324 Antoni Kaminski external demands that decisive measures must be ~=:L.k::.en, no gov- ernment has done much to remedy this situation.14 ...... Whatever the role of particular interests in the P«=:»-:Iii.s;h eeonomic 12 policy process, the professional integrity of the econo~s-ts in eharge ...... of budgetary and financial policie s has been high ea:::8L<:>l.:1ghto keep these out of the realm of partisan quarrels. This haa.==- been an im- portant factor in Poland's relative economic success. :==i:anilarly, the existence of a group of professionals with a strong icI~c>.ogical eom- The Czech Republic: The Unexpected mitment to self-government, and the support this fou:r=:aacI ~mong loeal Force OrInstitutional Constraints and regional elites, were decisive factors in stimul8L~::::i=J:.g the drive i~ toward the reform of the Polish state. The Europea-=--- Commission has supported this reform, by making it a condition:L "
My thanks to Dagmar Ašerová, Matthew Evangelista, Rick Fawn, Timothy Garton Ash, Jirí Pehe, Alex Pravda, Matthew Rhodes, Marek Škréta, Timothy Snyder, Jonathan Stein, Stephen Whitefield, and Kieran Williams for comments on an earlier draft. This chapter also benefited from conversations with officials of the European Commission and of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including Jirí Havlík, Petr Lunák, Martin Palouš, and Pavel Telicka. The research was funded by a NATO-National Science Foundation postdoctoral fellowship, and supported by the Prague centre of the East-West Institute.
1 This argument draws on Milada Anna Vachudová, Revolution, Democracy and lntegration: East Central and South Eastern Europe since 1989 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming), úL-I ;j:l6 Maada Anna Vachudova '.1'ne Gzec:n .Ht:jJUUH(; domestic rerorms and the design orrational roreign policy. The Com- a model and as a goal remained during this stage, but was neces- mission's 1997 'Opinion' on the Czech Republic's application alIuded sarily weakened by claims that the Czech Republic had already to this attitude in a single laconic sentence: 'Confident or its pro- become part or the West. Indeed, Klaus's Czech Republic became gress towards meeting the obligations or EU membership, the Czech so convinced or its virtues as the most advanced post-communist Republic has at times shown reluctance to acknowledge difficulties state with the most successful economy in Europe that basic reforms and seek a colIaborative approach to resolving them.'2 remained unfinished. The influence or international factors on the consolidation of Czech The conditions necessary for direct international infiuence on democracy since 1989 can be divided into four stages, correspond- the policy choices of the Czech government did not emerge until ing roughly to the changes of government. In the first, from 1989 the end of this second stage. For much of the 1990s, the criticisms to 1992, the Czechoslovak government was led by former dissidents and diplomatic initiatives ofWestern governments and international who sought to create a Western liberal democracy and return institutions were aimed at those post-communist governments who Czechoslovakia to Europe. The infiuence of the West, as a model violated democratic standards and whose use of ethnic nationalism and as a goal for the Czech political and economic transformation, threatened the rights of ethnic minorities and peaceful relations with was profound. Securing membership in the EU and NATO became neighbouring states. This was not the case in the Czech Republic. fundamental goals, and the perceived requirements ofmembership Nor was the Czech Republic, with its low levels ofdebt and good macro- shaped policy in the new state. This occurred welI before either the economic indicators, under pressure from the International Monetary EU or NATO had committed to eastern enlargement, much less set Fund (lMF) or the World Bank. Nevertheless, international cen- down specific requirements for membership. To the extent that the sure did eventualIy force the Czech government to change a 1993 West did set down explicit conditions, for example on the treatment citizenship law which, by design, disadvantaged Roma applicants. of ethnic minorities by the Council of Europe (COE) or on the Over the course of the second stage, the EU gradualIy developed liberalization of trade by the EU, these coincided with the liberal the tools to identify the problems plaguing democratic consolidation democratic agenda of the Czechoslovak government. Meanwhile.. in the Czech Republic. Mter taking the necessary step of commit- the speeches of Czechoslovak President Václav Havel during this ting itself to eastern enlargement in 1992, the EU's expectations period helped crystallize Western Europe's vague plans to integrate of the aspiring candidates became more concrete. It set out the gen- the post-communist east. eral political and economic requirements of membership in 1993, ln the second stage, which will be the chief concern of this chap- and the extensive regulatory requirements of the internal market ter, the centre-right coalition of Prime Minister Václav Klaus in 1995. In view of approaching negotiations, the European Com- governed the Czech Republic from June 1992 until November 1997. mission examined Czech political and economic reform to write its Although the independent Czech Republic perceived itself, and was Opinion on the Czech Republic's application, published in July 1997. generally perceived by others, as among the most pro-Western states This scrutiny revealed the reforms which had been neglected or in Eastern Europe, the reform project was surprisingly insulated unsuccessful, notably enterprise restructuring, bank privatization, from international infiuences. Klaus had his own strategy-a and public administration reformo personal mix of free market ideology and political pragmatism- As the Commission's Opinion was being written and the start of for creating a 'Western' state, fit for membership in the EU and negotiations drew near, economic downturn and political instabil- NATO. From 1993, Klaus and other Czech officials asserted that ity in the Czech Republic announced the third stage in summer the transition was complete, and that the damage to society under 1997. Mter the falI of the Klaus government in November 1997, communism had been reversed. Unti11997, supported by impress- an interim government led by Prime Minister Josef Tosovsky held ive macroeconomic indicators, they succeeded in projecting a very power until the early elections of June 1998. By force of necessity positive image of the Czech Republic. The infiuence of the West as but also of its political outlook, this government was more respons- ive to outside advice and more attentive to the conditionality inherent in the EU accession process. 2 'Commission Opinion on the Czech Republic's Application for Membership in the European Union', A. Introduction. Commission documents are all at The greatest international infiuence on the consolidation of europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/. Czech democracy would arise from an abiding desire of the Czech
L 328 Milada Anna Vachudová The Czech Republic 329 Republic to gain entry into the EU. Ir the Czech Republic is to join policy programme of the Civic Forum from its inception in 1989. in the first wave, the most direct and substantial influence will occur Securing membership in the EU and, from 1991, in NATO became in the rourth stage: current and subsequent Czech governments must goals of state policy,and the anticipated requirements of membership tend to the requirements or EU membership. The elections or increasingly shaped policy choices in the new state. For their part, 1\ June 1998 yielded a minority Social Democratic government led Western governments and international institutions looked on by Prime Minister Milos Zeman. !ts rerorm efforts in 1998 and 1999 approvingly, while experimenting with a wide array of tools for i were dragged down by inexperience and opposition intransigence. supporting the transformation. Czechoslovak president Václav Mter two negative progress reports rrom the Commission, however, Havel enjoyed significant moral authority in the West, and his rerorm showed signs or a revival. Ir the pursuit or rerorm does over- speeches during this period, calling on the West to integrate the come the stultifying politics or 1997, 1998, and 1999, it will be thanks East, made a strong impression on Western policy makers.3 to the incentives or EU membership and the momentum inherent The influence of the East initially was more concrete, as the in the accession process. Czechoslovak government had to extricate itself from the Warsaw NATO underwent an evolution similar to that orthe EU, inviting Pact and from its close economic ties to the Soviet bloc. The dra- II. the Czech Republic to begin membership negotiations in December matic collapse of trade among the CMEA (Council for Mutual IIII 1997. However, the rerorms NATO demanded concerned a much Economic Assistance) members and the (successful) reorientation I smaller part or state policy, and the political decision to admit the of Czechoslovak trade to the West demanded considerable effort. I. Czech Republic was largely divorced rrom how well these rerorms Meanwhile, the idealism of the post-dissident Czechoslovak govern- were pursued. Perhaps qualifying ror membership was too easy. ment and its sympathy for the difficult domestic position of Mikhail II Days arter the Czech Republic entered NATO along with Poland Gorbachev led it to propose the simultaneous dissolution of the 111 and Hungary in March 1999, opposition to the airstrikes against Warsaw Pact and NATO, accompanied by the creation of a collect- the Federal Republic or Yugoslavia suggested the ambivalence ive security system embracing the whole of Europe based on the or a considerable part or the Czech political class to the Czech Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, after " Republic's newfound alliance commitments. 1994, OSCE).4 Membership in NATO only became a declared goal " of Czechoslovak foreign policy in 1991, by which time the CSCE proposal had faded under Western disapproval,5 II Dissidents 'Return to Europe': II Czechoslovakia, 1990-1992 1111" Susceptibility to Western lnfluence, 1992-1997 IJ From 1989 to 1992, the Civic Forum governments of Czecho- slovakia worked to create a Western liberal democracy and to Until the mid-1990s, the project of anchoring the Czech Republic return Czechoslovakia to Europe. Aside from the deepening im- firmly in the West and removing it decisively from the orbit of broglio with the Slovaks in 1991 and 1992, the reform programme I1II of successive Czech governments was essentially unchallenged by II 3 The strongestcriticismorthe CivicForum'sroreignpolicy,ledby ForeignMinister I a post-communist right or left, as neither the defence of the Czech . Jirí Dienstbier, came rrom Klaus and others who held that Czechoslovak interests nation nor protection from the hardships of economic reform res- 'I were being sacrificed to grand roreign policy initiatives with pretensions or chang- onated strongly with the Czech electorate. The Civic Forum dom- ing the course or European integration. Pavel Seifter, 'Hic Europa, O Nesamozre- inated political discourse during the formative years after 1989, jmosti Ceskoslovenských Národních Zájmu', Mezinárodní Politika, 6: 4 (Apr. 1992), and for all of its subsequent divisions, it was united, resolute, and 3; and Ústav Mezinárodních Vztahu et al., Ceské národní zájmy (Prague: Ústav I!, successful in building the foundations of a liberal democracy. Mezinárodních Vztahu, 1993). I The influence of the West-as a model and as a goal for the 4 For an overview, Jirí Sedivý, 'From Dreaming to Realism: Czechoslovak Secur- ity Policy Since 1989', Perspectives (Winter 1994/5), 61-71. Czechoslovak transformation-was profound, yet the impetus for 5 NATO officials described the 1990 proposal as 'shocking'. JoserVesely, 'Spolecné 1\III ~ change came from within the Czech political class. Czechoslovak politické struktury jsou duležitejší než spolecné ozbrojené síly', Mladá Fronta Dnes (17 Dec. 1991), 6. I II membership in the EU formed the cornerstone of the foreign ~ II I !II, " III
