324 Antoni Kaminski external demands that decisive measures must be ~=:L.k::.en, no gov- ernment has done much to remedy this situation.14 ............................................................ Whatever the role of particular interests in the P«=:»-:Iii.s;h eeonomic 12 policy process, the professional integrity of the econo~s-ts in eharge ............................................................ of budgetary and financial policie s has been high ea:::8L<:>l.:1ghto keep these out of the realm of partisan quarrels. This haa.==- been an im- portant factor in Poland's relative economic success. :==i:anilarly, the existence of a group of professionals with a strong icI~c>.ogical eom- The Czech Republic: The Unexpected mitment to self-government, and the support this fou:r=:aacI ~mong loeal Force OrInstitutional Constraints and regional elites, were decisive factors in stimul8L~::::i=J:.g the drive i~ toward the reform of the Polish state. The Europea-=--- Commission has supported this reform, by making it a condition:L "<ar aceession and by providing funds. International factors have oIII~ 8Contributed Milada Anna Vachudová to making this reform feasible. By far the most important factor has been the relSL"8::;iiwe openness The Czech Republic provides an interesting study in the way that of Poland to Western influence since 1956. Poles trBiL~.e::Jled abroad international institutions may shape democratic consolidation more than any other nation within the communist CBiL-=r1]IJ, and were and economic reform in states that wish to join them. In Eastern able to acquire knowledge, albeit limited, of how tD=:.~ West oper- Europe, since 1989, the prospect of membership in the European ated. Polish scholars and students studied at Wes~"'Il academic Union (EU) and in the North Atlantie Treaty organization (NATO) institutions. Millions of émigrés in the West mainta1--=-Ec:l close con- has provided a strong incentive to build liberal democratic states. tacts with their families in Poland. Polish society was ~l...atively well Governments will implement difficult domestic reforms and modify prepared for the ehange of regime. The fact that <:II.e:spite these their foreign policies in order to obtain the political, economic, and propitious circumstances this ta sk proved difficult ~:g-:hlights the security benefits of membership. Yet for this dynamic to work, can- complex nature of democratic transition under p<»==-t-communist didates must consider membership to be a realistic goal. They must conditions. believe that these institutions will expand, and that they can fulfil the requirements of membership. They must also believe that they 14 The Buzekgovernmentpromisedto take some steps in this dir, Lion. Theresults are unprepared as yet for membership, that work remains to be remain to be seen. Antoni Z. Kamióski, 'Corruption under the ~&>st-Communist done.1 The Czech case demonstrates how this process depends on Transformation: The Case of Poland', Polish Sociological Revie~ 2: 118 (1997). a certain tension between confidence in securing membership and fear of suffering rejection due to inadequate reformo An overabund- ance of assurance on the part of the Czech governments of Prime Minister Václav Klaus undermined the execution of comprehensive My thanks to Dagmar Ašerová, Matthew Evangelista, Rick Fawn, Timothy Garton Ash, Jirí Pehe, Alex Pravda, Matthew Rhodes, Marek Škréta, Timothy Snyder, Jonathan Stein, Stephen Whitefield, and Kieran Williams for comments on an earlier draft. This chapter also benefited from conversations with officials of the European Commission and of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including Jirí Havlík, Petr Lunák, Martin Palouš, and Pavel Telicka. The research was funded by a NATO-National Science Foundation postdoctoral fellowship, and supported by the Prague centre of the East-West Institute. 1 This argument draws on Milada Anna Vachudová, Revolution, Democracy and lntegration: East Central and South Eastern Europe since 1989 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming), úL-I ;j:l6 Maada Anna Vachudova '.1'ne Gzec:n .Ht:jJUUH(; domestic rerorms and the design orrational roreign policy. The Com- a model and as a goal remained during this stage, but was neces- mission's 1997 'Opinion' on the Czech Republic's application alIuded sarily weakened by claims that the Czech Republic had already to this attitude in a single laconic sentence: 'Confident or its pro- become part or the West. Indeed, Klaus's Czech Republic became gress towards meeting the obligations or EU membership, the Czech so convinced or its virtues as the most advanced post-communist Republic has at times shown reluctance to acknowledge difficulties state with the most successful economy in Europe that basic reforms and seek