the nature or behavior of a specifed set of 38 39 phenomena” (ibid.). Scientifc theories, in other words, seek to “explain the nature 39 40 or behavior of a specifed set of phenomena … [in light of] a system of assump- 40 41 tions, accepted principles, and rules of procedure” (ibid.). Whether the theories 41 42 have been viewed as scientifc or not, much of the debate regarding explanation 42 43 in religious studies has centered on two issues, one explicit and the other not: 43 44 (1) the debate over reductionism, i.e., whether theories of religion can or should 44 45 explain religion in nonreligious terms, and (2) a tacit debate over “scientism,” i.e., 45 134 • Egil Asprem and Ann Taves 1 over whether anything resembling scientifc methods and lines of theorizing is 1 2 desirable or possible in the humanities (see for example Stenmark 1997). 2 3 In what follows, we assume the legitimacy of attempts to explain religious phe- 3 4 nomena in nonreligious terms in light of the assumptions, principles and rules 4 5 of procedure in the social and natural sciences. Building on Proudfoot’s (1985) 5 6 distinction between descriptive and explanatory reduction, we presuppose the 6 7 legitimacy and importance of the latter. We will directly engage the issue of 7 8 “scientism,” which we view as a dismissive term typically directed at perceived 8 9 over-extensions of scientifc inquiry, through our discussion of historical and 9 10 contemporary explanation in the philosophy of science. In doing so, we want to 10 11 make the point that there are various views of explanation in the sciences, some 11 12 of which we consider more appropriate for explaining socioculturally-informed 12 13 human behavior than others. Specifcally, we argue that the new mechanistic-causal 13 14 approach commonly presupposed in the “special sciences” (biology, the neuro- 14 15 sciences, and psychology), referred to by philosophers of science as “the new mech- 15 16 anism,” can be extended to the study of religion following the lead of researchers 16 17 who are extending it to the social sciences. 17 18 Our aim in making this case is, frst, to move the discussion in religious stud- 18 19 ies beyond general worries about “reductionism” and “scientism” (or “positiv- 19 20 ism”) and, second, to ground theorizing about human experience in a broadly 20 21 evolutionary base. We do so recognizing that any discussion of mechanisms in 21 22 the social sciences and history must take account of complexities typically not 22 23 encountered (or dealt with) in the natural sciences. Our goal, in other words, is 23 24 not to subsume or subordinate the humanities to the natural and social sciences, 24 25 but to connect them in a spirit of consilience (Slingerland and Collard 2011). 25 26 In the sections that follow, we will discuss explanation in theories of reli- 26 27 gion (§1), the nature and limitations of the “old mechanism” and other older 27 28 approaches to explanation in the philosophy of science (§2), and how the “new 28 29 mechanism” overcomes these difculties (§3). Throughout this discussion we will 29 30 highlight the complexities that will need to be addressed in extending the new 30 31 mechanist approach to explanation to the humanistic social sciences. 31 32 32 33 1 Explanation in Theories of Religion 33 34 34 35 “Explanation” has several diferent meanings in ordinary English (Craver 2014: 35 36 30–35): 36 37 37 1 It can refer to a communicative act. The professor explained 38 38 (communicates) the material to her students. The text explains 39 39 (communicates) what you need to know. ( 40 40 41 2 It can refer to a cause or a factor that produces a phenomenon. ( 41 42 42 3 It can refer to a mental representation or model of the causes that 43 43 produce a phenomenon. The model explains (represents) the (causal) 44 44 explanation. 45 45 Explanation and the Study of Religion • 135 1 Explanations in the frst and third senses are known as epistemic explanations. They 1 2 involve humans or other intentional creatures trying to communicate (“explain”) 2 3 something to an audience. Explanations in the second sense are known as ontic 3 4 explanations. They presuppose a view of reality (an ontology) which assumes that 4 5 certain entities and processes exist in the world “whether or not anyone discov- 5 6 ers or describes them” (Salmon 1989: 133, quoted in Craver 2014: 31), and assumes 6 7 that there exist ontic structures (e.g. mechanisms and causes) that explain the 7 8 production and behavior of various phenomena. 8 9 9 10 1.1 Theories of Religion 10 11 11 12 Explanation in the second sense allows us to distinguish between phenomeno- 12 13 logical and explanatory models. Phenomenological models describe or redescribe 13 14 (i.e., interpret) a phenomenon “without revealing the ontic structures that pro- 14 15 duce it” (Craver 2014: 40). We can distinguish three broad types of theories: 15 16 16 1 Phenomenological theories of religion. 17 17 18 2 Supernaturalistic causal theories of religion. 18 19 19 20 3 Naturalistic causal theories of religion. 20 21 21 Phenomenological theories of religion, associated historically with fgures such as 22 22 Chantepie de la Saussaye, Otto, Kristensen, van der Leeuw and, more recently, 23 23 with Ninian Smart and Mircea Eliade, are only loosely connected with philosoph- 24 24 ical phenomenologists, such as Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleu-Ponty. All, 25 25 however, give priority to human experience from the frst person point of view 26 26 (Smith 2013). Some who hold to this approach bracket their own ontological views 27 27 and limit themselves to describing or interpreting the ontological claims of their 28 28 subjects. Such theories, typically characterized as phenomenological or interpretive 29 29 (hermeneutical), describe the causal explanations of those they study, but refrain 30 30 from ofering causal explanations (i.e., ontic claims) of their own. 31 31 Phenomenological bracketing has given rise to “methodological agnosticism” 32 32 (see for example Porpora 2006), which we, like others (Martin forthcoming), fnd 33 33 problematic. We do however endorse the idea of a frst step in which research- 34 34 ers temporarily hold back their own explanations in order to describe the phe- 35 35 nomenon one wants to explain and avoid descriptive reduction (see discussion of 36 36 Proudfoot below). 37 37 In so far as the phenomenological is construed as the only step, however, it is 38 38 tied to the notion of religion as a sui generis phenomenon. This view holds that 39 39 to the extent that religion can be explained, it must be explained “on its own 40 40 terms,” that is, it cannot be reduced to something that is not religion. The sim- 41 41 plest version of sui generis theorizing holds simply that, in Daniel Pals’s words, 42 42 “one ought to accord them [religious phenomena] a certain independence” from 43 43 other human activities and experiences (Pals 1987: 259). Thus one can explain 44 44 religious phenomena in terms presumed to be internal to the religious feld (e.g., 45 45 136 • Egil Asprem and Ann Taves 1 “the holy,” “the sacred,” “mana,” or “power”), but not in terms of “external” fac- 1 2 tors, such as social alienation, latent neuroses, or evolved cooperative strategies.