.~ -"'- 330 Milada Anna Vachudová The Czech Republic 331 II Moscow was stilI underway. The Civic Forum governments of Republic or of other associated states-which raised charges that Czechoslovakia had prepared the way for the independent Czech the Europe Agreements were being víolated. Instances of EU pro- Republic's stellar image in the West, and for the presupposition tectionism, such as the 1993 total ban on the import of livestock, that subsequent governments would simply advance the democratic meat, and dairy products from Eastern Europe, risked discrediting project. The overarching goal ofthe two ODS-led governments (June the EU among the Czech public.7 Spates of EU protectionism 1992-June 1996 and June 1996-November 1997) was to create a strengthened Klaus's confident message of Czech economic superi- Western market democracy, crowned by EU and NATO member- ority and helped limit the impact of other, more positive Western ship. However, Klaus also wondered aloud whether these institu- model s of state interference in the economy. tions were good enough for the Czechs, and needlessly irritated Soon after the EU committed itself to enlargement, the so-called Western leaders by implying that the EU should join the Czech 'Copenhagen Requirements' for aspiring members were set out by Republic, and not více versa. The Klaus governments were successful the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993.8 These require- in projecting a very positive image to the West, while fostering an ments called for (1) the stability of democratic institutions includ- 'ideology of Czech exceptionalism' at home.6 Although they sought ing the protection of minority rights; (2) a functioning market to emulate and even surpass Western economic success, the influ- economy able to cope with the competitive pressures within the EU; ence of Western actors on policy choices in the new state was and (3) the ability to take on the obligations of membership. These minima!. requirements were very general, and therefore, by any account, the Czech Republic was making progress toward them in the The European Union: a sleeping giant mid-1990s. However, from 1993 onward the Czech government was criticized by many international actors for its treatment of the Roma From 1992 to 1997 the pro-EU comportment of the Czech govern- minority (see below). While these criticisms eventually forced ment, necessary to keep the Czech Republic well within the 'first change, Czech officials were able to downplay the problem of racism wave' of EU candidates, did not interfere with day-to-day policy- in the state administration. In this period, the Wests attention was making. The general expectations ofthe EU in many areas coincided generally directed at states where the treatment of ethnic minorities with the political and economic agenda of the Czech government. posed a much more obvious problem and democracy seemed much When they did not (as in reform of the state administration, protec- more tenuous than in the Czech Republic.9 tion of minority rights, and support of civil society), this remained ln 1995, the Commission published the White Paper stipulating largely hidden for lack of a systematic evaluation of Czech reforms. the requirements for integrating into the Single Market. Like The Czech Republic was the darling of the West, a self-perpetuating the free trade provisions of the Europe Agreements, the White status thanks to the shared impressions of Western policy makers Paper measures on the free movement of goods, services, capital, and the (mostly) favourable, cross-referenced reports ofinternational and people corresponded with the Czech governments free ma!"ket organizations. ideology. In fact, Klaus liked to equate the entirety of the EU's The Europe Agreement governing trade liberalization between the membership requirements with the White Paper. Meanwhile, the Czech Republic and the EU came into force in early 1995, but most Government Committee on European Integration, chaired person- of its provisions were adopted with the earlier Interim Agreement ally by the prime minister, was set up to coordinate the Czech of 1992. The agreement províded for a steady liberalization of trade drive for EU membership. The formal application was submitted over a ten-year period, with exceptions in agriculture and other in January 1996, by which time the Czechs had already made notable 'sensitive' areas. For reasons of free market ideology, the Czech government called for an acceleration of the schedules for trade lib- eralization contained in the Europe Agreement. It was generally 7 Jan Machácek, 'Nejsme protekcionisté', Respekt, 4: 15 (19 Apr. 1993), 15. the protectionist measures of EU member states-not of the Czech 6 On the EU's approach,AlanMayhew,RecreatingEurope:TheEuropean Union's Policy towards Central and Eastern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 6 Jirí Pehe, 'Souvislosti domácí a zahranicní politiky', Mezinárodní Politika, 12: 9 For benchmarks, Jacques Rupnik, 'The Postcommunist Divide', Journal of 1 (Jan. 1998), 6-7. Democracy, 10: 1 (1999), 57-62. 332 Milada Anna Vachudová The Czech Republic 333 progress in meeting the regulatory demands of the 1995 White Paper.10 by the Czech-Slovak confrontation. An independent Czech Republic promised the Klaus government easier reform, greater prosper- Leading EU politicians regretted that the Czechs seemed to ity, and a more westerly geopolitical position.14 Although Western solicitEU membership purely forreasons ofnational interest. II Klaus leaders called for the preservation of the federation,15 Klaus rea- lobbied for rapid membership in the EU, but he was also a vocal soned that when it came time to evaluate candidates for EU and critic of the integration projects envisioned by the Maastricht pro- NATO membership, Czech political stability and economic success cess.12Klaus identified with the so-called Eurosceptics, portraying would more than compensate for the Wests transient displeasure Czech independence and the Czech neoliberal economic project at the dissolution of Czechoslovakia.16 as being under threat from the 'socialist internationalism' of the On the question of union with Slovakia, this view proved correct: Brussels bureaucracy. Criticism of the EU did not tarnish the Czech the geostrategic position and economic health of an independent Republic's star status in the West, in part because the Czech foreign Czech Republic were better without Slovakia. More importantly, ministry worked overtime to smooth over Klaus's controversial state- though less remarked upon, an independent Czech Republic was ments. But it did limit the indirect influence of the EU on Czech free of what could have been an enduring stalemate between politics. By claiming to be 'West' of the West Europeans, Klaus Czech and Slovak politicians in a common Czechoslovak state. Such ensured that his administration, much of the media, and a good a stalemate could have proved another formidable obstacle to the deal of public opinion retained a provincial confidence in Czech consolidation of democracy. In any case, the West did not punish superiority, rather than opening the country to perhaps salutary the Czechs for the split, which scarcely delayed integration with influences. EU membership came to be understood as a reward for the West: the Czech Republic and Slovakia became separate mem- an economic job already well done.13 bers of the Council of Europe on 30 June 1993, and signed new association agreements with the EU on 4 October 1993. No federation, no cooperation: creating the perfect candidate? Klaus treated cooperation within the Visegrad Group of Czecho- slovakia, Poland, and Hungary much as he had the Slovaks: as Klaus relied upon his own calculations as to which 'foreign' pol- an obstacle to the rapid Western transformation of the Czech icies would most help the Czech Republic become part of 'the Republic.17 West European leaders supported Visegrad cooperation West. In 1992, he did not heed the advice of West European as a proving ground for East Central European states. Klaus, leaders to preserve the Czechoslovak federation and to pursue cooperation within the Visegrad Group of Czechoslovakia, Poland, 14The agreement between the ODS and the Movement for a Democratic and Hungary. While the West provided the motivation for govern- Slovakia (HZDS) of 20 June 1992 states that the HZDS wanted a confederation ment policies, Western actors had little if any say about their of two republics, but that the ODS refused, preferring the creation of two wholly content. independent states. 'Politická dohoda ODS a HZDS', Lidové Noviny (21 June ln the case of the break-up of Czechoslovakia, the desire to 1992), 2. 15 EU officials highlighted the costs of Czechoslovakia's dissolution, and EU par- emulate Western economic success played a critical role: Slovak liamentarians reminded Czechs and Slovaks that no association agreement could politicians hindered the implementation of reform measures, and enter into force without 260 votes in the European Parliament. Karel Gruber, foreign investors were deterred from investing in Czechoslovakia 'ES versus Ceská a Slovenská republika', Mladá Fronta Dnes (7 Aug. 1992),5; and Josef Veselý, 'Znovu o postoji ES k delení Ceskoslovenska', Mladá Fronta Dnes (11 Aug. 1992), 6. 10 The government reported that by earIy 1997 it had incorporated 417 out of 16 EU leaders only encouraged Klaus by warning that Czechoslovakia's associ- 899 White Paper measures. Their correct application however required 'highly ation agreement would have to be renegotiated individually by the successor developed and effective regulatory, standardization, certification and supervisory states with regard to the divergence of their 'economic performance'. See British authorities,' about whose existence the Commission had doubts. 'Commission Opin- Prime Minister John Major's remarks in 'Koncem dekády by CSFR mohla vstoupit ion', 4.2 Administrative Capacity to Apply the Acquis. do Evropy', Mladá Fronta Dnes (28 May 1992),4. 11 Commission President Jacques Santer excerpted in 'Evropa rozumu a 17 Dienstbier and Havel believed that cooperation would strengthen the position nadšení', Respekt, 7: 16 (15 Apr. 1996), 1. of the East Central European states with regard to the EU. From the outset, they 12 Martin Weiss, 'Evropská integrace a my', Respekt, 4: 3 (18 Jan. 1993),3. emphasized that the Visegrad Group constituted neither a military alliance nor 13 'Svobodaa Prosperita', ODS Party Program (Apr. 1996). an institution for economic integration.