a colIaborative approach to resolving them.'2 remained unfinished. The influence or international factors on the consolidation of Czech The conditions necessary for direct international infiuence on democracy since 1989 can be divided into four stages, correspond- the policy choices of the Czech government did not emerge until ing roughly to the changes of government. In the first, from 1989 the end of this second stage. For much of the 1990s, the criticisms to 1992, the Czechoslovak government was led by former dissidents and diplomatic initiatives ofWestern governments and international who sought to create a Western liberal democracy and return institutions were aimed at those post-communist governments who Czechoslovakia to Europe. The infiuence of the West, as a model violated democratic standards and whose use of ethnic nationalism and as a goal for the Czech political and economic transformation, threatened the rights of ethnic minorities and peaceful relations with was profound. Securing membership in the EU and NATO became neighbouring states. This was not the case in the Czech Republic. fundamental goals, and the perceived requirements ofmembership Nor was the Czech Republic, with its low levels ofdebt and good macro- shaped policy in the new state. This occurred welI before either the economic indicators, under pressure from the International Monetary EU or NATO had committed to eastern enlargement, much less set Fund (lMF) or the World Bank. Nevertheless, international cen- down specific requirements for membership. To the extent that the sure did eventualIy force the Czech government to change a 1993 West did set down explicit conditions, for example on the treatment citizenship law which, by design, disadvantaged Roma applicants. of ethnic minorities by the Council of Europe (COE) or on the Over the course of the second stage, the EU gradualIy developed liberalization of trade by the EU, these coincided with the liberal the tools to identify the problems plaguing democratic consolidation democratic agenda of the Czechoslovak government. Meanwhile.. in the Czech Republic. Mter taking the necessary step of commit- the speeches of Czechoslovak President Václav Havel during this ting itself to eastern enlargement in 1992, the EU's expectations period helped crystallize Western Europe's vague plans to integrate of the aspiring candidates became more concrete. It set out the gen- the post-communist east. eral political and economic requirements of membership in 1993, ln the second stage, which will be the chief concern of this chap- and the extensive regulatory requirements of the internal market ter, the centre-right coalition of Prime Minister Václav Klaus in 1995. In view of approaching negotiations, the European Com- governed the Czech Republic from June 1992 until November 1997. mission examined Czech political and economic reform to write its Although the independent Czech Republic perceived itself, and was Opinion on the Czech Republic's application, published in July 1997. generally perceived by others, as among the most pro-Western states This scrutiny revealed the reforms which had been neglected or in Eastern Europe, the reform project was surprisingly insulated unsuccessful, notably enterprise restructuring, bank privatization, from international infiuences. Klaus had his own strategy-a and public administration reformo personal mix of free market ideology and political pragmatism- As the Commission's Opinion was being written and the start of for creating a 'Western' state, fit for membership in the EU and negotiations drew near, economic downturn and political instabil- NATO. From 1993, Klaus and other Czech officials asserted that ity in the Czech Republic announced the third stage in summer the transition was complete, and that the damage to society under 1997. Mter the falI of the Klaus government in November 1997, communism had been reversed. Unti11997, supported by impress- an interim government led by Prime Minister Josef Tosovsky held ive macroeconomic indicators, they succeeded in projecting a very power until the early elections of June 1998. By force of necessity positive image of the Czech Republic. The infiuence of the West as but also of its political outlook, this government was more respons- ive to outside advice and more attentive to the conditionality inherent in the EU accession process. 2 'Commission Opinion on the Czech Republic's Application for Membership in the European Union', A. Introduction. Commission documents are all at The greatest international infiuence on the consolidation of europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/. Czech democracy would arise from an abiding desire of the Czech L 328 Milada Anna Vachudová The Czech Republic 329 Republic to gain entry into the EU.