------334 Milada Anna Vachudová The Czech Republic 335 however, reasoned that Visegrad cooperation would retard the Bonn than pushing the membership of the Czech Republic-because Czech Republic's admission to the EU and NATO: these institutions this would be an easy state for Western institutions to absorb- might claim that East Central European states were, for now, best was the stability of the whole of East Central Europe. Diminished left to develop their own structures. They might also commit them- ties between the Czech Republic and its eastern neighbours were selves to accepting all four states together, and then postpone their considered destabilizing, and met with displeasure. Second, the Czech admission because of the political or economic problems of any one government underestimated the strength of the Sudeten German state. By 1993, Bulgaria, Romania, and even Ukraine were clamour- lobby in German politics. ing for membership in the Visegrad Group. This set the stage for Once again, while the West provided the motivation for state the founding members to create their own membership requirements policy, it could not shape its execution: the Czech government re- and occupy themselves with judging the political reforms of their fused any discussion with organizations representing the 3 million post-communist neighbours, a questionable undertaking at best. ethnic Germans who were expelled from the Sudetenland by the While these apprehensions may have been reasonable, Klaus Czechoslovak government just after the Second World War. The overplayed the part of the 'Western' state by loudly severing ties Czech governments dismissive stance toward these organizations with his purportedly backward neighbours. Visegrad cooperation increased support for their cause in Germany. The Sudeten prob- including Slovakia would have faded of its own accord due to the lem made the Czech Republic an unlikely candidate for German anti-democratic behaviour of the Meciar governments (behaviour favoritism, as Czechs and Germans were unable to undertake a which in 1997 earned Slovakia its exclusion from membership reconciliation such as had occurred between Poles and Germans. negotiations with the EU and NATO). Klaus speculated publicly The Czech-German declaration was finally signed by Klaus and that the Czech image would suffer by association not only with Kohl on 21 January 1997, but a deeper reconciliation remained Slovakia, but also with Poland and Hungary. (From the perspect- elusive.19 Throughout this period, foreign policy was marked by ive of 1999, when the Czechs find themselves near the bottom of Klaus's personal tendency to reduce relations to economic matters, the Visegrad heap, ranked behind Hungary and Poland in the EU disregarding the importance of history, diplomacy, culture, and membership queue, this is amusing at best.) In the end, it was security. This circumscribed the infl.uence of western as well as Klaus's widely criticized public stance against regional cooperation eastern neighbours on the Czech polity.20 that damaged the Czech image.1BVisegrad cooperation was limited to the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA); this was con- guidelines.sidered a Success and admitted new members according to economic Western lnfluence on Domestic Reform, 1992-1997
As relations with eastern neighbours were downgraded, those Domestic reform was carried out according to Klaus's beliefs about with the Czech Republic's powerful western neighbour were to be how to create a Czech economic miracle, sure to please the public intensified: Germany was recognized by the Czech government in and the West. Between 1993 and 1997, there was no clear Western 1990 as the only West European state having real interests in the voice disputing his strategies. By 1997, when the shortcomings of integration of the Czech Republic into NATO and the EU. The the reforms had become clear, the damage to individual Czechs, to government hoped to create a special relationship with Germany their belief in the value of the market and of reform, to Czech civil by way of the political stability, the geostrategic position, and above society, and thus to democratic consolidation, had already been all the economic Success of the Czech Republic. Czechs miscalcu- done. In December 1997, Havel noted: 'if I criticize those who have lated German interests in two ways. First, of greater concern to resigned, it is not so much for any particular sin they may have com- mitted, but far more for their indifference and outright hostility 18 One colourfulArnericanreport describedCzechforeignpolicyas 'ethnocentric' and 'provincial, if not nationalist'. It concluded that 'Czech policy, although it pro- fesses integration with NATO and the EU, reflects a general renationalization of 19 For a critical view, Andrew Stroehlein, 'Czechs and the Czech-German Declara- security policy that largely stems from an internal failure of vision.' Stephen Blank, tion: The Failure of a New Approach to History', Glasgow Papers, 1 (1998). Prague,Institute,NATO,1996).and European Security (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies 20 Rudolf Kucera, professor at Charles University and director of the Institute for Central European Culture and Politics, interview in Prague (May 1994).
---L... 336 Milada Anna Vachudová The Czech Republic 337
contributeto everythingto itsthatcreation.'21may even slightly resemble a civil society or The ODS-led government, therefore, enjoyed remarkable polit- ical freedom. It augmented this freedom by neglecting to establish An economist under the communists, once in power Klaus an independent civil service and by undermining poles of opinion portrayed himself as a free market purist and navigated through outside the government, such as universities, non-governmental the transformation using a macroeconomic compass. The Czech organizations, and interest groups. Dialogue with civic groups was government adopted a strategy of privatization by which ownership, avoided, and a legal framework for non-governmental organizations unhindered by law or state oversight, was to be sorted out by the was delayed until 1995. No effort was made to foster public dis- higher laws of the market. However, pragmatism and political expe- cussion and few public information campaigns were attempted. diency clashed with market ideology: having pushed privatization No freedom of information law was passed.23 The International in the early 1990s, Klaus put off key reforms in 1994 and 1995 in Helsinki Foundation observed that 'it was nearly impossible for indi- order to win re-election in J"Qne 1996. To forestall unemployment, viduals to obtain any information or documents from the govern- the banks were not fully privatized, while rents and energy prices ment or other bodies of state administration.'24 Perhaps most telling were not deregulated. This combination of rushed reform in some was Klaus's eagerness to be rid of the Central European Univer- areas and gradualist back-peddling in others produced the Czech sity in Prague, which harboured Czech opposition intellectuals economic miracle, followed by the Czech economic mess. and formed part of George Soros's project to create civil society in post-communist Europe. All together, these practices stunted the The golden years Czech polity by impeding the creation of a vibrant civil society and a new class of Czech elites.25 The dissolution of Czechoslovakia aside, the first four years of For their part, those non-Czech actors (international institutions government by Klaus were marked by impressive political calm. and foreign governments) who disagreed with Klaus were often Mter the June 1992 elections, Klaus's victorious Civic Democratic ignored.26Out offear of competition with Western-trained elites and Party (ODS) formed a coalition with the Civic Democratic Alliance scorn for their advice, the Klaus government also shunned Czechs (ODA) and the Christian Democratic bloc (KDU-CSL). This coali- who had been exiled abroad. Foreigners in general were regarded tion controlled 105 out of 200 seats, and held together until the with suspicion, and significant obstacles were placed in the way of elections of 1996. The popularity of all three coalition parties their legal residence.27 remained stable, and the ODS preserved the support of more than The Klaus government devoted itself to creating the image that 30 per cent of respondents to opinion polls. During this period, market reform was 'complete' in the Czech Republic. It managed to Klaus's political power was not threatened by dissent within his preserve low inflation and very low unemployment, while balancing own party or by the disintegration of his coalition. Klaus's power was also not checked by a strong, experienced opposition: the 2" While the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, of which the Czech weak parties of the fragmented left were ineffective watchdogs. The Republic is a signatory, guarantees the right to information and obliges state media was likewise inexperienced and ineffectual. Havel was elected bodies to provide information about their activities, the Czech parliament did not to the Czech presidency, but the powers of the president were re- pass a freedom of information law until 1998. stricted, and he was overshadowed by Klaus.22 24 International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, The Czech Republic, Annual Report 1997. 21 For the text of his landmark December 1997 address to parliament in English, 25 On the impact of the Prague Spring of 1968 and of normalization on the Václav1998), 42-6.Havel, 'The State ofthe Republic', New York Review of Books, 45: 3 (5 Mar. Czech elite: Kieran Williams, The Prague Spring and lts Aftermath: Czechoslovak Politics, 1968-1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and Grzegorz 22 Klaus and Havel disagreed on many issues, most dramatically on the value Ekiert, The State against Society: Political Crises and Their Aftermath in East Central of the Czechoslovak federation and of civil society. See Timothy Garton Ash, 'Prague: Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). Intellectuals and Politicians', New York Review of Books (12 Jan. 1995), 34-41; 26 Klaus often declared himself suspicious of West European 'socialist economic Kieran Williams, 'National Myths in the New Czech Liberalism', in George practices, and had few contacts in West European governments and international SchOpfiinand Geoffi-eyHosking (eds.), Myths and Nationhood (London: Hurst, 1997), institutions. However, he admired the United States and reportedly lent an ear 79-89; and Martin Potucek, 'Havel versus Klaus; Public Policymaking in the Czech to the advice of conservative American think tanks such as the CATO Institute. Republic', lecture at the Institute for Human Sciences (IWM), Vienna (27 Jan. 1998). 27 Jirí Pehe, 'Cizinci v Cechách, Ceši v cizine', Lidové Noviny (15 June 1998), 10.
J :i:iM Milada Anna Vachudová The Czech ltepUDHC ;););:7 II its budgets. The contraction of the economy was reversed in 1993, related to the privatization process: voucher privatization had I to be replaced by steady growth. Rapid privatization and a large- failed to restructure and to privatize enterprises, whne government scale restitution of communist-confiscated property were hailed policy had stifled the creation of new enterprises and set the stage at home and abroad as dramatic successes. 'lb Klaus's credit, a for corruption by insiders in the distribution of the firms inherited great deal of foreign investment found its way to the Czech from communism.29 Republic due to the strong performance of the economy and to That the Klaus government only allowed the participation of Czech the governments free market rhetoric. Moreover, the economic hard- actors in voucher privatization was to the detriment of enterprise ships of the transition experienced by the population were curbed restructuring. The goal was a nationalist one: to keep Czech enter- as compared to other post-communist states. Mter much hard work, prises out of foreign (especially German) hands. The absence of the Czech Republic became the first state of the former Soviet bloc foreign investors meant that 'privatized' enterprises received no to join the OECD. A triumphalist Klaus invited West European influx of capital or know-how. As a result, most enterprises lacked leaders to Prague for pointers on how to run their own national the tools necessary to increase their competitiveness. In compar- economies. ison, the enterprises privatized with the participation of foreign Positive macroeconomic indicators masked the shortcomings of investors during the so-called small and large privatization were the governments economic policies-these would come to light much more successfuPo just as Klaus's political juggernaut began to lose steam in 1996 and Meanwhile, the financial structure of the Czech Republic became 1997. Klaus's three-party coalition fell short of a parliamentary an opaque maze of interconnected banks, investment funds, and majority in the June 1996 elections. In the 200-seat parliament, newly privatized firms. Many Czechs sold their vouchers to so-called the coalition won 99 seats, while the Social Democrat Party (CSSD) investment funds, allowing such funds to gain control of most firms won 61, the Communists (KSCM) 22, and the Republicans (SPR- privatized using the voucher method. Most of these funds were in RSC) 18.28Improving dramatically on its modest 7 per cent showing turn controlled by a handful of major banks and insurance com- in 1992, the CSSD received 26 per cent of the vote in 1996. From panies, which were in their turn still partly owned by the state. this point, Klaus led a minority government, which treaded water The 'privatized' firms were by then great1y indebted to the banks, until it sank in November 1997. and the banks were often called upon by the government to decide which enterprises should receive state financing. State-dominated banks were at once the owners, the creditors, and sometimes the Was it privatization? auditors of 'privatized' firms. Privatization, the crown jewel of Klaus's reforms and one argument Voucher privatization not only failed to restructure and to priv- for Czech economic superiority over its East Central European atize, it also created an investment climate distinctly unfavour- neighbours, began to seem less impressive in the late 1990s. able to new, legitimately private firms. To forestall the shocks or Voucher privatization itself was a self-consciously 'Czech' under- economic restructuring, Klaus's reform strategy offered communist- taking, designed by Klaus's economic team with the advice of a hand- era managers advantageous loans and loan-forgiveness by way of ful of Western-trained Czech economists, but without the help of the state-dominated banks. The banks, who could count on being Western actors. Indeed, the IMF and the World Bank discouraged bailed out by the state, were the indirect owners or old communist it-but without recommending a clear alternative. By 1996, seri- enterprises and therefore continued to loan them money. At great ous problems were evident in the Czech economy, many of them 29 John Gould, 'Winners, Losers and the Institutional Effeets or Privatization in the Czeeh and Slovak Republies', EUl Working Papers, RSC 99/11. 30 For an overview, Ivka Kalus-Bystrieky and Pedro Piek, 'The Rerorm Proeess 28 The eleetoral results or June 1996 ror the major Czeeh parties, with the results or June 1992 in parentheses, are as rollows. Klaus's eoalition: Civie Demoeratie in Czeehoslovakia and the Czeeh Republie: A Progress Report and the Tale or Party (ODS) 29.6% (29.7%), Christian Demoerats (KDU-CSL) 8.1% (6.3%), and Civie One Company', in H. Shaughnessy (ed.), Privatisation and Eeonomie Development Demoeratie Allianee (ODA) 6.7% (6%). The opposition: Soeial Demoeratie Party in Eastern Europe and the ClS (London: John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 1994), 47-75; (CSSD)26.4% (6.6%),Communist Party (KSCM)10.3%(14.1%),and Republiean and Aureliusz Pedziwol, 'Kupónová privatizaee: úspeeh, ale jaky?' Strední Evropa, Party (SPR-RSC) 8% (6%). 69: 4 (1997), 98-109.
J ~ 340 Milada Anna Vachudová The Czech Republic 341 expense to the taxpayer, the government in turn provided the that only 5 per cent of Czechs considered economic reform to have banks with various forms of state aid to cover these bad loans. Of been 'rather successful', while Oper cent believed it 'very successful'.33 necessity, this choked the liquid capital available to new 1irms, A central question is whether the architects and early observers and increased indebtedness to foreign creditors. New 1irms also of voucher privatization could have been ignorant of the con- had to face burdensome taxes which undermined the rise of a new sequences. Klaus himself was reportedly very surprised by the middle class. growing power of the investment funds, and by the 1inancial crimes ln addition to creating a good imitation of state socialism, which they perpetrated. These crimes occurred in part because so voucher privatization led to massive corruption. Three mammoth many people, after forty years of communism, were accustomed to de1iciencies in the privatization process produced the conditions for 1inding ways to steal. Did Czech officials not realize that this made a new 1inancial operation dubbed 'tunneling': when the assets of state instruments to combat 1inancial crime alI the more necessary? investment funds, banks, and enterprises are transferred to other Some say they did.34ln any case, although by 1998 everyone was businesses owned by the same people who manage the 'tunnelIed' clamouring to criticize voucher privatization, not more than a entity. While these 'managers' enrich themselves, the legal owners handful of Western economists and investors familiar with the Czech -for example, the shareholders in an investment fund-are effect- market warned of its pitfalIs before 1996.35 ively robbed. The 1irst de1iciency sprang from the desire to privatize as much and as rapidly as possible. This priority led to a disregard for the Economic misadventures detail s of who got rich by what means, and an alI-out assault on the rule of law. Some advisers close to Klaus advocated 'switching The Czech economy enjoyed the con1idence of investors and of inter- off the light: alIowing initial property alIocations to sort themselves national 1inancial institutions to 1996. It was only at the summit out without a legal framework or state oversight. Secondly, loop- of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) holes in the legal code governing the capital market and the bank- in April1997 that the Czech Republic was heavily criticized by rep- ing sector created the opportunity for managers to legalIy steal from resentatives of Western institutions.36 The IMF, the World Bank, owners.31 As of 1998, there was still no law to effectively protect and the OECD had already been prodding the Czech Republic for minority shareholders or members of cooperatives from tunnelling. some time about the slow pace of bank privatization. But Western Thirdly, even when confronted with persistent tunnelling, the criticism of economic reform, when it 1inalIy came, was a simple government failed to use what instruments it had to staunch the result offaltering macroeconomic indicators, just as Western praise flow of assets into foreign bank accounts. When attempted, state had earlier reflected favourable ones. It is difficult, then, to speak of the influence of international factors on the character of Czech oversight in banking and the capital markets was hampered by a shortage of able and experienced staff.32 economic reformo Millions of inexperienced shareholders could do nothing to pro- As evidence of 1inancial crime mounted, the economy worsened, tect their interests. Instead of building a society of shareholders, and corruption scandals loomed, the Klaus government began to voucher privatization alienated the average citizen from an economic system increasingly seen as corrupt. A February 1998 polI found 33 Adam Drda, 'Transformacní iluze', Lidové Noviny (5 Mar. 1998), 10; and 'Ceská transformace: kde se staly chyby a kudy ven?' Lidové Noviny (21 Feb. 1998), 31 On tunnelling, 'Co nového prinesl cesky kapitalismus svetu', Lidové Noviny Orientace, 1. (7 Feb. 1998), 3. On corporate governance, Susan Senior Nello, 'The Economic 34 For example, Tomáš Ježek, the self-appoinhd father of voucher privatization Accession Criteria for EU Enlargement: Lessons from the Czech Experience', EUl and the minister in charge of the National Property Fund in 1992, declared Working Paper, 11 (Robert Schuman Centre, 1999). that he battled for the early creation of a Securities and Exchange Commission. 32 After the collapse ofseveral Czechbanks and the loss ofhundreds ofmillions 'Zlamání kuponové privatizace se ekonomové vubec nediví', Lidové Noviny (7 May of dollars the govemment set up a special team to investigate bank fraud and other 1998),17. \ large-scale tinancial machinations in September 1996. Czech officials admitted that 35 On privatization, Pedro Pick, Patria Finance Tomáš Jesek, interview in the country did not have enough domestic experts to understand and deal with Prague, June 1998. the complexities of bank fraud. 36 Piotr Maszczyk, 'Czeska lekcja', Gazeta Wyborcza (30 Jan. 1998), 16-17. J "
.-L 342 Milada Anna Vachudová The Czech Republic 343 totter in the spring of 1997.37 Growth fell to 1 per cent due to weak export performance, a consequence of insufficient enterprise A New Era or EU Conditionality: The Tošovský and restructuring and an overvalued currency. Weak tax revenue forced Zeman Governments, 1998-1999 the government to cut expenditures. Meanwhile, the trade deficit increased due to strong household consumption fuelled by high wage The Klaus government was deposed in November 1997 by the ODS's growth (exceeding gains in productivity). Lower exports combined coalition partners and a faction within the ODS itself. It emerged with high consumer spending on imports had resulted in a steady that money had flowed into the ODS and also the ODA party coffers increase of trade and current account deficits from 1995 to 1997. in exchange for favours related to privatization and banking. As To counter the rising trade deficit, the Czech government intro- the Klaus government fell and stage three began, EU scrutiny of duced an import deposit scheme in April. This was widely inter- the Czech reform effort intensified in light of the upcoming negotia- preted as a show of force by an embattled government, and not as tions. The Klaus strategy of projecting a positive image westward a serious economic instrument. The scheme required importers no longer sufficed. to deposit in a Czech bank, at Oper cent interest for 180 days, an ln July 1997, the Commission published its 'Opinion' on the fitness amount equal to 20 per cent of the value of the goods they wished of the Czech Republic for EU accession. The Opinion noted that to import. The European Commission criticized the measure and many economic reforms had been neglected or mishandled, in par- called for its rapid withdrawal. It violated the Europe Agreement ticular reform of the banking sector, regulation of the capital according to which 'exceptional' protectionist measures mu st be markets, and enterprise restructuring. Without further reform, the targeted at a particular, distressed sector, not at the lion's share Czech Republic could not be competitive in the internal market, of all imports. Moreover, the Europe Agreement called for consulta- nor could it be in compliance with internal market rules. The Opinion tion with the Association Council before the realization of any trade- also highlighted the need to reform agriculture, improve the restrictive measures; the Czech government had implemented environment, and reinforce state borders. the scheme unilaterally. An arbitration was scheduled within the The Opinion criticized the Czech Republic most emphatically for Association Council for September 1997.38 its failure to reform the public administration. It cited the lack of Pressure from the European Commission was reinforced by any coherent plan for public administration modernization as criticism from EU member states, the IMF, and the World Trade 'the single greatest cause for concern' regarding the administrative Organization (WTO). The Czech government suspended the import capacity to apply the acquis communautaire and qualified existing deposit scheme in August 1997, citing a (questionable) reduction measures as 'thoroughly inadequate'. The judiciary and the civil in the trade deficit, not the censure ofthe EU. However, the scheme service were judged in greatest disrepair. The Opinion predicted was very likely withdrawn as a direct result of EU pressure, to which that 'a wide ranging reform process will need to be instigated and even the Klaus government had to be increasingly sensitive as sustained if the Czech Republic is to establish a civil service of negotiations drew nearer.39 The scheme was particularly ill-timed, the overall quality, level of training, motivation and flexibility as the Commission completed its Opinion on each candidate in the required on the country's path to further economic and social spring of 1997: the Czech Opinion is, therefore, replete with refer- development, and membership in the EU.'40Preconditions for reform ences to this (in fact minor) instance of misbehaviour. included an independent civil service statute and an increase in the salaries of civil servants. The judicial system was found to 37On the political corruption and financial malfeasance that brought down Klaus, Mitchell Orenstein, 'Václav Klaus: Revolutionary and Parliamentarian', East Euro- be remarkably slow and incompetent, exacerbating the Czech pean Constitutional Review, 7: 1 (Winter 1998),46-55. Republic's serious problems with firancial crime and enterprise 38 The Association Council, which oversees the Europe Agreement, is composed restructuring. A later report of EU judicial experts, even more of officials from the EU Council of Ministers, the European Commission, and the Czech government. Carlo González, 'The Czech Republic's application for membership in the EU', Report to the European Parliament, Euro-East 61 (Dec. 1997), xv-xvii. 40'Commission Opinion', BA. Administrative Capacity to Apply the Acquis. For 39 For this argument, Guido Dolara, 'The Impact of Prospective Membership proposed reforms, 'Analyza verejné správy Ceské republiky' and 'Návrh strategie of the European Union on Czech Domestic Policy', thesis submitted for the degree reformy verejné správy Ceské republiky', Národní vzdelávací fond (Aug. and of M.Phil. (University of Oxford, Trinity Term 1998). Oct. 1998). 344 Milada Anna Vachudová The Czech Republic 345 damning than the Opinion, found that the judiciary lacked inde- 1998, 61 per cent of Czechs polled favoured entry (as compared to pendence from government controlY 58 per cent in September 1997 and 42 per cent in March 1996).44 Following on the Opinion, the Commission created the Accession With an eye toward the West, the Tošovský government executed Partnership in March 1998 which set out what the Commission difficult reforms for which the Klaus government had lacked the believed should be the priorities of Czech reformo PHARE assist- courage, such as a steep increase in rent and energy prices. It also ance became conditional on addressing these priorities, which held to the austerity package adopted by the Klaus government included areas outside the 31 chapters of the acquis, such as the in the spring of 1997, thus improving the trade balance and protection of ethnic minorities. Mter the Opinion brought the re-establishing macroeconomic stability. As recommended by the problems ofthe Czechjudiciary to the fore, for example, they began Association Partnership, the Tošovský government improved the to be addressed in 1998 thanks to financial assistance from the regulation of the capital markets and adopted policies to attract PHARE programme.42 The twinning of institutions and adminis- Western investment. trations in the Czech Republic with relevant bodies in the EU !ts record was not perfect. The Tošovský government also member states provided an additional conduit for EU influence. approved, in January 1998, a quota on the import of apples from the EU which violated the Europe Agreement and was implemented without consultation with the Commission. The stated aim was to The Tosovsky interim government allow domestic producers to selllast year's harvest on the domestic ln December 1997, Czech National Bank Governor Josef Tošovský market and use the profits to modernize their equipment. The formed a centre-right 'technocratic' government which included inde- quotas were pushed by KDU-CSL chairman and Minister of pendents as well as members of the ODA, the KDU-CSL and the Agriculture Josef Lux, and the more likely aim was to increase his anti-Klaus wing ofthe ODS. This government secured the support party's popularity before the upcoming elections. Brussels retali- of the Social Democrats by agreeing to early elections in June 1998. ated swiftly with high tariffs on certain Czech meats and fruit juices. Many politicians left the ODS, which soon became a mere backdrop A defensive Czech government claimed it was protecting Czech for its charismatic leader, Václav Klaus. A new right-wing party, interests, but withdrew the quota in May 1998 after threats of the Freedom Union (US), was formed in January 1998 and collected further trade restrictions from Brussels. The Commission signalled departing ODS members and leaders of the disintegrating ODA. that negotiations would yield better results than violations: once The Freedom Union rebuked the Klaus government for tolerating the quotas were withdrawn, it promised Czech fruit growers a market without rules, and called for a revival of civil society and PHARE money for modernization. the creation of reliable state institutions. The 'screening' process, during which the Commission examined The Tošovský government gained legitimacy and coherence by Czech legislation and practice in light of the thirty-one chapters presenting itself as a responsible politi cal force whose policies of the acquis communautaire, officially launched negotiations in April would assist Czech integration into NATO and the EU and repair 1998. Where the Czech Republic fell short during screening, Czech the damage of instability. Its energies were visibly oriented toward negotiators, led by Deputy Foreign Minister Pavel Telicka, promised fulfilling the requirements of EU membership even in areas, such adoption of the acquis by a certain date. For all of their skill, Czech as bank privatization, where it lacked the time or the political negotiators could not deliver on these promises: only the politicians mandate to carry them out.43Unlike the Klaus governments, it used could deliver, and whether they did provides a measure of how much the requirements as an argument for new legislation. Public the goal ofjoining the EU shaped the work of government and par- opinion supported the drive towards EU membership. In January liament. To avoid delays in the negotiations, the timetable of the next government for passing and implementing criticallegislation 41 'Commission Opinion', B.3.7 Judicial Cooperation. had to be a very busy one.45 42 'Rule of Law and Judicial Reform', Remarks by Otakar Motejl, President of the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic, at the conference 'Making the Czech 44 Only 15% declared themselves against, while 24% were undecided. 'Obcané Republic Ready for the EU Accession' (Prague, 20 Mar. 1998). podporují vstup CR do EU', Lidové Noviny (20 Feb. 1998), 2. 43 For example,it prepared the extensivegovernmentpaper 'EconomicStrategy of 45 Michael Leigh, Chief Negotiator for the Czech Republic, European Commis- Joining the European Union: Key Issues and Options for Policy-making' (June 1998). sion, interview in Brussels (July 1998).
.... 346 Milada Anna Vachudová The Czech Republic 347 a custom-union with the EU on the model of Turkey. Ironically, the The Bocial Democrats take power political ideology that the ODS claimed to espouse would be well- The elections of June 1998 produced a minority Social Democratic served by EU requirements. Far from forcing socialism on the Czech government led by Prime Minister Miloš Zeman.46The government Republic, as Klaus claimed, they would compel the CSSD govern- was formed after the Social Democratic Party (CSSD) signed an ment to leave behind such ongoing socialist practices from the Klaus 'opposition agreement with its greatest ideological rival, Klaus's era as bailing out state banks and inefficient enterprises at the ODS. The ODS had done surprisingly well in the elections by expense of the taxpayer. forecasting doom if the left took power, yet it preferred to give power Meanwhile, the economy had a rough two years, shrinking by to the CSSD in order to undermine the two centrist parties. The 2.2 per cent in 1998 and roughly 0.3 per cent in 1999. Unemploy- KDU-CSL and the Freedom Union were, after all, peopled by politi- ment, a sign of restructuring, did well to triple to 9 per cent. The cians who had brought down Klaus in November 1997. For its part, Zeman government inherited social and economic problems which the Freedom Union refused the CSSD's generous offer of a three- were a challenge to tackle.49 It was applauded for moving on soft- party coalition government with the KDU-CSL so as not to betray its lending by selling off two banks and preparing two others for priv- right-wing voters, though once again personal antipathies played atization. The government had to assume the banks' 'bad debts' their part. What, then, was Zeman to do but sign the opposition before privatization, thus the state regained ownership of struggling, agreement? tunnelled-out Czech enterprises. (What next, a new round of priv- The opposition agreement allowed the two largest parties to atization?) Reform of the country's wholly ineffectual bankruptcy divide up the spoils of power, never mind their declared ideolo- laws also began, but only very gingerly. For months a four-way gical antagonisms. In exchange for important positions in the discussion between CSSD dinosaurs, CSSD progressives, the Com- state administration, the ODS promised not to topple the CSSD mission, and the Czech National Bank raged on over the rules government-but it did not promise to support its legislation. With of a government scheme to revive 'key' enterprises with another the help of the CSSD, the ODS schemed to replace the electoral injection from the state budget.50 The recession did come to an end, system of proportional representation with first-past-the-post in with the WorldBank predicting mild growth at 1.7 per cent in 2000 order to push the smaller parties out of parliament.47 and 2.5 per cent in 2001.51 The ODS distinguished itself in 1998 and 1999 as the only The Social Democrats hailed accession to the EU, and made meet- moderate party of the left or the right in post-communist Europe ing the requirements a cornerstone of their electoral programme. which opposed EU membership. This can be attributed to a mix With negotiations already underway, the Czech Republic risked of populism, ideology, and defensiveness. In the 1998 campaign falling out of the first wave if reform was further delayed. Once in and after, Klaus employed a confusing rhetoric of Euroscepticism power, however, the CSSD faltered in preparing relevant legisla- which misrepresented the real costs and benefits of EU entry.48 tion due to incompetence, disunity, and a lack ofpolitical will.52The ODS leaders called Brussels a 'bureaucratic mastodon' on a par with CMEA, and proposed that the Czech Republic limit itself to 49 For the CSSD's comprehensive and astute report on the state or the country, 'Zpráva vlády o stavu ceské spolecnosti', Hospodárské noviny (5 Mar. 1999). 46 The results ror the five parties elected to the Czech parliament in June 1998 50 For the thoughtrul views orthe CSSD progressives, see the official government are as rollows: the Social Democrats (CSSD) 32.3%, the Civic Democratic Party paper 'Economic Strategy or Joining the European Union: Growth-Competitiveness- (ODS) 27.7%, the Communists (KSCM) 11%, the Christian Democrats (KDU-CSL) Employment-Solidarity', written under the direction or Pavel Mertlík and Jan 9%, and the Freedom Union (US) 8.6%. The extreme right-wing Republicans Mládek. The paper prioritizes restarting growth, restructuring enterprises, priv- (SPR-RSC) garnered 3.9% orthe vote and the neo-communist pensioners (DZJ) 3.1%, atizing banks, and rerorming the public administration. thus railing to clear the 5% threshold. 51 'Czech Republic: Toward EU Accession', World Bank Country Study (Sept. 1999); 47 ln 1999, Ramiro Cibrian, the Head or the Delegation or the European Com- and 'Belly up? A Survey or the Czech Republic', Business Central Europe (Dec. . mission in Prague, expressed the EU's misgivings about the possible change in 1999/Jan. 2000), 45-56. electoral law and about the lack or political will ror more salutary projects. 52 The CSSD's proposal to pass accession-related legislation by decree was 'Velvyslanec EU: Ceští politici delají pro vstup do unie málo', Lidové Noviny (4 rejected by parliament in May 1999. On EU preparations, Václav Bartuška, June 1999), 2. 'S návratem do Evropy jsou potíže', Mladá Fronta Dnes (26 July 1999), 1; and 48 For this argument, Milada Anna Vachudová, 'Matoucí retorika ceského euro- Katarina Šafan'ková, 'EU zatim s Cechy pocita, otázkou je, jak dlouho', Lidové Noviny skpeticismu', Lidové Noviny (19 Oct. 1999), 11. (3 Sept. 1999), 2.
---- 348 Milada Anna Vachudová - The Czech Republic 349 upshot was the negative 'Regular Report of October 1999 which noted that little progress had been made and ranked the Czech The Road to NATO Membership Republic well behind Hungary, Estonia, and Poland. The Report criticized the slow pace of legislative alignment and economic Czech foreign policy guided by Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec from reform across the board. Bank privatization and an overhaul of 1992 to 1997 treated NATO membership as indispensable to the the judiciary were among the bright spots. Meanwhile, on many security of the Czech Republic and worked consistently to obtain issues, Zeman and Klaus were sounding more and more alike. There it. NATO succeeded in shaping the refor~ of the Czech military was a risk that the CSSD would assume the anti-EU rhetoric of and the Czech Republic's entire (shallow) conception of its own the ODS: Mimicking its partner's disapprobation of the EU could security. Czech political parties, however, failed to treat member- provide an easy way to avoid the work and the compromise neces- ship in NATO as a matter of state interest: legislation required for sary to prepare for accession. accession became embroiled in various domestic political fights, and The opposition agreement led to rising political dissatisfaction. was not accorded the political weight that it deserved. This was Preference s for the Freedom Union rose sharply, but so did those a symptom of a broader disregard for reformulating the security of the Czech Republic's entirely unrepentant Communist Party of concept of the state, stemming in part from the absence of per- Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM).53Intellectuals and centrist politicians ceived threats. By nature, NATO required much les s 'pre-emptive' expressed concern at the political stagnation and the slow prepara- integration than the EU and for this reason posed less of a problem tions for EU membership. These became the central themes of for the Czech political class and the Czech state. Even so, Czech the civic initiative 'Impuls 99', founded in August 1999. On the tenth politicians showed that they would succumb to the requirements anniversary of the Velvet Revolution, former student leaders called of NATO membership only at the eleventh hour. on existing party chairmen to end their choke hold on Czech pol- The drive for NATO membership enjoyed the support of only itics; their petition 'Thank you, now go' resonated strongly with a slim majority of Czechs.56 ln the Klaus-dominated period of the electorate. Czech politics, few politicians exerted themselves to explain to The divisive politics of 1997, 1998, and 1999 made productive the public the benefits and responsibilities of NATO membership, cooperation difficult to imagine.54 By the beginning of 2000, how- or to underscore that NATO could prevent the security failures which ever, the CSSD was working hard to prepare necessary legislation had twice in this century spelled the end of Czechoslovak demo- (as part of a celebrated 'legislative tornado') while a subdued ODS cracy. Klaus viewed NATO membership as a matter of prestige, was helping to get the legislation through parliament. Two mess- and gave little thought to the Czech Republic's security environment ages seemed to be getting through: the Czech Republic would be or to its future role in NATO.57 ln private, he reportedly opposed better off if it joined the EU in the first wave and, barring an accel- NATO membership and favoured deep cuts in the defence budget. eration of reform, it would likely be excluded from it.55As far as ln public, he questioned NATO policies, for example in Bosnia, the EU was concerned, how the Czech Republic measured up in and exhibited his trademark overconfidence in the Czech Republic's the Regular Reports of 2000 and 2001 would decide the matter. qualifications for membership. Taking a broader view, Havel explained that the Czech Republic belonged to West European 53 For a comparison with its rerormed neighbours, Mitchell Orenstein, 'A civilization and should take part in its defence. Genealogy or Communist Successor Parties in East-Central Europe', East Euro- The absence of a pro-NATO campaign created political space for pean Politics and Society, 12: 3 (Fall1998), 472-99. the Communists and the extreme-right Republicans to paint NATO 54 On Czech political culture and parties, Jirí Pehe, 'Ceským politickym stranám chybí vize', Lidové Noviny (31 Mar. 1998),8; 'Krize a záludnosti virtuální as the tool of (respectively) Ameri:an and German imperialists. politiky', Lidové Noviny (10 Apr. 1998), 10; and 'Nesnesitelná lehkost ceské politiky', Mladá Fronta Dnes (18 Oct. 1999),6. 56 Opinion polls in 1996 and 1997 showed that as rew as one-third or Czechs 55 On EU costs and benefits, Susan Senior Nello and Karen Smith, The Euro- supported NATO membership, while one-third were against and one-third did not pean Union and Central and Eastern Europe: The lmplications or Enlargement in know. By eariy 1998, those in ravour had increased to 54%, while 24% were against Stages (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998); and Petr Kolár, 'Dopady evropské integrace and 22% did not know. Lidové Noviny (12 Feb. 1998), 2. na Ceskou republiku', Study prepared ror a meeting or the Lípa group, Brno 57 Jirí Šedivý, Director or the Institute or International Relations, interview in (Apr. 1999). Prague, June 1998.
I ~ 350 Milada Anna Vachudová The Czech Republic 351 Only strong pressure from the Czech RepubHc's future allies in however, proved quite a challenge. Without Poland and Hungary in late 1997 finally compelled the government to concentrate on bol- the mix, Czech indifference to NATO might well have cooled NATO's stering popular support for NATO membership.58 ln this sense, interest in expansion. an outside actor forced the government into a dialogue with its The Social Democratic Party (CSSD) never took a strong stand own people on an issue of unusual importance. Western pressure in favour of NATO; instead of convincing its 'conservative' left-wing included direct reprimands from American secretary of state electorate of NATO's advantages, it preferred a vague, shifting Madeleine A1bright, who no doubt wondered why she was battling approach to membership. This amounted to supporting NATO AmericanCzechs. critics of enlargement so fiercely on behalf of the torpid membership as a matter of foreign policy, but sporadically cater- ing to anti-NATO voters on the domestic poHtical scene. A1though A1bright laid down three requirements for prospective members: only one-half of the Social Democrat electorate supported Czech the adoption of a new strategie concept, the improvement of milit- membership, Zeman had made no attempt over the previous five ary interoperabiHty, and the acceptance of a 'new responsibility' years to persuade the other half. Playing to Czech parochial sen- for European security. The Czech 'National Strategy Concept', in timents in view of the upcoming elections, the Social Democrats the making for five years, was only finished in 1998.59As for inter- insisted on a referendum and voted in early 1998 to defer the par- operability, it became clear in 1997 that the greatest hurdle for the Haments ratification of NATO accession.61 The Social Democrats Czech military would be knowledge of EngHsh and that NATO also voted to delay a law on the protection of sensitive information. grant s for language training had been squandered. The Czechs They feared that pro-NATO votes in parliament before the June struggled to find EngHsh-speaking military officers and civilians to 1998 elections would cause their anti-NATO electorate to vote for serve in various functions at NATO. Prospective members were also Republicans or Communists.62 ln the end, however, they backed to be judged by their participation in joint projects and the level down from their referendum demands, and the US Senate and oftheir defence spending (to reach 2 per cent ofGDP). The Czechs the Czech parliament ratified the NATO accession treaty before the were widely praised for the conduct of their troops serving in elections. IFOR/SFOR, and for participating actively in Partnership for Peace (PfP). However, unlike most PfP members, the Czechs did not cre- The Kosovo crisis ate a joint unit with another PfP state, despite an abiding interest on the part of the Poles.60Defence spending did increase, rising to When NATO launched airstrikes against the Federal Republic of 1.7 per cent of GDP in 1997. Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999, the government, political parties, A10ng with Poland and Hungary, the Czech Republic was invited and public of the Czech Republic emanated substantially less sup- to begin negotiations on joining NATO in July 1997. By the time port for the alliance than those of Poland or Hungary. The lack of the Tosovsky government took office in December 1997, it was evid- political consensus on NATO was vividly displayed, and the CSSD ent that Czech membership depended on the US Senate, which would again seemed intent on following public opinion rather than shap- be influenced only indirectly by the progress of reforms in the ing it. Czech politicians were unable to formulate the interests of Czech military. The Tosovsky government nevertheless made the the Czech state with respect to the Yugoslav conflict, or the respons- requirements of NATO membership a priority, and managed to ibilities of the Czech government with regard to its new allies.63 A push the treaty of accession through the Czech parHament. This, hostile political reaction was not warranted by any immediate threats
58 Officialsemphasizedthat the CzechRepublicwillreceivemorefromthe NATO 61 A Czech referendum on NATO virtually precluded ratification before the induc- budget than it wilI contribute (an estimated $18.3 million/year), and that no nuclear tion ceremonies planned for March 1999, as the Czech Constitution would have weapons or foreign troops wilI be stationed on Czech soil. had to first be amended to include provisions for a referendum. 59 Martin Kontra and Jaroslav Špurný, 'Tretí pokus sejmenuje NATO:Ospalost 62 Until it was passed, Czechrepresentatives at NATO(unlike their Polish and hlavní prekázkou na ceste k diplomatickému úspechu stolett, Respekt, 9: 9 (9 Mar. 1998), 9-11. Hungarian counterparts) waited in the halIway during negotiations pertaining to classified information. 12-19.60 Zdenek Brousil, 'Príprava na vstup do Aliance', Vojenské Rozhledy, 6: 4(997), 63 Ivan Gabal, 'Ceský politicise k utoku NATOnehlást, LidovéNoviny (26Mar. 1999), 1. 352 Milada Anna Vachudová The Czech Republic 353 to the security or the Czech Republic, such as stray missiles or waves the Christian Democrats also strongly criticized the CSSD and or refugees, nor by the expectation or high economic costs. The Zeman the ODS, observing that the Czech Republic was proving to be government did support the alliance in deeds, ir not in words. an unreliable new ally. Other NATO members remarked upon the It met all of its formal obligations including the provision of air- disunity in Prague and the scant solidarity proffered by their space, airfields, roads, and rail facilities for the transit of NATO new ally. But since the Czech Republic was far removed from the military forces. Foreign Minister Jan Kavan consistently presented conflict, its disposition was largely irrelevant for the prosecution a pro-NATO foreign policy on behalf of the government (aIthough of the war. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs co-authored a peace initiative with its Greek counterpart which was met with displeasure in other NATO capitals). Racism and tke Roma But the Kosovo crisis revealed deep divisions within the Social Democratic Party itself, and belied previous claims that the party Much of the criticism of the Czech Republic by international unambiguously supports Czech membership in NATO. 'lb start things institutions and Western governments has been directed at the treat- off, Prime Minister Zeman lied to the Czech public, denying that ment of the Roma minority. The tragedies of history and the the government had assented to the airstrikes which he charac- split of Czechoslovakia left the Czech Republic with fewer national terized as the work of primitive troglodytes. Some weeks later, problems than most ofits post-communist neighbours. No substantial Vice-Prime Minister Egon Lánsky declared that Milosevic's ethnic populations of ethnic Czechs live beyond the borders, and the Czechs cleansing of Kosovo was morally justified because of the NATO share their state with only one significant minority, the Roma. But bombing.64A few CSSD deputies, claiming traditionally strong ties the Roma-who number up to 300,000-have suffered widespread between Serbs and Czechs, set sail to Belgrade to express their sup- discrimination and occasional violence. port for Miloševié. While the CSSD stood divided and irresolute, Anti-Roma and anti-German sentiments have been the province the ODS stood united-in its condemnation of NATO. For the ofthe extreme right-wing Republican Party ofMiroslav Sládek. The whole of the 1990s, Klaus had taken an unusually amicable stand party's platform called for the assimilation of ethnic minorities toward the Yugoslav regime of Slobodan Miloševié.65ln March 1999 and resistance to an alleged German economic takeover.68 The he defended Miloševié, for example by proclaiming that the air- Germans, who numbered some 3 million before they were expelled strikes had caused the ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo.66 after the Second World War, still evoke hatred and fear at the The Czech public could only be confused and unconvinced by incon- prospect of their return. Support for the Republican Party rose from sistent and telescopic political pronouncements on the Yugoslav 6 per cent in the 1992 elections to 8 per cent in the 1996 elections. crisis. Support for the strikes stood at 34 per cent (with 48 per cent While Czech politicallife was sullied by Sládek's public ranting and against) in April, while support for the Czech Republic's accession parliament was constantly disrupted by his party's obstructionist to NATO had declined to 49 per cent by early March. Havel warned behaviour, the Republicans played a negligible direct role in national that 'Czech politicians who publicly condemn NATO's military politics. The Republicans received only 3.9 per cent of the vote in intervention are responsible for the creation and the support of the June 1998 elections and failed to enter parliament. isolationist and, from the long-term perspective, very dangerous The Czech state has generally chosen not to prosecute the Re- moods in society.'67 The Czech media, the Freedom Union and publicans, for example, for publisJring the magazine Republika which promotes anti-Semitism, racial intolerance, and xenophobia. At a
64 Martin Schmarcz, 'Lánský; vina NATO', Lidové Noviny (6 Apr. 1999), 10. demonstration against the Czech-German declaration in January Dnes65 Vilaim(30 Mar.Buchert,1999), 'Klaus12. selhává v zahranicní politice dlouho', Mladá Fronta 1997, Sládek observed that 'we can only regret that during the war
66 Ondrej Drábek, 'Za odsun Albáncu muze NATO', Lidové Noviny (8 Apr. 1999), (301; andMar.Václav1999),Klaus,II. 'Kosovo; nevytvarejme nové falešné myty', Lidové Noviny 66 Sladek's was the only party whose platform called for the return of Trans- carpathian Ruthenia, annexed by the Soviet Union in 1945, though in December 1999),67 'Názory2. na úder dále štepí politickou scénu', Mladá Fronta Dnes (27 Mar. 1991, KDU-CSL leader JosefLux briefly called for its return as well. Petr Janyska, 'Zacátek nové éry', Respekt, 2; 51 (23 Dec. 1991), 2. 354 Milada Anna Vachudouá The Czech Republic 355
we killed so rew Gennans'. Sládek was then charged with inciting Citizenship racial hatred, but acquitted in January 1998. The courts railed to convict Republicans or inciting racial hatred on many other occa- ln 1993 and 1994, the Klaus government was indifferent to the plight sions as wel1.69For example, on 25 July 1996, Sládek stated in of the Roma, and resisted Western pressure for improvement.70 It parliament that 'the Gypsies should be penally responsible rrom initiated few programmes to promote interethnic understanding, birth because that is practically their biggest crime'. In June 1998 and was unwilling to collaborate with non-governmental organiza- the Republicans called for the end of 'the rampage of black racists' tions that seek to help the Roma community. Calling it a redund- as part of a vitriolic anti-Roma election campaign. Although the ancy, Klaus fiercely resisted international pressure to create an Republicans are no longer represented in parliament, echoes of their ombudsman (such as the Parliamentary Commissioner for National sentiments are shared by enough Czechs to make the treatment and Ethnic Minority Rights in Hungary). The need for such a figure of Roma the greatest challenge for the consolidation of Czech in the Czech government was evident as ministries were unable democracy. to cooperate, and episodic outcries against racism died down leav- The social, economic, and educational position of the Roma in ing no one in charge of a comprehensive policy. These problems were Czech society has declined steadily since 1990. In some areas, the manifest as the Czech Citizenship Law came into effect. unemployment rate for Roma is over 80 per cent. While in 1970 By design, the Citizenship Law of January 1993 denied cit- only 20 per cent of the children in 'special schools' were Roma, izenship to as many as 100,000 'Czechoslovak' Roma.71 The law the figure in 1997 was 60 per cent. As their daily lives have required 'Slovak' applicants to prove that they had a clean crim- worsened, Roma have found themselves confronting ever more inal record over the previous five years and were resident in the racism. While Sládek's party and skinheads have been its most Czech Republic for two years. Many Roma resident in the Czech visible and brutal face, racism has become widespread among Republic at the time of the split were consequently left without ordinary citizens and also among 'moderate' politicians of the left citizenship. Some Roma were deported, while others were given train and right, especially at the locallevel. Up to 90 per cent of Czech tickets to Slovakia by local authorities and pressured to leave. Most respondent s have said that they would not want to have aRoma stayed in the Czech Republic but found the bureaucratic obstacles as a neighbour. For their part, the government, the police, and the to obtaining citizenship insunnountable.72 Consequently, several courts have failed to make a stand against the rise of racially international institutions began helping Roma to obtain Czech motivated crime. citizenship. To the extent that discrimination and violent attacks have led The citizenship law was criticized by international organizations significant numbers of Czech Roma to flee their country, it is and Western governments, including the United Nations High clear that this community has been far from feeling itself to be a Commission on Refugees, the OSCE, the US State Department, part of the democratic state. That the isolation of Roma was partly the US Congress, the International Helsinki Foundation, Amnesty self-imposed is beyond question: but the issue at hand is whether International, Human Rights Watch, and the Council or Europe. the Czech Republic's largest national minority has formed a Only an April 1996 amendment brought some improvement, allow- part of the political community, and whether international actors ing the Ministry of Interior to waive the five-year clean criminal have extended any influence on its behalf. It is worth recalling that Roma, unlike other national minorities, have no home state 70 Despite being a signatory or international conventions on sareguarding the to defend their interests. When Czech authorities do not protect memory or victims or rascism, the Klaus government ignored international pres- them, they can attempt a move west, or an appeal to international sure to remove a pig rarm rrom the site or a concentration camp where hundreds institutions. or Roma were murdered. The Tošovský government made its removal a priority. 71 Jirina Šiklová and Marta Miklusáková, 'Denying Citizenship to the Czech Roma', East European Constitutional Review, 7: 2 (Spring 1998), 58-63; and 'Human Rights and Democratization in the Czech Republic', Commission on Security and Co- 69 TomášNemecek,'Proc zavreli Sládka', Respekt, 9: 4 (19-25 Jan. 1998),2; and operation in Europe (Sept. 1994), 18-27. Jan Kubita and Vladimír Dubsky, 'Státní orgány pristupují ke stíhání SPR-RSC 72 'Czech Republic Human Rights Practices, 1995', US Department or State velmi kiknave', Lidové Noviny (5 June 1998), 3. (Mar. 1996). 356 Milada Anna Vachudová The Czech Republic 357 record requirement on a case-by-case basis. This amendment was crime.77 For example, the court in Písek refused to rule the brutal a direct result of international pressure and followed on the recom- murder ofthe Rom Tibor Danihel by skinheads as racially motivated: mendation of the Council of Europe. The Czech government held the skinheads clearly understood that the court was sympathetic out for three years because it risked no meaningful sanctions. During to their racist views, and laughed openly at Roma witnesses dur- the 1992-6 period, the EU did not yet have any tools with which ing the tria!. 78 Meanwhile, the Czech Commercial Inspectorate, to to pressure the Czechs.73 NATO and the 1995 Stability Pact were which complaints about discrimination against the Roma in public chiefly concerned with relations among East European states which services, shops, and restaurant s are to be submitted, has usually the Roma, having no protector state, did not aggravate. decided in favour of the perpetrators. Indeed, in 1997 only one restaur- ant owner had ever been prosecuted by the Inspectorate for refus- Violence ing to serve Roma customers. The problem of racist violence was largely ignored by the Czech On the related but distinct problem of the general treatment of government until 1995. At that time, a set of policies designed to the Roma minority, we observe the same pattern: a disturbing counter raci srn was designed and central government politicians problem, government stonewalling between 1992 and 1997, and became more engaged in problems affecting the Romany commun- effective Western pressure. Compared to other European states, the ity. In October 1996, parliament unanimously passed a resolution officially reported incidence of violent, racially motivated attacks denouncing racism and xenophobia in the Czech Republic. One hun- on Roma and dark-skinned foreigners has not been high. From 1990 dred and twenty new positions were created in the police force for to 1997, 1,210 racially motivated attacks were recorded in the specialists in the fight against racism and extremism. As events of Czech lands by the Documentation Center for Human Rights. (ln 1997 were to show, however, these policies and pronouncements did a country where the police have generally been thought indif- not reverse the growing tide of raci srn against the Roma. ferent or sympathetic to such attacks, it is likely that many more have gone unreported.) Of 1,210 attacks, only one-third were officially qualified as racially motivated; and of the nineteen incid- Exodus ents in which people were killed, only two were qualified as racially Mter an August 1997 television documentary portrayed Canada as motivated.74 Only about 10 per cent of attackers ended up in court, a wealthy country free of racism, several hundred Roma families and more then 95 per cent of those convicted received suspended left for Canada. Some local authorities reacted by encouraging Roma sentences.75 to leave the country, and one ODS deputy mayor famously offered Police in the Czech Republic have been accused by human rights them money to buy plane tickets on the condition that they abandon organizations and Roma leaders of doing little to investigate even their tenancy rights. Between January and August 1997, Canada violent crimes against the Roma, and judges have usually refused had granted refugee status to 22 Roma from the Czech Republic. to rule a crime to have been racially motivated even when it was Over 1,200 applied before Canada reinstated visa requirements for plainly SO.76Light sentences, sometimes appallingly so, send the Czech citizens in September 1997.79Another wave ofRoma left for message that racially motivated violence is not considered a serious the United Kingdom in October 1997. In January 1998, about 800 Roma were seeking political asylum in the United Kingdom or
73 Technicallyit could have suspended the Europe Agreement, which contained a clause on the protection or minority rights. Had the law not been amended by 1997, it could have invoked the Copenhagen requirements to keep the Czech Republic 77 'Roma and Sinti, Czech Republic: Report to the OSCE Implementation Meet- out or the first wave. ing on Human Dimension Issues' (Warsaw, 1997), International Helsinki Federation 74 MiroslavKoreckyand Renata Kalenská,'Bojs rasismem skoncilu slibu',Lidové ror Human Rights; and 'Czech Republic Human Rights Practices, 1998', US Noviny, 28 (Jan. 1998), 5. Department or State (Feb. 1999). 75 Vladimír Dusánek, 'Rasové násilí,' Mladá Fronta Dnes (10 Feb. 1998),4. 78 Václav Trojan, 'Rasismus má u nás hluboké koreny', Lidové Noviny (19 Feb. 76 Only five people were convicted in the Czech lands ror racially motivated 1998), 10. crimes in 1991; this number had risen to 146 in 1997. Mladá Fronta Dnes (10 Feb. 1998), 4. 79 'Czech Republic Human Rights Practices, 1997', US Department or State (Jan. 1998).
1 358 Milada Anna Vachudová The Czech Republic 359 France.8o About ten Roma families had been granted asylum since condemned it. Romano Prodi, European Commission President, 1990 in the United Kingdom. However, between October 1997 and declared 'Europe will never accept new walls separating European January 1998, the British authorities had returned 563 Czech and citizens from one another.'83 For Czech Roma, the wall symbolized Slovak Roma to their countries. StilI, after the brutal murder of a the discrimination which compelled them to emigrate to the West. young Romany woman in the Czech Republic in February 1998, a ln late November 1999, the Zeman government finally persuaded Roma family which left in the October 1997 exodus was granted the stubborn local authorities to remove the wall, in exchange for asylum by the British courts.81 The murder reportedly moved state subsidies. Canadian courts to grant asylum to several Roma from the Czech Republic as welL Meanwhile, reports of state-tolerated racist viol- EU pressure ence in the Czech Republic caused concern in the US Senate in the run-up to the vote on NATO expansion. Before the exodus of Roma to the West, the Commission had ln the face or this international embarrassment, many Czech already criticized the treatment of the Roma minority in its July politicians maintained that the Roma were economic migrants, not 1997 'Opinion'. The Commission placed significant emphasis on the refugees fleeing from racism. The Klaus government did in its integration of Roma into Czech society as a condition for membership. waning days emphasize its willingness to work to improve the It has been at something of a disadvantage in this policy area: since situation of the Roma, and held talks with Roma leaders. In the EU member states have not harmonized their minority pol- September 1997, it agreed to create a new commission for Romany icies, the treatment of ethnic minorities is not among the thirty- affairs to advise the government but also rejected as too critical one chapters of the acquis. Nevertheless, the Copenhagen criteria the assessments of a report written on the treatment of the Roma include the protection of ethnic minorities, and the EU can insist by one of its own ministers. The parliament ratified the Council of that the treatment of the Roma meet its expectations as a require- Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National ment for accession. Minorities in December 1997, but the Czech Republic has much The Accession Partnership states that further work must be work to do before the spirit of this convention wilI enter the gov- done to integrate the Roma into Czech society before accession, and ernment or society. To begin, the government wilI have to report PHARE money has been allocated for this purpose.84 Among the to the Council of Europe what anti-discrimination measures have priorities are the fight against racism in the police force and the been taken by state organs: in 1997, state organs took no such judiciary, and the creation of a new education policy for Roma measures.82 Meanwhile, the Roma exodus and raci st violence have children. In response, the Tosovsky and Zeman governments have occasioned only the beginning of a long overdue public discussion devoted considerable attention to these problems. For assessments on racism in Czech society. of the Roma situation, the Commission has relied on the OSCE High The Czech Republic's reputation was not helped by prominent Commissioner on National Minorities, the Council of Europe, and reports in the Western press beginning in May 1998 that new ghet- other expert institutions, whose importance have thereby been toes would be built in the Czech Republic: the ODS mayors of two amplified.85 The Roma have already proven that they can migrate I Czech towns planned walls around 'noisy' apartment complexes I inhabited by Roma. Despite va st amounts of international media 83 Robert Anderson, 'Romany wall demolished, Financial Times (25 Nov. 1999), 3. attention and worldwide condemnation, the city council ofUstí nad 1 R4 'Czech Republic:AccessionPartnership', European Commission(Mar. 1998), I Labem constructed its wall by the cover of night in October 1999. 3. For EU leverage to take on its rull potential rorce, Czech officials must be able The Czech parliament, president, and political class helplessly to imagine that negotiations on all 31 chapters or the acquis are complete, but Czech accession to the EU is blocked by inadequate efforts to integrate the Roma 80 'V Evrope prý žádá azyl osm set Romu',Lidové Noviny (28 Jan. 1998),5. into Czech society. 81 'Britský soud uznal, ze tri Romové byli v Cechách diskriminováni' and 'Po 85 European human rights groups advised the EU to require candidates to Kanade získali Romové z Ceské republiky azyl rovnež ve Velké Británii', Lidové improve their treatment or the Roma minority. European Parliament Member Noviny (28 Feb. 1998), 1-2. Graham Watson asked the Commission in February 1998 to put particular pres- 82 Martin Palouš, 'Základní cíle ceské zahranicní politiky a lidská práva', sure on the Czech government. 'Zahranicní odborníci kritizují vztah ceských Mezinárodní Politika, 12: 1 (Jan. 1998),9. úradu k Romum', Lidové Noviny (24 Feb. 1998),3. 360 Milada Anna Vachudová The Czech Republic 361 II in large numbers, which will make their treatment a particular1y and he secured a striking degree of domestic political freedom to U sensitive issue for EU members. As the Czech Republic nears EU carry it out. membership, humanitarian and self-interested advocacy of the During this second stage, Western influence on the independent
Roma cause in Western Europe will increase. Czech Republic was delimited by two factors. First, the Czech III governments' liberal democratic project impressed Western II observers, particular1y in comparison to the neo-communist and Conclusions nationalist projects undertaken by governing elites elsewhere in post-communist Europe. For years the Czech transformation was The character of the influence of international factors on the con- considered a great success, without most Westerners (or Czechs) solidation of Czech democracy changed with time, as the Czech looking too closely at the details. Klaus managed to convince the III polity passed through the four stages set out in the introduction. West (and the Czech public) that the Czech political and economic II International influence was most profound during the first stage transition was all but complete. (1989-92), but also most diffuse: the democratic and prosperous Second, the institutions which stood to exercise the greatest 'West-a vague but hegemonic idea-provided the model and the leverage on the policy choices of Czech governments-NATO and goal of reform after the revolutions of 1989. In the Czech lands, as especially the EU-only gradually developed the tools necessary to in Poland and Hungary, the Western model was so deeply inter- compel reform in those areas where the Czech project was even- nalized as to become a truly domestic factor. The liberal democratic tually revealed to have fundamental flaws. Unti11997, international choice of these polities after 1989 thus had little to do with the imme- pressure only forced change in one clear case: the 1993 Citizenship diate influence of outside actors.86 Law. This of course speaks to the weakness of international influ- The 'West, caught unawares by the fall of communism, offered ence and to the attitude of the Czech government, but also to the spiritual support and mode st economic assistance. However, the fact that, for all of its faults, the Czech Republic was not much of governments of Czechoslovakia, along with those of Poland and a miscreant in comparison to other post-communist states. Hungary, sought to establish the West as the clear destination of All of that, however, began to change in 1997. As the Commis- their liberal democratic projects by making membership in the EU sion studied Czech reform more closely in preparing its Opinion (and later NATO) an overarching goal of state policy, and the on the Czech application for EU membership, it found serious prob- anticipated domestic requirements of membership the guidelines lems, some of which were reflected in the economic downturn and of reformo They were disappointed but resolute when the EU and the corruption scandals of 1997. Meanwhile, the exodus of Czech NATO refused for years to commit to eastern enlargement. Once Roma alerted the West (and some Czechs) that raci srn posed a grave these institutions decided to enlarge, the conditionality of acces- problem. The illusion of Czech superiority was dispelled, and the sion gave the West increasing influence over the details of reformo Klaus government was toppled in November 1997. The end of ln the second stage (1992-7), the Klaus governments' ability the Klaus era coincided with the EU's direct engagement in the to pursue a westward orientation while rejecting policies recom- details of Czech reformo By identifying its shortcomings and offer- mended by the West necessarily limited the direct influence of ing the incentive of EU membership, the EU steered subsequent Western actors. While the Civic Forum governments of 1990-2 Czech governments toward resolving the deficiencies of the Czech engaged in a dialogue with the West about the course of domestic reform process. The third stage of international influence on the reform, the ODS-led governments wanted the transformation pro- Czech polity was brief: the six months of the interim Tosovsky ject to be 'homemade'. Klaus had his own strategy-a mix of Czech government which held power until the ear1y elections of June 1998. provincialism, free market ideology, and political pragmatism-for The Tosovsky government took the conditionality inherent in the bringing the Czech Republic into the prosperous, democratic fold, EU accession process more seriously, and addressed mounting international criticism of economic reform, the state administra- tion, and the treatment of the Roma minority. 86 Milada Anna Vachudová and Timothy Snyder, 'Are Transitions Transitory? Two Models of Political Change in East Central Europe Since 1989', East Euro- The fourth stage of international influence on the consolida- pean Politics and Societies, 11: 1 (Winter 1997), 1-35. tion of Czech democracy began when the Social Democratic Party 362 Milada Anna Vachudová formed a minority government in July 1998. The Zeman govern- ment was tasked with difficult economic reforms which drove ...... up unemployment and prices. By repeating for years that radical 13 reform was complete, Klaus ensured that this suffering seemed ...... senseless to Czech society and undermined the effectiveness of EU membership as an argument for difficult reformo In 1998 and 1999, the disunity and ineptitude of Zeman's CSSD combiIíed with the obstructionism and anti-EU populism of Klaus's ODS put in ques- Slovakia: Misreading the tion the ability of the Czech Republic to tend to the requirements VVestern Message of EU membership. The Czech case shows that the conditionality of the EU depends II on a certain tension between confidence in securing membership and fear of suffering rejection due to inadequate reformo The Ivo Samson small, highly industrialized, relatively rich Czech Republic began the 1990s with rather less work to do to prepare for EU member- This chapter shows the failure of Western pressure aimed at ship than many of its post-communist neighbours. It could there- improving the democratic record of successive Slovak governments fore suffer a variety of mistakes and delays in its reform process led by the former prime minister, Vladimír Meciar, until 1998. A without compromising its place among the first group of post- new, proud, and insecure state tried to assert and manifest its inde- communist states to join the EU. Indeed, its political and economic pendence from foreign actors. Unlike in Poland, Hungary, and the misadventures can be attributed in part to its comfortable position. Czech Republic Western pressure was often considered as being alien Eventually, however, the scarcity of reform made the threat of exclu- to Slovak culture and in conflict with Slovak national interest. But sion from the EU's first wave a credible one. In the eleventh hour, the Meciar government also misread the Western determination to this threat seemed to be galvanizing the government and opposi- bring about democratic reforms in Slovakia. It wrongly believed that tion into action. regardless of its many democratic flaws Slovakia would soon become a member ofthe European Union and NATO, simply because ofits unique geostrategic importance and decent economic performance. It apparently believed that allowing free and relatively fair elections in Slovakia would be enough to satisfYWestern actors. But the United States' and Western European countries also expected Slovakia to fully respect the right of ethnic minorities, liberalize the media, restrict the powers of secret services, and strictly observe constitu- tional provisions. In other words, the mere establishment of an elect- oral type of democracy could not be sufficient, and the West wanted Slovákia to embrace a Western-type of liberal constitutionalism before considering its possible membership in the EU and NATO. ln its 1997 Opinion on the Slovak application to the EU the Euro- pean Commission concluded that 'although the institutional frame- work defined by the Slovak constitution responds to the needs of a parliamentary democracy where elections are free and fair, never- theless the situation is unsatisfactory, both in terms of the insti- tutions and the extent to which they are rooted in politicallife'.l
1 EC Commission, 'Commission Opinion on Slovakia's Application for Member- ship of the European Union', Bulletin af the Eurapean Unian, suppl. 9 (1997).